773254e3a162f2f44a0cb977872a8bde2da43dd3
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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81f627167d |
docs(obs): record that the gate-sidecar scrape works — four places still said it did not
PR #49 (merged
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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bce101d03f |
feat(obs): wire the gate-sidecar scrape, and fix the alert that would have gone silent doing it
PR #28 gave the five fleet oauth2-proxy sidecars --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180 and a named `metrics` port. This wires a scraper to them and, in the process, found a real bug in the alert this branch added. PodMonitor, not ServiceMonitor. Measured: no Service exposes 44180 on any of the five (jackett/radarr/sonarr/qbittorrent/pihole all publish only their app port + authproxy 4180), so a ServiceMonitor would select nothing. A PodMonitor targets pod ports directly and needs no change to catalog/render.py or the apps/wave-* renders and goldens. Selector is the pod label homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode=forward-auth — present on exactly those five gate pods, absent from crafty's, which still has no metrics listener. The property, not an app list. THE BUG: `up{container="oauth2-proxy"}` -> `up{container="oauth2-proxy"} == 1`. A target that is discovered but FAILING still publishes `up`, with value 0. The series exists, so count by (namespace) returned 1, `unless` removed the namespace, and OAuth2ProxyGateUnobserved went QUIET while nothing was being scraped at all — this branch's own disease reproduced inside the alert written to cure it. Not hypothetical: the PodMonitor lands five targets whose scrape is dropped, so the bare form would have silently cleared on this very commit. Proven by mutation: reverting the `== 1` fails the two new unit-test scenarios (got: nil) and leaves every other assertion green. The scrape does NOT work yet, and that is documented rather than papered over. From a pod in ns monitoring to the jackett pod, :44180 AND :4180 both time out; the shared proxy's :44180 answers. ns jackett's default-deny is podSelector:{} with policyTypes:[Ingress,Egress] and NO ingress key (deny-all), and the one allowance is fromEntities:[ingress] to 4180 — the Gateway's Envoy only. The endpoint itself is healthy: port-forwarded, /metrics returns http=200, 10208 bytes, all three oauth2_proxy_* families including requests_total{code="302"}. Same bug and fingerprint as platform/longhorn/networkpolicy-metrics.yaml records for Longhorn; the fix is one narrow rule per app, and it cannot ship from this tier because oauth2-proxy and apps-wave-0 are Flux SIBLINGS (both dependsOn platform-config), so naming ns jackett here would apply today and fail on a cold rebuild. Needs an owner in the renderer. Touches conformance/** : one KNOWN_EXTERNAL_MONITORS entry, which is the mechanism the failing check explicitly instructs ("DECLARE it ... with who creates it") and which flux-podmonitor.yaml already uses. It records that the port name was measured on prod instead of resolved from a Service, and that the targets are currently down. That makes this PR require a non-author review on the sensitive-path rule. Also: ratio alert still NOT shipped. oauth2_proxy_requests_total now exists on the endpoint but not in the TSDB, so writing it today would make it inert for exactly the reason it was refused on 2026-09-30. Runbook gains policy-vs-no-target triage and the radarr /signalr/messages/negotiate worked case — one orphaned browser tab, 206 identical 302s, nobody ever re-prompted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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fc7ec01628 |
feat(obs): make oauth2-proxy auth failures visible — alert on the gap, not on absent metrics
Jackett failed on 2026-09-30 in the most expensive way available: HTTP 200 and a
plausible page. oauth2-proxy answers an unauthenticated XHR with a 302 to Keycloak
rather than a 401; the browser follows it silently against a live SSO session and
the call resolves 200 carrying a 44 KB HTML dashboard where the app's JavaScript
wanted JSON. The user is never re-prompted, reloading never helps, and every uptime
check stays green. `jackett-down` watches replicas_available, which was 1 throughout.
The reason nothing alerted turns out not to be a missing rule. Measured on prod:
count by (__name__) ({__name__=~"oauth2_proxy.*"})
oauth2_proxy_requests_in_flight => 2
Two series, both from the SHARED forward-auth Deployment. The six per-app gate
sidecars (crafty, jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr) publish nothing at
all: no --metrics-address, so the metrics listener never starts; no `metrics`
container port; no ServiceMonitor or PodMonitor selects them. The alert the incident
calls for — sustained auth redirects to an authenticated user — is therefore NOT
WRITABLE, and writing it anyway would have shipped a rule that is present,
evaluating, permanently silent and indistinguishable from health.
So alert on the condition that made the incident invisible, from families that ARE
scraped:
OAuth2ProxyGateUnobserved
count by (namespace) (kube_pod_container_info{container="oauth2-proxy"})
unless
count by (namespace) (up{container="oauth2-proxy"})
kube_pod_container_info is kube-state-metrics (a declared scrape owner) and sees the
container whether or not it exports anything; `up` is UNIVERSAL and carries a
`container` label for any target, so the rule needs no advance knowledge of what job
name a future per-app scrape picks. Nothing in it touches oauth2_proxy_*, so it
cannot be inert for the reason it is reporting. Run verbatim against live prod it
returns six namespaces and correctly excludes oauth2-proxy. It clears per namespace
as each gate gains a real scrape.
Also:
- promtool companion test pinning all four states: fires unscraped, quiet when
scraped, honours for:1h, and STOPS once a scrape appears under a different job name.
- runbooks/oauth2-proxy-auth-failures.md — tell the gate's refusal from the group
check from the app's own login from an XHR that silently got HTML, with the
2026-09-30 jackett trace as the worked example and the Loki queries to use while
there are no metrics. Registered in the configMapGenerator and README.
- runbooks/README.md gains an inert-alerts row for the unscraped sidecars.
Rejected: an alert on the shared proxy's oauth2_proxy_requests_total ratio. It needs
a conformance/ SCRAPE_OWNERS entry (human approval) and, decisively, would not have
fired on this incident — the shared instance is not in any sidecar-gated app's data
path and its current pods have proxied nothing. It would have looked like coverage
and been none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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3e7e9386a0 |
feat(oauth2-proxy): forward-auth ext_authz enforcement mechanism + group floor
Build the deferred forward-auth ENFORCEMENT for non-OIDC UIs (pihole/*arr/ qbittorrent/homepage; Crafty next), gated by Keycloak via oauth2-proxy. - helmrelease: add `--allowed-groups=platform-admins` (R-IDP-06 floor: authenticated AND in group) + `--skip-provider-button` (302 straight to Keycloak; verified the interstitial 403 sign-in page otherwise). - forward-auth-cec.yaml: interim self-authored CiliumClusterwideEnvoyConfig ext_authz listener -> oauth2-proxy /oauth2/auth, failure_mode_allow:false, per-route opt-in via virtualHost. TEMPLATE — not Flux-wired (PM deploys with an L2 VIP + DNS repoint). The ext_authz stanza is verified in-cluster. - README: document the mechanism, why per-route ext_authz on the shared Gateway is NOT clean on Cilium 1.16.5 (machine-owned cilium-gateway-shared CEC; native ExternalAuth/GEP-1494 in no released Cilium), the three options + recommendation, the opt-in steps, the in-cluster proof, and the human browser test. Keycloak `oauth2-proxy` client already carries the callback redirect URI + a bare `groups` claim (full.path=false) — no realm change needed. Proof (cilium-envoy v1.30.8): a standalone envoy running this exact ext_authz stanza against the live oauth2-proxy denied unauthenticated requests (403, oauth2-proxy sign-in body; upstream never served), while a no-filter control route on the same backend returned 200. R-IDP-02 property holds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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af4f6c07ae |
T-0.1 Flux GitOps layout + dev/prod overlays + platform component skeletons (R-GITOPS-01/03, R-ENV-02, R-PLAT-01)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |