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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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da8a0eac04 |
test(l0): R-STATE-04 gets a real check — bulk storage provably is not the replicated tier
The gate BLOCKED this branch, correctly, and the block was the interesting part.
Attaching the media library selects R-STATE-04 as a touched requirement ("bulk media storage has
a capacity strategy distinct from the replicated tier"), and R-STATE-04 had NO scaffolded test, so
the coverage REQUIRE stage failed both l0 and l1. There were two ways out. One was to keep
avoiding the token — the existing discipline in catalog/plex.yaml and catalog/qbittorrent.yaml,
which say in as many words that naming the requirement would block the merge. That made sense while
the tier was a stub. It does not make sense in the change that DELIVERS the tier: it would mean
shipping the requirement and claiming nothing. So: the check.
WHAT IT ASSERTS, and why each one is a real failure mode rather than a shape
The `bulk` StorageClass sat as `server: REPLACE-ME` for six roadmap phases, and the only thing
keeping a multi-terabyte library off the 3-replica `longhorn` class was four hand-written comments.
That is the class of failure being closed: a bulk volume on the replicated tier does not fail
loudly — Longhorn accepts the PVC and starts replicating 3x of data three mini-PCs cannot hold.
(1) DISTINCTNESS — no bulk PV/PVC on any class the repo declares with the Longhorn provisioner
(derived from platform/longhorn/, so adding a Longhorn class cannot create a blind spot),
and the class is explicitly EMPTY.
(2) CAPACITY STRATEGY as arithmetic — a bulk volume at least an order of magnitude above the
same service's replicated volume. The requirement is about two magnitudes of data; a "bulk"
volume sized like a config PVC means the tier was named, not applied. The 10x floor is
CALIBRATED against the real corpus, not guessed: the media library is ~460x its config
volume and the Nextcloud archive ~13x its 20Gi, so a higher floor would fire on a legitimate
volume and teach the next reader to weaken the check. My first draft used 100x and did
exactly that — the corpus caught it.
(3) PRE-BOUND FROM BOTH ENDS (claimRef + volumeName, agreeing). Guards the most deceptive
failure available in this tier: a dynamic bulk class hands out a FRESH EMPTY directory, the
pod mounts, the PVC Binds, everything is green, and the 8 TiB was never attached.
(4) Retain, always. (5) mountOptions carry `hard` and exactly one nfsvers=4.x, and never `soft`
— a soft mount hands a server hiccup to the app as a short read, which for a media library
is silent corruption; and v4 is what keeps the firewall surface at one port.
(6) ONE EXPORT, AT MOST ONE MOUNT PER WORKLOAD. This is the assertion I most wanted. Splitting
one export into two subPath mounts looks TIGHTER and breaks link() with EXDEV; Sonarr and
Radarr then degrade to copy-then-delete, rewriting every import over NFS and destroying the
seeding copy, surfacing weeks later as "imports are slow and my ratio is gone". No reviewer
sees that in a diff.
(7) READ-ONLY COUPLING — nfs.readOnly, the volumeMount flag and ReadOnlyMany must agree, so
dropping one still leaves the others; and every bulk mode is a `...Many`.
(8) The server is a BARE cluster-vars token, that knob has a base default, and EVERY overlay
supplies it — the seam that lets one authored definition serve two clusters that reach this
host by different addresses.
(9) LOAD-BEARING and NON-VACUOUS. Wired unconditionally into ci/l0.sh as Stage 3e for the same
reason as 3c/3d: Stage 3b scopes to touched requirements, and the path map keys NEITHER
apps/* NOR platform/longhorn/* to this requirement — so the change most likely to break
this could attribute nothing and be gated by nothing. An EMPTY bulk corpus FAILS rather
than passing trivially, and a floor on the assertion count keeps a pass from degenerating.
It reads the COMMITTED apps/ goldens rather than calling the renderer. Asking the renderer would
only prove it agrees with itself; the goldens are what Flux reconciles, and render==golden is
already its own gate stage.
PERTURBED, because a check that has never failed is not evidence. Each of these was applied to the
real tree and each fired with the intended message: bulk PVC moved onto `longhorn`; Retain -> Delete;
`hard` -> `soft`; the token replaced by the literal 192.168.1.9; sonarr's single mount split into
two subPath mounts (assertion 6); and the prod overlay's knob deleted.
Also hardens render.py: `size` is structurally required of a bulk entry (a PV with no capacity is
rejected by the API server) but the JSON Schema only enforces `export`, so omitting it raised a bare
KeyError three frames down. It now raises a sentence naming the service, the volume and the remedy.
