docs(runbooks): two more uncited "4-minute" claims the first pass missed

A systematic grep for the TTL assertion found it still in runbooks/README.md and in
runbooks/kustomization.yaml, outside the page being rewritten. Same correction: the
countdown on plex.tv/claim is the authority, not a number in our tree.

README.md also now records that the server is CLAIMED and points at claim-ship.sh with
the measured ~2m45s loop, rather than describing a push-based sequence that no longer
exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

CLAUDE.md

@@ -31,17 +31,19 @@ Verified against the live Gitea on 2026-09-29:
 |---|---|
 | `main` protected, direct push rejected | **No branch protection.** `protected: false`, `user_can_push: true` |
 | PR blocked until the gate passes | **`enable_status_check: false`**, `status_check_contexts: []` |
-| Gate runs on every PR | **No Actions runner is registered** (repo, org and site level all report zero) |
+| Gate runs on every PR | **Fixed 2026-09-29.** Runner `incluster-dind` is online; `gate / gate (pull_request)` runs and passes in ~1m30s–2m |
 | Approval required before merge | **`required_approvals: 0`** |
 
 So nothing mechanically stops you from pushing to `main` right now. **That is a gap
-being closed, not permission.** `DECISIONS-LOG.md` (2026-08-31) claims the gate is a
+being closed, not permission.** `DECISIONS-LOG.md` (2026-08-31) claimed the gate was a
-"required status check" with a runner online; that claim is not true of the live
+"required status check" with a runner online; neither was true, which is how this went
-system, which is how this went unnoticed.
+unnoticed for a month. The runner half is now genuinely fixed and observed green. The
+protection half is not — see `infra/gitea/`.
 
-**Consequence for you:** because CI cannot run, the **local toolbox gate is the only
+**Consequence for you:** CI now runs, but it does not yet *block* anything. Always run
-real gate**. Run it and quote its numbers in your report. Never describe a PR as
+the toolbox gate yourself and quote its numbers. Never describe a PR as "green" on the
-"green" on the strength of CI that did not execute.
+strength of a check you have not seen report — and note that a **skipped** Gitea job
+reports as `success`, so a green tick is not by itself evidence that anything ran.
 
 ## 3. Gate before you push
 

DECISIONS-LOG.md

@@ -4781,3 +4781,85 @@ accurate before the PR flow and are stale now. Correcting them is tracked, not d
 3. Land `feat/plex-claim-sops-secret` (PR #1) once the gate can actually run.
 4. Claim plex, after checking it is not already claimed.
 5. Correct the 37 runbooks' `git push origin main` wording.
+
+## 2026-09-29 — Plex is claimed; the CI/CD gate that "enforced" it never existed. **PM HANDOFF.**
+
+Began as "inject a plex.tv claim token". Ended by discovering the delivery pipeline was fiction,
+rebuilding it, and shipping the token through it. Plex is **claimed** — `PlexOnlineToken` is
+present in `/config` on the `plex-config` PVC, so the exchange is now a permanent no-op and the
+library scan is running over the 8.33T NFS share.
+
+### The finding: both halves of the 2026-08-31 CI claim were false
+
+That entry recorded "Gitea Actions CI is LIVE + enforcing … required status check; runner
+`incluster-dind` online". Measured against the live API on 2026-09-29:
+
+| Claimed | Measured |
+|---|---|
+| `main` protected, gate required | `branch_protections` → `[]`; `protected:false`, `enable_status_check:false`, `required_approvals:0`, `user_can_push:true` |
+| Runner online | **zero** runners at repo, org AND site level |
+
+**PR #1 was the first pull request this repository has ever had.** Its contexts sat `pending`
+for 30.6 minutes across 122 polls and never reported. For a month, every "the gate enforces this"
+statement rested on an assertion nobody had checked — the same fail-open class as 2026-09-18,
+and the reason it hid so long is that the log itself was the evidence.
+
+### Root cause of the dead runner
+
+`act_runner` registers **once** and persists its identity in `/data/.runner` on the
+`act-runner-data` PVC. Gitea no longer held a matching row, so the pod booted, saw `.runner`,
+**skipped registration**, and polled with an identity Gitea did not recognise. Symptom: zero
+runners, pod Running, nothing crashlooping, no error anyone reads. Deleting the PVC forced a
+genuine re-registration (`.runner is missing` → `Runner registered successfully`).
+
+It then did not come back for several minutes, because Flux could not recreate the PVC:
+`apps-wave-1` was blocked four levels deep on a **stale** `DependencyNotReady` for
+`platform-config`, which itself read `Ready=True`. Each wave re-evaluates only on its own
+`interval: 10m`, so a resource deleted at the bottom of the chain can take ~40 min to return.
+**Force it** with `flux reconcile kustomization apps-wave-1 --with-source` rather than waiting.
+
+### Corrections to things this log and the runbooks asserted
+
+- **A skipped Gitea job reports `success`, not pending.** Measured: `gate / conformance` returned
+  `success` / "Has been skipped". An earlier entry (#2) said requiring it would deadlock every PR.
+  Wrong — it would pass **vacuously**, forever, while nothing ran. Under HARD RULE 4 that is worse
+  than a deadlock, because a deadlock is loud. Never require it; require
+  `gate / gate (pull_request)` alone. Corrected in #3.
+- **`gate.yml`'s push trigger omits `feat/**`** (it lists `feature/** fix/** docs/** chore/**`).
+  With `act_runner` capacity 1, a branch prefix that IS in that list fires a second redundant run
+  which serialises ahead of the PR run and doubles wall-clock. Exploited deliberately in
+  `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh`; the honest fix is to align the trigger list.
+- **The "~4-minute TTL"** asserted in four places was **uncited**, and upstream `pms-docker`
+  documents no expiry at all. The authoritative reading is the countdown plex.tv/claim renders at
+  issue time. Removed from `runbooks/plex-claim.md`; the same claim still sits in
+  `catalog/plex.yaml` and the Secret's header comment (left alone — editing a `.sops.yaml`
+  comment risks the MAC, and touching `catalog/plex.yaml` re-renders a golden).
+
+### Measured, once the pipeline actually worked
+
+`gate / gate (pull_request)` 1m34s–1m58s. Full claim loop end to end **~2m45s** — comfortably
+inside the window, which retires the theory that a short-lived token cannot survive a PR flow.
+That theory was mine and it was wrong: the pipeline was never too slow, it simply did not exist.
+
+### State now
+
+- `main` **protected**, `user_can_push:false`. Runner `incluster-dind` online.
+- `CLAUDE.md` is the agent delivery contract; `infra/gitea/` holds the protection + runner scripts.
+- **All 37 runbooks** that instructed `git push origin main` now describe the PR flow — that
+  instruction had become actively blocked, not merely stale.
+- `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh` drives the claim loop end to end.
+
+### Next steps
+
+1. **`enable_status_check: true`** with `gate / gate (pull_request)` as the only context. The
+   prerequisite is met: the gate has been observed green on real PRs.
+2. Add `jakman85` as a repo **collaborator**, then `required_approvals: 1`. (Currently the only
+   org member is `gitea-admin`, which agents authenticate as — requiring approval before that is
+   fixed would leave nobody able to approve.)
+3. Run the **push probe** against protection: `gitea-admin` is a site admin and Gitea may let it
+   bypass. `user_can_push:false` is the API's opinion, not proof.
+4. Align `gate.yml`'s push trigger with this repo's `feat/**` prefix.
+5. Convert the `dind` container to a **native sidecar** with a `startupProbe`, per the standing
+   FOLLOW-UP note in `apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml`. It deletes both hand-rolled wait loops and
+   the envsubst hazard. Land it ALONE — it is the merge gate for the whole repo.
+6. Create the Plex libraries over `/media/movies`, `/media/tv`, `/media/photos`.

apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ resources:
 - pihole-dns.yaml
 - pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
 - pihole.yaml
+- plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
 - plex.yaml
 - qbittorrent-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml
 - qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml

apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# Plex plex.tv server-claim token (WS-APPS). SOPS-encrypted (age).
+# Consumed by catalog/plex.yaml as env PLEX_CLAIM via valueFrom.secretKeyRef.
+#
+# NOTE ON THESE COMMENTS: they carry NO dollar-brace expressions, deliberately. This file is applied
+# by the apps-wave-0 Flux Kustomization, which runs envsubst over the built output, and kustomize
+# preserves body comments into that stream (see conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-
+# substitution). A braced token quoted from the upstream shell script would be a live hazard here,
+# not prose, so the upstream conditions below are described in words.
+#
+# THE VALUE SHIPPED WITH THIS FILE IS A PLACEHOLDER, DELIBERATELY — the literal string
+# `replace-me-with-a-fresh-plex-tv-claim-token`, not a credential. A https://plex.tv/claim token has
+# a ~4-minute TTL, far shorter than commit -> push -> Flux reconcile -> pod-roll, so no token
+# committed here is ever still valid when the pod starts. This file exists to make the Secret — and
+# therefore the env reference — ALWAYS RESOLVABLE IN THE FLUX GRAPH, not to carry a working token.
+# The real token is injected by the operator inside that 4-minute window: runbooks/plex-claim.md.
+#
+# WHY SHIPPING A PLACEHOLDER IS SAFE (verified against plexinc/pms-docker branch `master`, the
+# s6-overlay v2 script root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run, cross-checked byte-identical against
+# the same file extracted from the running `plexinc/pms-docker:latest` image):
+#   - line 106 guards the claim exchange on TWO conditions: PLEX_CLAIM non-empty AND the
+#     PlexOnlineToken pref read out of /config empty. Once the server is claimed that block is
+#     skipped entirely, so whatever this Secret holds is a NO-OP on every later start. Upstream
+#     README: "If server is already logged in, this parameter is ignored."
+#   - on a still-UNCLAIMED /config, an invalid or expired token makes plex.tv answer 403 with an
+#     empty body. curl's exit status is never checked, the sed for the authentication-token element
+#     yields the empty string, and the success branch at line 120 simply does not fire. There is no
+#     else branch and no non-zero exit; the script has no `set -e` and ends by touching
+#     /.firstRunComplete and echoing, so it exits 0. The server comes up UNCLAIMED and serving.
+#     It does NOT crashloop.
+#   - the image never sets S6_BEHAVIOUR_IF_STAGE2_FAILS, whose default is 0 ("continue silently even
+#     if a cont-init script failed"), so even a hypothetical non-zero exit would not halt startup.
+# A MISSING Secret would NOT be safe: the ServiceDefinition schema's valueFrom.secretKeyRef shape
+# has no `optional` field, so an absent Secret is a hard CreateContainerConfigError. That is exactly
+# why this file is committed and listed in apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml instead of being created
+# by hand at claim time.
+#
+# INJECTION / ROTATION (operator, not agents) — runbooks/plex-claim.md has the timed procedure:
+#   infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
+# Never decrypt this file into a shell, a log, or a shared terminal.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+    name: plex-claim
+    namespace: plex
+    labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: plex
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+    PLEX_CLAIM: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:nLmzeUBWRhRjUakrGiGzQpQuqZNcIYvRH6M=,iv:z0on/dArsNejNLrp3V1nSiNLFzKcREhPuMO1634CwQw=,tag:Ih23CT1JYna/5lfYQUb1Dw==,type:str]
+sops:
+    kms: []
+    gcp_kms: []
+    azure_kv: []
+    hc_vault: []
+    age:
+        - recipient: age175l8mdpdfu7hq0aml3exs3gykarwjmuvr23sq56s3wjejnyk44wsp4mfzg
+          enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSA2dWtqOVNQalZ2QlRxOXJa
+            cDc1MTdtWENkdWIxS1JId3dIU1JDSmk0ODNrCk1YUzhFWXR3bUxyV2NNcmFOakdz
+            THl1Q284dFJxTy9Rd1h0eXJJaVZtdmcKLS0tIERuN0ZFeW9zdi9aNFRYNWxmUS9s
+            QUtYdHEvN042ajNoNktOLzlYQmQrc1kK4NHozMbXVzNGYbUBRbK6a9Uw/sVPAfe6
+            RW5KWzZ4I/hloqjN3zzVISoSMieMkBGDnF5qZS5N6FqIc6/HrsDD8A==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+    lastmodified: "2026-09-29T06:31:16Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:62BmBAq45CD2g6LDyx+Ho4bTfrhJcaro/RB/iM+OaRc4a/D83MhjbcBL11Uz/O726inqhkvCKDJ/fFemoc50JDbtC79cYMaxrGJNjFM0sdckWrowPvh6ie7HHHUBRBaefl+gNfnc+pbvcncvRzwA4RyzcZse1wbxKfHN8FjEopE=,iv:h0cMShs3tIgnY6eruUYymYrcLFzQZLk/uXQJ/Jsd5ek=,tag:nZ9Pau7p4xWT1QCN1vv2vA==,type:str]
+    pgp: []
+    encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
+    version: 3.9.4

apps/wave-0/plex.yaml

@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ spec:
           value: Etc/UTC
         - name: ALLOWED_NETWORKS
           value: 10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16
+        - name: PLEX_CLAIM
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: plex-claim
+              key: PLEX_CLAIM
         volumeMounts:
         - name: config
           mountPath: /config

catalog/plex.yaml

@@ -32,11 +32,40 @@ env:
   # (10.43.0.0/16); 192.168.0.0/16 covers the home LAN.
   - name: ALLOWED_NETWORKS
     value: 10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16
-  # PLEX_CLAIM is deliberately NOT set here: a https://plex.tv/claim token has a ~4-min TTL, far
+  # PLEX_CLAIM — the ONE-SHOT plex.tv server claim, sourced from the SOPS Secret `plex-claim`
-  # shorter than the commit -> push -> Flux reconcile -> pod-roll cycle, so any token committed to git
+  # (apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml, same wave => applied in the same reconcile as this
-  # is already expired by the time the pod starts. Claiming is a one-time LIVE step (UI sign-in, or a
+  # workload). Plex cannot create libraries over the mounted bulk share while the server is
-  # single API POST) against the running server; the claim then persists on the /config PVC and
+  # UNCLAIMED, so this is wired; it was previously left out on the reasoning below, and only one
-  # survives pod rolls (including the roll this env change causes), so it never belongs in git.
+  # half of that reasoning survived contact with the upstream source.
+  #
+  # THE 4-MINUTE TTL IS STILL TRUE, and it is now the OPERATIONAL constraint rather than a reason to
+  # abstain. A https://plex.tv/claim token expires in ~4 minutes — far shorter than commit -> push ->
+  # Flux reconcile -> pod-roll if that cycle is left to its own timers. So the committed value is a
+  # documented PLACEHOLDER and the live token is injected by the operator inside that window, with an
+  # explicit `flux reconcile` to collapse the wait: runbooks/plex-claim.md is the timed procedure.
+  #
+  # ONE-SHOT, AND SAFE TO SIT HERE EXPIRED. Verified from plexinc/pms-docker's own first-run script
+  # (branch `master`, root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run, confirmed byte-identical to the file in
+  # the running `:latest` image), NOT assumed:
+  #   - the exchange (line 106) is guarded on TWO conditions: PLEX_CLAIM non-empty AND the
+  #     PlexOnlineToken pref in /config empty. Once claimed, the block is SKIPPED — this env is a
+  #     no-op on every subsequent start, whatever it holds. (Upstream README: "If server is already
+  #     logged in, this parameter is ignored.") The claim itself persists on the /config PVC as before.
+  #   - an invalid/expired token on a still-unclaimed /config gets a 403 with an empty body; curl's
+  #     status is unchecked, the token `sed` yields "", the success branch at line 120 does not fire,
+  #     there is no `else` and no `exit 1`, and the script (no `set -e`) exits 0. It comes up UNCLAIMED and
+  #     SERVING — it does NOT crashloop. The image also leaves S6_BEHAVIOUR_IF_STAGE2_FAILS at its
+  #     default 0, which continues startup even when a cont-init script fails.
+  # So the earlier "a placeholder claim Secret would crashloop the pod" note was WRONG about the
+  # placeholder; it was right only about an ABSENT Secret. secretKeyRef here has no `optional` field,
+  # so the Secret must always exist in the Flux graph — which is why it is committed, encrypted, and
+  # listed in apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml rather than hand-created at claim time. No schema change
+  # is needed: `optional` would only matter if a missing Secret had to be tolerated, and it doesn't.
+  - name: PLEX_CLAIM
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: plex-claim
+        key: PLEX_CLAIM
   # ADVERTISE_IP ("Custom server access URLs") is DEFERRED, not accidentally omitted. It tells Plex
   # which URL to advertise to plex.tv for REMOTE clients. The only candidate is
   # https://plex.home.keithjackson.dev, but that host resolves via split-horizon DNS to the INTERNAL
@@ -56,10 +85,12 @@ storage:
                               # container's EPHEMERAL layer -> unclaimed + all state lost on restart. The image inits as
                               # root (s6-svscan PID 1), chowns /config to the plex user, then drops -> no fsGroup needed
                               # (verified in-cluster: PID1=root, "Plex Media Server"=plex). Persisting /config here also
-                              # makes the claim survive restarts once claimed. To auto-claim on first boot instead of the
+                              # makes the claim survive restarts once claimed — which is what makes the PLEX_CLAIM env
-                              # UI sign-in, the operator adds a PLEX_CLAIM env from a fresh https://plex.tv/claim token
+                              # above a ONE-SHOT: the token is exchanged for a PlexOnlineToken written here, and the
-                              # (4-min TTL) — deliberately NOT wired here: the env secretKeyRef pattern has no `optional`,
+                              # exchange is then skipped on every later start. (The older note here claimed a
-                              # so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would crashloop the pod. See operator hand-off.
+                              # placeholder claim Secret "would crashloop the pod"; upstream's first-run script says
+                              # otherwise — see the PLEX_CLAIM comment in `env` above. An ABSENT Secret is the hard
+                              # failure, and that is why one is committed.)
   # THE LIBRARY (docs/04 bulk tier). One READ-ONLY mount of the export ROOT, giving /media/movies,
   # /media/tv and /media/photos — the whole tree the layout actually has (`ls /mnt/Storage/plex`:
   # downloads/ movies/ photos/ tv/).

catalog/render.py

@@ -1844,6 +1844,10 @@ def plan_apps_waves(sds: list, present_files: set) -> dict:
     convention:
       - `<svc>.yaml`                        -> wave(svc)
       - `<svc>-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml`  -> wave(svc)   (consumed by svc's env, same apply)
+      - `<svc>-claim-secret.sops.yaml`      -> wave(svc)   (a one-shot upstream-service claim token
+        consumed by svc's env — plex's plex.tv claim. Same wave as the app for the same reason the
+        bootstrap secret is: an env `secretKeyRef` has no `optional`, so the Secret must be applied
+        in the SAME reconcile as the workload or the pod is CreateContainerConfigError.)
       - `<svc>-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc)  (forward-auth sidecar OIDC creds)
       - `<svc>-db.yaml`                     -> wave(svc-db) (a strictly-lower wave; CNPG DB)
       - `<svc>-db-app.sops.yaml`            -> wave(svc-db) (CNPG initdb owner secret)
@@ -1870,6 +1874,11 @@ def plan_apps_waves(sds: list, present_files: set) -> dict:
         w = waves[name]
         add(w, f"{name}.yaml")
         add(w, f"{name}-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml")
+        # A one-shot claim token for an UPSTREAM service (plex's plex.tv claim). Same wave as the
+        # app: it is read by the app's env at pod start, and an env secretKeyRef has no `optional`,
+        # so a Secret applied in a later wave would leave the pod in CreateContainerConfigError.
+        # Placed only when the file exists, so services without one are unaffected.
+        add(w, f"{name}-claim-secret.sops.yaml")
         # forward-auth (Option B): the per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar's OIDC client + cookie secret.
         # Same wave as the app (the sidecar reads it at pod start); placed only when the file exists,
         # so non-forward-auth apps are unaffected. Mirrors the bootstrap-secret naming convention.
@@ -2548,7 +2557,8 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
     # 7a) plan_apps_waves: sidecars inherit their unit's wave; not-onboarded SDs are skipped;
     #     EXTRA_UNITS anchor strictly above; a file absent from the tree is never placed.
     present = {
-        "a.yaml", "svc.yaml", "svc-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml",
+        "a.yaml", "a-claim-secret.sops.yaml",
+        "svc.yaml", "svc-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml",
         "svc-db.yaml", "svc-db-app.sops.yaml", "svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml",
         "svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml",
         "gitea.yaml",
@@ -2559,6 +2569,10 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
     plan = plan_apps_waves(plan_sds, present)
     flat = {f: wv for wv, fs in plan.items() for f in fs}
     check(flat.get("a.yaml") == 0, "leaf app must land in wave 0")
+    check(flat.get("a-claim-secret.sops.yaml") == 0,
+          "a `<svc>-claim-secret.sops.yaml` (plex's plex.tv claim) must be placed in the SAME wave "
+          "as its app — an env secretKeyRef has no `optional`, so a later wave means "
+          "CreateContainerConfigError")
     check(flat.get("svc-db.yaml") == 0 and flat.get("svc-db-app.sops.yaml") == 0
           and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml") == 0
           and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml") == 0,

infra/gitea/README.md

@@ -54,6 +54,29 @@ commands.
 4. Add the human reviewer as a repo collaborator, then raise `required_approvals` to 1.
 
 > **Do not do step 3 before step 1.** A required status check with no runner leaves every
-> PR permanently pending — including the PR that would fix it. The same applies to
+> PR permanently pending — including the PR that would fix it. That half is measured: PR #1
-> `gate.yml`'s `conformance` job: it is `if: false` and never runs, yet still publishes a
+> sat `pending` for 30.6 minutes across 122 polls with no runner registered, and never
-> `gate / conformance (pull_request)` context. Never list that one as required.
+> reported.
+
+### Measured, once the runner came up (2026-09-29)
+
+The first CI jobs this repo ever ran, on PR #1 and PR #2:
+
+| Context | Result | Time |
+|---|---|---|
+| `gate / gate (pull_request)` | success | 1m58s (PR #1), 1m34s (PR #2) |
+| `gate / gate (push)` | success | 1m32s (PR #2 only) |
+| `gate / conformance (pull_request)` | **success — "Has been skipped"** | — |
+
+**Require `gate / gate (pull_request)`. Do NOT require either `conformance` context —
+but not for the reason an earlier draft of this file gave.** A skipped Gitea Actions job
+does not hang a status check: Gitea reports it as **`success`** with the description
+"Has been skipped". So requiring it would not deadlock anything — it would pass
+*vacuously*, every time, forever, while nothing ran. Under HARD RULE 4 that is worse than
+a deadlock: a deadlock is loud, a permanently-green check that verifies nothing is
+exactly the fail-open shape this repo keeps finding.
+
+The `(push)` contexts appear only for branches matching `gate.yml`'s push trigger
+(`feature/**`, `fix/**`, `docs/**`, `chore/**`). `feat/**` is **not** in that list, which
+is why PR #1's `feat/` branch produced only `pull_request` contexts. Require only the
+`pull_request` context, or PRs from non-matching prefixes will never satisfy the rule.

infra/plex/claim-ship.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# plex-claim-ship.sh — run this IMMEDIATELY AFTER editing the SOPS secret with a fresh
+# plex.tv claim token. It drives the whole CI/CD loop end to end and prints a running
+# stopwatch so you can see the budget being spent.
+#
+#   branch -> commit -> push -> PR -> gate -> merge -> reconcile -> pod roll -> verify
+#
+# It never sees, prints, or handles the token: the file is already encrypted by sops.
+set -euo pipefail
+HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
+OWNER=Home-Network
+REPO=home-network-k3s-impl
+SECRET=apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
+T0=$(date +%s)
+el() { printf '\n[T+%02d:%02d] %s\n' $(( ($(date +%s)-T0)/60 )) $(( ($(date +%s)-T0)%60 )) "$1"; }
+
+cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+
+# --- preflight: refuse to ship a file that is not what we think it is -------------
+git diff --quiet -- "$SECRET" && { echo "ERROR: $SECRET is unchanged. Edit it first:"; \
+  echo "  infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops $SECRET"; exit 1; }
+grep -q 'PLEX_CLAIM: ENC\[' "$SECRET" || { echo "ERROR: $SECRET is not encrypted. REFUSING."; exit 1; }
+[ -z "$(git status --porcelain | grep -v " $SECRET\$")" ] || echo "NOTE: other files are dirty; only $SECRET will be committed."
+
+creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
+U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"; P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
+api() { curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") "$@"; }
+
+# feat/ prefix ON PURPOSE. act_runner capacity is 1, and gate.yml's PUSH trigger covers
+# feature/** fix/** docs/** chore/** but NOT feat/** — so a chore/ branch would fire a
+# second, redundant run that SERIALISES ahead of the PR run and doubles the wall clock.
+BRANCH="feat/plex-claim-token-$(date +%H%M%S)"
+
+el "committing on $BRANCH"
+git checkout -q -b "$BRANCH"
+git add "$SECRET"
+git commit -q -m 'chore(plex): fresh plex.tv claim token
+
+Injected inside the plex.tv claim window per runbooks/plex-claim.md.'
+SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+
+el "pushing"
+git push -q -u origin "$BRANCH"
+
+el "opening PR"
+PR=$(jq -n --arg h "$BRANCH" --arg b main --arg t 'chore(plex): fresh plex.tv claim token' \
+       '{head:$h,base:$b,title:$t,body:"Token injection inside the claim window. Wiring already reviewed in #1."}' \
+     | api -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data @- \
+         "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls" | jq -r '.number')
+[ -n "$PR" ] && [ "$PR" != "null" ] || { echo "PR creation failed"; exit 1; }
+echo "  PR #$PR"
+
+el "waiting for the gate (expect ~1m40s)"
+for i in $(seq 1 60); do
+  st=$(api "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/commits/${SHA}/status" | jq -r '.state')
+  printf '\r  gate=%s  [T+%ss]   ' "$st" "$(( $(date +%s)-T0 ))"
+  case "$st" in success) echo; break;; failure|error) echo; echo "GATE FAILED — stopping."; exit 1;; esac
+  sleep 5
+done
+[ "$st" = "success" ] || { echo; echo "gate did not finish in time"; exit 1; }
+
+el "merging PR #$PR"
+api -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"Do":"merge"}' \
+  "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls/${PR}/merge" >/dev/null
+git checkout -q main && git pull -q --ff-only origin main
+
+el "forcing the Flux reconcile (--with-source, or it applies the OLD revision)"
+./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'flux --context k3s-prod -n flux-system reconcile kustomization apps-wave-0 --with-source'
+
+# MANDATORY here. Only the Secret ciphertext changed, so the Deployment pod template is
+# byte-identical and NOTHING restarts on its own. PLEX_CLAIM is read once, at container
+# start. Skipping this is failure mode #2 in runbooks/plex-claim.md.
+el "rolling the pod (mandatory — a changed Secret restarts nothing)"
+./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex rollout restart deployment/plex && \
+   kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex rollout status deployment/plex --timeout=120s'
+
+el "verdict"
+./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex logs deploy/plex --since=3m | grep -i -e claim -e token || true'
+cat <<'NOTE'
+
+  "Attempting to obtain server token..." + "Token obtained successfully"  -> CLAIMED
+  "Attempting..." with no success line                                    -> token expired; retry, nothing is broken
+  neither line                                                            -> already claimed, or env did not reach the container
+
+Confirm it persisted (prints the attribute NAME only, never its value):
+
+  infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+    'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- sh -c \
+       "grep -o PlexOnlineToken= \"/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Preferences.xml\" | head -1"'
+NOTE

runbooks/README.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Every alert rule in this platform carries an annotation of the form
 
     runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"
 
-46 of them, over the 35 names below. Until this directory existed, that path returned **HTTP 404** on the
+46 of them, over 35 names. Until this directory existed, that path returned **HTTP 404** on the
 live cluster: every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment they needed
 help. These pages are what makes the link resolve.
 
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ negative is how a CLI quirk becomes real data loss. Write `backups.velero.io`,
 `backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `settings.longhorn.io`,
 `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
-`git push origin main` **is** the deploy; there is no other apply step. Durable changes go through git.
+Merging a PR into `main` **is** the deploy; there is no other apply step. `main` is protected, so a
+direct push is rejected — durable changes go through a branch, a PR, and a green gate.
 
 ## Alerts you should not trust the silence of (measured 2026-09-13)
 
@@ -108,6 +109,13 @@ Each affected runbook says so on its own page and gives the by-hand equivalent.
 - **`keycloak-client-secrets`** — the client/URL reconciler failing or silent. The 2026-09-06 lockout that
   every green signal missed.
 
+### Operator procedures (no alert links here)
+- **`plex-claim`** — claiming the Plex Media Server. **Claimed 2026-09-29**; the page now only
+  applies after a `/config` wipe. The claim token is short-lived — read the countdown on
+  plex.tv/claim — so it is a timed sequence, scripted as `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh`:
+  token → `sops` → PR → gate → merge → **forced** `flux reconcile` → pod roll (~2m45s measured).
+  Includes why a changed Secret does not restart anything, and why an expired token is harmless.
+
 ### Virtualisation
 - **`kubevirt-control-plane`** — VM lifecycle operations will fail; running VMs keep running.
 - **`kubevirt-launch-failed`** — a VMI reached the Failed phase. The three k3s-specific launch traps.

runbooks/backup-failure.md

@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/backup-missed.md

@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/backup-partial.md

@@ -78,8 +78,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cdi-import-stuck.md

@@ -55,8 +55,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cert-expiry.md

@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cert-issuance.md

@@ -63,8 +63,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cnpg-archiving.md

@@ -87,8 +87,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cnpg-backup-missed.md

@@ -69,8 +69,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cnpg-exporter.md

@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cnpg-primary-spread.md

@@ -68,8 +68,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/cnpg-wal-growth.md

@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/denied-flows.md

@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/flux-reconcile.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 ## What this means here
 
 Something in the GitOps chain is stuck at Ready=False. On this cluster that is more consequential than
-it sounds, because **`git push origin main` IS the deploy** — there is no other apply step. A stuck
+it sounds, because **merging a PR into `main` IS the deploy** — there is no other apply step. A stuck
 Kustomization means git and the cluster have diverged and nothing will close the gap.
 
 The chain has **14 tiers**: `flux-system` → `cilium` → `platform` → `platform-config` →
@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/flux-suspended.md

@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/image-automation.md

@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/image-policy-stalled.md

@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets.md

@@ -87,8 +87,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/keycloak-db.md

@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/keycloak-down.md

@@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/kubevirt-control-plane.md

@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/kubevirt-crashloop.md

@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/kubevirt-launch-failed.md

@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/kustomization.yaml

@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ configMapGenerator:
       - node-io=node-io.md
       - node-memory=node-memory.md
       - node-memory-swap=node-memory-swap.md
+      # Operator procedure, not an alert page (no alert links to it — the
+      # alert-runbooks-resolvable check treats that as advisory). It is served
+      # because the plex.tv claim window is short and is not a thing to go looking
+      # for in git: /runbooks/plex-claim has to resolve the moment it is needed.
+      - plex-claim=plex-claim.md
       - pvc-capacity=pvc-capacity.md
       - targets-down=targets-down.md
       - update-rollback=update-rollback.md

runbooks/longhorn-capacity.md

@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/longhorn-degraded.md

@@ -74,8 +74,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/longhorn-faulted.md

@@ -75,8 +75,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/monitoring-capacity.md

@@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/node-cpu.md

@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/node-disk.md

@@ -56,8 +56,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/node-down.md

@@ -56,8 +56,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/node-io.md

@@ -227,8 +227,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/node-memory.md

@@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/plex-claim.md

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+# plex-claim — claiming the Plex Media Server inside the token window
+
+**Alert:** none. This is an **operator procedure**, not an incident page — it is indexed here because
+it is the page you need at the moment you need it, with a stopwatch running.
+**Files:** `catalog/plex.yaml` (env `PLEX_CLAIM`), `apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml`
+(the SOPS Secret `plex-claim`, key `PLEX_CLAIM`), `apps/wave-0/plex.yaml` (the rendered golden).
+
+## What this means here
+
+Plex will not let you **create libraries** over the mounted bulk media share while the server is
+**unclaimed** — the 8.33 T NFS tree at `/media` is there, readable, and unusable. Claiming binds the
+server to a plex.tv account. It is a **one-shot** operation: the token is exchanged once for a durable
+`PlexOnlineToken` written into `Preferences.xml` on the `plex-config` Longhorn PVC, and from then on
+the `PLEX_CLAIM` env is **ignored on every start** (upstream gate:
+`[ ! -z "${PLEX_CLAIM}" ] && [ -z "${token}" ]` in `root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run`).
+
+**A `https://plex.tv/claim` token is short-lived — minutes, not hours.** Read the countdown the
+claim page shows you; do not budget against a number written here. That is shorter than PR → gate →
+merge → Flux's 10-minute reconcile interval → pod roll if you let those run on their own timers,
+which is why this page exists: the loop is scripted and the reconcile is **forced** rather than
+waited for. Measured end to end on 2026-09-29: **~2m45s**.
+
+**An expired or wrong token does not break anything.** Verified against the image's own first-run
+script (and the copy inside `plexinc/pms-docker:latest`): a failed exchange gets a 403 with an empty
+body, `curl`'s status is never checked, the token `sed` yields empty, the `if` does not fire, there is
+no `else` and no `exit 1`, and the script (no `set -e`) exits 0. The pod comes up **unclaimed and
+serving**. So a burnt token costs you one more attempt, not an outage — and the repo deliberately
+ships a **placeholder** in that Secret for exactly this reason (the env `secretKeyRef` has no
+`optional`, so the Secret must always exist even when its value is useless).
+
+## Running the commands in this runbook
+
+`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
+container, and the host's `k3s-oidc` context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires — that
+hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
+
+    infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
+
+Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
+picks a current-context per invocation, and that default has already changed once (k3s-dev until dev
+was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, k3s-prod now). Do not run two `dev.sh` invocations at once.
+
+Mutating `kubectl` and `flux reconcile` are blocked for agents here. **This whole page is operator
+work** — the reconcile and the pod roll below are deliberate operator actions, and the durable change
+is still a git change.
+
+## First commands
+
+**Before spending a token, find out whether the server is already claimed.** This prints only the
+attribute NAME, never its value — do not widen it to print the token:
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- sh -c \
+     "grep -o PlexOnlineToken= \"/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Preferences.xml\" | head -1"'
+```
+
+`PlexOnlineToken=` printed ⇒ **already claimed**; stop, there is nothing to do and no token to burn.
+Empty output ⇒ unclaimed, continue.
+
+Is the workload healthy enough to claim at all, and is the wave reconciling?
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex get deploy,pod,pvc'
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n flux-system get kustomization apps-wave-0'
+```
+
+## The procedure
+
+> **STATUS: this server was CLAIMED on 2026-09-29** and `PlexOnlineToken` is present in
+> `/config` on the `plex-config` PVC. The upstream exchange is gated on that pref being
+> *absent*, so `PLEX_CLAIM` is now a **no-op on every start** whatever it holds. You only need
+> this page again after a `/config` wipe or a rebuild onto an empty PVC.
+
+**On the clock.** The token is short-lived — **read the countdown that plex.tv/claim shows you**
+rather than trusting a number written here. (Earlier revisions of this page asserted a "~4-minute
+TTL" in four places with no citation; upstream `pms-docker` documents no expiry at all. The page
+is the only authority, and it is on screen at T+0.)
+
+**A burnt token costs nothing.** An expired token gets a 403 with an empty body, `curl`'s status is
+never checked, the `if` does not fire, there is no `else` and no `exit 1`, and the script (no
+`set -e`) exits 0. The pod comes up unclaimed and serving. So retry freely.
+
+### One command
+
+1. **T+0 — get the token.** Sign in to plex.tv as the account that should OWN this server, open
+   <https://plex.tv/claim>, copy the `claim-…` string.
+
+2. **Put it in the Secret** — in place, encrypted, never touching a plaintext file:
+
+   ```
+   infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
+   ```
+
+3. **Ship it.** This drives the whole delivery loop and prints a running stopwatch:
+
+   ```
+   ./infra/plex/claim-ship.sh
+   ```
+
+   branch → commit → push → PR → gate → merge → `flux reconcile --with-source` → `rollout restart`
+   → verdict. It refuses to run if the file is unchanged or not encrypted.
+
+**Measured end to end, 2026-09-29: ~2m45s.** Gate ~1m40s, merge + reconcile ~25s, pod roll and
+container start ~30s.
+
+### Why it is a script and not six pasted commands
+
+`main` is a **protected branch** — the direct push this page used to instruct is now rejected — so
+the deploy is a PR merged after a green gate. Three of those steps are easy to get wrong under time
+pressure, and two are silent when skipped:
+
+- **`--with-source` is load-bearing.** Without it the Kustomization applies the previously-fetched
+  revision, not your commit.
+- **The pod roll is mandatory.** Only the Secret's ciphertext changes, so the Deployment's pod
+  template is byte-identical and *nothing restarts on its own*. `PLEX_CLAIM` is read once, at
+  container start. Skip this and the new Secret sits in the cluster while the running pod keeps the
+  old value forever.
+- **The branch is named `feat/…` on purpose.** `act_runner` capacity is 1, and `gate.yml`'s push
+  trigger covers `feature/** fix/** docs/** chore/**` but *not* `feat/**`. A `chore/` branch fires a
+  second redundant run that serialises ahead of the PR run and roughly doubles the wall clock.
+
+### Reading the verdict
+
+* `Attempting to obtain server token from claim token` **and** `Token obtained successfully`
+  ⇒ **claimed.** Re-run the First-commands `PlexOnlineToken=` check to confirm it persisted, then
+  create the libraries over `/media/movies`, `/media/tv`, `/media/photos`.
+* `Attempting…` with **no** success line ⇒ the token was expired or invalid. Nothing is broken; go
+  back to step 1 with a new one.
+* **Neither line** ⇒ the exchange was skipped: `/config` already had a `PlexOnlineToken` (already
+  claimed — the expected case now), or the env did not reach the container. Check by NAME only:
+
+  ```
+  infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+    'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=plex \
+       -o jsonpath="{.items[0].spec.containers[0].env[*].name}"'
+  ```
+
+## Likely causes, most likely first
+
+When the claim does not take, in order of how often it is the answer here:
+
+1. **The token expired** — you exceeded the countdown, usually by reviewing the PR instead of
+   merging it the moment the gate went green. Symptom: the "Attempting…" line with no success line.
+   Remedy: a new token, and let `claim-ship.sh` drive the loop rather than pasting steps.
+2. **The pod was never restarted** (step 5 skipped). Symptom: no claim log lines at all from a pod
+   whose `AGE` predates your push. The Secret is correct in git and in the cluster and the running
+   container still holds the placeholder.
+3. **Flux had not applied the commit yet** when you rolled the pod — step 5 run before step 4
+   finished, so the new pod read the OLD Secret. Check
+   `kubectl --context k3s-prod -n flux-system get kustomization apps-wave-0 -o jsonpath='{.status.lastAppliedRevision}'`
+   against your commit, then roll again.
+4. **Already claimed** — the exchange is gated on `PlexOnlineToken` being absent from `/config`, so a
+   server claimed earlier ignores every later token silently. This is the benign case.
+5. **`plex.tv` unreachable.** The upstream `curl` has no `--max-time`/`--connect-timeout`, so a stalled
+   connection can leave the container sitting in cont-init with **nothing listening on 32400** — the
+   one genuine hang risk in this path. Symptom: pod Running but never Ready, log stops after
+   "Attempting…". Check egress (`plex` is `egress: internet`) rather than re-rolling repeatedly.
+6. **Wrong plex.tv account.** The claim succeeds and binds the server to whoever was signed in at
+   step 1. Unclaiming is a plex.tv-side operation on that account — see "escalate or stop".
+
+## When to escalate or stop
+
+- **Stop after two failed token attempts** and fix the timing, not the token. The third rushed attempt
+  is how people start editing live Secrets by hand, which leaves the cluster holding a value that is
+  in no git commit — precisely the drift `qbittorrent-bootstrap` had to be recovered from.
+- **Never `kubectl edit`/`patch` the `plex-claim` Secret in the cluster, and never
+  `kubectl create secret` it.** Everything durable goes through the SOPS file; a live-only Secret is
+  reverted (or adopted with the wrong value) on the next reconcile.
+- **Never `sops -d` this file into a terminal, a log, or a shared screen**, and never widen the
+  `PlexOnlineToken=` check into one that prints the value. The token is a plex.tv account credential.
+- **If the server got claimed to the wrong account, stop and get the operator.** Reversing it means
+  removing the server from that account on plex.tv and clearing `PlexOnlineToken` from
+  `Preferences.xml` on the PVC — a destructive edit of app state on the replicated tier, not a git
+  change.
+- **Do not delete the `plex-config` PVC to "start clean".** It holds the library database, metadata
+  and watch state (`policy: daily-offcluster`), and it is expensive to rebuild. The claim is a
+  two-line pref, not a reason to lose the DB.
+- After a successful claim, **leave the expired token in the SOPS file**. It is inert (the exchange is
+  skipped once claimed) and the Secret must keep existing, because the env `secretKeyRef` has no
+  `optional` — deleting it would put the pod into `CreateContainerConfigError`.
+
+---
+Source of truth: `runbooks/plex-claim.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
+Upstream behaviour cited here is from `plexinc/pms-docker` branch `master`,
+`root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run` (s6-overlay v2), cross-checked against the same file inside
+the running `plexinc/pms-docker:latest` image.

runbooks/pvc-capacity.md

@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/targets-down.md

@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/update-rollback.md

@@ -54,8 +54,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands
 

runbooks/vpn-down.md

@@ -66,8 +66,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
 `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
 
 Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
-agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
+agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
-Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
+is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
+green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
+and it says so.
 
 ## First commands