fix(cilium): point cgroup.hostRoot at the host's real cgroup2 root

hostRoot was /run/cilium/cgroupv2 with autoMount disabled, but nothing
mounts cgroup2 there. The agent mounted one from inside its own private
cgroup namespace, so socket-LB attached to the agent's own cgroup and
host processes got no Service/LB translation. k3s-prod-1 (Gateway L2
lease holder + kube-vip VIP) therefore could not reach the Gateway VIP,
and its apiserver's OIDC authenticator has failed since 2026-09-12.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

decisions/2026-10-02-plex-quicksync-verification.md

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+date: 2026-10-02
+branch: fix/plex-quicksync-verification
+title: Hardware transcoding works — and `runbooks/plex-quicksync.md`'s verification section was wrong
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+**Hardware transcoding is confirmed working on prod.** Measured 2026-10-02 from
+`Plex Media Server.log` in the running pod: `vaapi` on `/dev/dri/renderD128`
+(`Intel CoffeeLake-S GT2 [UHD Graphics 630]`), `using hardware decode accelerator vaapi`,
+`zero-copy support present`, `using zero-copy transcoding`, and
+`final decoder: vaapi, final encoder: vaapi`. VAAPI for **both** directions, zero-copy, so frames
+never round-trip through the CPU. The device-plugin mechanism from PR #37 works end to end.
+
+**And `runbooks/plex-quicksync.md`'s verification section was wrong, which is the correction this
+branch exists to publish.** The page said the Plex dashboard showing `Transcode (hw)` was "the *only*
+proof available, and nothing else will ever tell you". The operator had hardware transcoding fully
+working while **Dashboard → Activity showed nothing of the sort** — so the page's authoritative check
+was silent on a working system, and sent someone looking for a fault that did not exist. Three
+inference errors are now corrected on the page, two of them recorded as named false leads so the next
+reader does not re-walk them:
+
+1. **The dashboard is not proof.** Replaced as the primary check by Plex's own log — the grep is in
+   the page, in its **redacting** form, because `Plex Media Server.log` carries API URLs containing
+   `X-Plex-Token` (CLAUDE.md §6; a credential has been leaked into a transcript here before). The
+   page also now says explicitly that **`Plex Transcoder Statistics.log` is the wrong file** — it
+   holds XML `<Variant .../>` records, not ffmpeg output, and the name invites the mistake — and why
+   `grep -a` is required. The dashboard is **kept but demoted** to a secondary, best-effort signal,
+   with its absence stated to prove nothing.
+2. **An fd snapshot is not evidence.** A `/proc/*/fd` sweep inside the pod found no holder of
+   `renderD128` while hardware transcoding was active; transcode sessions are short and the scan
+   landed in a gap. Recorded as a documented false lead, with the reliable process-level check in its
+   place: the transcoder's **argv** (`-hwaccel`, `-hwaccel_device`, `vaapi`, `renderD128`), found via
+   `ps -eo pid,user,comm | grep -i transcoder`.
+3. **A missing preference key does not mean the setting is off.** The page told readers to treat an
+   absent `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` in `Preferences.xml` as "never enabled". With hardware
+   acceleration demonstrably on and working, that key was **absent from all 27 attributes** while
+   `HardwareDevicePath` **was** written and the log said `hardware transcoding: enabled`. First-command
+   #4 now reads both keys and states plainly that `HardwareDevicePath` present is a positive signal,
+   absence of `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` means nothing either way, only `="0"` is conclusive, and the
+   log settles it.
+
+Also on the page:
+
+- **GID `992` is no longer presented as a number to expect.** Under the plugin the injected device
+  arrives `root:root`, so the image's `cont-init.d` hook resolves GID **`0`** and adds `plex` to the
+  **root group** — measured `Groups: 0 100 1000`, `id plex` → `groups=1000(plex),0(root),100(users)`.
+  992 was the hostPath-era host `render` GID. The page now says so, marks the root-group membership as
+  an inherent property of the plugin's `DeviceSpec` rather than a defect, and repeats that it is
+  **not** a reason to reintroduce `supplementalGroups` (still a no-op: `s6-setuidgid` rebuilds the
+  group list from `/etc/group`). The stale `Groups: 100 1000` claim in the escalation section is gone.
+- **A new troubleshooting entry for legitimate per-title fallbacks**, marked as a **hypothesis**.
+  Between two fully hardware sessions, one logged `enabled, but no hardware decode accelerator found`
+  and empty final decoder/encoder. UHD 630 decodes H.264, HEVC 8/10-bit and VP9 but **not AV1** and
+  not 10-bit 4:2:2 HEVC, so the likely cause is the source file, not the platform — explicitly
+  written as a lead to check first, **not** a confirmed diagnosis of that item.
+- The status is stated at the top of the page and in a rewritten provenance footer that separates the
+  2026-10-02 confirmations from the superseded 2026-09-30/2026-10-01 hostPath-era readings.
+- `runbooks/README.md`'s index entry for the page was stale in the same two ways (it still described a
+  `/dev/dri` hostPath and the dashboard-only proof) and is corrected to match.
+
+Unchanged on purpose: the "STOP HERE IF PLEX IS `Pending`" section and the escape hatch (delete the
+`hardware:` block from `catalog/plex.yaml`, re-render) keep exactly their existing prominence — they
+are correct and they are the 2am material. The "no alert is possible" reasoning is also kept verbatim
+in substance: Plex declares no `metricsEndpoint`, renders no ServiceMonitor, and a fallback alert
+would be a rule evaluating against nothing.
+
+**Documentation only.** No change to `catalog/`, `schemas/`, `apps/` or `platform/`.
+
+## What I verified
+
+- **Gate, in the pinned toolbox from this worktree** (`DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null`, `ENGINE` shim
+  bind-mounting the main checkout's `.git`): **rc 3 UNDETERMINED**, diff base
+  `origin/main @ 948875aad37d`, with exactly the three expected skips and **no failures**. Green:
+  `decisions-log`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1`, `approval-policy`. Skipped:
+  `spec-immutability` (spec repo unavailable → R-TEST-06 not verified), `gitea-settings`
+  (`SETTINGS_API_TOKEN` unset), `conformance` (`CLUSTER_AVAILABLE!=true` → L2/L3 not run).
+  Touched requirements: **R-OBS-04**, reported `UNVERIFIED` for lack of a cluster. `approval-policy`
+  passed as `N/A` locally (`event='none'`, not a `pull_request`) — it evaluates for real on the PR.
+  **rc 3 is not green**, it is the calibrated worktree result, and it is reported here as rc 3.
+- **The gate was run three times, with the same rc 3 / three-skip result on each committed tip** —
+  including the final one. Worth recording from the first attempt: run *before* committing, with
+  `HEAD == origin/main`, the touched-requirement set is `NOT DETERMINABLE (on-base)` and the
+  R-TEST-03 coverage gate cannot be applied at all. Commit before gating from a fresh worktree branch.
+- **`runbooks/kustomization.yaml` still carries `- plex-quicksync=plex-quicksync.md`** in the
+  `configMapGenerator` `files:` list (line 110) — checked explicitly, because without it the page
+  merges and still 404s. `README=README.md` is likewise present, which is what serves the corrected
+  index entry.
+- **This change touches no `sensitive_paths`.** `infra/gitea/approval-policy.json` lists `ci/**`,
+  `.gitea/**`, `conformance/**`, `clusters/**`, `bootstrap/**`, `infra/gitea/**`,
+  `platform/kyverno/**`, `platform-config/kustomization.yaml`, `.sops.yaml`, `**/*.sops.yaml`,
+  `**/rbac.yaml`, `CLAUDE.md`. `runbooks/**` and `decisions/**` are not among them, and the
+  `approval-policy` stage passed.
+- **No YAML was added or edited**, so `indent-sequences: consistent` (which blocked a sibling branch
+  today) is not in play here; `lint` passed over the full tracked YAML set regardless.
+- **`DECISIONS-LOG.md` is untouched** — this handoff is its own file, per CLAUDE.md §7.
+- **The PR's own CI run was read, not assumed** (PR #39, run 208, task 261, head `1677dff5688b`).
+  **It is RED, and not because of this branch.** Every stage this change could affect is green —
+  `decisions-log`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1`, `approval-policy` (`approval-policy` evaluated
+  for real on the `pull_request` event and passed: no sensitive path touched). The single failure is
+  **`gitea-settings`**, quoting the measured field:
+
+      [fail]   required_approvals: DECLARED 1 but LIVE is 0
+      [fail] Gitea has DRIFTED from infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json.
+      [fail] MERGE GATE: BLOCKED
+
+  Every other declared setting matched (`block_admin_merge_override`, `block_on_rejected_reviews`,
+  `dismiss_stale_approvals`, `enable_status_check`, `enable_push=false`,
+  `status_check_contexts = ["gate / gate (pull_request)"]`, `runners online: 1`). So **live `main`
+  currently requires ZERO approvals**, the declaration still says 1, and with
+  `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true"` in `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml` that drift **blocks every PR in
+  the repo**, not just this one. Note the shape of it: the check that would notice approvals are
+  unenforced is the check that is failing. Local branch `fix/admin-approval-override` (`616a497`,
+  "fix(ci): let an administrator merge their own green PR") looks like the in-flight work that means
+  to change the declaration. **I did not touch it** — `infra/gitea/**` is a sensitive path, needs a
+  non-author approval, and is outside this branch's documentation-only scope. It is an operator
+  decision: re-assert the protection, or change the declaration deliberately in its own PR.
+- The repository-wide grep for `992` to find what else still asserts it: remaining occurrences are in
+  `catalog/plex.yaml`, `catalog/render.py`, `schemas/renderer-contract.md`,
+  `platform/intel-gpu-plugin/README.md`, `platform/intel-gpu-plugin/kustomization.yaml`, and three
+  older `decisions/` entries.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **I did not re-measure anything on the live cluster in this session.** Every platform number on the
+  page — the VAAPI/zero-copy log lines, `RW-OPEN-OK` as uid 1000, the `gpu.intel.com/i915` limits and
+  requests on the pod spec, `Groups: 0 100 1000`, `id plex`, the 27 `Preferences.xml` attributes, the
+  empty `/proc/*/fd` sweep — came to me as measurements taken earlier on 2026-10-02 and was
+  transcribed, not re-run. Per CLAUDE.md §2b, treat the page as reporting those readings rather than
+  as proof of current state; re-run the primary check before relying on it.
+- **The per-title fallback cause is unverified and labelled as such.** The source codec of the title
+  that logged `no hardware decode accelerator found` was never read. The AV1 / 10-bit-4:2:2-HEVC
+  explanation is inferred from UHD 630's capability set alone.
+- **Whether Plex's dashboard *ever* shows `Transcode (hw)` on this deployment is unknown.** It was
+  observed silent during working hardware transcoding; whether that is a client/version quirk, a
+  reporting bug, or something about this setup was not investigated. The page therefore demotes it
+  rather than explaining it.
+- **The commands as written in the page were not executed from the page.** They are the forms that
+  were run, re-wrapped for `dev.sh`; in particular the `exec -it deploy/plex -- sh` route for the argv
+  check is noted as possibly lacking a TTY under `dev.sh run` and was not exercised in that shape.
+- **Stale `992` copies outside `runbooks/` were left alone**, deliberately — scope was documentation
+  only, and `catalog/plex.yaml`, `catalog/render.py`, `schemas/renderer-contract.md` and
+  `platform/intel-gpu-plugin/` all still carry the hostPath-era `Groups: 44 100 992 1000` reading as
+  if current. `render.py --selftest` asserts around that comment, so correcting it is a real change
+  with gate consequences, not a doc edit. **That is open work.** Older `decisions/` entries also cite
+  992; those are historical records and should stay as written.
+- **CI on the PR.** The branch is pushed and the PR opened; I did not watch the Gitea run report, so
+  nothing here should be read as "CI green". The only gate result I can quote is the local rc 3 above.

decisions/2026-10-03-cilium-cgroup-hostroot.md

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+date: 2026-10-03
+branch: fix/cilium-cgroup-hostroot
+title: Cilium socket-LB never covered host processes — cgroup.hostRoot pointed at an unmounted path
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+`cgroup.hostRoot` changes from `/run/cilium/cgroupv2` to `/sys/fs/cgroup` in all three parity
+copies: `platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml` (authoritative), `platform/cilium/values.yaml`
+(mirror) and `infra/ansible/roles/cilium/templates/cilium-values.yaml.j2` (bootstrap).
+`autoMount` stays `false`.
+
+**The defect.** With `autoMount: false`, the Cilium chart only bind-mounts whatever exists at
+`hostRoot`, and expects the operator to have mounted cgroup2 there (cilium 1.20.1 values.yaml).
+The repo's rationale was "k3s provides the cgroupv2 mount". That is true only for
+`/sys/fs/cgroup`. Nothing mounts cgroup2 at `/run/cilium/cgroupv2` on these nodes; it is an
+empty `DirectoryOrCreate` hostPath. So the agent mounted cgroup2 there itself, from inside its
+own private cgroup namespace, and that mount's root is the agent container's own leaf cgroup.
+The socket-LB programs (`cil_sock4_connect` etc.) were attached to it and covered only the
+agent.
+
+**The consequence.** Every other host-netns process got no Service/LB translation:
+- Service ClusterIPs were unreachable from every node's host.
+- The node holding the Gateway's L2 lease could not reach the Gateway VIP (`no route to host`).
+  Other nodes reached it only because their packets crossed the wire to the lease holder, where
+  the tc datapath handles them.
+- k3s-prod-1 holds both the Gateway lease and the kube-vip API VIP. Its apiserver could not reach
+  the OIDC issuer, logging `oidc: authenticator not initialized` since at least 2026-09-12
+  (899 occurrences by 2026-10-03). kubectl SSO through the VIP therefore failed, and in-cluster
+  OIDC clients failed on whichever calls landed on that apiserver.
+- Webhooks and aggregated APIs were unaffected only because k3s runs
+  `--enable-aggregator-routing=true` (endpoint IPs, not ClusterIPs).
+
+Cilium's own source (v1.20.1 `bpf/bpf_sock.c`, `__sock4_xlate_fwd`) handles exactly this case
+when the hook does run: a host-netns connect to an L7-LB Service (the Gateway) is rewritten to
+`127.0.0.1:<l7_lb_proxy_port>`, the local Envoy listener. The fix is to make the hook cover the
+host.
+
+## What I verified
+
+- `cilium-dbg status --verbose` on k3s-prod-1: `Socket LB: Enabled`, `Coverage: Hostns-only`.
+  The live cilium-config shows `bpf-lb-sock=false`, but socket LB is implied by kube-proxy
+  replacement. The Gateway Service frontends `192.168.2.20:{80,443}` and
+  `10.43.225.79:{80,443}` map to `127.0.0.1:14337`.
+- Host: `findmnt /run/cilium/cgroupv2` is empty on all three nodes, and `/sys/fs/cgroup` is
+  `cgroup2`.
+- In the agent: `/run/cilium/cgroupv2` is a `cgroup2 none` mount, the agent's own cgroup reads
+  `0::/`, the mount has 0 child cgroups, and `bpftool cgroup show /run/cilium/cgroupv2` lists all
+  `cil_sock*` programs. k3s runs in `0::/system.slice/k3s.service`, and the agent container in
+  `/kubepods.slice/…/cri-containerd-3ad04cde….scope`.
+- **The decisive test**, run on k3s-prod-1 in the same netns: raw TCP connect to
+  `192.168.2.20:443`, `10.43.225.79:443` and `10.43.59.141:8080` CONNECTED from inside the agent
+  container (covered cgroup) and FAILED from the host (`No route to host` / timeout).
+- Blast radius: host-network pods are cilium, cilium-envoy, cilium-operator (API via
+  `192.168.2.9:6443`, not a Service), kube-vip (`127.0.0.1:6443`, `svc_enable=false`) and
+  node-exporter (no outbound). Nothing depends on host Service translation being absent; the
+  change only makes Service/LB addresses reachable from the host where they currently fail.
+- `helm template cilium/cilium --version 1.20.1` with the new values, in the toolbox: the
+  DaemonSet bind-mounts hostPath `/sys/fs/cgroup` into `cilium-agent` and `clean-cilium-state`,
+  the cilium-config shows `cgroup-root: "/sys/fs/cgroup"`, and the init containers are unchanged
+  (no `mount-cgroup`).
+- Toolbox gate: see the PR description.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **The rollout itself.** After merge, the agent DaemonSet rolls one node at a time
+  (`maxUnavailable: 1`). On each node, afterwards: host TCP connects to the three targets above
+  must succeed. On k3s-prod-1, the apiserver's background OIDC init retry must stop logging
+  `authenticator not initialized` with no k3s restart.
+- That the old programs, attached to the previous agent container's cgroup, disappear with it.
+  Expected, because cgroup BPF attachments die with the cgroup, but not observed.
+- An end-to-end kubectl OIDC login (needs a browser).
+- No regression test was added. A natural one is an L2 conformance check that a host-netns
+  connect to the Gateway VIP succeeds on the lease holder, but `conformance/**` is a sensitive
+  path. Left as a follow-up.

decisions/2026-10-03-node-keycloak-hosts-pin.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+date: 2026-10-03
+branch: fix/node-keycloak-hosts-pin
+title: Pin the OIDC issuer to the Gateway VIP on prod nodes — the WAN answer does not hairpin
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+Follow-up to PR #40 (`decisions/2026-10-03-public-dns-wan-target.md`). Public DNS for
+`*.home.keithjackson.dev` now CNAMEs to the WAN IP. The prod nodes resolve through public DNS,
+and the router does not hairpin, so the kube-apiserver could no longer reach its OIDC issuer
+`keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev`.
+
+- `roles/node_baseline`: a new `node_baseline_hosts_pins` list (default `[]`) and one
+  `blockinfile` task (tags `dns`, `hosts`). It writes the pins into `/etc/hosts` as a single
+  marked block. An empty list removes the block.
+- `group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml`: pins `keycloak.{{ k3s_base_domain }}` → `192.168.2.20`, which
+  must stay equal to `GATEWAY_VIP` (parity comment added). It also replaces the stale "no
+  /etc/hosts pin is needed" paragraph with the measured reason the pin is now required.
+
+Dev is unaffected (empty default).
+
+## What I verified
+
+- After PR #40 reconciled (`platform` lastAppliedRevision `576e1ab`, Healthy=True), on
+  k3s-prod-2 and k3s-prod-3: `getent hosts keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` →
+  `136.51.115.252 wan.home.keithjackson.dev`. `curl https://keycloak…/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration`
+  → exit 60, `ssl_verify_result=18` (the router's self-signed cert, not the Gateway).
+- `journalctl -u k3s` (last 20 min) showed no OIDC/JWKS errors yet. The apiserver still holds
+  the keys it cached before the flip, so the failure is latent until a k3s restart or key rotation.
+- Neither node has cloud-init (`/etc/cloud` absent), so nothing rewrites `/etc/hosts` at boot.
+- `--check --diff --tags hosts --limit k3s-prod-2,k3s-prod-3`: each node gets exactly the
+  three-line marked block `192.168.2.20	keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev`.
+- Outside-in, PR #40 works: check-host.net probes from 3 external nodes got `200 OK` from
+  `https://plex.home.keithjackson.dev/identity` at `136.51.115.252`.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **k3s-prod-1**: Ansible cannot reach it. SSH host key verification fails (`known_hosts:94`,
+  ED25519 `SHA256:zgUS8OeWznzCX9hlN7XdZ8iLNkU1G2loXjtJFfEUYpE`), which is consistent with
+  the 2026-09-11 SSD replacement and reinstall. The operator must confirm the fingerprint
+  before the pin can be applied there.
+- The playbook has not been applied for real. It is an operator run after merge:
+  `ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags hosts`.
+- An end-to-end kubectl OIDC login after the pin (needs a browser).

decisions/2026-10-03-public-dns-wan-target.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+---
+date: 2026-10-03
+branch: feat/public-dns-wan-target
+title: Public DNS now points at the WAN — Gateway-published names CNAME to an in-cluster DDNS record
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+The operator closed the open "public-target gap" recorded in
+`platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml`. The WAN NAT / port-forwarding (80/443 → Gateway VIP
+192.168.2.20) was done by the operator outside this repo.
+
+Operator decisions (2026-10-03):
+
+1. **Scope: every Gateway-published name goes public.** That covers the five `exposure: public`
+   apps (plex, gitea, keycloak, nextcloud, seerr) and also the hand-authored admin UIs (auth,
+   crafty, grafana, headlamp, the `home.keithjackson.dev` apex). `internal` services still publish
+   nothing: their `controller: none` route annotation is checked before the target is read.
+2. **The WAN IP is kept current in-cluster**, not hardcoded.
+
+Implementation:
+
+- `platform/gateway/gateway.yaml`: `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/target: wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` on
+  the shared Gateway. Every gateway-sourced record changes from `A 192.168.2.20` to
+  `CNAME wan.home.keithjackson.dev`.
+- `platform/externaldns/ddns.yaml` (new): `favonia/cloudflare-ddns:1.17.1` Deployment in the
+  `external-dns` namespace. It reuses `cloudflare-api-token` and keeps `wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` an
+  unproxied IPv4 A record at the WAN IP (detected via Cloudflare trace, checked every 5 min,
+  `DELETE_ON_STOP=false`). external-dns has no TXT registry entry for it, so it never owns or
+  deletes it.
+- The helmrelease comment block and the README now describe the decision instead of the gap.
+
+Known consequence: **k3s nodes resolve through public DNS** (`node_baseline_dns_servers` = 8.8.8.8 /
+1.1.1.1). The kube-apiserver's OIDC issuer `keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` therefore resolves to the
+WAN IP from the nodes, and kubectl SSO works only if the router hairpins WAN:443 back to the Gateway.
+A LAN-side probe of `136.51.115.252:443` on 2026-10-03 returned a **self-signed placeholder cert**,
+not the Gateway's Let's Encrypt wildcard. That suggests no hairpin. The cert-based admin kubeconfig
+is unaffected.
+
+## What I verified
+
+- Live prod, 2026-10-03, before the change: Gateway `gateway/shared` ADDRESS `192.168.2.20`.
+  External-dns args include `--source=gateway-httproute --source=service --policy=sync
+  --txt-owner-id=prod --domain-filter=keithjackson.dev`, and it logs "All records are already up to
+  date".
+- Public answers at 1.1.1.1: plex/gitea/keycloak/grafana/auth/apex → `192.168.2.20`;
+  `crafty-mc` → `.22` and `unifi` → `.21` (service source, not affected by this change); jackett →
+  none (internal, correctly unpublished).
+- The authority (betty.ns.cloudflare.com) has no unprefixed TXT, AAAA or MX at `plex.` or the apex,
+  so the A→CNAME switch has no co-existing record to collide with.
+- WAN IP from the workstation: `136.51.115.252`.
+- No CiliumNetworkPolicy or NetworkPolicy in `external-dns`. The Kyverno label and default-deny
+  policies match only `app-namespace` namespaces. The vpn egress policy selects only
+  `egress-class: vpn` pods.
+- Toolbox gate result: see the PR description (run after this commit).
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **The outside-in path.** I have no vantage point outside the LAN. Whether
+  `https://<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` from the internet reaches the Gateway with the LE cert is
+  UNVERIFIED.
+- **Hairpin / kubectl SSO after the flip.** Likely broken per the probe above. Fix candidates: a
+  node `/etc/hosts` pin for `keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}` → Gateway VIP via `node_baseline`, or router
+  NAT reflection.
+- **The record-type flip itself**, until Flux reconciles: whether Cloudflare accepts external-dns's
+  create-CNAME in the same batch as the delete-A, or converges one interval later.
+- `favonia/cloudflare-ddns` under this pod securityContext. The README warns that
+  `no-new-privileges` misbehaves on some Proxmox-style hosts. These are bare-metal nodes, but it is
+  untested until the pod runs.
+- Whether the L4 service-source names (crafty-mc, unifi) should also go public. Not decided, not
+  changed.
+- `conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns/check.sh` header lines 39–40
+  still describe the target as open. That is a sensitive path, so it is left for a follow-up.

infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml

@@ -306,19 +306,27 @@ node_baseline_dns_servers:
   # k3s_base_domain, below). It reaches the issuer through the NODE resolver, i.e. through
   # these PUBLIC upstreams — not through CoreDNS's split-horizon answer.
   #
-  # THIS USED TO BE BROKEN, AND THE 2026-09-04 SUBDOMAIN SPLIT FIXED IT. While prod was
-  # authored to serve dev's hostnames, a prod node resolving keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
-  # publicly got DEV's Gateway VIP (192.168.1.53) — the wrong cluster, on the wrong LAN, so
-  # kubectl OIDC SSO on prod could not work at all. Now prod's issuer is
-  # keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and the public record for that name is published by
-  # PROD's own external-dns pointing at PROD's Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20). The public answer
-  # and the split-horizon answer therefore AGREE, and no /etc/hosts pin is needed.
+  # THE PUBLIC ANSWER IS NOW THE WAN, SO THE ISSUER IS PINNED (2026-10-03). Since
+  # platform/gateway/gateway.yaml set an external-dns `target`, every public name is a CNAME
+  # to wan.home.keithjackson.dev = the home WAN IP. The SOHO router does NOT hairpin: from the
+  # LAN, WAN:443 answers with the router's own self-signed placeholder cert (measured from
+  # k3s-prod-2/-3 2026-10-03: `curl` exit 60, ssl_verify_result=18). The apiserver would then
+  # be unable to fetch its issuer's discovery/JWKS, so kubectl OIDC SSO would fail on the
+  # next k3s restart or Keycloak key rotation. node_baseline_hosts_pins (below) pins the
+  # issuer host to the Gateway VIP in /etc/hosts, which glibc consults before these
+  # resolvers. (History: before the 2026-09-04 subdomain split the public answer was DEV's
+  # VIP; after it, the public answer was prod's own VIP and no pin was needed.)
   #
-  # STILL TO VERIFY on prod bring-up (PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10): this holds only once prod's
-  # external-dns has actually published the record. Until then the issuer does not resolve
-  # from the nodes and kubectl SSO fails — the cert-based admin kubeconfig is the break-glass
-  # path, and it always works. Ordering, not a design gap.
+  # The cert-based admin kubeconfig never depends on any of this. It is the break-glass path.
 node_baseline_dns_search: []
+# /etc/hosts pins: node-process names that must reach the in-cluster Gateway directly rather
+# than via the public (WAN, non-hairpinned) answer. See "THE PUBLIC ANSWER IS NOW THE WAN" above.
+# [parity] the IP MUST equal GATEWAY_VIP in clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml (192.168.2.20),
+# and the name MUST follow k3s_oidc_issuer_url's host (roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml).
+node_baseline_hosts_pins:
+  - ip: "192.168.2.20"
+    names:
+      - "keycloak.{{ k3s_base_domain }}"
 
 # --- platform hostname suffix, ANSIBLE SIDE (R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01) --------------------
 # PROD SERVES ITS OWN SUBDOMAIN. [parity] MUST equal BASE_DOMAIN in clusters/prod/

infra/ansible/roles/cilium/templates/cilium-values.yaml.j2

@@ -51,11 +51,14 @@ hubble:
 l2announcements:
   enabled: true
 
-# k3s ships its own cgroup mount; point Cilium at it instead of auto-mounting.
+# Point Cilium at the host's real cgroup2 root (/sys/fs/cgroup, mounted by systemd) instead of
+# auto-mounting. NOT /run/cilium/cgroupv2: nothing mounts cgroup2 there, so the agent mounted its
+# OWN namespaced cgroup and socket-LB covered only itself — host processes (the apiserver) lost
+# Service/LB translation. [parity] platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml explains (2026-10-03).
 cgroup:
   autoMount:
     enabled: false
-  hostRoot: /run/cilium/cgroupv2
+  hostRoot: /sys/fs/cgroup
 
 # Roll the cilium agent DaemonSet ONE node at a time. [parity] must match the
 # platform/cilium HelmRelease. The cilium 1.20.1 chart defaults this to 2, which on a

infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline/defaults/main.yml

@@ -242,3 +242,9 @@ node_baseline_dns_search:
 node_baseline_dns_options:
   - timeout:2
   - attempts:2
+# Static /etc/hosts entries (tags: dns, hosts), as a list of {ip, names}. EMPTY by default:
+# dev needs none. Prod pins its OIDC issuer host to the Gateway VIP because the public
+# answer for it is the non-hairpinned WAN IP (inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml).
+# Written as ONE marked block, so removing an entry here removes it from the node, and
+# an empty list removes the block entirely.
+node_baseline_hosts_pins: []

infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline/tasks/main.yml

@@ -1090,3 +1090,22 @@
       {% endif %}
   when: node_baseline_dns_mechanism == 'resolv-conf-file'
   tags: [dns]
+
+# /etc/hosts pins — tag `dns` (and `hosts` on its own). Some node processes must reach a
+# public hostname at the in-cluster Gateway, not at its public answer. On prod, the
+# kube-apiserver's OIDC issuer resolves publicly to the WAN IP, which the router does not
+# hairpin. glibc reads /etc/hosts before any nameserver (nsswitch `files dns`), so a pin wins
+# regardless of which resolver mechanism above is in effect. One marked block: entries
+# dropped from node_baseline_hosts_pins disappear from the node, and an empty list
+# removes the block.
+- name: Pin node-process hostnames in /etc/hosts
+  ansible.builtin.blockinfile:
+    path: /etc/hosts
+    marker: "# {mark} node_baseline hosts pins (Ansible, tags: hosts)"
+    block: |
+      {% for pin in node_baseline_hosts_pins %}
+      {{ pin.ip }}	{{ pin.names | join(' ') }}
+      {% endfor %}
+    state: "{{ 'present' if node_baseline_hosts_pins | length > 0 else 'absent' }}"
+    backup: true
+  tags: [dns, hosts]

platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -106,14 +106,33 @@ spec:
     # CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy (reserved 10.73.0.240-.250) authored by WS-NET in Phase 2.
     l2announcements:
       enabled: true
-    # --- cgroup: k3s ships its own cgroup mount; point Cilium at it, don't auto-mount ---
-    # [parity] MUST equal Ansible cgroup block. Not in the deliverable's headline list, but it IS
-    # part of the working CNI config on k3s: reconciling without it lets Cilium try to auto-mount
-    # cgroupv2 and break on adopt. Kept in parity for a safe Phase-2 adoption.
+    # --- cgroup: point Cilium at the HOST's cgroup2 root, which systemd mounts at /sys/fs/cgroup ---
+    # [parity] MUST equal Ansible cgroup block (roles/cilium/templates/cilium-values.yaml.j2).
+    #
+    # FIXED 2026-10-03 — hostRoot WAS /run/cilium/cgroupv2, AND THAT SILENTLY BROKE SOCKET-LB FOR
+    # EVERY HOST PROCESS. With autoMount disabled, the chart only bind-mounts whatever already exists
+    # at hostRoot ("it's expected that users have mounted cgroup2 filesystem at the specified
+    # cgroup.hostRoot" — cilium 1.20.1 values.yaml). Nothing ever mounted cgroup2 at
+    # /run/cilium/cgroupv2 on these nodes (it is an empty DirectoryOrCreate hostPath), so the agent
+    # mounted one ITSELF from inside its own private cgroup namespace. That mount's root is the
+    # agent container's OWN leaf cgroup, so cil_sock4_connect & co. were attached there and covered
+    # only the agent. Every other host-netns process (the k3s apiserver in
+    # /system.slice/k3s.service, curl over SSH) was untranslated: Service ClusterIPs timed out from
+    # every node, and the node holding the Gateway's L2 lease could not reach the Gateway VIP at all
+    # ("no route to host"). That is why k3s-prod-1's apiserver logged `oidc: authenticator not
+    # initialized` from 2026-09-12 on — kubectl SSO through the kube-vip VIP failed outright.
+    # Measured on k3s-prod-1 before this change: TCP connect to 192.168.2.20:443, 10.43.225.79:443
+    # and 10.43.59.141:8080 SUCCEEDED from inside the agent container (the covered cgroup) and
+    # FAILED from the host, same node, same netns. Full write-up:
+    # decisions/2026-10-03-cilium-cgroup-hostroot.md.
+    #
+    # /sys/fs/cgroup IS a cgroup2 mount in the host's root cgroup namespace on every node (verified
+    # with findmnt on all three), so bind-mounting it gives the agent the real host root. autoMount
+    # stays off because the mount it would create already exists.
     cgroup:
       autoMount:
         enabled: false
-      hostRoot: /run/cilium/cgroupv2
+      hostRoot: /sys/fs/cgroup
     # --- Agent rollout: ONE node at a time (blast-radius bound) — 2026-09-01 incident ---
     # [parity] MUST equal Ansible: updateStrategy.rollingUpdate.maxUnavailable: 1.
     # The chart's own default is 2 (cilium 1.20.1 values.yaml: updateStrategy.rollingUpdate.

platform/cilium/values.yaml

@@ -41,11 +41,13 @@ hubble:
 # [parity] ingress VIP announcement on the flat LAN (docs/09, OQ-1)
 l2announcements:
   enabled: true
-# [parity] k3s provides the cgroupv2 mount; do not auto-mount
+# [parity] the host's cgroup2 root is /sys/fs/cgroup (systemd mounts it); do not auto-mount.
+# NOT /run/cilium/cgroupv2: nothing mounts cgroup2 there, so socket-LB attached to the agent's own
+# cgroup and host processes lost Service/LB translation (2026-10-03 — see helmrelease.yaml).
 cgroup:
   autoMount:
     enabled: false
-  hostRoot: /run/cilium/cgroupv2
+  hostRoot: /sys/fs/cgroup
 # [parity] roll the agent DaemonSet ONE node at a time. Overrides the cilium 1.20.1 chart
 # default of 2, which on 3 nodes lets a single bad render break 2/3 agents at once — as the
 # 2026-09-01 incident did (k8sServiceHost: "" → the `config` init container fell back to the

platform/externaldns/README.md

@@ -20,6 +20,30 @@ A wildcard `*.keithjackson.dev` matches only one label deep, so `<svc>.home.keit
 its own record. **`internal` services need NO public record** — PiHole resolves them to the internal
 Gateway VIP (split-horizon). ExternalDNS manages **`public`** services' records only.
 
+## Public target + in-cluster DDNS (2026-10-03)
+
+Gateway-published records are **CNAMEs to `wan.home.keithjackson.dev`**, not the Gateway VIP:
+
+```
+plex.home.keithjackson.dev  CNAME  wan.home.keithjackson.dev   <- external-dns (Gateway `target` annotation)
+wan.home.keithjackson.dev   A      <current WAN IP>            <- cloudflare-ddns (ddns.yaml), every 5m
+```
+
+- The `target` annotation is on the **shared Gateway** (`platform/gateway/gateway.yaml`), so it
+  applies to every route that publishes at all. `internal` routes (`controller: none`) still publish
+  nothing.
+- `ddns.yaml` runs `favonia/cloudflare-ddns` in this namespace with the same `cloudflare-api-token`.
+  It detects the WAN IP through Cloudflare's trace endpoint, so the pod **must not** carry
+  `egress-class: vpn`.
+- LAN and pods resolve `*.home.keithjackson.dev` to the Gateway VIP via PiHole and CoreDNS
+  (split-horizon) and never use the public path.
+- **Nodes resolve through public DNS** (`node_baseline_dns_servers`), so from a node, the apiserver's
+  OIDC issuer `keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` resolves to the WAN IP. kubectl SSO therefore relies on
+  the router hairpinning (NAT reflection) WAN:443 back to the Gateway.
+
+Check: `dig +short @1.1.1.1 plex.home.keithjackson.dev` → `wan.home.keithjackson.dev.` then the WAN IP;
+`kubectl -n external-dns logs deploy/cloudflare-ddns`.
+
 ## Secrets
 
 Cloudflare API token referenced **by name** (`cloudflare-api-token`, shared with cert-manager),

platform/externaldns/ddns.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+---
+# In-cluster dynamic DNS for the home WAN (2026-10-03).
+#
+# Keeps ONE record, `wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` (A, IPv4 only, not proxied), pointed at the home WAN's
+# current public IP. Every public name external-dns publishes from the shared Gateway is a CNAME to
+# it (platform/gateway/gateway.yaml `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/target`), so a WAN IP change
+# moves all of them through this one record, with no Git change and no external-dns involvement.
+#
+# OWNERSHIP SPLIT WITH EXTERNAL-DNS. This record carries no external-dns TXT registry entry, so
+# external-dns (policy: sync, owner `prod`) never treats it as its own and never deletes it.
+# Conversely this updater manages only the names in DOMAINS and never touches external-dns's records.
+#
+# IP DETECTION. Default `cloudflare.trace`: an HTTPS request to Cloudflare's trace endpoint, which
+# reports the address the request arrived from. Correct here only because this pod is NOT in the
+# `vpn` egress class — the CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy (platform/vpn-egress) selects pods by
+# `homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: vpn` alone, cluster-wide. Labelling this pod `vpn` would
+# publish the VPN exit IP instead of the WAN IP.
+#
+# TOKEN. Reuses this namespace's `cloudflare-api-token` (same Zone:DNS:Edit token as external-dns
+# and cert-manager) — no new secret.
+#
+# TIER NOTE. This lives in the gating `platform` Flux Kustomization (wait: true) next to
+# external-dns. If it ever crashloops, `platform` goes not-Ready and apps stop reconciling (no
+# outage). Kept here rather than in its own non-gating Kustomization to avoid a clusters/** change.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: cloudflare-ddns
+  namespace: external-dns
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudflare-ddns
+spec:
+  replicas: 1                 # exactly one writer for the record
+  revisionHistoryLimit: 3
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate            # never two updaters at once
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudflare-ddns
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudflare-ddns
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        runAsGroup: 1000
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: cloudflare-ddns
+          image: favonia/cloudflare-ddns:1.17.1
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          env:
+            - name: CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: cloudflare-api-token
+                  key: api-token
+            - name: DOMAINS
+              value: "wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
+            - name: IP6_PROVIDER
+              value: "none"         # IPv4 WAN only; leaves any AAAA alone
+            - name: PROXIED
+              value: "false"        # DNS-only: Plex/Gitea/etc. terminate TLS on the Gateway
+            - name: UPDATE_CRON
+              value: "@every 5m"
+            - name: DELETE_ON_STOP
+              value: "false"        # a pod restart must not blank the record every CNAME depends on
+            - name: RECORD_COMMENT
+              value: "managed by k3s cloudflare-ddns (platform/externaldns/ddns.yaml)"
+            - name: EMOJI
+              value: "false"
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 5m
+              memory: 16Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 64Mi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL

platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -81,38 +81,29 @@ spec:
     # what this instance can see or own; per-resource exclusion only ever REMOVES an object from
     # this instance's view, so it cannot make prod capable of deleting a record it does not own.
     # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-    # THE PUBLIC-TARGET GAP — STILL OPEN, AND NOT FIXABLE HERE ON v0.21.0 (operator decision)
+    # THE PUBLIC TARGET — DECIDED 2026-10-03 (operator): every Gateway-published name goes public
     #
-    # The five `exposure: public` services (plex, gitea, seerr, keycloak, nextcloud) publish records
-    # that point at 192.168.2.20 — the Gateway VIP, an unroutable RFC1918 address — so they are not
-    # actually reachable from the internet either. Their records are LEFT EXACTLY AS THEY ARE by
-    # this change, for two independent reasons:
+    # Until 2026-10-03 every gateway-sourced record answered with the Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20,
+    # RFC1918), so nothing published here was reachable from the internet. Two facts constrained the
+    # fix, and both still hold:
+    #   * `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/target` is read in v0.21.0's gateway-httproute source ONLY
+    #     from the GATEWAY (source/gateway.go: `overrides: annotations.TargetsFromTargetAnnotation(
+    #     gw.Annotations)`) and from a ListenerSet listener — NEVER from an HTTPRoute. A target on the
+    #     shared Gateway therefore moves EVERY gateway-sourced record at once.
+    #   * The home WAN IP is residential and can change, so a literal IP in Git would rot.
     #
-    #   1. THE VALUE IS NOT ESTABLISHED. The one public IP this repo knows is 136.51.115.252
-    #      (clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml, where the zone's `*.keithjackson.dev` wildcard also
-    #      points). It belongs to the LEGACY non-k3s stack and currently serves a placeholder
-    #      certificate. Whether prod's public services belong behind it, behind a new forward, or
-    #      are not meant to be public at all is an operator decision. Breaking five services' DNS
-    #      on a guess is worse than leaving a known-wrong-but-stable state.
-    #   2. THE MECHANISM CANNOT BE SCOPED TO THEM. `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/target` is a
-    #      real override, but in v0.21.0's gateway-httproute source it is read ONLY from the
-    #      GATEWAY (source/gateway.go: `overrides: annotations.TargetsFromTargetAnnotation(
-    #      gw.Annotations)`) and from a ListenerSet listener — NEVER from the HTTPRoute. So there is
-    #      no per-service target override while every public service shares the `shared` Gateway.
-    #      Annotating the Gateway would move EVERY gateway-sourced record, which after this change
-    #      still includes auth, crafty, grafana, headlamp and the apex — i.e. it would publish a
-    #      routable address for admin UIs. That is strictly worse than the status quo.
-    #
-    # SO THE DECISION THE OPERATOR OWNS IS TWO-PART, and no knob is added here until the first half
-    # is answered, because a knob that cannot take effect invites someone to set it and expect one:
-    #   (a) WHAT address should the five public names answer with — 136.51.115.252 as-is, a new
-    #       port-forward/WAN address, or nothing (drop `exposure: public` to `internal` instead)?
-    #   (b) HOW should they be separated from the non-public names that share the Gateway? Options,
-    #       roughly in ascending cost: a SECOND Gateway (or a ListenerSet) carrying the target
-    #       annotation, with only the public services' routes attached; or publishing the five names
-    #       from the `crd` source (DNSEndpoint objects the renderer emits for `public` services),
-    #       which restores per-service targeting without a second Gateway.
-    # Only (b) is a manifest change; (a) is a fact about the home WAN that has to be checked.
+    # The operator's answers: (a) yes, ALL of them — the five `exposure: public` apps AND the admin
+    # UIs (auth, crafty, grafana, headlamp, the apex), which sit behind Keycloak / oauth2-proxy;
+    # (b) the address is kept current IN-CLUSTER. Implementation:
+    #   * platform/gateway/gateway.yaml sets `target: wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` on the shared Gateway, so
+    #     each published name becomes a CNAME to that one hostname;
+    #   * platform/externaldns/ddns.yaml (favonia/cloudflare-ddns) keeps `wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` an A
+    #     record at the current WAN IP. That record has no external-dns TXT registry entry, so this
+    #     instance never owns or garbage-collects it.
+    # Internal services are unchanged: their routes carry `controller: none` (above), which is
+    # checked BEFORE the target is read, so they still publish nothing. The `service` source (the L4
+    # LoadBalancers crafty-mc, unifi) does not read the Gateway's annotation and still publishes its
+    # LB VIP. Whether those should go public is a separate, still-open question.
     # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     # CROSS-CLUSTER DNS OWNERSHIP. Read before changing either knob below.
     #

platform/externaldns/kustomization.yaml

@@ -8,3 +8,5 @@ resources:
   # SOPS-encrypted Cloudflare token (env CF_API_TOKEN) — SAME token as cert-manager, second copy in
   # the external-dns namespace. Flux decrypts at reconcile.
   - cloudflare-api-token.sops.yaml
+  # DDNS for `wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}` — the CNAME target every Gateway-published record points at.
+  - ddns.yaml

platform/gateway/gateway.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,23 @@ kind: Gateway
 metadata:
   name: shared
   namespace: gateway
+  annotations:
+    # PUBLIC DNS TARGET (2026-10-03, operator decision). Without this, external-dns publishes every
+    # route on this Gateway with the Gateway's OWN address (${GATEWAY_VIP}, RFC1918), which is
+    # unreachable from the internet. With it, every published `<svc>.${BASE_DOMAIN}` (and the apex)
+    # becomes a CNAME to `wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, an A record that platform/externaldns/ddns.yaml keeps
+    # pointed at the home WAN's current public IP. The WAN forwards 80/443 to ${GATEWAY_VIP}.
+    #
+    # Scope is EVERY route on this Gateway that publishes at all — the operator chose to make the
+    # admin UIs (auth, grafana, headlamp, crafty, apex) publicly resolvable alongside the five
+    # `exposure: public` apps. `internal` services stay unpublished via their
+    # `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: none` route annotation, which external-dns checks
+    # BEFORE it reads this target. external-dns v0.21.0 reads `target` from the Gateway only, never
+    # from an HTTPRoute — see platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml.
+    #
+    # LAN and in-cluster clients are unaffected: PiHole and CoreDNS answer ${BASE_DOMAIN} with
+    # ${GATEWAY_VIP} directly (split-horizon), so they never take this public path.
+    external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/target: "wan.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
 spec:
   gatewayClassName: cilium
   listeners:

runbooks/README.md

@@ -153,14 +153,18 @@ Each affected runbook says so on its own page and gives the by-hand equivalent.
   plex.tv/claim — so it is a timed sequence, scripted as `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh`:
   token → `sops` → PR → gate → merge → **forced** `flux reconcile` → pod roll (~2m45s measured).
   Includes why a changed Secret does not restart anything, and why an expired token is harmless.
-- **`plex-quicksync`** — hardware transcoding on the host iGPU. GitOps puts `/dev/dri` in the pod
-  (`hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync`); **a human still has to tick Settings → Transcoder → "Use hardware
-  acceleration when available"**, and no environment variable can do it (the image supports no
-  `PLEX_PREFERENCE*`, verified). The page names the real preference key (`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs`,
-  read out of the binary), says which widely-cited key **does not exist**, and is explicit that the
-  **only** proof is `Transcode (hw)` on the Plex dashboard — Plex renders no ServiceMonitor, so no
-  alert could ever fire. Also: the device-cgroup failure to expect first and its device-plugin
-  fallback, and why a `:latest` pull can silently break it.
+- **`plex-quicksync`** — hardware transcoding on the host iGPU. **Confirmed working 2026-10-02**
+  (VAAPI decode *and* encode, zero-copy). GitOps requests `gpu.intel.com/i915` on the pod
+  (`hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync`, satisfied by the `intel-gpu-plugin` DaemonSet — a `/dev/dri`
+  hostPath was measured not to work: device-cgroup `EPERM`); **a human still has to tick Settings →
+  Transcoder → "Use hardware acceleration when available"**, and no environment variable can do it
+  (the image supports no `PLEX_PREFERENCE*`, verified). **The proof is `Plex Media Server.log`'s
+  `final decoder: / final encoder:` line, not the Plex dashboard** — the dashboard showed nothing
+  while hardware transcoding was working, so its silence proves nothing; the page carries the
+  redacting grep (`X-Plex-Token` lives in that log), the WRONG log file to avoid, and two more
+  documented false leads (an empty `/proc/*/fd` scan, and a missing `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` key).
+  Plex renders no ServiceMonitor, so no alert could ever fire. Also: **`Pending` stalls the whole app
+  tier** and its one-field escape hatch, and why a `:latest` pull can silently break it.
 - **`oauth2-proxy-session`** — a gated UI loads but its saves quietly do nothing, and you are never
   re-prompted to log in. Tells the three stacked auth layers apart from the sidecar's own access log
   (the four lines that matter, including the upstream `-` that means the proxy answered a request the

runbooks/plex-quicksync.md

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 # plex-quicksync — making Plex actually use Intel Quick Sync, and proving it did
 
+**Status: hardware transcoding is CONFIRMED WORKING on prod as of 2026-10-02** — VAAPI for both
+decode *and* encode, zero-copy, measured in Plex's own server log (see "How to verify"). The manual
+toggle has been ticked. This page is therefore now mostly a **verification and regression**
+procedure, and its old verification section was **wrong** — see the correction at the top of
+"How to verify".
 **Alert:** none, and none is possible — see "How to verify" below. This is an **operator procedure**,
 not an incident page. It is indexed here because the feature it completes is **inert until a human
 clicks one button**, and a switched-off feature that looks shipped is exactly what this page exists
@@ -33,7 +38,7 @@ is in git**:
 | Half | Who does it | State |
 |---|---|---|
 | The render device is inside the container **and openable** | **GitOps.** `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync` in `catalog/plex.yaml` renders `resources.limits: {gpu.intel.com/i915: 1}` on the app container. The `intel-gpu-plugin` DaemonSet (`platform/intel-gpu-plugin/`) injects the device **and the matching device-cgroup allow rule**. Flux applies it. | Done by merging that change. |
-| Plex is *told* to use it | **The operator, by hand, in the Plex web UI.** | **NOT done.** `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` was **absent** from `Preferences.xml` when this page was written — the toggle has never been on. |
+| Plex is *told* to use it | **The operator, by hand, in the Plex web UI.** | **Done, 2026-10-02**, and confirmed from the **log** rather than from a preference key. `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` is **still absent** from `Preferences.xml` with hardware transcoding working, so its absence proves nothing — see first-command #4. |
 
 **There is no GitOps path to the second half, and that is verified rather than assumed.** A bounded
 grep across the running image's entire init surface — `/etc/cont-init.d`, `/etc/services.d`,
@@ -79,8 +84,8 @@ also the only thing that produces the cgroup allow rule. There is no graceful-de
 The one improvement is that the loss is no longer silent.
 
 What this does **not** do, so nobody reads more into a green gate than is there: it does not enable
-hardware transcoding (that is the manual toggle below), a green gate only proves the **manifest
-renders**, and it writes no `nodeSelector` — the resource itself constrains Plex to nodes the plugin
+hardware transcoding (that is the manual toggle below — done 2026-10-02), a green gate only proves
+the **manifest renders**, and it writes no `nodeSelector` — the resource itself constrains Plex to nodes the plugin
 advertises, which is the scheduler's doing and not a selector in this repo.
 
 ## Running the commands in this runbook
@@ -172,17 +177,28 @@ cgroup rule that uid 0 could not buy its way past either. `RW-OPEN-DENIED` with
 visible is the **device-cgroup** failure — i.e. the plugin's allow rule did not arrive; see "Likely
 causes" #2.
 
-**4. Is the toggle on?** Named key only — never the whole file:
+**4. Is the toggle on?** **You cannot answer this from `Preferences.xml` alone.** That mistake is on
+this page's record: it told readers to treat a missing `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` as "never
+enabled", and on 2026-10-02 that key was **absent from all 27 attributes** while hardware
+transcoding was demonstrably working. Named keys only — never the whole file, it holds
+`PlexOnlineToken`:
 
 ```
 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
   'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- \
-     grep -o "HardwareAcceleratedCodecs=\"[01]\"" \
-     "/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Preferences.xml" || echo ABSENT'
+     grep -o -e "HardwareAcceleratedCodecs=\"[01]\"" -e "HardwareDevicePath=\"[^\"]*\"" \
+     "/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Preferences.xml" || echo NEITHER-KEY'
 ```
 
-`ABSENT` ⇒ never enabled (the state this page was written in). `="0"` ⇒ explicitly off. `="1"` ⇒ on,
-and the remaining question is whether it *works* — go to "How to verify".
+| Reading | What it actually means |
+|---|---|
+| `HardwareDevicePath="…"` **present** | **Positive signal.** Plex writes this when hardware acceleration is configured; it was present on 2026-10-02 alongside a working VAAPI pipeline. |
+| `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` **absent** | **Nothing. Neither on nor off.** Measured absent with the feature working (2026-10-02). Do not diagnose from it, and do not write it into the file to "fix" it. |
+| `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs="0"` | explicitly **off** — the only conclusive reading, and only in the negative. |
+| `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs="1"` | on. |
+
+**The log settles it, this file does not.** Go to "How to verify"; the `hardware transcoding:
+enabled` and `final decoder/final encoder` lines are the verdict.
 
 ## The one manual step
 
@@ -191,8 +207,11 @@ Plex web UI → **Settings → Transcoder → "Use hardware acceleration when av
 
 The underlying preference key is **`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs`**. That name was confirmed by
 extracting strings from the 23 MB `Plex Media Server` binary in the running container — **not** from
-recall and not from a forum post. Real neighbouring keys from the same binary, so you can recognise
-them and not invent them:
+recall and not from a forum post. **But do not expect to see it in `Preferences.xml` after ticking
+the box:** on 2026-10-02, with the toggle on and hardware transcoding working, the key was absent and
+`HardwareDevicePath` was what had been written. The key exists in the binary; Plex does not
+necessarily persist it. Real neighbouring keys from the same binary, so you can recognise them and
+not invent them:
 
 | Key | What it is |
 |---|---|
@@ -209,42 +228,121 @@ binary. Recorded explicitly so nobody spends an evening hunting for it or, worse
 Editing `Preferences.xml` by hand is **not** the procedure. It is app state on the replicated Longhorn
 tier, it is in no git commit, and the UI writes the key correctly. Use the UI.
 
-## How to verify — and why there is no alert
+## How to verify — the log, not the dashboard
 
-Start a playback that **forces a transcode** (a client that cannot direct-play the source, or pick a
-lower quality explicitly), then read Plex's own **Dashboard → Activity**:
+**Correction, 2026-10-02.** Until today this page said the Plex dashboard showing `Transcode (hw)`
+was "the *only* proof available, and nothing else will ever tell you". **That was false and it cost
+the operator real time:** hardware transcoding was fully working — VAAPI decode *and* encode, with
+zero-copy — while **Dashboard → Activity showed nothing of the sort**. A check that is silent while
+the feature works does not just fail to prove anything; it sends someone hunting a fault that does
+not exist. The authoritative check is **Plex's own server log**.
 
-- **`Transcode (hw)`** on the session ⇒ hardware transcoding. **This is the proof.**
-- plain **`Transcode`** ⇒ software. The feature is not working, whatever the manifest says.
+### The primary check — run this one
 
-**That dashboard is the *only* proof available, and nothing else will ever tell you.**
-`catalog/plex.yaml` declares no `metricsEndpoint`, so Plex renders **no ServiceMonitor at all** —
-there is no scrape, no transcode-mode metric, and therefore no alert that could fire. Do not open work
-to "alert on software-transcode fallback": with no metric behind it such a rule would be permanently
-inert, and this repo has already been burned at scale by rules that evaluated against nothing while
-looking like coverage (`runbooks/README.md`, "Alerts you should not trust the silence of"). If that
-gap is ever worth closing, the honest order is a real exporter first and a rule second.
+```
+./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- \
+  grep -aiE "hardware transcoding: (final|using)" \
+  "/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Logs/Plex Media Server.log" \
+  | sed -E "s/(X-Plex-Token|token)=[^&[:space:]]*/\1=REDACTED/g" | tail -5'
+```
 
-Corroborating, not a substitute — the server log on the config PVC:
+| Line | Verdict |
+|---|---|
+| `hardware transcoding: final decoder: vaapi, final encoder: vaapi` | **PASS.** Hardware in **both** directions. This is the pass condition. |
+| `hardware transcoding: using zero-copy transcoding` | Best case — frames never round-trip through the CPU. Observed on prod 2026-10-02. |
+| `hardware transcoding: final decoder: , final encoder: ` (both empty) | It **fell back to software** for that session. |
+| no matching line at all | No transcode has been attempted since the log rolled — force one (below), then look again. Absence is not a failure. |
+
+The 2026-10-02 reading on prod, in full, for the shape to recognise:
+
+```
+Codecs: hardware transcoding: testing API vaapi for device '/dev/dri/renderD128'
+                              (Intel CoffeeLake-S GT2 [UHD Graphics 630])
+hardware transcoding: using hardware decode accelerator vaapi
+hardware transcoding: zero-copy support present
+hardware transcoding: using zero-copy transcoding
+hardware transcoding: final decoder: vaapi, final encoder: vaapi
+```
+
+To make a line appear, start a playback that **forces a transcode**: a client that cannot
+direct-play the source, or an explicitly lower quality. Direct Play / Direct Stream never reaches
+the transcoder and logs nothing.
+
+### Three things to get right about that command
+
+1. **Always keep the `sed`.** `Plex Media Server.log` carries API URLs containing
+   **`X-Plex-Token=…`**, a live plex.tv credential. Any output that might land in a ticket, a
+   transcript or a chat window must be redacted — CLAUDE.md §6, and a credential has already been
+   leaked into a transcript in this repo exactly this way. The redacting form above is the form to
+   copy; do not "simplify" the pipe out of it.
+2. **`Plex Transcoder Statistics.log` is the WRONG FILE.** The name is irresistible and someone will
+   reach for it. It holds XML `<Variant .../>` session records — **not** ffmpeg/VAAPI output. There
+   is no decoder/encoder verdict anywhere in it. The file you want is `Plex Media Server.log`.
+3. `grep -a` is deliberate: the log carries occasional non-UTF-8 bytes, and without `-a` GNU grep
+   reports "binary file matches" and prints nothing — which reads exactly like "no hardware
+   transcoding".
+
+### Secondary and unreliable: the Plex dashboard
+
+**Dashboard → Activity** *may* label a transcoding session `Transcode (hw)`. If it does, it agrees
+with the log and you are done. **If it does not, that proves nothing at all** — measured 2026-10-02:
+hardware transcoding active and zero-copy, dashboard silent. Never conclude "software transcoding"
+from the dashboard and never open an investigation on its say-so. Kept here only because it is the
+fastest glance available; it is a convenience, **not evidence**.
+
+### Process-level, while a transcode is in flight: the transcoder's argv
+
+This shows Plex *requesting* hardware, as distinct from reporting it afterwards. Get a shell in the
+pod (if `-it` has no TTY under `dev.sh run`, wrap each line in `sh -c "…"` instead):
 
 ```
 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
-  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- \
-     sh -c "grep -i -m20 -e hardware -e vaapi -e hwdevice \
-     \"/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Logs/Plex Media Server.log\""'
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec -it deploy/plex -- sh'
 ```
 
-Treat those strings as advisory: they are Plex's, not this repo's, and they move between versions.
-Absence of a match is **not** evidence of software transcoding; a VA-API device open is good evidence
-of hardware. The dashboard remains the verdict.
+then, inside the pod:
+
+```
+ps -eo pid,user,comm | grep -i transcoder
+tr '\0' ' ' < /proc/<transcoder-pid>/cmdline | grep -oE '(-hwaccel[a-z_]*|vaapi|renderD[0-9]+)'
+```
+
+`-hwaccel`, `-hwaccel_device`, `vaapi`, `renderD128` present ⇒ Plex is asking for hardware. Keep the
+`grep -oE`: the raw argv contains media paths and session identifiers you do not want in a
+transcript. This only works while a session is actually transcoding.
+
+### Documented false lead: scanning `/proc/*/fd` for a holder of `renderD128`
+
+**It returns nothing even when hardware transcoding is working.** Measured 2026-10-02: a
+`/proc/*/fd` sweep inside the pod found **no** process holding `/dev/dri/renderD128`, while the log
+showed `final decoder: vaapi, final encoder: vaapi` for sessions either side of the scan. Transcode
+sessions are **short** and the scan landed in a gap between two of them. An empty fd scan is a
+**timing artefact, not a finding** — do not report it as evidence of software transcoding, and do
+not escalate on it. Use the argv check above (which has the same timing constraint but tells you
+something when it does catch a session), or just read the log, which is retrospective and therefore
+does not care about timing.
+
+### Why there is no alert — this half was always right
+
+`catalog/plex.yaml` declares no `metricsEndpoint`, so Plex renders **no ServiceMonitor at all** —
+there is no scrape, no transcode-mode metric, and therefore no alert that could fire. Do not open
+work to "alert on software-transcode fallback": with no metric behind it such a rule would be
+permanently inert, and this repo has already been burned at scale by rules that evaluated against
+nothing while looking like coverage (`runbooks/README.md`, "Alerts you should not trust the silence
+of"). If that gap is ever worth closing, the honest order is a real exporter first and a rule
+second.
 
 ## Likely causes, most likely first
 
-When the dashboard still says plain `Transcode`:
+When the **log** says it fell back to software — `final decoder: , final encoder: ` with both
+fields empty. (Not when the dashboard is quiet: the dashboard's silence means nothing, see "How to
+verify".)
 
-1. **The toggle is off.** Overwhelmingly the most likely answer, and the reason this page exists.
-   First-command #4 returns `ABSENT` or `="0"`. Remedy: the manual step above. Check this **before**
-   investigating anything technical.
+1. **The toggle is off.** Historically the most likely answer and the reason this page exists. It was
+   ticked on 2026-10-02 and should stay ticked, but a `/config` restore or a stray UI save can unset
+   it. Remedy: the manual step above. **Do not diagnose this from a missing
+   `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs`** — see first-command #4; only `="0"` is conclusive, and the log line
+   `hardware transcoding: enabled` is the real signal that the toggle took.
 
 2. **The device cannot be `open()`ed — the plugin's cgroup allow rule did not arrive.** Symptom:
    first-command #3 shows `renderD128` present and correctly owned, and the open returns
@@ -276,13 +374,27 @@ When the dashboard still says plain `Transcode`:
 4. **The image changed under you.** See "The floating-image caveat". A `:latest` pull can remove the
    mechanism this feature leans on with no commit in this repo.
 
-5. **The session was never transcoding.** Direct Play / Direct Stream never touches the transcoder, so
-   `Transcode (hw)` cannot appear. Confirm the session actually says `Transcode` before treating it as
-   a hardware failure.
+5. **The session was never transcoding.** Direct Play / Direct Stream never reaches the transcoder,
+   so no `hardware transcoding:` line is written for it at all. An *absent* line is this, not a
+   failure — confirm a transcode actually happened before treating anything as a hardware fault.
 
-6. **The source needs a codec Quick Sync on this generation cannot handle** — e.g. AV1 decode, which
-   Coffee Lake's UHD 630 has no engine for. Plex falls back to software *per stream*. Symptom: some
-   sessions show `(hw)` and others do not. Not a fault.
+6. **The *source* codec may be one this iGPU cannot decode — HYPOTHESIS, not a confirmed
+   diagnosis.** The symptom that points here is fallback on **particular titles** while other
+   sessions are hardware. Measured on prod 2026-10-02, *between* two fully hardware sessions, one
+   session logged:
+
+   ```
+   hardware transcoding: enabled, but no hardware decode accelerator found
+   hardware transcoding: final decoder: , final encoder:
+   ```
+
+   The platform was demonstrably working either side of it, so the likely explanation is the **file**,
+   not the cluster: UHD 630's media engine decodes H.264, HEVC 8-bit and 10-bit, and VP9 — but **not
+   AV1**, and not 10-bit 4:2:2 HEVC. **This was NOT verified against that particular title.** It is
+   inferred from the hardware's capability set and is written here as the lead to check first, not as
+   a finding. So: fallback on *all* files is a platform problem (causes 1-4); fallback on *some*
+   files, check the source codec before suspecting the device, and expect occasional legitimate
+   per-title fallbacks to be normal rather than a fault.
 
 ## Plex will not schedule
 
@@ -360,19 +472,30 @@ infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
 ```
 
 `45-plex-hw-transcode-and-connected-tuner` still present ⇒ the group mechanism is still the one
-described here. Gone or renamed ⇒ stop and re-measure. In particular the "no `supplementalGroups`
-needed" conclusion in `catalog/plex.yaml` and `schemas/renderer-contract.md` is only true while that
-hook exists.
+described here: the hook reads the injected device's **own** ownership, which under the device plugin
+is `root:root`, so it resolves GID `0` (see "When to escalate or stop"). Gone or renamed ⇒ stop and
+re-measure. In particular the "no `supplementalGroups` needed" conclusion in `catalog/plex.yaml` and
+`schemas/renderer-contract.md` is only true while that hook exists.
 
 ## When to escalate or stop
 
 - **Do not add `supplementalGroups` or a `podSecurityContext` to `catalog/plex.yaml`.** It would be
-  **inert**, and it would mislead the next person. Measured in-container 2026-09-30: the image's
-  `cont-init.d` hook stats each `/dev/dri` char device and `usermod -a -G`s the `plex` user into its
-  group *inside* the container, and the service then execs via `s6-setuidgid plex`, which **replaces**
-  the process group list from `/etc/group` rather than appending — `Plex Media Server` runs with
-  `Groups: 100 1000`, root's gid `0` (which PID 1 does hold) gone. Anything Kubernetes supplies is
+  **inert**, and it would mislead the next person. The image's `cont-init.d` hook stats each
+  `/dev/dri` char device and `usermod -a -G`s the `plex` user into **that device's** group, inside
+  the container; the service then execs via `s6-setuidgid plex`, which **rebuilds** the process group
+  list from `/etc/group` rather than appending to it. Anything Kubernetes supplies is therefore
   discarded before Plex starts. `render.py --selftest` asserts that absence deliberately.
+- **GID `992` is a hostPath-era number — do not expect it, and do not read the root group as a
+  defect.** Under the device plugin the injected `/dev/dri/renderD128` arrives **`root:root`**, so
+  the hook resolves GID **`0`** and adds `plex` to the **root group**. Measured 2026-10-02:
+  `Plex Media Server` runs with `Groups: 0 100 1000`, and `id plex` reports
+  `groups=1000(plex),0(root),100(users)`. Under the old hostPath the device was `root:render`
+  (GID 992 on these nodes) and the reading was `Groups: 44 100 992 1000`. **992 is now irrelevant**:
+  if any page, comment or older handoff tells you to expect it, that text is stale and the system
+  you are looking at is working. The root-group membership is an inherent property of the plugin's
+  `DeviceSpec` — it injects the host device with its host ownership — **not** a defect, and **not** a
+  reason to reintroduce `supplementalGroups`, which would still be a no-op for the reason in the
+  bullet above.
 - **Do not reach for `privileged: true`.** Kyverno `restrict-host-namespaces` is Enforce and will
   reject it — and it would not help: `uid 0` failed the same `open()` in the 2026-09-30 measurement,
   because root does not bypass the cgroup device gate.
@@ -390,7 +513,8 @@ hook exists.
   watch state (`policy: daily-offcluster`). The transcode toggle is one preference, not a reason to
   lose the DB.
 - **Stop and get the operator** if the device cannot be opened from the pod as uid 1000 (cause #2
-  confirmed) *under the current mechanism*. The next step is a platform change in
+  confirmed) *under the current mechanism* — note that this open **passed** on 2026-10-02
+  (`RW-OPEN-OK` as uid 1000 via `s6-setuidgid plex`), so a failure now is a regression. The next step is a platform change in
   `platform/intel-gpu-plugin/`, with its own PR, not more poking at this workload.
 
 ## Known gaps, deliberately not fixed here
@@ -413,10 +537,25 @@ Recorded so they are findable, and so nobody assumes they were overlooked:
 
 ---
 Source of truth: `runbooks/plex-quicksync.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
-The node measurements (all three prod nodes) and the in-container image measurements cited here were
-taken **2026-09-30** against `plexinc/pms-docker` digest `sha256:e0ab27395614…`
-(`plexmediaserver 1.43.4.10903`). The `EPERM` open measurements, the `Groups: 44 100 992 1000`
-reading and the `gpu.intel.com/i915: 1` allocatable/DaemonSet readings were taken **2026-10-01**.
-Hardware transcoding has **still not been observed working**: the open test has not been re-run under
-the device-plugin mechanism (it cannot be, until that merges and Flux reconciles), and the Plex-side
-toggle is still unset.
+
+**Hardware transcoding is CONFIRMED WORKING on prod, measured 2026-10-02.** From
+`Plex Media Server.log` in the running pod: API `vaapi` on `/dev/dri/renderD128`
+(`Intel CoffeeLake-S GT2 [UHD Graphics 630]`), `using hardware decode accelerator vaapi`,
+`zero-copy support present`, `using zero-copy transcoding`, and
+`final decoder: vaapi, final encoder: vaapi`. Also measured in the same pod: `RW-OPEN-OK` opening
+`/dev/dri/renderD128` as uid 1000 via `s6-setuidgid plex`; the pod spec carrying
+`{"limits":{"gpu.intel.com/i915":"1"},"requests":{"gpu.intel.com/i915":"1"}}`; `Groups: 0 100 1000`
+and `id plex` → `groups=1000(plex),0(root),100(users)`; and `HardwareDevicePath` present in
+`Preferences.xml` while `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` was absent from all 27 attributes.
+
+Earlier readings, kept for provenance and **superseded** where they conflict: the node measurements
+(all three prod nodes) and the in-container image measurements taken **2026-09-30** against
+`plexinc/pms-docker` digest `sha256:e0ab27395614…` (`plexmediaserver 1.43.4.10903`); the hostPath
+`EPERM` open results and the `Groups: 44 100 992 1000` / GID-992 group reading, **2026-10-01, under
+the hostPath mechanism that no longer exists**; and the `gpu.intel.com/i915: 1` allocatable and
+`intel-gpu-plugin` DaemonSet readings, **2026-10-01**.
+
+What this page still does **not** establish: that any particular title's software fallback was caused
+by its source codec (cause 6 is an unverified hypothesis), and that Plex's dashboard *ever* labels a
+session `Transcode (hw)` on this deployment — it has not been observed doing so, which is exactly why
+the log is now the primary check.