Found by the same perturbation pass.
Coverage: 48/51 -> 49/51 (96.1%), 2 gaps, 0 safety-critical.
BASE_REF=main make -C ci gate -> MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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cec550045b |
feat(storage): the bulk tier becomes real — static NFS PVs, authored once per environment
The `bulk` class has existed since Phase 0 as a deliberate stub: the StorageClass named an NFS
CSI driver that is not installed and a server/share of REPLACE-ME, so plex, sonarr, radarr and
qbittorrent all carry a comment saying "attach the library once OQ-2 is resolved". This is that
resolution — for the case that actually exists here, which is NOT the case the stub anticipated.
The stub assumed DYNAMIC provisioning: ask a CSI driver for a bulk volume and get a fresh empty
subdirectory. That is the wrong shape for this platform's bulk data. The media library is 8.33 TiB
that already exists, on ZFS datasets on the Proxmox host, with live non-k3s consumers. Nothing
needs provisioning; existing datasets need ATTACHING. So a bulk storage entry now renders a
STATIC, pre-bound NFS PersistentVolume plus its PVC, and needs no CSI driver at all (the in-tree
NFS volume source is not deprecated and has no CSI migration).
Schema 1.4.0 adds, on a storage entry:
export absolute NFS export path; REQUIRED when class is bulk, FORBIDDEN otherwise (an `if`
in the schema, so a bulk entry cannot be authored without saying what it attaches).
subPath mount a subtree instead of the volume root — any class.
readOnly any class; on bulk it also sets the PV's nfs.readOnly, so the mount really is `ro`.
The SERVER is deliberately NOT a schema field. It is the `${BULK_NFS_SERVER}` cluster-vars knob,
because dev and prod reach the SAME storage host by different addresses and R-ENV-02 says the
service definition is authored once. A ServiceDefinition says WHICH dataset; the overlay says
where the host is.
Three decisions worth the reader's time, argued in full in the r_bulk_pvs docstring:
* PV/PVC, not an inline `nfs:` pod volume. Inline is fewer objects and would work. It cannot
express `persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain`, which is the one property most worth having
in git for 8.33 TiB of data with consumers outside this cluster; it puts read-only enforcement
one Deployment edit away from silent removal; and it is invisible to `kubectl get pv,pvc`,
which is where an operator looks for attached external storage.
* storageClassName: "" on both ends, NOT the `bulk` StorageClass. Explicitly empty is the
canonical marker for a statically provisioned volume. It also sidesteps a trap: a
StorageClass's `provisioner` is IMMUTABLE, so re-pointing the deployed `bulk` stub would make
Flux fail on that object forever.
* Access mode is always `…Many` and follows the read/write posture — ReadOnlyMany for a reader,
ReadWriteMany for a writer. One export is consumed by several namespaces AND several nodes at
once, which is exactly what ReadWriteOnce cannot express; which `Many` it is then makes the
intent legible in `kubectl get pv`.
mountOptions are a platform decision held in the renderer rather than a per-service field:
nfsvers=4.1,hard,noatime,timeo=600,retrans=2. NFSv4 carries mount and lock in-protocol, so the
only port that must be reachable is tcp/2049 — no rpcbind/111, mountd or statd. That is a
firewall decision as much as a storage one. `hard` over `soft` because a soft mount converts a
server hiccup into a short read handed to the application.
The contract doc records the trap that will otherwise be discovered in production: fsGroup is a
NO-OP on an NFS volume (the in-tree plugin does no ownership management), so a writable bulk mount
requires the container's own uid/gid to suit the export's ownership. A mount that succeeds and
then cannot write is this tier's characteristic failure.
Every pre-existing golden renders byte-identical: the new keys are emitted only when declared, and
`readOnly` defaults to False. render-golden: 10/10. selftest: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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e7c4a95c2d |
feat(backup): the four backup credentials become TWO objects each, one per environment
The four backup-credential SOPS Secrets are SHARED BASE manifests: platform/ and apps/ are
rendered by the same Flux tiers on both clusters, and the ONLY per-environment difference in
this repo is cluster-vars substitution (R-ENV-02). So writing the R2 token into all four
(0a6a862) did not "give prod credentials" — it REPLACED DEV'S. Merging that as-is would have
handed dev's Velero and all three dev CNPG Clusters an R2 key id to sign MinIO requests with:
403 on every WAL segment, and archive_mode=on turns that into a disk-full clock on the pgdata
PVC, not a degraded backup. Dev's PROVEN DR restore (R-STATE-03) is the thing that would have
broken.
