b7341b329b71fa86e13eff61e50e1452748df448
11
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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7057bbb711 |
fix(monitoring): alert when a Velero schedule has NEVER backed up, or is paused
VeleroNoRecentBackup could not fire for the failure mode that actually happened.
`(time() - velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""}) > 24*3600` is the
right SHAPE — per-schedule, un-aggregated — but Velero only creates that series once
a backup for the schedule SUCCEEDS, and `time() - <absent series>` yields no series.
So it detects "backed up once, then stopped" and is structurally INERT on "never
backed up". Prod ran with `velero-daily` (the schedule carrying VOLUME DATA) paused
and never-successful: no volume backups at all, nothing alerted, and it was masked
because `velero-daily-resources-only` completed cleanly every 03:00, so every other
backup signal read green while only Kubernetes objects were protected.
A PromQL-only fix is impossible, verified rather than assumed: velero v1.18.1 exports
35 velero_* metric names and every one carrying a `schedule` label is created by a
backup ATTEMPT, not by the Schedule object. A throwaway `paused: true` Schedule on
prod produced ZERO velero_* series, and nothing exposes `spec.paused`. The fact is
not in the TSDB, so the Schedule CRs are exported via kube-state-metrics'
custom-resource-state collector — the path this repo already uses for
kube_node_labels — as kube_velero_schedule_{created,paused,protects_volume_data,info}.
Proven by running KSM v2.20.0 with this exact config against prod's API: the CRD
list/watch rule the chart adds is MANDATORY, not cosmetic — without it KSM emits the
CRS metrics as an empty set, silently.
Three rules, all keyed on PROPERTIES rather than schedule names:
* VeleroScheduleNeverBackedUp (critical) — a Schedule older than 36h with no
successful backup ever. The 36h grace comes from creationTimestamp so a newly
added schedule is not paged before its first run is even due.
* VeleroSchedulePaused (warning) — the direct root-cause signal; a paused backup
schedule must never be silently indefinite.
* VeleroNoVolumeDataBackup (critical) — THE ANTI-MASKING RULE. Fires unless some
schedule with spec.template.defaultVolumesToFsBackup=true succeeded in 36h, so a
healthy resources-only schedule can never make the platform look protected.
Reading the property that DEFINES volume protection (not a name list) matches
platform/velero/volume-policies.yaml and survives renames. `or vector(0)` is
load-bearing: `count(<empty>) == 0` returns no series and would be inert —
absence of the exporter is deliberately the alarm.
Adds the repo's first Prometheus rule-unit-test harness (platform/monitoring/tests/,
wired as the `prom-rules` gate stage). It flattens the COMMITTED PrometheusRule CRs —
never a copy — and pins every rule in the group both ways: quiet on today's healthy
prod state, firing on the reconstructed bad state, with `for:` durations asserted.
Two mutation checks confirm the tests are not vacuous: dropping `or vector(0)` and
breaking the `unless on (schedule)` join each turn the suite red. This is the tool
that makes both of this repo's recurring alert bugs — permanently-firing and
structurally inert — provable offline, which neither yamllint, Kyverno, nor a healthy
cluster can do.
Proof of the fix is by construction; the live metrics cannot show it any more, because
`velero-daily` was unpaused on 2026-09-12 and has since completed 2492/2492 items.
The throwaway probe Schedule and the probe KSM deployment were deleted and the
deletion confirmed; `velero-daily` remains unpaused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6202d92c27 |
test(conformance): gate the URL desired state, and prove the selftest can fail
L0 (212 assertions, was 175):
* runs ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py --check, so client-urls.yaml must be exactly
what the realm import renders. A hand edit that makes the two disagree is
unmergeable -- this is what keeps the realm import the single source of truth for
hostnames rather than just the place they were first typed.
* asserts client-urls.yaml and the realm import are rendered by the SAME Flux
Kustomization. postBuild.substituteFrom is per-Kustomization, so a split would let
one ${BASE_DOMAIN} resolve to two different values and the realm would converge on
a hostname the HTTPRoutes do not serve.
* asserts the desired state uses no substitution token the realm definition lacks,
names only clients the import declares, and declares no field outside the
five-field write surface; that the CronJob mounts it readOnly at the path the
script defaults to; and that the script, renderer and check agree on which fields
are writable.
* NEW mutations.py: injects 12 plausible regressions into the EXTRACTED script and
requires --selftest to catch every one. A passing suite proves nothing if it cannot
fail, and "reported success while the realm was broken" is precisely what this
component exists to end -- so the same standard applies to its own test. ~20s.
L2: the audit Job now mounts keycloak-client-urls and asserts
KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_URLS_AUDIT_OK. Without that it would pass on a realm still holding
pre-migration redirect URIs -- the exact state prod was measured in.
Alerts: the existing Failing/Stale pair is EXTENDED to name redirect-URI drift, not
duplicated. One CronJob gets one pair; a second pair on the same job_name regex would
fire twice for one cause. No new critical, no new permanently-firing rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85
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efc6db6c1f |
feat(obs): alert on I/O pressure — the metric that missed the prod-1 outage
On 2026-09-07 06:05:21Z k3s-prod-1 went NotReady ("Kubelet stopped posting node
status") with the host up, pingable and SSH-able. The cause was disk I/O
starvation of the embedded etcd, from its own journal:
slow fdatasync took=3.56s / 6.71s / 4.95s / 3.40s (expects 1s)
apply request took too long took=8.30s (expects 100ms)
etcdserver: too many requests
/proc/pressure/io FULL avg300 read 11.36 on k3s-prod-1 against 0.75 on
k3s-prod-2 (NVMe) and 1.29 on k3s-prod-3 — all three nodes put /data/k3s
(etcd's WAL) and /data/longhorn (every replica) on ONE partition, and node 1's
is a 2011 consumer SATA SSD with 61,440 reallocated sectors.
The stack alerted on CPU-PSI and memory and had NO I/O alert at all, so the
first signal the operator got was a node already out of the cluster. Adds:
NodeIOPressureHigh full IO PSI > 5% for 10m warning
NodeIOPressureCritical full IO PSI > 10% for 5m critical
Thresholds are measured, not guessed: rate() is a 0-1 fraction, so the outage's
11.36% is 0.1136 and the healthy steady state on the same node is ~0.01.
Verified live that node-exporter already exports
node_pressure_io_{stalled,waiting}_seconds_total for all three prod nodes, so
these rules fire on arrival — no new exporter, no scrape change. (etcd's own
fsync histograms are NOT available: kube-prometheus-stack's kubeEtcd scrape job
is deliberately disabled for k3s, so PSI is the signal we actually have.)
PSI *full* (every runnable task blocked on disk), not *some*: `some` is noisy on
a storage node and did not separate the failing node from its peers.
Dashboard gains the matching I/O row and is retitled accordingly. Not scoped to
prod — dev shares this file and its k3s VMs are HDD-backed, where the same alert
is if anything more likely to earn its keep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit cb28fc80e7e2085d2539530d55f90fc92e3b1bba)
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6a8953e288 |
feat(prod): observability for the two failure modes that went unseen, plus OIDC self-healing
Minimal prod delivery, authored directly on main (= prod's live revision
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c8c1d2935d |
feat(dns): per-environment BASE_DOMAIN — prod moves to its own subdomain
INCIDENT FIX. Prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE OF DEV'S PUBLIC DNS RECORDS. Both
clusters ran policy: sync against the SAME Cloudflare zone with the SAME implicit
txtOwnerId (`default`), so prod believed it owned dev's records, found no matching sources,
and removed them plus their TXT registry entries. Dev recovered ~30s after prod was scaled
to 0; verified restored against Cloudflare directly (my first check went through a pfSense
override and falsely showed healthy — local resolvers are not evidence about public DNS).
THE MISS WAS MINE, and it was a failure of imagination in how I briefed every agent. I put
"never touch dev" in brief after brief and enforced it — separate kubeconfigs, verified
--limit, sha-checked dev's kubeconfig before and after. Every one of those guards held. NONE
of them covered SHARED EXTERNAL RESOURCES. Prod reconciling its OWN correctly-authored
manifests reached across a third party and destroyed dev's state. Cluster-to-cluster
isolation was verified; the dependency that mattered was cluster-to-Cloudflare.
Operator's architecture: dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod ->
*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, apex CNAME <svc>.home -> <svc>.prod.home.
PHASE 1 ONLY (this commit): prod moves to its own subdomain. DEV IS NOT MIGRATED and its
effective hostname stays home.keithjackson.dev, so dev renders byte-identically and nothing
live moves. That alone ends the collision and unblocks prod. Phase 2 (dev -> dev.home. +
apex CNAMEs) is deferred to when the operator is present: it relocates Keycloak's issuer and
12 clients' redirect URIs, forces a rolling k3s restart and kubectl SSO re-issue for every
user, and moves gitea.home. — which is BOTH the GitOps source and the current push target.
BASE_DOMAIN WAS A DEAD KNOB — it existed in cluster-vars but the status report flagged it as
referenced by nothing, because hostnames were hardcoded throughout. Now real: 141 refs.
Searched the AUTHORITATIVE reconciled set by resolving each Flux spec.path transitively via
conformance/lib/status.py — the same resolver the L0 gate uses, so "what Flux reconciles"
has one definition. 185 occurrences across 47 files in 154 reconciled files. Tokenized:
Gateway listeners, the wildcard Certificate, coredns-custom, external-dns, Keycloak
instance/realm (26 redirect URIs), oauth2-proxy, Grafana OIDC, all HTTPRoutes, Homepage's 15
links, 30 runbook_urls, unifi cloud-init, render.py's ZONE constant (which drove
--oidc-issuer-url/--cookie-domain/--whitelist-domain on every forward-auth sidecar) and 11
catalog/ ServiceDefinitions re-rendered canonically. Left alone: 43 comment/prose
occurrences and non-reconciled paths.
TWO THAT CANNOT BE TOKENIZED, flagged not forced:
- headlamp's OIDC URLs live inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret; re-encrypting rewrites the MAC
over every value and the OFFLINE harness cannot verify it (kustomize does not decrypt),
so an error would break live-dev SSO with no pre-flight proof. Prod needs its own copy
anyway — client secrets are realm-scoped.
- kube-apiserver --oidc-issuer-url is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so Flux can never
reach it. Done on the inventory seam instead (k3s_base_domain -> k3s_oidc_issuer_url,
overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod). Verified per host: dev keeps the default, prod gets
prod.home.
EXTERNAL-DNS OWNER, the actual incident cause: txtOwnerId is now explicit per environment —
dev renders exactly `default` (the chart default it was already using, so its existing
records stay recognised) and prod gets `prod`. The BASE default is a NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL,
deliberately not `default`, so a future environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and
can delete nothing rather than silently inheriting dev's identity.
I OVERRODE ONE AGENT DECISION against our own prior finding: it narrowed prod's
domainFilters to prod.home.keithjackson.dev as defence in depth. FINDING F-DNS1
(DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) already proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE —
ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS
Name". Prod would have published NOTHING. Set to the ZONE (keithjackson.dev) like dev.
Isolation comes from the subdomain split plus txtOwnerId, which is what the incident
actually needed and what a domain filter cannot provide.
DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED: 11 of 12 substituting paths byte-identical; the 12th differs by
exactly one line, `+ txtOwnerId: default` — the value dev was already using implicitly.
POSITIVE CONTROLS confirm the harness is not blind: perturbing BASE_DOMAIN moves 10 of 12
hashes (the 2 that don't provably contain no hostname), perturbing the owner id moves
exactly 1. Prod's rendered output has ZERO home.keithjackson.dev references outside prod.,
and its cert renders *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev — no overlap with dev's.
L0 substitution assertions 106 -> 254; BASE_DOMAIN is no longer flagged dead. Gate PASS.
PROD REMAINS SUSPENDED (platform + 10 downstream tiers) pending review; nothing applied.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-02, R-DNS-03, R-TLS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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a720c73fcd |
monitoring: node CPU-pressure alerts + PSI/load dashboard (#4)
Adds NodeCPUPressureHigh (CPU PSI 'some' > 15% for 15m) and NodeCPULoadHigh (load5/core > 1 for 15m) to platform-health.nodes, plus a 'Nodes — CPU / Memory Pressure' Grafana dashboard (PSI + load-per-core + utilization). These surface the bursty CPU contention that averaged CPU%/kubectl top hides — the signal behind 'spikes cause blips of delay'. Makes the 6->8 vCPU resize measurable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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bfec9d869e |
feat(updates): alert on failed / rolled-back updates (R-UPD-02 + R-OBS)
Add platform-health.automated-updates PrometheusRule group carried by platform-config: ImageUpdateAutomationFailing (write-back broken -> advances silently stop), ImagePolicyStalled (registry/range can't resolve a stable tag), and UpdateHealthGateFailed (a bad update health-gated and auto-rolling-back via HelmRelease remediation). Routes to Alertmanager email so a bad update is visible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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4bebd4b6d2 | keycloak: coverage tests + dashboard + reword cross-cutting tags | ||
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jakman85
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ce83c6af3b | WIP keycloak stack (gate probe) | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d519ede4e3 |
monitoring: retarget VPNTunnelDown to node tun0 presence; drop obsolete EgressGatewayUnhealthy
gluetun retirement removes the gluetun_vpn_up gauge and the in-cluster gateway pod. Point
VPNTunnelDown at absent(node_network_receive_bytes_total{device=tun0}) — tun0 exists iff the
host OpenVPN tunnel is up (node_network_up unreliable: tun0 operstate=unknown). This also
fires if the gateway node/node-exporter is down (series goes stale). Remove the pod-readiness
EgressGatewayUnhealthy alert — there is no gateway pod under ADR-0015.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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cc89b4b830 |
Autonomous session: Phase-2 platform authoring + Flux bootstrap progress
Author-only Phase-2 components (platform suspended; cluster untouched): - platform/longhorn: 3-replica SC + bulk external-mount indirection (R-STATE) - platform/monitoring: kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy (dev-trimmed) + 8 alert rules (R-OBS) - platform/cilium: parity fix (k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11 + masquerade) safe to adopt Phase 2 - conformance: partial L2 tests (worker hit session limit; incomplete — see DECISIONS-LOG K2) - bootstrap/gitea: fix rootless-podman perms (host bind-mount -> named volume) Flux installed on the cluster; host Gitea up + repo pushed; GitRepository BLOCKED by host firewalld (VM->10.73.0.1:3000) — needs one operator sudo command (DECISIONS-LOG). Known issue K1: cluster-vars substitution-var case mismatch (fix before un-suspend). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |