d7f24d0a9ec5241f9a19dd476e2c708ff1bbff08
32
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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f7d4648851 |
docs(keycloak): record the URL-reconciliation decisions
Records K1-K9: extend-vs-sibling and why, the generated+gated desired state, verbatim token pass-through, per-pass fail-closed, order-insensitivity, unmanaged-means-untouched, public clients' URLs managed, one alert pair not two, and the mutation harness. Also records a process note: my first pass reported three false findings (reconciler absent from main, import not templated, BASE_DOMAIN dead) because I diffed against origin/main -- origin is dev's Gitea, stale at |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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23ea72d01e |
feat(keycloak): reconcile client redirect URIs, not just client secrets
The realm import is a one-shot that never re-runs, so a redirect URI changed in git reaches the realm never. Prod's stored URIs were measured still on the pre-migration hostname while git declared the new one -- after a BASE_DOMAIN flip every OIDC login fails with a redirect_uri mismatch, with the CR still reading Done=True and nothing alerting. Same failure class as the literal-placeholder secrets, same cure. EXTENDS the existing reconciler rather than adding a sibling. Decisive reason: a URL write needs NO new endpoint. It is the same minimal client PUT, and the current URLs already come back in the allow-listed client lookup -- so the allow-list is widened by nothing and the users/groups/roles/authentication guarantee is preserved unchanged rather than re-declared in a second copy. The ConfigMap also carries exactly one script key by L0 contract, so a sibling would have had to fork ~300 lines of safety-critical code that the header explicitly forbids forking. Reconciles redirectUris, webOrigins, rootUrl, baseUrl, adminUrl -- only the fields a client actually declares, and on a write only the fields that actually drifted. A field the desired state omits is UNMANAGED and left untouched; absence never means force-to-empty. THE TWO PASSES ARE INDEPENDENT. Each reads its own desired state and fails closed for its own fields only. A malformed URL ConfigMap cannot stop client-SECRET repair, which would otherwise make credential healing depend on a hostname file. List fields compare order-insensitively (sorted, not set -- duplicates are still drift), because Keycloak does not preserve the authored order of redirectUris and an order-sensitive compare would rewrite every client forever while reporting success. --selftest grows to 84 assertions covering the domain flip, a client gaining a URI, a client losing a stale one, a public client's URLs being managed while its secret is not, per-pass fail-closed, order-insensitivity, and a server that accepts a PUT without applying it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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51d8676f90 |
feat(keycloak): render the client-URL desired state from the realm import
The realm import is a one-shot: once Done=True it never re-runs, so a redirect URI
changed in git never reaches the realm. Healing that needs a DESIRED STATE the
reconciler can read -- and the reconciler pod has no Kubernetes API access at all
(automountServiceAccountToken: false), so it cannot read the KeycloakRealmImport CR.
Its desired state must be mounted, hence a ConfigMap.
A hand-authored ConfigMap would be a second source of truth for every public
hostname in the realm, free to disagree with the import -- the same shape as the bug
being closed. So it is GENERATED from the import and the render is gated, the same
render==golden idiom catalog/render.py already uses for apps/.
URL strings are copied VERBATIM: a ${BASE_DOMAIN} token in the source appears
unchanged here, and both files are rendered by the SAME Flux Kustomization
(./platform-config), so both are substituted in one pass with one value. The
renderer never parses a hostname and never reads cluster-vars, so there is no
second place the domain can be decided.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85
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cac413e87a |
feat(cnpg): synchronous replication, quorum of 1, dataDurability preferred
Three instances replicating ASYNCHRONOUSLY still lose data on failover: COMMIT returns as soon as the primary has flushed locally, so a primary that dies before its standbys catch up takes the last few transactions with it and the promoted standby comes up quietly missing them. On keycloak-db that is a just-created user, a rotated credential or a consent vanishing at exactly the moment of a failover. `method: any` + `number: 1` makes COMMIT wait for ONE of the two standbys to confirm — the point of having them. dataDurability: preferred, NEVER required. `required` is a strict quorum: fewer than `number` healthy standbys and writes BLOCK. Postgres here shares three nodes with etcd and the CNI, so one degraded standby — a node reboot, a Longhorn replica rebuild, a Cilium restart — would turn a partial degradation into a total write outage, and on the SSO database that takes kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth with it. `preferred` keeps synchronous commit while a healthy standby is there and relaxes the required count dynamically when one is not. dataDurability is only honoured while standbyNamesPre/standbyNamesPost are unset — both are. NON-DISRUPTIVE: this compiles to `synchronous_standby_names`, a reload-only PostgreSQL parameter. No pod restart, no switchover, no client disconnect. It is the last of the three commits because it wants standbys that already exist and are already on their final nodes. Field shape verified against the live clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io CRD before relying on it (CNPG 1.30.0, byte-identical schema on k3s-prod and k3s-dev): spec.postgresql.synchronous requires `method` (enum any|first) and `number` (x-kubernetes-validation self > 0); `dataDurability` is enum required| preferred. None of the three Clusters previously had a `postgresql:` block, so this adds one rather than merging into existing parameters. DEV IMPACT: identical and non-disruptive, same reload-only path. Verified: yamllint clean; both tiers render the block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f1ce19461415e77eb2f1ca5109ebab49edf0860b) |
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jakman85
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e8d8601ca6 |
feat(cnpg): required pod anti-affinity + switchover primary rolls
`instances: 3` alone does not keep the three instances apart. All three Clusters used CNPG's default `podAntiAffinityType: preferred`, which is a scheduler HINT — two instances may share a node whenever that scores better, and they WILL on the path that matters: when CNPG recreates an instance after a node loss, the surviving nodes are the only candidates and one of them already runs an instance. `preferred` is how a 3-instance cluster decays back into the single-node failure domain the previous commit exists to remove. `required` makes it a scheduling constraint. On a 3-node cluster with no spare, the cost is that an instance whose node is gone stays Pending until a node returns. That is correct: a replacement squeezed onto an already-occupied node dies with that node while making the cluster LOOK three-way replicated. 2 of 3 instances still serve and CNPG still promotes. ALSO SETS primaryUpdateMethod: switchover. This is not cosmetic. Changing the affinity changes the instance pod spec, so CNPG performs a rolling update, and the CRD default for primaryUpdateMethod is `restart` (verified against the live CNPG 1.30.0 CRD on both clusters) — a delete-and-recreate of the PRIMARY pod, i.e. tens of seconds of no Postgres. On keycloak-db that is an SSO outage, which also means kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth. With standbys now present, `switchover` promotes an already-updated streaming replica instead, reducing the roll to a connection reset. Known constraint documented in the manifest: under `switchover` the operator rejects an update that changes imageName and a postgresql parameter in the same reconcile. Verified satisfiable before merge (read-only): k3s-prod and k3s-dev each have 3 Ready, schedulable, untainted nodes, and every pgdata PVC already has a Longhorn replica on all three (replica-soft-anti-affinity=false), so any instance can attach from any node. DEV IMPACT: identical, and dev can absorb it. Longhorn dev nodes are 124.9 GiB each with 152.0 GiB already scheduled under a 200% over-provisioning ceiling (249.8 GiB); the six new 5Gi volumes add 30 GiB scheduled per node -> 182.0, still inside the ceiling, and only ~600 MiB per volume is really consumed. Prod is far looser: 239 -> 269 GiB scheduled against a 829 GiB ceiling. THIS IS THE DISRUPTIVE COMMIT of the three. Land it on its own reconcile, after the scale-out has produced two Ready standbys per Cluster, so the blast radius is one clean switchover per database rather than a scale-out and a roll at once. Expect a brief SSO interruption for keycloak-db. Verified: yamllint clean; both tiers render the new fields; field names, types and enum values checked against the live clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io CRD (CNPG 1.30.0, identical on prod and dev). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e1d364238d73e6ee99c9a50108fe8b4e09481a7e) |
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jakman85
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f338e91770 |
feat(cnpg): instances 3 on all three Clusters — a standby to fail over to
All three CNPG Clusters ran `instances: 1`. Longhorn's 3-way replication saves the DATA when a node dies; it does not save the SERVICE — a single instance has to be rescheduled, re-attach its volume and replay WAL before Postgres accepts a connection again. With nothing in the spec keeping them apart, all three primaries had drifted onto ONE node (k3s-prod-2 on prod, k3s-dev-3 on dev). On 2026-09-07 that node took SSO, Nextcloud and Semaphore down together, and with SSO went kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth. Three instances give each Cluster a streaming standby CNPG can promote in seconds, repointing the -rw Service with no volume re-attach and no restore. UNBLOCKED BY WORKING BACKUPS, NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THEM. Standbys replicate corruption and deletions faithfully; only the Barman archive is a backup, and adding standbys while archive_mode=on with a failing archive_command would have multiplied the disk-full clock, not hedged it. All three Clusters on both k3s-prod and k3s-dev now report ContinuousArchiving=True with a real firstRecoverabilityPoint (verified read-only, 2026-09-07). Scaling out is non-disruptive on its own: CNPG creates -2 then -3 sequentially, each seeded by pg_basebackup from the RUNNING primary. The primary is not restarted and clients are not disconnected. The anti-affinity change that DOES cause a switchover is deliberately the next commit. DEV IMPACT: identical — dev is on the same shape (three single-instance DBs, all on k3s-dev-3) and gets the same scale-out. Dev has three untainted nodes and Longhorn headroom for it (see the next commit's message for the numbers). Cost: 2 extra 5Gi PVCs per Cluster; ~30 GiB provisioned cluster-wide against live pgdata of ~600 MiB each, on Longhorn with 200% over-provisioning. Verified: yamllint clean; `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone platform-config` and `kubectl kustomize apps/wave-0` both render `instances: 3`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ed6fe6cb019b96f677a92448a0347f979d1a6d02) |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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bc9c93d2ab |
fix(keycloak): the reconciler could not read its own Secret
Shipped in the previous delivery and failing on every run since: FATAL: cannot read /etc/keycloak-realm-clients (PermissionError) BackoffLimitExceeded The client-secrets volume used defaultMode 0400 — owner-only — but the owner of a projected Secret volume is root, while the pod runs runAsUser/runAsGroup 65532. The sibling script volume worked only because it is 0444. So the healer that exists to correct client-secret drift was itself inert. It failed CLOSED (no writes attempted, no drift introduced), and the two alerts shipped alongside it are exactly what surfaces this: KeycloakClientSecretReconciler Failing fires on the failed Jobs. The observability caught its own subject. Fixed with fsGroup 65532 + defaultMode 0440 rather than relaxing to world-readable 0444: fsGroup makes the projected volume group-owned by the running user, so the secret stays unreadable to any other uid in the container. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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3ca4ad6011 | merge: R2 off-cluster backups + per-environment backup credentials | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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161430d915 |
feat(backup): the overlay picks the credential — BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX
The previous commit created the two halves. This one wires the choice, so dev renders MinIO
credentials and prod renders R2 credentials from the SAME base manifests (R-ENV-02: the
overlay patch is the entire difference between environments; no base manifest is forked).
cluster-vars BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX base "" | dev "" | prod "-prod"
velero HelmRelease credentials.existingSecret: velero-cloud-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
3x CNPG Cluster s3Credentials.*.name: <db>-backup-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
ONE SUFFIX, NOT FOUR SECRET-NAME KNOBS. Four independent knobs can be updated three-quarters
of the way, leaving one consumer reading the OTHER environment's key with nothing rendering
wrong — and StrictPostBuildSubstitutions cannot catch that: strict mode fails on an UNDEFINED
variable, never on a defined-but-stale one. With one suffix the four move together or not at
all. The cost is that the rendered Secret name is not greppable from the consumer, so both
kustomizations spell the two names out in full beside the resources.
THE BASE DEFAULT IS "" AND THAT IS LOAD-BEARING. It renders the UNSUFFIXED names — objects
that exist in every render, and that dev is running today. The alternative failure mode is
strictly worse than the shared-Secret state this replaces: velero's pod hangs in
ContainerCreating forever when `existingSecret` names a missing Secret (the volume never
mounts), and a CNPG Cluster whose s3Credentials Secret is absent stops archiving WAL — which
under archive_mode=on is a filling pgdata PVC, not a missing backup. So an unresolvable
default breaks the referencing cluster HARDER than a wrong key does. Both overlays state the
value explicitly anyway, so neither inherits it silently.
Prod's overlay change is a cluster-vars op only. The velero Flux Kustomization patch is
untouched (it stays decryption-only, and velero stays suspended on prod).
VERIFIED — `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone` on clusters/dev and
clusters/prod for the cluster-vars values, then on each of the four affected tiers (platform,
platform-config, platform/velero, apps/wave-0) piped through `flux envsubst --strict` with
that environment's variables:
strict envsubst PASSES for all 8 (env x tier) combinations
dev velero existingSecret velero-cloud-credentials
dev keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db <db>-backup-credentials (both key refs each)
prod velero existingSecret velero-cloud-credentials-prod
prod keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db <db>-backup-credentials-prod (both key refs each)
both all EIGHT Secret objects present in the rendered output (dev and prod alike)
no `${...}` survives in any rendered tier except gitea's three DELIBERATE `$${...}` shell
escapes in apps/wave-0, which are pre-existing and unrelated.
Read alongside the endpoints the same overlays already set, the two environments are now
isolated on credential AND target:
dev velero s3://velero (root) + cnpg s3://cnpg @ http://192.168.1.9:9000 region us-east-1
prod velero k3s-prod-backup/velero + barman prefix @ https://<acct>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com region auto
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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e7c4a95c2d |
feat(backup): the four backup credentials become TWO objects each, one per environment
The four backup-credential SOPS Secrets are SHARED BASE manifests: platform/ and apps/ are
rendered by the same Flux tiers on both clusters, and the ONLY per-environment difference in
this repo is cluster-vars substitution (R-ENV-02). So writing the R2 token into all four
(0a6a862) did not "give prod credentials" — it REPLACED DEV'S. Merging that as-is would have
handed dev's Velero and all three dev CNPG Clusters an R2 key id to sign MinIO requests with:
403 on every WAL segment, and archive_mode=on turns that into a disk-full clock on the pgdata
PVC, not a degraded backup. Dev's PROVEN DR restore (R-STATE-03) is the thing that would have
broken.
This commit splits the material. Each credential is now TWO Secret objects, both applied to
BOTH clusters, differing only in name suffix:
dev -> velero-cloud-credentials keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db-backup-credentials
prod -> velero-cloud-credentials-prod ...-db-backup-credentials-prod
The consumer picks one by name; that wiring is the NEXT commit, so this one changes no
rendered reference and is a no-op for both live clusters.
WHY DEV KEEPS THE UNSUFFIXED NAME. Dev is live. Renaming its Secret would change
`s3Credentials.accessKeyId.name` on three running CNPG Clusters — which projects into the
instance pods' environment and therefore ROLLS keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db —
and would roll the velero Deployment, all to rename an object whose contents do not change.
This repo already makes exactly this call for dev's live identifiers (EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
"default", VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX ""): the live cluster keeps the name it is running, and the
NEW environment takes the new one. The asymmetry is deliberate and documented at each
kustomization.
WHERE THE MATERIAL CAME FROM. Neither side is invented:
- the four unsuffixed files are restored byte-for-byte from `main` (the MinIO material as
it stood before 0a6a862), so dev's Secrets are IDENTICAL to what dev is running;
- the four `-prod` files carry the R2 token from 0a6a862 (already on this branch as
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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0a0527e7db |
feat(backup): prod's off-cluster DR lands on R2 — and stops the WAL clock
Prod has been archiving WAL to `TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT` since bootstrap. Verified live 2026-09-07 on all three CNPG Clusters: ContinuousArchiving=False, "unexpected failure invoking barman-cloud-wal-archive: exit status 4". Because archive_mode is ON, that is not a degraded backup — it is a DISK-FULL CLOCK. Postgres will not recycle a segment it has not archived, so keycloak-db's pgdata PVC is at 579 MiB used / 4360 MiB free and climbing monotonically. When it fills, the primary PANICs and takes SSO down, and with it kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth. Wiring the endpoint is what lets Postgres drain the whole accumulated backlog in one pass. THE KNOB LAYOUT (three new, one repurposed) and why it is shaped this way. The operator created exactly ONE R2 bucket, `k3s-prod-backup`, but the two backup tools want differently-SHAPED values: the Velero chart takes `bucket` and `prefix` as separate fields, while CNPG's barmanObjectStore.destinationPath is one full s3:// URL whose first path segment IS the bucket. So: S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT dev http://192.168.1.9:9000 prod https://<acct>.r2... S3_BACKUP_REGION dev us-east-1 prod auto VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET dev velero prod k3s-prod-backup VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX dev "" prod velero CNPG_BACKUP_PATH dev s3://cnpg prod s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman There is deliberately NO separate `S3_BACKUP_BUCKET`: CNPG's bucket already lives inside CNPG_BACKUP_PATH, and a second knob holding the same bucket name twice is a rotation waiting to drift. Three knobs, each shaped for its own consumer, and no two of them can contradict each other. TENANCY. Inside k3s-prod-backup, velero and barman get disjoint TOP-LEVEL prefixes — s3://k3s-prod-backup/velero/ and s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/<cluster>/ — with the bucket ROOT left empty so a misrendered prefix lands somewhere obviously wrong instead of silently colliding. This is not tidiness: Velero ADOPTS every backup under its location and TTL-DELETES it on retention, so an overlapping prefix would let it reap WAL segments; and interleaving two Postgres servers' WAL into one prefix corrupts the chain outright. Dev↔prod isolation is doubly independent — different endpoint AND different bucket names — so neither cluster can reach the other's objects even with a mis-substituted prefix. DEV IS UNCHANGED, BYTE-FOR-BYTE, and that is asserted rather than assumed. Base defaults are dev's LIVE values (verified against the running cluster: BSL bucket=velero with NO prefix, region us-east-1; all three CNPG Clusters ContinuousArchiving=True at s3://cnpg on the MinIO), and the dev overlay now restates all five explicitly for the same reason LONGHORN_DATA_PATH is restated — a silent drift in base would ORPHAN the backups dev's PROVEN restore depends on. The empty-prefix case was the one real risk, and it is settled empirically: with prefix "" the chart omits objectStorage.prefix from the rendered BackupStorageLocation ENTIRELY (helm template, chart 12.1.0), so dev's live BSL is unchanged, not merely equivalent. R2's TWO GOTCHAS, both wired up front: - region must be exactly `auto`. head-bucket answers {"BucketRegion":"WNAM"}, which is a PHYSICAL LOCATION HINT, not a signing region. This was hardcoded us-east-1 inside the Velero HelmRelease — correct-by-accident for MinIO, wrong for anything else — so it is a knob now. - checksumAlgorithm: "". velero-plugin-for-aws v1.14.2 bundles an AWS SDK with flexible checksums on by default and sends x-amz-sdk-checksum-algorithm / x-amz-checksum-crc32 on every PUT; R2 rejects those with HTTP 400 InvalidArgument, failing every backup and every kopia blob upload. It must be PRESENT-but-empty (the plugin branches on the key existing), and the chart does emit an empty value — verified by rendering it. Harmless against MinIO, so it is unconditional rather than a fourth knob. WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO. Velero stays SUSPENDED on prod. `spec.suspend: true` is owned by field manager `flux` (verified: kustomize-controller's managedFields do not include f:suspend), so server-side apply will not strip it, and nothing here declares suspension — which would also trip R-ENV-03, since a prod overlay may patch only cluster-vars and a Flux Kustomization's `decryption`. Unsuspending is the operator's, after `standup.sh --s3-endpoint <r2> s3check` proves a round trip. NO DNS KNOB IS TOUCHED. BASE_DOMAIN stays prod.home.keithjackson.dev and every EXTERNALDNS_* value is untouched. The apex inversion on work/prod-standup-campaign was deliberately NOT carried: this branch ports that branch's R2 reasoning knob by knob, and merges nothing. VERIFIED: ci/l0.sh green (flux-postbuild-substitution 272 assertions, 0 hazards, 33 knobs defined / 28 referenced, every new token resolved in BOTH overlays); render-golden, lint, schema, spec-immutability green; touched requirement R-STATE-03 covered. Refs R-STATE-03, R-IDP-05, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6a8953e288 |
feat(prod): observability for the two failure modes that went unseen, plus OIDC self-healing
Minimal prod delivery, authored directly on main (= prod's live revision
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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9739e9be91 |
chore(backup): R2 credentials for the off-cluster DR target
Written by platform/backup/set-r2-credentials.sh (operator, 2026-09-07T05:41:34Z) into all four consumers, in the two shapes they need: velero wants an AWS INI file, CNPG/barman wants discrete ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY. All four verified to carry the SAME 32-character key id, so no consumer was missed. Proven from a pod INSIDE prod against https://7ce452a1b3d6c86daf2c020edcb82d37.r2.cloudflarestorage.com: head-bucket on k3s-prod-backup returns BucketRegion WNAM, and PUT and DELETE both succeed. Byte-integrity of GET is NOT yet proven (the aws-cli image has no cmp); s3check is what will establish it. Credentials only — no endpoint or bucket wiring. That is feat/r2-backup-prod. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c8c1d2935d |
feat(dns): per-environment BASE_DOMAIN — prod moves to its own subdomain
INCIDENT FIX. Prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE OF DEV'S PUBLIC DNS RECORDS. Both
clusters ran policy: sync against the SAME Cloudflare zone with the SAME implicit
txtOwnerId (`default`), so prod believed it owned dev's records, found no matching sources,
and removed them plus their TXT registry entries. Dev recovered ~30s after prod was scaled
to 0; verified restored against Cloudflare directly (my first check went through a pfSense
override and falsely showed healthy — local resolvers are not evidence about public DNS).
THE MISS WAS MINE, and it was a failure of imagination in how I briefed every agent. I put
"never touch dev" in brief after brief and enforced it — separate kubeconfigs, verified
--limit, sha-checked dev's kubeconfig before and after. Every one of those guards held. NONE
of them covered SHARED EXTERNAL RESOURCES. Prod reconciling its OWN correctly-authored
manifests reached across a third party and destroyed dev's state. Cluster-to-cluster
isolation was verified; the dependency that mattered was cluster-to-Cloudflare.
Operator's architecture: dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod ->
*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, apex CNAME <svc>.home -> <svc>.prod.home.
PHASE 1 ONLY (this commit): prod moves to its own subdomain. DEV IS NOT MIGRATED and its
effective hostname stays home.keithjackson.dev, so dev renders byte-identically and nothing
live moves. That alone ends the collision and unblocks prod. Phase 2 (dev -> dev.home. +
apex CNAMEs) is deferred to when the operator is present: it relocates Keycloak's issuer and
12 clients' redirect URIs, forces a rolling k3s restart and kubectl SSO re-issue for every
user, and moves gitea.home. — which is BOTH the GitOps source and the current push target.
BASE_DOMAIN WAS A DEAD KNOB — it existed in cluster-vars but the status report flagged it as
referenced by nothing, because hostnames were hardcoded throughout. Now real: 141 refs.
Searched the AUTHORITATIVE reconciled set by resolving each Flux spec.path transitively via
conformance/lib/status.py — the same resolver the L0 gate uses, so "what Flux reconciles"
has one definition. 185 occurrences across 47 files in 154 reconciled files. Tokenized:
Gateway listeners, the wildcard Certificate, coredns-custom, external-dns, Keycloak
instance/realm (26 redirect URIs), oauth2-proxy, Grafana OIDC, all HTTPRoutes, Homepage's 15
links, 30 runbook_urls, unifi cloud-init, render.py's ZONE constant (which drove
--oidc-issuer-url/--cookie-domain/--whitelist-domain on every forward-auth sidecar) and 11
catalog/ ServiceDefinitions re-rendered canonically. Left alone: 43 comment/prose
occurrences and non-reconciled paths.
TWO THAT CANNOT BE TOKENIZED, flagged not forced:
- headlamp's OIDC URLs live inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret; re-encrypting rewrites the MAC
over every value and the OFFLINE harness cannot verify it (kustomize does not decrypt),
so an error would break live-dev SSO with no pre-flight proof. Prod needs its own copy
anyway — client secrets are realm-scoped.
- kube-apiserver --oidc-issuer-url is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so Flux can never
reach it. Done on the inventory seam instead (k3s_base_domain -> k3s_oidc_issuer_url,
overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod). Verified per host: dev keeps the default, prod gets
prod.home.
EXTERNAL-DNS OWNER, the actual incident cause: txtOwnerId is now explicit per environment —
dev renders exactly `default` (the chart default it was already using, so its existing
records stay recognised) and prod gets `prod`. The BASE default is a NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL,
deliberately not `default`, so a future environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and
can delete nothing rather than silently inheriting dev's identity.
I OVERRODE ONE AGENT DECISION against our own prior finding: it narrowed prod's
domainFilters to prod.home.keithjackson.dev as defence in depth. FINDING F-DNS1
(DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) already proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE —
ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS
Name". Prod would have published NOTHING. Set to the ZONE (keithjackson.dev) like dev.
Isolation comes from the subdomain split plus txtOwnerId, which is what the incident
actually needed and what a domain filter cannot provide.
DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED: 11 of 12 substituting paths byte-identical; the 12th differs by
exactly one line, `+ txtOwnerId: default` — the value dev was already using implicitly.
POSITIVE CONTROLS confirm the harness is not blind: perturbing BASE_DOMAIN moves 10 of 12
hashes (the 2 that don't provably contain no hostname), perturbing the owner id moves
exactly 1. Prod's rendered output has ZERO home.keithjackson.dev references outside prod.,
and its cert renders *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev — no overlap with dev's.
L0 substitution assertions 106 -> 254; BASE_DOMAIN is no longer flagged dead. Gate PASS.
PROD REMAINS SUSPENDED (platform + 10 downstream tiers) pending review; nothing applied.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-02, R-DNS-03, R-TLS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
3f980d2a17 |
feat(env): tokenize hardcoded dev LAN addresses into cluster-vars (R-ENV-02)
R-ENV-02 promises dev and prod differ ONLY by scoped cluster-vars overrides. In fact
dev LAN addresses were hardcoded into base manifests, so clusters/prod would have come
up ANNOUNCING DEV ADDRESSES (192.168.1.x) on the prod LAN (192.168.2.x).
New cluster-vars knobs (base default = dev literal, per the file's existing convention):
K3S_API_HOST platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml (+ the values.yaml mirror)
CILIUM_LB_POOL_START platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml
CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP "
UNIFI_L4_VIP apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml
CRAFTY_L4_VIP platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml, apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,
semaphore}-db.yaml, and platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml
Also fixes GATEWAY_VIP's base default, which was still the RETIRED libvirt address
10.73.0.240, and adds the GATEWAY_VIP patch that clusters/prod was missing entirely.
clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml gains postBuild.substituteFrom (it was the one consuming
Kustomization without it, so a ${TOKEN} there would have shipped as a literal string).
The envsubst contract is documented there: ${VAR} substitutes and escapes as $${VAR};
$VAR and $(cmd) are left alone; ${ARR[0]} hard-errors. The three UOS_URL expansions in
the unifi cloud-init are escaped accordingly.
PROD ADDRESS PLAN (operator, 2026-08-31):
nodes .10/.11/.12 · control-plane VIP .9 (Ansible-side) · GATEWAY_VIP .20
Cilium LB pool .20-.30
CONTAINMENT INVARIANT, now documented at the pool and in the prod overlay: GATEWAY_VIP
MUST equal CILIUM_LB_POOL_START. The shared Gateway pins no address, so Cilium LB-IPAM
gives it the first free address of a matching pool block. An initial prod proposal put
.20 outside a .21-.30 pool; the Gateway would have come up on .21 while split-horizon
coredns-custom kept answering *.home.keithjackson.dev with .20 — an address nothing
announces — blackholing in-cluster OIDC hairpin traffic while reporting healthy. The
pool was widened to .20-.30. The control-plane VIP (.9) stays outside the pool so
kube-vip and LB-IPAM can never contend.
Values prod still cannot know stay INVALID `TBD-PROD-*` placeholders on purpose: base
defaults are dev values, so an omitted patch means prod silently inherits a dev address
— far worse than a loud failed apply.
DEV IS BYTE-IDENTICAL. Verified by kustomize build over 13 paths before/after, then
flux envsubst with the dev cluster-vars values applied to both sides: zero drift. The
only deltas are the intended additive keys in the overlay ConfigMap itself. No
unresolved ${TOKEN} survives. render-golden green (10 goldens); yamllint clean.
Serves: R-ENV-02. Task: T-7.1 (prerequisite). Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
b2752aec48 |
feat(auth): gate jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr UIs with oauth2-proxy sidecar (rollout)
Roll the verified Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar out to the remaining four forward-auth apps after the pihole canary was confirmed fail-closed (unauthenticated -> 302 to Keycloak, pod 2/2, clean sidecar OIDC discovery). Each app's Gateway route now terminates at its oauth2-proxy sidecar (:4180, --allowed-group=media-users, --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>); the gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180, so the bare UI is never served un-authenticated (fail-closed; R-IDP-02/06). The apps' own app/API ports stay in-Service for EAST-WEST callers (arr -> qbittorrent:8080 / jackett:9117) via the existing reciprocal-ingress allows. - keycloak: confidential jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr clients (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper). - secrets: four SOPS/age <app>-oauth2-proxy-credentials, wired into apps/wave-0 and apps/wave-1 by the renderer's sidecar-creds wave rule. - ci: remove the temporary canary deferral (all five goldens now reproduce). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
72d4720d58 |
feat(auth): gate pihole UI with per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar (canary)
Close the un-gated-UI security finding for forward-auth apps (R-IDP-02) by rendering the Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar that crafty proves working. catalog/render.py now emits, for any forward-auth app with an exposed UI: the oauth2-proxy sidecar (upstream http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>, :4180, --allowed-group per auth.group), an authproxy :4180 Service port, an HTTPRoute backendRef -> :4180, and a gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy that allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180 (fail-closed: the bare UI is never served un-authenticated). oidc/native/none apps render byte-identical. This is the CANARY: only pihole's golden carries the sidecar and is verified fail-closed in-cluster first. jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr are deferred to the rollout commit (temporarily listed in ci/render-golden.sh) so their UIs keep serving exactly as today until their clients+secrets land. - keycloak: confidential pihole client (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper, bare names). - secret: SOPS/age pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials (client-id/secret/cookie), wired into apps/wave-0 via the renderer's new sidecar-creds wave rule. - L1 render goldens regenerated for the sidecar (forward-auth fixtures). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
45deac9d50 |
keycloak: fix conditional-OTP role config key (blocked all admin SSO with 403)
The browser-mfa conditional-user-role authenticator used config key 'condition.evaluated.user.role', which is not a real Keycloak property — the role resolved to null, so Keycloak logged 'Invalid role name submitted: null' and the REQUIRED conditional-OTP step threw, 403-ing every platform-admins login (Headlamp, Grafana admin, etc.). Correct key for Keycloak 26 is condUserRole=platform-admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d1248e6778 |
feat(backup): wire Velero + CNPG Barman to the live MinIO S3 target
Author the GitOps side of off-cluster backups against the on-Proxmox MinIO (http://192.168.1.9:9000, path-style; buckets velero + cnpg). Velero (R-STATE-03): - HelmRelease (chart 8.x / Velero 1.15) + velero-plugin-for-aws init container + node-agent kopia File System Backup (deployNodeAgent, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). BSL default -> bucket velero, s3ForcePathStyle. - Two daily Schedules: `daily` backs up the whole cluster's resources+PVC data (defaultVolumesToFsBackup opt-out) EXCEPT monitoring+unifi; `daily-resources-only` captures monitoring+unifi RESOURCES only (Prometheus TSDB, Loki 72h logs, and the ~7.4GiB UniFi VM disk are reconstructable — excluded from volume backup). - velero-cloud-credentials SOPS Secret (cloud INI key, ns velero). - Own non-gating Flux tier clusters/base/backup.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) + clusters/dev SOPS decryption patch — mirrors headlamp. CNPG native Barman PITR (R-IDP-05 / R-STATE-03): - keycloak-db, nextcloud-db, semaphore-db gain spec.backup.barmanObjectStore (s3://cnpg/<cluster>, endpointURL MinIO, gzip WAL+data, 30d retention) + a daily ScheduledBackup (6-field cron, immediate) each. - Per-namespace scoped-key SOPS Secrets (<db>-backup-credentials), same-ns only. - render.py: emit-waves now recognizes <svc>-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml as a DB-wave sidecar (+ self-test); wave-0 kustomization regenerated. Creds mirror platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml (scoped key k3s-backup), SOPS round-trip verified with the cluster age key. gate: green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
0437871807 |
Onboard Crafty Controller (Minecraft panel) with Keycloak-gated web UI
Add Crafty Controller 4 (registry.gitlab.com/crafty-controller/crafty-4:4.10.8) as a platform component: a web panel that runs Java + Bedrock Minecraft servers as subprocesses in one pod + a 20Gi Longhorn PVC (mounted 5x by subPath). Auth = Option B (per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar), since Cilium 1.16.5 cannot do ext_authz on the shared Gateway: - oauth2-proxy v7.8.1 sidecar (:4180) reverse-proxies to Crafty's self-signed HTTPS UI (127.0.0.1:8443), gated to Keycloak homelab realm group platform-admins. - Confidential `crafty` client provisioned live via kcadm + captured in the realm import; client secret + cookie secret via SOPS/age (mirrored in realm-clients). - Web UI: HTTPRoute crafty.home.keithjackson.dev -> Service :80 -> sidecar :4180. - Game ports: Cilium L2 LoadBalancer on VIP 192.168.1.55 (next free after .53/.54), starter set TCP 25565-25567 (Java) + UDP 19132-19134 (Bedrock), NOT auth-gated. - fsGroup:0 / runAsGroup:0 / runAsUser:1000 for the image's crafty:root identity on the root:root Longhorn PVC (the seerr fsGroup lesson). - Own non-gating Flux tier clusters/base/crafty.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) + sops-decryption patch in clusters/dev — a leaf UI must never gate the platform. - Explicit default-deny NetworkPolicy + CiliumNetworkPolicies (platform namespace, not app-namespace, so Kyverno does not auto-generate the baseline). make -C ci gate green; kustomize build of platform/crafty, clusters/base, clusters/dev clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
330c99eb8b |
feat(keycloak): enable offline_access for kubernetes OIDC client
Add the offline_access optional client scope to the `kubernetes` kubelogin client so the operator's kubectl can request long-lived OFFLINE refresh tokens (--oidc-extra-scope=offline_access) instead of being forced to re-auth on the realm's ONLINE session timeouts (ssoSessionIdleTimeout 30m / ssoSessionMaxLifespan 10h). Offline tokens honour offlineSessionIdleTimeout 30d with no hard max lifespan. - keycloak-realm-import.yaml: add optionalClientScopes: [offline_access] to the kubernetes client so a fresh realm import reproduces it. - k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml: document the kubeconfig exec-arg (--oidc-extra-scope=offline_access) + clear-cache/re-login steps. Realm session timeouts unchanged; scope is optional (opt-in) and client-only. Applied live via kcadm (reversible). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
5fb097d019 |
platform: deploy Headlamp dashboard with Keycloak OIDC + per-user RBAC
Add Headlamp (kubernetes-sigs/headlamp Helm chart) at headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev with native Keycloak OIDC login and PER-USER RBAC: Headlamp forwards each user's id_token to the k3s apiserver, so the existing oidc:* group bindings (platform-admins->cluster-admin, viewers->view) apply per user. The ServiceAccount is deliberately NOT bound to cluster-admin (clusterRoleBinding.create=false), since user requests ride the forwarded token. Key integration nuance: the apiserver is configured oidc-client-id=kubernetes, so it only accepts tokens whose aud contains `kubernetes`. The new `headlamp` Keycloak client carries an oidc-audience-mapper (included.client.audience= kubernetes) so tokens carry aud=[headlamp, kubernetes] -- accepted by both Headlamp's own verifier and the apiserver, leaving the apiserver config untouched. A groups mapper emits the `groups` claim the apiserver maps to RBAC. - platform/headlamp: namespace, HelmRepository/HelmRelease, SOPS OIDC secret (externalSecret envFrom), default-deny NetworkPolicy + Cilium ingress (gateway)/egress (apiserver+Keycloak) policies, README. Wired into platform/kustomization.yaml (platform tier). - platform/headlamp/httproute.yaml wired into platform-config (Gateway API CR, dependsOn platform), modeled on grafana-httproute. - keycloak-realm-import: add `headlamp` confidential client + groups/audience mappers + HEADLAMP_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder. Client also created LIVE via kcadm (realm import no-ops on the existing realm). - keycloak-realm-clients.sops: add headlamp-client-secret (mirrored into headlamp-oidc-credentials clientSecret). Both encrypted to the repo age key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
7f86e1099b |
fix(nextcloud-sso): register post-logout redirect URI + harden admin promotion
Two SSO follow-ups the operator hit after Nextcloud OIDC login worked. 1. Sign-out "redirect failed". On logout user_oidc redirects the browser to Keycloak's end_session_endpoint with post_logout_redirect_uri=<Nextcloud base '/'> and client_id=nextcloud but NO id_token_hint (provider sendIdTokenHint=0). Keycloak then validates that redirect against the client's post.logout.redirect.uris attribute, which was empty -> "Invalid redirect uri" -> the operator's "redirect failed". Register https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/* on the nextcloud client (attributes.post.logout.redirect.uris). Applied live via kcadm and captured here so git stays authoritative (a RealmImport no-ops on the existing realm). 2. postStart step (d) mirrors platform-admins -> built-in admin group, but the previous single best-effort pass ran occ group:adduser once with output swallowed and no retry. At early boot (container Started ~9s after create) that call can transiently fail (DB / maintenance race), silently dropping the promotion until the next restart. Harden step (d) with a verify-and-retry loop (like step (c)): re-read group:list and re-add any platform-admins member still missing from admin until verified (bounded ~30s), no-op for existing members. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
f163026954 |
feat(nextcloud,semaphore): wire native Keycloak OIDC SSO (break-glass admins retained)
Extends the SSO work to the two remaining `auth: oidc` apps still on local-admin
logins, each as a native confidential client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm with
its local admin kept as break-glass (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `nextcloud` and `semaphore` confidential clients
to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana/gitea) + their
NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET / SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET placeholders. As before, a
KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so both live clients were
ALSO created via kcadm (nextcloud e95049ed-ca10-4085-97d9-4bbef495fe61, semaphore
1835bfe9-b125-4026-8f69-33557519cf4a); the YAML keeps git authoritative.
Secrets (SOPS/age): add nextcloud-client-secret + semaphore-client-secret to
keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns). Mirror the nextcloud secret as
oidc-client-secret into nextcloud-bootstrap (nextcloud ns). For semaphore, the
whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON (which embeds the client secret) is held
encrypted as oidc-providers-json in semaphore-bootstrap (semaphore ns). All values
verified == the live clients; existing keys untouched; no plaintext in git.