This commit splits the material. Each credential is now TWO Secret objects, both applied to
BOTH clusters, differing only in name suffix:
dev -> velero-cloud-credentials keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db-backup-credentials
prod -> velero-cloud-credentials-prod ...-db-backup-credentials-prod
The consumer picks one by name; that wiring is the NEXT commit, so this one changes no
rendered reference and is a no-op for both live clusters.
WHY DEV KEEPS THE UNSUFFIXED NAME. Dev is live. Renaming its Secret would change
`s3Credentials.accessKeyId.name` on three running CNPG Clusters — which projects into the
instance pods' environment and therefore ROLLS keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db —
and would roll the velero Deployment, all to rename an object whose contents do not change.
This repo already makes exactly this call for dev's live identifiers (EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
"default", VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX ""): the live cluster keeps the name it is running, and the
NEW environment takes the new one. The asymmetry is deliberate and documented at each
kustomization.
WHERE THE MATERIAL CAME FROM. Neither side is invented:
- the four unsuffixed files are restored byte-for-byte from `main` (the MinIO material as
it stood before 0a6a862), so dev's Secrets are IDENTICAL to what dev is running;
- the four `-prod` files carry the R2 token from 0a6a862 (already on this branch as
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c8c1d2935d |
feat(dns): per-environment BASE_DOMAIN — prod moves to its own subdomain
INCIDENT FIX. Prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE OF DEV'S PUBLIC DNS RECORDS. Both
clusters ran policy: sync against the SAME Cloudflare zone with the SAME implicit
txtOwnerId (`default`), so prod believed it owned dev's records, found no matching sources,
and removed them plus their TXT registry entries. Dev recovered ~30s after prod was scaled
to 0; verified restored against Cloudflare directly (my first check went through a pfSense
override and falsely showed healthy — local resolvers are not evidence about public DNS).
THE MISS WAS MINE, and it was a failure of imagination in how I briefed every agent. I put
"never touch dev" in brief after brief and enforced it — separate kubeconfigs, verified
--limit, sha-checked dev's kubeconfig before and after. Every one of those guards held. NONE
of them covered SHARED EXTERNAL RESOURCES. Prod reconciling its OWN correctly-authored
manifests reached across a third party and destroyed dev's state. Cluster-to-cluster
isolation was verified; the dependency that mattered was cluster-to-Cloudflare.
Operator's architecture: dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod ->
*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, apex CNAME <svc>.home -> <svc>.prod.home.
PHASE 1 ONLY (this commit): prod moves to its own subdomain. DEV IS NOT MIGRATED and its
effective hostname stays home.keithjackson.dev, so dev renders byte-identically and nothing
live moves. That alone ends the collision and unblocks prod. Phase 2 (dev -> dev.home. +
apex CNAMEs) is deferred to when the operator is present: it relocates Keycloak's issuer and
12 clients' redirect URIs, forces a rolling k3s restart and kubectl SSO re-issue for every
user, and moves gitea.home. — which is BOTH the GitOps source and the current push target.
BASE_DOMAIN WAS A DEAD KNOB — it existed in cluster-vars but the status report flagged it as
referenced by nothing, because hostnames were hardcoded throughout. Now real: 141 refs.
Searched the AUTHORITATIVE reconciled set by resolving each Flux spec.path transitively via
conformance/lib/status.py — the same resolver the L0 gate uses, so "what Flux reconciles"
has one definition. 185 occurrences across 47 files in 154 reconciled files. Tokenized:
Gateway listeners, the wildcard Certificate, coredns-custom, external-dns, Keycloak
instance/realm (26 redirect URIs), oauth2-proxy, Grafana OIDC, all HTTPRoutes, Homepage's 15
links, 30 runbook_urls, unifi cloud-init, render.py's ZONE constant (which drove
--oidc-issuer-url/--cookie-domain/--whitelist-domain on every forward-auth sidecar) and 11
catalog/ ServiceDefinitions re-rendered canonically. Left alone: 43 comment/prose
occurrences and non-reconciled paths.
TWO THAT CANNOT BE TOKENIZED, flagged not forced:
- headlamp's OIDC URLs live inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret; re-encrypting rewrites the MAC
over every value and the OFFLINE harness cannot verify it (kustomize does not decrypt),
so an error would break live-dev SSO with no pre-flight proof. Prod needs its own copy
anyway — client secrets are realm-scoped.
- kube-apiserver --oidc-issuer-url is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so Flux can never
reach it. Done on the inventory seam instead (k3s_base_domain -> k3s_oidc_issuer_url,
overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod). Verified per host: dev keeps the default, prod gets
prod.home.
EXTERNAL-DNS OWNER, the actual incident cause: txtOwnerId is now explicit per environment —
dev renders exactly `default` (the chart default it was already using, so its existing
records stay recognised) and prod gets `prod`. The BASE default is a NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL,
deliberately not `default`, so a future environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and
can delete nothing rather than silently inheriting dev's identity.
I OVERRODE ONE AGENT DECISION against our own prior finding: it narrowed prod's
domainFilters to prod.home.keithjackson.dev as defence in depth. FINDING F-DNS1
(DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) already proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE —
ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS
Name". Prod would have published NOTHING. Set to the ZONE (keithjackson.dev) like dev.
Isolation comes from the subdomain split plus txtOwnerId, which is what the incident
actually needed and what a domain filter cannot provide.
DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED: 11 of 12 substituting paths byte-identical; the 12th differs by
exactly one line, `+ txtOwnerId: default` — the value dev was already using implicitly.
POSITIVE CONTROLS confirm the harness is not blind: perturbing BASE_DOMAIN moves 10 of 12
hashes (the 2 that don't provably contain no hostname), perturbing the owner id moves
exactly 1. Prod's rendered output has ZERO home.keithjackson.dev references outside prod.,
and its cert renders *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev — no overlap with dev's.
L0 substitution assertions 106 -> 254; BASE_DOMAIN is no longer flagged dead. Gate PASS.
PROD REMAINS SUSPENDED (platform + 10 downstream tiers) pending review; nothing applied.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-02, R-DNS-03, R-TLS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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3484955903 |
fix(sso): gitea + nextcloud OIDC bootstrap was DEAD CODE — envsubst ate the guard
Both ServiceDefinitions guarded their Keycloak OIDC registration with an UNESCAPED
braced expansion:
if [ -z "${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # gitea
if [ -z "${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # nextcloud, then exit 0
apps-wave-0/1 both declare postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars, and neither name is a
cluster-vars key — so Flux's envsubst substituted them away AT RECONCILE TIME, long
before the container ever ran. Verified in the LIVE cluster: the deployed Deployments
literally contain
if [ -z "" ]; then
which is always true. The entire OIDC registration block has been skipped on EVERY boot
of both apps.
WHY NOBODY NOTICED: both apps DO have the provider registered — `gitea admin auth list`
shows keycloak/OAuth2/true and `occ user_oidc:provider` shows the keycloak provider.
Those live in each app's own database, persisted from an earlier successful registration.
SSO works today and DECISIONS-LOG is not wrong. But the idempotent re-registration is
dead, so any PVC rebuild, DB restore, or fresh cluster build comes up with NO OIDC and
only the break-glass local admin. A PROD BUILD FROM THIS REPO WOULD SILENTLY HAVE NO SSO
on gitea or nextcloud.
The irony: the surrounding code was hardened twice — see its own comments about a "silent
first-boot RACE", the verify-then-retry loops, the marker files. All of that hardening was
unreachable, because the guard above it always evaluated true.
Not a regression from the recent R-ENV-02 tokenization — introduced 2026-08-27 (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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72d4720d58 |
feat(auth): gate pihole UI with per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar (canary)
Close the un-gated-UI security finding for forward-auth apps (R-IDP-02) by rendering the Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar that crafty proves working. catalog/render.py now emits, for any forward-auth app with an exposed UI: the oauth2-proxy sidecar (upstream http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>, :4180, --allowed-group per auth.group), an authproxy :4180 Service port, an HTTPRoute backendRef -> :4180, and a gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy that allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180 (fail-closed: the bare UI is never served un-authenticated). oidc/native/none apps render byte-identical. This is the CANARY: only pihole's golden carries the sidecar and is verified fail-closed in-cluster first. jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr are deferred to the rollout commit (temporarily listed in ci/render-golden.sh) so their UIs keep serving exactly as today until their clients+secrets land. - keycloak: confidential pihole client (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper, bare names). - secret: SOPS/age pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials (client-id/secret/cookie), wired into apps/wave-0 via the renderer's new sidecar-creds wave rule. - L1 render goldens regenerated for the sidecar (forward-auth fixtures). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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68690e5019 |
fix(net): allow SSO apps egress to keycloak backend (Cilium 1.20 CVE-2025-30162)
App SSO broke cluster-wide after the Cilium 1.16.5->1.20.1 upgrade: the CVE-2025-30162 fix (in
>=1.16.8/1.17.2) makes the shared Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluate a pod's egress policy against
Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) when it hairpins to keycloak.home.
'toEntities: world' matches the Gateway VIP at L3/L4 but not the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so
OIDC discovery/token 403'd ('Access denied') for every app with a NetworkPolicy (gitea/nextcloud/
semaphore/headlamp/crafty...); Grafana survived only because monitoring has no NetworkPolicy.
Fix: explicit toEndpoints egress allow to the keycloak backend for SSO apps.
- catalog/render.py: emit it for auth.mode in {oidc,forward-auth}; re-rendered 8 app goldens.
- platform/headlamp + platform/crafty: hand-written policies get the same allow.
Split-horizon design unchanged. Verified live: headlamp-ns -> keycloak discovery 403 -> 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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cbc2301b30 |
docs: reconcile docs/comments with post-upgrade cluster state
Text-only cleanup after the upgrade campaign. Updates stale version strings, prose, and comments to the verified current facts; no Kubernetes behavior or version pins changed except the kubectl toolchain bump (below). Verified facts applied: k3s v1.36.4+k3s1, Debian 13 trixie, Cilium 1.20.1 / Gateway API v1.6.1, Longhorn 1.12.1, node RAM 24 GiB, dedicated virtio2 SSD etcd disk per node, Velero chart 12.x / v1.18, Grafana 13.2.0. - Version strings across infra/ and platform/ READMEs + comments - kubectl toolchain 1.31.4 -> 1.36.4 (devcontainer/ci/conformance versions.env; 1.31 vs a 1.36 cluster exceeded the +-1 skew) - Retired-single-apps-Kustomization refs -> apps-wave-0/1/2 + apps-vms with per-wave SOPS decryption (flux/clusters docs + bootstrap.sh) - COMPLETED/historical banners on the three executed plan docs - Resolved TODO(WS-SEC) markers -> Renovate-maintained ranges - Appended dated DECISIONS-LOG entry (2026-08-30) superseding the 2026-08-26 LIVE STATE line Left as revalidation items (not blind-edited): external-snapshotter v8.2.0 vs 1.36, Cilium ext_authz/forward-auth relevance under 1.20.1, conformance ImageVolume feature-gate assertions under 1.36. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d24a443c7d |
chore(flux): migrate image-automation API v1beta2 -> v1
Migrate image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2 -> /v1 for ImageRepository,
ImagePolicy, and ImageUpdateAutomation ahead of the Flux v2.7+ upgrade
(cluster-upgrade-plan §3.2). Flux v2.4 (current) already serves /v1, so
migrating the manifests now is a safe no-op at runtime.
- catalog/render.py: r_image_automation emits v1 for ImageRepository/ImagePolicy
- platform/image-automation/{image-update-automation,per-service/pihole.example}
- conformance L3 hands-off-update chainsaw applies v1 CRs
- conformance L1 goldens re-rendered to match (apiVersion-only diff)
No spec-field changes required: all spec fields used (image, interval,
imageRepositoryRef, filterTags.pattern/extract, policy.semver.range,
sourceRef, git.*, update.strategy/path) are unchanged in v1; the v1
messageTemplate already uses .Changed (not the removed .Updated).
apps/ golden unaffected (canonical render uses --no-image-automation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d1248e6778 |
feat(backup): wire Velero + CNPG Barman to the live MinIO S3 target
Author the GitOps side of off-cluster backups against the on-Proxmox MinIO (http://192.168.1.9:9000, path-style; buckets velero + cnpg). Velero (R-STATE-03): - HelmRelease (chart 8.x / Velero 1.15) + velero-plugin-for-aws init container + node-agent kopia File System Backup (deployNodeAgent, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). BSL default -> bucket velero, s3ForcePathStyle. - Two daily Schedules: `daily` backs up the whole cluster's resources+PVC data (defaultVolumesToFsBackup opt-out) EXCEPT monitoring+unifi; `daily-resources-only` captures monitoring+unifi RESOURCES only (Prometheus TSDB, Loki 72h logs, and the ~7.4GiB UniFi VM disk are reconstructable — excluded from volume backup). - velero-cloud-credentials SOPS Secret (cloud INI key, ns velero). - Own non-gating Flux tier clusters/base/backup.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) + clusters/dev SOPS decryption patch — mirrors headlamp. CNPG native Barman PITR (R-IDP-05 / R-STATE-03): - keycloak-db, nextcloud-db, semaphore-db gain spec.backup.barmanObjectStore (s3://cnpg/<cluster>, endpointURL MinIO, gzip WAL+data, 30d retention) + a daily ScheduledBackup (6-field cron, immediate) each. - Per-namespace scoped-key SOPS Secrets (<db>-backup-credentials), same-ns only. - render.py: emit-waves now recognizes <svc>-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml as a DB-wave sidecar (+ self-test); wave-0 kustomization regenerated. Creds mirror platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml (scoped key k3s-backup), SOPS round-trip verified with the cluster age key. gate: green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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36a1a4e1f9 |
refactor(apps): split monolithic apps Kustomization into dependency waves
Replaces the single `apps` Flux Kustomization with dependency-ordered waves
(apps-wave-0..2) so a crashlooping workload isolates to its wave + downstream
instead of stalling the entire app tier. Parallel within a wave, ordered across.
- catalog/render.py: compute waves by longest dependency-path depth over the
ServiceDefinition `dependencies:` edges (a `<svc>-db` is a leaf, so its
consumer lands strictly higher — the "DB below consumer" rule falls out of
longest-path, no special case). `--emit-waves` generates the per-wave
kustomizations + Flux CRs; `--wave-layout` places renders into the right dir.
wave 0: pihole gitea jackett plex qbittorrent nextcloud-db semaphore-db
wave 1: sonarr radarr nextcloud semaphore gitea-actions
wave 2: seerr
- apps/*.yaml -> apps/wave-{0,1,2}/ (byte-identical moves; SOPS files intact).
- clusters/base: apps.yaml removed; apps-wave-{0,1,2}.yaml added (dependsOn
chain: platform-config -> wave-0 -> wave-1 -> wave-2, prune+wait each).
- clusters/dev: one SOPS decryption patch per wave (load-bearing).
- DESIGN-waves.md: wave table, topology, cutover runbook.
Cutover: preceded by disabling prune on `apps` (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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28498f1099 |
fix(apps): semaphore fsGroup — schema 1.3.0 podSecurityContext for non-root PVC write
The semaphoreui/semaphore image runs as non-root UID 1001 / GID 0 and writes its generated config.json into the config dir on boot. A mounted Longhorn PVC is root:root, so UID 1001 got "permission denied" and the pod crash-looped. First-class the fix into the render contract (same mechanism the retired gitea-bootstrap-patch was replaced by): schema 1.3.0 adds an optional pod-level `podSecurityContext`, emitted verbatim onto spec.template.spec.securityContext by render.py. Absent => every other app renders byte-identical (verified). semaphore declares fsGroup=1001 (kubelet group-owns the PVC + adds the supplemental group so UID 1001 can write) plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot pinning the image identity. render.py selftest extended (verbatim render + absence). L0 (schema+kyverno 17/17), L1 3/3, lint all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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c8dd4f3f9d |
feat(catalog): add SD env/envFrom/lifecycle; retire gitea bootstrap patch
Extend the ServiceDefinition contract with optional per-container `env`, `envFrom`, and `lifecycle` fields (k8s EnvVar / EnvFromSource / Lifecycle shapes) so headless-install / DB-backed apps configure themselves through the SD instead of a supplementary kustomize patch. - schema: bump 1.1.0 -> 1.2.0; add optional env/envFrom/lifecycle to the container kind (literal + secretKeyRef/configMapKeyRef; secretRef/ configMapRef; postStart/preStop exec via $defs/execHandler). Existing fields unchanged; all fields optional -> absent renders byte-identical. - render.py: emit env/envFrom/lifecycle verbatim onto the Deployment app container when present; --selftest coverage for the new fields. - catalog/gitea.yaml: fold the headless-install env (INSTALL_LOCK, fixed SECRET_KEY via secretKeyRef, DOMAIN/ROOT_URL, actions, break-glass admin creds) + the idempotent postStart break-glass admin bootstrap inline. - apps/gitea.yaml: re-rendered with env/lifecycle inline (effective pod spec provably equivalent to base+patch). - DELETE apps/gitea-bootstrap-patch.yaml + drop it from apps/kustomization patches. gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml kept (still sourced by the env). Proves the renderer feature by retiring the known TODO; unblocks env + DB onboarding for nextcloud/semaphore/unifi/minecraft. All other rendered apps byte-identical. Gates: selftest PASS, l0 17/17 + schema, l1 goldens, lint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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b871877c1b |
fix(render): namespace-pin east-west selectors so declared deps actually connect
Follow-up to the reciprocal-ingress fix: in-cluster verification (Hubble) revealed
the east-west path was STILL fully blocked — and that the pre-existing EGRESS half
was also broken, contrary to the original diagnosis. Root cause: a CiliumNetworkPolicy
`toEndpoints`/`fromEndpoints` selector is scoped to the POLICY's OWN namespace unless
it carries the reserved `k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace` label. Every service lives
in its own namespace (== its name) and every dependency crosses a namespace boundary,
so an app-label-only peer selector matched nothing and Cilium silently denied the flow
(Hubble: sonarr->qbittorrent = "EGRESS DENIED ... Policy denied DROPPED").
Pin the peer namespace on BOTH halves — egress toEndpoints (destination ns == dep.to)
and the reciprocal ingress fromEndpoints (source ns == source name). This is a strict
TIGHTENING (more precise, still L3/L4), not a weakening. Verified end-to-end in-cluster:
sonarr->qbittorrent:8080, sonarr->jackett:9117, seerr->{sonarr:8989,radarr:7878,
plex:32400} now CONNECT (were DROPPED); undeclared sonarr->plex:32400 and
seerr->qbittorrent:8080 stay BLOCKED (default-deny holds).
Selftest + L0 (17/17) + L1 (3/3, goldens byte-identical) + lint all pass. NOTE: this
necessarily touches the egress toEndpoints selector, which the task scoped as
ingress-only; the premise that egress already worked was empirically false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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14beb85b65 |
fix(render): emit reciprocal ingress-allow for declared dependencies (R-NET-02)
A `dependencies` edge is declared ONCE on the SOURCE, but with the default-deny-
BOTH-directions baseline (docs/03 R-NET-01/02) it needs TWO matching halves: the
source egress-allow AND the destination ingress-allow. render.py emitted only the
egress half, so every declared east-west dependency was silently dropped by the
destination's default-deny ingress — verified in-cluster: sonarr->qbittorrent:8080,
sonarr->jackett:9117 and seerr->sonarr:8989 were all BLOCKED.
Add a cross-service reverse-dependency pass (build_reverse_map) and render the
reciprocal ingress half (r_reverse_dependency_policies): for each source that
declares a dependency on X, X gains an additive ingress-allow CiliumNetworkPolicy
`X-allow-<source>-<port>` whose fromEndpoints matches the source identity, mirroring
the egress half's L3/L4 granularity. Deterministic (sorted), additive (default-deny
ingress stays []), egress side unchanged. A lone render with no cross-catalog context
renders no reciprocal ingress, so the L1 render goldens are byte-identical.
New ingress CNPs: qbittorrent<-{sonarr,radarr}:8080, jackett<-{sonarr,radarr}:9117,
sonarr<-seerr:8989, radarr<-seerr:7878, plex<-seerr:32400. Selftest + L0 (17/17) +
L1 (3/3) + lint all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d32b5c4ec0 |
fix(renderer): Recreate strategy for Deployments mounting RWO PVCs
Any single-replica app with a `storage:` entry mounts a ReadWriteOnce Longhorn PVC. The default RollingUpdate strategy starts the new pod before terminating the old one, but the old pod still holds the RWO volume -> the new pod hangs in ContainerCreating and the rollout deadlocks (observed on gitea's update). Emit spec.strategy.type=Recreate whenever storage is present so the old pod releases the PVC first. Non-storage apps (and VMs) keep the default (no strategy emitted). Re-rendered apps: gitea, pihole, sonarr, radarr, plex, qbittorrent, jackett now carry strategy: Recreate. Updated the egress-class L1 render goldens (storage fixture) accordingly; all L1 render checks pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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73c4475d34 |
fix(gitea): mount PVC at /data + headless-install bootstrap (Phase 6)
Two defects blocked in-cluster Gitea from becoming the Flux source: 1. Storage mountPath: the renderer hard-coded /data/<name>, so Gitea's PVC mounted at /data/data while Gitea writes all state to /data — real repos/DB landed on the ephemeral rootfs. Add an OPTIONAL `mountPath` to the storage schema + render.py (default stays /data/<name>, back-compat). catalog/gitea.yaml sets data.mountPath: /data. Only gitea.yaml's rendered mount changes; every other app renders byte-identical. 2. Headless install: the instance was un-installed (INSTALL_LOCK=false, ephemeral SECRET_KEY, no admin, API 404). A Gitea-only supplementary manifest (apps/gitea-bootstrap-patch.yaml) patches the rendered Deployment with GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true, a FIXED SECRET_KEY from a persistent SOPS secret (apps/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml), ROOT_URL/DOMAIN, and a postStart hook that idempotently creates a break-glass local admin. State persists on the now-correct /data Longhorn PVC. The env/lifecycle wiring is a supplementary kustomize patch because the ServiceDefinition schema/renderer does not yet express env/envFrom/lifecycle — noted as a renderer follow-up (TODO in the patch). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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7e8ae472c9 |
fix(net): renderer emits world/internet egress allow per egress class + fix jackett/plex tags
Root cause the media stack surfaced: the default-deny baseline is DNS-only egress (correct for R-NET-01 east-west), but the egress CLASS (internet/vpn) had no policy ALLOWING north-south egress — so qbittorrent/sonarr/radarr couldn't reach the internet at all (VPN downloaders broken). Add an additive per-app CiliumNetworkPolicy '<app>-allow-internet-egress' with toEntities:[world] (non-cluster); the egress-class steering + kill-switch (ADR-0015) govern the PATH (internet=WAN, vpn=tun0). East-west stays denied except declared dependencies; R-NET-01 baseline unchanged. Re-rendered all apps + regenerated L1 goldens. Also fixed jackett + plex image tags (bad pins -> :latest; Renovate/update policy pins later). |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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c13ef69e71 |
feat(net): renderer emits gateway-ingress allow for exposed services (R-NET-01/02)
Exposed apps got a default-deny NetworkPolicy with ingress: [] (deny all), so the
Cilium Gateway (Envoy, reserved identity `ingress`) could not reach the backend — an
Accepted HTTPRoute was still unreachable. render.py now emits an ADDITIVE, least-
privilege CiliumNetworkPolicy for any ServiceDefinition that renders an HTTPRoute:
ingress:
- fromEntities: [ingress] # the shared Cilium Gateway/Envoy proxy identity
toPorts: [<exposed service port(s)> TCP]
Verified against the live cluster (Cilium 1.16.5): with default-deny in place, Hubble
shows the Gateway proxy reaching pihole as source identity `(ingress)` and the flow
`Policy denied DROPPED` on :80 — so `fromEntities: [ingress]` is exactly the source the
Gateway uses, scoped to the service targetPort. Default-deny stays intact (ingress: []
unchanged); the allow only opens the north-south path (docs/09), east-west stays denied.
- render.py: add r_gateway_ingress_policy(); emit it after dependency policies; selftest
asserts the allow is additive (default-deny ingress stays []), least-privilege (only the
exposed port, only the ingress identity), and absent for non-exposed services.
- L1 goldens updated for the two exposed fixtures (container-workload, egress-class);
default-deny-baseline golden unchanged (no exposure). --selftest + run.sh --layer l1 green.
- apps/pihole.yaml re-rendered (--no-image-automation) to carry the allow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85
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e843db2601 |
feat(apps): onboard pihole via renderer + --no-image-automation flag (WS-APPS golden path)
First app onboarded through catalog/render.py -> apps/. Added --no-image-automation so apps deploy before the Flux image controllers exist (L1 goldens keep the default, unchanged). KNOWN GAP surfaced: exposed apps get default-deny (ingress: []) with no gateway-ingress allow, so the HTTPRoute path is blocked — renderer/WS-NET follow-up to allow Cilium gateway ingress to services with an exposure/HTTPRoute. |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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6b2c04ed5c |
Add ServiceDefinition renderer (T-0.3, R-GITOPS-02)
catalog/render.py compiles a ServiceDefinition into the manifest set defined by schemas/renderer-contract.md: Namespace + default-deny baseline (R-NET-01), Deployment/Service or KubeVirt VM + CDI DataVolume (R-PLAT-02/03), PVCs (R-STATE), per-dependency CiliumNetworkPolicy allows (R-NET-02), egress-class steering label (R-NET-05), HTTPRoutes on the shared Gateway (R-TLS/R-DNS), ServiceMonitor + SLI alerts (R-OBS-01), Flux image-automation (R-UPD), auth-mode/backup hints (R-IDP). Deterministic (golden-diffable) with a built-in --selftest; single dependency (PyYAML) so the conformance harness stays stdlib-only. Documents the mechanism choice in catalog/README.md and the script header. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |