docs(vuln): handoff for automated CVE visibility

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

.gitea/workflows/README.md

@@ -164,11 +164,14 @@ Cost: the job shares the single act_runner slot with the gate, but the build its
 .gitea/workflows/
   merge-gate.yaml            the pipeline (lint → l0 → l1 → conformance → decision)
   images.yaml                build/verify/publish this repo's container images (see above)
+  cve-triage.yaml            scheduled CVE triage bot (R-VULN-05/07, ADR-0027; runs before Renovate)
   scripts/
     install-tools.sh         installs the pinned tools per stage (from ci/versions.env) — used by the
                              dormant merge-gate.yaml blueprint only; gate.yml runs in the toolbox image
     decide.sh                the R-TEST-03 merge decision over job results
     images.sh                the image pipeline's driver (what to build, base, push, digest)
+    cve_triage.py            the CVE triage bot: reads the scanner report, maintains the counts-only
+                             CVE Dashboard issue, ticks Renovate approval rows (cve-triage.yaml)
   README.md                  this file
 ```
 

.gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+# CVE triage bot (R-VULN-05, R-VULN-07; docs/17 "The triage bot"; ADR-0027). Same shape as
+# renovate.yaml: scheduled, loud on a missing credential, never concurrent with itself, and it
+# records what it did in the job summary. The logic and its reasoning live in
+# scripts/cve_triage.py; this file only supplies the image, the code, the credential and the
+# schedule.
+#
+# WHY IT CANNOT SUCCEED SILENTLY. A skipped Gitea job reports `success` (CLAUDE.md §2), so the
+# token preflight exits 1 rather than skipping, and an unreachable scanner fails the script
+# rather than skipping. The heartbeat POST is the script's last action, so VulnTriageBotSilent
+# fires for every run that did not get all the way through, and when the schedule stops firing.
+#
+# THE ONE SECRET: RENOVATE_TOKEN, deliberately reused (ADR-0027). It acts as renovate-bot, which
+# is also what authored the dashboard this edits. It needs read:repository and write:issue.
+name: cve-triage
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    # 07:15 UTC, one hour before Renovate's 08:15 (renovate.yaml), so a tick is read the same
+    # morning, and clear of its run so the bot's edit cannot race Renovate's rewrite of the body.
+    - cron: "15 7 * * *"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      dry_run:
+        description: "Dry run: read everything, write nothing, print counts."
+        required: false
+        default: "true"
+
+concurrency:
+  group: cve-triage
+  cancel-in-progress: false
+
+jobs:
+  triage:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # THE TOOLBOX, the image gate.yml already runs, pinned by digest. A job here has no Docker
+    # daemon, so a job container is the only way to choose an image. The toolbox provides
+    # python3, git, curl and jq, pulls anonymously like the gate's, and is normally already in
+    # the DinD store. It has no Node, so actions/checkout cannot run; a public python image has
+    # neither Node nor git and would add a second image to keep pinned. The cost is a cold pull
+    # after a runner restart, which the gate pays anyway.
+    container:
+      # renovate-digest: image=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/toolbox tag=main
+      image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/toolbox@sha256:83a3501efe34fa0b039e3f0d360738686a0f59109866c49779768f5d5ed0ef81
+    # Without a bound, a wedged run would hold the concurrency group and block every later run.
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+    steps:
+      - name: Preflight - the token must exist, and its absence must be LOUD
+        shell: bash
+        env:
+          RENOVATE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RENOVATE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ -z "${RENOVATE_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
+            echo "::error::RENOVATE_TOKEN is not set on this repository." >&2
+            echo "A skipped job reports success, so this fails on purpose: without the token no dashboard is maintained and no approval is requested. Add the Actions secret RENOVATE_TOKEN (scopes read:repository, write:issue)." >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "RENOVATE_TOKEN is present (value not printed)."
+
+      - name: Preflight - Gitea is reachable and the token can do this job
+        shell: bash
+        env:
+          RENOVATE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RENOVATE_TOKEN }}
+        # GETs only. The token reaches curl on stdin, never argv. A 401 is the token's value, a 403
+        # its scope; the script's own errors would only show a bare status later.
+        run: |
+          set -uo pipefail
+          GITEA=https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
+          REPO=Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl
+          fail=0
+          body=$(mktemp)
+          fetch() {
+            printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$RENOVATE_TOKEN" \
+              | curl -sS --max-time 30 --config - -o "$body" -w '%{http_code}' "$GITEA$1" || true
+          }
+          probe() { # <what it proves> <path>
+            local code
+            code=$(fetch "$2")
+            if [ "$code" = 200 ]; then
+              echo "ok    $1"
+            else
+              fail=1
+              echo "::error::$1: GET ${2%%\?*} -> $code"
+            fi
+          }
+          probe "read:repository, Gitea reachable" "/api/v1/repos/$REPO"
+          if [ "$(jq -r '.permissions.push // false' "$body" 2>/dev/null)" != "true" ]; then
+            fail=1
+            echo "::error::renovate-bot has no write access to $REPO, so it cannot create labels or edit issues."
+          fi
+          probe "read:issue" "/api/v1/repos/$REPO/labels?limit=1"
+          probe "Renovate's dashboard readable" "/api/v1/repos/$REPO/issues/91"
+          # A GET cannot prove a write scope; Gitea's scope refusal lists the token's scopes
+          # (names only). Same technique as renovate.yaml, advisory if the message format changes.
+          fetch "/api/v1/admin/orgs?limit=1" > /dev/null
+          scopes=$(jq -r '.message // empty' "$body" 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/.*token scope=//p')
+          if [ -n "$scopes" ]; then
+            case ",$scopes," in
+              *",write:issue,"*|*",all,"*) echo "ok    write:issue" ;;
+              *) echo "::error::scope write:issue is missing (token scope=$scopes)"; fail=1 ;;
+            esac
+          else
+            echo "::warning::could not read the token's scope list; write:issue is UNVERIFIED"
+          fi
+          rm -f "$body"
+          [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]
+
+      # Plain git for the same reason as gate.yml: the toolbox has no Node. One commit is enough,
+      # and the job token goes to the single fetch only, never into .git/config.
+      - name: Checkout the script (git, one commit)
+        shell: bash
+        env:
+          GIT_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          SERVER_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}
+          REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }}
+          SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          umask 0022
+          git config --global --add safe.directory "$PWD"
+          git init -q .
+          git remote add origin "${SERVER_URL}/${REPOSITORY}"
+          auth="$(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$GIT_TOKEN" | base64 -w0)"
+          GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader \
+          GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="AUTHORIZATION: basic ${auth}" \
+            git -c protocol.version=2 fetch --quiet --depth=1 --no-tags origin \
+              "+${SHA}:refs/remotes/checkout/head"
+          unset auth GIT_TOKEN
+          git checkout -q --force --detach "$SHA"
+          [ "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$SHA" ]
+
+      - name: Triage
+        shell: bash
+        env:
+          RENOVATE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RENOVATE_TOKEN }}
+          GITEA_URL: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
+          GITEA_REPOSITORY: Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl
+          RENOVATE_DASHBOARD_ISSUE: "91"
+          VULN_API_URL: http://vuln-scanner.vuln-scanner.svc.cluster.local:8081
+          # The Service's pinned spec.clusterIP (platform/vuln-scanner/service.yaml), used only
+          # when the name above fails to resolve. Keep the two in step.
+          VULN_API_FALLBACK_URL: http://10.43.210.10:8081
+          VULN_PAGE_URL: https://cve.home.keithjackson.dev
+          # Anything other than an explicit false on a dispatch is a dry run; a schedule is live.
+          DRY_RUN: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.dry_run != 'false' && 'true' || 'false' }}
+        run: python3 .gitea/workflows/scripts/cve_triage.py
+
+      - name: Summary
+        if: always()
+        run: |
+          {
+            echo "## CVE triage"
+            echo
+            echo "- trigger: \`${{ github.event_name }}\`"
+            echo "- dry run requested: \`${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.dry_run != 'false' && 'true' || 'false' }}\`"
+            echo "- outcome: \`${{ job.status }}\`"
+            echo
+            echo "Counts only: which CVE lands where is on the CVE page, never here."
+          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"

.gitea/workflows/scripts/cve_triage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,820 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""CVE triage bot (docs/17 "The triage bot", ADR-0027; R-VULN-05, R-VULN-07).
+
+Runs in .gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml, once a day, before Renovate. Each run:
+  1. reads report.json from the scanner's internal API;
+  2. creates or updates the single `CVE Dashboard` issue (aggregates only);
+  3. reads Renovate's Dependency Dashboard and open PRs, derives each image's remediation state;
+  4. ticks `approve-branch` boxes on that dashboard, for packages matching an image with an
+     unaccepted CRITICAL that has a fix;
+  5. POSTs the heartbeat and the remediation states to the scanner.
+
+WHAT IT MUST NEVER DO. Renovate is the only author of version changes (R-UPD-02): this script
+never edits a version, opens a bump PR, merges anything, or posts `/approve-override`. It never
+ticks a `rebase-branch` row. The dashboard issue carries no CVE id, package, image or workload,
+because the repository is readable without authentication, and no label the in-cluster PM acts
+on (platform/pm-agent/configmap.yaml PM_REQUIRE_LABEL = `agent`).
+
+OUTPUT IS COUNTS ONLY. Job logs and the summary are as visible as the issue, so nothing here
+prints a report string. Every report value is untrusted: strings are validated, and only counts
+and timestamps that passed RFC 3339 validation ever reach markdown.
+
+HOW A JOB CONTAINER REACHES THE SCANNER, AND WHAT IS NOT PROVEN
+---------------------------------------------------------------
+Jobs are containers on a per-job docker bridge network inside the DinD sidecar of the act-runner
+pod (apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml). The runner config sets no `container.network` and dockerd no
+`--dns`, so name resolution is docker's embedded resolver forwarding to the resolvers of the
+dockerd container, which are that pod's: cluster DNS. Egress is masqueraded to the pod IP
+(measured 2026-10-29, platform/buildkit/networkpolicy.yaml header), so a ClusterIP is routed and
+policy-matched as the act-runner pod in gitea-actions. images.yaml relies on the same path to
+reach buildkitd.buildkit.svc.cluster.local, which is indirect evidence only.
+  UNVERIFIED: in-cluster DNS from a DinD job container.
+  UNVERIFIED: ClusterIP reachability from a DinD job container to vuln-scanner:8081.
+Hence VULN_API_FALLBACK_URL (the Service's pinned ClusterIP), used only when the name fails to
+resolve. Anything else, including refused and timed-out connections, fails the job: an
+unreachable API is a red run, never a skip.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import http.client
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import socket
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Callable, Iterable, NamedTuple
+
+DASHBOARD_TITLE = "CVE Dashboard"
+DASHBOARD_LABEL = "cve-dashboard"
+DASHBOARD_LABEL_COLOR = "b60205"
+# Labels the in-cluster PM dispatcher selects work by. Never applied to anything here.
+FORBIDDEN_LABELS = frozenset({"agent"})
+RENOVATE_DASHBOARD_TITLE = "Dependency Dashboard"
+
+SEVERITIES = ("CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW", "UNKNOWN")
+FINDING_STATUSES = ("open", "fix-available", "accepted")
+TARGET_STATES = ("scanned", "pending", "stale", "failed", "credential-required", "by-tag", "not-covered")
+TARGET_TYPES = ("image", "vm", "node")
+RUN_STATUSES = ("complete", "degraded")
+REMEDIATION_STATES = ("pr-open", "approval-requested", "no-update-identified", "not-tracked")
+
+MAX_REPORT_BYTES = 128 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_API_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_FIELD_LEN = 4096
+MAX_IMAGE_LEN = 512
+MAX_ISSUE_BODY = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_DASHBOARD_ROWS = 2000
+MAX_DETECTED_DEPS = 20000
+MAX_REMEDIATION = 5000
+MAX_PAGES = 200
+PAGE_SIZE = 50
+REPORT_STALE_HOURS = 26
+DATABASE_STALE_HOURS = 48
+
+HTTP_TIMEOUT = 60
+
+RFC3339_RE = re.compile(r"\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d{1,9})?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})")
+IMAGE_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9._:/-]*[a-z0-9])?")
+HTTP_URL_RE = re.compile(r"https?://[A-Za-z0-9.-]+(:\d{1,5})?(/[A-Za-z0-9._~%/-]*)?")
+REPO_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+")
+
+# Renovate's own row shape (lib/workers/repository/dependency-dashboard.ts, getListItem). The kind
+# is captured whole so `approvePr-branch` can never read as `approve-branch`.
+ROW_RE = re.compile(r" - \[(?P<mark>[ xX])\] <!-- (?P<kind>[A-Za-z]+)-branch=(?P<branch>\S+) -->(?P<rest>.*)")
+LINKED_TITLE_RE = re.compile(r"\[(?P<title>.*)\]\((?P<target>[^()\s]*)\)(?P<tail>.*)")
+PR_LINK_RE = re.compile(r"(?:^|/)pulls?/(\d{1,9})$")
+PACKAGE_LIST_RE = re.compile(r"\s\(((?:`[^`\s]+`(?:, )?)+)\)\s*$")
+TITLE_PACKAGE_RE = re.compile(r"(?:^|\s)(?:Update|Pin)\s+(\S+)\s+Docker\s+(?:tag|digest)\b")
+SUMMARY_RE = re.compile(r"<details><summary>([^<]*?)(?: \(\d+\))?</summary>")
+DETECTED_RE = re.compile(r" - `(?P<name>[^\s`]+)(?: [^`]*)?`(?P<updates>\s*→ \[Updates:.*\])?\s*")
+
+# Detected-dependency managers whose names are charts or actions, never container images.
+NON_IMAGE_MANAGERS = frozenset({"flux", "helmv3", "github-actions"})
+
+
+class BotError(Exception):
+    """A failure that ends the run. The message must be safe to print: no report text, no secret."""
+
+
+class DnsFailure(Exception):
+    """The hostname did not resolve. The only condition that selects the fallback address."""
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- pure: normalisation + report
+
+
+def normalise_image(value: object) -> str:
+    """Canonical form for exact comparison, or "" when the value is not an image reference.
+
+    Lowercase; drop digest and tag; drop the Docker Hub registry and the `library/` namespace.
+    `library/` is only Hub's implicit namespace, so ghcr.io/library/x keeps it. Comparison of the
+    result is always string equality, never a substring test.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > MAX_IMAGE_LEN:
+        return ""
+    name = value.strip().lower().split("@", 1)[0]
+    head, sep, last = name.rpartition("/")
+    name = f"{head}{sep}{last.split(':', 1)[0]}"
+    for hub in ("docker.io/", "index.docker.io/", "registry-1.docker.io/"):
+        if name.startswith(hub):
+            name = name[len(hub):]
+            break
+    if name.startswith("library/"):
+        name = name[len("library/"):]
+    return name if IMAGE_RE.fullmatch(name) else ""
+
+
+def parse_timestamp(value: object, field: str, nullable: bool = False) -> datetime | None:
+    if value is None and nullable:
+        return None
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not RFC3339_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise BotError(f"report: {field} is not an RFC 3339 timestamp")
+    text = re.sub(r"\.\d+", "", value).replace("Z", "+00:00")
+    try:
+        return datetime.fromisoformat(text)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise BotError(f"report: {field} is not a valid timestamp") from exc
+
+
+def _object(value: object, field: str) -> dict:
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise BotError(f"report: {field} is not an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def _array(value: object, field: str) -> list:
+    if not isinstance(value, list):
+        raise BotError(f"report: {field} is not an array")
+    return value
+
+
+def _string(value: object, field: str, nullable: bool = False) -> str | None:
+    if value is None and nullable:
+        return None
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) > MAX_FIELD_LEN:
+        raise BotError(f"report: {field} is not a bounded string")
+    return value
+
+
+def _member(value: object, allowed: Iterable[str], field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or value not in allowed:
+        raise BotError(f"report: {field} has a value outside its enumeration")
+    return value
+
+
+def parse_report(raw: bytes) -> dict:
+    """Decode and validate report.json into the only shape the rest of this file reads."""
+    try:
+        doc = json.loads(raw)
+    except (ValueError, RecursionError) as exc:
+        raise BotError("report: body is not valid JSON") from exc
+    doc = _object(doc, "document")
+    if doc.get("schemaVersion") != 1 or isinstance(doc.get("schemaVersion"), bool):
+        raise BotError("report: unsupported schemaVersion")
+    parse_timestamp(doc.get("generatedAt"), "generatedAt")
+    database = _object(doc.get("database"), "database")
+    run = _object(doc.get("run"), "run")
+    parse_timestamp(database.get("updatedAt"), "database.updatedAt", nullable=True)
+    parse_timestamp(run.get("startedAt"), "run.startedAt", nullable=True)
+    parse_timestamp(run.get("finishedAt"), "run.finishedAt", nullable=True)
+    if run.get("status") is not None:
+        _member(run.get("status"), RUN_STATUSES, "run.status")
+
+    targets = []
+    known_ids = {}
+    for entry in _array(doc.get("targets"), "targets"):
+        entry = _object(entry, "target")
+        target_id = _string(entry.get("id"), "target.id")
+        kind = _member(entry.get("type"), TARGET_TYPES, "target.type")
+        state = _member(entry.get("state"), TARGET_STATES, "target.state")
+        image = _string(entry.get("image"), "target.image", nullable=True)
+        if kind == "image" and not normalise_image(image):
+            raise BotError("report: an image target has an invalid image reference")
+        known_ids[target_id] = image if kind == "image" else None
+        targets.append({"id": target_id, "type": kind, "state": state, "image": image})
+
+    findings = []
+    for entry in _array(doc.get("findings"), "findings"):
+        entry = _object(entry, "finding")
+        target_id = _string(entry.get("targetId"), "finding.targetId")
+        if target_id not in known_ids:
+            raise BotError("report: a finding references an unknown target")
+        findings.append({
+            "targetId": target_id,
+            "image": known_ids[target_id],
+            "severity": _member(entry.get("severity"), SEVERITIES, "finding.severity"),
+            "status": _member(entry.get("status"), FINDING_STATUSES, "finding.status"),
+            "fixedVersion": _string(entry.get("fixedVersion"), "finding.fixedVersion", nullable=True),
+        })
+    return {
+        "generatedAt": doc["generatedAt"],
+        "database": {"updatedAt": database.get("updatedAt")},
+        "run": {"finishedAt": run.get("finishedAt"), "status": run.get("status")},
+        "targets": targets,
+        "findings": findings,
+    }
+
+
+def qualifies(finding: dict) -> bool:
+    """An unaccepted CRITICAL with a fix: the only thing that may cause a tick."""
+    return (
+        finding["severity"] == "CRITICAL"
+        and finding["status"] == "fix-available"
+        and bool(finding["fixedVersion"])
+    )
+
+
+def qualifying_images(report: dict) -> set[str]:
+    return {
+        norm
+        for finding in report["findings"]
+        if qualifies(finding) and (norm := normalise_image(finding["image"]))
+    }
+
+
+def aggregate(report: dict) -> dict:
+    severity = {sev: dict.fromkeys(FINDING_STATUSES, 0) for sev in SEVERITIES}
+    for finding in report["findings"]:
+        severity[finding["severity"]][finding["status"]] += 1
+    coverage = dict.fromkeys(TARGET_STATES, 0)
+    for target in report["targets"]:
+        coverage[target["state"]] += 1
+    return {
+        "severity": severity,
+        "coverage": coverage,
+        "targets_total": len(report["targets"]),
+        "critical_with_fix": sum(1 for f in report["findings"] if qualifies(f)),
+        "generatedAt": report["generatedAt"],
+        "databaseUpdatedAt": report["database"]["updatedAt"],
+        "runFinishedAt": report["run"]["finishedAt"],
+        "runStatus": report["run"]["status"],
+    }
+
+
+def render_dashboard(agg: dict, page_url: str, now: datetime) -> str:
+    """The CVE Dashboard issue body: a fixed template over counts and validated timestamps."""
+    if not HTTP_URL_RE.fullmatch(page_url):
+        raise BotError("config: VULN_PAGE_URL is not a plain http(s) URL")
+    warnings = []
+    generated = parse_timestamp(agg["generatedAt"], "generatedAt")
+    if now - generated > timedelta(hours=REPORT_STALE_HOURS):
+        warnings.append(f"The report is older than {REPORT_STALE_HOURS} hours.")
+    updated = parse_timestamp(agg["databaseUpdatedAt"], "database.updatedAt", nullable=True)
+    if updated is None or now - updated > timedelta(hours=DATABASE_STALE_HOURS):
+        warnings.append(f"The vulnerability database is older than {DATABASE_STALE_HOURS} hours or unknown.")
+    if agg["runStatus"] != "complete":
+        warnings.append("The latest scan run did not complete cleanly.")
+
+    lines = [
+        "Maintained by the CVE triage bot, once a day. **Counts only**: this repository is readable",
+        "without authentication, so which CVE lands where is only on the",
+        f"[CVE page]({page_url}) (SSO, platform-admins).",
+        "",
+    ]
+    lines += [f"> **WARNING:** {text}" for text in warnings]
+    if warnings:
+        lines.append("")
+    lines += [
+        "## Freshness",
+        "",
+        "| | |",
+        "|---|---|",
+        f"| Report generated | {agg['generatedAt']} |",
+        f"| Database updated | {agg['databaseUpdatedAt'] or 'unknown'} |",
+        f"| Last run finished | {agg['runFinishedAt'] or 'none yet'} |",
+        f"| Last run status | {agg['runStatus'] or 'none yet'} |",
+        f"| Dashboard rendered | {now.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')} |",
+        "",
+        "## Findings by severity",
+        "",
+        "| Severity | Open | Fix available | Accepted |",
+        "|---|---:|---:|---:|",
+    ]
+    for sev in SEVERITIES:
+        row = agg["severity"][sev]
+        lines.append(f"| {sev} | {row['open']} | {row['fix-available']} | {row['accepted']} |")
+    lines += [
+        "",
+        f"Unaccepted CRITICAL with a fix: **{agg['critical_with_fix']}**",
+        "",
+        "## Coverage",
+        "",
+        f"{agg['targets_total']} targets. A count in any state other than `scanned` is something"
+        " that was not freshly examined, and is not a clean result.",
+        "",
+        "| State | Targets |",
+        "|---|---:|",
+    ]
+    lines += [f"| {state} | {agg['coverage'][state]} |" for state in TARGET_STATES]
+    return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- pure: Renovate's dashboard
+
+
+class Row(NamedTuple):
+    kind: str
+    mark: str
+    branch: str
+    packages: tuple[str, ...]
+    pr_number: int | None
+    offset: int  # offset in the body of the first character of the line
+
+
+def _title_package(title: str) -> str:
+    match = TITLE_PACKAGE_RE.search(title)
+    return normalise_image(match.group(1)) if match else ""
+
+
+def _row_details(rest: str) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], int | None]:
+    """Packages and PR number of a row. No recognisable package means no packages, so no tick."""
+    rest = rest.rstrip("\r")
+    number = None
+    title = rest
+    tail = rest
+    linked = LINKED_TITLE_RE.fullmatch(rest)
+    if linked:
+        title, tail = linked.group("title"), linked.group("tail")
+        link = PR_LINK_RE.search(linked.group("target"))
+        number = int(link.group(1)) if link else None
+    listed = PACKAGE_LIST_RE.search(tail)
+    if listed:
+        names = re.findall(r"`([^`]+)`", listed.group(1))
+        packages = tuple(n for n in map(normalise_image, names) if n)
+    else:
+        package = _title_package(title)
+        packages = (package,) if package else ()
+    return packages, number
+
+
+def _is_detected_heading(line: str) -> bool:
+    return line.startswith("## ") and line[3:].strip().lower().startswith("detected dependencies")
+
+
+def parse_rows(body: str) -> list[Row]:
+    """Checkbox rows above `## Detected Dependencies`. Only a whole-line match counts."""
+    if len(body) > MAX_ISSUE_BODY:
+        raise BotError("renovate dashboard: body exceeds its bound")
+    rows: list[Row] = []
+    offset = 0
+    for line in body.split("\n"):
+        if _is_detected_heading(line):
+            break
+        match = ROW_RE.fullmatch(line.rstrip("\r"))
+        if match:
+            packages, number = _row_details(match.group("rest"))
+            rows.append(Row(match.group("kind"), match.group("mark"), match.group("branch"),
+                            packages, number, offset))
+            if len(rows) > MAX_DASHBOARD_ROWS:
+                raise BotError("renovate dashboard: too many rows")
+        offset += len(line) + 1
+    return rows
+
+
+def parse_detected(body: str) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    """{normalised depName: has a pending update} from `## Detected Dependencies`."""
+    tracked: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    lines = body.split("\n")
+    in_section = False
+    manager = ""
+    count = 0
+    for index, raw in enumerate(lines):
+        line = raw.rstrip("\r")
+        if line.startswith("## "):
+            in_section = _is_detected_heading(line)
+            continue
+        if not in_section:
+            continue
+        summary = SUMMARY_RE.fullmatch(line)
+        if summary:
+            # A manager heading is the summary directly followed by <blockquote>; a file heading
+            # is not.
+            if index + 1 < len(lines) and lines[index + 1].strip() == "<blockquote>":
+                manager = summary.group(1)
+            continue
+        match = DETECTED_RE.fullmatch(line)
+        if not match or manager in NON_IMAGE_MANAGERS:
+            continue
+        count += 1
+        if count > MAX_DETECTED_DEPS:
+            raise BotError("renovate dashboard: too many detected dependencies")
+        norm = normalise_image(match.group("name"))
+        if norm:
+            tracked[norm] = tracked.get(norm, False) or bool(match.group("updates"))
+    return tracked
+
+
+def row_matches(row: Row, qualifying: set[str]) -> bool:
+    return any(package in qualifying for package in row.packages)
+
+
+def select_ticks(rows: list[Row], qualifying: set[str]) -> list[Row]:
+    return [
+        row for row in rows
+        if row.kind == "approve" and row.mark == " " and row_matches(row, qualifying)
+    ]
+
+
+def apply_ticks(body: str, ticks: list[Row]) -> str:
+    """Replace only the `[ ]` of each row, re-verifying the row where it stands.
+
+    Every byte other than the three of each marker is carried over unchanged.
+    """
+    pieces = []
+    cursor = 0
+    for row in sorted(ticks, key=lambda r: r.offset):
+        expected = f" - [ ] <!-- approve-branch={row.branch} -->"
+        if row.kind != "approve" or not body.startswith(expected, row.offset):
+            raise BotError("renovate dashboard: a row changed between parse and write")
+        marker = row.offset + len(" - ")
+        pieces += [body[cursor:marker], "[x]"]
+        cursor = marker + len("[ ]")
+    pieces.append(body[cursor:])
+    return "".join(pieces)
+
+
+def derive_remediation(
+    images: Iterable[str],
+    rows: list[Row],
+    open_prs: list[dict],
+    tracked: dict[str, bool],
+    pr_url: Callable[[int], str],
+    now_text: str,
+) -> list[dict]:
+    """One entry per report image.
+
+    pr-open: an open-PR row or an open Renovate PR for that package. approval-requested: an
+    approve row. no-update-identified: Renovate tracks it and lists no update. not-tracked:
+    everything else, which deliberately includes "Renovate knows an update but no PR or approval
+    row exists" (awaiting schedule, rate limited): saying no update was identified would be
+    false, and the enumeration has no closer value, so it lands on the state that draws attention.
+    """
+    by_branch = {pr["branch"]: pr["number"] for pr in open_prs}
+    result = []
+    for image in sorted(set(images)):
+        norm = normalise_image(image)
+        state = "not-tracked"
+        url = None
+        rebase = next((r for r in rows if r.kind == "rebase" and norm in r.packages), None)
+        pr = next((p for p in open_prs if p["package"] == norm), None)
+        if rebase is not None or pr is not None:
+            state = "pr-open"
+            number = None
+            if rebase is not None:
+                number = rebase.pr_number or by_branch.get(rebase.branch)
+            if number is None and pr is not None:
+                number = pr["number"]
+            url = pr_url(number) if number is not None else None
+        elif any(r.kind == "approve" and norm in r.packages for r in rows):
+            state = "approval-requested"
+        elif norm in tracked and not tracked[norm]:
+            state = "no-update-identified"
+        result.append({"image": image, "state": state, "url": url, "updatedAt": now_text})
+    return result
+
+
+def count_states(remediation: list[dict]) -> dict[str, int]:
+    counts = dict.fromkeys(REMEDIATION_STATES, 0)
+    for entry in remediation:
+        counts[entry["state"]] += 1
+    return counts
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- I/O
+
+
+class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """A redirect would carry the Authorization header to wherever it points."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return None
+
+
+class UrllibTransport:
+    """(method, url, headers, body, max_bytes) -> (status, bytes); never uses a proxy."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), _NoRedirect())
+
+    def __call__(self, method: str, url: str, headers: dict, body: bytes | None, max_bytes: int):
+        request = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, method=method, headers=headers)
+        try:
+            with self._opener.open(request, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT) as response:
+                data = response.read(max_bytes + 1)
+                return response.status, data
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            return exc.code, b""
+        except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
+            if isinstance(exc.reason, socket.gaierror):
+                raise DnsFailure() from exc
+            raise BotError(f"{method} {urllib.parse.urlsplit(url).path}: {type(exc.reason).__name__}") from exc
+        except (OSError, http.client.HTTPException) as exc:
+            raise BotError(f"{method} {urllib.parse.urlsplit(url).path}: {type(exc).__name__}") from exc
+
+
+class GiteaClient:
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, repo: str, token: str, transport) -> None:
+        self._api = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/api/v1/repos/{repo}"
+        self._web = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/{repo}"
+        self._token = token
+        self._transport = transport
+
+    def _call(self, method: str, path: str, query: dict | None = None, payload=None, expect=(200,)):
+        url = self._api + path + (f"?{urllib.parse.urlencode(query)}" if query else "")
+        headers = {"Authorization": f"token {self._token}", "Accept": "application/json"}
+        data = None
+        if payload is not None:
+            data = json.dumps(payload).encode()
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        try:
+            status, raw = self._transport(method, url, headers, data, MAX_API_BYTES)
+        except DnsFailure as exc:
+            raise BotError(f"gitea: {method} {path}: name resolution failed") from exc
+        if status not in expect:
+            raise BotError(f"gitea: {method} {path} -> HTTP {status}")
+        if len(raw) > MAX_API_BYTES:
+            raise BotError(f"gitea: {method} {path}: response exceeds its bound")
+        if not raw:
+            return None
+        try:
+            return json.loads(raw)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise BotError(f"gitea: {method} {path}: response is not JSON") from exc
+
+    def _list(self, path: str, query: dict | None = None) -> list:
+        items: list = []
+        for page in range(1, MAX_PAGES + 1):
+            batch = self._call("GET", path, {**(query or {}), "limit": PAGE_SIZE, "page": page})
+            if not isinstance(batch, list):
+                raise BotError(f"gitea: GET {path}: expected a list")
+            items += batch
+            if len(batch) < PAGE_SIZE:
+                return items
+        raise BotError(f"gitea: GET {path}: more than {MAX_PAGES} pages")
+
+    def pr_url(self, number: int) -> str:
+        return f"{self._web}/pulls/{int(number)}"
+
+    def labels(self) -> list:
+        return self._list("/labels")
+
+    def create_label(self, name: str, color: str) -> dict:
+        return self._call("POST", "/labels", payload={"name": name, "color": color}, expect=(201,))
+
+    def issues_with_label(self, label: str) -> list:
+        return self._list("/issues", {"state": "all", "type": "issues", "labels": label})
+
+    def issues_matching(self, text: str) -> list:
+        return self._list("/issues", {"state": "all", "type": "issues", "q": text})
+
+    def create_issue(self, title: str, body: str, label_id: int) -> dict:
+        return self._call("POST", "/issues", payload={"title": title, "body": body, "labels": [label_id]}, expect=(201,))
+
+    def update_issue(self, number: int, fields: dict) -> None:
+        self._call("PATCH", f"/issues/{int(number)}", payload=fields, expect=(200, 201))
+
+    def add_issue_label(self, number: int, label_id: int) -> None:
+        self._call("POST", f"/issues/{int(number)}/labels", payload={"labels": [label_id]}, expect=(200,))
+
+    def get_issue(self, number: int) -> dict:
+        issue = self._call("GET", f"/issues/{int(number)}")
+        if not isinstance(issue, dict):
+            raise BotError("gitea: issue response is not an object")
+        return issue
+
+    def open_renovate_prs(self) -> list[dict]:
+        result = []
+        for pr in self._list("/pulls", {"state": "open"}):
+            head = pr.get("head") if isinstance(pr, dict) else None
+            ref = head.get("ref") if isinstance(head, dict) else None
+            number = pr.get("number") if isinstance(pr, dict) else None
+            title = pr.get("title") if isinstance(pr, dict) else None
+            if not isinstance(ref, str) or not isinstance(number, int) or isinstance(number, bool):
+                raise BotError("gitea: a pull request has an unexpected shape")
+            if ref.startswith("renovate/"):
+                package = _title_package(title) if isinstance(title, str) else ""
+                result.append({"number": number, "branch": ref, "package": package})
+        return result
+
+
+class ScannerClient:
+    """The scanner's internal API. Falls back to the pinned ClusterIP on a DNS failure only."""
+
+    def __init__(self, primary: str, fallback: str, transport) -> None:
+        self._bases = [base.rstrip("/") for base in (primary, fallback) if base]
+        self._transport = transport
+        self.used_fallback = False
+
+    def _call(self, method: str, path: str, body: bytes | None, headers: dict, max_bytes: int):
+        last = len(self._bases) - 1
+        for index, base in enumerate(self._bases):
+            try:
+                result = self._transport(method, base + path, headers, body, max_bytes)
+            except DnsFailure as exc:
+                if index == last:
+                    raise BotError(f"scanner: {method} {path}: name resolution failed") from exc
+                continue
+            if index:
+                self.used_fallback = True
+                self._bases = self._bases[index:]
+            return result
+        raise BotError("scanner: no address configured")
+
+    def report(self) -> dict:
+        status, raw = self._call("GET", "/report.json", None, {"Accept": "application/json"}, MAX_REPORT_BYTES)
+        if status != 200:
+            raise BotError(f"scanner: GET /report.json -> HTTP {status}")
+        if len(raw) > MAX_REPORT_BYTES:
+            raise BotError("scanner: report exceeds its bound")
+        return parse_report(raw)
+
+    def triage(self, heartbeat: str, remediation: list[dict]) -> None:
+        if len(remediation) > MAX_REMEDIATION:
+            raise BotError("scanner: more remediation entries than POST /triage accepts")
+        body = json.dumps({"heartbeatAt": heartbeat, "remediation": remediation}).encode()
+        status, _ = self._call("POST", "/triage", body, {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, 4096)
+        if status != 204:
+            raise BotError(f"scanner: POST /triage -> HTTP {status}")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- orchestration
+
+
+def _label_names(issue: dict) -> set:
+    return {label.get("name") for label in (issue.get("labels") or []) if isinstance(label, dict)}
+
+
+def find_dashboard_issues(gitea: GiteaClient) -> list[dict]:
+    """Every issue that is the dashboard: by label, and by exact title in case a label was removed."""
+    found: dict[int, dict] = {}
+    for issue in gitea.issues_with_label(DASHBOARD_LABEL) + gitea.issues_matching(DASHBOARD_TITLE):
+        if (
+            isinstance(issue, dict)
+            and issue.get("title") == DASHBOARD_TITLE
+            and not issue.get("pull_request")
+            and isinstance(issue.get("number"), int)
+        ):
+            found[issue["number"]] = issue
+    return list(found.values())
+
+
+def sync_dashboard_issue(gitea: GiteaClient, body: str, dry_run: bool) -> dict:
+    """Create or update the one dashboard issue. Returns counts of what it did or would do."""
+    if DASHBOARD_LABEL in FORBIDDEN_LABELS:
+        raise BotError("config: the dashboard label is one the PM agent acts on")
+    plan = {"label_created": 0, "issue_created": 0, "issue_updated": 0, "issue_reopened": 0}
+    existing = find_dashboard_issues(gitea)
+    if len(existing) > 1:
+        # Closing an issue on a guess is worse than a red run naming the numbers to look at.
+        numbers = sorted(issue["number"] for issue in existing)
+        raise BotError(f"dashboard: {len(numbers)} issues titled {DASHBOARD_TITLE!r}: {numbers}")
+
+    label = next((x for x in gitea.labels() if isinstance(x, dict) and x.get("name") == DASHBOARD_LABEL), None)
+    if label is None:
+        plan["label_created"] = 1
+        if not dry_run:
+            label = gitea.create_label(DASHBOARD_LABEL, DASHBOARD_LABEL_COLOR)
+
+    if not existing:
+        plan["issue_created"] = 1
+        if not dry_run:
+            created = gitea.create_issue(DASHBOARD_TITLE, body, label["id"])
+            if not isinstance(created, dict) or not isinstance(created.get("number"), int):
+                raise BotError("gitea: issue creation returned an unexpected shape")
+        return plan
+
+    issue = existing[0]
+    fields: dict = {}
+    if issue.get("body") != body:
+        fields["body"] = body
+    if issue.get("state") != "open":
+        fields["state"] = "open"
+        plan["issue_reopened"] = 1
+    if fields:
+        plan["issue_updated"] = 1
+    if not dry_run:
+        if DASHBOARD_LABEL not in _label_names(issue):
+            gitea.add_issue_label(issue["number"], label["id"])
+        if fields:
+            gitea.update_issue(issue["number"], fields)
+    return plan
+
+
+def _renovate_issue(gitea: GiteaClient, number: int) -> dict:
+    issue = gitea.get_issue(number)
+    body = issue.get("body")
+    if issue.get("title") != RENOVATE_DASHBOARD_TITLE or issue.get("state") != "open" or not isinstance(body, str):
+        raise BotError(f"renovate dashboard: issue {number} is not the open Dependency Dashboard")
+    return issue
+
+
+def report_images(report: dict) -> list[str]:
+    return [t["image"] for t in report["targets"] if t["type"] == "image"]
+
+
+def run(cfg: dict, gitea: GiteaClient, scanner: ScannerClient, now: datetime, emit: Callable[[str], None]) -> dict:
+    """One triage pass. Any failure raises, and the heartbeat is the last thing it writes."""
+    dry_run = cfg["dry_run"]
+    report = scanner.report()
+    agg = aggregate(report)
+    now_text = now.astimezone(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+    summary: dict = {"dry_run": dry_run, "targets": agg["targets_total"], "critical_with_fix": agg["critical_with_fix"]}
+    summary["dashboard"] = sync_dashboard_issue(gitea, render_dashboard(agg, cfg["page_url"], now), dry_run)
+
+    number = cfg["renovate_issue"]
+    body = _renovate_issue(gitea, number)["body"]
+    remediation = derive_remediation(
+        report_images(report), parse_rows(body), gitea.open_renovate_prs(), parse_detected(body),
+        gitea.pr_url, now_text,
+    )
+    summary["remediation"] = count_states(remediation)
+
+    # Re-read immediately before writing: Renovate rewrites this body, and a tick must apply to
+    # the body as it is now.
+    fresh = _renovate_issue(gitea, number)["body"]
+    ticks = select_ticks(parse_rows(fresh), qualifying_images(report))
+    summary["ticks"] = len(ticks)
+    if ticks and not dry_run:
+        gitea.update_issue(number, {"body": apply_ticks(fresh, ticks)})
+
+    if not dry_run:
+        scanner.triage(now_text, remediation)
+    summary["heartbeat"] = 0 if dry_run else 1
+    summary["fallback_used"] = scanner.used_fallback
+    emit(render_summary(summary))
+    return summary
+
+
+def render_summary(summary: dict) -> str:
+    verb = "would be" if summary["dry_run"] else "were"
+    dash = summary["dashboard"]
+    states = ", ".join(f"{name} {count}" for name, count in summary["remediation"].items())
+    return "\n".join([
+        f"### CVE triage ({'DRY RUN, no writes' if summary['dry_run'] else 'live'})",
+        "",
+        f"- targets in report: {summary['targets']}",
+        f"- unaccepted CRITICAL with a fix: {summary['critical_with_fix']}",
+        f"- dashboard label created: {dash['label_created']}; issue created: {dash['issue_created']};"
+        f" updated: {dash['issue_updated']}; reopened: {dash['issue_reopened']} ({verb} applied)",
+        f"- remediation states: {states}",
+        f"- approval boxes that {verb} ticked: {summary['ticks']}",
+        f"- heartbeat posted: {summary['heartbeat']}",
+        f"- scanner reached through the ClusterIP fallback: {summary['fallback_used']}",
+        "",
+    ])
+
+
+def load_config(env: dict) -> dict:
+    token = env.get("RENOVATE_TOKEN", "")
+    if not token:
+        raise BotError("RENOVATE_TOKEN is not set")
+    repo = env.get("GITEA_REPOSITORY", "Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl")
+    if not REPO_RE.fullmatch(repo):
+        raise BotError("config: GITEA_REPOSITORY is malformed")
+    urls = {
+        "gitea_url": env.get("GITEA_URL", "https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev"),
+        "vuln_url": env.get("VULN_API_URL", "http://vuln-scanner.vuln-scanner.svc.cluster.local:8081"),
+        "page_url": env.get("VULN_PAGE_URL", "https://cve.home.keithjackson.dev"),
+    }
+    fallback = env.get("VULN_API_FALLBACK_URL", "")
+    for name, value in {**urls, **({"fallback": fallback} if fallback else {})}.items():
+        if not HTTP_URL_RE.fullmatch(value):
+            raise BotError(f"config: {name} is not a plain http(s) URL")
+    dry_run = env.get("DRY_RUN", "false")
+    if dry_run not in ("true", "false"):
+        raise BotError("config: DRY_RUN must be true or false")
+    issue = env.get("RENOVATE_DASHBOARD_ISSUE", "91")
+    if not issue.isdigit():
+        raise BotError("config: RENOVATE_DASHBOARD_ISSUE is not a number")
+    return {**urls, "token": token, "repo": repo, "fallback": fallback,
+            "dry_run": dry_run == "true", "renovate_issue": int(issue)}
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    def emit(text: str) -> None:
+        print(text)
+        path = os.environ.get("GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY")
+        if path:
+            with open(path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                handle.write(text + "\n")
+
+    try:
+        cfg = load_config(dict(os.environ))
+        transport = UrllibTransport()
+        gitea = GiteaClient(cfg["gitea_url"], cfg["repo"], cfg["token"], transport)
+        scanner = ScannerClient(cfg["vuln_url"], cfg["fallback"], transport)
+        run(cfg, gitea, scanner, datetime.now(timezone.utc), emit)
+    except BotError as exc:
+        print(f"::error::CVE triage failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        emit(f"### CVE triage FAILED\n\n{exc}\n")
+        return 1
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

README.md

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ bug but the honest answer, because proofs are claims about a specific tree on a
 |---|---|
 | 0 Foundations | ServiceDefinition schema + renderer, Kyverno L0 gate, conformance harness, CI |
 | 1 Cluster bring-up | 3-node k3s HA, embedded etcd, kube-vip VIP, Cilium, Flux, SOPS. Originally Proxmox VMs; **now 3× mini-PC bare metal** (`k3s-prod-1/2/3`, `192.168.2.10/.11/.12`, k3s v1.36.4+k3s1, Debian 13) |
-| 2 Platform core | Cilium · Longhorn · cert-manager (LE-prod wildcard) · ExternalDNS · Gateway API · split-horizon DNS, **both halves**: CoreDNS for pods, and **PiHole as the authoritative LAN resolver** for `${BASE_DOMAIN}` on udp/53 + tcp/53 at a pinned VIP (`192.168.2.23` on prod). The LAN half was claimed from the start but did not exist until 2026-09-14 — PiHole's Service was ClusterIP :80/:4180, so LAN clients ran on hand-maintained per-client `dnsmasq` files |
+| 2 Platform core | Cilium · Longhorn · cert-manager (LE-prod wildcard) · ExternalDNS · Gateway API · split-horizon DNS, **both halves**: CoreDNS for pods, and **PiHole as the LAN resolver**, answering an explicit list of `${BASE_DOMAIN}` names (LAN-only apps, gitea/nextcloud/keycloak/auth, the L4 VIPs — everything else resolves publicly to Cloudflare, since 2026-11-09) on udp/53 + tcp/53 at a pinned VIP (`192.168.2.23` on prod). The LAN half was claimed from the start but did not exist until 2026-09-14 — PiHole's Service was ClusterIP :80/:4180, so LAN clients ran on hand-maintained per-client `dnsmasq` files |
 | 3 Egress / VPN | ADR-0015 node-level OpenVPN split-tunnel + Cilium egress-gateway steering + host kill-switch |
 | 4 Observability | kube-prometheus-stack · Loki · Alloy · Alertmanager. **Velero unblocked 2026-09-13** — backs up to Cloudflare R2 (OQ-BKP closed; the `velero-plugin-for-aws` tagging incompatibility needed a pinned plugin). Longhorn has **no** backup target by decision: volume data is protected by Velero + kopia to R2. image-automation authored but disabled |
 | 5 IaaS | KubeVirt + CDI on real nested KVM; live-migratable RWX VM storage. The UniFi VM runs, but **UniFi OS Server is not yet installed in the guest** |

apps/vms/unifi/README.md

@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ or any UDP (`3478`/`10001`) — exactly the ports adoption rides. So:
 
 **UI access:** `https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443`. That name resolves to the VIP and not to
 the Gateway on purpose: both `platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml` (in-cluster) and
-`apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml` (LAN split-horizon) carve `unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}` out of the
-zone-wide `${GATEWAY_VIP}` answer and point it at `${UNIFI_L4_VIP}`. `${BASE_DOMAIN}` on prod is the
+`apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml` (LAN split-horizon, an explicit name list since 2026-11-09) point
+`unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}` at `${UNIFI_L4_VIP}` rather than `${GATEWAY_VIP}`. `${BASE_DOMAIN}` on prod is the
 apex `home.keithjackson.dev` (confirmed live in the `cluster-vars` ConfigMap) after the 2026-09-13
 flip, so this hostname is current, not a dev leftover.
 

apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ spec:
     spec:
       containers:
       - name: jackett
-        image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:v0.24.3025-ls29
+        image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:v0.24.3030-ls30
         ports:
         - containerPort: 9117
         volumeMounts:

apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml

@@ -83,15 +83,25 @@
 # and would also fix the same latent defect in unifi and crafty; it belongs in its own change.
 #
 # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# loadBalancerSourceRanges — THE LAN RESTRICTION, ENFORCED IN THE DATAPATH.
+# loadBalancerSourceRanges — THE LAN + VPN RESTRICTION, ENFORCED IN THE DATAPATH.
 # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Cilium enforces this list in eBPF on the ingress node, on the VIP, BEFORE load-balancing and
-# before SNAT. A packet to ${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP}:53 from outside ${LAN_CIDR} is dropped by the
-# datapath — it never reaches a backend and never reaches a network policy. This is what makes
+# before SNAT. A packet to ${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP}:53 from outside ${LAN_CIDR} and ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR} is
+# dropped by the datapath — it never reaches a backend and never reaches a network policy. This is what makes
 # "LAN clients only" a real, tested restriction rather than a comment: VERIFIED by narrowing the
 # range to a /24 that excludes the test client, after which the same query that had been answering
 # stopped being answered at all, and restoring it, after which it answered again.
 #
+# ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR} IS LISTED BECAUSE VPN CLIENTS REACH THIS CHECK UNTRANSLATED. wg0 is one of
+# Cilium's kube-proxy-replacement devices (measured 2026-11-08: `cilium-dbg status` lists eno1, wg0,
+# tun0), so a tunnel client's query is load-balanced as it enters from wg0, ahead of the iptables
+# MASQUERADE in platform/vpn-ingress/daemonset.yaml, and the source tested here is still 10.90.0.x
+# rather than the node's address. Without this entry a full-tunnel client's DNS is predicted to die
+# with DROP_NOT_IN_SRC_RANGE (derived from Cilium's source; NOT observed live, because no peer has
+# ever completed a handshake). The range is private and reachable only by a key in peers.conf, so
+# PiHole stays off the internet; conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-dns-source-ranges fails the gate
+# if either entry goes missing or any range here stops being RFC1918.
+#
 # It is also the layer that survives the SNAT above. A CiliumNetworkPolicy cannot express this
 # restriction once the source has been rewritten: measured on this cluster, the forwarded query
 # arrives from the ingress node's internal router address and Cilium resolves that source to the
@@ -113,6 +123,7 @@ spec:
   externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster
   loadBalancerSourceRanges:
     - ${LAN_CIDR}
+    - ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR}
   selector:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: pihole
   ports:
@@ -133,6 +144,7 @@ spec:
   externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster
   loadBalancerSourceRanges:
     - ${LAN_CIDR}
+    - ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR}
   selector:
     app.kubernetes.io/name: pihole
   ports:
@@ -158,7 +170,9 @@ spec:
 # "Policy denied ... identity world" drops in `cilium-dbg monitor`). So `world` is the only peer
 # selector that can describe LAN traffic that has been through the LoadBalancer, and the set of
 # addresses that can actually BE that traffic is fixed by loadBalancerSourceRanges before this
-# policy is consulted. Together: ${LAN_CIDR} in the datapath, udp/53 + tcp/53 here.
+# policy is consulted. Together: ${LAN_CIDR} + ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR} in the datapath, udp/53 + tcp/53
+# here. A VPN client delivered to a backend on its own ingress node keeps its 10.90.0.x source,
+# which Cilium also classifies as `world`, so this rule needs no new peer for it.
 #
 # This is NOT wider than the precedent it follows. unifi-allow-l4-ingress and crafty-allow-ingress
 # admit `fromEntities: [world, cluster, host]` on their L4 ports with NO source-range filter at all;
@@ -187,7 +201,7 @@ spec:
       app.kubernetes.io/name: pihole
   ingress:
     - fromEntities:
-        - world         # LAN clients, post-LoadBalancer: see the block above for why not fromCIDR
+        - world         # LAN + VPN clients, post-LoadBalancer: see the block above for why not fromCIDR
         - host          # this node's kubelet probes
         - remote-node   # the node-to-node hop that forwards a query to wherever the pod runs
       toPorts:

apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ spec:
         - name: FTLCONF_dns_rateLimit_count
           value: '0'
         - name: FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines
-          value: local-ttl=60;address=/${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${UNIFI_L4_VIP};address=/crafty-mc.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${CRAFTY_L4_VIP};address=/pihole-dns.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP};address=/plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PLEX_L4_VIP}
+          value: local-ttl=60;address=/gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/auth.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/plex.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${UNIFI_L4_VIP};address=/crafty-mc.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${CRAFTY_L4_VIP};address=/pihole-dns.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP};address=/plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PLEX_L4_VIP}
         - name: FTLCONF_webserver_api_password
           valueFrom:
             secretKeyRef:

catalog/jackett.yaml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 name: jackett
 kind: container
 source:
-  image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:v0.24.3025-ls29
+  image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:v0.24.3030-ls30
 exposure: internal              # LAN-only web UI at jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 4; R-DNS/R-NET)
 egress: vpn                     # indexer scraping via node PIA tunnel + kill-switch (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
 storage:

catalog/pihole.yaml

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ env:
   # Default is LOCAL, which answers only clients on the same subnet as the listening interface. The
   # pod's interface is on the CLUSTER pod CIDR, so every LAN client would be refused. ALL is
   # required for a LoadBalancer-fronted resolver; what keeps PiHole from being an OPEN resolver is
-  # the exposure, not this setting — `loadBalancerSourceRanges: [${LAN_CIDR}]` on the DNS Services,
+  # the exposure, not this setting — `loadBalancerSourceRanges: [${LAN_CIDR}, ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR}]` on the DNS Services,
   # enforced by Cilium in the datapath before load-balancing, plus a CiliumNetworkPolicy that admits
   # nothing but udp/53 and tcp/53. See apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml.
   - name: FTLCONF_dns_listeningMode
@@ -108,41 +108,61 @@ env:
   # `loadBalancer.mode: dsr`, which preserves the client address.
   - name: FTLCONF_dns_rateLimit_count
     value: "0"
-  # THE SPLIT-HORIZON ANSWERS. A dnsmasq `address=/<domain>/<ip>` entry answers that domain AND
-  # every subdomain of it, and dnsmasq resolves overlapping entries by LONGEST MATCHING DOMAIN —
-  # so the first line is a wildcard for the whole zone and each later line is a specific override.
-  # PRECEDENCE IS THEREFORE STRUCTURAL, not order-dependent: `unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}` matches both
-  # line 1 and line 2, line 2 is the longer domain, line 2 wins. Rewriting these in any order
-  # changes nothing.
+  # THE LAN ANSWERS — AN EXPLICIT LIST, NOT A ZONE WILDCARD (2026-11-09). A dnsmasq
+  # `address=/<domain>/<ip>` entry answers that domain AND every subdomain of it (on LABEL
+  # boundaries: `pihole.` does not match `pihole-dns.`), and dnsmasq resolves overlapping entries by
+  # LONGEST MATCHING DOMAIN, so the order below is irrelevant. Every name NOT listed here is
+  # FORWARDED to the upstreams above and gets the PUBLIC answer.
   #
-  # A NEWLY ONBOARDED SERVICE NEEDS NO CHANGE HERE. Every catalog ingressRoute host is
-  # `<label>.${BASE_DOMAIN}` served by the shared Gateway, so the wildcard already answers it with
-  # ${GATEWAY_VIP} — the same guarantee, and the same reasoning, as the `template IN A` block in
-  # platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml. Add a line here ONLY for a service that does not live
-  # behind the Gateway: an L4 LoadBalancer on its own pinned VIP. Those are enumerated from the
-  # repo, not from memory — grep `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname` on a Service, which
-  # is the annotation that means "this Service publishes its own hostname at its own address":
-  # apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml (unifi -> ${UNIFI_L4_VIP}) and
-  # platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml (crafty-mc -> ${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}). Those two, plus PiHole's own
-  # resolver address, are the complete set of exceptions today.
+  # WHY NO WILDCARD ANY MORE. Until 2026-11-09 the first entry was `address=/${BASE_DOMAIN}/
+  # ${GATEWAY_VIP}`, answering the whole zone. That made sense while every public record was a
+  # DNS-only CNAME to `wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` (no NAT hairpin on this router, so the LAN NEEDED a
+  # private answer). Since PR #156 every public name is a PROXIED CNAME to the Cloudflare Tunnel
+  # (platform/externaldns/README.md), which works identically from the LAN — so a name that is
+  # public now SHOULD resolve publicly from the LAN too, and the LAN no longer depends on PiHole for
+  # it: a client that bypasses PiHole (DoH browser, phone private DNS, the router's fallback) gets
+  # the same working answer. The wildcard had also become actively misleading: it answered names
+  # that exist nowhere (`wan.` itself resolved to the Gateway VIP on the LAN).
   #
-  # AAAA needs nothing: dnsmasq answers a AAAA query for an `address=`d name with NODATA
-  # (NOERROR, no answer), so IPv6-capable clients fall back to the A record instead of getting
-  # NXDOMAIN — the same behaviour coredns-custom hand-writes a `template IN AAAA` block for.
+  # WHAT IS LISTED, and why each — enforced by conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-lan-names:
+  #   -> ${GATEWAY_VIP}, LAN-ONLY: every HTTPRoute disowned from public DNS
+  #      (`external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: none`, i.e. catalog `exposure: internal`,
+  #      plus plex and headlamp) — jackett, pihole, plex, qbittorrent, radarr, semaphore, sonarr,
+  #      headlamp. These have NO public record and the tunnel 404s them, so THIS LINE IS THEIR ONLY
+  #      PATH: drop one and the app is unreachable everywhere. A NEWLY ONBOARDED `internal` SERVICE
+  #      MUST BE ADDED HERE (the L0 check fails until it is). A new `public` service needs nothing.
+  #   -> ${GATEWAY_VIP}, PUBLIC BUT KEPT ON THE LAN PATH: gitea (git push, LFS, container registry)
+  #      and nextcloud (uploads) — Cloudflare's proxy caps a request body at 100 MB and a response
+  #      at 100 s, which a large push or upload exceeds; keycloak and auth (oauth2-proxy) — so the
+  #      OIDC login of those two LAN-path apps stays on the same path as the apps themselves.
+  #   -> their own L4 VIPs: unifi (${UNIFI_L4_VIP}) and crafty-mc (${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}) are not behind
+  #      the Gateway (grep `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname` on a Service:
+  #      apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml, platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml); their public records
+  #      are DNS-only A records to the same RFC1918 VIPs, which this router's rebind protection
+  #      strips, so the LAN answer is still required. pihole-dns (${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP}) is PiHole's own
+  #      resolver address; plex-vip (${PLEX_L4_VIP}) is below.
+  # NOT listed, deliberately, so they resolve via Cloudflare from the LAN as from anywhere: the apex,
+  # grafana, crafty, seerr. In-cluster (platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml) and node
+  # (/etc/hosts pins, node_baseline_hosts_pins) resolution are separate and unchanged.
+  #
+  # AAAA: dnsmasq answers a AAAA query for an `address=`d name with NODATA (NOERROR, no answer),
+  # so IPv6-capable clients fall back to the A record instead of getting NXDOMAIN — the same
+  # behaviour coredns-custom hand-writes a `template IN AAAA` block for. Unlisted (proxied) names
+  # now get Cloudflare's real A and AAAA answers.
   #
   # Array-valued FTLCONF variables are SEMICOLON-separated. A JSON-looking list is accepted and
   # then silently wrong: FTL stores `["a","b"]` as ONE array element containing those literal
   # characters, writes that single bogus line into /etc/pihole/dnsmasq.conf and reports "0 invalid"
   # while resolution for the zone does not work. Confirmed both ways against the live image.
-  # plex-vip -> ${PLEX_L4_VIP} (added 2026-10-04) is the LAN HALF of Plex's single advertised
-  # hostname. Plex publishes ONE URL to plex.tv for both local and remote clients
-  # (catalog/plex.yaml ADVERTISE_IP): on the LAN this answer points it at the tcp/32400
-  # LoadBalancer, while Cloudflare answers the same name publicly with the WAN address, NATed to
-  # the same VIP. WITHOUT THIS LINE the entry above answers it with ${GATEWAY_VIP} via the zone
-  # wildcard, where NOTHING listens on 32400 — measured 2026-10-04, plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}
-  # resolved to the Gateway VIP and a connect to :32400 there returned http=000. That is a silent
-  # failure: the Plex web UI on plex.${BASE_DOMAIN} keeps working through the Gateway on 443 while
-  # every client that takes the ADVERTISED connection cannot reach the server at all.
+  #
+  # plex-vip -> ${PLEX_L4_VIP} (added 2026-10-04) is the name of the tcp/32400 LoadBalancer
+  # (apps/wave-0/plex-remote.yaml) and the domain of the certificate Plex serves there
+  # (catalog/plex.yaml CERTDOMAIN / customCertificateDomain, Secret `plex-vip-tls`). It is NOT what
+  # Plex advertises any more (ADVERTISE_IP is a resolver-independent plex.direct name since
+  # 2026-10-05) and it has NO public record, so this entry is its only resolution — kept for
+  # reaching the VIP by name with a matching certificate from a LAN shell. Measured 2026-10-04,
+  # before it existed the zone wildcard answered it with ${GATEWAY_VIP}, where nothing listens on
+  # 32400; without it now, the name is NXDOMAIN.
   #
   # ── local-ttl=60 — THE SPLIT-HORIZON ANSWER MUST BE CACHEABLE ────────────────────────────────
   # MEASURED 2026-10-18, diagnosing "DNS flapping between the cluster ingress and the public IP":
@@ -172,10 +192,17 @@ env:
   # cache expires, the router falls back, and the public answer latches again. That is a real
   # outage, and the fix for it is PiHole availability, not DNS caching.
   #
+  # SINCE 2026-11-09 THE LATCH IS MOSTLY HARMLESS. The measurement above predates the tunnel: the
+  # public answer was then `wan.`, unreachable from the LAN. Now the public answer for every
+  # proxied name is Cloudflare, which works from the LAN, and those names are not listed below at
+  # all. A latch still bites only the listed names: gitea/nextcloud/keycloak/auth fall back to
+  # Cloudflare (working, but under its 100 MB / 100 s limits); the LAN-only names and the L4 VIPs
+  # get NXDOMAIN or a stripped answer until the router re-queries PiHole.
+  #
   # Applies to every `address=` reply below (dnsmasq: local-ttl governs replies made from
-  # configuration, /etc/hosts and DHCP leases), so one directive covers all five names.
+  # configuration, /etc/hosts and DHCP leases), so one directive covers every listed name.
   - name: FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines
-    value: "local-ttl=60;address=/${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${UNIFI_L4_VIP};address=/crafty-mc.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${CRAFTY_L4_VIP};address=/pihole-dns.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP};address=/plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PLEX_L4_VIP}"
+    value: "local-ttl=60;address=/gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/auth.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/plex.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP};address=/unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${UNIFI_L4_VIP};address=/crafty-mc.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${CRAFTY_L4_VIP};address=/pihole-dns.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP};address=/plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PLEX_L4_VIP}"
   # THE ADMIN PASSWORD, previously the ONE operator-set value declared nowhere. Sourced from
   # apps/wave-0/pihole-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml (SOPS/age, same wave => same reconcile), which
   # carries the full rationale and the measurement that found it.

clusters/base/kustomization.yaml

@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ resources:
   # `wg-server-key` Secret, so in the gating `platform` tier an unfinished manual step would have
   # stalled every apps wave. Carries no SOPS secret, so neither overlay adds a decryption patch.
   - vpn-ingress.yaml     # Flux Kustomization -> ./platform/vpn-ingress (dependsOn platform-config)
+  # CVE visibility scanner (docs/17, ADR-0027) — POST-platform tier (dependsOn platform-config,
+  # wait:false): a failing scanner must never gate the platform, and nothing dependsOn it. Carries the
+  # oauth2-proxy credential SOPS file, so both overlays add a decryption patch by name.
+  - vuln-scanner.yaml    # Flux Kustomization -> ./platform/vuln-scanner (dependsOn platform-config)
   # Cloudflare Tunnel connector (north-south INGRESS from the Cloudflare edge) — POST-platform tier
   # (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false), and NOTHING dependsOn it. Non-gating is load-bearing,
   # as for vpn-ingress: the Deployment cannot become Ready until the operator enrols the tunnel

clusters/base/vuln-scanner.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+# Flux Kustomization: the CVE visibility scanner (docs/17, ADR-0027) — reconciles ./platform/vuln-scanner.
+#
+# ISOLATION IS THE POINT, as for clusters/base/cloudflared.yaml. A failing scanner, an unbound PVC or a
+# pending Certificate must never become a stalled platform, so:
+#   * ITS OWN Kustomization, not a line in platform/kustomization.yaml;
+#   * wait: false — its health is reported by the VulnScanStale/VulnDatabaseStale/VulnCoverageGap/
+#     VulnCriticalFixAvailable/VulnTriageBotSilent alerts (platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.yaml), not by
+#     this object's Ready condition, which reaches Ready on apply success;
+#   * NOTHING dependsOn THIS. conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-scanner-isolation fails the gate if any
+#     Kustomization gains `dependsOn: vuln-scanner` or this one stops being wait:false.
+#
+# dependsOn: [platform-config] — a real edge: PrometheusRule/ServiceMonitor/Gateway API CRDs, the
+# Longhorn StorageClass, the Gateway, Keycloak's realm, and Longhorn itself come up through
+# `platform`/`platform-config` first.
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 2m
+  timeout: 5m
+  prune: true
+  wait: false
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: platform-config
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./platform/vuln-scanner
+  # REQUIRED: the HTTPRoute hostname, the oauth2-proxy issuer/redirect/cookie-domain args and every
+  # alert's runbook_url are written `${BASE_DOMAIN}`. Substitution fails OPEN, so the file
+  # conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution audits this tier.
+  postBuild:
+    substituteFrom:
+      - kind: ConfigMap
+        name: cluster-vars
+  # SOPS decryption is layered per-environment: clusters/dev and clusters/prod each patch THIS
+  # Kustomization by name with a `decryption:` stanza for the oauth2-proxy credentials.

clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml

@@ -140,6 +140,21 @@ patches:
           provider: sops
           secretRef:
             name: sops-age
+  # vuln-scanner (the CVE visibility scanner, clusters/base/vuln-scanner.yaml) carries
+  # platform/vuln-scanner/vuln-scanner-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml — the per-pod oauth2-proxy
+  # client and cookie secrets. Without this stanza the Secret applies full of ENC[...] and the
+  # sidecar cannot authenticate; the rest of the scanner runs regardless. `sops-age` is out-of-band.
+  - patch: |-
+      apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+      kind: Kustomization
+      metadata:
+        name: vuln-scanner
+        namespace: flux-system
+      spec:
+        decryption:
+          provider: sops
+          secretRef:
+            name: sops-age
   # cloudflared (the Cloudflare Tunnel connector, clusters/base/cloudflared.yaml) carries
   # platform/cloudflared/cloudflared-credentials.sops.yaml — the tunnel credentials JSON, the one
   # secret in that component. Without this stanza the Secret applies full of ENC[...]: the APPLY

clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml

@@ -131,6 +131,21 @@ patches:
           provider: sops
           secretRef:
             name: sops-age
+  # vuln-scanner (the CVE visibility scanner, clusters/base/vuln-scanner.yaml) carries
+  # platform/vuln-scanner/vuln-scanner-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml — the per-pod oauth2-proxy
+  # client and cookie secrets. Without this stanza the Secret applies full of ENC[...] and the
+  # sidecar cannot authenticate; the rest of the scanner runs regardless. `sops-age` is out-of-band.
+  - patch: |-
+      apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+      kind: Kustomization
+      metadata:
+        name: vuln-scanner
+        namespace: flux-system
+      spec:
+        decryption:
+          provider: sops
+          secretRef:
+            name: sops-age
   # cloudflared (the Cloudflare Tunnel connector, clusters/base/cloudflared.yaml) carries
   # platform/cloudflared/cloudflared-credentials.sops.yaml — the tunnel credentials JSON, the one
   # secret in that component. Without this stanza the Secret applies full of ENC[...]: the APPLY

conformance/requirements/registry.yaml

@@ -135,6 +135,44 @@ requirements:
     safety_critical: false
     summary: "Update policy per-service configurable (cadence, channel, pinning)."
 
+  # --- Vulnerability visibility ---
+  - id: R-VULN-01
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Inventory every running container image by digest with its workloads, from the cluster."
+  - id: R-VULN-02
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Every running image evaluated against a current database at least every 24h; new images within 2h."
+  - id: R-VULN-03
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Any target not evaluated is visibly reported with its reason; absence is never shown as clean."
+  - id: R-VULN-04
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Authenticated page lists every CVE with affected images, containers and workloads; searchable and filterable."
+  - id: R-VULN-05
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Inventory, scanning, reporting and triage run on a schedule with no human or AI action; loud failure."
+  - id: R-VULN-06
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Scan failure, staleness and unaccepted CRITICAL fixes reported by email as grouped alerts."
+  - id: R-VULN-07
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Scheduled bot keeps one dashboard issue and requests remediation via Renovate; no CVE detail exposed."
+  - id: R-VULN-08
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Accepted risk declared in git with reason and mandatory expiry; reverts to open on expiry."
+  - id: R-VULN-09
+    doc: docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md
+    safety_critical: false
+    summary: "Scanner digest-pinned, no auto-merged updates, no Secret read or write access, no git credential."
+
   # --- Observability & alerting ---
   - id: R-OBS-01
     doc: docs/10-observability-and-alerting.md

conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-metrics-have-scrape-targets/check.sh

@@ -411,6 +411,28 @@ SCRAPE_OWNERS: list[dict] = [
                    "Keeping the two in one file makes that pair inseparable",
         },
     },
+    # ── ADDED 2026-11-09 (CVE visibility, ADR-0027). A NEW OWNER, NOT A RELAXED ASSERTION. ──────
+    # Registers the vuln_scanner_* family and the Service+ServiceMonitor that scrapes it.
+    {
+        "owner": "vuln-scanner: Service + ServiceMonitor on port `metrics` (:9090)",
+        "prefixes": ("vuln_scanner_",),
+        "file": "platform/vuln-scanner/servicemonitor.yaml",
+        "require": [
+            r"^kind:\s*ServiceMonitor\s*$",
+            r"^\s*-\s*port:\s*metrics\s*$",
+        ],
+        "forbid": [],
+        "why": "vuln_scanner_* powers the five VulnScan alerts, the only email path for scan "
+               "failure, staleness and overdue critical fixes (R-VULN-06). Two of those rules fire "
+               "on an absent metric, so a lost scrape is loud rather than inert",
+        "companion": {
+            "file": "platform/vuln-scanner/kustomization.yaml",
+            "require": [r"^\s*-\s*networkpolicy\.yaml\s*$"],
+            "why": "platform/vuln-scanner/networkpolicy.yaml ships the namespace's default-deny "
+                   "and the ingress allow for Prometheus on :9090 in one file, so a baseline "
+                   "without its allow cannot empty the TSDB",
+        },
+    },
     # ── ADDED 2026-11-08 (feat/cloudflare-tunnel). A NEW OWNER, NOT A RELAXED ASSERTION. ───────
     # Purely additive, the same shape as the kured entry: it registers the cloudflared_* family
     # and the Service+ServiceMonitor that scrapes it, and makes the check STRICTER for that component.

conformance/tests/l0-static/cloudflared-ingress-rules/check.sh

@@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ if not CONFIG.is_file():
 # headlamp: operator decision 2026-11-08 (LAN/VPN-only). qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr: catalog
 # `exposure: internal`, like jackett/pihole/semaphore.
 EXCLUDED_HOSTS = ("plex", "plex-vip", "jackett", "pihole", "pihole-dns", "semaphore",
-                  "qbittorrent", "radarr", "sonarr", "headlamp", "unifi", "crafty-mc")
+                  "qbittorrent", "radarr", "sonarr", "headlamp", "cve", "unifi", "crafty-mc")
 # Their Gateway-backend namespaces (unifi / crafty-mc are L4 VIPs, not Gateway backends).
 EXCLUDED_NAMESPACES = ("plex", "jackett", "pihole", "semaphore", "qbittorrent", "radarr",
-                       "sonarr", "headlamp")
+                       "sonarr", "headlamp", "vuln-scanner")
 FORBIDDEN_ENTITIES = {"kube-apiserver", "host", "remote-node", "cluster", "all"}
 # Any of these in a `service` means a route toward the Kubernetes API (or a raw-TCP/SSH bastion).
 API_MARKERS = ("kubernetes", "kube-apiserver", "apiserver", ":6443", "10.43.0.1", "tcp://",

conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns/check.sh

@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ KNOWN_NON_CATALOG_PUBLISHERS: dict[str, str] = {
         "decision: Headlamp is LAN/VPN-only) and the tunnel 404s the name. A Kubernetes web UI "
         "with native Keycloak OIDC; listed because it is a hand-authored route, and pinned "
         "disowned by (9d).",
+    "platform/vuln-scanner/httproute.yaml:vuln-scanner/vuln-scanner":
+        "publishes NOTHING: the route carries `controller: none` (docs/17: the CVE page is internal "
+        "only) and the tunnel 404s the name. Hand-authored because the scanner is not a catalog "
+        "service (its cluster-wide read role cannot be expressed in a ServiceDefinition, ADR-0027).",
     "platform/homepage/httproute.yaml:homepage/homepage":
         "publishes the APEX ${BASE_DOMAIN} itself -> the tunnel (proxied CNAME), via the https-apex "
         "listener. The apex is not a per-service name and cannot be withdrawn by an exposure "

conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-dns-source-ranges/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — PiHole's DNS frontends admit the LAN and the VPN, and nothing public
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+#
+# loadBalancerSourceRanges is the only thing keeping PiHole from being an open resolver, and it
+# must also carry the WireGuard client subnet, because Cilium load-balances tunnel traffic on wg0
+# before the iptables MASQUERADE (so the source it tests is still 10.90.0.x). check.sh's header
+# states the assertions and what they do not prove.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (standard library + PyYAML);
+# conformance/run.sh --layer l0 runs it directly and this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: pihole-dns-source-ranges
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-DNS-03: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-DNS-03"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    # WHOLE-REPO SCOPE: ci/touched-requirements.sh maps apps/* to no R-DNS requirement, so a change
+    # to these Services would otherwise select nothing.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Every PiHole LoadBalancer Service lists both the LAN and the WireGuard client subnet in
+      loadBalancerSourceRanges, and every range resolves to RFC1918, so VPN clients can resolve
+      and PiHole stays unreachable from the internet.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-pihole-source-ranges
+      description: >-
+        Collect the PiHole LoadBalancer Services, resolve each source range through cluster-vars,
+        and assert both required ranges are present and every range is private.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-dns-source-ranges/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — pihole-dns-source-ranges
+# Serves: R-DNS-03 (LAN split-horizon DNS — spec docs/09).
+#
+# THE BUG CLASS THIS CLOSES. PiHole's LoadBalancer frontends are the only thing stopping it being
+# an open resolver, and their `loadBalancerSourceRanges` is pulled in two opposite directions:
+#   * Too WIDE, and the resolver is open: a public range, or 0.0.0.0/0, in this list is the whole
+#     restriction gone, with nothing else in the path to catch it (the CiliumNetworkPolicy admits
+#     `world` on :53, because that is the only peer that can describe post-LoadBalancer traffic).
+#   * Too NARROW, and VPN DNS dies: wg0 is a Cilium kube-proxy-replacement device, so a tunnel
+#     client's query is load-balanced with its 10.90.0.x source intact, ahead of the iptables
+#     MASQUERADE. A LAN-only list is predicted to drop it as DROP_NOT_IN_SRC_RANGE, and the
+#     tunnel would still report a healthy handshake.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  every type=LoadBalancer Service in namespace `pihole` is collected and each source range
+#       is resolved through cluster-vars (base value AND the prod overlay's replacement),
+# THEN  (1) the frontends exist and cover both udp/53 and tcp/53;
+#       (2) every frontend lists ${LAN_CIDR} and ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR};
+#       (3) every range resolves to a valid IPv4 CIDR inside RFC1918 — so no 0.0.0.0/0, no public
+#           range, and no unresolvable token that could hide one;
+#   AND (4) the check is NON-VACUOUS: a real checkout and a floor on the assertion count.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES NOT PROVE: that a query over the tunnel is actually answered. That needs a
+# handshake from a real client; see platform/vpn-ingress/README.md.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import ipaddress, re, subprocess, sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+REQUIRED_TOKENS = ("LAN_CIDR", "WG_CLIENT_CIDR")
+RFC1918 = [ipaddress.ip_network(n) for n in ("10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16")]
+TOKEN = re.compile(r"^\$\{([A-Z0-9_]+)\}$")
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def docs_of(rel: str):
+    try:
+        return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / rel).read_text(errors="replace"))
+                if isinstance(d, dict)]
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+
+
+FILES = [p for p in subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "ls-files", "-z"],
+                                   capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout.split("\0")
+         if p]
+YAML_FILES = [f for f in FILES if re.search(r"\.ya?ml$", f)]
+check(len(YAML_FILES) > 50, f"only {len(YAML_FILES)} YAML files seen — not a real checkout")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------- every value a ${TOKEN} can take on this tree
+values: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
+for d in docs_of("clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml"):
+    if d.get("kind") == "ConfigMap":
+        for k, v in (d.get("data") or {}).items():
+            values.setdefault(k, set()).add(str(v))
+for d in docs_of("clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml"):
+    for p in d.get("patches") or []:
+        ops = p.get("patch") if isinstance(p, dict) else None
+        ops = yaml.safe_load(ops) if isinstance(ops, str) else ops
+        for op in ops if isinstance(ops, list) else []:
+            m = re.fullmatch(r"/data/([A-Z0-9_]+)", str(op.get("path", "")))
+            if m and op.get("op") in ("add", "replace"):
+                values.setdefault(m.group(1), set()).add(str(op.get("value")))
+for tok in REQUIRED_TOKENS:
+    check(values.get(tok), f"clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml defines no {tok} (R-DNS-03)")
+
+
+def assert_private(where: str, cidr: str):
+    try:
+        net = ipaddress.ip_network(cidr, strict=False)
+    except ValueError:
+        check(False, f"{where}: {cidr!r} is not a valid CIDR (R-DNS-03)")
+        return
+    check(net.version == 4 and any(net.subnet_of(r) for r in RFC1918),
+          f"{where}: {cidr} is not inside RFC1918, so it opens PiHole beyond the LAN and the VPN "
+          "(R-DNS-03)")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- the frontends
+frontends = []
+for rel in YAML_FILES:
+    for d in docs_of(rel):
+        md, spec = d.get("metadata") or {}, d.get("spec") or {}
+        if d.get("kind") == "Service" and md.get("namespace") == "pihole" \
+                and spec.get("type") == "LoadBalancer":
+            frontends.append((rel, md.get("name"), spec))
+
+protocols = {(p.get("protocol", "TCP"), p.get("port"))
+             for _, _, spec in frontends for p in spec.get("ports") or []}
+for want in (("UDP", 53), ("TCP", 53)):
+    check(want in protocols, f"no PiHole LoadBalancer Service serves {want[0]}/{want[1]} — this "
+                             "check's corpus has moved and must be re-derived (R-DNS-03)")
+
+for rel, name, spec in frontends:
+    where = f"{rel}: Service/{name}"
+    ranges = spec.get("loadBalancerSourceRanges") or []
+    check(ranges, f"{where} has no loadBalancerSourceRanges, so it answers anyone who can reach "
+                  "the VIP (R-DNS-03)")
+    tokens = {m.group(1) for m in (TOKEN.match(str(r)) for r in ranges) if m}
+    for tok in REQUIRED_TOKENS:
+        check(tok in tokens, f"{where} does not list ${{{tok}}} in loadBalancerSourceRanges "
+                             "(R-DNS-03)")
+    for r in ranges:
+        m = TOKEN.match(str(r))
+        if not m:
+            assert_private(where, str(r))
+            continue
+        resolved = values.get(m.group(1))
+        check(resolved, f"{where}: {r} is not defined in cluster-vars, so its value cannot be "
+                        "shown to be private (R-DNS-03)")
+        for v in sorted(resolved or []):
+            assert_private(f"{where} ({r})", v)
+
+check(CHECKS >= 15, f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — this check has gone vacuous (R-DNS-03)")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"check FAIL: {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"check OK: pihole-dns-source-ranges — {CHECKS} assertions over "
+      f"{len(frontends)} PiHole LoadBalancer Service(s)")
+PY

conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-lan-names/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — PiHole answers an explicit LAN name list, and no LAN-only name is left out of it
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+#
+# Since PR #156 every public name is a proxied CNAME to the Cloudflare Tunnel and works from the
+# LAN, so PiHole's zone wildcard was replaced by an explicit list (catalog/pihole.yaml). That makes
+# the list load-bearing: a route disowned from public DNS and absent from it resolves nowhere. This
+# test derives the required names from the tree (every `controller: none` HTTPRoute, every hostname
+# the tunnel 404s, the L4 Services' own VIPs) and asserts the list covers them, carries no
+# zone-wide entry, and pins gitea and nextcloud to the Gateway VIP. It proves itself non-vacuous by
+# mutation. Rationale and the honest NOT-proven list: check.sh.
+#
+# WHY SCOPE, NOT REQUIREMENTS: the property spans catalog/, apps/, platform/ and runbooks/; a new
+# internal service in any of them can break it, and ci/touched-requirements.sh maps apps/* to no
+# requirement at all, so a requirement-scoped selection would skip it on precisely those changes.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: pihole-lan-names
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-DNS-03: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-DNS-03"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      PiHole answers an explicit list of LAN names rather than the whole zone; every HTTPRoute
+      disowned from public DNS has an entry to the Gateway VIP; every hostname the Cloudflare
+      Tunnel 404s has an entry, with the L4 names on their own VIPs; and gitea and nextcloud stay
+      on the LAN path, off Cloudflare's request-size and timeout limits.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-pihole-explicit-lan-names
+      description: >-
+        Parse FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines from catalog/pihole.yaml and the rendered
+        apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml, derive the required names from every `controller: none` HTTPRoute,
+        the http_status:404 hostnames in platform/cloudflared/config.yaml and the L4 Services'
+        lbipam annotations, assert the list covers them and contains no zone-wide entry, and run
+        the evaluator on mutated lists to prove it is not vacuous.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-lan-names/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — pihole-lan-names
+# Serves: R-DNS-03 (LAN split-horizon answers), and decisions/2026-11-09-pihole-explicit-lan-names.md.
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS. Since PR #156 every PUBLIC name is a proxied CNAME to the Cloudflare Tunnel and
+# works from the LAN, so PiHole no longer answers the whole zone with a wildcard: it answers an
+# EXPLICIT list (catalog/pihole.yaml, FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines) and forwards everything else to
+# the public resolvers. That inverts the old failure mode. With the wildcard, a forgotten name still
+# resolved; now a forgotten LAN-ONLY name — a route disowned from public DNS, which the tunnel also
+# 404s — resolves NOWHERE, and the app is silently unreachable from every client. Nothing in the
+# cluster turns red when that happens. So the list is derived from the tree and asserted here.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# THEN  (0) the dnsmasq value parses (only `local-ttl=` and `address=/<domain>/<${VAR}>` entries,
+#           every VAR is a cluster-var), the catalog value and the rendered apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml
+#           value are identical, and the inventories below are non-empty (anti-vacuous-pass);
+#       (a) NO entry covers the whole zone: no `address=/${BASE_DOMAIN}/`, no `address=/#/`, and no
+#           entry for any parent of the zone (dnsmasq matches every subdomain of an entry);
+#       (b) every HTTPRoute hostname disowned from public DNS
+#           (`external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: none`, anywhere in apps/ platform/
+#           runbooks/) has an explicit entry to ${GATEWAY_VIP} — a disowned route with no
+#           `hostnames:` is itself a FAIL, because it cannot be checked;
+#       (c) every hostname platform/cloudflared/config.yaml maps to http_status:404 has an entry;
+#           the L4 DNS-only names (derived: Services carrying both
+#           `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname` and `lbipam.cilium.io/ips` — unifi,
+#           crafty-mc) must map to THAT Service's VIP, not the Gateway;
+#       (d) gitea and nextcloud are pinned to ${GATEWAY_VIP} (Cloudflare's 100 MB body / 100 s
+#           limits break git push/LFS and large uploads);
+#   AND (e) the evaluator is not vacuous: it is run against mutated copies of the real entry list
+#           (zone wildcard added; a disowned host dropped; a 404'd host dropped; gitea repointed;
+#           unifi repointed to the Gateway) and must flag each one.
+#
+# NOT proven (static): that the running PiHole pods carry this value (FTL applies FTLCONF_* at
+# start; the env change rolls the StatefulSet), that public resolution of the unlisted names
+# reaches Cloudflare, or the substituted IPs. Runtime check: `dig @${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP} <name>`.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import copy
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                   # pragma: no cover
+    print("CHECK FAIL (pihole-lan-names): PyYAML is required", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+NAME = "pihole-lan-names"
+ZONE = "${BASE_DOMAIN}"
+GW = "${GATEWAY_VIP}"
+DISOWN = "external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller"
+EDNS_HOST = "external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname"
+LB_IPS = "lbipam.cilium.io/ips"
+# Public, but must bypass Cloudflare's 100 MB request body / 100 s response limits.
+LAN_PINNED = ("gitea", "nextcloud")
+# Trees that hold applied manifests. conformance/ fixtures and .claude/ worktrees are not authored
+# surface (CLAUDE.md §0); decisions/ is prose.
+SCAN = ("apps", "platform", "runbooks")
+
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+
+def docs(path):
+    try:
+        return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(path.read_text()) if isinstance(d, dict)]
+    except yaml.YAMLError:
+        return []
+
+
+def dnsmasq_value(objs):
+    """The FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines value from a list of docs (a ServiceDefinition or manifests)."""
+    found = []
+    for d in objs:
+        envs = list(d.get("env") or [])
+        tmpl = (((d.get("spec") or {}).get("template") or {}).get("spec") or {})
+        for c in tmpl.get("containers") or []:
+            envs += c.get("env") or []
+        found += [e.get("value") for e in envs if e.get("name") == "FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines"]
+    return found
+
+
+def die(msg):
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+
+CATALOG = ROOT / "catalog" / "pihole.yaml"
+RENDERED = ROOT / "apps" / "wave-0" / "pihole.yaml"
+CF = ROOT / "platform" / "cloudflared" / "config.yaml"
+for p in (CATALOG, RENDERED, CF):
+    if not p.is_file():
+        die(f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)} is absent — the surface this check guards moved; re-point or "
+            "delete this check in the SAME change")
+
+cat_vals = dnsmasq_value(docs(CATALOG))
+ren_vals = dnsmasq_value(docs(RENDERED))
+check(len(cat_vals) == 1, f"(0) catalog/pihole.yaml declares FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines exactly "
+                          f"once (found {len(cat_vals)})")
+check(len(ren_vals) == 1, f"(0) apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml carries FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines exactly "
+                          f"once (found {len(ren_vals)})")
+if not cat_vals:
+    die("no dnsmasq value to check")
+check(cat_vals[:1] == ren_vals[:1],
+      "(0) the rendered apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml dnsmasq value differs from catalog/pihole.yaml — "
+      "re-render pihole (catalog/render.py --no-image-automation catalog/pihole.yaml)")
+
+cv = next(d for d in docs(ROOT / "clusters" / "base" / "cluster-vars.yaml")
+          if d.get("kind") == "ConfigMap")
+CLUSTER_VARS = set(cv["data"])
+BASE_DOMAIN_VALUE = cv["data"]["BASE_DOMAIN"]
+
+ENTRY = re.compile(r"^address=/([^/]+)/(\$\{[A-Z0-9_]+\})$")
+
+
+def parse(value):
+    """Return (entries {domain: target}, problems)."""
+    entries, problems = {}, []
+    for raw in value.split(";"):
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if raw != line:
+            problems.append(f"entry {raw!r} has surrounding whitespace (FTL writes it verbatim)")
+        if not line:
+            problems.append("empty entry (doubled or trailing `;`)")
+            continue
+        if re.fullmatch(r"local-ttl=\d+", line):
+            continue
+        m = ENTRY.match(line)
+        if not m:
+            problems.append(f"entry {line!r} is not `local-ttl=N` or `address=/<domain>/${{VAR}}` — "
+                            f"this check cannot reason about it")
+            continue
+        dom, tgt = m.groups()
+        if tgt[2:-1] not in CLUSTER_VARS:
+            problems.append(f"{dom} -> {tgt}: not a key of clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml")
+        if dom in entries and entries[dom] != tgt:
+            problems.append(f"{dom} is listed twice with different targets")
+        entries[dom] = tgt
+    return entries, problems
+
+
+entries, problems = parse(cat_vals[0])
+for pr in problems:
+    check(False, f"(0) {pr}")
+
+# ── inventories, derived from the tree ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+disowned, unnamed = set(), []
+l4 = {}
+for top in SCAN:
+    for f in sorted((ROOT / top).rglob("*.yaml")):
+        for d in docs(f):
+            meta = d.get("metadata") or {}
+            ann = meta.get("annotations") or {}
+            if d.get("kind") == "HTTPRoute" and str(ann.get(DISOWN, "")).strip() == "none":
+                hosts = (d.get("spec") or {}).get("hostnames") or []
+                if not hosts:
+                    unnamed.append(f"{f.relative_to(ROOT)}:{meta.get('name')}")
+                disowned.update(hosts)
+            if d.get("kind") == "Service" and EDNS_HOST in ann and LB_IPS in ann:
+                for h in str(ann[EDNS_HOST]).split(","):
+                    l4[h.strip()] = str(ann[LB_IPS]).strip()
+for u in unnamed:
+    check(False, f"(b) disowned HTTPRoute {u} declares no `hostnames:` — it inherits a listener "
+                 f"hostname this check cannot see; name it explicitly")
+check(len(disowned) >= 5, f"(0) only {len(disowned)} disowned HTTPRoute hostnames found — the scan "
+                          f"is vacuous (the disown annotation was renamed?)")
+check(len(l4) >= 2, f"(0) only {len(l4)} L4 Services publishing their own hostname found (expected "
+                    f"unifi and crafty-mc) — the scan is vacuous")
+
+cf = yaml.safe_load(CF.read_text())
+cf_404 = {r["hostname"] for r in cf.get("ingress") or []
+          if r.get("hostname") and r.get("service") == "http_status:404"}
+check(len(cf_404) >= 5, f"(0) only {len(cf_404)} http_status:404 hostnames in the cloudflared "
+                        f"config — the scan is vacuous")
+
+
+def covers_zone(dom):
+    """True if an entry for `dom` answers every name in the zone (dom is the zone or a parent)."""
+    if dom in ("#", "", "."):
+        return True
+    if dom == ZONE:
+        return True
+    # A literal parent (e.g. `keithjackson.dev`, `dev`) of the zone's substituted value.
+    real = dom.replace(ZONE, BASE_DOMAIN_VALUE)
+    return real == BASE_DOMAIN_VALUE or BASE_DOMAIN_VALUE.endswith("." + real)
+
+
+def evaluate(entries):
+    bad = []
+    # (a)
+    for dom in entries:
+        if covers_zone(dom):
+            bad.append(f"(a) `address=/{dom}/` answers EVERY name in the zone — the wildcard is gone "
+                       f"on purpose (public names must resolve to Cloudflare from the LAN)")
+    # (b)
+    for h in sorted(disowned):
+        if entries.get(h) != GW:
+            bad.append(f"(b) {h} is disowned from public DNS but PiHole maps it to "
+                       f"{entries.get(h, 'NOTHING')} — expected {GW}; without it the app is "
+                       f"unreachable everywhere")
+    # (c)
+    for h in sorted(cf_404):
+        if h in l4:
+            if entries.get(h) != l4[h]:
+                bad.append(f"(c) {h} is an L4 DNS-only name; PiHole maps it to "
+                           f"{entries.get(h, 'NOTHING')}, expected its own VIP {l4[h]}")
+        elif h not in entries:
+            bad.append(f"(c) the tunnel 404s {h} but PiHole has no entry for it — it would resolve "
+                       f"only publicly, and the tunnel refuses it")
+    # (d)
+    for n in LAN_PINNED:
+        h = f"{n}.{ZONE}"
+        if entries.get(h) != GW:
+            bad.append(f"(d) {h} maps to {entries.get(h, 'NOTHING (public/Cloudflare)')}; it must be "
+                       f"pinned to {GW} — Cloudflare caps request bodies at 100 MB and responses at "
+                       f"100 s")
+    return bad
+
+
+for v in evaluate(entries):
+    check(False, v)
+
+# (e) mutation self-test
+mutants = {}
+m = dict(entries); m[ZONE] = GW
+mutants["zone wildcard added"] = m
+m = dict(entries); m[BASE_DOMAIN_VALUE.split(".", 1)[1]] = GW
+mutants["parent-of-zone wildcard added"] = m
+m = dict(entries); m.pop(sorted(disowned)[0], None)
+mutants[f"disowned host {sorted(disowned)[0]} dropped"] = m
+pure_404 = sorted(h for h in cf_404 if h not in l4 and h not in disowned)
+if pure_404:
+    m = dict(entries); m.pop(pure_404[0], None)
+    mutants[f"404'd host {pure_404[0]} dropped"] = m
+m = dict(entries); m.pop(f"gitea.{ZONE}", None)
+mutants["gitea unpinned"] = m
+m = dict(entries); m[f"nextcloud.{ZONE}"] = "${UNIFI_L4_VIP}"
+mutants["nextcloud repointed"] = m
+if l4:
+    h = sorted(l4)[0]
+    m = dict(entries); m[h] = GW
+    mutants[f"{h} repointed to the Gateway"] = m
+for name, mut in mutants.items():
+    check(evaluate(mut), f"(e) self-test: the evaluator did NOT flag the mutant '{name}' — vacuous")
+check(len(mutants) >= 5, f"(e) only {len(mutants)} mutants built — the self-test degenerated")
+_, pr = parse("local-ttl=60;address=/x.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${NOT_A_CLUSTER_VAR}; address=/y/${GATEWAY_VIP}")
+check(len(pr) >= 2, "(e) self-test: the parser accepted an unknown VAR or a whitespace-padded entry")
+
+if CHECKS < 15:
+    FAILURES.append(f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated")
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"PASS ({NAME}): {CHECKS} assertions; {len(entries)} PiHole names, {len(disowned)} disowned "
+      f"routes, {len(cf_404)} tunnel-404 names, {len(l4)} L4 names")
+PY

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-acceptances-schema/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — accepted CVE risk has a reason and a bounded expiry (R-VULN-08, docs/17 "Risk acceptance").
+# Offline, no cluster.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-acceptances-schema
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-08: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-08"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      platform/vuln-scanner/acceptances.yaml rejects any entry without a reason or expiry, with a
+      malformed expiry, or expiring more than 180 days out. Proven with mutated negative fixtures.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-acceptance-schema
+      description: >-
+        Validate acceptances.yaml against the docs/17 shape, then run the validator on mutated
+        negative fixtures to prove it can fail.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-acceptances-schema/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — vuln-acceptances-schema
+# Serves: R-VULN-08 (docs/17 "Risk acceptance": "An entry with no reason or expiry is rejected by the gate").
+#
+# GIVEN platform/vuln-scanner/acceptances.yaml,
+# THEN  (1) it is a YAML list;
+#       (2) every entry has a non-empty id, a non-empty reason, an expires of the form YYYY-MM-DD
+#           at most 180 days from today, and only the permitted keys (image is optional);
+#   AND (3) the validator rejects mutated negative fixtures for each rule and accepts a good entry.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import datetime as dt, re, sys
+from pathlib import Path
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+NAME = "vuln-acceptances-schema"
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+TODAY = dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).date()
+MAX_DAYS = 180
+ALLOWED_KEYS = {"id", "image", "reason", "expires"}
+DATE_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$")
+
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+
+def validate(entries):
+    errs = []
+    if not isinstance(entries, list):
+        return ["acceptances must be a YAML list"]
+    for i, e in enumerate(entries):
+        if not isinstance(e, dict):
+            errs.append(f"entry {i} is not a mapping")
+            continue
+        if set(e) - ALLOWED_KEYS:
+            errs.append(f"entry {i} has unknown keys {sorted(set(e) - ALLOWED_KEYS)}")
+        for field in ("id", "reason"):
+            if not isinstance(e.get(field), str) or not e[field].strip():
+                errs.append(f"entry {i} has no non-empty {field}")
+        if "image" in e and (not isinstance(e["image"], str) or not e["image"].strip()):
+            errs.append(f"entry {i} has an empty image")
+        exp = e.get("expires")
+        if isinstance(exp, dt.date) and not isinstance(exp, dt.datetime):
+            exp_s = exp.isoformat()
+        elif isinstance(exp, str):
+            exp_s = exp
+        else:
+            errs.append(f"entry {i} has no expires")
+            continue
+        if not DATE_RE.match(exp_s):
+            errs.append(f"entry {i} expires is malformed: {exp_s!r}")
+            continue
+        try:
+            d = dt.date.fromisoformat(exp_s)
+        except ValueError:
+            errs.append(f"entry {i} expires is not a real date: {exp_s!r}")
+            continue
+        if (d - TODAY).days > MAX_DAYS:
+            errs.append(f"entry {i} expires {exp_s}, more than {MAX_DAYS} days out")
+    return errs
+
+
+path = ROOT / "platform" / "vuln-scanner" / "acceptances.yaml"
+if not path.is_file():
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): platform/vuln-scanner/acceptances.yaml is absent", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+entries = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text())
+check(entries == [] or (isinstance(entries, list) and entries), "(1) acceptances.yaml parsed to a list")
+errs = validate(entries)
+check(not errs, f"(2) acceptances.yaml is valid: {errs}")
+
+soon = (TODAY + dt.timedelta(days=30)).isoformat()
+far = (TODAY + dt.timedelta(days=200)).isoformat()
+good = {"id": "CVE-2026-00000", "image": "docker.io/library/x", "reason": "not reachable", "expires": soon}
+check(validate([good]) == [], "(3) a well-formed entry is accepted")
+check(validate([{k: v for k, v in good.items() if k != "image"}]) == [], "(3) image is optional (platform-wide)")
+for name, entry in {
+    "no reason":        {k: v for k, v in good.items() if k != "reason"},
+    "empty reason":     dict(good, reason=""),
+    "no expires":       {k: v for k, v in good.items() if k != "expires"},
+    "no id":            {k: v for k, v in good.items() if k != "id"},
+    "malformed expiry": dict(good, expires="next-tuesday"),
+    "impossible date":  dict(good, expires="2027-13-45"),
+    "past 180 days":    dict(good, expires=far),
+    "unknown key":      dict(good, owner="me"),
+}.items():
+    check(bool(validate([entry])), f"(3) the validator accepted a bad entry: {name}")
+check(bool(validate({"not": "a list"})), "(3) the validator accepted a non-list")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"PASS ({NAME}): {CHECKS} assertions")
+PY

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-alerts-unit-tested/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — the five scanner alerts exist and are unit-tested, including the absent-metric cases
+# (R-VULN-06, docs/17 "Acceptance gates"). Offline, no cluster.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-alerts-unit-tested
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-06: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-06"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      VulnScanStale, VulnDatabaseStale, VulnCoverageGap, VulnCriticalFixAvailable and
+      VulnTriageBotSilent exist, each promtool-tested firing, and the two absent-metric rules fire
+      in a test with no such series. Proven by mutation.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-alert-unit-tests
+      description: >-
+        Parse alerts.yaml and alerts.promtool-test.yaml, assert every alert and the two absent cases
+        are pinned, run the harness when promtool is present, and run the evaluator on mutated copies.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-alerts-unit-tested/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — vuln-alerts-unit-tested
+# Serves: R-VULN-06 (docs/17 "Acceptance gates": alerts unit-tested, including the absent-metric cases).
+#
+# GIVEN platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.yaml and alerts.promtool-test.yaml,
+# THEN  (1) the rules are exactly the five contract alerts, with the two absent()-bearing rules;
+#       (2) each alert is asserted FIRING in a promtool test;
+#       (3) VulnScanStale and VulnTriageBotSilent each fire in a test with NO input series for their
+#           own metric (the absent case) and in one where it vanishes (re-fire);
+#       (4) each alert carries severity and a runbook_url;
+#       (5) when promtool is present (the toolbox), the actual harness passes on this file;
+#   AND (6) the evaluator is run on mutated copies (the absent arm deleted, a firing assertion
+#           removed, an alert dropped) and must flag each (non-vacuity).
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import copy, re, shutil, subprocess, sys
+from pathlib import Path
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+NAME = "vuln-alerts-unit-tested"
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+ALERTS = {"VulnScanStale", "VulnDatabaseStale", "VulnCoverageGap", "VulnCriticalFixAvailable", "VulnTriageBotSilent"}
+ABSENT_ALERTS = {
+    "VulnScanStale": "vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds",
+    "VulnTriageBotSilent": "vuln_scanner_triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds",
+}
+
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+
+COMP = ROOT / "platform" / "vuln-scanner"
+for f in ("alerts.yaml", "alerts.promtool-test.yaml"):
+    if not (COMP / f).is_file():
+        print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): platform/vuln-scanner/{f} is absent", file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(1)
+rules = yaml.safe_load((COMP / "alerts.yaml").read_text())
+tests = yaml.safe_load((COMP / "alerts.promtool-test.yaml").read_text())
+
+
+def alert_rules(doc):
+    return {r["alert"]: r for g in doc["spec"]["groups"] for r in g["rules"]}
+
+
+def eval_alerts(doc):
+    bad = []
+    got = alert_rules(doc)
+    if set(got) != ALERTS:
+        bad.append(f"alerts are {sorted(got)}, expected {sorted(ALERTS)}")
+    for name, metric in ABSENT_ALERTS.items():
+        if name in got and f"absent({metric})" not in got[name]["expr"].replace(" ", ""):
+            bad.append(f"{name} lacks the absent({metric}) arm")
+    for name, r in got.items():
+        if not (r.get("labels") or {}).get("severity"):
+            bad.append(f"{name} has no severity label")
+        if "/runbooks/" not in ((r.get("annotations") or {}).get("runbook_url") or ""):
+            bad.append(f"{name} has no runbook_url")
+    return bad
+
+
+def firing_assertions(test):
+    """(alertname -> assertion list) for the firing expectations of one promtool test."""
+    out = {}
+    for pe in test.get("promql_expr_test") or []:
+        expr, samples = pe.get("expr", ""), pe.get("exp_samples") or []
+        m = re.search(r'alertname="(Vuln\w+)"', expr)
+        if m and samples and 'alertstate="firing"' in (expr + " " + " ".join(s.get("labels", "") for s in samples)):
+            out.setdefault(m.group(1), []).append(pe)
+    return out
+
+
+def series_for(test):
+    return [s.get("series", "") for s in test.get("input_series") or []]
+
+
+def eval_tests(doc):
+    bad = []
+    all_tests = doc.get("tests") or []
+    fired = set()
+    for t in all_tests:
+        fired |= set(firing_assertions(t))
+    missing = ALERTS - fired
+    if missing:
+        bad.append(f"no firing promtool assertion for {sorted(missing)}")
+    for alert, metric in ABSENT_ALERTS.items():
+        absent_case = any(
+            alert in firing_assertions(t) and not any(s.startswith(metric) for s in series_for(t))
+            for t in all_tests)
+        if not absent_case:
+            bad.append(f"{alert} has no firing test with NO {metric} series (the absent case)")
+        vanish_case = any(
+            alert in firing_assertions(t) and any(s.startswith(metric) and "stale" in str(i.get("values", ""))
+                                                  for i in t.get("input_series", []) for s in [i.get("series", "")])
+            for t in all_tests)
+        if not vanish_case:
+            bad.append(f"{alert} has no test where its metric goes stale (the re-fire case)")
+    return bad
+
+
+for v in eval_alerts(rules):
+    check(False, f"(1,4) {v}")
+for v in eval_tests(tests):
+    check(False, f"(2,3) {v}")
+check(len(alert_rules(rules)) == 5, "(1) five alert rules parsed")
+
+# (5) the real harness, only when the rule engine is present.
+if shutil.which("promtool"):
+    rc = subprocess.run(["bash", str(ROOT / "platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh"),
+                         "platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.promtool-test.yaml"],
+                        cwd=str(ROOT), capture_output=True, text=True)
+    check(rc.returncode == 0, f"(5) the promtool harness failed: rc={rc.returncode}\n{rc.stdout[-800:]}{rc.stderr[-800:]}")
+
+# (6) non-vacuity
+m = copy.deepcopy(rules)
+for g in m["spec"]["groups"]:
+    for r in g["rules"]:
+        if r["alert"] == "VulnTriageBotSilent":
+            r["expr"] = r["expr"].split(" or ")[0]
+check(bool(eval_alerts(m)), "(6) evaluator missed: absent arm deleted")
+m = copy.deepcopy(rules)
+m["spec"]["groups"][0]["rules"].pop(1)
+check(bool(eval_alerts(m)), "(6) evaluator missed: alert dropped")
+m = copy.deepcopy(rules)
+for g in m["spec"]["groups"]:
+    for r in g["rules"]:
+        r["annotations"].pop("runbook_url", None)
+check(bool(eval_alerts(m)), "(6) evaluator missed: runbook_url removed")
+
+m = copy.deepcopy(tests)
+for t in m["tests"]:
+    t["promql_expr_test"] = [p for p in t["promql_expr_test"]
+                             if 'VulnCoverageGap' not in p.get("expr", "")]
+check(bool(eval_tests(m)), "(6) evaluator missed: firing assertion removed")
+m = copy.deepcopy(tests)
+m["tests"] = [t for t in m["tests"] if "ABSENT" not in t.get("name", "")]
+check(bool(eval_tests(m)), "(6) evaluator missed: absent-case tests removed")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"PASS ({NAME}): {CHECKS} assertions")
+PY

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-metrics-no-per-cve-label/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — Prometheus receives aggregates only (R-VULN-06, docs/17 "Alerting").
+# Offline, no cluster. Depends on platform/vuln-scanner/src/metrics.py (the SCANNER's file).
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-metrics-no-per-cve-label
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-06: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-06"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      No vuln_scanner_* metric or alert rule carries a label other than state, severity or fixable,
+      so Prometheus can never hold a per-CVE, per-image or per-workload series. Proven by mutation.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-metric-labels-are-aggregates
+      description: >-
+        Extract every vuln_scanner_* metric label from metrics.py and alerts.yaml, assert the
+        allowlist, and run the extractor on mutated text to prove it can fail.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-metrics-no-per-cve-label/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — vuln-metrics-no-per-cve-label
+# Serves: R-VULN-06 ("Prometheus receives aggregates only ... MUST NOT receive a per-CVE series").
+#
+# GIVEN platform/vuln-scanner/src/metrics.py and platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.yaml,
+# THEN  (1) every label name attached to a vuln_scanner_* metric is in the allowlist
+#           (state, severity, fixable);
+#       (2) metrics.py exposes every metric name from the contract;
+#       (3) alerts.yaml selects vuln_scanner_* metrics with no label matcher outside the allowlist;
+#   AND (4) the extractor is proven on mutated text: a `cve=` label, a `{image=...}` selector and a
+#           per-workload label are each flagged, and label-free text is not.
+# A missing metrics.py is a FAIL: this is a whole-repo-scoped check and the file is part of the same
+# delivery (the check has no skip path).
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import re, sys
+from pathlib import Path
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+NAME = "vuln-metrics-no-per-cve-label"
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+ALLOWED = {"state", "severity", "fixable"}
+METRICS = (
+    "vuln_scanner_report_generated_timestamp_seconds",
+    "vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds",
+    "vuln_scanner_database_updated_timestamp_seconds",
+    "vuln_scanner_targets",
+    "vuln_scanner_findings",
+    "vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h",
+    "vuln_scanner_critical_fix_overdue",
+    "vuln_scanner_triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds",
+)
+# Label keys that could only carry per-CVE or per-target identity, anywhere a metric could be
+# written. Catches label construction the name{...} scan cannot see (e.g. "cve_id": cve_id).
+IDENTITY_LABEL = re.compile(r'''["'](cve|cve_id|advisory|package|pkg|image|digest|workload|namespace|pod|container|target|target_id)["']\s*[:=]''')
+
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+
+def label_names(text):
+    """Every label key in `vuln_scanner_x{key="value",...}` occurrences (Python or PromQL text),
+    tolerating f-strings' doubled braces and multi-line calls."""
+    found = set()
+    for m in re.finditer(r"vuln_scanner_[a-z0-9_]+\{", text):
+        tail = text[m.end(): m.end() + 200]
+        close = tail.find("}\n")
+        chunk = tail[: close if close != -1 else None].split("\n", 1)[0]
+        for key in re.findall(r"([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\s*=\s*\\?[\"'{]", chunk):
+            found.add(key)
+    return found
+
+
+METRICS_PY = ROOT / "platform" / "vuln-scanner" / "src" / "metrics.py"
+ALERTS = ROOT / "platform" / "vuln-scanner" / "alerts.yaml"
+if not METRICS_PY.is_file():
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): platform/vuln-scanner/src/metrics.py is absent (the SCANNER's "
+          f"deliverable); the aggregate-only property cannot be asserted without it", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+src = METRICS_PY.read_text()
+check(all(m in src for m in METRICS), f"(2) metrics.py names every contract metric "
+      f"(missing: {[m for m in METRICS if m not in src]})")
+
+labels = label_names(src)
+extra = labels - ALLOWED
+check(not extra, f"(1) metrics.py attaches labels outside the allowlist: {sorted(extra)}")
+hits = IDENTITY_LABEL.findall(src)
+check(not hits, f"(1) metrics.py constructs an identity-bearing metric label: {sorted(set(hits))}")
+
+rules = yaml.safe_load(ALERTS.read_text())
+exprs = [r["expr"] for g in rules["spec"]["groups"] for r in g["rules"]]
+check(len(exprs) >= 5, "(3) alerts.yaml parsed five or more rules")
+alert_labels = set()
+for e in exprs:
+    alert_labels |= label_names(e)
+check(not (alert_labels - ALLOWED),
+      f"(3) alerts.yaml selects labels outside the allowlist: {sorted(alert_labels - ALLOWED)}")
+
+# (4) non-vacuity
+negatives = {
+    "cve label":      'vuln_scanner_findings{severity="HIGH",cve="CVE-1"} 1\n',
+    "image selector": 'max(vuln_scanner_findings{image="docker.io/x"})\n',
+    "workload label": 'f"vuln_scanner_targets{{workload=\\"{w}\\",state=\\"x\\"}} 1"\n',
+}
+for name, text in negatives.items():
+    check(bool(label_names(text) - ALLOWED), f"(4) the extractor missed: {name}")
+ok_text = 'vuln_scanner_targets{state="scanned"} 3\nvuln_scanner_findings{severity="LOW",fixable="true"} 1\n'
+check(not (label_names(ok_text) - ALLOWED), "(4) the extractor flagged the allowed labels")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"PASS ({NAME}): {CHECKS} assertions")
+PY

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-scanner-isolation/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — the scanner's Flux tier cannot stall the platform, and its network reach is exactly what
+# docs/17 "Security of the scanner itself" allows (R-VULN-09). Offline, no cluster.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-isolation
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-09: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-09"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      The vuln-scanner Flux tier is wait:false, in neither gating tier, and nothing dependsOn it;
+      ingress is exactly the Gateway to 4180, the CI runner to 8081 and Prometheus to 9090;
+      egress reaches the API, DNS, the public internet on 443 only with cluster and LAN excluded,
+      and the Keycloak path the sidecar needs. Proven by mutation.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-isolation-and-network-shape
+      description: >-
+        Parse the Flux wiring and networkpolicy.yaml, assert isolation and the exact network shape,
+        and run the evaluators on mutated copies to prove they can fail.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-scanner-isolation/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — vuln-scanner-isolation
+# Serves: R-VULN-09 (docs/17 "Security of the scanner itself").
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# THEN  (1) the Flux tier is wait:false, dependsOn platform-config, in neither gating tier, nothing
+#           anywhere dependsOn it, and both overlays carry its SOPS decryption patch;
+#       (2) ingress is EXACTLY: reserved:ingress to 4180, act-runner to 8081, prometheus to 9090;
+#       (3) egress to the world is tcp/443 only through a CIDR rule excluding every private range,
+#           and the only other destinations are the API entity, the Gateway entity on 443 and Keycloak
+#           (the oauth2-proxy sidecar's OIDC path, the one deliberate addition to the spec's list);
+#           no `world`, `all`, `cluster`, `host` or `remote-node` entity;
+#       (4) the namespace ships a default-deny baseline and is not app-namespace=true (single owner);
+#   AND (5) each evaluator is run on a mutated copy and must flag it (non-vacuity).
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import copy, re, sys
+from pathlib import Path
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+NAME = "vuln-scanner-isolation"
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+FORBIDDEN_ENTITIES = {"world", "all", "cluster", "host", "remote-node"}
+PRIVATE_RANGES = {"10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"}
+
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+
+def docs(path):
+    return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(path.read_text()) if isinstance(d, dict)]
+
+
+fk_path = ROOT / "clusters" / "base" / "vuln-scanner.yaml"
+np_path = ROOT / "platform" / "vuln-scanner" / "networkpolicy.yaml"
+for p in (fk_path, np_path):
+    if not p.is_file():
+        print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {p.relative_to(ROOT)} is absent", file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(1)
+
+# (1) Flux wiring
+fk = next(d for d in docs(fk_path) if d.get("kind") == "Kustomization")
+check(fk["spec"].get("wait") is False, "(1) clusters/base/vuln-scanner.yaml must be wait: false")
+check([d.get("name") for d in fk["spec"].get("dependsOn") or []] == ["platform-config"],
+      "(1) the tier dependsOn exactly platform-config")
+check(fk["spec"].get("path") == "./platform/vuln-scanner", "(1) the tier reconciles ./platform/vuln-scanner")
+check((fk["spec"].get("postBuild") or {}).get("substituteFrom"),
+      "(1) postBuild.substituteFrom is present (the route/alerts use ${BASE_DOMAIN})")
+check("vuln-scanner.yaml" in (ROOT / "clusters" / "base" / "kustomization.yaml").read_text(),
+      "(1) clusters/base/kustomization.yaml lists vuln-scanner.yaml")
+check("vuln-scanner" not in (ROOT / "platform" / "kustomization.yaml").read_text(),
+      "(1) platform/kustomization.yaml must not include vuln-scanner (the gating tier)")
+for f in sorted((ROOT / "clusters").rglob("*.yaml")):
+    for d in docs(f):
+        for dep in (d.get("spec") or {}).get("dependsOn") or []:
+            check(not (isinstance(dep, dict) and dep.get("name") == "vuln-scanner"),
+                  f"(1) {f.relative_to(ROOT)} {d.get('metadata', {}).get('name')} dependsOn vuln-scanner — "
+                  "a broken scanner must never stall anything")
+for env in ("dev", "prod"):
+    text = (ROOT / "clusters" / env / "kustomization.yaml").read_text()
+    check(re.search(r"name:\s*vuln-scanner\s*\n\s*namespace:\s*flux-system\s*\n\s*spec:\s*\n\s*decryption:",
+                    text) is not None,
+          f"(1) clusters/{env}/kustomization.yaml carries the vuln-scanner SOPS decryption patch")
+
+# Network shape
+np_docs = docs(np_path)
+dd = [d for d in np_docs if d.get("kind") == "NetworkPolicy" and d["metadata"]["name"] == "default-deny"]
+check(len(dd) == 1 and set(dd[0]["spec"]["policyTypes"]) == {"Ingress", "Egress"} and dd[0]["spec"].get("ingress") == [],
+      "(4) default-deny baseline denies both directions with no ingress")
+ns = next(d for d in docs(ROOT / "platform" / "vuln-scanner" / "namespace.yaml") if d.get("kind") == "Namespace")
+check("homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace" not in (ns["metadata"].get("labels") or {}),
+      "(4) the namespace must not be app-namespace=true (the default-deny would be double-owned)")
+
+
+def cnp(name):
+    return next((d for d in np_docs if d.get("kind") == "CiliumNetworkPolicy" and d["metadata"]["name"] == name), None)
+
+
+def ports_of(rule):
+    return {(p.get("port"), p.get("protocol", "TCP")) for tp in rule.get("toPorts") or [] for p in tp.get("ports") or []}
+
+
+def eval_ingress(policy):
+    bad = []
+    rules = policy["spec"].get("ingress") or []
+    if len(rules) != 3:
+        bad.append(f"expected exactly 3 ingress rules, found {len(rules)}")
+    seen = set()
+    for r in rules:
+        ports = ports_of(r)
+        if r.get("fromEntities") == ["ingress"] and ports == {("4180", "TCP")}:
+            seen.add("gateway")
+        elif len(r.get("fromEndpoints") or []) == 1:
+            sel = r["fromEndpoints"][0].get("matchLabels") or {}
+            if (sel.get("io.kubernetes.pod.namespace") == "gitea-actions"
+                    and sel.get("app.kubernetes.io/name") == "act-runner" and ports == {("8081", "TCP")}):
+                seen.add("ci")
+            elif (sel.get("io.kubernetes.pod.namespace") == "monitoring"
+                  and sel.get("app.kubernetes.io/name") == "prometheus" and ports == {("9090", "TCP")}):
+                seen.add("prometheus")
+            else:
+                bad.append(f"unexpected ingress rule {r}")
+        else:
+            bad.append(f"unexpected ingress rule {r}")
+    missing = {"gateway", "ci", "prometheus"} - seen
+    if missing:
+        bad.append(f"ingress paths missing: {sorted(missing)}")
+    return bad
+
+
+def eval_egress(policy):
+    bad = []
+    rules = policy["spec"].get("egress") or []
+    if len(rules) != 4:
+        bad.append(f"expected exactly 4 egress rules, found {len(rules)}")
+    world = 0
+    for r in rules:
+        ents = set(r.get("toEntities") or [])
+        if ents & FORBIDDEN_ENTITIES:
+            bad.append(f"egress admits forbidden entity {sorted(ents & FORBIDDEN_ENTITIES)}")
+        if ents == {"kube-apiserver"} and not r.get("toPorts"):
+            continue
+        if ents == {"ingress"} and ports_of(r) == {("443", "TCP")}:
+            continue
+        if r.get("toEndpoints"):
+            sel = r["toEndpoints"][0].get("matchLabels") or {}
+            if not (len(r["toEndpoints"]) == 1 and sel.get("io.kubernetes.pod.namespace") == "keycloak"
+                    and sel.get("app") == "keycloak"):
+                bad.append(f"egress to unexpected endpoints {r}")
+            continue
+        if r.get("toCIDRSet"):
+            world += 1
+            sets = r["toCIDRSet"]
+            if len(sets) != 1 or sets[0].get("cidr") != "0.0.0.0/0":
+                bad.append(f"unexpected CIDR rule {r}")
+                continue
+            if not PRIVATE_RANGES.issubset(set(sets[0].get("except") or [])):
+                bad.append(f"the world CIDR rule does not exclude {sorted(PRIVATE_RANGES - set(sets[0].get('except') or []))}")
+            if ports_of(r) != {("443", "TCP")}:
+                bad.append(f"the world CIDR rule is not tcp/443 only ({sorted(ports_of(r))})")
+            continue
+        if r.get("toCIDR"):
+            bad.append(f"egress names a bare CIDR rule {r}")
+            continue
+        if not ents:
+            bad.append(f"unexpected egress rule {r}")
+    if world != 1:
+        bad.append(f"expected exactly one world CIDR rule, found {world}")
+    return bad
+
+
+ing, eg = cnp("vuln-scanner-allow-ingress"), cnp("vuln-scanner-allow-egress")
+check(ing is not None, "(2) the ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy exists")
+check(eg is not None, "(3) the egress CiliumNetworkPolicy exists")
+if ing is not None:
+    for v in eval_ingress(ing):
+        check(False, f"(2) {v}")
+if eg is not None:
+    for v in eval_egress(eg):
+        check(False, f"(3) {v}")
+check(len([d for d in np_docs if d.get("kind") == "CiliumNetworkPolicy"]) == 2,
+      "(3) exactly two CiliumNetworkPolicies, so no other path is added silently")
+
+# (5) non-vacuity
+if ing is not None and eg is not None:
+    def m_ing_open(p): p["spec"]["ingress"].append({"fromEntities": ["world"], "toPorts": [{"ports": [{"port": "8081", "protocol": "TCP"}]}]})
+    def m_ing_ns(p): p["spec"]["ingress"][1]["fromEndpoints"][0]["matchLabels"]["io.kubernetes.pod.namespace"] = "default"
+    def m_ing_port(p): p["spec"]["ingress"][0]["toPorts"][0]["ports"][0]["port"] = "8080"
+    for name, fn in (("extra world ingress", m_ing_open), ("CI rule moved to another namespace", m_ing_ns),
+                     ("Gateway reaches the page port", m_ing_port)):
+        m = copy.deepcopy(ing)
+        fn(m)
+        check(bool(eval_ingress(m)), f"(5) ingress evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+    def m_eg_world(p): p["spec"]["egress"].append({"toEntities": ["world"]})
+    def m_eg_lan(p):
+        for r in p["spec"]["egress"]:
+            if r.get("toCIDRSet"):
+                r["toCIDRSet"][0]["except"] = ["10.0.0.0/8"]
+    def m_eg_port(p):
+        for r in p["spec"]["egress"]:
+            if r.get("toCIDRSet"):
+                r["toPorts"][0]["ports"].append({"port": "80", "protocol": "TCP"})
+    def m_eg_endpoint(p):
+        for r in p["spec"]["egress"]:
+            if r.get("toEndpoints"):
+                r["toEndpoints"][0]["matchLabels"]["io.kubernetes.pod.namespace"] = "default"
+    for name, fn in (("world entity added", m_eg_world), ("LAN not excluded", m_eg_lan),
+                     ("port 80 added", m_eg_port), ("endpoints moved", m_eg_endpoint)):
+        m = copy.deepcopy(eg)
+        fn(m)
+        check(bool(eval_egress(m)), f"(5) egress evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+
+if CHECKS < 18:
+    FAILURES.append(f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated")
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"PASS ({NAME}): {CHECKS} assertions")
+PY

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-scanner-supply-chain/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — the CVE scanner's supply chain and privileges are what docs/17 "Security of the scanner
+# itself" says (R-VULN-09). Offline, no cluster.
+#
+# WHY SCOPE, NOT REQUIREMENTS: the property spans platform/vuln-scanner and renovate.json5. A
+# requirement-scoped selection would miss a Renovate edit that quietly lets the scanner auto-merge.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-supply-chain
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-09: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-09"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      The scanner image is pinned by digest and is not a banned Trivy version; Renovate never
+      auto-merges it and proposes it only after 7 days; its RBAC holds get/list/watch only and no
+      Secret; the pod is unprivileged with bounded resources and a size-limited cache. Each is
+      proven by mutation.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-supply-chain-and-privileges
+      description: >-
+        Parse platform/vuln-scanner/deployment.yaml, rbac.yaml and renovate.json5, assert the
+        digest/version/Renovate/RBAC/security-context contract, and run each evaluator on mutated
+        copies to prove it can fail.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-scanner-supply-chain/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — vuln-scanner-supply-chain
+# Serves: R-VULN-09 (docs/17 "Security of the scanner itself").
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# THEN  (1) the Trivy image is `ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy:<ver>@sha256:<64hex>` — by digest, and a
+#           tag so Renovate has something to follow;
+#       (2) that version is not 0.69.4/0.69.5/0.69.6 (the compromised March 2026 releases);
+#       (3) every pod image is digest-pinned except the oauth2-proxy sidecar, which follows the
+#           per-app sidecar pattern so one Renovate branch moves them all;
+#       (4) renovate.json5 keeps Trivy in the blast-radius list, automerge:false, minimumReleaseAge
+#           of at least 7 days, and no later rule re-enables automerge for it;
+#       (5) rbac.yaml: only ClusterRole/ClusterRoleBinding to the scanner SA, only get/list/watch, no
+#           Secret, no wildcard, and only the resources the inventory needs;
+#       (6) the pod: non-root, read-only rootfs, drop ALL, seccomp RuntimeDefault, no host
+#           namespaces or hostPath, CPU and memory limits on every container, an ephemeral-storage
+#           limit on the scanner, and a size-limited /cache emptyDir.
+#       (8) a renovate.json5 rule covers every file under platform/vuln-scanner: automerge:false,
+#           minimumReleaseAge of at least 7 days, and no later rule turns auto-merge back on (the
+#           python image holds the cluster-read token);
+#       (9) the scanner names the private registry it cannot reach, so that registry reports
+#           credential-required rather than a permanent failed.
+#   AND (7) each evaluator is run on a mutated copy and must flag it (non-vacuity).
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import copy, json, re, sys
+from pathlib import Path
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+NAME = "vuln-scanner-supply-chain"
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+COMP = ROOT / "platform" / "vuln-scanner"
+BANNED = {"0.69.4", "0.69.5", "0.69.6"}
+DIGEST = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+ALLOWED_VERBS = {"get", "list", "watch"}
+ALLOWED_RESOURCES = {
+    "": {"pods", "nodes"},
+    "apps": {"replicasets", "deployments", "statefulsets", "daemonsets"},
+    "batch": {"jobs", "cronjobs"},
+    "kubevirt.io": {"virtualmachineinstances"},
+}
+
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+
+def docs(path):
+    return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(path.read_text()) if isinstance(d, dict)]
+
+
+for f in ("deployment.yaml", "rbac.yaml"):
+    if not (COMP / f).is_file():
+        print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): platform/vuln-scanner/{f} is absent", file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(1)
+
+
+def split_ref(image):
+    # A digest suffix, then a tag after the last ':' (only when it holds no '/', so a registry port
+    # stays in the repository part).
+    ref, _, digest = image.partition("@")
+    head, colon, tail = ref.rpartition(":")
+    if colon and "/" not in tail:
+        return head, tail, digest or None
+    return ref, None, digest or None
+
+
+def containers(pod):
+    return (pod.get("initContainers") or []) + (pod.get("containers") or [])
+
+
+def eval_images(pod):
+    bad = []
+    trivy = [c for c in containers(pod) if split_ref(c["image"])[0] == "ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy"]
+    if len(trivy) != 1:
+        bad.append(f"expected one Trivy image, found {len(trivy)}")
+    for c in containers(pod):
+        repo, tag, digest = split_ref(c["image"])
+        if repo == "quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy":
+            if not tag or tag == "latest":
+                bad.append("oauth2-proxy sidecar has no version tag")
+            continue
+        if not digest or not DIGEST.match(digest):
+            bad.append(f"{c['name']} image {c['image']} is not pinned by digest")
+        if not tag:
+            bad.append(f"{c['name']} image {c['image']} has no tag for Renovate to follow")
+        if repo == "ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy" and tag in BANNED:
+            bad.append(f"Trivy {tag} is a banned (compromised) version")
+    return bad
+
+
+def strip_json5(text):
+    # Drop // comments outside strings, then trailing commas.
+    out, i, in_str, esc = [], 0, False, False
+    while i < len(text):
+        ch = text[i]
+        if in_str:
+            out.append(ch)
+            if esc:
+                esc = False
+            elif ch == "\\":
+                esc = True
+            elif ch == '"':
+                in_str = False
+            i += 1
+            continue
+        if ch == '"':
+            in_str = True
+            out.append(ch)
+            i += 1
+            continue
+        if text.startswith("//", i):
+            while i < len(text) and text[i] != "\n":
+                i += 1
+            continue
+        out.append(ch)
+        i += 1
+    return re.sub(r",(\s*[}\]])", r"\1", "".join(out))
+
+
+TRIVY_PKG = "ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy"
+VERSION_UPDATE_RULE_RE = re.compile(r"^(\d+)\s*(day|days)$")
+
+
+def eval_renovate(rules):
+    bad = []
+    trivy_rules = [r for r in rules if TRIVY_PKG in (r.get("matchPackageNames") or [])]
+    if not trivy_rules:
+        bad.append("no packageRule matches ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy (blast-radius list)")
+        return bad
+    if not any(r.get("automerge") is False and "blast-radius" in (r.get("addLabels") or [])
+               for r in trivy_rules):
+        bad.append("Trivy is not in a blast-radius rule with automerge:false")
+    ages = [r["minimumReleaseAge"] for r in trivy_rules if "minimumReleaseAge" in r]
+    if not ages or not any(VERSION_UPDATE_RULE_RE.match(a) and int(VERSION_UPDATE_RULE_RE.match(a).group(1)) >= 7
+                           for a in ages):
+        bad.append(f"Trivy has no minimumReleaseAge of at least 7 days (found {ages})")
+    # Renovate applies packageRules in order, later wins; the last rule that names automerge for
+    # Trivy (or matches it generically by update type) must be false.
+    last = None
+    for r in rules:
+        if "automerge" in r and (TRIVY_PKG in (r.get("matchPackageNames") or [])
+                                 or set(r) <= {"description", "matchUpdateTypes", "automerge", "automergeType", "platformAutomerge"}):
+            last = r
+    if last is None or last.get("automerge") is not False:
+        bad.append("the last packageRule deciding automerge for Trivy leaves it true")
+    return bad
+
+
+SCANNER_FILES = "platform/vuln-scanner/**"
+
+
+def eval_renovate_files(rules):
+    positions = [i for i, r in enumerate(rules) if SCANNER_FILES in (r.get("matchFileNames") or [])]
+    if not positions:
+        return [f"no packageRule has matchFileNames {SCANNER_FILES}"]
+    bad = []
+    rule = rules[positions[-1]]
+    if rule.get("automerge") is not False:
+        bad.append("the platform/vuln-scanner file rule is not automerge:false")
+    age = VERSION_UPDATE_RULE_RE.match(rule.get("minimumReleaseAge") or "")
+    if not age or int(age.group(1)) < 7:
+        bad.append("the platform/vuln-scanner file rule has no minimumReleaseAge of at least 7 days")
+    if any(r.get("automerge") is True for r in rules[positions[-1] + 1:]):
+        bad.append("a rule after the platform/vuln-scanner file rule re-enables auto-merge")
+    return bad
+
+
+def eval_private_registries(pod):
+    scanner = next(c for c in pod["containers"] if c["name"] == "scanner")
+    env = {e["name"]: e.get("value") for e in scanner.get("env") or []}
+    if env.get("VULN_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES") != "gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}":
+        return ["the scanner does not name the private registry gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}"]
+    return []
+
+
+def eval_rbac(rbac):
+    bad = []
+    croles = [d for d in rbac if d.get("kind") == "ClusterRole"]
+    if len(croles) != 1:
+        bad.append(f"expected one ClusterRole, found {len(croles)}")
+        return bad
+    for rule in croles[0].get("rules") or []:
+        verbs = set(rule.get("verbs") or [])
+        if verbs - ALLOWED_VERBS:
+            bad.append(f"rule grants non-read verbs {sorted(verbs - ALLOWED_VERBS)}")
+        if "*" in verbs:
+            bad.append("rule grants the verb wildcard")
+        for group in rule.get("apiGroups") or []:
+            if group == "*" or group not in ALLOWED_RESOURCES:
+                bad.append(f"rule names apiGroup {group!r}")
+                continue
+            for res in rule.get("resources") or []:
+                if res == "*" or res not in ALLOWED_RESOURCES[group]:
+                    bad.append(f"rule grants resource {group}/{res}")
+        if "secrets" in (rule.get("resources") or []):
+            bad.append("rule grants Secret access")
+    kinds = {d.get("kind") for d in rbac}
+    if kinds - {"ServiceAccount", "ClusterRole", "ClusterRoleBinding"}:
+        bad.append(f"unexpected RBAC kinds {sorted(kinds)}")
+    for b in (d for d in rbac if d.get("kind") == "ClusterRoleBinding"):
+        if (b.get("roleRef") or {}).get("name") != croles[0]["metadata"]["name"]:
+            bad.append("the ClusterRoleBinding does not bind the scanner's ClusterRole")
+    return bad
+
+
+def eval_pod(pod):
+    bad = []
+    psc = pod.get("securityContext") or {}
+    if psc.get("runAsNonRoot") is not True:
+        bad.append("pod runAsNonRoot is not true")
+    if (psc.get("seccompProfile") or {}).get("type") != "RuntimeDefault":
+        bad.append("pod seccompProfile is not RuntimeDefault")
+    for f in ("hostNetwork", "hostPID", "hostIPC"):
+        if pod.get(f):
+            bad.append(f"pod sets {f}")
+    if any("hostPath" in v for v in pod.get("volumes") or []):
+        bad.append("pod mounts a hostPath volume")
+    for c in containers(pod):
+        sc = c.get("securityContext") or {}
+        if sc.get("readOnlyRootFilesystem") is not True:
+            bad.append(f"{c['name']} root filesystem is writable")
+        if sc.get("allowPrivilegeEscalation") is not False:
+            bad.append(f"{c['name']} allows privilege escalation")
+        if "ALL" not in ((sc.get("capabilities") or {}).get("drop") or []):
+            bad.append(f"{c['name']} does not drop ALL capabilities")
+        limits = (c.get("resources") or {}).get("limits") or {}
+        for lim in ("cpu", "memory"):
+            if lim not in limits:
+                bad.append(f"{c['name']} has no {lim} limit")
+        if c["name"] == "scanner" and "ephemeral-storage" not in limits:
+            bad.append("the scanner has no ephemeral-storage limit")
+    vols = {v["name"]: v for v in pod.get("volumes") or []}
+    if not (vols.get("cache", {}).get("emptyDir") or {}).get("sizeLimit"):
+        bad.append("the /cache emptyDir has no sizeLimit (Longhorn or etcd must never hold it)")
+    return bad
+
+
+dep = next(d for d in docs(COMP / "deployment.yaml") if d.get("kind") == "Deployment")
+pod = dep["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+for v in eval_images(pod) + eval_pod(pod):
+    check(False, f"(1-3,6) {v}")
+check(dep["spec"].get("replicas") == 1, "(6) one replica (one RWO report store)")
+check((dep["spec"].get("strategy") or {}).get("type") == "Recreate", "(6) Recreate strategy")
+
+renovate = json.loads(strip_json5((ROOT / "renovate.json5").read_text()))
+rules = renovate.get("packageRules") or []
+check(len(rules) > 5, "(4) parsed renovate.json5 packageRules (parser degenerated)")
+for v in eval_renovate(rules):
+    check(False, f"(4) {v}")
+for v in eval_renovate_files(rules):
+    check(False, f"(8) {v}")
+for v in eval_private_registries(pod):
+    check(False, f"(9) {v}")
+
+rbac = docs(COMP / "rbac.yaml")
+for v in eval_rbac(rbac):
+    check(False, f"(5) {v}")
+
+# (7) non-vacuity
+def mutated(fn, base):
+    m = copy.deepcopy(base)
+    fn(m)
+    return m
+
+# Image mutants
+def img_digest(p): p["initContainers"][0]["image"] = "ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy:0.76.1"
+def img_banned(p): p["initContainers"][0]["image"] = re.sub(r":[0-9.]+@", ":0.69.5@", p["initContainers"][0]["image"])
+def img_nopin(p): p["containers"][0]["image"] = "docker.io/library/python:3.14.9-alpine"
+for name, fn in (("digest stripped from Trivy", img_digest), ("banned Trivy version", img_banned),
+                 ("python image unpinned", img_nopin)):
+    check(bool(eval_images(mutated(fn, pod))), f"(7) image evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+
+# RBAC mutants
+def rbac_secret(r):
+    role = next(d for d in r if d.get("kind") == "ClusterRole")
+    role["rules"][0]["resources"].append("secrets")
+def rbac_write(r):
+    role = next(d for d in r if d.get("kind") == "ClusterRole")
+    role["rules"][0]["verbs"].append("delete")
+def rbac_wild(r):
+    role = next(d for d in r if d.get("kind") == "ClusterRole")
+    role["rules"][1]["resources"] = ["*"]
+for name, fn in (("Secret resource granted", rbac_secret), ("write verb granted", rbac_write),
+                 ("resource wildcard granted", rbac_wild)):
+    check(bool(eval_rbac(mutated(fn, rbac))), f"(7) RBAC evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+
+# Renovate mutants
+def ren_auto(r):
+    for x in r:
+        if TRIVY_PKG in (x.get("matchPackageNames") or []):
+            x["automerge"] = True
+def ren_age(r):
+    for x in r:
+        if TRIVY_PKG in (x.get("matchPackageNames") or []) and "minimumReleaseAge" in x:
+            x["minimumReleaseAge"] = "2 days"
+def ren_drop(r):
+    r[:] = [x for x in r if TRIVY_PKG not in (x.get("matchPackageNames") or [])]
+def ren_later(r):
+    r.append({"matchUpdateTypes": ["digest"], "automerge": True})
+for name, fn in (("Trivy automerge flipped true", ren_auto), ("minimumReleaseAge shortened", ren_age),
+                 ("Trivy removed from Renovate rules", ren_drop), ("later auto-merge rule appended", ren_later)):
+    check(bool(eval_renovate(mutated(fn, rules))), f"(7) Renovate evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+
+# Renovate file-rule mutants
+def files_rule(r):
+    return next(x for x in r if SCANNER_FILES in (x.get("matchFileNames") or []))
+def files_auto(r): files_rule(r)["automerge"] = True
+def files_age(r): files_rule(r)["minimumReleaseAge"] = "1 day"
+def files_drop(r): r.remove(files_rule(r))
+def files_later(r): r.append({"matchDatasources": ["docker"], "automerge": True})
+for name, fn in (("file rule automerge true", files_auto), ("file rule age shortened", files_age),
+                 ("file rule removed", files_drop), ("later rule re-enables auto-merge", files_later)):
+    check(bool(eval_renovate_files(mutated(fn, rules))), f"(7) file-rule evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+
+def reg_drop(p):
+    next(c for c in p["containers"] if c["name"] == "scanner")["env"][:] = [
+        e for e in next(c for c in p["containers"] if c["name"] == "scanner")["env"]
+        if e["name"] != "VULN_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES"]
+check(bool(eval_private_registries(mutated(reg_drop, pod))), "(7) private-registry evaluator missed the removal")
+
+# Pod mutants
+def pod_root(p): p["securityContext"]["runAsNonRoot"] = False
+def pod_host(p): p["hostNetwork"] = True
+def pod_rw(p): p["containers"][0]["securityContext"]["readOnlyRootFilesystem"] = False
+def pod_nolim(p): del p["containers"][0]["resources"]["limits"]["memory"]
+def pod_nocap(p):
+    for v in p["volumes"]:
+        if v["name"] == "cache":
+            v["emptyDir"].pop("sizeLimit", None)
+for name, fn in (("runAsNonRoot off", pod_root), ("hostNetwork on", pod_host), ("rw rootfs", pod_rw),
+                 ("no memory limit", pod_nolim), ("no cache sizeLimit", pod_nocap)):
+    check(bool(eval_pod(mutated(fn, pod))), f"(7) pod evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+
+if CHECKS < 15:
+    FAILURES.append(f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated")
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"PASS ({NAME}): {CHECKS} assertions")
+PY

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-triage-bot-workflow-guards/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — the CVE triage bot workflow fails loudly and is shaped like Renovate's (R-VULN-05,
+# R-VULN-07, docs/17 "The triage bot"). Offline, no cluster. Depends on .gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml
+# (the BOT's file); fails until that file is integrated.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-triage-bot-workflow-guards
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-05: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-07: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-05, R-VULN-07"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      The bot workflow runs on the 07:15 cron, has a workflow_dispatch dry-run input, never runs
+      concurrently with itself, and a step fails the job hard when RENOVATE_TOKEN is empty.
+      Proven by mutation.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-workflow-guards
+      description: >-
+        Parse .gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml and assert the trigger, concurrency and hard
+        credential failure, then run the evaluator on mutated copies to prove it can fail.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-triage-bot-workflow-guards/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — vuln-triage-bot-workflow-guards
+# Serves: R-VULN-05 (runs on a schedule, fails loudly), R-VULN-07 (bot conventions, docs/17).
+#
+# GIVEN .gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml,
+# THEN  (1) it runs on `15 7 * * *` and has a workflow_dispatch `dry_run` input;
+#       (2) concurrency is set (the workflow never runs against itself);
+#       (3) a step fails the job HARD when RENOVATE_TOKEN is empty (exit non-zero, not skip);
+#   AND (4) the evaluator is run on mutated copies and must flag each (non-vacuity).
+# A missing workflow file is a FAIL: this is whole-repo scoped and has no skip path.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import copy, re, sys
+from pathlib import Path
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+NAME = "vuln-triage-bot-workflow-guards"
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+WF = ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "cve-triage.yaml"
+
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+
+if not WF.is_file():
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): .gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml is absent (the BOT's deliverable); "
+          f"whether it fails on a missing credential cannot be asserted without it", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+doc = yaml.safe_load(WF.read_text())
+
+
+def evaluate(doc):
+    bad = []
+    triggers = doc.get(True) if True in doc else doc.get("on")  # YAML reads `on:` as boolean True
+    if not isinstance(triggers, dict):
+        return ["no triggers parsed"]
+    if "15 7 * * *" not in [s.get("cron") for s in triggers.get("schedule") or [] if isinstance(s, dict)]:
+        bad.append("no schedule with cron 15 7 * * *")
+    inputs = ((triggers.get("workflow_dispatch") or {}).get("inputs") or {})
+    if "dry_run" not in inputs:
+        bad.append("workflow_dispatch has no dry_run input")
+    conc = doc.get("concurrency")
+    jobs = doc.get("jobs") or {}
+    if not conc and not any(isinstance(j, dict) and j.get("concurrency") for j in jobs.values()):
+        bad.append("no concurrency set (the bot must not run against itself)")
+    hard_fail = False
+    for j in jobs.values():
+        for step in (j.get("steps") or []) if isinstance(j, dict) else []:
+            run = str(step.get("run", ""))
+            if ("RENOVATE_TOKEN" in run and re.search(r"(-z|!\s*-n)[^\n]*RENOVATE_TOKEN|RENOVATE_TOKEN[^\n]*(-z)", run)
+                    and re.search(r"exit\s+[1-9]", run)):
+                hard_fail = True
+    if not hard_fail:
+        bad.append("no step fails hard (exit non-zero) when RENOVATE_TOKEN is empty")
+    return bad
+
+
+for v in evaluate(doc):
+    check(False, f"(1-3) {v}")
+check(isinstance(doc.get("jobs"), dict) and doc["jobs"], "(1) the workflow declares jobs")
+
+# (4) non-vacuity
+def mutate(fn):
+    m = copy.deepcopy(doc)
+    fn(m)
+    return m
+
+def trig(m):
+    return m.get(True) if True in m else m.get("on")
+
+def no_cron(m): trig(m).pop("schedule", None)
+def no_dry(m): trig(m)["workflow_dispatch"] = {}
+def no_conc(m):
+    m.pop("concurrency", None)
+    for j in m.get("jobs", {}).values():
+        if isinstance(j, dict):
+            j.pop("concurrency", None)
+def no_guard(m):
+    for j in m.get("jobs", {}).values():
+        for step in j.get("steps") or []:
+            if "RENOVATE_TOKEN" in str(step.get("run", "")):
+                step["run"] = 'echo "::warning::RENOVATE_TOKEN unset, skipping"'
+for name, fn in (("cron removed", no_cron), ("dry_run input removed", no_dry),
+                 ("concurrency removed", no_conc), ("credential check softened", no_guard)):
+    check(bool(evaluate(mutate(fn))), f"(4) evaluator missed mutant: {name}")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL ({NAME}): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"PASS ({NAME}): {CHECKS} assertions")
+PY

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-acceptances/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# L1 fixture test: runs check.py (python3 stdlib, source imported from platform/vuln-scanner/src,
+# no cluster, no network beyond loopback). conformance/run.sh --layer l1 runs check.sh offline;
+# this Chainsaw Test wraps the same script so an in-cluster run executes identical assertions.
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-acceptances
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-08: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-08"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L1"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    # Whole-repo scope: the touched-path map keys nothing to platform/vuln-scanner, so without this
+    # a change to the scanner would select no vuln-scanner test.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given acceptance files, When parsed and applied, Then expiry reverts to open and malformed entries never hide a finding.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: run-offline-check
+      description: Run check.sh, the same assertions the offline harness runs.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-acceptances/check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""R-VULN-08: acceptance parsing, expiry and fail-safe behaviour."""
+import sys
+from datetime import date, datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE.parents[3] / "platform/vuln-scanner/src"))
+import acceptances  # noqa: E402
+import report  # noqa: E402
+
+FAILED = []
+TODAY = date(2026, 11, 9)
+NOW = datetime(2026, 11, 9, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+A1 = "sha256:" + "a1" * 32
+
+
+def check(name, condition):
+    print(("ok   " if condition else "FAIL ") + name)
+    if not condition:
+        FAILED.append(name)
+
+
+def parse(text):
+    return acceptances.parse_text(text, TODAY)
+
+
+entries, errors = parse("""# header comment
+- id: CVE-2026-1
+  image: docker.io/library/nginx     # exact match
+  reason: not reachable - feature disabled
+  expires: 2027-02-01
+
+- id: CVE-2026-2
+  reason: "platform wide"
+  expires: 2026-12-01
+""")
+check("valid flat entries parse with no errors", len(entries) == 2 and errors == [])
+check("inline comment is stripped", entries[0]["image"] == "docker.io/library/nginx")
+check("omitted image means platform-wide", entries[1]["image"] is None)
+check("empty list form is accepted", parse("# none\n[]\n") == ([], []))
+check("empty file is accepted", parse("") == ([], []))
+
+for name, text in (
+    ("missing reason", "- id: CVE-1\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n"),
+    ("missing expires", "- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n"),
+    ("expires beyond 180 days", "- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n  expires: 2027-06-01\n"),
+    ("unknown key", "- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n  scope: all\n"),
+    ("not a date", "- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n  expires: soon\n"),
+    ("impossible date", "- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n  expires: 2026-13-45\n"),
+    ("duplicate key", "- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n  reason: y\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n"),
+    ("flow value", "- id: CVE-1\n  reason: [x]\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n"),
+):
+    found, problems = parse(text)
+    check("rejected: " + name, found == [] and len(problems) == 1)
+
+found, problems = parse("- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n- id: bad entry\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n")
+check("one bad entry is ignored, the valid one kept", len(found) == 1 and len(problems) == 1)
+found, problems = parse("- id: CVE-1\n   reason: x\n")
+check("bad indentation invalidates the whole file", found == [] and problems)
+found, problems = parse("garbage\n- id: CVE-1\n  reason: x\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n")
+check("a stray line invalidates the whole file", found == [] and problems)
+check("missing file is an error, not an empty allowlist", acceptances.load("/nonexistent/acceptances.yaml")[1])
+
+entry = {"id": "CVE-1", "image": None, "reason": "r", "expires": date(2026, 11, 9)}
+check("acceptance holds on its expiry day", acceptances.match([entry], "CVE-1", "any/image", TODAY) is entry)
+check("acceptance gone the day after", acceptances.match([entry], "CVE-1", "any/image", TODAY + timedelta(days=1)) is None)
+scoped = {"id": "CVE-1", "image": "docker.io/library/nginx", "reason": "r", "expires": date(2026, 12, 1)}
+check("image match is exact", acceptances.match([scoped], "CVE-1", "docker.io/library/nginx-extra", TODAY) is None)
+check("image match accepts the exact image", acceptances.match([scoped], "CVE-1", "docker.io/library/nginx", TODAY) is scoped)
+
+
+def state_with(findings):
+    target = {"id": "docker.io/library/nginx@" + A1, "type": "image", "image": "docker.io/library/nginx", "digest": A1,
+              "ref": "", "reason": None, "workloads": []}
+    return {
+        "inventory": [target], "database": {"updatedAt": "2026-11-09T06:00:00Z", "version": "2"},
+        "run": {"startedAt": "2026-11-09T09:00:00Z", "finishedAt": "2026-11-09T09:30:00Z", "status": "complete"},
+        "remediation": [], "inventoryError": None, "loadError": None,
+        "scans": {A1: {"firstDiscoveredAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z", "lastInventoriedAt": "2026-11-09T09:00:00Z",
+                       "lastAttemptAt": "2026-11-09T09:00:00Z", "lastSuccessAt": "2026-11-09T09:00:00Z", "outcome": "ok",
+                       "reason": None, "failedSince": None, "findings": findings,
+                       "firstSeen": {f["id"]: "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z" for f in findings}}},
+    }
+
+
+FINDING = {"id": "CVE-1", "severity": "CRITICAL", "cvss": 9.0, "package": "p", "installedVersion": "1", "fixedVersion": "2",
+           "title": "t", "url": ""}
+ST = state_with([FINDING])
+
+
+def status(when, accepted, errs=()):
+    built = report.build(ST, accepted, list(errs), when)
+    return built, built["findings"][0]
+
+
+def reason_entry(length):
+    return acceptances.parse_text("- id: CVE-1\n  reason: " + "r" * length + "\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n", NOW.date())
+
+
+found, problems = reason_entry(3000)
+check("a reason over 2048 characters ignores the entry and reports it", found == [] and any("2048" in p for p in problems))
+found, problems = reason_entry(2048)
+check("mutation: a reason of exactly 2048 characters is valid", len(found) == 1 and problems == [])
+
+entry = {"id": "CVE-1", "image": None, "reason": "not reachable", "expires": date(2026, 11, 9)}
+built, finding = status(NOW, [entry])
+check("unexpired acceptance marks the finding accepted", finding["status"] == "accepted"
+      and finding["acceptance"] == {"reason": "not reachable", "expires": "2026-11-09"})
+check("accepted report is schema-valid", report.validate(built) == [])
+_, finding = status(NOW + timedelta(days=1), [entry])
+check("expired acceptance reverts to the finding's own status", finding["status"] == "fix-available" and "acceptance" not in finding)
+_, finding = status(NOW, [])
+check("mutation: no acceptance leaves it open/fix-available", finding["status"] == "fix-available")
+built, finding = status(NOW, [], ["bad entry"])
+check("an invalid entry degrades the run", built["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+check("an invalid entry never hides the finding", finding["status"] == "fix-available")
+
+print("FAILED: " + str(len(FAILED)) if FAILED else "all checks passed")
+sys.exit(1 if FAILED else 0)

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-acceptances/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runs the fixture-driven assertions in check.py. See chainsaw-test.yaml for the requirement tags.
+# What this does NOT prove: anything at runtime (real Trivy, real API, real browser). L2/L3 cover that.
+set -euo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+exec python3 "${HERE}/check.py"

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-api-metrics/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# L1 fixture test: runs check.py (python3 stdlib, source imported from platform/vuln-scanner/src,
+# no cluster, no network beyond loopback). conformance/run.sh --layer l1 runs check.sh offline;
+# this Chainsaw Test wraps the same script so an in-cluster run executes identical assertions.
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-api-metrics
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-02: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-03: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-05: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-06: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-02, R-VULN-03, R-VULN-05, R-VULN-06"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L1"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    # Whole-repo scope: the touched-path map keys nothing to platform/vuln-scanner, so without this
+    # a change to the scanner would select no vuln-scanner test.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given a running engine, When the HTTP surfaces are exercised, Then the API validates, metrics are aggregates only, and listeners answer during a scan.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: run-offline-check
+      description: Run check.sh, the same assertions the offline harness runs.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-api-metrics/check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""R-VULN-02/03/05/06: internal API, metrics, publish refusal, and HTTP during a scan."""
+import copy
+import http.client
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE.parents[3] / "platform/vuln-scanner/src"))
+import main  # noqa: E402
+import metrics  # noqa: E402
+import report  # noqa: E402
+import server  # noqa: E402
+import state as st  # noqa: E402
+
+logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL)
+FAILED = []
+NOW = datetime(2026, 11, 9, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+A1 = "sha256:" + "a1" * 32
+
+
+def check(name, condition):
+    print(("ok   " if condition else "FAIL ") + name)
+    if not condition:
+        FAILED.append(name)
+
+
+class Clock:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.now = NOW
+
+    def __call__(self):
+        return self.now
+
+
+class Client:
+    def list_all(self, path):
+        if path.endswith("pods"):
+            return [{"metadata": {"namespace": "apps", "name": "p"}, "spec": {"containers": [{"name": "c", "image": "nginx:1"}]},
+                     "status": {"containerStatuses": [{"name": "c", "imageID": "docker.io/library/nginx@" + A1}]}}]
+        return []
+
+
+class Runner:
+    """Blocks on release while a scan is 'running', so a test can prove the HTTP path stays live."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.entered = threading.Event()
+        self.release = threading.Event()
+        self.release.set()
+        self.result = {"SchemaVersion": 2, "Results": [{"Vulnerabilities": [
+            {"VulnerabilityID": "CVE-1", "Severity": "CRITICAL", "PkgName": "openssl", "InstalledVersion": "1",
+             "FixedVersion": "2", "Title": "t", "PrimaryURL": "https://example.test/1"}]}]}
+
+    def download_db(self):
+        pass
+
+    def db_info(self):
+        return {"updatedAt": "2026-11-09T06:00:00Z", "version": "2"}
+
+    def scan(self, _reference):
+        self.entered.set()
+        self.release.wait(10)
+        return self.result
+
+    def clean_cache(self):
+        pass
+
+
+def request(port, method, path, body=None, headers=None):
+    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection("127.0.0.1", port, timeout=10)
+    conn.request(method, path, body, headers or {})
+    resp = conn.getresponse()
+    data = resp.read()
+    conn.close()
+    return resp.status, data, resp
+
+
+def post(port, document, content_type="application/json"):
+    return request(port, "POST", "/triage", json.dumps(document), {"Content-Type": content_type})
+
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    accept = os.path.join(tmp, "a.yaml")
+    Path(accept).write_text("[]\n")
+    clock = Clock()
+    runner = Runner()
+    eng = main.Engine(tmp, Client(), runner, accept, clock=clock, publish_seconds=0)
+    servers = server.start_all(eng, ("127.0.0.1", 0), ("127.0.0.1", 0), ("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    page_port, internal, metrics_port = (s.server_address[1] for s in servers)
+
+    status, body, _ = request(internal, "GET", "/report.json")
+    check("report.json is 503 before any report", status == 503)
+    status, body, resp = request(page_port, "GET", "/")
+    check("page is 503 before any report, with the CSP", status == 503 and resp.getheader("Content-Security-Policy"))
+    text = request(metrics_port, "GET", "/metrics")[1].decode()
+    check("last-complete-run metric is absent before the first run", "last_complete_run" not in text)
+    check("triage heartbeat metric is absent before the first POST", "triage_heartbeat" not in text)
+
+    # HTTP must stay live while a scan is blocked mid-flight.
+    runner.release.clear()
+    worker = threading.Thread(target=eng.tick, daemon=True)
+    worker.start()
+    check("the scan is genuinely in flight", runner.entered.wait(10))
+    status_h, _, _ = request(internal, "GET", "/healthz")
+    status_p, _, _ = request(page_port, "GET", "/healthz")
+    status_m, _, _ = request(metrics_port, "GET", "/metrics")
+    check("listeners answer during a scan", (status_h, status_p, status_m) == (200, 200, 200))
+    runner.release.set()
+    worker.join(10)
+    check("the tick then completes", not worker.is_alive())
+
+    status, body, _ = request(internal, "GET", "/report.json")
+    check("report.json serves a schema-valid report after a tick", status == 200 and report.validate(json.loads(body)) == [])
+
+    # Page and CSP over HTTP
+    status, body, resp = request(page_port, "GET", "/?view=inventory")
+    check("page served over HTTP carries the CSP and nosniff",
+          status == 200 and resp.getheader("Content-Security-Policy").startswith("default-src 'none'") and resp.getheader("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff")
+    status, body, resp = request(page_port, "GET", "/missing")
+    check("a 404 from the page listener also carries the CSP", status == 404 and resp.getheader("Content-Security-Policy"))
+
+    status, body, resp = request(page_port, "POST", "/")
+    check("an unsupported method on the page listener also carries the CSP", status == 501 and resp.getheader("Content-Security-Policy"))
+
+    # Triage API
+    valid = {"heartbeatAt": "2026-11-09T11:00:00Z", "remediation": [
+        {"image": "docker.io/library/nginx", "state": "pr-open", "url": "https://gitea.test/pulls/9", "updatedAt": "2026-11-09T11:00:00Z"}]}
+    status, body, _ = post(internal, valid)
+    check("valid triage is 204", status == 204 and body == b"")
+    check("remediation surfaces in the report", eng.report["remediation"][0]["state"] == "pr-open")
+    text = request(metrics_port, "GET", "/metrics")[1].decode()
+    check("heartbeat metric appears and uses server receipt time, not the bot's", f"triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds {int(NOW.timestamp())}" in text)
+    for name, mutate in (
+        ("unknown top-level key", lambda d: d.update(extra=1)),
+        ("missing heartbeat", lambda d: d.pop("heartbeatAt")),
+        ("unknown remediation key", lambda d: d["remediation"][0].update(x=1)),
+        ("bad remediation state", lambda d: d["remediation"][0].update(state="merged")),
+        ("javascript url", lambda d: d["remediation"][0].update(url="javascript:x")),
+        ("bad timestamp", lambda d: d.update(heartbeatAt="yesterday")),
+    ):
+        document = copy.deepcopy(valid)
+        mutate(document)
+        status, _, _ = post(internal, document)
+        check("triage rejects " + name, status == 400)
+    for name, url in (("an uppercase scheme", "HTTP://gitea.test/pulls/1"), ("an empty url", ""), ("a javascript url", "javascript:alert(1)")):
+        bad = json.loads(json.dumps(valid))
+        bad["remediation"][0]["url"] = url
+        check("triage rejects " + name, post(internal, bad)[0] == 400)
+    check("triage rejects a wrong content type", post(internal, valid, "text/plain")[0] == 415)
+    status, _, _ = request(internal, "POST", "/triage", b"x" * 300000, {"Content-Type": "application/json"})
+    check("triage rejects an oversized body", status == 413)
+    many = {"heartbeatAt": "2026-11-09T11:00:00Z", "remediation": [valid["remediation"][0]] * 5001}
+    check("triage rejects more than 5000 entries", post(internal, many)[0] in (400, 413))
+    check("rejected triage leaves state untouched", eng.state["remediation"][0]["url"] == "https://gitea.test/pulls/9")
+
+    # Metrics labels and values
+    text = request(metrics_port, "GET", "/metrics")[1].decode()
+    allowed = {"state", "severity", "fixable"}
+    labels = {k for line in text.splitlines() for k in re.findall(r"([A-Za-z_]+)=\"", line)}
+    check("metric labels are within the allowlist", labels and labels <= allowed)
+    check("no metric carries a CVE, package, image or workload", not re.search(r"CVE-|openssl|nginx|apps", text))
+    for state in report.STATES:
+        check("targets gauge present for " + state, 'vuln_scanner_targets{state="' + state + '"}' in text)
+    check("critical fix findings counted with fixable true", 'vuln_scanner_findings{severity="CRITICAL",fixable="true"} 1' in text)
+    check("every severity and fixability appears", text.count("vuln_scanner_findings{") == 10)
+    check("failed-over-24h gauge exists", "vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h 0" in text)
+    check("critical fix overdue is 0 inside the 72h grace", "vuln_scanner_critical_fix_overdue 0" in text)
+    clock.now += timedelta(hours=73)
+    text = request(metrics_port, "GET", "/metrics")[1].decode()
+    check("critical fix overdue is 1 after 72h", "vuln_scanner_critical_fix_overdue 1" in text)
+    check("last-complete-run metric present after a complete run", "vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds" in text)
+    for srv in servers:
+        srv.shutdown()
+
+# Invalid report: refuse and keep the old one.
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    good = {"schemaVersion": 1, "generatedAt": "2026-11-09T10:00:00Z", "database": {"updatedAt": "2026-11-09T06:00:00Z", "version": "2"},
+            "run": {"startedAt": "2026-11-09T09:00:00Z", "finishedAt": "2026-11-09T09:30:00Z", "status": "complete"},
+            "targets": [], "findings": [], "remediation": []}
+    check("a valid report publishes", report.publish(good, tmp) is True)
+    before = Path(tmp, "report.json").read_bytes()
+    for name, mutate in (
+        ("wrong schemaVersion", lambda r: r.update(schemaVersion=2)),
+        ("extra top-level key", lambda r: r.update(extra=1)),
+        ("bad timestamp", lambda r: r.update(generatedAt="soon")),
+        ("unknown state", lambda r: r.update(targets=[{"id": "x", "type": "image", "image": "x", "digest": None, "state": "fine",
+                                                        "reason": None, "lastScannedAt": None, "workloads": []}])),
+        ("dangling targetId", lambda r: r.update(findings=[{"id": "CVE-1", "targetId": "nope", "severity": "LOW", "cvss": None,
+                                                            "package": "p", "installedVersion": "1", "fixedVersion": None, "title": "t",
+                                                            "url": "", "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z", "status": "open"}])),
+    ):
+        broken = copy.deepcopy(good)
+        mutate(broken)
+        check("invalid report refused: " + name, report.publish(broken, tmp) is False)
+    check("an invalid report writes nothing", Path(tmp, "report.json").read_bytes() == before)
+    check("accepted without acceptance is invalid", report.validate({**good, "targets": [{"id": "x", "type": "image", "image": "x", "digest": None,
+          "state": "scanned", "reason": None, "lastScannedAt": None, "workloads": []}], "findings": [{"id": "CVE-1", "targetId": "x", "severity": "LOW",
+          "cvss": None, "package": "p", "installedVersion": "1", "fixedVersion": None, "title": "t", "url": "", "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+          "status": "accepted"}]}) != [])
+    Path(tmp, "report.json").write_text("{not json")
+    check("a corrupt published report is not served", report.load_published(tmp) is None)
+
+# Crash-consistency of state: the temp+rename leaves no temp files behind and the file parses.
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    store = st.Store(tmp)
+    state = st.new_state()
+    state["triageHeartbeatAt"] = "2026-11-09T11:00:00Z"
+    store.save(state)
+    check("state saves with no temp file left behind", sorted(os.listdir(tmp)) == ["state.json"])
+    check("state survives a reload", st.Store(tmp).load()["triageHeartbeatAt"] == "2026-11-09T11:00:00Z")
+    Path(tmp, "state.json").write_text("not json")
+    loaded = st.Store(tmp).load()
+    check("corrupt state starts empty and marks degraded", loaded["loadError"] and loaded["scans"] == {})
+    check("corrupt state is preserved for inspection", Path(tmp, "state.json.corrupt").exists())
+
+# Metrics module directly, without the report.
+empty_state = st.new_state()
+text = metrics.render(None, empty_state, NOW)
+check("with no report only the state-derived gauge exists", text == "vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h 0\n")
+
+print("FAILED: " + str(len(FAILED)) if FAILED else "all checks passed")
+sys.exit(1 if FAILED else 0)

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-api-metrics/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runs the fixture-driven assertions in check.py. See chainsaw-test.yaml for the requirement tags.
+# What this does NOT prove: anything at runtime (real Trivy, real API, real browser). L2/L3 cover that.
+set -euo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+exec python3 "${HERE}/check.py"

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-inventory/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# L1 fixture test: runs check.py (python3 stdlib, source imported from platform/vuln-scanner/src,
+# no cluster, no network beyond loopback). conformance/run.sh --layer l1 runs check.sh offline;
+# this Chainsaw Test wraps the same script so an in-cluster run executes identical assertions.
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-inventory
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-01: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-01"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L1"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    # Whole-repo scope: the touched-path map keys nothing to platform/vuln-scanner, so without this
+    # a change to the scanner would select no vuln-scanner test.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given recorded API lists, When the inventory is built, Then owner chains, digests, by-tag CronJobs and not-covered targets resolve per R-VULN-01.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: run-offline-check
+      description: Run check.sh, the same assertions the offline harness runs.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-inventory/check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""R-VULN-01: inventory from recorded API lists."""
+import copy
+import http.server
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE.parents[3] / "platform/vuln-scanner/src"))
+import inventory  # noqa: E402
+
+FAILED = []
+
+
+def check(name, condition):
+    print(("ok   " if condition else "FAIL ") + name)
+    if not condition:
+        FAILED.append(name)
+
+
+CLUSTER = json.loads((HERE / "fixtures/cluster.json").read_text())
+A1 = "sha256:" + "a1" * 32
+B2 = "sha256:" + "b2" * 32
+C3 = "sha256:" + "c3" * 32
+D4 = "sha256:" + "d4" * 32
+E5 = "sha256:" + "e5" * 32
+F6 = "sha256:" + "f6" * 32
+
+
+def by_id(targets):
+    return {t["id"]: t for t in targets}
+
+
+def workloads(target):
+    return {(w["namespace"], w["kind"], w["name"]): w["containers"] for w in target["workloads"]}
+
+
+targets = inventory.build(CLUSTER)
+ids = by_id(targets)
+
+nginx = ids["docker.io/library/nginx@" + A1]
+check("ReplicaSet resolves to Deployment, not the ReplicaSet", workloads(nginx) == {
+    ("apps", "Deployment", "web"): ["app"], ("apps", "Deployment", "api"): ["server"]})
+check("docker-pullable:// prefix stripped and digest taken from imageID", nginx["digest"] == A1)
+check("init container inventoried", ("apps", "Deployment", "web") in workloads(ids["ghcr.io/org/tool@" + B2]))
+check("ephemeral container inventoried", "debug" in workloads(ids["docker.io/library/busybox@" + C3])[("apps", "Deployment", "web")])
+
+backup = ids["ghcr.io/org/backup@" + E5]
+check("Job resolves to CronJob", workloads(backup) == {("ops", "CronJob", "backup"): ["backup"]})
+check("a CronJob with a running pod is not also inventoried from its template",
+      not any(t["id"].startswith("ghcr.io/org/backup:") for t in targets))
+
+nightly = ids["ghcr.io/org/nightly:2.1"]
+check("idle CronJob inventoried from template with no digest", nightly["digest"] is None
+      and workloads(nightly) == {("ops", "CronJob", "nightly"): ["job"]})
+
+solo = ids["docker.io/library/alpine:3.20"]
+check("empty imageID gives a by-tag target from the spec image", solo["digest"] is None)
+check("bare Pod is its own workload", ("ops", "Pod", "solo") in workloads(solo))
+check("Succeeded pod's image is not inventoried", not any(F6 in t["id"] for t in targets))
+check("virt-launcher stays owned by its VirtualMachineInstance",
+      ("kubevirt-vms", "VirtualMachineInstance", "vm1") in workloads(ids["quay.io/kubevirt/virt-launcher@sha256:" + "ab" * 32]))
+vm, node = ids["vm/kubevirt-vms/vm1"], ids["node/prod-1"]
+check("VM inventoried as non-container target", vm["type"] == "vm" and vm["digest"] is None and vm["reason"])
+check("node inventoried as non-container target", node["type"] == "node" and node["reason"])
+
+# Non-vacuous: mutating the fixture changes the answer the assertions above rely on.
+broken = copy.deepcopy(CLUSTER)
+broken["replicasets"] = []
+broken["jobs"] = []
+broken_ids = by_id(inventory.build(broken))
+check("mutation: losing the ReplicaSet record leaves the ReplicaSet as the workload",
+      ("apps", "ReplicaSet", "web-5f") in workloads(broken_ids["docker.io/library/nginx@" + A1]))
+check("mutation: losing the Job record leaves the Job as the workload",
+      ("ops", "Job", "backup-123") in workloads(broken_ids["ghcr.io/org/backup@" + E5]))
+check("mutation: a Running phase on the Succeeded pod does inventory its image", any(
+    F6 in t["id"] for t in inventory.build({**CLUSTER, "pods": [
+        {**p, "status": {**p["status"], "phase": "Running"}} if p["metadata"]["name"] == "done-1" else p
+        for p in CLUSTER["pods"]]})))
+
+for reference, expected in (
+    ("nginx:1.27", ("docker.io/library/nginx", "1.27", None)),
+    ("nginx", ("docker.io/library/nginx", None, None)),
+    ("bitnami/redis:7", ("docker.io/bitnami/redis", "7", None)),
+    ("ghcr.io/org/app:v1", ("ghcr.io/org/app", "v1", None)),
+    ("registry.local:5000/x/y:2", ("registry.local:5000/x/y", "2", None)),
+    ("index.docker.io/library/nginx:1", ("docker.io/library/nginx", "1", None)),
+    ("ghcr.io/org/app:v1@" + A1, ("ghcr.io/org/app", "v1", A1)),
+):
+    check("normalise " + reference, inventory.normalise_reference(reference) == expected)
+check("bare config id is not a digest", inventory.digest_from_image_id("sha256:" + "a1" * 32) is None)
+check("empty imageID has no digest", inventory.digest_from_image_id("") is None)
+
+
+class FakeListClient:
+    """list_all replaced; proves collect() tolerates exactly a 404 on the VMI API."""
+
+    def __init__(self, vmi_error):
+        self.vmi_error = vmi_error
+
+    def list_all(self, path):
+        if "kubevirt" in path and self.vmi_error:
+            raise self.vmi_error
+        return []
+
+
+check("VMI API 404 tolerated as no VMs", inventory.collect(FakeListClient(inventory.NotFound("x")))["vmis"] == [])
+try:
+    inventory.collect(FakeListClient(inventory.InventoryError("403")))
+    check("a non-404 VMI error is not swallowed", False)
+except inventory.InventoryError:
+    check("a non-404 VMI error is not swallowed", True)
+
+
+class PagedAPI(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def log_message(self, *args):
+        return
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        if self.headers.get("Authorization") != "Bearer fixture-token":
+            self.send_response(403)
+            self.end_headers()
+            return
+        if self.path.startswith("/apis/kubevirt"):
+            self.send_response(404)
+            self.end_headers()
+            return
+        if "continue=" in self.path:
+            body = {"items": [{"metadata": {"name": "b"}}], "metadata": {}}
+        else:
+            body = {"items": [{"metadata": {"name": "a"}}], "metadata": {"continue": "page2"}}
+        payload = json.dumps(body).encode()
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(payload)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(payload)
+
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    token = os.path.join(tmp, "token")
+    Path(token).write_text("fixture-token\n")
+    server = http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), PagedAPI)
+    threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+    client = inventory.KubeClient("http://127.0.0.1:" + str(server.server_address[1]), token, os.devnull)
+    items = client.list_all("/api/v1/pods")
+    check("pagination follows the continue token with the bearer token", [i["metadata"]["name"] for i in items] == ["a", "b"])
+    check("collect over real HTTP tolerates VMI 404", inventory.collect(client)["vmis"] == [])
+    server.shutdown()
+
+print("FAILED: " + str(len(FAILED)) if FAILED else "all checks passed")
+sys.exit(1 if FAILED else 0)

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-inventory/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runs the fixture-driven assertions in check.py. See chainsaw-test.yaml for the requirement tags.
+# What this does NOT prove: anything at runtime (real Trivy, real API, real browser). L2/L3 cover that.
+set -euo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+exec python3 "${HERE}/check.py"

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-inventory/fixtures/cluster.json

@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+{
+ "cronjobs": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "backup",
+    "namespace": "ops"
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "jobTemplate": {
+     "spec": {
+      "template": {
+       "spec": {
+        "containers": [
+         {
+          "image": "ghcr.io/org/backup:1.0",
+          "name": "job"
+         }
+        ]
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "nightly",
+    "namespace": "ops"
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "jobTemplate": {
+     "spec": {
+      "template": {
+       "spec": {
+        "containers": [
+         {
+          "image": "ghcr.io/org/nightly:2.1",
+          "name": "job"
+         }
+        ]
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "jobs": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "backup-123",
+    "namespace": "ops",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "CronJob",
+      "name": "backup"
+     }
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "backup-99",
+    "namespace": "ops",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "CronJob",
+      "name": "backup"
+     }
+    ]
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "nodes": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "prod-1"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "prod-2"
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "pods": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "web-1",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "ReplicaSet",
+      "name": "web-5f"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "nginx:1.27",
+      "name": "app"
+     }
+    ],
+    "ephemeralContainers": [
+     {
+      "image": "busybox:1.37",
+      "name": "debug"
+     }
+    ],
+    "initContainers": [
+     {
+      "image": "ghcr.io/org/tool:v2",
+      "name": "init-db"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker-pullable://docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+      "name": "app"
+     }
+    ],
+    "ephemeralContainerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker.io/library/busybox@sha256:c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3",
+      "name": "debug"
+     }
+    ],
+    "initContainerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "ghcr.io/org/tool@sha256:b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2",
+      "name": "init-db"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "web-2",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "ReplicaSet",
+      "name": "web-5f"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "nginx:1.27",
+      "name": "app"
+     }
+    ],
+    "initContainers": [
+     {
+      "image": "ghcr.io/org/tool:v2",
+      "name": "init-db"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+      "name": "app"
+     }
+    ],
+    "initContainerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "ghcr.io/org/tool@sha256:b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2b2",
+      "name": "init-db"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "api-1",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "ReplicaSet",
+      "name": "api-77"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "nginx:1.27",
+      "name": "server"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+      "name": "server"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "db-0",
+    "namespace": "data",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "StatefulSet",
+      "name": "db"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "postgres:16",
+      "name": "postgres"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker.io/library/postgres@sha256:d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4",
+      "name": "postgres"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "backup-123-x",
+    "namespace": "ops",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "Job",
+      "name": "backup-123"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "ghcr.io/org/backup:1.0",
+      "name": "backup"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "ghcr.io/org/backup@sha256:e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5",
+      "name": "backup"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "solo",
+    "namespace": "ops"
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "alpine:3.20",
+      "name": "toolbox"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "",
+      "name": "toolbox"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Pending"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "done-1",
+    "namespace": "ops",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "Job",
+      "name": "backup-99"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "ghcr.io/org/old-backup:0.1",
+      "name": "backup"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "ghcr.io/org/old-backup@sha256:f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6f6",
+      "name": "backup"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Succeeded"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "virt-launcher-vm1-abc",
+    "namespace": "kubevirt-vms",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "VirtualMachineInstance",
+      "name": "vm1"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "quay.io/kubevirt/virt-launcher:v1.8",
+      "name": "compute"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "quay.io/kubevirt/virt-launcher@sha256:abababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab",
+      "name": "compute"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "replicasets": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "web-5f",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "Deployment",
+      "name": "web"
+     }
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "api-77",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "Deployment",
+      "name": "api"
+     }
+    ]
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "vmis": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "vm1",
+    "namespace": "kubevirt-vms"
+   }
+  }
+ ]
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-page/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# L1 fixture test: runs check.py (python3 stdlib, source imported from platform/vuln-scanner/src,
+# no cluster, no network beyond loopback). conformance/run.sh --layer l1 runs check.sh offline;
+# this Chainsaw Test wraps the same script so an in-cluster run executes identical assertions.
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-page
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-03: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-04: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-03, R-VULN-04"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L1"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    # Whole-repo scope: the touched-path map keys nothing to platform/vuln-scanner, so without this
+    # a change to the scanner would select no vuln-scanner test.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given a report fixture, When the page renders, Then all CVEs, containers and workloads appear in all views and hostile input is inert.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: run-offline-check
+      description: Run check.sh, the same assertions the offline harness runs.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-page/check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""R-VULN-03/04: the rendered page. Assertions run against the actual HTML output."""
+import base64
+import copy
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import sys
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from html.parser import HTMLParser
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE.parents[3] / "platform/vuln-scanner/src"))
+import page  # noqa: E402
+
+FAILED = []
+NOW = datetime(2026, 11, 9, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+REPORT = json.loads((HERE / "fixtures/report.json").read_text())
+CLEAN_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)\bclean\b|no vulnerabilit")
+
+
+def check(name, condition):
+    print(("ok   " if condition else "FAIL ") + name)
+    if not condition:
+        FAILED.append(name)
+
+
+def render(report=REPORT, query="", now=NOW):
+    status, headers, body = page.render(report, query, now)
+    return status, headers, body.decode("utf-8")
+
+
+class Tags(HTMLParser):
+    def __init__(self):
+        super().__init__()
+        self.tags = []
+        self.attrs = []
+
+    def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs):
+        self.tags.append(tag)
+        self.attrs.append((tag, dict(attrs)))
+
+
+def tags(body):
+    parser = Tags()
+    parser.feed(body)
+    return parser
+
+
+def covers_everything(body, report):
+    """Every fixture CVE id, workload name and container name appears in the document."""
+    missing = [f["id"] for f in report["findings"] if f["id"] not in body]
+    for target in report["targets"]:
+        for workload in target["workloads"]:
+            if workload["name"] not in body:
+                missing.append(workload["name"])
+            missing.extend(c for c in workload["containers"] if c not in body)
+    return missing
+
+
+def workload_view_covers(body, report):
+    """Every workload row with its containers, and every CVE in the expansions."""
+    missing = covers_everything(body, report)
+    return missing
+
+
+for view in ("cves", "workloads", "inventory"):
+    status, headers, body = render(query="view=" + view)
+    check(view + " view returns 200", status == 200)
+    check(view + " view has the Content-Security-Policy with no script source", "script-src" not in headers["Content-Security-Policy"]
+          and headers["Content-Security-Policy"].startswith("default-src 'none'"))
+    check(view + " view sets nosniff", headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] == "nosniff")
+    check(view + " view has no script element", "script" not in tags(body).tags)
+    style_body = re.search(r"<style>(.*?)</style>", body, re.S).group(1)
+    expected = base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(style_body.encode()).digest()).decode()
+    check(view + " view's CSP hash matches its inline style", "'sha256-" + expected + "'" in headers["Content-Security-Policy"])
+    check(view + " view header shows every state count", all(state + ": <strong>" in body for state in page.report_mod.STATES))
+    check(view + " view shows a coverage warning", "INCOMPLETE COVERAGE" in body)
+    check(view + " view makes no clean claim with unscanned targets", not CLEAN_RE.search(body))
+
+status, headers, cves = render(query="view=cves")
+check("CVE view contains every CVE", all(f["id"] in cves for f in REPORT["findings"]))
+affected = {f["targetId"] for f in REPORT["findings"]}
+expected_in_cves = {(t["id"], w["name"]) for t in REPORT["targets"] if t["id"] in affected for w in t["workloads"]}
+check("CVE view expansions name every workload of an affected target", all(name in cves for _, name in expected_in_cves))
+check("CVE view expansions name every container of an affected target",
+      all(c in cves for t in REPORT["targets"] if t["id"] in affected for w in t["workloads"] for c in w["containers"]))
+for name in ("web", "api", "app", "server"):
+    check("CVE view expansion names " + name, name in cves)
+status, headers, workloads = render(query="view=workloads")
+check("workloads view contains every workload and container, including zero-finding ones", covers_everything(workloads, REPORT) == [])
+status, headers, inventory = render(query="view=inventory")
+check("inventory view contains every target", all(t["id"] in inventory for t in REPORT["targets"]))
+check("inventory view contains every workload and container", covers_everything(inventory, REPORT) == [])
+mutated = copy.deepcopy(REPORT)
+mutated["findings"] = [f for f in mutated["findings"] if f["id"] != "CVE-2026-1003"]
+check("mutation: the coverage evaluator catches a dropped CVE", "CVE-2026-1003" in covers_everything(render(mutated, "view=workloads")[2], REPORT))
+
+_, _, body = render(query="view=cves")
+check("hostile title is escaped", "&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;" in body)
+check("hostile title is never live", "<script>" not in body)
+hostile = copy.deepcopy(REPORT)
+hostile["findings"][0]["url"] = "javascript:alert(1)"
+hostile["findings"][0]["title"] = '"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
+hostile["targets"][0]["reason"] = "<b onmouseover=alert(1)>x</b>"
+hostile["remediation"][0]["url"] = "javascript:evil()"
+_, _, body = render(hostile, "view=cves")
+parsed = tags(body)
+check("a javascript: advisory URL never becomes a link", not any("javascript:" in (a.get("href") or "") for t, a in parsed.attrs if t == "a"))
+check("no element carries a hostile inline handler", not any(k.startswith("on") for _, a in parsed.attrs for k in a))
+check("no img element was injected", "img" not in parsed.tags)
+_, _, body = render(hostile, "view=inventory")
+check("hostile reason is escaped in inventory", "<b onmouseover" not in body and "&lt;b onmouseover" in body)
+_, _, body = render(query="view=cves&q=" + "%3Cscript%3E")
+check("a hostile search term is escaped", "<script>" not in body)
+check("a linked CVE points at its advisory", 'href="https://example.test/CVE-2026-1001"' in render(query="view=cves")[2])
+
+stale = copy.deepcopy(REPORT)
+stale["generatedAt"] = (NOW - timedelta(hours=27)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+_, _, body = render(stale)
+check("stale report shows a warning", "STALE REPORT" in body)
+check("stale report shows no normal state", "Status: ATTENTION NEEDED" in body and "Status: CURRENT" not in body)
+check("mutation: a fresh report has no stale warning", "STALE REPORT" not in render(REPORT)[2])
+degraded = copy.deepcopy(REPORT)
+degraded["run"]["status"] = "degraded"
+_, _, body = render(degraded)
+check("degraded run shows a warning and no normal state", "DEGRADED RUN" in body and "Status: ATTENTION NEEDED" in body and "Status: CURRENT" not in body)
+
+allgood = copy.deepcopy(REPORT)
+allgood["targets"] = [t for t in allgood["targets"] if t["state"] == "scanned"]
+allgood["findings"] = []
+_, _, body = render(allgood)
+check("the clean claim appears when every target is scanned with zero findings", "Clean: all 1 targets" in body)
+check("mutation: an all-scanned report shows the current state", "Status: CURRENT" in body)
+one_pending = copy.deepcopy(allgood)
+one_pending["targets"].append({"id": "x@sha256:" + "0" * 64, "type": "image", "image": "x", "digest": "sha256:" + "0" * 64,
+                               "state": "pending", "reason": None, "lastScannedAt": None, "workloads": []})
+_, _, body = render(one_pending)
+check("one pending target removes the clean claim", "Clean:" not in body and not CLEAN_RE.search(body))
+for state in ("failed", "stale", "credential-required", "by-tag", "not-covered"):
+    variant = copy.deepcopy(allgood)
+    variant["targets"].append({**one_pending["targets"][-1], "state": state})
+    check("a " + state + " target removes the clean claim", not CLEAN_RE.search(render(variant)[2]))
+empty = copy.deepcopy(allgood)
+empty["targets"] = []
+check("zero targets is never a clean claim", not CLEAN_RE.search(render(empty)[2]))
+degraded_clean = copy.deepcopy(allgood)
+degraded_clean["run"]["status"] = "degraded"
+check("a degraded run never makes a clean claim", not CLEAN_RE.search(render(degraded_clean)[2]))
+
+status, headers, body = render(None)
+check("no report yet is a 503 with the CSP", status == 503 and "Content-Security-Policy" in headers)
+check("no report yet makes no clean claim", not CLEAN_RE.search(body))
+
+_, _, body = render(query="view=cves&severity=CRITICAL")
+check("the severity filter narrows the list", "CVE-2026-1001" in body and "CVE-2026-1004" not in body)
+check("a filter is carried in pagination and sort links", "severity=CRITICAL" in body)
+_, _, body = render(query="view=cves&status=accepted")
+check("accepted findings stay listed with their reason", "CVE-2026-1003" in body and "not reachable" in body)
+_, _, body = render(query="view=cves&fix=no")
+check("the fix filter excludes fixed CVEs", "CVE-2026-1001" not in body and "CVE-2026-1002" in body)
+_, _, body = render(query="view=inventory&status=credential-required")
+check("inventory filters on coverage state", "ghcr.io/org/private" in body and "postgres" not in body.split("<main>")[1])
+_, _, body = render(query="view=workloads&namespace=ops")
+check("the namespace filter narrows workloads", "nightly" in body and "<td>web</td>" not in body)
+_, _, body = render(query="view=cves&q=openssl")
+check("free text search matches packages", "CVE-2026-1001" in body and "CVE-2026-1004" not in body)
+_, _, body = render()
+check("default view excludes nothing", all(f["id"] in body for f in REPORT["findings"]))
+check("remediation column shows pr-open with a link", 'href="https://gitea.test/pulls/1"' in body and "pr-open" in body)
+
+# Status and state belong to the line they describe (R-VULN-04).
+images = [t for t in REPORT["targets"] if t["type"] == "image" and t["workloads"]]
+check("fixture has two image targets with workloads", len(images) >= 2)
+mixed = copy.deepcopy(REPORT)
+first, second = next(t for t in mixed["targets"] if t["id"] == images[0]["id"]), next(t for t in mixed["targets"] if t["id"] == images[1]["id"])
+first["state"], first["reason"] = "scanned", None
+second["state"], second["reason"] = "stale", "last success long ago"
+base = dict(REPORT["findings"][0], id="CVE-MIXED")
+base.pop("acceptance", None)
+mixed["findings"] = [
+    dict(base, targetId=first["id"], status="accepted", acceptance={"reason": "only-on-the-first", "expires": "2026-12-01"}),
+    dict(base, targetId=second["id"], status="fix-available"),
+]
+_, _, body = render(mixed, "view=cves&q=CVE-MIXED")
+check("a mixed CVE reads as mixed, with counts", "mixed: 1 fix-available, 1 accepted" in body)
+check("a mixed CVE's row does not carry one image's acceptance", "<td>mixed: 1 fix-available, 1 accepted</td>" in body)
+first_line = page.e(first["id"]) + " — target scanned — status accepted (only-on-the-first, until 2026-12-01)"
+second_line = page.e(second["id"]) + " — target stale (last success long ago) — status fix-available"
+check("the accepted image's line carries its own acceptance", first_line in body)
+check("the other image's line carries its own status and state", second_line in body)
+check("no line attaches the acceptance to the unaccepted status", "status fix-available (only-on-the-first" not in body)
+check("workload lines inside the expansion carry state and status",
+      "target stale (last success long ago) — status fix-available</li>" in body
+      and "containers: " + page.e(", ".join(second["workloads"][0]["containers"]) or "none") + " — target stale" in body)
+_, _, plain = render(query="view=cves&status=accepted")
+check("mutation: a uniformly accepted CVE does not read as mixed", "mixed:" not in plain and "CVE-2026-1003" in plain)
+_, _, body = render(mixed, "view=workloads")
+check("the workloads images column labels each image's state", page.e(second["id"]) + " — target stale (last success long ago)" in body)
+check("the workloads expansion labels each finding's status, image and state",
+      "status fix-available — " + page.e(second["id"]) + " — target stale (last success long ago)</li>" in body)
+check("the workloads expansion keeps an acceptance on its own line",
+      "status accepted (only-on-the-first, until 2026-12-01) — " + page.e(first["id"]) + " — target scanned</li>" in body)
+
+big = copy.deepcopy(REPORT)
+big["findings"] = [dict(REPORT["findings"][0], id="CVE-2026-" + format(i, "05d")) for i in range(250)]
+_, _, body = render(big, "view=cves&size=50&page=2")
+check("pagination states the total", "of 250 CVEs (page 2 of 5)" in body)
+check("pagination shows only its page", "CVE-2026-00049" not in body and "CVE-2026-00050" in body and "CVE-2026-00100" not in body)
+check("every page's links include next and previous", ">next<" in body and ">previous<" in body)
+
+print("FAILED: " + str(len(FAILED)) if FAILED else "all checks passed")
+sys.exit(1 if FAILED else 0)

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-page/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runs the fixture-driven assertions in check.py. See chainsaw-test.yaml for the requirement tags.
+# What this does NOT prove: anything at runtime (real Trivy, real API, real browser). L2/L3 cover that.
+set -euo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+exec python3 "${HERE}/check.py"

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-page/fixtures/report.json

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+{
+ "database": {
+  "updatedAt": "2026-11-09T06:00:00Z",
+  "version": "2"
+ },
+ "findings": [
+  {
+   "cvss": 9.1,
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "fixedVersion": "3.0.2",
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1001",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "package": "openssl",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "status": "fix-available",
+   "targetId": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+   "title": "OpenSSL flaw",
+   "url": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-1001"
+  },
+  {
+   "cvss": null,
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "fixedVersion": null,
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1002",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "package": "zlib",
+   "severity": "LOW",
+   "status": "open",
+   "targetId": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+   "title": "<script>alert(1)</script>",
+   "url": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-1002"
+  },
+  {
+   "acceptance": {
+    "expires": "2027-01-01",
+    "reason": "not reachable"
+   },
+   "cvss": null,
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "fixedVersion": "16.2",
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1003",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "package": "libpq",
+   "severity": "HIGH",
+   "status": "accepted",
+   "targetId": "docker.io/library/postgres@sha256:d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4",
+   "title": "libpq flaw (retained from a prior scan)",
+   "url": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-1003"
+  },
+  {
+   "cvss": null,
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "fixedVersion": null,
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1004",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "package": "curl",
+   "severity": "MEDIUM",
+   "status": "open",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/org/nightly:2.1",
+   "title": "curl flaw",
+   "url": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-1004"
+  }
+ ],
+ "generatedAt": "2026-11-09T10:00:00Z",
+ "remediation": [
+  {
+   "image": "docker.io/library/nginx",
+   "state": "pr-open",
+   "updatedAt": "2026-11-09T10:00:00Z",
+   "url": "https://gitea.test/pulls/1"
+  }
+ ],
+ "run": {
+  "finishedAt": "2026-11-09T09:30:00Z",
+  "startedAt": "2026-11-09T09:00:00Z",
+  "status": "complete"
+ },
+ "schemaVersion": 1,
+ "targets": [
+  {
+   "digest": "sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+   "id": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+   "image": "docker.io/library/nginx",
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T10:00:00Z",
+   "reason": null,
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "type": "image",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "containers": [
+      "app"
+     ],
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "web",
+     "namespace": "apps"
+    },
+    {
+     "containers": [
+      "server"
+     ],
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "api",
+     "namespace": "apps"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "digest": "sha256:d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4",
+   "id": "docker.io/library/postgres@sha256:d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4",
+   "image": "docker.io/library/postgres",
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-07T09:00:00Z",
+   "reason": "trivy timed out",
+   "state": "failed",
+   "type": "image",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "containers": [
+      "postgres"
+     ],
+     "kind": "StatefulSet",
+     "name": "db",
+     "namespace": "data"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "digest": "sha256:e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5",
+   "id": "ghcr.io/org/private@sha256:e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/org/private",
+   "lastScannedAt": null,
+   "reason": "registry ghcr.io refused anonymous access",
+   "state": "credential-required",
+   "type": "image",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "containers": [
+      "priv"
+     ],
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "priv",
+     "namespace": "apps"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "digest": null,
+   "id": "ghcr.io/org/nightly:2.1",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/org/nightly",
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T10:00:00Z",
+   "reason": null,
+   "state": "by-tag",
+   "type": "image",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "containers": [
+      "job"
+     ],
+     "kind": "CronJob",
+     "name": "nightly",
+     "namespace": "ops"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "digest": null,
+   "id": "vm/kubevirt-vms/vm1",
+   "image": "",
+   "lastScannedAt": null,
+   "reason": "guest OS packages are not assessed by this scanner",
+   "state": "not-covered",
+   "type": "vm",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "containers": [],
+     "kind": "VirtualMachineInstance",
+     "name": "vm1",
+     "namespace": "kubevirt-vms"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "digest": null,
+   "id": "node/prod-1",
+   "image": "",
+   "lastScannedAt": null,
+   "reason": "node OS packages and the k3s binary are not assessed by this scanner",
+   "state": "not-covered",
+   "type": "node",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "containers": [],
+     "kind": "Node",
+     "name": "prod-1",
+     "namespace": ""
+    }
+   ]
+  }
+ ]
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# L1 fixture test: runs check.py (python3 stdlib, source imported from platform/vuln-scanner/src,
+# no cluster, no network beyond loopback). conformance/run.sh --layer l1 runs check.sh offline;
+# this Chainsaw Test wraps the same script so an in-cluster run executes identical assertions.
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-scan-loop
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-02: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-03: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-05: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-02, R-VULN-03, R-VULN-05"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L1"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    # Whole-repo scope: the touched-path map keys nothing to platform/vuln-scanner, so without this
+    # a change to the scanner would select no vuln-scanner test.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given a fake Trivy runner and clock, When ticks run, Then shared digests scan once, failures isolate, and coverage states and first-seen persist.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: run-offline-check
+      description: Run check.sh, the same assertions the offline harness runs.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""R-VULN-02/03/05: scan loop semantics with a fake Trivy runner and a controllable clock."""
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE.parents[3] / "platform/vuln-scanner/src"))
+import main  # noqa: E402
+import report  # noqa: E402
+import trivy  # noqa: E402
+
+logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL)
+FAILED = []
+A1 = "sha256:" + "a1" * 32
+D4 = "sha256:" + "d4" * 32
+E5 = "sha256:" + "e5" * 32
+NGINX = "docker.io/library/nginx@" + A1
+POSTGRES = "docker.io/library/postgres@" + D4
+PRIVATE = "ghcr.io/org/private@" + E5
+NIGHTLY = "ghcr.io/org/nightly:2.1"
+CLUSTER = json.loads((HERE / "fixtures/cluster.json").read_text())
+
+
+def fixture(name):
+    return json.loads((HERE / "fixtures" / name).read_text())
+
+
+def check(name, condition):
+    print(("ok   " if condition else "FAIL ") + name)
+    if not condition:
+        FAILED.append(name)
+
+
+class Clock:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.now = datetime(2026, 11, 9, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+    def __call__(self):
+        return self.now
+
+    def advance(self, **delta):
+        self.now += timedelta(**delta)
+
+
+class FakeClient:
+    def __init__(self, cluster):
+        self.cluster = cluster
+        self.fail = False
+
+    def list_all(self, path):
+        if self.fail:
+            raise RuntimeError("api down")
+        for name, item in (("pods", "/api/v1/pods"), ("replicasets", "replicasets"), ("jobs", "/jobs"),
+                           ("cronjobs", "cronjobs"), ("nodes", "/nodes"), ("vmis", "virtualmachineinstances")):
+            if path.endswith(item):
+                return self.cluster[name]
+        return []
+
+
+class FakeRunner:
+    """Recorded results, no Trivy binary."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.scans = []
+        self.outcomes = {
+            NGINX: fixture("trivy-nginx.json"), POSTGRES: fixture("trivy-postgres.json"),
+            NIGHTLY: fixture("trivy-nightly.json"),
+            PRIVATE: trivy.classify_failure("ghcr.io", "FATAL: GET https://ghcr.io/: UNAUTHORIZED: authentication required"),
+        }
+        self.db_age_hours = 1
+        self.db_fails = False
+        self.clock = None
+
+    def download_db(self):
+        if self.db_fails:
+            raise trivy.ScanFailure("failed", "database update failed")
+
+    def db_info(self):
+        return {"updatedAt": (self.clock() - timedelta(hours=self.db_age_hours)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"), "version": "2"}
+
+    def scan(self, reference):
+        self.scans.append(reference)
+        outcome = self.outcomes[reference]
+        if isinstance(outcome, Exception):
+            raise outcome
+        return outcome
+
+    def clean_cache(self):
+        pass
+
+
+def engine(tmp, runner=None, clock=None, acc="[]\n", cluster=CLUSTER, private=()):
+    path = os.path.join(tmp, "acceptances.yaml")
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        Path(path).write_text(acc)
+    clock = clock or Clock()
+    runner = runner or FakeRunner()
+    runner.clock = clock
+    return main.Engine(tmp, FakeClient(cluster), runner, path, clock=clock, publish_seconds=0, private_registries=private), runner, clock
+
+
+def targets(eng):
+    return {t["id"]: t for t in eng.report["targets"]}
+
+
+def findings(eng, target_id):
+    return [f for f in eng.report["findings"] if f["targetId"] == target_id]
+
+
+def one_scan_per_digest(scans):
+    return len(scans) == len(set(scans))
+
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    eng.tick()
+    t = targets(eng)
+    check("two workloads sharing a digest produce exactly one scan", runner.scans.count(NGINX) == 1 and one_scan_per_digest(runner.scans))
+    check("mutation: the digest-uniqueness evaluator rejects a double scan", not one_scan_per_digest(["a", "a"]))
+    check("the shared digest maps back to both workloads",
+          {(w["kind"], w["name"]) for w in t[NGINX]["workloads"]} == {("Deployment", "web"), ("Deployment", "api")})
+    check("shared digest findings appear once per target", len(findings(eng, NGINX)) == 2)
+    check("digest target is scanned", t[NGINX]["state"] == "scanned")
+    check("idle CronJob template is by-tag after scanning, not scanned", t[NIGHTLY]["state"] == "by-tag")
+    check("node is not-covered", t["node/prod-1"]["state"] == "not-covered")
+    check("report is schema-valid", report.validate(eng.report) == [])
+    check("credential-required is its own state, not failed", t[PRIVATE]["state"] == "credential-required")
+    check("credential-required reason names the registry", "ghcr.io" in t[PRIVATE]["reason"])
+    check("credential-required does not count toward failed_over_24h", report.failed_over_24h(eng.state, clock() + timedelta(hours=48)) == 0)
+    check("report is written to disk", json.loads(Path(tmp, "report.json").read_text())["generatedAt"])
+    first_seen = {f["id"]: f["firstSeenAt"] for f in findings(eng, NGINX)}
+
+    clock.advance(hours=21)
+    runner.outcomes[POSTGRES] = trivy.ScanFailure("failed", "pull error: manifest unknown")
+    eng.tick()
+    t = targets(eng)
+    check("a failed image leaves the run continuing", runner.scans.count(NGINX) == 2 and runner.scans.count(NIGHTLY) == 2)
+    check("the failed target is failed", t[POSTGRES]["state"] == "failed")
+    check("the failed target's reason is shown", "manifest unknown" in t[POSTGRES]["reason"])
+    check("the failed target keeps its prior findings", [f["id"] for f in findings(eng, POSTGRES)] == ["CVE-2026-0010"])
+    check("other targets stay scanned", t[NGINX]["state"] == "scanned")
+    check("first-seen survives a re-scan", {f["id"]: f["firstSeenAt"] for f in findings(eng, NGINX)} == first_seen)
+    check("run with one failed image is still complete (failure is per-target)", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "complete")
+
+    clock.advance(hours=25)
+    check("failed target is counted over 24h after 25h", report.failed_over_24h(eng.state, clock()) == 1)
+    eng.publish()
+    check("a target whose last success aged past 24h is stale", targets(eng)[NGINX]["state"] == "stale")
+    check("stale target keeps findings", len(findings(eng, NGINX)) == 2)
+
+    # Restart: a new Engine loads everything from disk.
+    eng2, runner2, clock2 = engine(tmp, runner=FakeRunner(), clock=clock)
+    check("report survives restart", eng2.report is not None and eng2.report_bytes() is not None)
+    check("last complete run survives restart", eng2.state["lastCompleteRunAt"] is not None)
+    eng2.publish()
+    check("first-seen survives restart", {f["id"]: f["firstSeenAt"] for f in findings(eng2, NGINX)} == first_seen)
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # Not-scanned is never zero findings: the first tick has not scanned anything yet.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    eng.refresh_inventory()
+    eng.publish()
+    t = targets(eng)
+    check("before scanning, digest targets are pending", t[NGINX]["state"] == "pending" and t[POSTGRES]["state"] == "pending")
+    check("run object exists and is degraded before the first run", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+    check("no fabricated findings before scanning", eng.report["findings"] == [])
+    check("zero findings report still counts every target", len(eng.report["targets"]) == 5)
+    clock.advance(hours=3)
+    eng.publish()
+    t = targets(eng)
+    check("pending beyond 2h becomes failed, never silently absent", t[NGINX]["state"] == "failed")
+    check("failed reason is the contract's text", t[NGINX]["reason"] == report.NOT_SCANNED_REASON)
+    check("a never-scanned failed target has lastScannedAt null", t[NGINX]["lastScannedAt"] is None)
+    clock.advance(hours=24)
+    check("never-scanned target counts as failed over 24h", report.failed_over_24h(eng.state, clock()) >= 1)
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # Database problems degrade the run but it still reports.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    runner.db_fails = True
+    eng.tick()
+    check("DB update failure degrades the run", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+    check("DB update failure still scans and reports", runner.scans and eng.report["findings"])
+    check("a degraded run is not recorded as complete", eng.state["lastCompleteRunAt"] is None)
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    runner.db_age_hours = 49
+    eng.tick()
+    check("a DB older than 48h degrades the run", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+    runner.db_age_hours = 1
+    clock.advance(hours=21)
+    eng.tick()
+    check("mutation: a fresh DB gives a complete run", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "complete" and eng.state["lastCompleteRunAt"])
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # A target leaving the inventory leaves the report, with its findings.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    eng.tick()
+    check("postgres is present first", POSTGRES in targets(eng))
+    gone = dict(CLUSTER)
+    gone["pods"] = [p for p in CLUSTER["pods"] if p["metadata"]["name"] != "db-0"]
+    eng.client.cluster = gone
+    clock.advance(minutes=15)
+    eng.tick()
+    check("a target leaving the inventory leaves the report", POSTGRES not in targets(eng))
+    check("its findings go with it", not findings(eng, POSTGRES))
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # Unexpected exceptions are contained at each level.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    runner.outcomes[POSTGRES] = RuntimeError("boom")
+    eng.tick()
+    check("an unexpected scan exception fails only that target", targets(eng)[POSTGRES]["state"] == "failed")
+    check("the run continued past it", runner.scans.count(NIGHTLY) == 1)
+    eng.client.fail = True
+    clock.advance(minutes=15)
+    eng.tick()
+    check("an inventory failure keeps the previous inventory", NGINX in targets(eng))
+    check("an inventory failure degrades the report", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+
+    calls = []
+
+    def crashing_tick():
+        calls.append(1)
+        if len(calls) == 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("cycle crash")
+        eng.stop.set()
+
+    eng.tick = crashing_tick
+    eng.tick_seconds = 0
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=eng.run_forever, daemon=True)
+    thread.start()
+    thread.join(10)
+    check("a crash in one cycle is logged and the loop continues", len(calls) == 2 and not thread.is_alive())
+
+class Killed(BaseException):
+    """What an OOM kill looks like from inside the process: no `except Exception` runs."""
+
+
+class KillingRunner(FakeRunner):
+    def __init__(self, victim, data_dir):
+        super().__init__()
+        self.victim = victim
+        self.data_dir = data_dir
+        self.on_disk = None
+
+    def scan(self, reference):
+        if reference == self.victim:
+            self.on_disk = json.loads(Path(self.data_dir, "state.json").read_text()).get("inFlight")
+            raise Killed()
+        return super().scan(reference)
+
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # R-VULN-05 BLOCKER: a scan that kills the container must cost that image only.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp, runner=KillingRunner(POSTGRES, tmp))
+    killed = False
+    try:
+        eng.tick()
+    except Killed:
+        killed = True
+    check("kill: the simulated OOM really aborted the process path", killed)
+    check("kill: inFlight is on disk BEFORE the scan starts", runner.on_disk == D4)
+    eng2, runner2, clock2 = engine(tmp, runner=FakeRunner(), clock=clock)
+    check("kill: startup clears inFlight", eng2.state["inFlight"] is None)
+    check("kill: clearing is persisted", json.loads(Path(tmp, "state.json").read_text())["inFlight"] is None)
+    eng2.publish()
+    t = targets(eng2)
+    check("kill: the target is failed", t[POSTGRES]["state"] == "failed")
+    check("kill: the reason is the killed-scan text", t[POSTGRES]["reason"] == main.KILLED_REASON)
+    eng2.tick()
+    t = targets(eng2)
+    check("kill: images after the killed one get scanned", PRIVATE in runner2.scans and t[PRIVATE]["state"] == "credential-required")
+    check("kill: the killed image is not retried on restart (no wedge)", POSTGRES not in runner2.scans)
+    check("kill: the killed target stays failed with its reason", t[POSTGRES]["reason"] == main.KILLED_REASON)
+    check("kill: inFlight is clear after a normal cycle", eng2.state["inFlight"] is None)
+    clock.advance(hours=21)
+    eng2.tick()
+    check("kill: the killed image is retried after the sit-out", runner2.scans.count(POSTGRES) == 1)
+    check("kill: a successful retry clears the failure", targets(eng2)[POSTGRES]["state"] == "scanned")
+    check("kill: a successful retry clears killedAt", eng2.state["scans"][D4]["killedAt"] is None)
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    eng.refresh_inventory()
+    eng2, runner2, clock2 = engine(tmp, runner=FakeRunner(), clock=clock)
+    eng2.publish()
+    check("mutation: a restart with no inFlight fails nothing", targets(eng2)[POSTGRES]["state"] == "pending")
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # A registry the scanner cannot reach is credential-required, and Trivy is never invoked.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp, private=[" GHCR.io ", ""])
+    eng.tick()
+    t = targets(eng)
+    check("private registry: reported credential-required", t[PRIVATE]["state"] == "credential-required")
+    check("private registry: the reason names the registry", "ghcr.io" in t[PRIVATE]["reason"])
+    check("private registry: Trivy is never invoked for it", PRIVATE not in runner.scans and NIGHTLY not in runner.scans)
+    check("private registry: other registries still scan", NGINX in runner.scans)
+    check("private registry: not counted as failed", report.failed_over_24h(eng.state, clock() + timedelta(hours=48)) == 0)
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    eng.tick()
+    check("mutation: with no private registry configured Trivy is invoked", PRIVATE in runner.scans)
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # A corrupt state.json degrades the run that rebuilds from it, not every run thereafter.
+    Path(tmp, "state.json").write_text("{not json")
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    check("loadError: set after a corrupt state.json", eng.state["loadError"])
+    eng.tick()
+    check("loadError: the rebuilding run is degraded", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+    check("loadError: cleared after a full run with a good inventory", eng.state["loadError"] is None)
+    clock.advance(hours=21)
+    eng.tick()
+    check("loadError: the next full run is complete", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "complete" and eng.state["lastCompleteRunAt"])
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    Path(tmp, "state.json").write_text("{not json")
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    eng.client.fail = True
+    eng.tick()
+    check("mutation: loadError is kept when the inventory failed", eng.state["loadError"])
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # lastCompleteRunAt means a report reached the store; a refused report must not advance it.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    real_publish = report.publish
+    report.publish = lambda *_: False
+    try:
+        eng.tick()
+    finally:
+        report.publish = real_publish
+    check("a refused publish does not advance lastCompleteRunAt", eng.state["lastCompleteRunAt"] is None)
+    clock.advance(hours=21)
+    eng.tick()
+    check("mutation: a successful publish does advance it", eng.state["lastCompleteRunAt"] is not None)
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # One upstream string costs that string. Each of these used to freeze the whole report.
+    long_reason = "x" * 3000
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp, acc="- id: CVE-2026-0010\n  reason: " + long_reason + "\n  expires: 2026-12-01\n")
+    runner.outcomes[NGINX] = {"SchemaVersion": 2, "Results": [{"Vulnerabilities": [
+        {"VulnerabilityID": "CVE-UP", "Severity": "HIGH", "PkgName": "p", "InstalledVersion": "1",
+         "PrimaryURL": "HTTPS://upper.example/x", "Title": "t\ud800"}]}]}
+    eng.tick()
+    check("hostile strings: the report still publishes", json.loads(Path(tmp, "report.json").read_text())["findings"] and report.validate(eng.report) == [])
+    up = [f for f in findings(eng, NGINX) if f["id"] == "CVE-UP"][0]
+    check("hostile strings: an uppercase scheme drops only the URL", up["url"] == "")
+    check("hostile strings: a lone surrogate is removed", "\ud800" not in up["title"])
+    check("hostile strings: an over-long acceptance is ignored, the finding stays open", [f for f in findings(eng, POSTGRES) if f["id"] == "CVE-2026-0010"][0]["status"] != "accepted")
+    check("hostile strings: an over-long acceptance degrades the run", eng.report["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+    check("hostile strings: the degraded run is not recorded as complete", eng.state["lastCompleteRunAt"] is None)
+
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+    # Isolation: values already in state, whatever put them there, cannot refuse the whole report.
+    eng, runner, clock = engine(tmp)
+    eng.tick()
+    clean = report.build(eng.state, [], [], clock())
+    check("mutation: a clean state is not reported as repaired", clean["run"]["status"] == "complete" and clean == report.build(eng.state, [], [], clock()))
+    record = eng.state["scans"][A1]
+    record["findings"][0].update(url="HTTP://x", title="t" * 900, severity="weird", cvss=99, package="p" * 900)
+    eng.state["database"] = {"updatedAt": "not-a-time", "version": "1"}
+    eng.state["remediation"] = [{"image": "a/b", "state": "pr-open", "url": "HTTP://x", "updatedAt": "2026-11-09T00:00:00Z"}]
+    target = next(i for i in eng.state["inventory"] if i["id"] == NIGHTLY)
+    target["id"] = "ghcr.io/" + "o" * 3000 + ":1"
+    target["image"] = "ghcr.io/" + "o" * 3000
+    eng.state["scans"][target["id"]] = eng.state["scans"].pop(NIGHTLY)  # a by-tag unit is keyed by its id
+    built = report.build(eng.state, [], [], clock())
+    check("isolation: the repaired report is schema-valid", report.validate(built) == [])
+    check("isolation: a repair degrades the run", built["run"]["status"] == "degraded")
+    bad = [f for f in built["findings"] if f["targetId"] == NGINX and f["title"] == "t" * 512][0]
+    check("isolation: the bad finding survives with sanitised fields",
+          bad["url"] == "" and bad["severity"] == "UNKNOWN" and bad["cvss"] is None and len(bad["package"]) == 256)
+    check("isolation: every other finding is untouched", len(built["findings"]) == len(clean["findings"]))
+    check("isolation: a bad remediation loses only its url", built["remediation"][0]["url"] is None)
+    check("isolation: an unusable database is reported as unavailable", built["database"]["version"] == "unavailable")
+    long_ids = [t for t in built["targets"] if len(t["id"]) > 2000]
+    check("isolation: an over-long target stays listed", len(long_ids) == 1 and len(long_ids[0]["id"]) <= 2048)
+    check("isolation: findings follow the shortened target id",
+          any(f["targetId"] == long_ids[0]["id"] for f in built["findings"]))
+
+
+class FakeProcess:
+    returncode = 0
+
+    def __init__(self, stdout):
+        self.stdout = stdout
+
+
+class VersionRunner(trivy.Runner):
+    def __init__(self, stdout):
+        super().__init__("/nonexistent", "/nonexistent")
+        self.stdout = stdout
+
+    def _run(self, args, timeout):
+        return FakeProcess(self.stdout)
+
+
+def db_info(updated, version):
+    return VersionRunner(json.dumps({"VulnerabilityDB": {"UpdatedAt": updated, "Version": version}})).db_info()
+
+
+check("db_info rejects an unparseable timestamp", db_info("yesterday", "2") is None)
+check("db_info rejects a non-string timestamp", db_info(5, "2") is None)
+check("db_info bounds the version", len(db_info("2026-11-09T06:13:52.123456789Z", "v" * 500)["version"]) == 128)
+check("mutation: db_info keeps a good database", db_info("2026-11-09T06:13:52Z", "2") == {"updatedAt": "2026-11-09T06:13:52Z", "version": "2"})
+check("a credential failure's reason is bounded", len(trivy.classify_failure("r" * 3000, "401 unauthorized").reason) <= 1024)
+
+for url, want in (("https://a.test/x", "https://a.test/x"), ("http://a.test/", "http://a.test/"), ("HTTPS://a.test/x", ""),
+                  ("HTTP://a.test/x", ""), ("Https://a.test/x", ""), ("javascript:alert(1)", ""), ("", "")):
+    check("safe_url " + repr(url), trivy.safe_url(url) == want)
+check("every url safe_url keeps satisfies the report schema",
+      report.re.search(report.SCHEMA["properties"]["findings"]["items"]["properties"]["url"]["pattern"], trivy.safe_url("https://a.test/x")))
+
+# Recorded Trivy output through the normaliser: untrusted text.
+parsed = trivy.parse_results({"SchemaVersion": 2, "Results": [{"Vulnerabilities": [
+    {"VulnerabilityID": "CVE-1", "Severity": "weird", "PkgName": "p", "InstalledVersion": "1", "Title": "x\x07y",
+     "PrimaryURL": "javascript:alert(1)", "CVSS": {"nvd": {"V3Score": 11}}},
+    {"VulnerabilityID": "CVE-2", "Severity": "HIGH", "PkgName": "q", "InstalledVersion": "1", "FixedVersion": "2",
+     "PrimaryURL": "https://example.test/x", "CVSS": {"nvd": {"V3Score": 7.5}}},
+]}]})
+check("unknown severity becomes UNKNOWN", parsed[0]["severity"] == "UNKNOWN")
+check("control characters are stripped from upstream text", "\x07" not in parsed[0]["title"])
+check("non-http(s) advisory URL becomes empty", parsed[0]["url"] == "")
+check("out-of-range CVSS is dropped", parsed[0]["cvss"] is None)
+check("http(s) URL is kept", parsed[1]["url"] == "https://example.test/x")
+check("a recorded report with no Results is zero findings", trivy.parse_results(fixture("trivy-empty.json")) == [])
+try:
+    trivy.parse_results({"not": "a report"})
+    check("an unrecognised document is a failure, never zero findings", False)
+except trivy.ScanFailure as exc:
+    check("an unrecognised document is a failure, never zero findings", exc.kind == "failed")
+failure = trivy.classify_failure("ghcr.io", "GET failed: 401 Unauthorized")
+check("401 is credential-required", failure.kind == "credential-required" and "ghcr.io" in failure.reason)
+check("permission denied on local disk is a plain failure", trivy.classify_failure("r", "open /cache/x: permission denied").kind == "failed")
+check("a pull timeout is failed, not credential-required", trivy.classify_failure("r", "context deadline exceeded").kind == "failed")
+
+print("FAILED: " + str(len(FAILED)) if FAILED else "all checks passed")
+sys.exit(1 if FAILED else 0)

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runs the fixture-driven assertions in check.py. See chainsaw-test.yaml for the requirement tags.
+# What this does NOT prove: anything at runtime (real Trivy, real API, real browser). L2/L3 cover that.
+set -euo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+exec python3 "${HERE}/check.py"

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/fixtures/cluster.json

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+{
+ "cronjobs": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "nightly",
+    "namespace": "ops"
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "jobTemplate": {
+     "spec": {
+      "template": {
+       "spec": {
+        "containers": [
+         {
+          "image": "ghcr.io/org/nightly:2.1",
+          "name": "job"
+         }
+        ]
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "jobs": [],
+ "nodes": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "prod-1"
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "pods": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "web-1",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "ReplicaSet",
+      "name": "web-5f"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "nginx:1.27",
+      "name": "app"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+      "name": "app"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "api-1",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "ReplicaSet",
+      "name": "api-77"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "nginx:1.27",
+      "name": "server"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1a1",
+      "name": "server"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "db-0",
+    "namespace": "data",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "StatefulSet",
+      "name": "db"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "postgres:16",
+      "name": "postgres"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "docker.io/library/postgres@sha256:d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4",
+      "name": "postgres"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "priv-1",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "ReplicaSet",
+      "name": "priv-1a"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "spec": {
+    "containers": [
+     {
+      "image": "ghcr.io/org/private:1",
+      "name": "priv"
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "status": {
+    "containerStatuses": [
+     {
+      "imageID": "ghcr.io/org/private@sha256:e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5",
+      "name": "priv"
+     }
+    ],
+    "phase": "Running"
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "replicasets": [
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "web-5f",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "Deployment",
+      "name": "web"
+     }
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "api-77",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "Deployment",
+      "name": "api"
+     }
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "metadata": {
+    "name": "priv-1a",
+    "namespace": "apps",
+    "ownerReferences": [
+     {
+      "controller": true,
+      "kind": "Deployment",
+      "name": "priv"
+     }
+    ]
+   }
+  }
+ ],
+ "vmis": []
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/fixtures/trivy-empty.json

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+ "ArtifactName": "x",
+ "SchemaVersion": 2
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/fixtures/trivy-nginx.json

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "ArtifactName": "x",
+ "Results": [
+  {
+   "Target": "t",
+   "Vulnerabilities": [
+    {
+     "CVSS": {
+      "nvd": {
+       "V3Score": 9.8
+      }
+     },
+     "FixedVersion": "3.0.2",
+     "InstalledVersion": "1.0",
+     "PkgName": "openssl",
+     "PrimaryURL": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-0001",
+     "Severity": "CRITICAL",
+     "Title": "OpenSSL flaw",
+     "VulnerabilityID": "CVE-2026-0001"
+    },
+    {
+     "InstalledVersion": "1.0",
+     "PkgName": "zlib",
+     "PrimaryURL": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-0002",
+     "Severity": "LOW",
+     "Title": "t",
+     "VulnerabilityID": "CVE-2026-0002"
+    }
+   ]
+  }
+ ],
+ "SchemaVersion": 2
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/fixtures/trivy-nightly.json

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+ "ArtifactName": "x",
+ "Results": [
+  {
+   "Target": "t",
+   "Vulnerabilities": [
+    {
+     "InstalledVersion": "1.0",
+     "PkgName": "curl",
+     "PrimaryURL": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-0020",
+     "Severity": "MEDIUM",
+     "Title": "t",
+     "VulnerabilityID": "CVE-2026-0020"
+    }
+   ]
+  }
+ ],
+ "SchemaVersion": 2
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-scan-loop/fixtures/trivy-postgres.json

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+ "ArtifactName": "x",
+ "Results": [
+  {
+   "Target": "t",
+   "Vulnerabilities": [
+    {
+     "CVSS": {
+      "nvd": {
+       "V3Score": 7.5
+      }
+     },
+     "FixedVersion": "16.2",
+     "InstalledVersion": "1.0",
+     "PkgName": "libpq",
+     "PrimaryURL": "https://example.test/CVE-2026-0010",
+     "Severity": "HIGH",
+     "Title": "libpq flaw",
+     "VulnerabilityID": "CVE-2026-0010"
+    }
+   ]
+  }
+ ],
+ "SchemaVersion": 2
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-approval-ticks/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L1 RENDERING — the bot ticks only qualifying approve rows (R-VULN-05, R-VULN-07)
+# Spec: docs/17 "The triage bot" and its L1 acceptance gates. GIVEN a Renovate dashboard in the
+# real issue #91 format plus a constructed Pending Approval section, WHEN the bot plans ticks,
+# THEN only `approve` rows exact-matching an image with an unaccepted CRITICAL with a fix change,
+# by exactly their marker, and every negative row stays byte-identical.
+#
+# render-check.sh is a pure offline check; this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-triage-bot-approval-ticks
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-05: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-07: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-05,R-VULN-07"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L1"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    # The script under test lives in .gitea/workflows/, which requirement-scoped selection does
+    # not attribute to R-VULN-*, so a change to it must still select this test.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      A tick is applied only to an approve row for an image with a qualifying finding, and dry
+      runs, duplicate prevention and heartbeat ordering hold through the whole run.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: plan-and-assert-ticks
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./render-check.sh

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-approval-ticks/check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""L1: the bot ticks only qualifying approve rows, and a whole run behaves (R-VULN-05, R-VULN-07).
+
+fixtures/renovate-dashboard.md follows issue #91's real format (`## Open` rebase rows, Detected
+Dependencies) plus a constructed Pending Approval section, because the live dashboard has none.
+Runs the real functions and the real run() over a fake Gitea and a fake scanner.
+
+What this does NOT prove: that Renovate honours a tick; that the live dashboard keeps this format
+across Renovate upgrades (a format change yields no tick rather than a wrong one); that Gitea's
+API matches the fake; or anything about the runner's network path to the scanner.
+"""
+import copy
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import sys
+import urllib.parse
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.dont_write_bytecode = True
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+ROOT = HERE.parents[3]
+spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("cve_triage", ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/scripts/cve_triage.py")
+bot = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+sys.modules["cve_triage"] = bot
+spec.loader.exec_module(bot)
+
+RAW = (HERE / "fixtures/report.json").read_bytes()
+FIXTURE = json.loads(RAW)
+BODY = (HERE / "fixtures/renovate-dashboard.md").read_text()
+OPEN_PRS = json.loads((HERE / "fixtures/open-prs.json").read_text())
+NOW = datetime(2026, 11, 9, 7, 15, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+GITEA = "https://gitea.example.test"
+REPO = "o/r"
+VULN = "http://vuln-scanner.vuln-scanner.svc.cluster.local:8081"
+FALLBACK = "http://10.43.0.99:8081"
+EXPECTED = {
+    "renovate/nginx-2.x",
+    "renovate/ghcr.io-example-app-2.x",
+    "renovate/example-group",
+}
+failures = []
+
+
+def check(name, condition):
+    print(f"{'ok  ' if condition else 'FAIL'} {name}")
+    if not condition:
+        failures.append(name)
+
+
+def fails(function):
+    try:
+        function()
+    except AssertionError:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def raises(function):
+    try:
+        function()
+    except bot.BotError:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def planned(report_doc, body):
+    report = bot.parse_report(json.dumps(report_doc).encode())
+    rows = bot.parse_rows(body)
+    return bot.select_ticks(rows, bot.qualifying_images(report))
+
+
+def assert_ticks(report_doc, body, expected):
+    """The tick plan is exactly `expected`, and writing it changes exactly those markers."""
+    ticks = planned(report_doc, body)
+    assert {row.branch for row in ticks} == expected, "tick plan differs"
+    after = bot.apply_ticks(body, ticks)
+    want = body
+    for branch in expected:
+        line = f" - [ ] <!-- approve-branch={branch} -->"
+        assert want.count(line) == 1, "expected row not found exactly once"
+        want = want.replace(line, line.replace("[ ]", "[x]", 1))
+    assert after == want, "output differs from a marker-only edit"
+
+
+check("exactly the three qualifying approve rows are ticked, and nothing else changes",
+      not fails(lambda: assert_ticks(FIXTURE, BODY, EXPECTED)))
+
+after = bot.apply_ticks(BODY, planned(FIXTURE, BODY))
+changed = [(a, b) for a, b in zip(BODY.split("\n"), after.split("\n")) if a != b]
+check("three lines differ, same line count, same length", len(changed) == 3 and len(BODY) == len(after))
+for label, needle in {
+    "rebase row of a qualifying image": "rebase-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-has-pr",
+    "approve row for a non-matching package": "approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-other-unrelated",
+    "approve row matching only by substring": "approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-foo-bar-extras",
+    "approve row for a HIGH-only image": "approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-high-only",
+    "approve row for an accepted-CRITICAL image": "approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-accepted-only",
+    "approve row for a CRITICAL with no fix": "approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-nofix",
+    "approve row with no container package": "approve-branch=renovate/mychart",
+    "approvePr row of a qualifying image": "approvePr-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-app-automerge",
+    "unschedule row of a qualifying image": "unschedule-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-pending-sched",
+    "decoy approve row below Detected Dependencies": "approve-branch=renovate/decoy",
+}.items():
+    original = next(line for line in BODY.split("\n") if needle in line)
+    check(f"untouched: {label}", original in after.split("\n"))
+check("untouched: the approve-all row", "- [ ] <!-- approve-all-pending-prs -->" in after)
+check("untouched: the already ticked row keeps its mark",
+      " - [x] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-already-ticked-2.x -->" in after)
+
+# Non-vacuity: each mutation must make the exact assertion above fail.
+def mutated_finding(image, **fields):
+    doc = copy.deepcopy(FIXTURE)
+    target = next(t for t in doc["targets"] if t["image"] == image)
+    finding = next(f for f in doc["findings"] if f["targetId"] == target["id"])
+    finding.update(fields)
+    return doc
+
+
+for label, doc in {
+    "HIGH-only image raised to CRITICAL": mutated_finding("ghcr.io/example/high-only", severity="CRITICAL"),
+    "accepted CRITICAL un-accepted": mutated_finding("ghcr.io/example/accepted-only", status="fix-available"),
+    "qualifying finding accepted": mutated_finding("ghcr.io/example/app", status="accepted"),
+    "CRITICAL gains a fix": mutated_finding("ghcr.io/example/nofix", status="fix-available", fixedVersion="2"),
+}.items():
+    check(f"non-vacuity: mutated fixture fails ({label})", fails(lambda: assert_ticks(doc, BODY, EXPECTED)))
+
+mutated_body = BODY.replace("rebase-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-has-pr", "approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-has-pr")
+check("non-vacuity: a rebase row rewritten as approve is then ticked",
+      fails(lambda: assert_ticks(FIXTURE, mutated_body, EXPECTED)))
+
+real_match = bot.row_matches
+bot.row_matches = lambda row, qualifying: any(q in p for p in row.packages for q in qualifying)
+check("non-vacuity: a substring matcher fails the assertion", fails(lambda: assert_ticks(FIXTURE, BODY, EXPECTED)))
+bot.row_matches = real_match
+
+for raw, want in {
+    "docker.io/library/nginx": "nginx",
+    "library/nginx": "nginx",
+    "nginx:1.27": "nginx",
+    "Docker.IO/Pihole/Pihole": "pihole/pihole",
+    "ghcr.io/library/x": "ghcr.io/library/x",
+    "registry.example:5000/a/b:v1@sha256:" + "0" * 64: "registry.example:5000/a/b",
+    "bad image": "",
+    "": "",
+}.items():
+    check(f"normalise_image({raw[:40]!r})", bot.normalise_image(raw) == want)
+
+ticks = planned(FIXTURE, BODY)
+moved = BODY.replace(" - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/nginx-2.x -->", " - [ ] <!-- rebase-branch=renovate/nginx-2.x -->")
+check("apply_ticks refuses a row that stopped being approve", raises(lambda: bot.apply_ticks(moved, ticks)))
+crlf = BODY.replace("\n", "\r\n")
+crlf_after = bot.apply_ticks(crlf, planned(FIXTURE, crlf))
+check("CRLF body keeps every line ending", crlf_after.count("\r\n") == crlf.count("\r\n") and crlf_after.count("[x]") == 4)
+
+
+class FakeWorld:
+    """A fake Gitea and scanner reached through the transport interface. Records every write."""
+
+    def __init__(self, renovate_body=BODY, report=RAW):
+        self.report = report
+        self.labels = []
+        self.issues = {91: {"number": 91, "title": "Dependency Dashboard", "state": "open", "labels": [], "body": renovate_body, "pull_request": None}}
+        self.next_issue = 200
+        self.writes = []
+        self.triage = None
+        self.fail = None
+        self.dns_down = set()
+        self.seen_hosts = []
+
+    def __call__(self, method, url, headers, body, max_bytes):
+        parts = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+        self.seen_hosts.append(parts.netloc)
+        if parts.netloc in self.dns_down:
+            raise bot.DnsFailure()
+        if self.fail and self.fail[0] == method and self.fail[1] in parts.path:
+            return 500, b""
+        payload = json.loads(body) if body else None
+        if parts.netloc != "gitea.example.test":
+            if method == "GET" and parts.path == "/report.json":
+                return 200, self.report
+            if method == "POST" and parts.path == "/triage":
+                self.writes.append(("POST", "triage"))
+                self.triage = payload
+                return 204, b""
+            return 404, b""
+        path = parts.path.removeprefix(f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}")
+        query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parts.query))
+        page = int(query.get("page", "1"))
+        if method != "GET":
+            self.writes.append((method, path))
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/labels":
+            return 200, json.dumps(self.labels if page == 1 else []).encode()
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/labels":
+            label = {"id": 900 + len(self.labels), "name": payload["name"]}
+            self.labels.append(label)
+            return 201, json.dumps(label).encode()
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/pulls":
+            return 200, json.dumps(OPEN_PRS if page == 1 else []).encode()
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/issues":
+            items = list(self.issues.values())
+            if "labels" in query:
+                items = [i for i in items if query["labels"] in {x["name"] for x in i["labels"]}]
+            if "q" in query:
+                items = [i for i in items if query["q"] in i["title"]]
+            return 200, json.dumps(items if page == 1 else []).encode()
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/issues":
+            number = self.next_issue
+            self.next_issue += 1
+            names = [x for x in self.labels if x["id"] in payload["labels"]]
+            self.issues[number] = {"number": number, "title": payload["title"], "state": "open", "labels": names, "body": payload["body"], "pull_request": None}
+            return 201, json.dumps(self.issues[number]).encode()
+        if path.startswith("/issues/") and path.endswith("/labels") and method == "POST":
+            number = int(path.split("/")[2])
+            self.issues[number]["labels"] += [x for x in self.labels if x["id"] in payload["labels"]]
+            return 200, b"[]"
+        if path.startswith("/issues/"):
+            number = int(path.split("/")[2])
+            if method == "GET":
+                return 200, json.dumps(self.issues[number]).encode()
+            if method == "PATCH":
+                self.issues[number].update(payload)
+                return 201, json.dumps(self.issues[number]).encode()
+        return 404, b""
+
+
+def execute(world, dry_run=False, fallback=FALLBACK):
+    cfg = {"dry_run": dry_run, "page_url": "https://cve.example.test", "renovate_issue": 91}
+    gitea = bot.GiteaClient(GITEA, REPO, "fixture-token", world)
+    scanner = bot.ScannerClient(VULN, fallback, world)
+    lines = []
+    summary = bot.run(cfg, gitea, scanner, NOW, lines.append)
+    return summary, "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def dashboards(world):
+    return [i for i in world.issues.values() if i["title"] == bot.DASHBOARD_TITLE]
+
+
+# Dry run: reads everything, writes nothing, reports the plan as counts.
+world = FakeWorld()
+summary, text = execute(world, dry_run=True)
+check("dry run performs no writes", world.writes == [] and world.triage is None and not dashboards(world))
+check("dry run plans the three ticks and the issue", summary["ticks"] == 3 and summary["dashboard"]["issue_created"] == 1)
+check("dry run leaves the dashboard body untouched", world.issues[91]["body"] == BODY)
+
+NAMES = {"CVE-2026", "fixture-pkg", "fixture-ns-", "fixture-workload", "nginx", "ghcr.io"}
+
+
+def leaks(text_value):
+    return [name for name in NAMES if name.lower() in text_value.lower()]
+
+
+check("dry-run summary is counts only", not leaks(text))
+
+# Live run.
+world = FakeWorld()
+summary, text = execute(world)
+board = dashboards(world)
+check("live run creates one label and one dashboard issue", len(world.labels) == 1 and len(board) == 1)
+check("the dashboard issue carries only its own label", [x["name"] for x in board[0]["labels"]] == ["cve-dashboard"])
+check("issue body and summary are counts only", not leaks(board[0]["body"]) and not leaks(text))
+check("exactly one PATCH to issue #91", world.writes.count(("PATCH", "/issues/91")) == 1)
+want_body = BODY
+for branch in EXPECTED:
+    line = f" - [ ] <!-- approve-branch={branch} -->"
+    want_body = want_body.replace(line, line.replace("[ ]", "[x]", 1))
+check("the PATCHed body is the marker-only edit", world.issues[91]["body"] == want_body)
+check("the heartbeat is the last write", world.writes[-1] == ("POST", "triage"))
+check("heartbeat shape is exact", set(world.triage) == {"heartbeatAt", "remediation"} and world.triage["heartbeatAt"] == "2026-11-09T07:15:00Z")
+for entry in world.triage["remediation"]:
+    if set(entry) != {"image", "state", "url", "updatedAt"} or entry["state"] not in bot.REMEDIATION_STATES:
+        check("remediation entry shape", False)
+states = {e["image"]: (e["state"], e["url"]) for e in world.triage["remediation"]}
+for image, want in {
+    "docker.io/library/nginx": ("approval-requested", None),
+    "ghcr.io/example/app": ("approval-requested", None),
+    "ghcr.io/example/grouped": ("approval-requested", None),
+    "ghcr.io/example/already-ticked": ("approval-requested", None),
+    "ghcr.io/example/high-only": ("approval-requested", None),
+    "ghcr.io/example/has-pr": ("pr-open", f"{GITEA}/{REPO}/pulls/173"),
+    "ghcr.io/example/pr-by-title": ("pr-open", f"{GITEA}/{REPO}/pulls/174"),
+    "ghcr.io/example/tracked-clean": ("no-update-identified", None),
+    "ghcr.io/foo/bar": ("no-update-identified", None),
+    "ghcr.io/example/untracked": ("not-tracked", None),
+    "ghcr.io/example/pending-sched": ("not-tracked", None),
+}.items():
+    check(f"remediation for {image}", states.get(image) == want)
+check("one remediation entry per image", len(states) == len(FIXTURE["targets"]))
+
+# A second run updates the same issue.
+before = len(world.issues)
+second = copy.deepcopy(FIXTURE)
+second["targets"][-1]["state"] = "stale"
+world.report = json.dumps(second).encode()
+summary, _ = execute(world)
+check("a second run creates no duplicate", len(dashboards(world)) == 1 and len(world.issues) == before)
+check("a second run updates the issue", summary["dashboard"]["issue_updated"] == 1 and "| stale | 1 |" in dashboards(world)[0]["body"])
+check("a second run has nothing left to tick", summary["ticks"] == 0)
+
+# The dashboard issue is found even without its label, and a closed one is reopened.
+world = FakeWorld()
+world.labels.append({"id": 900, "name": "cve-dashboard"})
+world.issues[150] = {"number": 150, "title": "CVE Dashboard", "state": "closed", "labels": [], "body": "old", "pull_request": None}
+summary, _ = execute(world)
+check("an unlabelled closed dashboard is reused, relabelled and reopened",
+      len(dashboards(world)) == 1 and world.issues[150]["state"] == "open"
+      and [x["name"] for x in world.issues[150]["labels"]] == ["cve-dashboard"] and summary["dashboard"]["issue_created"] == 0)
+
+world = FakeWorld()
+world.labels.append({"id": 900, "name": "cve-dashboard"})
+for number in (150, 151):
+    world.issues[number] = {"number": number, "title": "CVE Dashboard", "state": "open", "labels": [world.labels[0]], "body": "x", "pull_request": None}
+check("two dashboard issues fail the run", raises(lambda: execute(world)))
+check("two dashboard issues write nothing", world.writes == [])
+
+# Failures end the run before the heartbeat.
+world = FakeWorld()
+world.fail = ("PATCH", "/issues/91")
+check("a failed tick PATCH fails the run", raises(lambda: execute(world)))
+check("a failed run posts no heartbeat", world.triage is None)
+world = FakeWorld(report=b"{not json")
+check("an unreadable report fails the run", raises(lambda: execute(world)))
+check("an unreadable report writes nothing", world.writes == [])
+world = FakeWorld()
+world.issues[91]["title"] = "Something else"
+check("issue 91 being something else fails the run", raises(lambda: execute(world)))
+world = FakeWorld()
+world.issues[91]["state"] = "closed"
+check("a closed Renovate dashboard fails the run", raises(lambda: execute(world)))
+
+# DNS fallback, and nothing but DNS failure selects it.
+world = FakeWorld()
+world.dns_down.add("vuln-scanner.vuln-scanner.svc.cluster.local:8081")
+summary, _ = execute(world)
+check("DNS failure uses the fallback for report and heartbeat", summary["fallback_used"] and world.triage is not None)
+check("the fallback was actually contacted", "10.43.0.99:8081" in world.seen_hosts)
+world = FakeWorld()
+world.dns_down.add("vuln-scanner.vuln-scanner.svc.cluster.local:8081")
+check("DNS failure with no fallback fails the run", raises(lambda: execute(world, fallback="")))
+
+
+def refused(method, url, headers, body, max_bytes):
+    raise bot.BotError("GET /report.json: ConnectionRefusedError")
+
+
+check("a refused connection fails the run and does not fall back",
+      raises(lambda: bot.ScannerClient(VULN, FALLBACK, refused).report()))
+
+for label, env, expected_ok in (
+    ("missing token", {}, False),
+    ("present token", {"RENOVATE_TOKEN": "x"}, True),
+    ("bad DRY_RUN", {"RENOVATE_TOKEN": "x", "DRY_RUN": "maybe"}, False),
+    ("non-http API URL", {"RENOVATE_TOKEN": "x", "VULN_API_URL": "file:///etc/passwd"}, False),
+):
+    try:
+        bot.load_config(env)
+        ok = True
+    except bot.BotError:
+        ok = False
+    check(f"load_config: {label}", ok is expected_ok)
+
+print(f"{len(failures)} failure(s)")
+sys.exit(1 if failures else 0)

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-approval-ticks/fixtures/open-prs.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[
+  {"number": 173, "title": "chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/has-pr Docker tag to v2", "head": {"ref": "renovate/ghcr.io-example-has-pr-2.x"}, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.test/o/r/pulls/173"},
+  {"number": 174, "title": "chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/pr-by-title Docker tag to v2", "head": {"ref": "renovate/ghcr.io-example-pr-by-title-2.x"}, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.test/o/r/pulls/174"},
+  {"number": 160, "title": "WIP: chore(spec): not Renovate work", "head": {"ref": "chore/adopt-spec-sync"}, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.test/o/r/pulls/160"}
+]

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-approval-ticks/fixtures/renovate-dashboard.md

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+This issue lists Renovate updates and detected dependencies. Read the [Dependency Dashboard](https://docs.renovatebot.com/key-concepts/dashboard/) docs to learn more.
+
+## Pending Approval
+
+The following branches are pending approval. To create them, click on a checkbox below.
+
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/nginx-2.x -->chore(deps): Update nginx Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-app-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/app Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/example-group -->chore(deps): Update example group (`ghcr.io/example/grouped`, `ghcr.io/example/other`)
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-foo-bar-extras-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/foo/bar-extras Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-other-unrelated-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/other/unrelated Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-high-only-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/high-only Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-accepted-only-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/accepted-only Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-nofix-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/nofix Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/mychart-2.x -->chore(deps): Update Helm release mychart to v2
+ - [x] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-already-ticked-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/already-ticked Docker tag to v2
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-all-pending-prs -->🔐 **Create all pending approval PRs at once** 🔐
+
+## Awaiting Schedule
+
+The following updates are awaiting their schedule. To get an update now, click on a checkbox below.
+
+ - [ ] <!-- unschedule-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-pending-sched-2.x -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/pending-sched Docker tag to v2
+
+## Pending Branch Automerge
+
+The following branches have automerge enabled. To abort a branch automerge, click on a checkbox below.
+
+ - [ ] <!-- approvePr-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-app-automerge -->chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/app Docker tag to v2
+
+## Open
+
+The following updates have all been created. To force a retry/rebase of any, click on a checkbox below.
+
+ - [ ] <!-- rebase-branch=renovate/gitea.home.keithjackson.dev-home-network-toolbox-main -->[chore(deps): Update gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/toolbox:main Docker digest to 83a3501](pulls/161)
+ - [ ] <!-- rebase-branch=renovate/kube-prometheus-stack-93.x -->[chore(deps): Update Helm release kube-prometheus-stack to v93](pulls/164)
+ - [ ] <!-- rebase-branch=renovate/ghcr.io-example-has-pr-2.x -->[chore(deps): Update ghcr.io/example/has-pr Docker tag to v2](pulls/173)
+ - [ ] <!-- rebase-all-open-prs -->**Click on this checkbox to rebase all open PRs at once**
+
+## Detected Dependencies
+
+<details><summary>flux (13)</summary>
+<blockquote>
+
+<details><summary>platform/cert-manager/helmrelease.yaml (1)</summary>
+
+ - `cert-manager >=1.21.0 <1.22.0` → [Updates: `>=1.21.3 <1.22.0`]
+
+</details>
+
+</blockquote>
+</details>
+
+<details><summary>kubernetes (69)</summary>
+<blockquote>
+
+<details><summary>apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml (4)</summary>
+
+ - `lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett v0.24.3025-ls29` → [Updates: `v0.24.3030-ls30`]
+ - `quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy v7.15.6`
+ - `NetworkPolicy networking.k8s.io/v1`
+ - `ghcr.io/example/tracked-clean 1.0`
+ - `ghcr.io/foo/bar 1.0`
+ - `ghcr.io/example/pending-sched 1.0` → [Updates: `2.0`]
+ - `ghcr.io/example/app 1.0` → [Updates: `2.0`]
+ - [ ] <!-- approve-branch=renovate/decoy-below-detected -->chore(deps): Update nginx Docker tag to v9
+
+</details>
+
+</blockquote>
+</details>

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-approval-ticks/fixtures/report.json

@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+{
+ "schemaVersion": 1,
+ "generatedAt": "2026-11-09T06:00:00Z",
+ "database": {
+  "updatedAt": "2026-11-09T01:00:00Z",
+  "version": "fixture-db"
+ },
+ "run": {
+  "startedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+  "finishedAt": "2026-11-09T05:30:00Z",
+  "status": "complete"
+ },
+ "targets": [
+  {
+   "id": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "docker.io/library/nginx",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-0",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-0",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/app",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-1",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-1",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/grouped@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/grouped",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-2",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-2",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/foo/bar@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/foo/bar",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-3",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-3",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/has-pr@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/has-pr",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-4",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-4",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/pr-by-title@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/pr-by-title",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-5",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-5",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/already-ticked@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/already-ticked",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-6",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-6",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/untracked@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/untracked",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-7",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-7",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/pending-sched@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/pending-sched",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-8",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-8",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/high-only@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/high-only",
+   "digest": "sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-9",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-9",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/accepted-only@sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/accepted-only",
+   "digest": "sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-10",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-10",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/nofix@sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/nofix",
+   "digest": "sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-11",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-11",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "ghcr.io/example/tracked-clean@sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c",
+   "type": "image",
+   "image": "ghcr.io/example/tracked-clean",
+   "digest": "sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c",
+   "state": "scanned",
+   "reason": null,
+   "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z",
+   "workloads": [
+    {
+     "namespace": "fixture-ns-12",
+     "kind": "Deployment",
+     "name": "fixture-workload-12",
+     "containers": [
+      "main"
+     ]
+    }
+   ]
+  }
+ ],
+ "findings": [
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1000",
+   "targetId": "docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-0",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1010",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/app@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-1",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1020",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/grouped@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-2",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1030",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/foo/bar@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-3",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1040",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/has-pr@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-4",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1050",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/pr-by-title@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-5",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1060",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/already-ticked@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-6",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1070",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/untracked@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-7",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1080",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/pending-sched@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-8",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1090",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/high-only@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009",
+   "severity": "HIGH",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-9",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "fix-available"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1100",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/accepted-only@sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-10",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": "9.9.9",
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "accepted",
+   "acceptance": {
+    "reason": "fixture",
+    "expires": "2027-01-01"
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "CVE-2026-1110",
+   "targetId": "ghcr.io/example/nofix@sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b",
+   "severity": "CRITICAL",
+   "cvss": 9.0,
+   "package": "fixture-pkg-11",
+   "installedVersion": "1.0",
+   "fixedVersion": null,
+   "title": "fixture",
+   "url": "https://advisory.example/x",
+   "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z",
+   "status": "open"
+  }
+ ],
+ "remediation": []
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-approval-ticks/render-check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# L1 offline check for the CVE triage bot: fixture-driven, no cluster, no network. Assertions and
+# their limits are in check.py. rc 0 pass, 1 fail.
+set -euo pipefail
+here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 exec python3 "${here}/check.py"

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-dashboard-aggregates/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L1 RENDERING — CVE Dashboard issue carries aggregates only (R-VULN-05, R-VULN-07)
+# Spec: docs/17 "The triage bot". GIVEN a report fixture with hostile and distinctive strings,
+# WHEN the bot renders the dashboard issue, THEN no CVE id, package, image, workload, namespace or
+# other report string appears, the counts are exact, and a deliberately leaking body is caught.
+#
+# render-check.sh is a pure offline check; this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-triage-bot-dashboard-aggregates
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-05: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-07: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-05,R-VULN-07"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L1"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    # The script under test lives in .gitea/workflows/, which requirement-scoped selection does
+    # not attribute to R-VULN-*, so a change to it must still select this test.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      A dashboard issue rendered from a fixture contains counts and timestamps only, never a CVE id,
+      package, image or workload name.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: render-and-assert-aggregates-only
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./render-check.sh

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-dashboard-aggregates/check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""L1: the CVE Dashboard issue is aggregates only (R-VULN-05, R-VULN-07).
+
+Exercises the real renderer in .gitea/workflows/scripts/cve_triage.py over fixtures/report.json,
+whose every name is distinctive so a leak cannot be confused with template text.
+
+What this does NOT prove: that Gitea accepts the issue, or that the issue is the one the live bot
+wrote. Those need a real run and are not exercised by any L1 test.
+"""
+import copy
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import re
+import sys
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.dont_write_bytecode = True
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+ROOT = HERE.parents[3]
+spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("cve_triage", ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/scripts/cve_triage.py")
+bot = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+sys.modules["cve_triage"] = bot
+spec.loader.exec_module(bot)
+
+RAW = (HERE / "fixtures/report.json").read_bytes()
+FIXTURE = json.loads(RAW)
+NOW = datetime(2026, 11, 9, 7, 15, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+PAGE = "https://cve.example.test"
+failures = []
+
+
+def check(name, condition):
+    print(f"{'ok  ' if condition else 'FAIL'} {name}")
+    if not condition:
+        failures.append(name)
+
+
+def sensitive_names(doc):
+    """Every string in the fixture that must never reach the issue."""
+    names = set()
+    for target in doc["targets"]:
+        for field in ("id", "image", "digest", "reason"):
+            if target.get(field):
+                names.add(target[field])
+        if target.get("image"):
+            names.add(bot.normalise_image(target["image"]))
+            names.add(target["image"].rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
+        for workload in target["workloads"]:
+            names.update((workload["namespace"], workload["name"]))
+            names.update(workload["containers"])
+    for finding in doc["findings"]:
+        for field in ("id", "package", "installedVersion", "fixedVersion", "title", "url"):
+            if finding.get(field):
+                names.add(finding[field])
+        if finding.get("acceptance"):
+            names.add(finding["acceptance"]["reason"])
+    names.add(doc["database"]["version"])
+    return {name for name in names if name}
+
+
+def assert_no_names(body, names):
+    lowered = body.lower()
+    leaked = sorted(name for name in names if name.lower() in lowered)
+    assert not leaked, f"{len(leaked)} fixture names leaked into the issue body"
+
+
+def rendered(raw=RAW, now=NOW):
+    return bot.render_dashboard(bot.aggregate(bot.parse_report(raw)), PAGE, now)
+
+
+def fails(function):
+    try:
+        function()
+    except AssertionError:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def rejected(doc):
+    try:
+        bot.parse_report(json.dumps(doc).encode())
+    except bot.BotError:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+body = rendered()
+names = sensitive_names(FIXTURE)
+check("fixture carries a non-trivial set of names", len(names) >= 25)
+check("rendered body contains no fixture name", not fails(lambda: assert_no_names(body, names)))
+check("body has no CVE or GHSA identifier at all", not re.search(r"CVE-\d|GHSA-", body, re.I))
+check("hostile title's markup is absent", "onerror" not in body and "evil.example" not in body and "@keith" not in body)
+
+# Non-vacuity: the assertion above must detect each class of leak.
+for label, leak in {
+    "CVE id": "CVE-2026-11111",
+    "package": "fixture-libcrit",
+    "image": "ghcr.io/fixture-org/fixture-api",
+    "workload": "fixture-workload-db",
+    "namespace": "fixture-ns-gamma",
+}.items():
+    check(f"non-vacuity: a leaked {label} is caught", fails(lambda: assert_no_names(body + leak, names)))
+
+for row in (
+    "| CRITICAL | 1 | 1 | 1 |",
+    "| HIGH | 0 | 1 | 0 |",
+    "| MEDIUM | 0 | 0 | 0 |",
+    "| LOW | 1 | 0 | 0 |",
+    "| UNKNOWN | 0 | 0 | 0 |",
+    "| scanned | 1 |",
+    "| pending | 0 |",
+    "| stale | 1 |",
+    "| failed | 0 |",
+    "| credential-required | 1 |",
+    "| by-tag | 0 |",
+    "| not-covered | 1 |",
+    "Unaccepted CRITICAL with a fix: **1**",
+    "4 targets.",
+    "| Report generated | 2026-11-09T06:00:00Z |",
+    f"[CVE page]({PAGE})",
+):
+    check(f"body states {row!r}", row in body)
+check("a fresh report carries no warning", "WARNING" not in body)
+
+mutated = copy.deepcopy(FIXTURE)
+extra = copy.deepcopy(mutated["findings"][0])
+extra["id"] = "CVE-2026-55555"
+mutated["findings"].append(extra)
+changed = rendered(json.dumps(mutated).encode())
+check("non-vacuity: a mutated fixture changes the counts", "| CRITICAL | 1 | 2 | 1 |" in changed and changed != body)
+
+check("stale report warns", "older than 26 hours" in rendered(now=NOW + timedelta(hours=30)))
+degraded = copy.deepcopy(FIXTURE)
+degraded["run"]["status"] = "degraded"
+check("degraded run warns", "did not complete cleanly" in rendered(json.dumps(degraded).encode()))
+old_db = copy.deepcopy(FIXTURE)
+old_db["database"]["updatedAt"] = "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z"
+check("stale database warns", "database is older" in rendered(json.dumps(old_db).encode()))
+
+for label, mutate in {
+    "wrong schemaVersion": lambda d: d.update(schemaVersion=2),
+    "unknown severity": lambda d: d["findings"][0].update(severity="SEVERE"),
+    "unknown status": lambda d: d["findings"][0].update(status="ignored"),
+    "unknown target state": lambda d: d["targets"][0].update(state="clean"),
+    "finding on an unknown target": lambda d: d["findings"][0].update(targetId="nope"),
+    "bad timestamp": lambda d: d.update(generatedAt="yesterday <b>"),
+    "invalid image": lambda d: d["targets"][0].update(image="bad image <x>"),
+}.items():
+    doc = copy.deepcopy(FIXTURE)
+    mutate(doc)
+    check(f"parse rejects {label}", rejected(doc))
+
+check("dashboard label is not one the PM acts on", bot.DASHBOARD_LABEL not in bot.FORBIDDEN_LABELS)
+configmap = (ROOT / "platform/pm-agent/configmap.yaml").read_text()
+match = re.search(r'^\s*PM_REQUIRE_LABEL:\s*"([^"]*)"', configmap, re.M)
+check("PM_REQUIRE_LABEL is readable", match is not None)
+check("the PM's label is in FORBIDDEN_LABELS and is not ours",
+      match is not None and match.group(1) in bot.FORBIDDEN_LABELS and match.group(1) != bot.DASHBOARD_LABEL)
+
+print(f"{len(failures)} failure(s)")
+sys.exit(1 if failures else 0)

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-dashboard-aggregates/fixtures/report.json

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{
+  "schemaVersion": 1,
+  "generatedAt": "2026-11-09T06:00:00Z",
+  "database": {"updatedAt": "2026-11-09T01:00:00Z", "version": "fixture-db-v2-20261109"},
+  "run": {"startedAt": "2026-11-09T05:00:00Z", "finishedAt": "2026-11-09T05:30:00Z", "status": "complete"},
+  "targets": [
+    {"id": "ghcr.io/fixture-org/fixture-api@sha256:1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111", "type": "image", "image": "ghcr.io/fixture-org/fixture-api", "digest": "sha256:1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111", "state": "scanned", "reason": null, "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-09T05:10:00Z", "workloads": [{"namespace": "fixture-ns-alpha", "kind": "Deployment", "name": "fixture-workload-api", "containers": ["fixture-container-api"]}]},
+    {"id": "docker.io/library/fixturedb@sha256:2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222", "type": "image", "image": "docker.io/library/fixturedb", "digest": "sha256:2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222", "state": "stale", "reason": "fixture-reason-stale-text", "lastScannedAt": "2026-11-07T05:10:00Z", "workloads": [{"namespace": "fixture-ns-beta", "kind": "StatefulSet", "name": "fixture-workload-db", "containers": ["fixture-container-db"]}]},
+    {"id": "fixture.example:5000/priv/fixture-private:v1", "type": "image", "image": "fixture.example:5000/priv/fixture-private", "digest": null, "state": "credential-required", "reason": "fixture.example:5000 refused anonymous access", "lastScannedAt": null, "workloads": [{"namespace": "fixture-ns-gamma", "kind": "CronJob", "name": "fixture-workload-cron", "containers": ["fixture-container-cron"]}]},
+    {"id": "vm/fixture-ns-vm/fixture-vm-name", "type": "vm", "image": null, "digest": null, "state": "not-covered", "reason": null, "lastScannedAt": null, "workloads": [{"namespace": "fixture-ns-vm", "kind": "VirtualMachineInstance", "name": "fixture-vm-name", "containers": []}]}
+  ],
+  "findings": [
+    {"id": "CVE-2026-11111", "targetId": "ghcr.io/fixture-org/fixture-api@sha256:1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111", "severity": "CRITICAL", "cvss": 9.8, "package": "fixture-libcrit", "installedVersion": "1.0.1-installed", "fixedVersion": "1.0.2-fixed", "title": "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)> @keith [click](http://evil.example/hook) | injected |", "url": "https://advisory.example/CVE-2026-11111", "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-01T00:00:00Z", "status": "fix-available"},
+    {"id": "GHSA-fixt-ure0-0001", "targetId": "ghcr.io/fixture-org/fixture-api@sha256:1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111", "severity": "CRITICAL", "cvss": 9.1, "package": "fixture-libopen", "installedVersion": "2.0.0-installed", "fixedVersion": null, "title": "fixture title without a fix", "url": "https://advisory.example/ghsa", "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-02T00:00:00Z", "status": "open"},
+    {"id": "CVE-2026-22222", "targetId": "docker.io/library/fixturedb@sha256:2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222", "severity": "CRITICAL", "cvss": 9.0, "package": "fixture-libaccepted", "installedVersion": "3.0.0-installed", "fixedVersion": "3.0.1-fixed", "title": "fixture accepted title", "url": "https://advisory.example/accepted", "firstSeenAt": "2026-10-01T00:00:00Z", "status": "accepted", "acceptance": {"reason": "fixture-acceptance-reason", "expires": "2027-01-01"}},
+    {"id": "CVE-2026-33333", "targetId": "docker.io/library/fixturedb@sha256:2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222", "severity": "HIGH", "cvss": 7.5, "package": "fixture-libhigh", "installedVersion": "4.0.0-installed", "fixedVersion": "4.0.1-fixed", "title": "fixture high title", "url": "https://advisory.example/high", "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-03T00:00:00Z", "status": "fix-available"},
+    {"id": "CVE-2026-44444", "targetId": "ghcr.io/fixture-org/fixture-api@sha256:1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111", "severity": "LOW", "cvss": null, "package": "fixture-liblow", "installedVersion": "5.0.0-installed", "fixedVersion": null, "title": "fixture low title", "url": "", "firstSeenAt": "2026-11-04T00:00:00Z", "status": "open"}
+  ],
+  "remediation": []
+}

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-triage-bot-dashboard-aggregates/render-check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# L1 offline check for the CVE triage bot: fixture-driven, no cluster, no network. Assertions and
+# their limits are in check.py. rc 0 pass, 1 fail.
+set -euo pipefail
+here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 exec python3 "${here}/check.py"

conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/vuln-internal-api-isolated/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL SCAFFOLD — the internal API is unreachable from an unrelated namespace  (R-VULN-09)
+# Catalog: docs/17 "Acceptance gates" (L2).
+#
+# A pod in an unrelated namespace cannot reach vuln-scanner :8081 or :9090, while the CI runner identity can reach :8081.
+#
+# STATUS: scaffold only. It asserts nothing and DOES NOT EXECUTE IN CI: vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE is unset,
+# so L2/L3 conformance does not run. Coverage from this file is a named gap, not evidence.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-internal-api-isolated
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-09: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-09"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      A pod in an unrelated namespace cannot reach vuln-scanner :8081 or :9090, while the CI runner identity can reach :8081.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: given-an-unrelated-namespace
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: create a throwaway namespace and probe pod"'
+    - name: when-connecting
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: attempt tcp to vuln-scanner:8081 and :9090"'
+    - name: then-denied
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: assert a timeout on both, and success from the act-runner identity on :8081"'

conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/vuln-new-digest-reported/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL SCAFFOLD — new workload digest appears in the report  (R-VULN-01, R-VULN-02)
+# Catalog: docs/17 "Acceptance gates" (L2).
+#
+# A newly started workload's digest appears in report.json, mapped to that workload, within the 2-hour window.
+#
+# STATUS: scaffold only. It asserts nothing and DOES NOT EXECUTE IN CI: vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE is unset,
+# so L2/L3 conformance does not run. Coverage from this file is a named gap, not evidence.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-new-digest-reported
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-01: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-02: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-01, R-VULN-02"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      A newly started workload's digest appears in report.json, mapped to that workload, within the 2-hour window.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: given-a-new-workload
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: start a pod from an image digest not yet in the report"'
+    - name: when-the-scanner-ticks
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: wait, bounded by the 2h SLO, polling GET /report.json from the CI runner identity"'
+    - name: then-digest-is-reported
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: assert a target with that digest and the workload mapping, state not pending past 2h"'

conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/vuln-page-requires-admin/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL SCAFFOLD — the CVE page requires a platform-admins login  (R-VULN-04)
+# Catalog: docs/17 "Acceptance gates" (L2).
+#
+# An unauthenticated request to cve.<domain> is redirected to Keycloak, and a logged-in user outside platform-admins gets 403.
+#
+# STATUS: scaffold only. It asserts nothing and DOES NOT EXECUTE IN CI: vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE is unset,
+# so L2/L3 conformance does not run. Coverage from this file is a named gap, not evidence.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-page-requires-admin
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-04: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-04"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      An unauthenticated request to cve.<domain> is redirected to Keycloak, and a logged-in user outside platform-admins gets 403.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: given-the-page-route
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: resolve cve.<domain> through the Gateway"'
+    - name: when-unauthenticated
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: request the page with no session"'
+    - name: then-redirected-to-keycloak
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: assert a 302 to the homelab realm"'
+    - name: then-non-admin-forbidden
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: assert 403 for a session outside platform-admins"'

conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/vuln-registry-failure/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L3 FAULT-INJECTION SCAFFOLD — breaking registry access produces failed targets and the coverage alert  (R-VULN-03, R-VULN-06)
+# Catalog: docs/17 "Acceptance gates" (L3).
+#
+# With registry access broken for one image, that target becomes failed with its reason, prior findings are retained, and VulnCoverageGap fires after 24h.
+#
+# STATUS: scaffold only. It asserts nothing and DOES NOT EXECUTE IN CI: vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE is unset,
+# so L2/L3 conformance does not run. Coverage from this file is a named gap, not evidence.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-registry-failure
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-03: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-VULN-06: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-VULN-03, R-VULN-06"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L3"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      With registry access broken for one image, that target becomes failed with its reason, prior findings are retained, and VulnCoverageGap fires after 24h.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: given-a-scanned-target
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: record a scanned target and its findings"'
+    - name: when-registry-access-is-broken
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: inject a fault blocking that registry"'
+    - name: then-target-failed
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: assert state failed, reason present, findings retained, run continues"'
+    - name: then-coverage-alert-fires
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: 'echo "TODO: assert VulnCoverageGap fires once the failure passes 24h"'

decisions/2026-11-08-wg-client-mtu-docs.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+date: 2026-11-08
+branch: fix/wg-client-mtu-docs
+title: WireGuard client profiles default to MTU 1280; VPN runbook corrected and given a troubleshooting section
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+- **`infra/vpn-ingress/new-peer.sh`**: `WG_MTU` default 1420 -> 1280, still overridable, reason in a
+  comment. Only new profiles change; the phone's existing profiles are not touched.
+- **`runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md`**: the verification table no longer says the Gateway sees a
+  `host`-identity source; the limitations no longer say everything arrives SNATed or that IPv6 leaks
+  on Android; the "if nothing handshakes" advice no longer claims `wg show` separates a bad forward
+  from a bad key. New "Troubleshooting" section covering the four cases in the brief.
+- **`platform/vpn-ingress/daemonset.yaml`**: header comment only, SNAT claim corrected.
+- **`platform/vpn-ingress/README.md`**: one sentence, so `MTU = 1420` reads as the server's value.
+
+Rollout on merge: the WireGuard DaemonSet does **not** roll. The `runbooks` ConfigMap is content
+hashed and `vpn-remote-access.md` is in it, so the runbooks site rolls.
+
+Left unchanged, for the operator:
+
+- **`platform/vpn-ingress/peers.conf`** still says "No peers enrolled yet". A comment-only edit on a
+  throwaway copy moved the ConfigMap from `wg-peers-29mf6k867t` to `wg-peers-gggkk5d4tm` and changed
+  the DaemonSet, so correcting it restarts every `wg0`. Fix it alongside the next peer change.
+- **`clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`** coverage comment still omits `WG_CLIENT_CIDR` (sensitive path).
+- **Server `wg0` MTU stays 1420**, because changing it restarts all WireGuard pods. For TCP a 1280
+  client should be enough on its own: it advertises an MSS of 1240, which caps what the far end
+  sends. That protection does not reach UDP. A server-to-phone datagram with an inner size of
+  1281-1420 bytes is still sent as up to 1480 outer bytes and could be lost on the same path; QUIC
+  should recover by probing, large DNS answers are the likeliest casualty. If that shows up, the
+  fix is a lower server MTU, as a deliberate rollout.
+- **Other stale text, outside this brief:** `platform/vpn-ingress/README.md` still says no peer has
+  ever completed a handshake, and the runbook's status line still calls the VPN inert.
+
+## What I verified
+
+- Upstream `wireguard-android` `GoBackend.java`, master (last commit to that file `ecc3c0a`,
+  2026-03-15): `builder.setMtu(config.getInterface().getMtu().orElse(1280))`, and `allowFamily()` is
+  skipped when `sawDefaultRoute && config.getPeers().size() == 1`.
+- Live, read-only, 2026-11-09 UTC, on the `k3s-prod-1` pod and agent:
+  - `wg0` MTU is 1420 on all three pods. Both peers have handshakes and transfer on prod-1 only; the
+    other two pods read `0`.
+  - BPF conntrack holds `UDP SVC 10.90.0.x -> 192.168.2.23:53` and flows to `192.168.2.24:32400`.
+    Their backend entries carry `SourceSecurityID=2` (`world`). So the source stays `10.90.0.x`
+    through the load balancer on those two VIPs.
+  - `/proc/net/nf_conntrack` is readable from the pod, which has no `conntrack` binary.
+- Offline, pinned toolbox: `kubectl kustomize platform/vpn-ingress` gives identical ConfigMap and
+  DaemonSet hashes on `origin/main` and on this branch.
+- `new-peer.sh` writes `MTU = 1280` by default and `MTU = 1420` with `WG_MTU=1420`. Run with
+  throwaway keys and stdout discarded; profiles shredded; nothing enrolled.
+- No test or conformance check pins the client MTU (`grep` for `WG_MTU` and `1420`).
+- Gate (pinned toolbox, from this worktree, on the committed tree): **rc 3, UNDETERMINED, not green.**
+  `gitea-settings` is the only stage counted as not run (no token locally). `conformance` (L2/L3)
+  also skipped as the declared no-cluster gap, so R-ENV-01 and R-OBS-04 are not certified.
+  `spec-immutability`, `approval-policy`, `decisions-log`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden` and `l1`
+  passed. No sensitive path is touched.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **That MTU was the cause.** It is inferred from one before-and-after, on one phone and one carrier,
+  reported by the operator. The path MTU was never measured.
+- **That 1280 is the best value.** It is the value that worked, and the IPv6 minimum. A higher one
+  may work too.
+- That the phone's app is on `GoBackend` rather than the kernel backend, so that a blank field meant
+  1280 on this device. Only the upstream default was read.
+- That TCP MSS behaves as described, or that large UDP replies are actually lost. No packet capture
+  was taken.
+- That the Gateway VIP `.20` sees `10.90.0.x` / `world`. Conntrack held no tunnel flows to it when
+  checked.
+- Android's IPv6 blocking on a real device; read from source only.
+- `wg-quick` IPv6 behaviour on Linux, and any non-Android client at 1280.
+- `/proc/net/nf_conntrack` output during a key mismatch. The `[UNREPLIED]` reading comes from the
+  earlier measurement in the brief; I saw only healthy entries.

decisions/2026-11-08-wg-home-peer-pihole-sources.md

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+---
+date: 2026-11-08
+branch: fix/wg-home-peer-pihole-sources
+title: Enrol keith-phone-home and admit the WireGuard subnet to PiHole's DNS frontends
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+- **`platform/vpn-ingress/peers.conf`**: new peer `keith-phone-home`, `10.90.0.3/32`, key generated
+  on the phone. It is the `home` half of a two-tunnel profile (Endpoint `192.168.2.10:51820`),
+  because the router has no hairpin NAT and `wan.` is unusable from inside the house.
+- **`apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml`**: `${WG_CLIENT_CIDR}` added after `${LAN_CIDR}` on both
+  `pihole-dns-udp` and `pihole-dns-tcp`. This file is hand-written, not rendered (`catalog/render.py`
+  only lists it in `EXTRA_UNITS`), so it is the source of truth and `--emit-waves` was not run.
+  `catalog/pihole.yaml` changes in one comment only, so nothing renders differently.
+- **New L0 guard `conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-dns-source-ranges`** (whole-repo scope,
+  R-DNS-03): every PiHole LoadBalancer Service lists both tokens, and every range resolves through
+  cluster-vars (base and prod overlay) to RFC1918.
+- **`platform/vpn-ingress/README.md`**: corrected "clients arrive SNATed" (false for LoadBalancer
+  VIPs) and the IPv6 claim (Android's `GoBackend` blocks IPv6 for a single-peer default route);
+  documented the home/away pattern, why `wan.` fails from inside, and the prod-1 dependency.
+
+Rollout on merge: the `wg-peers` ConfigMap hash changes (`m9kcckcb5t` -> `29mf6k867t`), so the
+DaemonSet rolls, `maxUnavailable: 1`, `maxSurge: 0`, one node at a time in an order the controller
+chooses. Each roll deletes and recreates that node's `wg0`, so an established session on that node
+drops and must re-handshake. `keith-phone` has no session today (see below), so nothing is
+interrupted in practice.
+
+**The one risk worth watching:** `wg0` is in Cilium's auto-detected device list and `devices` is
+still unpinned. On 2026-10-06 a crash-looping `wg0` churned that list and all three nodes lost their
+main-table default route. A rollout is one delete/create per node, not a loop, so it should not
+repeat that, but after merge check `ip route get 1.1.1.1` on each node.
+
+The Service change is an in-place update: same VIP, same Service objects, no pod restart.
+
+Checked on the rest of the path and left unchanged:
+
+- Gateway VIP `.20` (`gateway/cilium-gateway-shared`): no source ranges, live. Nothing needed.
+- `pihole-allow-lan-dns-ingress` admits `world` on :53, which covers an untranslated 10.90.0.x
+  source. `platform/vpn-ingress/networkpolicy.yaml` does not apply to a hostNetwork pod.
+- No L0 check pinned these ranges to the LAN; none needed updating.
+
+Flagged, not changed (out of scope):
+
+- `runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md` "Known limitations" repeats both corrected claims, and step 3 of
+  its verification table says the Gateway sees a `host`-identity source.
+- `platform/vpn-ingress/daemonset.yaml`'s header repeats the SNAT claim.
+- `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`'s substitution-coverage comment does not list
+  `WG_CLIENT_CIDR` under apps-wave-0. The variable is defined and substituted there regardless.
+- `peers.conf` still says "No peers enrolled yet" above the enrolled peers.
+- PiHole's NodePorts are not covered by source ranges (already acknowledged in `pihole-dns.yaml`).
+  Tunnel clients can reach node addresses, so they can reach those too; they are enrolled devices.
+- Pinning Cilium's `devices` remains the open hardening for the churn risk above.
+
+## What I verified
+
+Live, read-only, 2026-11-08:
+
+- `cilium-dbg status` on one agent: `KubeProxyReplacement: True [eno1 ..., wg0 10.90.0.1, tun0 ...]`
+  and `Masquerading: BPF [eno1, wg0, tun0]`. So `wg0` really is a load-balancing device.
+- `pihole-dns-tcp` and `-udp` carry `ranges=[192.168.2.0/24]`; no other LoadBalancer Service has
+  source ranges. Live `cluster-vars`: `WG_CLIENT_CIDR=10.90.0.0/24`, `LAN_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24`.
+- `wg show wg0 latest-handshakes` on all three pods: `keith-phone` = `0`.
+- `wan.home.keithjackson.dev` resolves publicly to a single A record (via 1.1.1.1).
+
+Offline, in the pinned toolbox:
+
+- `flux envsubst --strict` renders both Services to `[192.168.2.0/24, 10.90.0.0/24]`.
+- `kubectl kustomize platform/vpn-ingress`: `wg-peers-m9kcckcb5t` on the old `peers.conf`,
+  `wg-peers-29mf6k867t` on the new one.
+- Guard mutation test, each restored afterwards. Baseline passes (22 assertions, 2 Services). All
+  seven fail with rc 1 and a named message: WG range dropped from one Service; `0.0.0.0/0` added;
+  `8.8.8.0/24` added; `WG_CLIENT_CIDR` made public in cluster-vars; prod overlay sets `LAN_CIDR` to
+  `0.0.0.0/0`; ranges block removed; undefined token added.
+- The Android claim was read from upstream `GoBackend.java` (`wireguard-android`, master): the
+  `allowFamily` calls are skipped when `sawDefaultRoute && config.getPeers().size() == 1`.
+- Gate (pinned toolbox, from this worktree, on the committed tree): **rc 3, UNDETERMINED, not
+  green.** `gitea-settings` is the only stage counted as not run (no token locally). `conformance`
+  (L2/L3) also skipped as the declared no-cluster gap. `spec-immutability`, `decisions-log`, `lint`,
+  `l0` (including the new guard), `render-golden` and `l1` passed. `approval-policy` reported N/A
+  offline; it will be red in CI until the operator overrides, because `conformance/**` is sensitive.
+- `git merge-tree` against `feat/pihole-explicit-lan-names` (#157): no conflicts.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **`DROP_NOT_IN_SRC_RANGE` was NOT observed live.** It is a prediction from Cilium's source. Only
+  the `wg0` device membership was measured; the drop itself has never been seen.
+- **Full-tunnel behaviour was NOT observed live**, on either profile. **No handshake has ever been
+  recorded for any peer**: `keith-phone` reads `0` on all three pods (a counter that resets when a
+  pod restarts, last 22 days ago, so it covers only the time since; earlier entries here also
+  record none).
+- That tunnel DNS works after this change, including the reply path from a backend on another node
+  and from one on the ingress node. That needs the phone: `dig` over the tunnel, while watching
+  `cilium-dbg monitor --type drop`.
+- That the Gateway serves tunnel clients. Its source is predicted to be `world`, as for a LAN
+  browser, which is what the apps admit; not tested.
+- That the new peer's key is the one on the phone. I copied the public key from the brief.
+- That the rollout leaves node default routes intact. Reasoned from the 2026-10-06 incident being
+  a loop, not measured.
+- That a LAN client is unaffected while the Service's source ranges are updated. Expected, not
+  measured.
+- IPv6 behaviour on any non-Android client.
+- That the WAN forward targets prod-1: it is off-repo.

decisions/2026-11-09-pihole-explicit-lan-names.md

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+---
+date: 2026-11-09
+branch: feat/pihole-explicit-lan-names
+title: PiHole answers an explicit LAN name list instead of a zone wildcard (public names resolve to Cloudflare from the LAN)
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+**`catalog/pihole.yaml` → `apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml`.** `FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines` no longer carries
+`address=/${BASE_DOMAIN}/${GATEWAY_VIP}`. Every name not listed is now forwarded to 8.8.8.8/8.8.4.4 and
+gets the public answer. The final list (`local-ttl=60` kept):
+
+| Name (`.${BASE_DOMAIN}`) | Answer | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| jackett, pihole, plex, qbittorrent, radarr, semaphore, sonarr, headlamp | `${GATEWAY_VIP}` | LAN-only: every HTTPRoute with `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: none`, derived from the tree. No public record, tunnel 404s them; this entry is their only path |
+| gitea, nextcloud | `${GATEWAY_VIP}` | public, but Cloudflare's proxy caps bodies at 100 MB / responses at 100 s (git push, LFS, uploads) |
+| keycloak, auth | `${GATEWAY_VIP}` | keep the OIDC flow of the LAN-path apps on one path |
+| unifi | `${UNIFI_L4_VIP}` | L4 VIP, not behind the Gateway |
+| crafty-mc | `${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}` | L4 VIP, not behind the Gateway |
+| pihole-dns | `${PIHOLE_DNS_VIP}` | the resolver's own address |
+| plex-vip | `${PLEX_L4_VIP}` | kept, see below |
+
+Not listed, so they resolve to Cloudflare from the LAN: the apex, grafana, crafty, seerr.
+
+**The derived LAN-only set matches the brief's list exactly** (8 names; the tree was walked, not the
+list trusted). The `runbooks/serving` route has no `hostnames:` but is not disowned (it inherits the
+apex, public).
+
+**plex-vip is kept.** Nothing advertises it any more (`ADVERTISE_IP` is a `plex.direct` name since
+2026-10-05), but it is not unused: it is Plex's `customCertificateDomain` (`CERTDOMAIN`, Secret
+`plex-vip-tls`), the name of the tcp/32400 VIP, and the 404'd name in the tunnel config. It has no
+public record, so this entry is its only resolution.
+
+**New L0 check `conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-lan-names`** (`scope: whole-repo`, so picked up by
+the runner's scope selection with no other wiring). Asserts: (a) no zone-wide entry (zone, `#`, or any
+parent of the zone); (b) every `controller: none` hostname → `${GATEWAY_VIP}`, and a disowned route
+with no `hostnames:` fails; (c) every tunnel-404 hostname has an entry, with the L4 names (derived
+from Services carrying both the external-dns hostname and an lbipam VIP) on their own VIP; (d) gitea
+and nextcloud → `${GATEWAY_VIP}`; plus catalog == rendered value and a built-in mutation self-test.
+
+**Stale docs corrected:** `platform/pm-agent/README.md`, `runbooks/pm-agent.md`,
+`platform/externaldns/README.md`, `platform/cloudflared/README.md`, `platform/gateway/gateway.yaml`
+(comment), `platform/headlamp/httproute.yaml` (comment), `apps/vms/unifi/README.md`, `README.md`,
+`schemas/renderer-contract.md`; `runbooks/cloudflare-tunnel.md` gains the two consequences below.
+`platform/cloudflared/deployment.yaml`: the image entrypoint comment was wrong (comment-only).
+
+## What I verified
+
+- **Render:** the baseline `render.py --no-image-automation catalog/pihole.yaml` was byte-identical to
+  the committed `apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml` before the change, and the file was replaced by that
+  command's output after it; `--emit-waves` was not run.
+- **Mutation, against the real files (10 mutants, each rc 1 with the right assertion, each restored):**
+  (a) zone wildcard restored; (b) headlamp and sonarr entries removed; (b) a disowned route with no
+  `hostnames:`; (c) a new tunnel-404 host with no entry; (c) pihole-dns removed; (c) unifi pointed at
+  the Gateway; (d) gitea removed; (d) nextcloud repointed; (0) rendered value drifted from the catalog.
+- **Rollout mechanics, measured live (read-only):** StatefulSet `updateStrategy` RollingUpdate
+  partition 0, `podManagementPolicy: Parallel`, no `minReadySeconds`, 2 replicas, PDB minAvailable 1.
+  The last rollout (2026-11-08 06:47–06:48Z) replaced pihole-1 then pihole-0: FTL logged "started" ~1 s
+  after the container, the pod went Ready ~16 s after the container, and pihole-0 started ~9 s later.
+- **Expected LAN DNS blip:** no total outage; one replica answers throughout. Each of the two pod
+  replacements can lose a few UDP queries for ~1–2 s while the terminating pod leaves the Service
+  (clients retry). For roughly 30–60 s the two pods answer differently for the apex, grafana, crafty
+  and seerr; both answers work. Cached answers age out in 60 s (`local-ttl`).
+- **Live DNS before the change:** @8.8.8.8 returns Cloudflare (104.21.51.91 / 172.67.178.27) for the
+  apex, grafana, seerr, crafty and gitea, and nothing for jackett; @192.168.2.23 returns 192.168.2.20
+  for all of them (the wildcard).
+- **Cloudflared image:** `skopeo inspect --config` on the pinned digest (amd64): Entrypoint
+  `["cloudflared"]`, Cmd `["version"]`, User `65532:65532`.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **The post-merge behaviour.** Nothing here ran against a live PiHole with the new list; the
+  expected answers are from dnsmasq semantics and the tree. After reconcile, check
+  `dig @192.168.2.23` for one name per row, and grafana returning Cloudflare.
+- **Whether every LAN client path works via Cloudflare.** Measured 2xx/3xx through Cloudflare by the
+  brief, not re-measured from a LAN client here.
+- **The FTL DNS-listening moment.** "FTL started" is a log line, not a successful query; the rollout
+  timing above assumes DNS is up shortly after it.
+
+**Accepted consequences, stated plainly:**
+- The apex, grafana, crafty and seerr now depend on the internet and the tunnel from the LAN too. An
+  ISP or Cloudflare outage, or stopping the connectors, makes them unreachable from the LAN where they
+  previously kept working. If grafana in particular should survive an internet outage, add it to the
+  list (one entry; the check permits it).
+- The tunnel rollback (revert to `wan.`) now also requires restoring the wildcard; recorded in
+  `runbooks/cloudflare-tunnel.md`.
+
+**Flagged, not changed:**
+- The `pihole` container has no readiness probe; only the `oauth2-proxy` sidecar does, so "Ready" says
+  nothing about DNS. The measured margin (FTL ~1 s, Ready ~16 s) makes this benign in a normal rollout
+  but a slow FTL start would not hold the rollout back. A DNS readiness probe needs a schema/renderer
+  decision.
+
+**Stale statements left alone:** `platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml` header ("both resolve the whole
+zone ... by wildcard", brief said not to touch CoreDNS); `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml` comments
+(sensitive path); `schemas/renderer-contract.md` §`exposure` first bullets (manual edge port-forward
+wording); historical `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md`, `platform/externaldns/README.md` TODO list.

decisions/2026-11-09-vuln-visibility.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+---
+date: 2026-11-09
+branch: feat/vuln-visibility
+title: Automated CVE visibility for production (R-VULN-01..09, ADR-0027)
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+Implements `docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md` from spec PR Home-Network/home-network-k3s#4
+(commit `0fb44bb`, open, not merged). `ci/SPEC_PIN` is deliberately not bumped: the merge SHA does
+not exist yet, and open PR #160 owns the pin backlog.
+
+- `platform/vuln-scanner/`: stdlib Python scanner in a ConfigMap on a digest-pinned
+  `python:3.14.9-alpine`, Trivy 0.76.1 by digest copied in by an initContainer, a per-app
+  oauth2-proxy sidecar for `cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, read-only ClusterRole, RWO Longhorn PVC for the
+  report and state, size-limited emptyDir for the DB and scan cache, pinned Service ClusterIP
+  `10.43.210.10` as the bot's DNS fallback, five alerts with promtool tests and a runbook.
+- `clusters/base/vuln-scanner.yaml`: its own Flux tier, `wait: false`, `dependsOn: platform-config`,
+  nothing depends on it.
+- `.gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml` and `scripts/cve_triage.py`: the bot, cron `15 7 * * *`,
+  counts-only `CVE Dashboard` issue with its own `cve-dashboard` label, approve-row ticks only.
+- `renovate.json5`: Trivy on the blast-radius list, 7-day minimum release age, and everything under
+  `platform/vuln-scanner/**` non-automerging.
+- `conformance/`: R-VULN-01..09 in the registry; L0 checks and L1 fixture tests (scanner, page,
+  bot) wired by scope, L2/L3 authored as scaffolds.
+- PiHole LAN names and the Homepage link gained the CVE page.
+
+### Decisions a future reader will want
+
+- Page is server-rendered with **no JavaScript**, not inline JS: the CSP has no `script-src`,
+  escaping is in one place, and the L1 test exercises the real rendered page, which a JS page could
+  not do without a browser engine. Filters, sort and pagination are URL parameters.
+- Three pod ports, not two. Prometheus gets 9090 only, so it cannot read `report.json`.
+- A killed image (OOM, eviction) is recorded as failed from an in-flight marker and sits out full
+  runs for 20h, so it cannot wedge the scan loop.
+- Private registries are named in `VULN_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES` and short-circuit to
+  `credential-required` before Trivy runs (see escalation 1).
+- Bot's job container is the repo's toolbox image by digest: `actions/checkout` needs node and the
+  pull is already proven by the merge gate.
+
+### Spec escalations
+
+1. Coverage state `credential-required` is defined as "the registry refused anonymous access", but
+   the egress contract excludes LAN ranges, so the scanner cannot reach the private registry to be
+   refused. Implemented by naming private registries in configuration. The spec should define the
+   state by configuration or admit the registry to egress.
+2. The egress contract lists only the Kubernetes API, DNS and public TCP/443, but the SSO sidecar
+   must reach Keycloak. Egress additionally allows the Gateway on 443 and Keycloak. The spec should
+   name this path.
+
+## What I verified
+
+- Toolbox gate on the integrated tree: **rc 3 (UNDETERMINED, not green)**. Stages that did not run:
+  `spec-immutability` and `gitea-settings`; `conformance` (L2/L3) logged SKIPPED, no cluster.
+  `approval-policy`, `decisions-log`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1` reported green.
+  `approval-policy` is N/A offline and proves nothing locally.
+- All `vuln-*` L0 and L1 checks pass in the toolbox, each with a mutated-fixture non-vacuity case.
+- `renovate-config-validator` from `ghcr.io/renovatebot/renovate:44.167.0`, the tag `renovate.yaml`
+  runs: validated successfully. This is a read-only container run of a public image.
+- Trivy 0.76.1 digest: registry `created` 2026-10-21, 19 days old at authoring; cosign keyless
+  verification passed (cosign 3.1.3); `cp` and the CA bundle confirmed from a layer listing.
+- ClusterIP `10.43.210.10` confirmed unused against the live Service list, read-only.
+- An independent reviewer checked the diff against docs/17 and found no anonymous leak path, no way
+  for an unscanned image to read as clean, no way for the bot to tick a `rebase-branch` row, and no
+  platform stall path. One BLOCKER and five other code findings were fixed with tests.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+Nothing here has been deployed. No runtime behaviour has been observed.
+
+- **R-VULN-04 is NOT delivered until the operator adds the Keycloak client.** It needs a new key in
+  `platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml`, which needs the age private key, and a
+  one-time `kcadm` against the live realm. Exact steps: `platform/vuln-scanner/README.md`, "Operator
+  action required". Until then login fails closed with `invalid_client`. Those steps are UNVERIFIED.
+- A real Trivy run: every scanner test uses a recorded fixture and a fake runner.
+- The real Kubernetes API, real browser rendering, OIDC login and the `platform-admins` restriction.
+- Whether in-cluster DNS resolves from a DinD job container, and whether the pinned ClusterIP
+  fallback is reachable from one. The workflow has never run; Gitea behaviour is tested against a
+  fake only.
+- The `## Pending Approval` row format is from Renovate's source as recalled, because issue #91 has
+  no live approve row today. The `approve-branch` marker itself is documented.
+- L2 and L3 are scaffolds and do not run in CI.
+- Renovate `minimumReleaseAge` behaviour on a real update, as opposed to the config validating.
+- Cgroup v2 memory behaviour under the scanner's limits is inferred, not measured.

infra/vpn-ingress/new-peer.sh

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #   WG_ENDPOINT_HOST    default wan.home.keithjackson.dev
 #   WG_CLIENT_CIDR      default 10.90.0.0/24   (must match clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml)
 #   WG_LAN_CIDR         default 192.168.2.0/24 (prod LAN_CIDR)
+#   WG_MTU              default 1280 (client tunnel MTU; see the comment on the default below)
 #   WG_DNS              default 192.168.2.23   (prod PIHOLE_DNS_VIP)
 #
 # REQUIRES: `wg`, `qrencode`, `sops` — all three in the dev container.
@@ -80,7 +81,14 @@ PEERS_FILE="${REPO_ROOT}/platform/vpn-ingress/peers.conf"
 # cannot resolve until it is already connected.
 : "${WG_ENDPOINT_HOST:=wan.home.keithjackson.dev}"
 : "${WG_LISTEN_PORT:=51820}"
-: "${WG_MTU:=1420}"
+# The CLIENT's tunnel MTU. Deliberately lower than the server's 1420 (daemonset.yaml), which only
+# describes the 1500-byte path at the node's end. A phone's path is the carrier's, often behind
+# carrier NAT, and is not known to carry 1500. Measured 2026-11-09, one Android phone on one
+# carrier: at 1420 the handshake was healthy but names and pages failed; clearing the app's MTU
+# field (its userspace backend then uses 1280) fixed it. 1280 is also the IPv6 minimum link MTU, so
+# it stays valid if the tunnel ever gains IPv6. For a device only ever on a wired or known-1500
+# path, WG_MTU=1420 recovers about 10% of per-packet payload.
+: "${WG_MTU:=1280}"
 
 SPLIT=0
 OUT_DIR=""

platform/cloudflared/README.md

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ outbound-only from the cluster (no router port forward, no hairpin, no split-DNS
 | `networkpolicy.yaml` | default-deny (single owner — not an app namespace) + Prometheus scrape allow + egress CNP: world 7844 tcp/udp and 443, the Gateway (`ingress` entity), and Gateway backends by `gateway-access=shared` minus the LAN-only namespaces. |
 | `servicemonitor.yaml`, `alerts.yaml` | Headless metrics Service + ServiceMonitor scraping :2000, and the two alerts, both written to fire (not go quiet) when their series vanish. |
 
-**Phase 1 only.** This component changes no live traffic: Cloudflare sends a hostname through the
-tunnel only when its DNS record is a CNAME to `<UUID>.cfargotunnel.com`, and nothing here creates
-one. Moving DNS (external-dns, Gateway annotations, Pi-hole/CoreDNS split horizon) is a later change.
+Cloudflare sends a hostname through the tunnel only when its DNS record is a proxied CNAME to
+`<UUID>.cfargotunnel.com`; nothing in this directory creates one. Those records are published by
+external-dns from the shared Gateway's target annotation (Phase 2, PR #156; see
+`platform/externaldns/README.md`). LAN resolution: `catalog/pihole.yaml` (explicit names only since
+2026-11-09), so public names reach Cloudflare from the LAN too.

platform/cloudflared/config.yaml

@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ ingress:
   # tunnel alongside decision 4.
   - hostname: headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN}
     service: http_status:404
+  # The CVE page (docs/17: internal only, a list of what is exploitable where). Its route is disowned
+  # from public DNS (platform/vuln-scanner/httproute.yaml); this is the second layer.
+  - hostname: cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+    service: http_status:404
   # Non-HTTP L4 VIPs (their own LoadBalancer addresses, not the Gateway). Listed so a DNS flip
   # that CNAMEs them at the tunnel by mistake gets a 404, not the Gateway's catch-all.
   - hostname: unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}

platform/cloudflared/deployment.yaml

@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ spec:
         - name: cloudflared
           # Tag + digest: Renovate's `kubernetes` manager (renovate.json5, platform/**) bumps both.
           image: docker.io/cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.10.7@sha256:4955524aeaa379e154023d5a027c250f7b35041a2e7e950cf13f144bc9b9c5ba
-          # The image ENTRYPOINT is `cloudflared --no-autoupdate`; these replace its CMD. The tunnel
-          # UUID, credentials path, metrics address and ingress rules all come from the file.
+          # The image ENTRYPOINT is `cloudflared` and its CMD is `version` (read from the pinned
+          # digest's image config, 2026-11-09); these args replace that CMD. `no-autoupdate`, the
+          # tunnel UUID, credentials path, metrics address and ingress rules all come from the file.
           args:
             - tunnel
             - --config

platform/cloudflared/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -147,3 +147,4 @@ spec:
                 - radarr
                 - sonarr
                 - headlamp
+                - vuln-scanner

platform/externaldns/README.md

@@ -44,8 +44,13 @@ wan.home.keithjackson.dev    A     (DNS-only) <current WAN IP> <- cloudflare-ddn
 - `internal` routes (`controller: none`) still publish nothing. Plex's web UI and Headlamp joined that
   set on 2026-11-08 (LAN/VPN-only); the tunnel also 404s every such name (9c/9d).
 - Public answers are Cloudflare anycast **A and AAAA** — Cloudflare's edge, not an origin address.
-- LAN and pods resolve `*.home.keithjackson.dev` to the Gateway VIP via PiHole and CoreDNS
-  (split-horizon) and never use the public path.
+- **Pods** resolve the whole zone to the Gateway VIP via CoreDNS (split-horizon) and never use the
+  public path. **LAN clients** use PiHole, which since 2026-11-09 answers an EXPLICIT list
+  (`catalog/pihole.yaml`): the LAN-only names, plus gitea/nextcloud/keycloak/auth (kept off
+  Cloudflare's 100 MB / 100 s limits and on one OIDC path), go to the Gateway VIP and the L4 names to
+  their own VIPs; every other public name (apex, grafana, crafty, seerr) resolves to Cloudflare from
+  the LAN exactly as from anywhere else, so no split-DNS is needed for them. Guard:
+  `conformance/tests/l0-static/pihole-lan-names`.
 - **Nodes resolve through public DNS** (`node_baseline_dns_servers`), so from a node the apiserver's
   OIDC issuer `keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` now resolves to Cloudflare and its discovery/JWKS
   fetches go through the tunnel (publicly trusted edge cert; no `oidc-ca-file` is configured). The

platform/gateway/gateway.yaml

@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ metadata:
     # applies BEFORE it reads this target. Those same names map to `http_status:404` in the tunnel's
     # ingress rules, so even a hand-made record cannot reach them through the tunnel.
     #
-    # LAN and in-cluster clients are unaffected: PiHole and CoreDNS answer ${BASE_DOMAIN} with
-    # ${GATEWAY_VIP} directly (split-horizon), so they never take this public path.
+    # In-cluster clients are unaffected: CoreDNS answers ${BASE_DOMAIN} with ${GATEWAY_VIP} directly
+    # (split-horizon). LAN clients use PiHole's EXPLICIT list (catalog/pihole.yaml, since 2026-11-09):
+    # LAN-only names and gitea/nextcloud/keycloak/auth get ${GATEWAY_VIP}; every other published
+    # name takes this public path through Cloudflare, from the LAN as from anywhere.
     #
     # `wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` (platform/externaldns/ddns.yaml) is NO LONGER a target of anything here;
     # it stays only as the WireGuard udp/51820 endpoint.

platform/headlamp/httproute.yaml

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ metadata:
     homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: platform-admins
     # LAN/VPN-ONLY (operator decision 2026-11-08). Disowned from external-dns, so the public
     # headlamp record and its TXT are DELETED and nothing republishes them; LAN/VPN clients keep
-    # resolving the name via PiHole's split-horizon wildcard (-> the Gateway VIP). The Cloudflare
+    # resolving the name via PiHole's explicit entry for it (-> the Gateway VIP). The Cloudflare
     # Tunnel also maps headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN} to http_status:404 (platform/cloudflared/config.yaml).
     # Same mechanism the renderer emits for `exposure: internal` services; asserted by
     # conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns (9c).

platform/homepage/configmap.yaml

@@ -43,6 +43,13 @@ data:
             href: https://grafana.${BASE_DOMAIN}
             description: Metrics, logs & dashboards (fronts Prometheus/Loki/Alertmanager)
             icon: mdi-chart-areaspline
+        # The CVE page (platform/vuln-scanner, docs/17): behind SSO, restricted to platform-admins.
+        # Homepage has no per-group surfaces, so this tile is shown to everyone who can open this
+        # dashboard; the page itself enforces platform-admins.
+        - CVE Report:
+            href: https://cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+            description: Container image CVE inventory (platform-admins)
+            icon: mdi-shield-bug
         - Semaphore:
             href: https://semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}
             description: Ansible automation & CI

platform/pm-agent/README.md

@@ -72,11 +72,14 @@ Both are deliberate, and both fail **visibly** rather than silently:
    - **The nodes resolve the registry hostname to the WAN, so the TLS they fail to verify is
      the router's — DIAGNOSED 2026-10-06, and fixed in this change.** containerd pulls as a
      *node* process, so it resolves through the node's public upstreams
-     (`node_baseline_dns_servers` = the LAN gateway) rather than through Pi-hole. The public
-     answer for every name in this zone is a CNAME to `wan.home.keithjackson.dev` — the WAN
-     IP — which this router does not hairpin; it answers :443 with its own placeholder
+     (`node_baseline_dns_servers` = the LAN gateway) rather than through Pi-hole. At the time,
+     the public answer for every name in this zone was a CNAME to `wan.home.keithjackson.dev`
+     — the WAN IP — which this router does not hairpin; it answered :443 with its own placeholder
      certificate `CN=%D` carrying **no extensions, therefore no SANs**, which is precisely
-     `x509: certificate is not valid for any names`. The Gateway, the wildcard certificate
+     `x509: certificate is not valid for any names`. (Since 2026-11-08 the public answer is
+     Cloudflare's edge via the Tunnel, not the WAN IP — see `platform/externaldns/README.md`.
+     The pin is still the right path: it keeps registry pulls on the LAN and off Cloudflare's
+     proxy.) The Gateway, the wildcard certificate
      and the digest were never implicated. The fix is the pin this repository already uses
      for the Keycloak issuer, for the identical reason: `gitea.{{ k3s_base_domain }}` is now
      in `node_baseline_hosts_pins` — node configuration is Ansible's, declared in the

platform/vpn-ingress/README.md

@@ -42,8 +42,9 @@ no version string to match against a CVE, and no amplification to abuse.
 
 That is the whole security argument, and it is why the exposed port carries no IP allowlist (which
 would also have made roaming clients unusable — a phone's address changes with every cell tower).
-Compare `apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml`, which *does* pin `loadBalancerSourceRanges` to the LAN: a
-resolver answers anybody, so it must be scoped by address. WireGuard answers nobody.
+Compare `apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml`, which *does* pin `loadBalancerSourceRanges` to the LAN and
+this tunnel's client subnet: a resolver answers anybody, so it must be scoped by address. WireGuard
+answers nobody.
 
 What it does **not** protect against is a stolen device — anyone holding a device's private key
 *is* that device. That is what revocation is for: delete the stanza, merge, done (~1 min).
@@ -55,9 +56,9 @@ What it does **not** protect against is a stolen device — anyone holding a dev
  ┌──────────────┐  udp/51820   ┌───────────────┐  forward   ┌────────────────────────────┐
  │ WireGuard app│─────────────▶│ WAN 51820 ──▶ │───────────▶│ wg0 10.90.0.1/24           │
  │ 10.90.0.2/32 │   over the   │ node IP:51820 │            │   decrypt, then FORWARD    │
- └──────────────┘   internet   └───────────────┘            │   SNAT to the node's addr  │
+ └──────────────┘   internet   └───────────────┘            │  SNAT (LAN), eBPF LB (VIPs)│
                                                             └─────────────┬──────────────┘
-                                                                          │ as `host`/`remote-node`
+                                                                          │ translated per destination (below)
                                         ┌─────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┐
                                         ▼                                 ▼                      ▼
                                LAN 192.168.2.0/24            Gateway VIP .20 (16 web UIs)   WAN / internet
@@ -86,9 +87,21 @@ resolved, because `apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml`'s ingress policy deliberately om
 entity. A VPN that looks up and is useless is the worst available outcome, and nothing in the
 manifests would have hinted at it.
 
-In the **host** netns there is no pod identity to carry. Forwarded client traffic is SNATed to the
-node's own address, so it reaches the Gateway, PiHole and every LAN host as `host`/`remote-node` —
-byte-for-byte what a LAN client looks like. Three further problems vanish with it:
+In the **host** netns there is no pod identity to carry, which is what avoids the 403s. Clients do
+**not**, however, all arrive SNATed to the node. Measured 2026-11-08: Cilium counts `wg0` among its
+kube-proxy-replacement devices (`cilium-dbg status`: `eno1`, `wg0`, `tun0`), so what a packet looks
+like depends on where it is going:
+
+| destination | handled by | source the destination sees |
+|---|---|---|
+| LAN hosts, the internet | kernel FORWARD, then the iptables MASQUERADE in [`daemonset.yaml`](./daemonset.yaml) | the node's address |
+| LoadBalancer VIPs (Gateway `.20`, PiHole `.23`, ...) | Cilium's eBPF load balancer, as the packet enters from `wg0`, **before** MASQUERADE | `10.90.0.x` at the VIP's source-range check, identity `world` |
+
+The second row is why PiHole's `loadBalancerSourceRanges` has to list `${WG_CLIENT_CIDR}` as well as
+the LAN: left LAN-only, tunnel DNS is predicted to die with `DROP_NOT_IN_SRC_RANGE`. That prediction
+and the row's source column come from reading Cilium's datapath source; **no peer has ever completed
+a handshake, so neither has been observed live.** The Gateway VIP carries no source ranges and needs
+no change. Three further problems vanish with the host netns:
 
 * `net.ipv4.ip_forward` is **already 1** on these nodes (`node_baseline` writes
   `/etc/sysctl.d/99-k3s-cilium.conf`). It is *not* in the kubelet's safe-sysctl allowlist, so a
@@ -99,7 +112,9 @@ byte-for-byte what a LAN client looks like. Three further problems vanish with i
   `conformance/tests/l0-static/l2-announced-vips-serve-from-any-node`) and no
   `externalTrafficPolicy` trade-off to make at all.
 * **No double encapsulation.** Client UDP lands on the node's own NIC, so the underlay is a flat
-  1500-byte path, not Cilium's 1450-byte VXLAN. That is what makes `MTU = 1420` simply correct.
+  1500-byte path, not Cilium's 1450-byte VXLAN. That is what makes `MTU = 1420` correct on the
+  server's `wg0`. It says nothing about a client's own path: `new-peer.sh` defaults client profiles
+  to `1280` (see "Troubleshooting" in `runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md`).
 
 `hostNetwork` is *permitted* here, and not by oversight:
 `platform/kyverno/policies/restrict-host-namespaces.yaml` matches `namespaceSelector:
@@ -163,6 +178,30 @@ internet path. To enforce less *server-side*, add filtering to the `PostUp` chai
 before the accept rules) — the FORWARD chain there is the only enforcement point, since no
 NetworkPolicy applies.
 
+## Phone profiles: one tunnel for home, one for away
+
+A phone that needs the LAN-only apps runs full tunnel (`AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0`, `DNS = 192.168.2.23`)
+everywhere, so it needs **two tunnels**, each its own peer with its own key and address:
+
+| tunnel | peer | address | Endpoint | use when |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `away` | `keith-phone` | `10.90.0.2` | `wan.home.keithjackson.dev:51820` | off the home network |
+| `home` | `keith-phone-home` | `10.90.0.3` | `192.168.2.10:51820` | on the home Wi-Fi |
+
+**`wan.` cannot work from inside the house.** It is an unproxied A record holding the house's WAN
+address (`platform/externaldns/README.md`), and the router has no hairpin NAT, so a LAN client that
+sends to it never comes back in through the port-forward. The Cloudflare Tunnel is no way round: it
+carries HTTP(S) to the Gateway and WireGuard is UDP to a node, so `wan.` has to stay DNS-only and
+`away` has to keep using it.
+
+**`home` depends on `k3s-prod-1`.** Its Endpoint is that node's address, with no failover: if
+prod-1 is down, `home` cannot handshake even though the other two listeners are healthy. The fix
+is client-side: edit the tunnel's Endpoint to `192.168.2.11` or `.12`, since every node answers the
+same keys. No server change and no new key is needed. The same dependency applies to `away` if the
+WAN forward points at prod-1.
+
+Android allows one active VPN at a time, so switch tunnels by hand when leaving or arriving.
+
 ## Operating it
 
 * **Enrol a device:** `./infra/vpn-ingress/new-peer.sh <name> <octet>` → paste the printed `[Peer]`
@@ -215,10 +254,13 @@ right way; one was a defect in my own manifest.
   handshake — and would be a real secret, forcing `peers.conf` into SOPS and costing the
   reviewability above. Revisit only if the threat model changes; if it does, the PSK belongs in the
   `wg-server-key` Secret.
-* **No IPv6.** The server offers no IPv6 tunnel address, so a full-tunnel client with native IPv6
-  still reaches IPv6 sites *outside* the tunnel. Functionally harmless, a privacy leak if the point
-  was to hide the client's network. Fix is an `fd..` ULA on `wg0` plus `::/0` in the client's
-  `AllowedIPs`; not done because nothing here needs it.
+* **No IPv6.** The server offers no IPv6 tunnel address and `new-peer.sh` emits only `0.0.0.0/0`.
+  What happens to a client's IPv6 then depends on the client. The **Android app does not leak it**:
+  its `GoBackend` skips `allowFamily()` when the config is one peer with a default route, so Android
+  blocks IPv6 for the VPN's duration and apps fall back to IPv4. Other clients are not covered by
+  that code; expect `wg-quick` on a dual-stack Linux host to leave IPv6 outside the tunnel. Fix is
+  an `fd..` ULA on `wg0` plus `::/0` in the client's `AllowedIPs`; not done because nothing here
+  needs it.
 * **No in-cluster-service reach beyond what the LAN has.** Clients reach cluster apps the way a LAN
   browser does — through the Gateway VIP. Pod IPs and `10.43.0.0/16` service IPs are not routed
   into the tunnel.

platform/vpn-ingress/daemonset.yaml

@@ -30,9 +30,12 @@
 # `cluster` entity, so VPN clients would not have been able to resolve `*.${BASE_DOMAIN}` either.
 # The VPN would have looked up and been useless, which is the worst failure shape available.
 #
-# In the host netns there is no pod identity to carry: forwarded client traffic is SNATed to the
-# NODE's address, so it reaches the Gateway, PiHole and every LAN host as `host`/`remote-node` —
-# exactly what a LAN client looks like. Three further problems disappear with it:
+# In the host netns there is no pod identity to carry, so a client never looks like a pod. What a
+# destination sees depends on how the packet is handled. LAN hosts and the internet: forwarded,
+# then MASQUERADEd to the NODE's address by the PostUp rule below. LoadBalancer VIPs: Cilium's load
+# balancer takes the packet as it enters from wg0, before that rule, so the source is still
+# 10.90.0.x with identity `world`, like a LAN browser (measured 2026-11-09 for PiHole .23 and Plex
+# .24; see README). Three further problems disappear with it:
 #   * net.ipv4.ip_forward is ALREADY 1 on these nodes (node_baseline writes it to
 #     /etc/sysctl.d/99-k3s-cilium.conf), so no pod sysctl is needed — and `net.ipv4.ip_forward`
 #     is NOT in the kubelet's safe-sysctl allowlist, so a pod-netns version of this would have

platform/vpn-ingress/peers.conf

@@ -90,3 +90,7 @@
 [Peer]
 PublicKey = pBRSHrRyG2hnsuZ6FvHfEzF8hOVTF5stHUb/7fW2Km8=
 AllowedIPs = 10.90.0.2/32
+# keith-phone-home — <owner>, enrolled 2026-11-08 (at-home profile, LAN Endpoint; no hairpin NAT)
+[Peer]
+PublicKey = AT8lBJHqrVkv8RL9n0qWDsh5nyl0e3qgrfTAaYKgBz0=
+AllowedIPs = 10.90.0.3/32

platform/vuln-scanner/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# vuln-scanner — scheduled CVE visibility for what is running
+
+Answers three questions with no manual step: what is running, what is it vulnerable to, and can the
+answer be trusted. Contract: spec `docs/17-vulnerability-visibility.md`, ADR-0027 (R-VULN-01..09).
+Hand-authored platform tooling (not a catalog service), reconciled by its own non-gating Flux tier
+`clusters/base/vuln-scanner.yaml`. Operator runbook: `runbooks/vuln-scanner.md`.
+
+| Piece | Where |
+|---|---|
+| Scanner source (`python3`, stdlib only), mounted from a ConfigMap at `/app` | `src/` |
+| Accepted risk (R-VULN-08) | `acceptances.yaml` |
+| Pod, security context, sidecar | `deployment.yaml` |
+| Read-only identity (R-VULN-09) | `rbac.yaml` |
+| Network: Gateway→4180, CI→8081, Prometheus→9090; API, DNS, public 443 | `networkpolicy.yaml` |
+| Aggregate metrics and the five alerts | `servicemonitor.yaml`, `alerts.yaml`, `alerts.promtool-test.yaml` |
+
+The page is `cve.<domain>`, internal only, gated by the per-pod oauth2-proxy sidecar to `platform-admins`.
+The route is disowned from public DNS and the tunnel 404s it; PiHole answers it on the LAN.
+
+## Operator action required: the Keycloak client (R-VULN-04 is NOT delivered until this is done)
+
+Until these steps are done the page cannot complete a login (`invalid_client`, fail-closed). The
+scanner, its metrics and its alerts are unaffected.
+
+An agent cannot do this, because every route runs through one encrypted file. The client's secret
+must be the key `vuln-scanner-client-secret` in `platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml`:
+the reconciler mounts only that Secret, and the L0 check `keycloak-client-secret-reconciler` rejects a
+placeholder that reads any other (a second source would be declared but never healed). That check
+also requires the client and the key to land in the same change. Adding a key needs the age private
+key. Separately, a completed realm import never re-runs, so a new client has to be created in the
+live realm once whatever git says. `*.sops.yaml` is a sensitive path, so the PR needs an approval or
+an operator-posted `/approve-override` (`infra/gitea/approval-policy.json`).
+
+**Order matters.** Create the live client first: the reconciler treats every `*-client-secret` key as
+a client that must exist, and fails every 15-minute run with `NOT FOUND` otherwise
+(`KeycloakClientSecretReconcilerFailing`).
+
+1. Create the client in the live realm. No secret is passed: the reconciler sets it from git after
+   the merge, and it reads the admin credential from the pod's own environment, so nothing is echoed.
+
+   ```bash
+   kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak exec keycloak-0 -- bash -c '
+     K="/opt/keycloak/bin/kcadm.sh"; C="--config /tmp/kcadm-vuln.config"
+     $K config credentials $C --server http://localhost:8080 --realm master \
+       --user "$KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME" --password "$KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD"
+     D=home.keithjackson.dev
+     ID=$($K create clients $C -r homelab -i -s clientId=vuln-scanner -s "name=CVE report (oauth2-proxy)" \
+       -s protocol=openid-connect -s enabled=true -s publicClient=false -s standardFlowEnabled=true \
+       -s directAccessGrantsEnabled=false -s "redirectUris=[\"https://cve.$D/oauth2/callback\"]" \
+       -s "webOrigins=[\"https://cve.$D\"]")
+     $K create clients/$ID/protocol-mappers/models $C -r homelab -s name=groups -s protocol=openid-connect \
+       -s protocolMapper=oidc-group-membership-mapper -s "config.\"full.path\"=false" \
+       -s "config.\"id.token.claim\"=true" -s "config.\"access.token.claim\"=true" \
+       -s "config.\"userinfo.token.claim\"=true" -s "config.\"claim.name\"=groups"
+     rm -f /tmp/kcadm-vuln.config'
+   ```
+
+   `D` is the prod `BASE_DOMAIN`; check it against the `cluster-vars` ConfigMap first.
+
+2. On a branch, generate one value and set it in both encrypted files, through pipes so it is never
+   echoed. `client-secret` in the scanner's file is replaced so that the two match:
+
+   ```bash
+   ./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '
+     cs=$(python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))")
+     sops set platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml \
+       "[\"stringData\"][\"vuln-scanner-client-secret\"]" "\"$cs\""
+     sops set platform/vuln-scanner/vuln-scanner-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml \
+       "[\"stringData\"][\"client-secret\"]" "\"$cs\""'
+   ```
+
+3. Add to `platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml`, beside the `crafty` client:
+
+   ```yaml
+   # spec.placeholders
+   VULN_SCANNER_CLIENT_SECRET:
+     secret:
+       name: keycloak-realm-clients
+       key: vuln-scanner-client-secret
+   # spec.realm.clients
+   - clientId: vuln-scanner
+     name: CVE report (oauth2-proxy)
+     protocol: openid-connect
+     enabled: true
+     publicClient: false
+     standardFlowEnabled: true
+     directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
+     secret: "$(env:VULN_SCANNER_CLIENT_SECRET)"
+     redirectUris:
+       - https://cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
+     webOrigins:
+       - https://cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+     defaultClientScopes: [email, profile, roles]
+     protocolMappers:
+       - name: groups
+         protocol: openid-connect
+         protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
+         config:
+           "full.path": "false"
+           "id.token.claim": "true"
+           "access.token.claim": "true"
+           "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
+           "claim.name": groups
+   ```
+
+4. Regenerate the derived URL file with `python3 ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py --write`, and add
+   `vuln-scanner-client-secret: REPLACE-ME` to `keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml.example`. Commit all of
+   it in one PR, gate, merge.
+
+5. After Flux applies it, the next reconciler run sets the client's secret and URLs from git. Prove it
+   with the L2 test `keycloak-client-secrets-match-git`, then log in at `https://cve.<domain>`. The
+   `platform-admins` restriction is the sidecar's `--allowed-group`; the `groups` mapper above is what
+   supplies the claim it reads, so a user outside that group gets a 403 from oauth2-proxy.

platform/vuln-scanner/acceptances.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Accepted CVE risk (R-VULN-08). A list; this file is the ONLY place risk can be accepted, and it reaches
+# the scanner through the merge gate (a ConfigMap generated by kustomization.yaml).
+#
+# Each entry:
+#   - id: CVE-2026-00000                 # the CVE or advisory id, exactly as the scanner reports it
+#     image: registry/repository         # exact image match; omit only for a platform-wide acceptance
+#     reason: not reachable, feature disabled  # mandatory, a real sentence
+#     expires: 2027-02-01                # mandatory YYYY-MM-DD, at most 180 days out
+#
+# An accepted finding stays in the listing with its reason and expiry and stops counting toward the
+# critical-fix alert. When the expiry passes it reverts to open automatically. An entry with no reason
+# or no expiry, or an expiry more than 180 days out or malformed, is rejected by the merge gate
+# (conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-acceptances-schema) and ignored at runtime with the run marked
+# degraded, so a finding is never hidden by a bad entry.
+[]

platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.promtool-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+---
+# promtool unit tests for platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.yaml (R-VULN-06).
+#
+# Found by platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh through the COMPANION convention. Run just this file with
+#   platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.promtool-test.yaml
+#
+# Each rule is pinned both ways. VulnScanStale and VulnTriageBotSilent additionally pin the two cases
+# the spec names by hand: the metric ABSENT must FIRE, and a metric that vanishes must RE-FIRE.
+# conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-alerts-unit-tested reads this file and fails if any of those cases
+# is removed.
+#
+# Timestamps: promtool evaluates from t=0, so a timestamp series can equal its own evaluation time
+# with `0+60x<N>` at a 1m interval (time() - value == 0: fresh).
+rule_files:
+  - alerts.rules.yaml
+evaluation_interval: 1m
+
+tests:
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: healthy - fresh run, fresh database, heartbeat, zero backlog, nothing fires
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0+60x60'
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_database_updated_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0+60x60'
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0+60x60'
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x60'
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_critical_fix_overdue{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x60'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'count(ALERTS{alertname=~"Vuln.*"})'
+        eval_time: 50m
+        exp_samples: []
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: scan stale - last complete run older than 26h fires after the for window
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x1600'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 1559m
+        exp_samples: []
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 1590m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: scan stale ABSENT - metric never existed, VulnScanStale still fires
+    input_series:
+      # A healthy, unrelated metric proves this is the absent() arm, not a broken test file.
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x60'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 20m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: scan metric VANISHES - a scanner that dies re-fires instead of latching clear
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0+60x20 stale'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 18m
+        exp_samples: []
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 40m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnScanStale", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: database stale - older than 48h fires after the for window
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_database_updated_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x2960'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnDatabaseStale", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 2870m
+        exp_samples: []
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnDatabaseStale", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 2900m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnDatabaseStale", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: coverage gap - a failed target over 24h fires, zero is quiet
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x20 3x40'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnCoverageGap", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 25m
+        exp_samples: []
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnCoverageGap", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 40m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnCoverageGap", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: critical fix overdue - fires, one grouped alert instance
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_critical_fix_overdue{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x20 12x40'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnCriticalFixAvailable", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 25m
+        exp_samples: []
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnCriticalFixAvailable", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 40m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnCriticalFixAvailable", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+      - expr: 'count(ALERTS{alertname="VulnCriticalFixAvailable", alertstate="firing"})'
+        eval_time: 40m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: '{}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: triage bot silent - last heartbeat older than 26h fires after the for window
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x1600'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnTriageBotSilent", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 1559m
+        exp_samples: []
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnTriageBotSilent", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 1590m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnTriageBotSilent", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: triage bot silent ABSENT - no heartbeat metric ever, VulnTriageBotSilent still fires
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0x60'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnTriageBotSilent", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 20m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnTriageBotSilent", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1
+
+  - interval: 1m
+    name: triage heartbeat VANISHES - re-fires instead of latching clear
+    input_series:
+      - series: 'vuln_scanner_triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds{namespace="vuln-scanner"}'
+        values: '0+60x20 stale'
+    promql_expr_test:
+      - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnTriageBotSilent", alertstate="firing"}'
+        eval_time: 40m
+        exp_samples:
+          - labels: 'ALERTS{alertname="VulnTriageBotSilent", alertstate="firing", severity="warning"}'
+            value: 1

platform/vuln-scanner/alerts.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+---
+# Alert rules for the vulnerability scanner (R-VULN-06, docs/17 "Alerting").
+#
+# ONE ALERT, ONE GROUPED EMAIL PER CONDITION, never one per CVE. The scanner's metrics are aggregates
+# with no per-CVE, per-image or per-workload label; `max()` strips scrape labels, so each rule yields a
+# single alert instance, and Alertmanager's `group_by: [alertname, namespace]` route delivers one email.
+#
+# THE TWO RULES WHOSE ABSENT-METRIC CASE IS LOAD-BEARING: VulnScanStale and VulnTriageBotSilent. Their
+# metrics are absent until the first complete run / first bot heartbeat, and absent when the scanner
+# or the scrape is dead; both are `or absent(...)` so a scanner that has never run, or an unscraped
+# one, fires instead of reading as healthy. Pinned by alerts.promtool-test.yaml in both directions.
+# VulnCriticalFixAvailable is expected to fire on first deployment (the backlog made visible).
+#
+# Severity follows the platform-health convention: warning (a condition to act on, not a page).
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: PrometheusRule
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+spec:
+  groups:
+    - name: platform-health.vulnerability-scanner
+      rules:
+        - alert: VulnScanStale
+          # No complete run within 26 hours, or the metric is absent. 15m rides out a pod restart.
+          expr: >-
+            (time() - max(vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds) > 93600)
+            or absent(vuln_scanner_last_complete_run_timestamp_seconds)
+          for: 15m
+          labels:
+            severity: warning
+          annotations:
+            summary: No complete vulnerability scan in over 26 hours
+            description: >-
+              The scanner has not completed a run within 26 hours, or no scan metric exists at all
+              (the scanner or its scrape is down). Findings on the CVE page are ageing.
+            runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/vuln-scanner"
+
+        - alert: VulnDatabaseStale
+          # Vulnerability database older than 48 hours (docs/17): the run is degraded, not a success.
+          expr: time() - max(vuln_scanner_database_updated_timestamp_seconds) > 172800
+          for: 15m
+          labels:
+            severity: warning
+          annotations:
+            summary: Vulnerability database is older than 48 hours
+            description: >-
+              The Trivy vulnerability database has not been refreshed in over 48 hours, so scans
+              evaluate images against stale advisories and the run reports as degraded.
+            runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/vuln-scanner"
+
+        - alert: VulnCoverageGap
+          # A target has been `failed` for more than 24 hours. credential-required targets are not
+          # `failed` and do not count, so a private registry cannot hold this alert firing.
+          expr: max(vuln_scanner_failed_targets_over_24h) > 0
+          for: 15m
+          labels:
+            severity: warning
+          annotations:
+            summary: "{{ $value }} image(s) have failed scanning for over 24 hours"
+            description: >-
+              One or more running images have failed scanning for more than 24 hours, so what is
+              reported for them is out of date. The CVE page lists each target and the reason.
+            runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/vuln-scanner"
+
+        - alert: VulnCriticalFixAvailable
+          # An unaccepted CRITICAL with a fix, first seen over 72 hours ago. The grace period gives
+          # Renovate's daily cycle time to act, so this marks what automation has not resolved.
+          expr: max(vuln_scanner_critical_fix_overdue) > 0
+          for: 15m
+          labels:
+            severity: warning
+          annotations:
+            summary: "{{ $value }} CRITICAL finding(s) with a fix available for over 72 hours"
+            description: >-
+              One or more unaccepted CRITICAL vulnerabilities have had a fix available for more than
+              72 hours. The CVE page has the details; this message deliberately names none of them.
+            runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/vuln-scanner"
+
+        - alert: VulnTriageBotSilent
+          # No bot heartbeat for 26 hours, or the metric is absent (the bot has never run, or the
+          # scanner or its scrape is down).
+          expr: >-
+            (time() - max(vuln_scanner_triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds) > 93600)
+            or absent(vuln_scanner_triage_heartbeat_timestamp_seconds)
+          for: 15m
+          labels:
+            severity: warning
+          annotations:
+            summary: CVE triage bot has not reported in over 26 hours
+            description: >-
+              The scheduled CVE triage bot has not posted a heartbeat in over 26 hours (or never
+              has), so remediation states are stale and no approvals are being requested.
+            runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/vuln-scanner"

platform/vuln-scanner/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+---
+# The vulnerability scanner (R-VULN-01..09, docs/17). One pod:
+#   init   trivy-tools   copies the Trivy binary and CA bundle from the digest-pinned Trivy image into
+#                        an emptyDir, so the running container has a single python interpreter + one
+#                        static Go binary and nothing else from that image.
+#   main   scanner       python3 stdlib only (no pip), source from a ConfigMap at /app: inventory,
+#                        sequential scans, report, the page on 127.0.0.1:8080, the internal API on
+#                        :8081, aggregates on :9090.
+#   sidecar oauth2-proxy  the only path to the page, restricted to platform-admins (R-IDP-06, docs/17
+#                        "Access"), reached from the shared Gateway on :4180.
+#
+# ONE REPLICA, Recreate: one scanner on one RWO report store; two would double-scan and contend for
+# the volume.
+#
+# SOFT affinity toward k3s-prod-2: prod-1 is the node whose etcd I/O starved historically, and scans
+# are CPU- and I/O-heavy. Soft on purpose: a scanner that cannot be placed must still run elsewhere.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  revisionHistoryLimit: 3
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+        # The direct egress path; never the VPN gateway (docs/17).
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: internet
+        # Per-pod oauth2-proxy gate in front of the page. This namespace is not app-namespace=true,
+        # so the auth-mode/egress-class policies do not select it; the labels are kept so the pod is
+        # compliant by construction if that ever changes.
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: vuln-scanner
+      # The scanner reads the Kubernetes API with this token (read-only, rbac.yaml).
+      automountServiceAccountToken: true
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 65532
+        runAsGroup: 65532
+        # Longhorn honours fsGroup on an RWO volume; this makes /data and the emptyDirs writable.
+        fsGroup: 65532
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      affinity:
+        nodeAffinity:
+          preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+            - weight: 100
+              preference:
+                matchExpressions:
+                  - key: kubernetes.io/hostname
+                    operator: In
+                    values:
+                      - k3s-prod-2
+      initContainers:
+        - name: trivy-tools
+          # TRIVY 0.76.1 — pinned by digest (R-VULN-09). Not 0.69.4/5/6 (compromised release, March
+          # 2026, CVE-2026-33634). Tag digest and config created timestamp read from the registry on
+          # 2026-11-09: sha256:790fd66d…6c06c, created 2026-10-21T11:16:20Z (19 days old, i.e. past
+          # the 7-day minimum release age; 0.76.2 was published 2026-11-05 and is too new).
+          # SIGNATURE VERIFIED 2026-11-09 with cosign v3.1.3, keyless:
+          #   cosign verify ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy@sha256:790fd66d... \
+          #     --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github\.com/aquasecurity/trivy/\.github/workflows/.+' \
+          #     --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
+          # Renovate: blast-radius component, never auto-merges, 7-day minimum release age
+          # (renovate.json5); this `tag@digest` form is what the `kubernetes` manager tracks.
+          # The image's ENTRYPOINT is `trivy`, overridden below. /bin/cp (busybox) and
+          # /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt confirmed present by listing the layers via the
+          # registry API (no image run).
+          image: ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy:0.76.1@sha256:790fd66d1697395d8693d1acaa1ea702406a20f109b6fc7bac8db623eca6c06c
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command:
+            - /bin/cp
+            - /usr/local/bin/trivy
+            - /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
+            - /tools/
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 10m
+              memory: 16Mi
+              ephemeral-storage: 256Mi
+            limits:
+              cpu: 200m
+              memory: 64Mi
+              ephemeral-storage: 512Mi
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: tools
+              mountPath: /tools
+      containers:
+        # ─────────────────────────────── scanner ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+        - name: scanner
+          # python 3.14 on alpine by digest, matching the interpreter the scanner's tests ran on.
+          # 3.14.9-alpine, config created 2026-10-21T23:01:37Z, read from the registry on 2026-11-09
+          # (19 days old; 3.14.10-alpine, the current 3.14-alpine, was built 2026-11-05 and is under
+          # the 7-day age applied here by hand). Tracked by the `kubernetes` Renovate manager.
+          # Runs as 65532 from this pod's securityContext; the image's default is root, overridden.
+          image: docker.io/library/python:3.14.9-alpine@sha256:dbeb11d16bb95c3a7e3c25c842cb9f20cbc8c18f8be0461a4a0dcc861ad386a0
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command:
+            - python3
+            - /app/main.py
+          env:
+            - name: VULN_DATA_DIR
+              value: /data
+            - name: VULN_CACHE_DIR
+              value: /cache
+            # Scan caches and temp extraction live on the size-limited emptyDir, never on the
+            # replicated volume or etcd (docs/17 "Load").
+            - name: TMPDIR
+              value: /cache
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /cache
+            - name: VULN_TOOLS_DIR
+              value: /tools
+            - name: TRIVY_BIN
+              value: /tools/trivy
+            - name: SSL_CERT_FILE
+              value: /tools/ca-certificates.crt
+            - name: VULN_ACCEPTANCES
+              value: /config/acceptances.yaml
+            # Registries that need a credential this scanner deliberately does not hold (R-VULN-09).
+            # Comma-separated hostnames. They report credential-required WITHOUT invoking Trivy:
+            # the egress policy excludes the LAN, so a real attempt ends in a connection error and
+            # would read as `failed`, firing VulnCoverageGap permanently. Flux substitutes the domain.
+            - name: VULN_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES
+              value: gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+            - name: PYTHONUNBUFFERED
+              value: "1"
+            - name: PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
+              value: "1"
+          ports:
+            - { name: internal, containerPort: 8081, protocol: TCP }
+            - { name: metrics, containerPort: 9090, protocol: TCP }
+          # Sized to trivy, the only heavy thing here: scans are sequential, the limit is the peak of
+          # one large image; the emptyDir sizeLimit bounds disk.
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 100m
+              memory: 256Mi
+              ephemeral-storage: 256Mi
+            limits:
+              cpu: "1"
+              memory: 2Gi
+              ephemeral-storage: 12Gi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          # /healthz on the metrics port is answered by the HTTP server itself and must not depend
+          # on scan state: a long scan or a failed one is reported, never a reason to restart.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: metrics
+            periodSeconds: 5
+            failureThreshold: 24
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: metrics
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            failureThreshold: 6
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /healthz
+              port: metrics
+            periodSeconds: 15
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: src
+              mountPath: /app
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: acceptances
+              mountPath: /config
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: tools
+              mountPath: /tools
+              readOnly: true
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data
+            - name: cache
+              mountPath: /cache
+        # ─────────────────────────── oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar ───────────────────────
+        - name: oauth2-proxy
+          # The per-app sidecar pattern (platform/crafty, catalog/render.py): same tag as the
+          # renderer's OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE so a Renovate bump lands every sidecar in one branch.
+          image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.6
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          args:
+            - --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
+            - --reverse-proxy=true
+            - --provider=oidc
+            - --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
+            # The page, bound to loopback in the scanner container; no Service reaches it.
+            - --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8080
+            - --email-domain=*
+            - --scope=openid email profile
+            - --oidc-groups-claim=groups
+            # R-IDP-06, docs/17 "Access": a valid session is not enough, the user must be a
+            # platform-admin, because this page is the list of what is exploitable where.
+            - --allowed-group=platform-admins
+            - --skip-provider-button=true
+            - --redirect-url=https://cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
+            # Unique name + host-scoped domain: the shared forward-auth proxy and the other sidecars
+            # hold different cookie-secrets, so a shared cookie name would evict sessions
+            # (oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct).
+            - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_vuln_scanner
+            - --cookie-domain=cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+            - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+            - --cookie-secure=true
+            - --set-xauthrequest=true
+          env:
+            # client-secret MUST equal the Keycloak `vuln-scanner` client's secret (key
+            # vuln-scanner-client-secret in platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml; see
+            # README.md, Operator action required). Secrets by name only (R-IDP-04).
+            - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef: { name: vuln-scanner-oauth2-proxy, key: client-id }
+            - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef: { name: vuln-scanner-oauth2-proxy, key: client-secret }
+            - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_SECRET
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef: { name: vuln-scanner-oauth2-proxy, key: cookie-secret }
+          ports:
+            - { name: http, containerPort: 4180, protocol: TCP }
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 25m
+              memory: 64Mi
+            limits:
+              cpu: 200m
+              memory: 128Mi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /ping
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 5
+            periodSeconds: 15
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /ping
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 5
+            periodSeconds: 15
+      volumes:
+        - name: src
+          configMap:
+            name: vuln-scanner-src
+        - name: acceptances
+          configMap:
+            name: vuln-scanner-acceptances
+        - name: tools
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 512Mi
+        - name: data
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: vuln-scanner-data
+        # Trivy DB + per-image scan cache + TMPDIR (trivy extracts layers here). Size-limited; never
+        # on a replicated volume or in etcd (docs/17 "Load"). A full run cleans it between images.
+        - name: cache
+          emptyDir:
+            sizeLimit: 10Gi

platform/vuln-scanner/httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+# The CVE page at cve.<domain>. Internal exposure only (docs/17 "Access"): a list of what is exploitable
+# where is sensitive, so this hostname publishes NO public DNS record (the `controller: none` annotation
+# below disowns it from external-dns) and the Cloudflare Tunnel 404s it (platform/cloudflared/config.yaml).
+# It resolves on the LAN through PiHole's explicit list (catalog/pihole.yaml).
+#
+# The backend is the `vuln-scanner` Service's `http` port, which fronts the oauth2-proxy sidecar, so the
+# SSO gate is in the data path; nothing routes to the page (:8080) directly.
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+  annotations:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: oauth2-proxy
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: platform-admins
+    external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: "none"
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: shared
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+    - cve.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+  rules:
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: vuln-scanner
+          port: 4180

platform/vuln-scanner/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+# The CVE visibility scanner (docs/17, ADR-0027). Reconciled by its OWN non-gating Flux Kustomization
+# (clusters/base/vuln-scanner.yaml: dependsOn platform-config, wait:false). A scanner that is failing,
+# or a pod that cannot get its report store, is a thing to alert on, never a thing that stalls the
+# platform. NOT a line in platform/kustomization.yaml.
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+# Required for the configMapGenerator (see platform/cloudflared/kustomization.yaml).
+namespace: vuln-scanner
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml
+  - rbac.yaml
+  - pvc.yaml
+  # The per-pod oauth2-proxy credential. SOPS-encrypted, decrypted per-env by the vuln-scanner
+  # Kustomization (both overlays patch it). Referenced by name only (R-IDP-04). Its template sibling
+  # is deliberately not named here (no-plaintext-secrets).
+  - vuln-scanner-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - service.yaml
+  # Namespace default-deny, the three ingress paths and the egress allowances. One file, so a baseline
+  # without its allows cannot ship alone and empty the TSDB.
+  - networkpolicy.yaml
+  - httproute.yaml
+  - servicemonitor.yaml
+  - alerts.yaml
+
+# Scanner source and the risk-acceptance file, both as content-hashed ConfigMaps, so a change rolls
+# the pod. No `disableNameSuffixHash`: the hash is the rollout mechanism.
+configMapGenerator:
+  - name: vuln-scanner-src
+    files:
+      - src/main.py
+      - src/inventory.py
+      - src/trivy.py
+      - src/state.py
+      - src/report.py
+      - src/acceptances.py
+      - src/page.py
+      - src/metrics.py
+      - src/server.py
+      - src/report.schema.json
+    options:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+  - name: vuln-scanner-acceptances
+    files:
+      - acceptances.yaml
+    options:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner

platform/vuln-scanner/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+# vuln-scanner — the CVE visibility scanner (R-VULN-01..09, ADR-0027, docs/17). Hand-authored platform
+# delivery tooling, not a catalog service: its cluster-wide read identity is something a
+# ServiceDefinition cannot express.
+#
+# gateway-access=shared opts this namespace in to attach the cve.<domain> HTTPRoute to the shared
+# Gateway; the route targets the per-pod oauth2-proxy sidecar (:4180), never the page directly.
+#
+# INTENTIONALLY NOT homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace=true (the crafty/cloudflared/pm-agent
+# posture): every Kyverno app policy matches on that label, and the generated default-deny would then
+# be double-owned with the one this tree ships (networkpolicy.yaml), the 2026-09-30 drift loop. The
+# pod still carries the egress-class and auth-mode labels those policies would require.
+#
+# PodSecurity `restricted` IS enforced: nothing here needs any privilege.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+    gateway-access: "shared"
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: latest

platform/vuln-scanner/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+---
+# Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01): deny all ingress and egress, allow only DNS. A platform namespace,
+# so Kyverno does not generate this and Flux is its only writer (namespace.yaml).
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
+spec:
+  podSelector: {}
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    - Egress
+  ingress: []
+  egress:
+    - to:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+      ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+---
+# INGRESS — exactly three paths (docs/17 "Security of the scanner itself"), one client each:
+#   :4180 from the shared Gateway only (the oauth2-proxy sidecar). The page itself (:8080, loopback)
+#         has no Service port and no rule.
+#   :8081 from the CI runner only. Job containers run inside the DinD sidecar of the act-runner pod in
+#         namespace gitea-actions, so what the network sees is THAT pod's identity (verified live
+#         2026-11-09: pods carry app.kubernetes.io/name=act-runner). No wider than the runner pods.
+#   :9090 from Prometheus only (verified live: app.kubernetes.io/name=prometheus in monitoring).
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-allow-ingress
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+  ingress:
+    - fromEntities:
+        - ingress
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - { port: "4180", protocol: TCP }
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: gitea-actions
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: act-runner
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - { port: "8081", protocol: TCP }
+    - fromEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: monitoring
+            app.kubernetes.io/name: prometheus
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - { port: "9090", protocol: TCP }
+---
+# EGRESS (DNS is in the baseline above).
+#   * kube-apiserver: the inventory.
+#   * tcp/443 to the public internet for the vulnerability database and registries, OUT THE DIRECT
+#     PATH (egress-class=internet, deployment.yaml; never the VPN gateway). Written as a CIDR rule
+#     rather than `toEntities: world` because the spec excludes cluster and LAN ranges and `world`
+#     includes every LAN address: RFC1918 + CGNAT + loopback + link-local + multicast are subtracted.
+#     Consequence, recorded rather than worked around: the Gitea registry resolves to the LAN VIP, so
+#     images hosted there are unreachable from here and report `failed` with that reason, until a
+#     registry credential and a narrower LAN rule are decided (docs/17, "Private registry coverage").
+#   * The two Keycloak rules below are the ONE addition beyond the spec's list, and they are required:
+#     the oauth2-proxy sidecar shares this pod's network identity with the scanner, and it must
+#     reach Keycloak for OIDC discovery and the token exchange. keycloak.<domain> resolves in-cluster
+#     to the Gateway VIP (split-horizon CoreDNS), which Cilium hands to the Gateway's Envoy
+#     (reserved:ingress, tcp/443), and Envoy then re-evaluates THIS pod's egress against Keycloak's
+#     real backend identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb), the same pair catalog/render.py gives every SSO
+#     app (buildkit/networkpolicy.yaml has the measurement). Without them login 403s.
+#   * NOT listed: anything else in-cluster, any node entity, the LAN, the VPN.
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-allow-egress
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+  egress:
+    - toEntities:
+        - kube-apiserver
+    - toCIDRSet:
+        - cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
+          except:
+            - 10.0.0.0/8
+            - 100.64.0.0/10
+            - 127.0.0.0/8
+            - 169.254.0.0/16
+            - 172.16.0.0/12
+            - 192.168.0.0/16
+            - 224.0.0.0/4
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - { port: "443", protocol: TCP }
+    - toEntities:
+        - ingress
+      toPorts:
+        - ports:
+            - { port: "443", protocol: TCP }
+    - toEndpoints:
+        - matchLabels:
+            io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: keycloak
+            app: keycloak

platform/vuln-scanner/pvc.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+# The report store: state.json (firstSeenAt, failed-since, heartbeat, last complete run) and
+# report.json. 1Gi on the replicated tier is generous for two JSON files; it is DELIBERATELY NOT where
+# the vulnerability database or the per-image scan caches live, because etcd and Longhorn share a
+# partition on every node (docs/02, docs/17 "Load"). Those are on the size-limited /cache emptyDir.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-data
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: longhorn
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 1Gi

platform/vuln-scanner/rbac.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+# Scanner identity (R-VULN-09). The whole of its Kubernetes reach is get/list/watch on the objects it
+# needs to answer "what is running, and which workload owns it". NO Secret, NO write verb, no
+# wildcard. conformance/tests/l0-static/vuln-scanner-supply-chain fails the gate if that changes.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-read
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+rules:
+  # Running images, their digests, and the nodes a pod sits on (nodes are inventoried as not-covered).
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [pods, nodes]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  # The owner chain Pod -> ReplicaSet -> Deployment, and the other two top-level controllers.
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources: [replicasets, deployments, statefulsets, daemonsets]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  # Pod -> Job -> CronJob, and CronJob templates with no running pod.
+  - apiGroups: [batch]
+    resources: [jobs, cronjobs]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  # KubeVirt VMs are inventoried as not-covered.
+  - apiGroups: [kubevirt.io]
+    resources: [virtualmachineinstances]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner-read
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: vuln-scanner-read
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: vuln-scanner
+    namespace: vuln-scanner

platform/vuln-scanner/service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+# One Service, three named ports (the page gate, the internal API and metrics).
+#
+# clusterIP IS PINNED ON PURPOSE (10.43.210.10, verified unused against the live Service list on
+# 2026-11-09, inside k3s' default 10.43.0.0/16 Service CIDR). The triage bot runs as a Gitea Actions
+# job inside the runner's DinD daemon, and whether in-cluster DNS resolves from a DinD job container
+# is UNVERIFIED. The pinned address is the bot's fallback when the Service name does not resolve:
+# `http://10.43.210.10:8081` (VULN_API_FALLBACK_URL in .gitea/workflows/cve-triage.yaml).
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  clusterIP: 10.43.210.10
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 4180
+      targetPort: http
+      protocol: TCP
+    - name: internal
+      port: 8081
+      targetPort: internal
+      protocol: TCP
+    - name: metrics
+      port: 9090
+      targetPort: metrics
+      protocol: TCP

platform/vuln-scanner/servicemonitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+# Prometheus scrape of the aggregate-only /metrics (:9090). Only the `metrics` port of the shared
+# Service; networkpolicy.yaml admits only Prometheus on it. kube-prometheus-stack selects
+# ServiceMonitors from any namespace; the `release` label is kept for consistency.
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: ServiceMonitor
+metadata:
+  name: vuln-scanner
+  namespace: vuln-scanner
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+spec:
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: vuln-scanner
+  endpoints:
+    - port: metrics
+      path: /metrics
+      interval: 60s