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c150327a30 |
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@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
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---
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date: 2026-10-17
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branch: fix/oauth2-proxy-oidc-startup-race
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title: "oauth2-proxy dies on a cold start because OIDC discovery runs once, before Keycloak serves"
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---
|
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|
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## What changed
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||||
|
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Exposed by the 2026-10-17 whole-cluster shutdown for the UPS move. oauth2-proxy performs OIDC
|
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discovery **once, at startup**, and `os.Exit(1)`s if it fails. On a cold boot Keycloak is not
|
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serving yet, so the shared Gateway answers 503 and the proxy dies:
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```
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[provider.go:55] Performing OIDC Discovery...
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[main.go:73] ERROR: Failed to initialise OAuth2 Proxy: error initialising provider: ...
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failed to discover OIDC configuration: unexpected status "503": no healthy upstream
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```
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|
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It then sits in **exponential CrashLoopBackOff long after Keycloak is healthy** — one of the two
|
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replicas was still down minutes later and only a manual `kubectl delete pod` cleared it. There is no
|
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retry flag; the process does not survive a cold start. A readinessProbe cannot help (the container
|
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is already dead), and CrashLoopBackOff backoff is not tunable per-pod.
|
||||
|
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`platform/oauth2-proxy/helmrelease.yaml` gains an `extraInitContainers` gate (`wait-for-idp`) that
|
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polls Keycloak's discovery doc until it answers, then lets the proxy start. A pod in `Init` does not
|
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accrue CrashLoopBackOff backoff and retries promptly, which is the point.
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|
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**Bounded, and fails open.** After ~5 minutes it gives up and starts the proxy anyway, so the worst
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case is exactly today's behaviour and never something new. An unbounded wait would trade a CrashLoop
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for a pod wedged in `Init` forever, which is not an improvement.
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|
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## Why this shape and not the alternatives
|
||||
|
||||
* **`extraInitContainers` is the chart's own documented hook for precisely this.** Its commented
|
||||
example in `values.yaml` is literally `- name: wait-for-idp`. The key was **confirmed against the
|
||||
pinned chart** (`helm show values oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy --version 10.7.1` → `extraInitContainers: []`
|
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at line 428), not assumed — a wrong Helm values key is silently ignored, which is the
|
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"reviewed, merged, apparently done, still broken" shape this repo keeps getting bitten by.
|
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* **No new base image.** The chart already runs an `alpine` init container for its built-in
|
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`initContainers.waitForRedis` gate, so alpine is a base this chart uses regardless. Pinned to
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`3.22` (verified to exist upstream) rather than the chart's own `latest`.
|
||||
* **Flux `postRenderers` rejected:** it would work independently of the chart schema, but nothing in
|
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this tree uses postRenderers, so it would introduce a mechanism with no precedent for a problem
|
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the chart already has a hook for.
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* **`--skip-oidc-discovery` rejected:** it removes the startup fetch entirely, which is arguably
|
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more elegant, but it means hardcoding four Keycloak endpoints and I could not verify offline that
|
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oauth2-proxy then fetches JWKS lazily rather than at startup. oauth2-proxy gates SSO for PiHole,
|
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the \*arr apps, qBittorrent, Homepage, Prometheus, Alertmanager and Hubble — a wrong guess locks
|
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the operator out of all of them, so the reversible, additive option wins.
|
||||
|
||||
The `$$`-free convention matters here: shell variables are written bare (`$i`, `$url`, `$(( ))`)
|
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with **no braced form anywhere**, because `platform` declares `postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars`
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and envsubst consumes braced expansions — a braced shell variable renders to the empty string and
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silently breaks the loop. `${BASE_DOMAIN}` is braced on purpose. Same hazard and same convention as
|
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the gitea and nextcloud OIDC bootstrap hooks, and `ci: flux-postbuild-substitution` enforces it.
|
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|
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## What I verified
|
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|
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* **The failure is measured, not theorised.** The log above is from the live pod
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(`oauth2-proxy-5d6c74876b-bzb2p`, `lastState.terminated: {reason: Error, exitCode: 1}`), captured
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with `--previous` after the cold boot. The surviving replica's log shows the same startup
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succeeding once Keycloak was up, which is what identifies this as a race rather than a config
|
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fault.
|
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* **Deleting the pod is a sufficient workaround** — done on prod 2026-10-17, the replacement came up
|
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clean and both replicas have been healthy since.
|
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* **The chart key is real**, at the pinned version range: `helm search repo` resolves
|
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`>=10.0.0 <11.0.0` to chart `10.7.1` (app `7.15.5`), whose values carry `extraInitContainers: []`,
|
||||
`extraContainers: []` and the built-in `initContainers.waitForRedis` (which uses `alpine`).
|
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* **`docker.io/library/alpine:3.22` exists** — confirmed against the registry tag list rather than
|
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assumed from memory.
|
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* The edited HelmRelease parses as YAML.
|
||||
|
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## What I did NOT verify
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||||
|
||||
* **UNAPPLIED. The init container has never run.** I did not reconcile the HelmRelease, so I have not
|
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seen `wait-for-idp` execute, exit 0, or gate the proxy. Applying it rolls both oauth2-proxy
|
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replicas, which is a mutating action (CLAUDE.md §5) — and it rolls the component that gates SSO for
|
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seven apps, so **do it when you can watch it**, not unattended.
|
||||
* **I did not re-create the cold-start race to prove the fix.** That needs Keycloak down while
|
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oauth2-proxy starts; the honest test is the next whole-cluster boot. Until then this is reasoned
|
||||
from the measured failure, not demonstrated against it.
|
||||
* **busybox `wget`'s TLS behaviour here is assumed, not tested.** The claim is that alpine's
|
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`ca-certificates-bundle` lets it validate the Gateway's LE-prod certificate, so a genuine TLS
|
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failure exits non-zero rather than passing falsely. If that is wrong in either direction the gate
|
||||
degrades safely — a never-succeeding probe just burns the 5-minute budget and then starts the proxy
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anyway — but the fast path would be silently dead and this would be doing nothing. **Check the
|
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init container's log on first apply**: it should print "Keycloak discovery reachable" within
|
||||
seconds on a warm cluster, not the give-up message.
|
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* **Whether a pod can reach the Gateway hostname at all from this namespace is inherited, not
|
||||
re-proven.** The main container does exactly this fetch today and succeeds, so the path is known
|
||||
good — but note the standing trap that an arbitrary pod gets 403 from every Gateway hostname
|
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(`decisions/2026-10-04-plex-advertise-plexdirect.md`); oauth2-proxy is exempt only because
|
||||
Keycloak's ingress policy admits it. An init container in the same pod inherits that identity, so
|
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this should hold — unverified.
|
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* **60 attempts x 5s is not tuned.** It is "comfortably longer than Keycloak's observed cold start",
|
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not a measured bound.
|
||||
* **No runtime conformance.** `vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset, so CI proves the L0/L1 offline
|
||||
subset only.
|
||||
* I did not re-measure branch protection or runner state (CLAUDE.md §2b).
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@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
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---
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||||
date: 2026-10-18
|
||||
branch: fix/coredns-ha
|
||||
title: "coredns ran at one replica, so any node drain was a cluster-wide DNS outage"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## What changed
|
||||
|
||||
**MEASURED on prod 2026-10-18: `kube-system/coredns` had `replicas: 1`.** In-cluster DNS was a
|
||||
single pod on a single node, so draining or rebooting that node was a **cluster-wide in-cluster DNS
|
||||
outage** until the pod rescheduled and became ready — every Service lookup, every CNPG replica
|
||||
finding its primary, every operator addressing the API by name. It was invisible because `1/1
|
||||
Ready` looks perfectly healthy.
|
||||
|
||||
It also became urgent rather than latent: the scheduled reboot automation on
|
||||
`feat/automated-upgrades` drains and reboots one node at a time, unattended, overnight — turning a
|
||||
single point of failure into a recurring one.
|
||||
|
||||
New `platform/coredns/hpa.yaml`: a `HorizontalPodAutoscaler` on the coredns Deployment with
|
||||
`minReplicas: 2`, `maxReplicas: 3`, registered in the existing `platform/coredns/kustomization.yaml`
|
||||
alongside the split-horizon ConfigMap already there.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why an HPA and not `replicas: 2` — this is the whole decision.** k3s owns the coredns Deployment
|
||||
and we cannot durably edit it: it is applied by k3s's own deploy controller from a bundled manifest
|
||||
(`AddOn/coredns`, source `/data/k3s/server/manifests/coredns.yaml`, `managedFields` managers
|
||||
`deploy@k3s-prod-1` and `k3s`, plus an `objectset.rio.cattle.io/hash` label). k3s re-stages its
|
||||
bundled manifests on startup, so a `replicas: 2` written there — or a `kubectl scale` — is reverted
|
||||
on the next k3s restart or upgrade. Two alternatives were weighed and rejected:
|
||||
|
||||
* **`coredns.yaml.skip` + our own templated copy** (the pattern `roles/kube_vip` already uses for a
|
||||
file in `server/manifests`). Deterministic and never flaps, but it takes ownership of coredns away
|
||||
from k3s permanently — k3s upgrades would stop updating it and the version would need refreshing
|
||||
by hand forever. Too high a price for a replica count.
|
||||
* **A Flux-managed patch of the Deployment.** Rejected outright: Flux and k3s's deploy controller
|
||||
would both own one object and fight continuously — the exact shape of the `default-deny`
|
||||
NetworkPolicy drift loop this cluster already suffered (~2500 events/10min).
|
||||
|
||||
An HPA avoids both: a separate object k3s does not own, driving the `/scale` subresource rather than
|
||||
the Deployment spec, so there is no shared-ownership fight. If k3s re-stages `replicas: 1`, the HPA
|
||||
sees it below `minReplicas` and scales back within one reconcile.
|
||||
|
||||
It is a **floor-holder, not an autoscaler**: the CPU metric exists only because an `autoscaling/v2`
|
||||
HPA needs one to be valid. `scaleDown.stabilizationWindowSeconds: 600` because DNS is the worst
|
||||
thing in the cluster to flap; `scaleUp` is immediate, since that is the path that restores redundancy
|
||||
after a k3s restart.
|
||||
|
||||
**Immediate action taken outside this PR:** `kubectl -n kube-system scale deploy coredns
|
||||
--replicas=2` was run at the operator's explicit request, so the cluster has two replicas **now**
|
||||
rather than after merge. That hand scale is what this PR makes durable.
|
||||
|
||||
## What I verified
|
||||
|
||||
* **The defect:** `kubectl -n kube-system get deploy coredns` → `replicas=1 available=1`.
|
||||
* **k3s ownership:** the `AddOn/coredns` object exists with source
|
||||
`/data/k3s/server/manifests/coredns.yaml`; the Deployment has no `ownerReferences` but carries
|
||||
`objectset.rio.cattle.io/hash` and `managedFields` managers `deploy@k3s-prod-1` / `k3s`. So it is
|
||||
k3s-managed, not Flux-managed — independently corroborated by another agent, which confirmed
|
||||
`platform/coredns/` contains **only** the `coredns-custom` ConfigMap and does not touch the
|
||||
Deployment or its replica count.
|
||||
* **The hand scale works and holds:** coredns went to `2/2 Running` on two different nodes, and
|
||||
in-cluster DNS kept answering throughout (`nslookup kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
|
||||
10.43.0.10` → `10.43.0.1`). Still `spec.replicas=2 ready=2` after ~2 minutes, with the AddOn
|
||||
checksum **unchanged** — so k3s's deploy controller does not revert on a drift timer; it
|
||||
re-applies on manifest change and on restart.
|
||||
* **The HPA's preconditions hold:** coredns ships `requests: {cpu: 100m, memory: 70Mi}` (so a
|
||||
Resource/Utilization metric is meaningful), and metrics-server is installed as a k3s addon and
|
||||
verified serving — `kubectl top pod -l k8s-app=kube-dns` returns **5m and 4m** against that 100m
|
||||
request, i.e. ~5% utilisation, confirming the 80% target will never be approached and the HPA will
|
||||
sit at `minReplicas`.
|
||||
* **The kustomization edit is additive:** `git diff --stat` is `1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)`,
|
||||
and `- coredns` was already registered in `platform/kustomization.yaml`, so no change was needed
|
||||
there.
|
||||
* All three touched/added YAML files parse.
|
||||
|
||||
## What I did NOT verify
|
||||
|
||||
* **The HPA has never been applied.** I did not reconcile it, so I have **not** observed it create,
|
||||
reach `ScalingActive=True`, resolve its metric against real coredns data, or hold `minReplicas`.
|
||||
Applying is an operator action (CLAUDE.md §5). The failure mode to watch for is
|
||||
`ScalingActive=False` with `FailedGetResourceMetric` — the HPA would then be present and inert,
|
||||
which looks identical to working because the hand scale already left 2 replicas in place. **Check
|
||||
`kubectl -n kube-system describe hpa coredns` after merge**, not just the replica count.
|
||||
* **The central claim that k3s reverts `replicas` on restart is REASONED, NOT OBSERVED.** It rests
|
||||
on k3s re-staging bundled manifests at startup plus the measured ownership evidence above. I did
|
||||
**not** restart k3s to watch the revert happen — doing so is a rolling control-plane restart, an
|
||||
operator action. If k3s in fact preserves a modified replica count, this HPA is unnecessary
|
||||
(though harmless).
|
||||
* **I did not confirm the HPA wins the race against k3s's deploy controller after a restart.** Both
|
||||
write the scale; the expectation is the HPA re-asserts within a reconcile, leaving a brief window
|
||||
at 1 replica. Neither the window's length nor the outcome has been measured.
|
||||
* **I nearly shipped a destructive change.** My first write of
|
||||
`platform/coredns/kustomization.yaml` replaced the file wholesale, listing only `hpa.yaml` — which
|
||||
would have pruned the existing `coredns-custom` ConfigMap and **broken in-cluster split-horizon
|
||||
DNS (R-DNS-01/03)**. It was caught by a guard assertion before commit and restored from `HEAD`, and
|
||||
the diff is now additive. Recorded because the near-miss is the useful part: `platform/coredns/`
|
||||
already existed and I assumed it did not. **No conformance check would obviously have caught the
|
||||
removal** — it is valid YAML and a legitimate-looking prune.
|
||||
* **Whether 2 is enough.** Three nodes, and coredns' anti-affinity only *prefers* spreading, so both
|
||||
replicas could in principle land on one node and a single drain would still take DNS down. I did
|
||||
not add a `topologySpreadConstraint` or a PodDisruptionBudget — both arguably belong here and
|
||||
neither is in this change.
|
||||
* **No alert fires if coredns drops to 1 replica**, so a future silent regression (k3s upgrade
|
||||
changing the manifest, the HPA going inert) would not be reported. That gap is not closed here.
|
||||
* **No conformance test asserts this**, so a future edit could remove the HPA with no gate stage
|
||||
noticing.
|
||||
* **No runtime conformance.** `vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset, so CI proves the L0/L1 offline
|
||||
subset only.
|
||||
* I did not re-measure branch protection or runner state (CLAUDE.md §2b).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# =================================================================================================
|
||||
# coredns HA floor — hold in-cluster DNS at >= 2 replicas, which k3s does not.
|
||||
# =================================================================================================
|
||||
# MEASURED on prod 2026-10-18: `kube-system/coredns` ran with **replicas: 1**. In-cluster DNS is a
|
||||
# single pod on a single node, so **draining or rebooting that one node is a cluster-wide
|
||||
# in-cluster DNS outage** for as long as the pod takes to reschedule and become ready — every pod
|
||||
# that looks up a Service, every CNPG replica finding its primary, every operator talking to the
|
||||
# API by name. It is the single cheapest availability defect in the cluster, and it was invisible
|
||||
# because `1/1 Ready` looks perfectly healthy.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This matters more now than it did: the reboot automation (kured + unattended-upgrades) drains and
|
||||
# reboots one node at a time on a schedule, which turns a latent single point of failure into a
|
||||
# recurring one, unattended, in the middle of the night.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# WHY AN HPA, AND NOT JUST `replicas: 2` — this is the whole decision
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# **k3s owns the coredns Deployment and we cannot durably edit it.** It is applied by k3s's own
|
||||
# deploy controller from a bundled manifest, not by Flux:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# $ kubectl -n kube-system get addon coredns
|
||||
# NAME SOURCE CHECKSUM
|
||||
# coredns /data/k3s/server/manifests/coredns.yaml 8cd91595...
|
||||
# $ kubectl -n kube-system get deploy coredns -o jsonpath='{.metadata.managedFields[*].manager}'
|
||||
# deploy@k3s-prod-1 k3s
|
||||
#
|
||||
# and the Deployment carries an `objectset.rio.cattle.io/hash` label — a wrangler objectset. k3s
|
||||
# RE-STAGES its bundled manifests on startup, so a `replicas: 2` written into that file (or a
|
||||
# `kubectl scale`) is reverted the next time k3s restarts or is upgraded. MEASURED the same day: a
|
||||
# hand `kubectl scale` to 2 was NOT actively reverted (it held, and the AddOn checksum did not
|
||||
# change) — the deploy controller re-applies on manifest change and on restart, not on a drift
|
||||
# timer. So the hand fix survives until exactly the event we are protecting against: a reboot.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The two durable alternatives were weighed and rejected:
|
||||
# * **`coredns.yaml.skip` + our own templated copy** (the pattern roles/kube_vip already uses for
|
||||
# a manifest in server/manifests). Fully deterministic and never flaps — but it takes OWNERSHIP
|
||||
# of coredns away from k3s permanently, so k3s upgrades would stop updating it and the version
|
||||
# would have to be refreshed by hand forever. Too high a price for a replica count.
|
||||
# * **A Flux-managed patch of the Deployment itself.** Rejected outright: Flux and k3s's deploy
|
||||
# controller would both own one object and fight continuously. That is the shape of the
|
||||
# `default-deny` NetworkPolicy drift loop this cluster already suffered (Kyverno generate + Flux
|
||||
# both owning one resource, ~2500 events per 10 minutes).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# An HPA avoids both. It is a SEPARATE object that k3s does not own and will never reconcile away,
|
||||
# and it drives the Deployment's `/scale` subresource rather than its spec — so there is no
|
||||
# shared-ownership fight. If k3s re-stages `replicas: 1`, the HPA observes it under `minReplicas`
|
||||
# and scales back to 2 within one reconcile (~15s by default).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# THE COST, STATED PLAINLY: there is a brief window — seconds, after a k3s restart — where coredns
|
||||
# is back at 1 replica until the HPA notices. That is strictly better than the status quo, where it
|
||||
# is at 1 replica permanently, but it is not zero. Accepting that window is the trade being made
|
||||
# here; the `.skip` option above is what to reach for if it ever proves unacceptable.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# THIS IS A FLOOR-HOLDER, NOT A REAL AUTOSCALER
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# `minReplicas: 2` is the entire point. The CPU metric exists because an autoscaling/v2 HPA needs a
|
||||
# metric to be a valid object, not because coredns is expected to scale on load: measured via
|
||||
# metrics-server, the two pods use **5m and 4m** against a **100m** request — ~5% utilisation, so
|
||||
# the 80% target will never be approached and the HPA will sit at `minReplicas` indefinitely.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CPU request is what makes this legal: coredns ships `requests: {cpu: 100m, memory: 70Mi}`
|
||||
# (measured), and a Resource/Utilization metric is meaningless without a request. metrics-server is
|
||||
# installed as a k3s addon and verified serving (`kubectl top pod -l k8s-app=kube-dns` returns
|
||||
# figures), so the metric resolves rather than leaving the HPA with `ScalingActive=False`.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# `maxReplicas: 3` = the node count. coredns' pod anti-affinity prefers one pod per node, so a
|
||||
# fourth replica would add no failure-domain coverage; the ceiling exists so a metrics glitch can
|
||||
# never balloon DNS pods across the cluster.
|
||||
apiVersion: autoscaling/v2
|
||||
kind: HorizontalPodAutoscaler
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: coredns
|
||||
# kube-system, because that is where k3s puts coredns. This is the only object this component
|
||||
# places outside a namespace it owns, and it is additive: it creates nothing in kube-system and
|
||||
# mutates only the coredns Deployment's scale subresource.
|
||||
namespace: kube-system
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
app.kubernetes.io/name: coredns
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
scaleTargetRef:
|
||||
apiVersion: apps/v1
|
||||
kind: Deployment
|
||||
name: coredns
|
||||
minReplicas: 2
|
||||
maxReplicas: 3
|
||||
metrics:
|
||||
- type: Resource
|
||||
resource:
|
||||
name: cpu
|
||||
target:
|
||||
type: Utilization
|
||||
# Deliberately high. See "floor-holder" above: this must not scale on normal DNS load.
|
||||
averageUtilization: 80
|
||||
behavior:
|
||||
scaleDown:
|
||||
# 10 minutes. DNS is the worst thing in the cluster to flap: a scale-down races in-flight
|
||||
# queries and every client's negative cache. The HPA should be reluctant in this direction.
|
||||
stabilizationWindowSeconds: 600
|
||||
policies:
|
||||
- type: Pods
|
||||
value: 1
|
||||
periodSeconds: 600
|
||||
scaleUp:
|
||||
# Prompt in the direction that restores redundancy — this is the path taken after a k3s
|
||||
# restart has re-staged `replicas: 1`.
|
||||
stabilizationWindowSeconds: 0
|
||||
policies:
|
||||
- type: Pods
|
||||
value: 2
|
||||
periodSeconds: 60
|
||||
@@ -7,3 +7,7 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
|
||||
kind: Kustomization
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
- coredns-custom.yaml
|
||||
# HA floor for the coredns Deployment itself — a separate concern from the split-horizon server
|
||||
# block above, and deliberately an HPA rather than a replica edit: k3s owns that Deployment via
|
||||
# its own deploy controller and re-stages `replicas: 1` on restart. hpa.yaml has the reasoning.
|
||||
- hpa.yaml
|
||||
@@ -63,6 +63,75 @@ spec:
|
||||
# gets oauth2-proxy's HTML sign-in page (HTTP 403) instead of an immediate redirect (docs/15 UX).
|
||||
skip-provider-button: "true"
|
||||
scope: "openid email profile"
|
||||
# ── Cold-start gate: do not start the proxy until Keycloak's discovery doc answers ──────────
|
||||
# MEASURED on prod 2026-10-17, during the UPS move: oauth2-proxy performs OIDC discovery ONCE at
|
||||
# startup and EXITS 1 if it fails. On a whole-cluster cold boot Keycloak is not serving yet, so
|
||||
# the Gateway answers 503 and the proxy dies:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [provider.go:55] Performing OIDC Discovery...
|
||||
# [main.go:73] ERROR: Failed to initialise OAuth2 Proxy: ... failed to discover OIDC
|
||||
# configuration: unexpected status "503": no healthy upstream
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It then sits in exponential CrashLoopBackOff long after Keycloak is healthy -- one replica was
|
||||
# still down minutes later and only a manual pod delete cleared it. There is no retry flag; the
|
||||
# process simply does not survive a cold start. A readinessProbe cannot help (the container is
|
||||
# already dead), and CrashLoopBackOff backoff is not tunable per-pod.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# `extraInitContainers` is the chart's OWN documented hook for this -- its commented example in
|
||||
# values.yaml is literally `- name: wait-for-idp` -- and the chart already uses an alpine init
|
||||
# container for its built-in waitForRedis gate, so this adds no new base image to the platform.
|
||||
# A pod in Init does not accrue CrashLoopBackOff backoff and retries promptly, which is the whole
|
||||
# point.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# BOUNDED, AND FAILS OPEN. After ~5 minutes it gives up and starts the proxy anyway: the worst
|
||||
# case is then exactly today's behaviour, never something new. An unbounded wait would trade a
|
||||
# CrashLoop for a pod wedged in Init forever, which is not an improvement.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SHELL VARIABLES ARE WRITTEN BARE ($i, $url, $(( ))), WITH NO BRACED FORM ANYWHERE. This file is
|
||||
# rendered through Flux envsubst (platform declares postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars), which
|
||||
# CONSUMES braced expansions -- so a braced shell variable renders to the empty string and
|
||||
# silently breaks the loop. BASE_DOMAIN below is braced ON PURPOSE: it is a real cluster-vars
|
||||
# knob and must be substituted. Same hazard, and the same convention, as the gitea and nextcloud
|
||||
# OIDC bootstrap hooks. (ci: flux-postbuild-substitution enforces it.)
|
||||
extraInitContainers:
|
||||
- name: wait-for-idp
|
||||
image: docker.io/library/alpine:3.22
|
||||
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
|
||||
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
|
||||
args:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -u
|
||||
url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration
|
||||
i=0
|
||||
while [ "$i" -lt 60 ]; do
|
||||
# busybox wget validates against alpine's ca-certificates-bundle, so a real TLS
|
||||
# failure is a non-zero exit here rather than a false pass.
|
||||
if wget -q -O /dev/null --timeout=5 "$url" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "[wait-for-idp] Keycloak discovery reachable; starting oauth2-proxy"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
i=$(( i + 1 ))
|
||||
sleep 5
|
||||
done
|
||||
echo "[wait-for-idp] discovery still unreachable after ~5m; starting anyway so this" >&2
|
||||
echo "[wait-for-idp] gate can never be worse than the un-gated behaviour it replaces" >&2
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
securityContext:
|
||||
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
|
||||
runAsNonRoot: true
|
||||
runAsUser: 65534
|
||||
runAsGroup: 65534
|
||||
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
|
||||
capabilities:
|
||||
drop:
|
||||
- ALL
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
requests:
|
||||
cpu: 10m
|
||||
memory: 16Mi
|
||||
limits:
|
||||
memory: 32Mi
|
||||
|
||||
# Metrics for the ServiceMonitor (../oauth2-proxy servicemonitor in platform-config).
|
||||
metrics:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user