Added gitea action runner secret

No runner is registered at repo, org or site level, so gate.yml has never executed.
PR #1 sat pending for 30.6 minutes across 122 polls and never reported. Requiring the
gate as a status check in that state would lock the repo permanently.

Adds runner-token-rotate.sh: mints a fresh instance-level registration token from the
Gitea API and writes it into the SOPS secret via sops set, without ever printing the
value.

Records the likely root cause, which a new token alone does NOT fix. act_runner
registers once and persists its identity in /data/.runner on the act-runner-data PVC.
If Gitea no longer holds a matching runner row, the pod starts, sees .runner, SKIPS
registration entirely, and polls with an identity Gitea does not recognise. Symptom:
zero runners, pod running, nothing obviously broken. Clearing the PVC is what forces a
genuine re-registration.

The README now sequences runner-first, enforcement-second, and requires CONFIRMING the
runner reports online rather than assuming it. That assumption is the whole defect:
DECISIONS-LOG recorded the runner as online on 2026-08-31 and nobody checked since.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# CLAUDE.md — how work lands in this repo
+
+Read this before doing anything durable. It is the delivery contract for AI coding
+sessions and agents. `DECISIONS-LOG.md`'s last entry is the current PM handoff and
+takes precedence on *what* to work on; this file governs *how* it lands.
+
+## 1. Never push to `main`. Ever.
+
+Every durable change reaches `main` exactly one way:
+
+    branch  ->  push the branch  ->  open a PR  ->  CI gate green  ->  human approval  ->  merge
+
+There is no other path. Specifically:
+
+- **Do not `git push origin main`.**
+- **Do not `git push origin HEAD:main`.** Same thing wearing a hat.
+- **Do not merge your own PR.** A human approves and clicks merge.
+- **Do not `kubectl apply` / `edit` / `patch` a durable change.** Flux reconciles `main`;
+  anything applied by hand is drift that the next reconcile reverts or, worse, adopts.
+
+> **Many runbooks under `runbooks/` still say `git push origin main` IS the deploy.**
+> That wording is **stale** — it predates the PR flow. It describes what Flux does
+> (main is what the cluster follows), not what you are permitted to do. Honour this
+> file, not that line. Fixing those runbooks is tracked work.
+
+## 2. Enforcement is currently WEAKER than this rule. Follow the rule anyway.
+
+Verified against the live Gitea on 2026-09-29:
+
+| Expected | Actual |
+|---|---|
+| `main` protected, direct push rejected | **No branch protection.** `protected: false`, `user_can_push: true` |
+| PR blocked until the gate passes | **`enable_status_check: false`**, `status_check_contexts: []` |
+| Gate runs on every PR | **No Actions runner is registered** (repo, org and site level all report zero) |
+| Approval required before merge | **`required_approvals: 0`** |
+
+So nothing mechanically stops you from pushing to `main` right now. **That is a gap
+being closed, not permission.** `DECISIONS-LOG.md` (2026-08-31) claims the gate is a
+"required status check" with a runner online; that claim is not true of the live
+system, which is how this went unnoticed.
+
+**Consequence for you:** because CI cannot run, the **local toolbox gate is the only
+real gate**. Run it and quote its numbers in your report. Never describe a PR as
+"green" on the strength of CI that did not execute.
+
+## 3. Gate before you push
+
+    ./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c './ci/gate.sh'
+
+Exit codes are a contract — do not flatten them:
+
+| rc | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| 0 | PASS |
+| 1 | BLOCKED — something failed |
+| 3 | UNDETERMINED — a stage did not run. **Never report this as green.** |
+
+`spec-immutability` reaches rc 3 whenever the sibling spec repo is not checked out
+beside this one; that single skip is expected and tolerated. Any *other* skip is a
+real gap in your run.
+
+**Never gate on the host.** `promtool` and `kustomize` are not on the host `$PATH`,
+so checks SKIP and you get a false rc 3. Only the pinned toolbox result counts.
+
+### Running the gate from a git worktree
+
+Two unrelated failures, both with known workarounds — put both in any agent brief:
+
+1. **`dev.sh` refuses to start:** `infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig` is untracked
+   and exists only in the main checkout. Do **not** copy it (it is a credential).
+   Use `DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null` — the gate contacts no cluster, so L2/L3 scaffold-skip
+   normally.
+2. **Every `git` call inside the container fails:** a worktree's `.git` is a pointer to a
+   gitdir outside the mounted root. `dev.sh` takes no extra-mount flag, so inject one via
+   the `ENGINE` hook — a shim that intercepts `run` and re-execs
+   `podman run -v /path/to/main/.git:/path/to/main/.git:ro "$@"`. A traceback in
+   `tracked_files()` is this bug, not a broken tree.
+
+## 4. Branch naming
+
+Use `feat/`, `fix/`, `docs/`, `chore/`. Note that `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml`'s **push**
+trigger lists `feature/**` — not `feat/**` — so branch pushes get no fast-feedback run.
+The `pull_request` trigger fires regardless of branch name, so the PR gate is unaffected.
+
+## 5. Cluster access
+
+`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation; the toolchain lives only in the
+pinned container. Always name the context explicitly:
+
+    ./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
+
+`dev.sh` merges both clusters and picks a current-context **per invocation**; that
+default has already changed once. Never rely on it. Do not run two `dev.sh`
+invocations concurrently.
+
+**Mutating `kubectl` and `flux reconcile` are operator actions, not agent actions.**
+
+## 6. Secrets
+
+- **Never `sops -d` a file into a terminal, a log, or a transcript.**
+- **Never print a Secret's `.data`/`.stringData`** when checking whether it exists —
+  list key names or object names only. A password has been leaked into a transcript
+  this way before.
+- Encrypted files are `*.sops.yaml` or live under `secrets/`. The root `.sops.yaml` is
+  the single creation-rules file; do not add a second one in a subtree.
+- A short-lived credential (e.g. a plex.tv claim token, ~minutes) cannot survive the PR
+  flow. Do not design around committing one — read the expiry from the issuing page and
+  treat a burnt token as free to retry.
+
+## 7. Before you finish
+
+Append a handoff entry to `DECISIONS-LOG.md` describing what you changed, what you
+verified, and what you did **not** verify. State gaps plainly — an honest
+"UNVERIFIED" is worth more than an optimistic "green", and this repo has already been
+burned by the difference.

DECISIONS-LOG.md

@@ -4716,3 +4716,68 @@ asleep. `git worktree remove` preserves branches and their commits, so only that
 6. **Five `public` services have no working public path** — waiting on WAN forwarding, deliberately.
 7. Backlog cherry-picks: `feat/egress-gateway-staleness-alert`, two `rescued/*` fixes, two rendered
    manifests nothing applies (the keycloak one would stand up a conflicting instance).
+
+## 2026-09-29 — The CI/CD merge gate does not exist: no runner, no branch protection. **PM HANDOFF.**
+
+Went to land the plex claim wiring through the documented PR flow and discovered the flow has
+never run. **PR #1 is the first pull request this repository has ever had.** It is still queued.
+
+### What is actually true of the live Gitea (verified via API, 2026-09-29)
+
+| Claimed (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-31) | Measured |
+|---|---|
+| "required status check" on `main` | `branch_protections` returns `[]`. `protected: false`, `enable_status_check: false`, `status_check_contexts: []`, `required_approvals: 0`, `user_can_push: true` |
+| "runner `incluster-dind` online (ns gitea-actions)" | **Zero runners registered** at repo, org and site level |
+
+Both halves of that entry are false. Nothing enforces the gate, and the gate cannot run.
+PR #1's two contexts (`gate / gate`, `gate / conformance`) sat `pending` for 14+ minutes with
+nothing to execute them, and will sit there indefinitely.
+
+This is a **fail-open governance hole**, the same class as the two found on 2026-09-18 — and it
+was invisible precisely because the log asserted the opposite. Every "the gate is enforcing"
+statement since 2026-08-31 rested on an unverified claim.
+
+### Ordering trap — read before fixing
+
+**Do not enable required status checks until a runner is live.** Requiring
+`gate / gate (pull_request)` with no runner deadlocks every PR permanently, including the PR
+that would fix it. Sequence: runner first, verify the gate actually runs and passes on a real
+PR, *then* turn on enforcement with the context name CI actually reported.
+
+Related: `gate.yml`'s `conformance` job is `if: false` by design (honest skip, never fake green),
+but it still publishes a `gate / conformance (pull_request)` context. If that context is ever
+listed as required, it deadlocks every PR for the same reason. Wire it or exclude it.
+
+### Delivery contract written down
+
+Added `CLAUDE.md` at the repo root — the first agent-facing delivery doc here. It states the
+branch -> PR -> gate -> approval -> merge rule, records that enforcement is currently weaker than
+the rule (so agents follow the rule rather than what they can get away with), and carries the
+toolbox-gate invocation, the two git-worktree workarounds, the rc 0/1/3 contract, and the secret
+handling rules.
+
+It also flags that **37 of 39 runbooks still instruct `git push origin main`**. Those were
+accurate before the PR flow and are stale now. Correcting them is tracked, not done.
+
+### Also found, not fixed
+
+- `gate.yml`'s push trigger lists `feature/**`; this repo's branches use `feat/**`, so branch
+  pushes get no fast-feedback run. PR trigger is unaffected.
+- The gitea-actions runner is GitOps-managed (`apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml` +
+  `gitea-actions-runner-secret.sops.yaml`), so it is deployed but not registering — most likely a
+  stale registration token in that SOPS secret. Needs in-cluster diagnosis (operator).
+- **Plex is still unclaimed and it was never checked** whether it is already claimed. Do that
+  before spending a token — `runbooks/plex-claim.md` §First commands.
+- `runbooks/plex-claim.md` asserts a "~4-minute TTL" for a plex.tv claim token in four places,
+  **uncited**, and the whole stopwatch procedure is built on it. Upstream `pms-docker`'s README
+  says nothing about expiry. The number is plausible community folklore, not a measured fact.
+  The authoritative reading is the countdown rendered on plex.tv/claim at issue time.
+
+### Next steps
+
+1. **Operator:** diagnose the gitea-actions runner; get one registered.
+2. **Operator:** enable branch protection on `main` — push blocked, approvals required — and only
+   then add the gate as a required status check.
+3. Land `feat/plex-claim-sops-secret` (PR #1) once the gate can actually run.
+4. Claim plex, after checking it is not already claimed.
+5. Correct the 37 runbooks' `git push origin main` wording.

apps/wave-1/gitea-actions-runner-secret.sops.yaml

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ metadata:
         app.kubernetes.io/name: act-runner
 type: Opaque
 stringData:
-    token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:W48mEtBqGeukX13lMhrhrer+zB21cLVp0acy3m1Xy/oo89DqO8FX/Q==,iv:wfTUU7RiFLdEc1fmEFS9DfE2SmGCFLPK17m0IKspft0=,tag:UhoXA47p7386KHcYNbPzCg==,type:str]
+    token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:f574mAUkLvMGq0TYycwCd4tduMuBgQLiTg/140kuRDgFUYYm1ZoSjQ==,iv:Tn7gFWBLm2hHk/BbfVX7qIZegwZp9ah1cMou5i2O91E=,tag:TkdSiMI4sdCNn2JuN++Pig==,type:str]
 sops:
     kms: []
     gcp_kms: []
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ sops:
             MDZLUE52QzJXbFlrNWxOcVhJbDNnY00KxCpFkbhhCuk4Fa8CC3C4+R9AcsUnaXQR
             UjAfwKFoXAneXUih7TTXMbR/6+VgQBww5Bmwpn7jVLnzP0N0pIZVTA==
             -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
-    lastmodified: "2026-08-26T04:48:14Z"
-    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:b99/zkL332RIT3FYBa1sR3o9+pwlmrUgKvVHawbjWYSJZ7ERUfO+LXuhKJ0HKrp6i1JfkurZlRO27iBcfrBisAXS9KLaqmsCJf4kKfFc4skANrmKCzprrXUmZexr1uiE8eDUzjNCLNxSCZfnFR6d/AkMXJqi6Hsj9/O+wH2lWsc=,iv:3DIPszSdxK81ERO3o/nTs33qQYHaAKLNcGP4qlZViFc=,tag:/B6VKkzMUwh0byNUicS5wQ==,type:str]
+    lastmodified: "2026-09-29T05:48:35Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:nobqr794nrdRYFrd8Ct8bw9M8NtftJXawRGk9zrL+pTWahwlWrwXVtOAxMGEPVojz3WemsxTJESzmzy0gcT1QcrjpYTsF2MVHcr6+umk8q9gAh2enyxy/0QkYiSt6XjvRVqfqleLanEkeIq1FPf2zhSLSJaiw4/oZTfkCHD1/Zg=,iv:JxaP0htmGcvE4ZU1YAmGF4A6JkejV29NNygyMl1OKF8=,tag:G70NvcPyVuagXhugWoUfTw==,type:str]
     pgp: []
     encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
     version: 3.9.4

infra/gitea/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# infra/gitea — platform settings that are NOT GitOps-managed
+
+Gitea's own repo settings (branch protection, required status checks, approvals) live
+in Gitea's database, not in a manifest Flux reconciles. They are therefore **drift-prone
+and invisible to the gate** — exactly how the state below went unnoticed.
+
+## The gap this closes
+
+Verified against the live API on 2026-09-29, against a `DECISIONS-LOG.md` entry
+(2026-08-31) asserting the opposite:
+
+| Claimed | Measured |
+|---|---|
+| `main` is a protected branch, gate is a required status check | `branch_protections` → `[]`; `protected:false`, `enable_status_check:false`, `required_approvals:0`, `user_can_push:true` |
+| Runner `incluster-dind` online | **zero** runners registered at repo, org and site level |
+
+So `main` accepted direct pushes, and the gate could not run at all. `CLAUDE.md` is the
+rule; this directory is how the rule gets enforced by the machine.
+
+## `branch-protection.sh`
+
+Blocks direct pushes to `main`. Run it, then run the push probe it prints — **verify,
+do not trust the API response**, since Gitea may let site admins bypass protection.
+
+    ./infra/gitea/branch-protection.sh
+
+It authenticates with the credential `git` already has stored for this host, and never
+prints the secret.
+
+## `runner-token-rotate.sh`
+
+Mints a fresh instance-level registration token from the Gitea API and writes it into
+`apps/wave-1/gitea-actions-runner-secret.sops.yaml` via `sops set`. **The token value is
+never printed.**
+
+    ./infra/gitea/runner-token-rotate.sh
+
+A fresh token is usually **not sufficient on its own**. `act_runner` registers exactly once
+and persists its identity in `/data/.runner` on the `act-runner-data` PVC. If Gitea no
+longer holds a matching runner row, the pod starts, sees `.runner`, **skips registration**,
+and polls with an identity Gitea does not recognise — so it never appears in the runner
+list. That is precisely the observed symptom: zero runners, pod running, no error anyone
+looks at. Clearing the PVC is what forces a real re-registration; the script prints the
+commands.
+
+## Sequence — order matters
+
+1. **Get an Actions runner registered** — `runner-token-rotate.sh`, then clear the PVC so
+   the runner actually re-registers, then confirm it shows `online` in the API. Do not
+   skip the confirmation: the whole reason this went unnoticed is that a runner was
+   *recorded* as online without anyone checking.
+2. **Watch the gate actually report on a real PR**, and note the context name it produced.
+3. **Only then set `enable_status_check: true`** with that exact context.
+4. Add the human reviewer as a repo collaborator, then raise `required_approvals` to 1.
+
+> **Do not do step 3 before step 1.** A required status check with no runner leaves every
+> PR permanently pending — including the PR that would fix it. The same applies to
+> `gate.yml`'s `conformance` job: it is `if: false` and never runs, yet still publishes a
+> `gate / conformance (pull_request)` context. Never list that one as required.

infra/gitea/branch-protection.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Enable branch protection on main for home-network-k3s-impl.
+#
+# Sets enable_push:false  -> no direct pushes to main; changes land only by merging a PR.
+#
+# enable_status_check is deliberately FALSE. There is currently NO Gitea Actions runner
+# registered (verified 2026-09-29: zero at repo, org and site level), so requiring the
+# gate context would deadlock EVERY PR permanently -- including the PR that fixes it.
+# Turn it on only after a runner is live and you have seen the gate actually report on
+# a real PR, using the context name CI itself produced.
+#
+# required_approvals is 0 for the same class of reason: jakman85 is a site admin but NOT
+# a repo collaborator, so requiring an approval now could leave nobody able to approve.
+# Add the collaborator first, then raise this to 1.
+set -euo pipefail
+HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
+OWNER=Home-Network
+REPO=home-network-k3s-impl
+
+creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
+U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"
+P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
+[ -n "$U" ] && [ -n "$P" ] || { echo "no stored credential for $HOST" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "authenticating as '${U}' (secret not shown)"
+
+echo "==> creating branch protection on 'main'"
+jq -n '{
+  branch_name: "main",
+  enable_push: false,
+  enable_status_check: false,
+  status_check_contexts: [],
+  required_approvals: 0,
+  block_on_rejected_reviews: true,
+  block_on_outdated_branch: false,
+  dismiss_stale_approvals: true
+}' | curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") \
+  -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data @- \
+  "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/branch_protections" \
+| jq -r 'if .branch_name then "created" else "API said: \(.message // tostring)" end'
+
+echo "==> verifying (this is the part that matters)"
+curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") \
+  "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/branches/main" \
+| jq -r '{protected, user_can_push, required_approvals, enable_status_check, status_check_contexts}'
+
+cat <<'NOTE'
+
+Now prove it actually blocks you -- do not take the API's word for it. From a clean
+checkout on main, with nothing to lose:
+
+    git commit --allow-empty -m 'protection probe'
+    git push origin main          # EXPECT: rejected by the remote
+    git reset --hard HEAD~1       # tidy up either way
+
+If that push SUCCEEDS, Gitea is letting site admins bypass protection and this is not
+yet doing what you want.
+NOTE

infra/gitea/runner-token-rotate.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Mint a fresh Gitea Actions registration token and write it into the SOPS secret.
+#
+# The token value is NEVER printed. It goes from the Gitea API into `sops set` and
+# nowhere else. (It is briefly visible in this host's process list as a sops argument;
+# acceptable on a single-operator workstation, and far better than echoing it.)
+#
+# This ALONE may not bring the runner back -- see "IMPORTANT" at the end of the output.
+set -euo pipefail
+HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
+SECRET=apps/wave-1/gitea-actions-runner-secret.sops.yaml
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
+cd "$REPO_ROOT"
+[ -f "$SECRET" ] || { echo "not in the repo root, or $SECRET is missing" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
+U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"
+P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
+[ -n "$U" ] && [ -n "$P" ] || { echo "no stored git credential for $HOST" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "==> minting an instance-level registration token as '${U}'"
+
+TOKEN="$(curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") \
+  "https://${HOST}/api/v1/admin/runners/registration-token" | jq -r '.token // empty')"
+[ -n "$TOKEN" ] || { echo "Gitea did not return a token" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "==> got a ${#TOKEN}-character token (value not shown)"
+
+echo "==> writing it into ${SECRET} via sops"
+DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null ./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run \
+  sops set "$SECRET" '["stringData"]["token"]' "\"${TOKEN}\""
+unset TOKEN
+
+echo "==> done. Verify the file is still encrypted (no plaintext token):"
+grep -q 'ENC\[' "$SECRET" && echo "    OK - stringData is still SOPS-encrypted" \
+  || { echo "    REFUSING TO CONTINUE: $SECRET is not encrypted" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+cat <<'NOTE'
+
+Next: commit this on a branch, open a PR, and merge it so Flux applies the new Secret.
+
+IMPORTANT -- a new token is usually NOT sufficient on its own.
+act_runner registers exactly ONCE and then persists its identity in /data/.runner on the
+act-runner-data PVC. If Gitea no longer has a matching runner row (DB restore, the row was
+deleted, the instance was rebuilt), the pod starts, sees .runner, SKIPS registration, and
+polls with an identity Gitea does not recognise -- so it never appears in the runner list,
+which is exactly the observed symptom (zero runners, pod running).
+
+So after the Secret lands, force a genuine re-registration by clearing that state:
+
+    kubectl --context k3s-prod -n gitea-actions scale deploy/act-runner --replicas=0
+    kubectl --context k3s-prod -n gitea-actions delete pvc act-runner-data
+    kubectl --context k3s-prod -n gitea-actions scale deploy/act-runner --replicas=1
+
+(The PVC holds only runner registration state -- no build artifacts, nothing durable.
+Deleting it is the supported way to re-register. Flux recreates it from the manifest.)
+
+Then confirm it actually registered -- do not assume:
+
+    curl -s -u '<user>' https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/api/v1/admin/actions/runners | jq
+
+A runner must appear with status "online" and the labels ubuntu-latest / homelab.
+NOTE