App config (catalog source + re-render):
- nextcloud: add NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env + an idempotent postStart hook
that installs/enables user_oidc and runs `occ user_oidc:provider keycloak`
(create-or-update; secret via --clientsecret-env so it never hits argv; occ as
www-data; group provisioning on the `groups` claim). Syntax verified against the
running user_oidc 8.11.0 on Nextcloud 31.0.14; su-to-www-data env passthrough
verified. Missing-secret/not-installed guards prevent crashloops.
- semaphore: add SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env sourced from the encrypted
oidc-providers-json (provider_url=realm issuer/auto-discovery, redirect
/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect). Mechanism verified against semaphore v2.19.10
source (util ConfigType oidc_providers env tag + OidcProvider struct + router
redirect path); no kubelet service-link env collision.
apps/wave-1/{nextcloud,semaphore}.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation` (diffs are env/lifecycle-only).
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; live
homelab clients now include gitea/nextcloud/semaphore; static gate (lint/l0/l1)
green. Browser SSO login for each still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
87388712f0 |
feat(gitea): wire native Keycloak OIDC SSO (break-glass admin retained)
Wires the bootstrapping-critical Gitea git host to the Keycloak `homelab` realm as a native confidential OIDC client, moving it off the local-admin-only login while keeping the local admin as the break-glass path (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06). Realm (source of truth): add the `gitea` confidential client to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana) + its GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder sourced from the keycloak-realm-clients Secret. NOTE: a KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so the live client was ALSO created via kcadm (id 70a6ca60-317a-42ce-8331-a60e380838ee); the YAML keeps git authoritative for a rebuild. Secrets (SOPS/age, never plaintext): add gitea-client-secret to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns) and mirror the same value as oidc-client-secret into apps/wave-0/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml (gitea ns) so the app can read it in-namespace. Both == the live client secret. App config (catalog source + re-render): catalog/gitea.yaml gains the GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env (from the mirrored Secret), [oauth2_client] auto-registration/account-linking app.ini env, and an idempotent postStart step that registers the "keycloak" OAuth2 login source (auto-discovery; groups claim; platform-admins -> Gitea admin). apps/wave-0/gitea.yaml re-rendered via `render.py --no-image-automation`. Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; static gate (lint/l0/l1) green. Browser SSO login still needs a human check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
3472f1d161 |
feat(auth): Keycloak OIDC login + RBAC for kubectl (cert kubeconfig stays break-glass)
Lets users kubectl into the cluster via Keycloak SSO, mapping realm groups to cluster RBAC. The cert-based admin kubeconfig is untouched and remains a fully independent break-glass path (works even if Keycloak/OIDC is down). - keycloak-realm-import.yaml: new `kubernetes` PUBLIC client + PKCE (S256) — no client secret in any kubeconfig; kubelogin runs auth-code+PKCE to localhost. groups mapper + email/profile/roles scopes. - k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (NEW, platform-config): ClusterRoleBindings oidc:platform-admins -> cluster-admin, oidc:viewers -> view. - k3s_server role: kube-apiserver-arg OIDC flags (issuer=homelab realm, client-id=kubernetes, username-claim=email + oidc: prefix, groups-claim=groups + oidc: prefix). No oidc-ca-file (nodes reach the issuer via the gateway VIP and trust the public LE cert). Applied via the rolling Restart k3s handler. Keycloak/RBAC land via Flux now; the API-server flags take effect on the next `ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml` rolling restart (deferred until cluster load from the VM-import incident settles). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
ed6a772599 |
feat(keycloak): provision SSO client secrets + re-enable oauth2-proxy (R-IDP-01/02/04)
Generate the 3 OIDC client secrets (SOPS-encrypted, minimal manifests) so the realm import can inject the grafana + oauth2-proxy client secrets and both consumers match: - platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (grafana + oauth2-proxy client secrets) - platform/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml (client-id/secret/cookie) - platform/monitoring/grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml (grafana client secret) Wire each into its component kustomization and re-enable oauth2-proxy in platform + platform-config (reverses the temp deferral now that its secret exists). Values generated by PM per operator instruction (random; recorded out-of-repo at ~/.config/home-k3s/keycloak-sso-secrets.txt for later rotation). Encrypted via sops in the dev container to the age recipient in .sops.yaml; plaintext never committed. Serves: R-IDP-01, R-IDP-02, R-IDP-04, R-SEC-01. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85
|
cb4fdf4a55 | keycloak: README — operator+CNPG design, runbook, hand-offs | ||
|
jakman85
|
4bebd4b6d2 | keycloak: coverage tests + dashboard + reword cross-cutting tags | ||
|
jakman85
|
ce83c6af3b | WIP keycloak stack (gate probe) | ||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
dfde5292d7 |
feat(phase4): deploy monitoring (kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy + Alertmanager)
Enable monitoring in platform/kustomization.yaml (Phase 4). Grafana admin + Alertmanager SMTP secrets are provisioned (SOPS) and wired; Longhorn SC is up for Prometheus/Loki PVCs. Set the Alertmanager receiver 'to:' to a valid inbox ([email protected]) so the config loads (REPLACE-ME is not a valid address); operator can change it. NOTE: smtp_from ([email protected]) differs from the Gmail auth user — Gmail may reject/rewrite unless a send-as alias is configured; that only affects email delivery at alert time, not stack health. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
af4f6c07ae |
T-0.1 Flux GitOps layout + dev/prod overlays + platform component skeletons (R-GITOPS-01/03, R-ENV-02, R-PLAT-01)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |