The container-workload and egress-class L1 fixtures use auth.mode=forward-auth, so the renderer now
emits the keycloak backend egress allow for them too. Regenerate the committed goldens to match the
canonical render. MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Migrate image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2 -> /v1 for ImageRepository,
ImagePolicy, and ImageUpdateAutomation ahead of the Flux v2.7+ upgrade
(cluster-upgrade-plan §3.2). Flux v2.4 (current) already serves /v1, so
migrating the manifests now is a safe no-op at runtime.
- catalog/render.py: r_image_automation emits v1 for ImageRepository/ImagePolicy
- platform/image-automation/{image-update-automation,per-service/pihole.example}
- conformance L3 hands-off-update chainsaw applies v1 CRs
- conformance L1 goldens re-rendered to match (apiVersion-only diff)
No spec-field changes required: all spec fields used (image, interval,
imageRepositoryRef, filterTags.pattern/extract, policy.semver.range,
sourceRef, git.*, update.strategy/path) are unchanged in v1; the v1
messageTemplate already uses .Changed (not the removed .Updated).
apps/ golden unaffected (canonical render uses --no-image-automation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Root cause the media stack surfaced: the default-deny baseline is DNS-only egress (correct for
R-NET-01 east-west), but the egress CLASS (internet/vpn) had no policy ALLOWING north-south
egress — so qbittorrent/sonarr/radarr couldn't reach the internet at all (VPN downloaders
broken). Add an additive per-app CiliumNetworkPolicy '<app>-allow-internet-egress' with
toEntities:[world] (non-cluster); the egress-class steering + kill-switch (ADR-0015) govern the
PATH (internet=WAN, vpn=tun0). East-west stays denied except declared dependencies; R-NET-01
baseline unchanged. Re-rendered all apps + regenerated L1 goldens. Also fixed jackett + plex
image tags (bad pins -> :latest; Renovate/update policy pins later).
Exposed apps got a default-deny NetworkPolicy with ingress: [] (deny all), so the
Cilium Gateway (Envoy, reserved identity `ingress`) could not reach the backend — an
Accepted HTTPRoute was still unreachable. render.py now emits an ADDITIVE, least-
privilege CiliumNetworkPolicy for any ServiceDefinition that renders an HTTPRoute:
ingress:
- fromEntities: [ingress] # the shared Cilium Gateway/Envoy proxy identity
toPorts: [<exposed service port(s)> TCP]
Verified against the live cluster (Cilium 1.16.5): with default-deny in place, Hubble
shows the Gateway proxy reaching pihole as source identity `(ingress)` and the flow
`Policy denied DROPPED` on :80 — so `fromEntities: [ingress]` is exactly the source the
Gateway uses, scoped to the service targetPort. Default-deny stays intact (ingress: []
unchanged); the allow only opens the north-south path (docs/09), east-west stays denied.
- render.py: add r_gateway_ingress_policy(); emit it after dependency policies; selftest
asserts the allow is additive (default-deny ingress stays []), least-privilege (only the
exposed port, only the ingress identity), and absent for non-exposed services.
- L1 goldens updated for the two exposed fixtures (container-workload, egress-class);
default-deny-baseline golden unchanged (no exposure). --selftest + run.sh --layer l1 green.
- apps/pihole.yaml re-rendered (--no-image-automation) to carry the allow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The renderer's PaaS path (kind: container) had no verifying conformance test — the
R-PLAT-02 token appears only in renderer comments, so a change touching catalog/
surfaced it as an uncovered touched-requirement (blocking the merge gate). Adds the
container render analog of vm-lifecycle (R-PLAT-03): asserts a kind: container
ServiceDefinition renders a Deployment (running the declared image) + a Service,
with the egress-class/auth-mode labels admission requires. Offline render-check.sh,
wrapped by a chainsaw Test for in-cluster runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8