chore(decisions): record the rebase onto main @ 08deb20

The runbooks/README.md conflict was two index entries appended at the
same point, not a semantic one. Both kept, in the file's grouped order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml

@@ -100,11 +100,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=platform-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_jackett
+        - --cookie-domain=jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -125,6 +128,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml

@@ -108,11 +108,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=platform-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_pihole
+        - --cookie-domain=pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -133,6 +136,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

apps/wave-0/plex.yaml

@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ spec:
         - name: media
           mountPath: /media
           readOnly: true
+        - name: dri
+          mountPath: /dev/dri
       volumes:
       - name: config
         persistentVolumeClaim:
@@ -150,6 +152,10 @@ spec:
       - name: media
         persistentVolumeClaim:
           claimName: plex-media
+      - name: dri
+        hostPath:
+          path: /dev/dri
+          type: DirectoryOrCreate
 ---
 # Service
 apiVersion: v1

apps/wave-0/qbittorrent.yaml

@@ -171,11 +171,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=platform-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_qbittorrent
+        - --cookie-domain=qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

apps/wave-1/radarr.yaml

@@ -153,11 +153,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=platform-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_radarr
+        - --cookie-domain=radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

apps/wave-1/sonarr.yaml

@@ -153,11 +153,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=platform-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_sonarr
+        - --cookie-domain=sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

catalog/plex.yaml

@@ -80,6 +80,58 @@ env:
   # remote access are UNVERIFIED. Advertising a wrong/internal-only URL breaks remote access for ALL
   # clients, so per "prefer safety over completeness" it is left unset. FOLLOW-UP: once remote
   # reachability through the Gateway is confirmed, set ADVERTISE_IP: "https://plex.home.keithjackson.dev:443".
+# HARDWARE TRANSCODING — the host iGPU's render device (schema 1.8.0 `hardware`; R-PLAT-02).
+# INTENT ONLY. This says "this workload needs an Intel Quick Sync render device"; it does NOT name a
+# device path. The renderer currently satisfies it with exactly two things — a `/dev/dri` hostPath
+# volume (`type: DirectoryOrCreate`) and a read-write `/dev/dri` volumeMount on the app container —
+# and nothing else: no nodeSelector, no privileged, no resources (schemas/renderer-contract.md
+# `### hardware`). If that mechanism is later replaced by the Intel GPU device plugin
+# (`gpu.intel.com/i915`), it is a `catalog/render.py` change and THIS BLOCK DOES NOT MOVE. Do not
+# "simplify" it into a raw `/dev/...` path; that is the whole point of the enum.
+#
+# THE DEVICE IS PRESENT ON EVERY PROD NODE, so nothing had to be installed and Plex can land
+# anywhere. Measured on all three nodes 2026-09-30: `/dev/dri/renderD128` present, `root:render`,
+# GID 992, mode 0660, driver `i915` bound (NOT `xe`), UHD Graphics 630 on an i7-9700T, media engines
+# `vcs0`/`vecs0` live, iGPU enabled in BIOS on each. Plex happens to run on k3s-prod-2 today, but
+# that is scheduler history rather than a requirement — this field deliberately renders no
+# nodeSelector, because placement is a separate concern with its own justification.
+#
+# NO `podSecurityContext.supplementalGroups`, AND ADDING ONE WOULD BE INERT — do not "fix" this.
+# The device is `root:render` 0660 and this process is uid/gid 1000, so the obvious move is to push
+# the host `render` GID in as a supplemental group. It cannot work here. MEASURED IN THE RUNNING
+# CONTAINER, 2026-09-30: the image's own
+# `/etc/cont-init.d/45-plex-hw-transcode-and-connected-tuner` stats every char device under
+# `/dev/dri`, `groupadd`s a matching group INSIDE the container when none exists, and
+# `usermod -a -G`s the `plex` user into it — every start, nothing hardcoded, which also makes a host
+# GID renumbering self-healing (no GID is pinned anywhere in this repo). The service then execs via
+# `s6-setuidgid plex`, and `s6-setuidgid` REPLACES the process group list from `/etc/group` rather
+# than appending to it: `Plex Media Server` runs with `Groups: 100 1000`, and root's gid `0` — which
+# PID 1 (`s6-svscan`) does hold — is GONE. Anything Kubernetes supplies therefore reaches s6-svscan
+# and is discarded before Plex ever starts. Mounting the device is sufficient; the group is the
+# image's job and it does it correctly. `render.py --selftest` asserts the ABSENCE of a pod
+# securityContext for this field precisely so nobody adds an inert one back later.
+#
+# `DirectoryOrCreate` IS THE SAFE FAILURE MODE, not laziness. A node that comes back without the
+# device (rebuild, BIOS reset, driver regression, hardware swap) gets an empty directory and Plex
+# degrades to SOFTWARE transcoding. `Directory` would fail the mount instead — and because
+# `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` with `apps-wave-1` `dependsOn` it, that would stall the WHOLE app
+# tier for a feature that is not load-bearing. The price, stated plainly: a missing device is
+# SILENT. This SD renders no `metricsEndpoint`, so there is no ServiceMonitor, no transcode-mode
+# metric, and no alert that could ever fire. The only proof is an operator reading the Plex
+# dashboard.
+#
+# THE LAST MILE IS A MANUAL OPERATOR STEP AND CANNOT LIVE IN THIS REPO. Mounting the device does
+# not enable hardware transcoding — Plex's own `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` preference does, and it
+# is ABSENT from `Preferences.xml` today (the toggle has never been on). NO environment variable can
+# set it: a grep of the running image's entire init surface (`/etc/cont-init.d`, `/etc/services.d`,
+# `/etc/fix-attrs.d`, `/plex-common.sh`, `/usr/local/bin`) found ZERO `PLEX_PREFERENCE*` support,
+# and the six prefs the image does write (`MachineIdentifier`, `ProcessedMachineIdentifier`,
+# `PlexOnlineToken`, `customConnections`, `allowedNetworks`, `TranscoderTempDirectory`) are all
+# unrelated. So there is no GitOps path to the toggle; an operator clicks it once in the web UI.
+# `runbooks/plex-quicksync.md` is that procedure, plus how to verify it took and the
+# device-cgroup failure mode to expect first.
+hardware:
+  gpu: intel-quicksync
 exposure: public              # edge port-forward + public DNS; clients + Seerr reach it (docs/09; R-DNS/R-NET)
 egress: internet              # normal WAN egress (docs/03; R-NET-05)
 storage:

catalog/render.py

@@ -133,6 +133,45 @@ OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE = "quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1"
 OAUTH2_PROXY_PORT = 4180
 KEYCLOAK_ISSUER = f"https://keycloak.{ZONE}/realms/homelab"
 
+# --- session lifetime -----------------------------------------------------------------
+# Keycloak's `homelab` realm issues access tokens with a 300-SECOND lifetime. MEASURED on a
+# live session, not read off a config page: `expires - created = 300.000s` exactly, with
+# `refresh_token:true` on the same line — so the proxy HOLDS a refresh token it was never
+# told to spend. `--cookie-refresh` defaults to 0, which the v7.8.1 binary's own help spells
+# "0 to disable", so every one of these sidecars dropped its session five minutes after
+# sign-in and sent the user back to Keycloak. Refresh at HALF the lifetime: two chances to
+# renew before expiry, so one failed refresh is not an immediate logout.
+#
+# NOTE for anyone tempted to add `--session-cookie-minimal` to shrink the cookie: it is
+# MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with this (provoked: "cookie_refresh > 0 requires oauth tokens in
+# sessions"). Dropping --pass-access-token is a least-privilege argument, not a size fix.
+OAUTH2_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_S = 300
+OAUTH2_COOKIE_REFRESH = "2m30s"
+
+# --- metrics --------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# oauth2-proxy serves /metrics only when --metrics-address is given; with it absent the
+# listener never starts, so NO per-app sidecar was scrapable at all (measured: `ports` was
+# `['http']` on all six). 44180 is the platform's existing convention, not a guess — the
+# SHARED proxy already runs `--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180` with a `metrics` port and 2
+# ready endpoints. The flag is confirmed present in the PINNED v7.8.1 binary (`--help`),
+# which matters because the shared proxy is on v7.15.3 and could not have vouched for it.
+#
+# THIS IS THE PREREQUISITE ONLY, AND IT IS NOT YET SCRAPED. A container port is not a
+# Service port: these sidecars' Services expose the app port and :4180, and each namespace's
+# default-deny baseline has `ingress: []`, so Prometheus can neither resolve nor reach this
+# port until a Service port (or PodMonitor), a monitoring-ingress allow and a ServiceMonitor
+# are added. Do not read this flag as "metrics are working".
+OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_PORT = 44180
+
+# --- Hardware capability: `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync` ------------------------------
+# The ServiceDefinition declares the CAPABILITY (schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json
+# `hardware.gpu`); everything below is the MECHANISM that currently satisfies it and is
+# deliberately confined to this file. Swapping to the Intel GPU device plugin
+# (`gpu.intel.com/i915` resource requests instead of a hostPath) is a change here and
+# nowhere else -- no catalog entry moves.
+DRI_VOLUME_NAME = "dri"
+DRI_DEVICE_DIR = "/dev/dri"
+
 
 # =============================================================================
 # Defaults (renderer-contract.md "Default posture") — materialize BEFORE mapping.
@@ -483,6 +522,46 @@ def r_deployment(s: dict) -> dict:
                 "persistentVolumeClaim": {"claimName": f"{s['name']}-{vol['name']}"},
             }
         )
+    # hardware capability (schema-optional): `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync` means this
+    # workload needs the host iGPU's render node for hardware video transcode. The SD says
+    # only that; the wiring below is the platform's current mechanism for satisfying it.
+    #
+    # `type: DirectoryOrCreate` is DELIBERATE and load-bearing -- do NOT "tighten" it to
+    # `Directory`. A node that comes back without the render device (rebuild, BIOS change,
+    # driver regression, hardware swap) must degrade the workload to SOFTWARE transcoding,
+    # not fail the mount: `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` and `apps-wave-1` dependsOn it, so a
+    # failed hostPath mount stalls the entire app tier for the sake of a feature that is not
+    # load-bearing. `DirectoryOrCreate` turns that failure mode into "transcodes in
+    # software" instead of "the app tier does not reconcile". /dev is tmpfs, so the empty
+    # directory the kubelet creates on such a node leaves nothing durable behind.
+    #
+    # The mount is deliberately NOT readOnly: VA-API opens the render node read-write.
+    #
+    # `podSecurityContext.supplementalGroups` is DELIBERATELY NOT SET here, and adding it
+    # would be a regression, not a hardening. MEASURED in the running container on prod-2,
+    # 2026-09-30: the image's own cont-init hook
+    # `/etc/cont-init.d/45-plex-hw-transcode-and-connected-tuner` `find`s every char device
+    # under /dev/dri, `stat -c '%g'` each one's GID, `groupadd`s a matching group INSIDE the
+    # container when none exists, and `usermod -a -G` the app user into it -- every start,
+    # nothing hardcoded. cont-init.d completes before services.d, so the account database
+    # s6 reads at exec time already carries the group. The service is then started with
+    # `exec s6-setuidgid plex ...`, and `s6-setuidgid` REPLACES the process group list from
+    # /etc/group rather than appending to it: `Plex Media Server` runs with
+    # `Uid: 1000  Gid: 1000  Groups: 100 1000` -- root's gid 0, which PID 1 (s6-svscan) does
+    # have, is GONE. Anything Kubernetes puts in supplementalGroups reaches s6-svscan and is
+    # then discarded before the app ever starts. MOUNTING THE DEVICE IS SUFFICIENT; the
+    # group handling is the image's job and it does it correctly. A supplementalGroups entry
+    # here would be inert AND would mislead whoever debugs this next.
+    hw_gpu = (s.get("hardware") or {}).get("gpu")
+    if hw_gpu == "intel-quicksync":
+        volume_mounts.append({"name": DRI_VOLUME_NAME, "mountPath": DRI_DEVICE_DIR})
+        volumes.append(
+            {
+                "name": DRI_VOLUME_NAME,
+                "hostPath": {"path": DRI_DEVICE_DIR, "type": "DirectoryOrCreate"},
+            }
+        )
+
     if volume_mounts:
         container["volumeMounts"] = volume_mounts
 
@@ -971,7 +1050,11 @@ def _oauth2_sidecar_container(s: dict) -> dict:
     auth.group (R-IDP-06: a valid session is not enough — the user must be in an authorized group,
     else /oauth2 returns 403). client-id/secret + cookie-secret come by name from the SOPS-encrypted
     `<app>-oauth2-proxy` Secret (R-IDP-04). Single provider => --skip-provider-button 302s straight
-    to Keycloak. The sidecar->app hop is pod-local (127.0.0.1) and not subject to network policy."""
+    to Keycloak. The sidecar->app hop is pod-local (127.0.0.1) and not subject to network policy.
+
+    --cookie-name and --cookie-domain are DERIVED per app (see the block comment on those two
+    args): every instance holds a different cookie-secret, so sharing one cookie name across the
+    zone makes the instances evict each other's sessions."""
     route = s["ingressRoutes"][0]
     host = route["host"]
     upstream_port = route["port"]
@@ -991,11 +1074,64 @@ def _oauth2_sidecar_container(s: dict) -> dict:
     args += [
         "--skip-provider-button=true",
         f"--redirect-url=https://{host}/oauth2/callback",
-        f"--cookie-domain=.{ZONE}",
+        # ── COOKIE ISOLATION (fleet fix 2026-09-30; crafty's 2026-09-29 fix, generalized) ──────
+        # EVERY oauth2-proxy on this platform — this sidecar, its four siblings, and the SHARED
+        # forward-auth proxy (platform/oauth2-proxy) — is an INDEPENDENT instance holding its OWN
+        # `cookie-secret`. Measured on prod 2026-09-30: seven `*-oauth2-proxy` Secrets, seven
+        # DISTINCT cookie-secret values, so no instance can decrypt any other's cookie.
+        #
+        # Left at oauth2-proxy's DEFAULTS (`_oauth2_proxy` / `_oauth2_proxy_csrf`) and scoped to
+        # `.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, the browser therefore keeps ONE cookie pair for ALL of them:
+        # whichever proxy authenticates last OVERWRITES every other's session. The loser logs
+        # "No valid authentication in request" and bounces to Keycloak, which — the SSO session
+        # still being live — redirects straight back and overwrites the cookie again. The
+        # user-visible symptom is "I signed into Keycloak but I'm still not signed in", and it
+        # sends you hunting in Keycloak, where nothing is wrong. Silent, intermittent, and
+        # misattributed: the exact shape this repo keeps getting burned by.
+        #
+        # WHY IT WAS *INTERMITTENT*, AND WHY RELOADING NEVER HELPED. The loser does not merely
+        # fail to read the cookie — it calls ClearSession, which EXPIRES the cookie on its own
+        # --cookie-domain, i.e. the whole zone. And the *arr UIs poll: measured on prod, radarr's
+        # rejections are `/api/v3/command`, `/api/v3/queue/details` and `/signalr/negotiate`,
+        # 155 of them in 12h against 1 successful auth. Every poll carrying a cookie radarr
+        # cannot decrypt calls ClearSession again — so A LEFT-OPEN RADARR TAB DELETES JACKETT'S
+        # COOKIE EVERY FEW SECONDS, from another namespace, with no user action at all. That is
+        # the intermittency, and it is why signing in again fixed nothing for longer than the
+        # gap between two polls. Host-scoping the cookie (below) is what contains the blast
+        # radius of a ClearSession to the app that issued it.
+        #
+        # DERIVED, NOT LISTED. Both flags come from the ServiceDefinition (`s['name']` and the
+        # route host), so a NEW forward-auth app is isolated the moment it is onboarded. A
+        # per-service table would leave the next app defaulting into the collision, which is how
+        # twelve ServiceMonitors acquired one identical wrong port name in a single edit.
+        # conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct asserts both properties
+        # over the WHOLE tree and asserts THIS function derives rather than lists.
+        #
+        #   --cookie-name   a unique name per instance, so two sessions cannot alias at all.
+        #                   This is the fix; the one below is defence in depth.
+        #   --cookie-domain HOST-scoped. A per-app reverse proxy has no reason to broadcast its
+        #                   session cookie to every other host in the zone — a zone-wide cookie
+        #                   is transmitted to every sibling app on `.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, so any
+        #                   FUTURE name collision would again be platform-wide instead of
+        #                   contained. The SHARED forward-auth proxy keeps the wide scope,
+        #                   because cross-host forward-auth is precisely its job.
+        #
+        # --whitelist-domain deliberately stays ZONE-WIDE: it governs permitted post-login
+        # REDIRECT targets, not cookie scope. Narrowing it here would break the sign-in bounce.
+        f"--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_{s['name']}",
+        f"--cookie-domain={host}",
         f"--whitelist-domain=.{ZONE}",
         "--cookie-secure=true",
+        # Spend the refresh token the proxy already holds, at half the 300s access-token
+        # lifetime. Without this the session dies 5 minutes after sign-in. See
+        # OAUTH2_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_S above for the measurement and the
+        # --session-cookie-minimal incompatibility.
+        f"--cookie-refresh={OAUTH2_COOKIE_REFRESH}",
         "--pass-access-token=true",
         "--set-xauthrequest=true",
+        # Start the /metrics listener. Prerequisite only — not yet reachable by Prometheus;
+        # see OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_PORT above for exactly what is still missing.
+        f"--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:{OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_PORT}",
     ]
     secret = f"{s['name']}-oauth2-proxy"
     return {
@@ -1017,7 +1153,10 @@ def _oauth2_sidecar_container(s: dict) -> dict:
                 "valueFrom": {"secretKeyRef": {"name": secret, "key": "cookie-secret"}},
             },
         ],
-        "ports": [{"name": "http", "containerPort": OAUTH2_PROXY_PORT, "protocol": "TCP"}],
+        "ports": [
+            {"name": "http", "containerPort": OAUTH2_PROXY_PORT, "protocol": "TCP"},
+            {"name": "metrics", "containerPort": OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_PORT, "protocol": "TCP"},
+        ],
         "resources": {
             "requests": {"cpu": "25m", "memory": "64Mi"},
             "limits": {"memory": "128Mi"},
@@ -2440,6 +2579,83 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
         "an SD without podSecurityContext must not gain a pod securityContext",
     )
 
+    # 6b) hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync -> a /dev/dri hostPath volume and a read-write mount
+    #     on the app container, and NOTHING ELSE. The SD declares the CAPABILITY; these
+    #     assertions pin the MECHANISM that currently satisfies it -- including what it
+    #     deliberately does NOT emit -- so a change to it is a deliberate, visible edit.
+    hw_docs = render(
+        {
+            "name": "hw",
+            "source": {"image": "a:1"},
+            "hardware": {"gpu": "intel-quicksync"},
+        }
+    )
+    hw_pod = next(
+        d[1] for d in hw_docs if d[1]["kind"] == "Deployment"
+    )["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    check(
+        {
+            "name": "dri",
+            "hostPath": {"path": "/dev/dri", "type": "DirectoryOrCreate"},
+        }
+        in hw_pod.get("volumes", []),
+        "hardware.gpu=intel-quicksync must render a /dev/dri hostPath volume "
+        "with type DirectoryOrCreate (a GPU-less node must degrade, not fail the mount)",
+    )
+    hw_mounts = hw_pod["containers"][0].get("volumeMounts", [])
+    check(
+        {"name": "dri", "mountPath": "/dev/dri"} in hw_mounts,
+        "hardware.gpu=intel-quicksync must mount /dev/dri READ-WRITE on the app container",
+    )
+    # The device mount is the WHOLE feature: no pod securityContext is invented. The image's
+    # own cont-init hook adds the app user to the device's group inside the container, and
+    # s6-setuidgid discards any Kubernetes-supplied supplementalGroups anyway (see the
+    # emission site). Asserting the absence is what stops someone adding an inert one back.
+    check(
+        "securityContext" not in hw_pod,
+        "hardware.gpu must NOT invent a pod securityContext (supplementalGroups is inert "
+        "under s6-setuidgid; the image's cont-init hook handles the device group)",
+    )
+    # Nothing privileged, and no node pinning: Kyverno restrict-host-namespaces (Enforce)
+    # rejects `privileged: true` in an app namespace, and placement is a separate concern
+    # with its own justification -- this field is about the DEVICE only.
+    check(
+        "privileged" not in hw_pod.get("securityContext", {})
+        and "securityContext" not in hw_pod["containers"][0]
+        and "nodeSelector" not in hw_pod,
+        "hardware.gpu must emit no privileged securityContext and no nodeSelector",
+    )
+    # The regression that matters: absence renders NOTHING. Mirrors the podSecurityContext
+    # negative above -- an SD that does not opt in must be byte-identical to before.
+    nohw_pod = next(
+        d[1] for d in render({"name": "nohw", "source": {"image": "a:1"}})
+        if d[1]["kind"] == "Deployment"
+    )["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    check(
+        "volumes" not in nohw_pod
+        and "volumeMounts" not in nohw_pod["containers"][0]
+        and "securityContext" not in nohw_pod,
+        "an SD without `hardware` must gain no dri volume, no mount and no securityContext",
+    )
+    # An SD that declares BOTH keeps its own podSecurityContext exactly as written -- the
+    # hardware field neither adds to it nor rewrites it.
+    hwm_pod = next(
+        d[1]
+        for d in render(
+            {
+                "name": "hwm",
+                "source": {"image": "a:1"},
+                "hardware": {"gpu": "intel-quicksync"},
+                "podSecurityContext": {"fsGroup": 1001, "supplementalGroups": [44]},
+            }
+        )
+        if d[1]["kind"] == "Deployment"
+    )["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    check(
+        hwm_pod["securityContext"] == {"fsGroup": 1001, "supplementalGroups": [44]},
+        "hardware.gpu must leave the SD's own podSecurityContext untouched",
+    )
+
     # 6c) forward-auth (Option B): an exposed forward-auth app gets an oauth2-proxy sidecar that
     #     fronts the Gateway path (fail-closed), while oidc/native/none apps are unchanged.
     fa_docs = render(
@@ -2475,6 +2691,86 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
         not any(a.startswith("--ssl-upstream-insecure-skip-verify") for a in side["args"]),
         "http upstream must NOT skip TLS verify (that flag is only for crafty's self-signed https)",
     )
+    # COOKIE ISOLATION. Every oauth2-proxy instance holds its own cookie-secret, so two instances
+    # sharing a cookie NAME on a shared DOMAIN evict each other's sessions silently. Both flags
+    # must be DERIVED from this service, not defaulted and not listed.
+    check(
+        "--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_fa" in side["args"],
+        "sidecar must declare a cookie name DERIVED from the service name — the oauth2-proxy "
+        "default (_oauth2_proxy) is shared with every other instance on the zone",
+    )
+    check(
+        "--cookie-domain=fa.home.keithjackson.dev" in side["args"],
+        "sidecar cookie-domain must be HOST-scoped (the app's own host), not zone-wide",
+    )
+    check(
+        f"--whitelist-domain=.{ZONE}" in side["args"],
+        "whitelist-domain must stay ZONE-wide — it governs post-login redirect targets, not "
+        "cookie scope; narrowing it breaks the sign-in bounce",
+    )
+    # SESSION LIFETIME. `--cookie-refresh` must be present AND strictly shorter than the
+    # measured 300s access-token lifetime, or the session dies mid-use. Asserted as a parsed
+    # duration rather than a string match, so "2m30s" -> "150s" -> "2.5m" stays green and a
+    # silent widening past the token lifetime does not.
+    refresh = next((a.split("=", 1)[1] for a in side["args"]
+                    if a.startswith("--cookie-refresh=")), None)
+    check(refresh is not None,
+          "sidecar must set --cookie-refresh; the v7.8.1 default is 0 = DISABLED, so the "
+          "session dies when the access token expires and the user is bounced to Keycloak")
+    if refresh is not None:
+        _m = re.fullmatch(r"(?:(\d+)m)?(?:(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)s)?", refresh)
+        _secs = (int(_m.group(1) or 0) * 60 + float(_m.group(2) or 0)) if _m else -1
+        check(0 < _secs < OAUTH2_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_S,
+              f"--cookie-refresh={refresh} parses to {_secs}s, which is not inside "
+              f"(0, {OAUTH2_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_S}s). A refresh at or past the access-token "
+              f"lifetime never renews in time, which is the same logout it was added to stop")
+    check(
+        not any(a.startswith("--session-cookie-minimal") for a in side["args"]),
+        "--session-cookie-minimal is MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with --cookie-refresh "
+        "('cookie_refresh > 0 requires oauth tokens in sessions') — the proxy refuses to start",
+    )
+    # METRICS. The listener does not exist unless the flag is given, and the port must be
+    # DECLARED or nothing can ever select it (neither a Service port nor a PodMonitor).
+    check(
+        f"--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:{OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_PORT}" in side["args"],
+        "sidecar must start the /metrics listener; without --metrics-address it is not merely "
+        "unscraped, it is not serving at all",
+    )
+    check(
+        [p["name"] for p in side["ports"]] == ["http", "metrics"]
+        and {p["containerPort"] for p in side["ports"]}
+        == {OAUTH2_PROXY_PORT, OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_PORT},
+        "sidecar must declare BOTH the http and metrics container ports — an undeclared port "
+        "cannot be named by a Service port or a PodMonitor, so the flag alone is inert",
+    )
+    # Two forward-auth apps must not be able to collide. Renders a SECOND one and compares, so a
+    # future refactor to a constant (or to a per-service table with a copy-paste slip) fails here
+    # rather than silently in a browser six weeks later.
+    fa2_side = next(
+        c
+        for c in next(
+            d[1]
+            for d in render(
+                {
+                    "name": "fa2",
+                    "source": {"image": "a:1"},
+                    "ingressRoutes": [{"host": "fa2.home.keithjackson.dev", "port": 9118}],
+                    "auth": {"mode": "forward-auth", "groups": ["media-users"]},
+                }
+            )
+            if d[1]["kind"] == "Deployment"
+        )["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"]
+        if c["name"] == "oauth2-proxy"
+    )
+
+    def _cookie_name(container):
+        return next(a for a in container["args"] if a.startswith("--cookie-name="))
+
+    check(
+        _cookie_name(side) != _cookie_name(fa2_side),
+        "two forward-auth apps rendered IDENTICAL cookie names — they would overwrite each "
+        "other's session on every sign-in (the 2026-09-29 crafty defect, fleet-wide)",
+    )
     check(
         side["env"][0]["valueFrom"]["secretKeyRef"]["name"] == "fa-oauth2-proxy",
         "sidecar creds must come by name from the per-app <app>-oauth2-proxy Secret (R-IDP-04)",

conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — no two oauth2-proxy instances can share a browser cookie
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+#
+# THE DEFECT THIS CLOSES. Every oauth2-proxy on this platform is an INDEPENDENT instance with
+# its OWN `cookie-secret`: five per-app reverse-proxy sidecars (jackett, pihole, qbittorrent,
+# radarr, sonarr), crafty's, and the SHARED forward-auth proxy. Measured on prod 2026-09-30:
+# seven `*-oauth2-proxy` Secrets, SEVEN DISTINCT cookie-secret values — so no instance can
+# decrypt any other's cookie.
+#
+# They were all emitting oauth2-proxy's DEFAULT cookie names (`_oauth2_proxy` and
+# `_oauth2_proxy_csrf`), scoped to `.${BASE_DOMAIN}`. A cookie is keyed by (name, domain, path),
+# so the browser kept ONE pair for ALL of them. Whichever proxy authenticated last OVERWROTE
+# every other's session; the loser logged `No valid authentication in request`, bounced to
+# Keycloak, and — the SSO session still being live — was redirected straight back and overwrote
+# the cookie again. Six live instances, one cookie, mutual eviction.
+#
+# WHY IT IS THE WORST KIND OF BUG. The symptom is "I signed into Keycloak but I'm still not
+# signed in", which points the investigator at Keycloak, where nothing is wrong. It is
+# INTERMITTENT — it only appears once a browser has visited a SECOND gated app, so the obvious
+# single-app reproduction succeeds — and it is SILENT: every Deployment stays Ready, every
+# Kustomization stays Ready, the proxy's own log line names an authentication failure rather
+# than a collision. It went unnoticed across five services for the whole life of the pattern,
+# and was found only as a side effect of investigating something else (2026-09-29, crafty).
+#
+# WHY A COMMIT IS NOT ENOUGH, AND THIS IS A GATE STAGE. The collision is a property of the
+# PATTERN, not of any one app: the next forward-auth service onboarded inherits the defect by
+# doing nothing at all, because a missing flag IS the bug. Nothing about its absence is loud.
+# This is the same shape as the twelve inert ServiceMonitors in this tree — one omission,
+# copied, invisible for weeks — and the same remedy: make the omission fail the merge.
+#
+# GIVEN every oauth2-proxy instance this repo authors — a container in any manifest (the
+#       rendered sidecars in apps/, crafty's hand-authored one in platform/) and the shared
+#       proxy's HelmRelease values,
+# WHEN  each instance's EFFECTIVE cookie name is resolved (its declared `--cookie-name` /
+#       `OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_NAME`, or oauth2-proxy's built-in default `_oauth2_proxy` when it
+#       declares none — an omission is a NAME, not an absence, and that is the whole bug),
+# THEN  (1) no two instances share an effective cookie name;
+#       (2) no instance's effective name is another's name + `_csrf` — oauth2-proxy derives the
+#           CSRF cookie that way, so `_oauth2_proxy` and `_oauth2_proxy_csrf` as two SESSION
+#           names would collide on the second cookie while looking distinct on the first;
+#       (3) the DEFAULT name has exactly ONE owner and it is the instance declared in
+#           SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER. This is the deliberate ASYMMETRY. The shared
+#           forward-auth proxy MUST keep `_oauth2_proxy`: it is the single session every
+#           OTHER forward-auth-gated surface on the platform rides on, so renaming it signs
+#           every one of them out at once. The rule is therefore NOT "every instance must
+#           declare a name" — it is "the default is a NAME LIKE ANY OTHER, held by exactly one
+#           REGISTERED owner". That formulation needs no exemption from (1), and it closes the
+#           hole an exemption would leave: if the shared proxy is ever removed, an app silently
+#           inheriting the default would still FAIL here instead of quietly becoming its heir;
+#       (4) every instance that is NOT that owner is HOST-SCOPED: its `--cookie-domain` equals
+#           the host of its own `--redirect-url`. See the argument below;
+#       (5) catalog/render.py DERIVES both flags from the ServiceDefinition (the service name
+#           and the route host) and does not carry a per-service table. A list is how twelve
+#           ServiceMonitors acquired one identical wrong port name in a single edit, and a list
+#           leaves the NEXT app defaulting into the collision;
+#       (6) the SHIPPED renderer is proven END-TO-END on synthetic ServiceDefinitions, run as a
+#           subprocess: two forward-auth fixtures must yield two different, non-default cookie
+#           names, each scoped to its own host. Without this, once the tree is compliant (1)-(4)
+#           are satisfied by a tree with nothing left to catch, and a guard whose only evidence
+#           is "nothing failed" cannot be told apart from one that stopped working;
+#   AND (7) the check is LOAD-BEARING: this Test DECLARES `conformance.home.k3s/scope:
+#           whole-repo`, so ci/l0.sh Stage 3b's `--include-scope whole-repo` unions it into
+#           EVERY gate run, and ci/gate.sh blocks the merge when the l0 stage fails. It
+#           deliberately adds NO stage to ci/l0.sh — tests/l0-static/whole-repo-invariants-wired
+#           fails the gate if anyone adds one.
+#
+# WHY SCOPE, NOT REQUIREMENTS: ci/touched-requirements.sh maps `apps/*` to R-IDP-02/R-IDP-06
+# today, but the instances live in THREE unrelated subtrees (apps/, platform/crafty/,
+# platform/oauth2-proxy/) and the file most likely to reintroduce the defect is
+# catalog/render.py, which maps to R-GITOPS-02 and to no identity requirement at all. A
+# requirement-scoped selection would filter this check out of exactly the change that breaks it.
+#
+# ON ASSERTION (4), HOST-SCOPED COOKIE-DOMAIN — the argument, and the decision.
+#   AGAINST asserting it (overreach): distinct NAMES already close the eviction bug completely.
+#   Two cookies with different names do not overwrite each other however wide their domains are,
+#   so (4) fixes nothing that (1) has not already fixed. `--cookie-domain` is also a legitimate
+#   knob — a future proxy fronting two hostnames of one app would need a wider value — and a
+#   check that fails correct configurations is a check someone eventually disables.
+#   FOR asserting it (and this wins): a zone-wide cookie is TRANSMITTED BY THE BROWSER TO EVERY
+#   HOST IN THE ZONE. qBittorrent's session token is therefore sent to pihole, to radarr, to
+#   sonarr, and to every other name under `.${BASE_DOMAIN}` — including hosts behind no proxy at
+#   all. That is a session-credential disclosure across trust boundaries that no one needs and
+#   nobody asked for; the sidecar's session is only ever meaningful to the one app it fronts.
+#   And it is what makes a FUTURE name collision catastrophic rather than contained: with
+#   host-scoped cookies, two instances that accidentally share a name cannot even see each
+#   other's cookie, so the failure this whole test exists to prevent degrades from platform-wide
+#   to nothing. Defence in depth on the exact axis that already failed once.
+#   DECISION: assert it, for every instance except the registered shared proxy — whose whole
+#   job IS cross-host forward-auth, and which is exempted by name and with a reason, not by
+#   loosening the rule. `--whitelist-domain` is deliberately NOT touched: it governs permitted
+#   post-login REDIRECT targets, not cookie scope, and narrowing it breaks the sign-in bounce.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is an offline assertion script (PyYAML, as catalog/render.py
+# and the sibling l0-static checks use); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it
+# directly, and this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# NOT proven (honest gaps; this is STATIC, with no cluster and no browser):
+#   - That anyone can actually sign in. No browser round-trip is performed, and none can be
+#     from L0. The 2026-09-29 crafty entry recorded the same gap and it is still open: the
+#     symptom has never been REPRODUCED in a browser, so this is a latent-bug fix reasoned from
+#     measured configuration, not a fix watched to work.
+#   - That the LIVE pods carry what the tree says. git is not the cluster (CLAUDE.md §2b). The
+#     live flags were measured separately, once, by hand; nothing here re-measures them, and a
+#     hand-applied drift would not be visible to this check.
+#   - That the cookie-secrets really differ. That is a Secret comparison and belongs in-cluster;
+#     it was measured out of band (seven distinct values, compared without printing any of
+#     them). If they were ever made IDENTICAL the collision would become harmless — but sharing
+#     one session-encryption key across trust zones is a worse idea than the bug it would mask,
+#     so this check does not offer it as an alternative and does not look for it.
+#   - Anything about the CONTENT of a session, group authorization, or the CSRF cookie's own
+#     behaviour. Names and domains only.
+#   - It does not read ../home-network-k3s. The spec is read-only (R-TEST-06).
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-IDP-02: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-IDP-06: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-IDP-02, R-IDP-06"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    # WHOLE-REPO SCOPE — the instances span apps/wave-0, apps/wave-1, platform/crafty and
+    # platform/oauth2-proxy, and the generator that emits five of them is catalog/render.py.
+    # No single requirement path-maps to that set, and the renderer maps to no identity
+    # requirement at all, so a requirement-scoped selection would skip this check on precisely
+    # the change that can reintroduce the defect fleet-wide in one edit.
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      No two oauth2-proxy instances can share a browser cookie: every instance's effective
+      cookie name is unique, the built-in default belongs to exactly one registered owner (the
+      shared forward-auth proxy, which cannot be renamed without signing every gated app out),
+      every other instance is host-scoped, and catalog/render.py derives both flags from the
+      ServiceDefinition rather than from a per-service list — proven end-to-end on synthetic
+      fixtures so the guard stays falsifiable once the tree is clean.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-no-two-oauth2-proxy-instances-share-a-cookie
+      description: >-
+        Inventory every oauth2-proxy container and HelmRelease in the tree, resolve each one's
+        effective cookie name (declared, or oauth2-proxy's default when omitted), assert
+        pairwise distinctness including the session/CSRF derivation, ratchet the single
+        registered owner of the default name, assert host-scoped cookie-domain on every other
+        instance, assert catalog/render.py derives rather than lists, and prove the shipped
+        renderer on two synthetic forward-auth ServiceDefinitions.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,498 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC CHECK — no two oauth2-proxy instances can share a browser cookie.
+# See chainsaw-test.yaml's header for WHY this exists, what it measured, and the argument
+# for assertion (4). In one paragraph:
+#
+# Every oauth2-proxy here holds its OWN cookie-secret (seven distinct values on prod,
+# 2026-09-30), so two instances sharing a cookie NAME on a shared DOMAIN cannot read each
+# other's session — they OVERWRITE it. The loser bounces to Keycloak, is redirected straight
+# back by the live SSO session, and overwrites the winner in turn. The symptom is "I signed
+# into Keycloak but I'm still not signed in", it only shows up after a second gated app is
+# visited, and nothing in the cluster reports an error. A missing --cookie-name IS the bug,
+# so the next forward-auth app inherits it by doing nothing.
+#
+# Exit 0 = all assertions pass. Exit 1 = a failure. Exit 3 (honest SKIP, which the runner
+# turns into rc 3 = UNWIRED, never green, because this test declares the whole-repo scope)
+# only if the tree contains no oauth2-proxy instance at all — genuinely nothing to audit.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+# Honest SKIP (never green for a scope-declaring test) if there is nothing to audit at all.
+# Matches the IMAGE every instance runs and the CHART the shared one installs; if NEITHER
+# appears anywhere, the forward-auth pattern has left this repo and the check has no subject.
+#
+# ANCHORED ON `image:` DELIBERATELY. A bare `oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:` also matches
+# platform/oauth2-proxy/forward-auth-cec.yaml's Envoy cluster reference
+# (`serviceName: oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:80` — namespace/service:port, not a registry path).
+# That file configures the ext_authz listener that CALLS the proxy; it runs no proxy and holds
+# no cookie flags, so counting it made the grep/parse cross-check below report a phantom
+# unaudited instance.
+if ! grep -rlE 'image:[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]]*oauth2-proxy|chart:[[:space:]]*oauth2-proxy' \
+       "${ROOT}/apps" "${ROOT}/platform" "${ROOT}/catalog" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "check SKIPPED: no oauth2-proxy image or chart found under apps/, platform/ or catalog/ — nothing to audit" >&2
+  exit 3
+fi
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+"""Static audit: no two oauth2-proxy instances can share a browser cookie.
+
+PyYAML (the same dependency as catalog/render.py and the sibling l0-static checks) rather
+than line-based parsing: a container's args live in a nested structure and a HelmRelease's
+flags live in a values map, and a line-based reader of either is precisely the approximate
+parser that silently stops matching — the failure class this check exists to prevent.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+sys.dont_write_bytecode = True          # keep __pycache__ out of the tracked tree
+
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def read(p: Path) -> str:
+    try:
+        return p.read_text()
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
+        return ""
+
+
+# oauth2-proxy's OWN built-in defaults (pkg/apis/options/cookie.go): the session cookie is
+# `_oauth2_proxy` and the CSRF cookie is that name with `_csrf` appended. An instance that
+# declares nothing is NOT unconfigured — it has claimed this exact name, which is why the
+# inventory below treats the default as a name like any other rather than as an absence.
+DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME = "_oauth2_proxy"
+CSRF_SUFFIX = "_csrf"
+
+# =============================================================================================
+# REGISTER — SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER. Exactly one entry, and it must match a real instance.
+#
+# The one instance permitted to hold DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME, and the one permitted a zone-wide
+# cookie-domain. Both exemptions belong to the SAME object for the SAME reason, so they are one
+# register rather than two: the shared forward-auth proxy is not a per-app sidecar, it is the
+# single session that every forward-auth-gated surface on the platform rides on. Renaming its
+# cookie signs all of them out simultaneously, and host-scoping it would break the cross-host
+# forward-auth that is its entire job.
+#
+# Shrink-only, and exact in BOTH directions: an entry that matches no instance FAILS as stale
+# (the proxy was renamed or removed and the exemption is now a hole), and an instance holding
+# the default WITHOUT an entry FAILS as an unregistered heir. Adding an entry is a review event
+# on a sensitive path.
+#
+# Keyed by "<relpath>:<instance id>".
+# =============================================================================================
+SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER: dict[str, str] = {
+    "platform/oauth2-proxy/helmrelease.yaml:oauth2-proxy":
+        "The SHARED forward-auth proxy (ADR-0014, platform/oauth2-proxy/README.md). It is the "
+        "single authenticator behind every forward-auth-gated surface that is NOT fronted by "
+        "its own sidecar, so its cookie is the platform session: renaming it signs every one "
+        "of them out at once, and that is why the 2026-09-29 crafty fix changed only the "
+        "sidecar side. Its cookie-domain is zone-wide for the same structural reason — "
+        "cross-host forward-auth is what it is for.",
+}
+
+
+def is_test_fixture(p: Path) -> bool:
+    """conformance/tests/**/{golden,fixtures}/** is assertion DATA, not deployed manifests.
+
+    Auditing a golden would be auditing a copy of something already audited through apps/.
+    Same exclusion the sibling l0-static checks make, and the same "reference, not
+    declaration" distinction ci/touched-requirements.sh draws for fixture paths.
+    """
+    parts = p.parts
+    return "conformance" in parts and ("golden" in parts or "fixtures" in parts)
+
+
+def iter_containers(node):
+    """Yield every container mapping under any `containers`/`initContainers` list, at any depth.
+
+    Depth-agnostic on purpose: a sidecar sits under spec.template.spec.containers in a
+    Deployment, but the same container shape appears under a CronJob's jobTemplate, a
+    DaemonSet, or a Pod, and a reader that hardcoded one path would silently stop seeing an
+    instance the day one moved.
+    """
+    if isinstance(node, dict):
+        for key, val in node.items():
+            if key in ("containers", "initContainers") and isinstance(val, list):
+                for c in val:
+                    if isinstance(c, dict):
+                        yield c
+            else:
+                yield from iter_containers(val)
+    elif isinstance(node, list):
+        for item in node:
+            yield from iter_containers(item)
+
+
+def flag_from_args(args: list, flag: str):
+    """Value of `--flag=value` or `--flag value` in an argv list, else None."""
+    pref = "--" + flag
+    for i, a in enumerate(args):
+        if not isinstance(a, str):
+            continue
+        if a.startswith(pref + "="):
+            return a.split("=", 1)[1]
+        if a == pref and i + 1 < len(args) and isinstance(args[i + 1], str):
+            return args[i + 1]
+    return None
+
+
+def host_of(url):
+    """Host part of an https://host/path URL, else None."""
+    if not isinstance(url, str):
+        return None
+    m = re.match(r"^https?://([^/]+)", url)
+    return m.group(1) if m else None
+
+
+# ============================================================ (0) INVENTORY
+# instances: list of dicts {rel, ident, kind, declared_name, cookie_domain, redirect_host}
+instances: list[dict] = []
+unparseable: list[str] = []
+# Files the grep gate says contain an instance, so the parse can be cross-checked against it.
+grep_files: set[str] = set()
+
+for p in sorted(ROOT.rglob("*.yaml")):
+    relparts = p.relative_to(ROOT).parent.parts
+    # NESTED WORKTREES: skip dot-DIRECTORIES (.git, .claude) while still matching dot-FILES
+    # such as .sops.yaml. .claude/worktrees/agent-*/ holds full repo copies for isolated agent
+    # runs, so a bare rglob audited up to 18 duplicates of every file — which both invents
+    # FAILs and, worse, can satisfy a "something declares X" check from a copy rather than from
+    # real source. Same fix as egress-paths-selected-by-rules. .claude/ is gitignored.
+    if any(part.startswith(".") for part in relparts) or is_test_fixture(p) or ".sops." in p.name:
+        continue
+    txt = read(p)
+    if not txt:
+        continue
+    rel = str(p.relative_to(ROOT))
+    # Same anchoring as check.sh's skip gate: `image:` (or a chart name), never a bare path —
+    # see the comment there for the Envoy `serviceName: oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:80` near-miss.
+    if re.search(r"image:\s*\S*oauth2-proxy|chart:\s*oauth2-proxy", txt):
+        grep_files.add(rel)
+    elif "oauth2-proxy" not in txt:
+        continue
+    try:
+        docs = [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(txt) if isinstance(d, dict)]
+    except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
+        unparseable.append(f"{rel} ({exc})")
+        continue
+    for d in docs:
+        # --- shape 1: a container running the oauth2-proxy image -------------------------
+        for c in iter_containers(d):
+            image = str(c.get("image") or "")
+            name = str(c.get("name") or "")
+            if "oauth2-proxy" not in image and name != "oauth2-proxy":
+                continue
+            args = [a for a in (list(c.get("args") or []) + list(c.get("command") or []))]
+            env = {e.get("name"): e.get("value")
+                   for e in (c.get("env") or []) if isinstance(e, dict) and "value" in e}
+            owner = (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") or "?"
+            instances.append({
+                "rel": rel,
+                "ident": f"{owner}/{name or 'oauth2-proxy'}",
+                "kind": "container",
+                "declared_name": flag_from_args(args, "cookie-name")
+                                 or env.get("OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_NAME"),
+                "cookie_domain": flag_from_args(args, "cookie-domain")
+                                 or env.get("OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_DOMAIN"),
+                "redirect_host": host_of(flag_from_args(args, "redirect-url")
+                                         or env.get("OAUTH2_PROXY_REDIRECT_URL")),
+            })
+        # --- shape 2: the shared proxy's HelmRelease values ------------------------------
+        if d.get("kind") != "HelmRelease":
+            continue
+        spec = d.get("spec") or {}
+        chart = (((spec.get("chart") or {}).get("spec") or {}).get("chart") or "")
+        if "oauth2-proxy" not in str(chart):
+            continue
+        values = spec.get("values") or {}
+        extra = values.get("extraArgs") or {}
+        if isinstance(extra, list):          # the chart also accepts a bare argv list
+            extra = {a.lstrip("-").split("=", 1)[0]: a.split("=", 1)[1]
+                     for a in extra if isinstance(a, str) and "=" in a}
+        cfg = values.get("config") or {}
+        get = lambda k: extra.get(k, cfg.get(k))     # noqa: E731 - two-source lookup, used 3x
+        instances.append({
+            "rel": rel,
+            "ident": str((d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") or "oauth2-proxy"),
+            "kind": "helmrelease",
+            "declared_name": get("cookie-name"),
+            "cookie_domain": get("cookie-domain"),
+            "redirect_host": host_of(get("redirect-url")),
+        })
+
+for u in unparseable:
+    check(False, f"{u} is not parseable YAML — every oauth2-proxy instance in it went unaudited")
+
+for ins in instances:
+    ins["key"] = f"{ins['rel']}:{ins['ident']}"
+    # THE CORE MODELLING DECISION: an omitted --cookie-name is not "unset", it is a CLAIM on
+    # oauth2-proxy's built-in default. Resolving it here is what lets assertion (1) below be a
+    # plain distinctness test with no special case, and it is exactly the step whose absence
+    # made the defect invisible to every reviewer who read these manifests.
+    ins["effective_name"] = ins["declared_name"] or DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME
+
+# Anti-vacuous. The floor is deliberately low (a real removal should not turn this check red),
+# so the load-bearing guard is the grep/parse CROSS-CHECK beneath it: every file the cheap
+# text scan says holds an instance must yield at least one PARSED instance. A parser that
+# quietly stopped matching would keep the floor and fail this.
+check(len(instances) >= 5,
+      f"only {len(instances)} oauth2-proxy instance(s) parsed out of the tree. This repo "
+      f"authors more than that (five rendered sidecars, crafty's, and the shared proxy), so "
+      f"the inventory has stopped seeing instances and every assertion below would pass "
+      f"vacuously while a collision went unaudited")
+
+parsed_files = {ins["rel"] for ins in instances}
+for rel in sorted(grep_files - parsed_files):
+    check(False,
+          f"{rel} contains an oauth2-proxy image or chart reference but NO instance was parsed "
+          f"out of it. Either it uses a shape iter_containers()/the HelmRelease reader does not "
+          f"recognise, or the file stopped parsing. Its cookie configuration is UNAUDITED, which "
+          f"is the same state the whole fleet was in before this check existed")
+
+# ============================================================ (1) DISTINCT EFFECTIVE NAMES
+by_name: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+for ins in instances:
+    by_name.setdefault(ins["effective_name"], []).append(ins)
+
+for nm, group in sorted(by_name.items()):
+    if len(group) < 2:
+        continue
+    who = ", ".join(sorted(g["key"] for g in group))
+    default_note = (
+        " Every one of them OMITS --cookie-name, so they are all claiming oauth2-proxy's "
+        "built-in default. Omitting the flag is not neutral: it IS this collision."
+        if nm == DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME else "")
+    check(False,
+          f"{len(group)} oauth2-proxy instances share the cookie name '{nm}': {who}.{default_note}\n"
+          f"       WHY THIS IS A BUG AND NOT A STYLE RULE: these are INDEPENDENT instances with "
+          f"DIFFERENT cookie-secrets (measured on prod 2026-09-30: seven distinct values), so "
+          f"neither can DECRYPT the other's cookie — it can only OVERWRITE it. A browser keys a "
+          f"cookie by (name, domain, path), so signing into one app destroys the session of every "
+          f"other app sharing that key. The loser logs 'No valid authentication in request', "
+          f"bounces to Keycloak, is redirected straight back because the SSO session is still "
+          f"live, and overwrites the winner in turn. The user sees 'I signed into Keycloak but "
+          f"I'm still not signed in' and goes looking in Keycloak, where nothing is wrong.\n"
+          f"       FIX: give each per-app instance its own --cookie-name. For a service rendered "
+          f"from catalog/, do NOT hand-edit the golden — catalog/render.py derives the flag from "
+          f"the service name; re-render instead (ci/render-golden.sh's header has the canonical "
+          f"command). Exactly one instance may hold '{DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME}', and it must be the "
+          f"one registered in SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER.")
+
+# ============================================================ (2) SESSION vs CSRF DERIVATION
+# oauth2-proxy names the CSRF cookie <cookie-name>_csrf. So a SESSION name that happens to equal
+# another instance's name + "_csrf" collides on the CSRF cookie while assertion (1) sees two
+# perfectly distinct strings. This is the near-miss the obvious fix invites: naming the shared
+# proxy's neighbour `_oauth2_proxy_csrf` reads as "clearly different" and is not.
+effective = {ins["effective_name"] for ins in instances}
+for ins in sorted(instances, key=lambda i: i["key"]):
+    base = ins["effective_name"]
+    if not base.endswith(CSRF_SUFFIX):
+        continue
+    victim = base[: -len(CSRF_SUFFIX)]
+    check(victim not in effective,
+          f"{ins['key']} uses the SESSION cookie name '{base}', which is exactly the CSRF cookie "
+          f"oauth2-proxy derives for the instance named '{victim}' (it appends '{CSRF_SUFFIX}'). "
+          f"The two session names look distinct and the CSRF cookies collide, so sign-in breaks "
+          f"with a state-mismatch instead of a session loss — the same bug wearing a different "
+          f"error message. Pick a name that is not another instance's name + '{CSRF_SUFFIX}'")
+
+# ============================================================ (3) THE DEFAULT HAS ONE OWNER
+default_holders = sorted(ins["key"] for ins in instances
+                         if ins["effective_name"] == DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME)
+registered = set(SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER)
+
+for key in sorted(registered - set(ins["key"] for ins in instances)):
+    check(False,
+          f"SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER registers '{key}', but no such oauth2-proxy instance "
+          f"exists in the tree. The register is SHRINK-ONLY and exact: a stale entry is a "
+          f"standing exemption for an object that is gone, so the next instance to inherit the "
+          f"default name would be silently excused. Remove the entry, or restore the instance")
+
+for key in default_holders:
+    check(key in registered,
+          f"{key} holds oauth2-proxy's DEFAULT cookie name '{DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME}' but is NOT "
+          f"registered in SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER. Exactly ONE instance may hold the default, "
+          f"and it is the SHARED forward-auth proxy — whose cookie is the platform-wide session "
+          f"every forward-auth-gated surface rides on, so renaming IT signs them all out at once. "
+          f"Every other instance must declare its own --cookie-name. If this instance really is "
+          f"the new shared proxy, register it here with the reason; if it is a per-app sidecar, "
+          f"give it a unique name")
+
+check(len(default_holders) <= 1,
+      f"{len(default_holders)} instances hold the default cookie name: {', '.join(default_holders)}. "
+      f"The default is a NAME, not an absence — it can have exactly one owner")
+
+# ============================================================ (4) HOST-SCOPED COOKIE DOMAIN
+# See the chainsaw-test header for the argument (distinct names alone already fix the eviction;
+# host-scoping is asserted anyway because a zone-wide cookie is TRANSMITTED to every host in the
+# zone, and because it makes a future name collision contained instead of platform-wide).
+for ins in sorted(instances, key=lambda i: i["key"]):
+    if ins["key"] in registered:
+        continue                          # the shared proxy: zone-wide by design, registered
+    dom, rhost = ins["cookie_domain"], ins["redirect_host"]
+    check(dom is not None,
+          f"{ins['key']} declares no --cookie-domain. oauth2-proxy then scopes the cookie to the "
+          f"request host, which happens to be correct — but it is correct BY ACCIDENT and says "
+          f"nothing to the next reader. Declare it explicitly as this app's own host")
+    if dom is None:
+        continue
+    check(not dom.startswith("."),
+          f"{ins['key']} sets --cookie-domain={dom}. A leading dot makes the cookie ZONE-WIDE: "
+          f"the browser sends this app's session token to every other host under that domain, "
+          f"including hosts behind no proxy at all, and it is what turns any future cookie-name "
+          f"collision into a platform-wide outage instead of a contained one. Scope it to this "
+          f"app's own host. Only the registered shared forward-auth proxy may be zone-wide, "
+          f"because cross-host forward-auth is its job")
+    if rhost:
+        check(dom == rhost,
+              f"{ins['key']} sets --cookie-domain={dom} but its --redirect-url host is {rhost}. "
+              f"The cookie is then set for a domain the sign-in flow never returns to (or for a "
+              f"wider one than this app owns), so the session either does not stick or leaks "
+              f"beyond the app. Both flags describe the SAME app: make them agree")
+
+# ============================================================ (5) THE RENDERER DERIVES
+# Five of these instances are GENERATED. Auditing only the goldens would let someone "fix" the
+# tree by hand and leave the generator emitting the defect for the next service onboarded — and
+# the next re-render would then silently revert the hand fix.
+render_py = ROOT / "catalog" / "render.py"
+check(render_py.is_file(),
+      "catalog/render.py is missing — the generator of five of these instances cannot be audited")
+if render_py.is_file():
+    src = read(render_py)
+    m = re.search(r"def _oauth2_sidecar_container\(.*?\n(?=\n*def |\n*# =)", src, re.S)
+    fn = m.group(0) if m else ""
+    check(bool(fn),
+          "could not locate _oauth2_sidecar_container() in catalog/render.py. It was renamed or "
+          "removed; assertions (5) below cannot run, and the generator is unaudited")
+    if fn:
+        cookie_name_lines = [ln for ln in fn.splitlines() if "--cookie-name" in ln]
+        check(bool(cookie_name_lines),
+              "catalog/render.py's _oauth2_sidecar_container() emits NO --cookie-name at all, so "
+              "every service it renders claims oauth2-proxy's default and collides with every "
+              "other. This is the defect itself, back in the one place that reintroduces it "
+              "fleet-wide in a single edit")
+        check(any("s['name']" in ln or 's["name"]' in ln for ln in cookie_name_lines),
+              "catalog/render.py emits --cookie-name without DERIVING it from the "
+              "ServiceDefinition's own name. A constant collides with every sibling by "
+              "construction; a per-service table leaves the NEXT app onboarded defaulting into "
+              "the collision, which is how twelve ServiceMonitors acquired one identical wrong "
+              "port name in a single edit. Derive it from s['name']")
+        cookie_dom_lines = [ln for ln in fn.splitlines() if "--cookie-domain" in ln]
+        check(any("{host}" in ln for ln in cookie_dom_lines),
+              "catalog/render.py's sidecar --cookie-domain is not derived from the route host. A "
+              "zone-wide literal (`.{ZONE}`) broadcasts every app's session cookie across the "
+              "whole zone — see assertion (4)")
+        check(not any(re.search(r"--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_[a-z0-9]", ln) for ln in cookie_name_lines),
+              "catalog/render.py hardcodes a literal service name into --cookie-name. Whatever "
+              "service that is, every OTHER service now renders the same constant and they all "
+              "collide. Derive the name instead")
+
+# ============================================================ (6) PROVE THE SHIPPED RENDERER
+# Once the tree is compliant, (1)-(4) have nothing left to catch and their passing is evidence
+# of nothing. This runs the SHIPPED renderer as a SUBPROCESS on two synthetic ServiceDefinitions
+# and asserts the property directly, so the guard stays falsifiable.
+def _sd(name: str, port: int) -> str:
+    return yaml.safe_dump({
+        "name": name,
+        "kind": "container",
+        "source": {"image": "example/app:1"},
+        "exposure": "internal",
+        "ingressRoutes": [{"host": f"{name}.home.keithjackson.dev", "port": port}],
+        "auth": {"mode": "forward-auth", "groups": ["platform-admins"]},
+    }, sort_keys=False)
+
+
+def _sidecar_args(rendered: str) -> list:
+    for doc in yaml.safe_load_all(rendered):
+        if not isinstance(doc, dict) or doc.get("kind") != "Deployment":
+            continue
+        for c in iter_containers(doc):
+            if c.get("name") == "oauth2-proxy":
+                return list(c.get("args") or [])
+    return []
+
+
+if render_py.is_file():
+    fixtures = {"cookiefixa": 8111, "cookiefixb": 8112}
+    rendered_args: dict[str, list] = {}
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+        for svc, port in fixtures.items():
+            f = Path(td) / f"{svc}.yaml"
+            f.write_text(_sd(svc, port))
+            proc = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(render_py), str(f)],
+                                  capture_output=True, text=True)
+            check(proc.returncode == 0,
+                  f"the shipped catalog/render.py failed on a synthetic forward-auth fixture "
+                  f"({svc}): rc={proc.returncode} {proc.stderr.strip()[:200]}")
+            if proc.returncode == 0:
+                rendered_args[svc] = _sidecar_args(proc.stdout)
+
+    names, domains = {}, {}
+    for svc, args in rendered_args.items():
+        names[svc] = flag_from_args(args, "cookie-name")
+        domains[svc] = flag_from_args(args, "cookie-domain")
+        check(bool(args),
+              f"the shipped renderer produced no oauth2-proxy sidecar for synthetic forward-auth "
+              f"fixture {svc} — the sidecar is how a forward-auth app is gated at all (R-IDP-02)")
+        check(names[svc] not in (None, DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME),
+              f"the shipped renderer gave synthetic fixture {svc} the cookie name "
+              f"{names[svc]!r}. A newly-onboarded forward-auth app would therefore default "
+              f"straight into the fleet collision — which is exactly how five services acquired "
+              f"this defect without anyone making a decision")
+        check(domains[svc] == f"{svc}.home.keithjackson.dev",
+              f"the shipped renderer scoped synthetic fixture {svc}'s cookie to "
+              f"{domains[svc]!r} rather than to its own host — a newly-onboarded app would "
+              f"broadcast its session cookie across the whole zone")
+        check(any(isinstance(a, str) and a.startswith("--whitelist-domain=.") for a in args),
+              f"synthetic fixture {svc} lost its ZONE-WIDE --whitelist-domain. That flag governs "
+              f"permitted post-login REDIRECT targets, not cookie scope; narrowing it with the "
+              f"cookie domain breaks the sign-in bounce")
+
+    if len(rendered_args) == 2:
+        a, b = sorted(rendered_args)
+        check(names[a] != names[b],
+              f"the shipped renderer gave two DIFFERENT synthetic services the SAME cookie name "
+              f"({names[a]!r}). Whatever the committed goldens currently look like, the generator "
+              f"will collide every forward-auth app it renders from now on")
+        check(domains[a] != domains[b],
+              f"the shipped renderer gave two different synthetic services the same cookie domain "
+              f"({domains[a]!r}) — the cookies would share a scope even with distinct names")
+
+# ============================================================ VERDICT
+inv = " | ".join(f"{i['key']} -> {i['effective_name']} @ {i['cookie_domain'] or '<host>'}"
+                 for i in sorted(instances, key=lambda x: x["key"]))
+print(f"oauth2-proxy instances audited ({len(instances)}): {inv}")
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"\nCHECK FAIL (oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct): {len(FAILURES)} failed, "
+          f"{CHECKS - len(FAILURES)} passed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  FAIL {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"check OK: oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct — {CHECKS} assertions (R-IDP-02, R-IDP-06)")
+PY

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/container-workload-render/golden/expected.yaml

@@ -76,11 +76,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=platform-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://paas-demo.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_paas-demo
+        - --cookie-domain=paas-demo.home.keithjackson.dev
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -101,6 +104,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/egress-class-render/golden/egress-internet.expected.yaml

@@ -99,11 +99,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=media-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_sonarr
+        - --cookie-domain=sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

conformance/tests/l1-rendering/egress-class-render/golden/egress-vpn.expected.yaml

@@ -99,11 +99,14 @@ spec:
         - --allowed-group=media-admins
         - --skip-provider-button=true
         - --redirect-url=https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
-        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_sonarr
+        - --cookie-domain=sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev
         - --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
         - --cookie-secure=true
+        - --cookie-refresh=2m30s
         - --pass-access-token=true
         - --set-xauthrequest=true
+        - --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
         env:
         - name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
           valueFrom:
@@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ spec:
         - name: http
           containerPort: 4180
           protocol: TCP
+        - name: metrics
+          containerPort: 44180
+          protocol: TCP
         resources:
           requests:
             cpu: 25m

decisions/2026-09-30-node-health-render-device.md

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+---
+date: 2026-09-30
+branch: feat/node-health-render-device
+title: The Intel render device is now self-re-measuring, not a fact someone checked once
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+### Why this probe has value at all
+
+**Nothing else in the platform would notice the device going missing.** Plex exposes no
+ServiceMonitor, so no alert fires on a silent fall back to software transcoding. And the
+manifest side mounts the device with `hostPath type: DirectoryOrCreate`, which means a node
+*without* the device mounts an **empty directory** — Plex starts, runs, and degrades quietly
+rather than failing loudly. There is no crash loop, no failed mount, no alert: just a hot CPU.
+This check is the only thing in the system that would surface it, which is the actual
+justification for the role carrying it.
+
+### The change
+
+`roles/node_health` grew a graphics / render-device probe. Nothing was installed, no module
+was loaded, no group was changed, nothing was rebooted: the prod nodes already have a working
+Intel render device (measured by hand on all three on 2026-09-30) and the point of this change
+is that the measurement now **re-runs forever** instead of decaying silently in a handoff note.
+
+The failure this exists to catch is silent by construction. Plex hardware-transcodes through
+`/dev/dri/renderD128`; if that node stops existing — node rebuild, a BIOS change that disables
+the onboard IGD, a kernel that binds a different DRM driver, a driver regression — Plex falls
+back to software transcoding on its own and the only symptom is a hot CPU.
+
+Four files:
+
+- `files/node_health_collect.py` — new `collect_graphics()`, wired into the **unprivileged**
+  pass (`main()`). Everything it reads is world-readable: `lstat()` on `/dev/dri/*`,
+  `grp.getgrgid()` for the owning group name, the `/sys/class/drm/card*/device/driver` symlink
+  target for the bound driver, `/sys/bus/pci/devices/*/class` for display-class (PCI base class
+  `0x03`) devices whether or not a driver is bound, `/sys/class/drm/card*/engine/*` for the
+  `vcs*`/`vecs*` media engines, `/proc/modules`, `/proc/cmdline`, and
+  `/sys/module/{i915,xe}/parameters/enable_guc`. `lspci` and `vainfo` were added to the
+  existing tool probe; both are optional and neither is depended on.
+- `tasks/assess.yml` — one shared derive task plus three checks: `graphics.render_device`
+  (PASS/FAIL/SKIP), `graphics.drm_driver` (PASS/WARN/FAIL/SKIP), `graphics.media_stack`
+  (INFO/SKIP).
+- `defaults/main.yml` — `node_health_graphics_expected_driver: i915`, so the one comparison the
+  check makes is data rather than task logic.
+- `templates/summary.txt.j2` — a `GRAPHICS / RENDER DEVICE` section, and
+  `roles/node_health/README.md` gained a section explaining the design and two new "known
+  limits".
+
+Three design rulings worth stating, because each is the kind of thing a later edit would get
+wrong:
+
+1. **The render node's GID is reported, never asserted.** It read `root:render`, gid **992**,
+   mode `0660` on all three prod nodes. The check does *not* compare against `992`. `render` is
+   a **systemd dynamic** allocation (`systemd-sysusers`), not a Debian static gid from
+   `base-passwd`, so a rebuild can legitimately move it — and Plex's container entrypoint stats
+   the device and joins whichever group owns it, so drift genuinely is not a fault. The
+   observed group name and number appear in the detail line, which makes drift *visible*
+   without making it an error. A hard `!= 992` would be a false alarm waiting for a reinstall.
+2. **The PCI scan is deliberately separate from the DRM scan.** `/sys/class/drm/card*` exists
+   only once a driver has *bound*, so a GPU with nothing attached has no `card0` and would
+   otherwise be indistinguishable from a machine with no GPU. Scanning the PCI bus separately
+   is what lets "no display device at all" be an honest **SKIP** (a VM guest — the same
+   convention `thermal.max` already uses for "no sensor on this hardware") while "a GPU is on
+   the bus and there is still no render node" is a **FAIL**.
+3. **GuC/HuC and host VAAPI userspace are INFO and must stay INFO.** GuC/HuC off
+   (`i915.enable_guc=0`) is an accepted state here and costs low-power H.264 encode *quality*
+   only. No host `vainfo` is not a defect at all — Plex ships its own libva and media driver
+   inside its container. Grading either would put a permanent WARN on a chosen configuration,
+   or invite someone to `apt install vainfo` on a node to clear a health check, and this role
+   installs nothing.
+
+`xe` bound instead of `i915` is a **WARN**, not a FAIL: the device still works, but the two
+drivers do not share a userspace media stack. On these nodes `xe.ko.xz` exists on disk and is
+bound to nothing.
+
+## What I verified
+
+### The real prod run (read-only, all three nodes)
+
+`--list-hosts` first, every time. It named exactly three hosts and nothing else:
+
+    play #1 (k3s_prod): Inspect node hardware health (read-only)
+        pattern: ['k3s_prod']
+        hosts (3): k3s-prod-3  k3s-prod-2  k3s-prod-1
+
+Then `--syntax-check` (rc 0), then the run:
+
+    ansible-playbook playbooks/node-health.yml -e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod --limit k3s_prod
+
+    k3s-prod-1 : ok=51  changed=3  unreachable=0  failed=0  skipped=1
+    k3s-prod-2 : ok=51  changed=2  unreachable=0  failed=0  skipped=1
+    k3s-prod-3 : ok=51  changed=2  unreachable=0  failed=0  skipped=1
+    PLAY rc=0
+
+(The `changed=` counts are the *controller-side* artifact writes under
+`infra/ansible/_artifacts/node-health/`, delegated to localhost. Nothing on any node changed —
+the collector task is `changed_when: false` and the role touches nothing.)
+
+All three nodes graded **PASS / PASS / INFO** on the new checks, 0 FAIL overall:
+
+    k3s-prod-1  VERDICT  0 FAIL · 1 WARN · 18 PASS · 2 SKIP · 6 INFO
+    k3s-prod-2  VERDICT  0 FAIL · 3 WARN · 15 PASS · 3 SKIP · 6 INFO
+    k3s-prod-3  VERDICT  0 FAIL · 2 WARN · 17 PASS · 2 SKIP · 6 INFO
+
+    [PASS] graphics.render_device — DRM render node present for hardware transcoding (/dev/dri/renderD*)
+    [PASS] graphics.drm_driver   — DRM driver bound to the display device (expected i915)
+    [INFO] graphics.media_stack  — Media engines, GuC/HuC firmware and host VAAPI userspace (informational)
+
+(The pre-existing WARNs and SKIPs are other checks — SMART, memattr, resolvers — and are not
+mine; none of them moved.)
+
+The new report section, **byte-identical on all three nodes**:
+
+    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     GRAPHICS / RENDER DEVICE (the Plex hardware-transcoding path)
+    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     pci  0000:00:02.0 00:02.0 VGA compatible controller [0300]: Intel Corporation CoffeeLake-S GT2 [UHD Graphics 630] [8086:3e98] (rev 02)
+                  driver i915
+     drm  card0        driver i915     at 0000:00:02.0  engines bcs0 rcs0 vcs0 vecs0
+     dev  card0        character special  mode 0660  root:video gid 44
+     dev  renderD128   character special  mode 0660  root:render gid 992
+     GuC/HuC     NOT READ — /sys/module/i915/parameters/enable_guc is not
+                  readable without root (i915 module parameters are mode 0400)
+                 no i915/xe parameter on the kernel cmdline
+     modules     amdgpu=false, i915=true, nouveau=false, nvidia=false, radeon=false, xe=false (/proc/modules — corroboration only; the bound-driver symlink above decides)
+     vainfo      NOT installed on this host — not a defect: Plex ships its own libva/media driver inside its container
+
+That reproduces every item of the 2026-09-30 hand measurement independently: `renderD128`
+character special, `root:render`, **gid 992**, mode `0660`; `card0` `root:video` gid 44 mode
+`0660`; `i915` bound; `xe` **not** loaded and bound to nothing; `[8086:3e98] (rev 02)`
+CoffeeLake-S GT2 UHD Graphics 630 at `00:02.0`; `vcs0` and `vecs0` live; no host `vainfo`.
+
+**One measured correction to my own phase-1 assumption:** `lspci` **is** present on all three
+prod nodes (`/usr/bin/lspci` — Debian ships `pciutils` by default). I had written that it was
+absent. It is still *treated* as optional, because `pciutils` is genuinely not declared in
+`node_baseline_packages` and depending on an undeclared package would be wrong — but the
+comments and README that asserted it was missing were factually wrong and are now corrected.
+Its presence is why the `pci` line above carries a readable device name rather than bare IDs.
+
+### The gate
+
+    DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null ENGINE=<shim> ./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c './ci/gate.sh'
+    GATE rc=3
+
+**rc 3 — UNDETERMINED. NOT green.** Nothing failed, and nothing is certified either. Exactly
+three stages did not run, all three the known local ceiling from a worktree, and **no fourth
+skip**:
+
+    [skip] spec-immutability  spec repo not present at /work/../home-network-k3s (set SPEC_REPO)
+    [skip] gitea-settings     SETTINGS_API_TOKEN is not set — cannot read the live Gitea rule
+    [skip] conformance        no cluster configured (CLUSTER_AVAILABLE!=true) — L2/L3 NOT RUN
+
+    [ ok ] decisions-log: pass      [ ok ] lint: pass       [ ok ] l0: pass
+    [ ok ] render-golden: pass      [ ok ] l1: pass         [ ok ] approval-policy: pass
+
+Both CLAUDE.md §3 worktree workarounds were needed and both worked: `DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null`
+(the credential in the main checkout was **not** copied) and an `ENGINE` shim that bind-mounts
+the main checkout's `.git` read-only. No `tracked_files()` traceback appeared, which is how I
+know the shim took effect rather than the git stages silently degrading.
+
+`ansible-lint` was **not** run, because **`ci/` does not invoke it anywhere** — I grepped
+`ci/` and `.gitea/` and the lint stage is `yamllint -c ci/yamllint.yaml` only. I am not
+claiming to have matched a lint convention that does not exist.
+
+### The CI gate on the PR — a green tick that is exit 3, read from the log
+
+The required context `gate / gate (pull_request)` reported **`success`, "Successful in 1m40s"**
+on commit `a78f010`. That description matters: a *skipped* Gitea job reports `success` with
+"Has been skipped", so this one genuinely ran, and 1m40s matches CLAUDE.md §2's ~1m35s.
+
+**But the green tick does NOT mean `gate.sh` returned 0.** `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml:138` is
+`run: ./ci/gate.sh || [ "$?" -eq 3 ]` — the job tolerates rc 3 by design. So I fetched the job
+log (`/actions/runs/173/jobs/0/logs`; the `/api/v1/.../tasks/{id}/logs` endpoints 404 on this
+Gitea, the web route serves it) and read the gate's own headline:
+
+    [fail] MERGE GATE: UNDETERMINED — greenness was NOT ESTABLISHED.
+    [fail]   Stages that did not run: spec-immutability
+
+**So CI is also rc 3, with exactly ONE stage skipped — `spec-immutability`.** The green Gitea
+check is the tolerance swallowing that 3, not a rc 0.
+
+**CI verified two things my local run could not, and both came back green:**
+
+    [ ok ] stage gitea-settings: pass
+    [ ok ]   enable_push = false          enable_status_check = true
+    [ ok ]   required_approvals = 1       block_admin_merge_override = true
+    [ ok ]   block_on_rejected_reviews = true   dismiss_stale_approvals = true
+    [ ok ]   runners online: 1 (>= 1)
+    [ ok ] Gitea settings match the declaration.
+    [ ok ] stage approval-policy: pass
+    [ ok ] no architecturally/security-relevant paths touched — the GATE is the approver.
+
+My local run **skipped** `gitea-settings` (no `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN`) and could not give
+`approval-policy` a PR number. CI has the secret and `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true"`, so a skip
+there would have failed the job. That is measured confirmation that the live Gitea matches
+`infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json`, and that `infra/ansible/**` needs no human
+reviewer. `lint` passed over 405 files. `conformance` SKIPPED in CI too
+(`CLUSTER_AVAILABLE != true`), so L2/L3 remains unverified there as well.
+
+Corroborated independently: `GET /repos/.../branches/main` →
+`protected=true user_can_push=false enable_status_check=true required_approvals=1`,
+contexts `["gate / gate (pull_request)"]`; `GET /admin/actions/runners` → `incluster-dind
+status=online`. And note the commit's **combined** state is `pending`, not success, because
+`gate / conformance (pull_request)` sits at "Blocked by required conditions" — that context is
+not in the required list, so it does not block, but the PR is not "all green" either.
+
+The gate's `lint` stage passed with one `line too long` **warning** on
+`roles/node_health/tasks/assess.yml:189` — that is pre-existing, in the SMART block, well
+above my insertion point, and warnings do not fail the stage.
+
+### Offline work (before the lock was released)
+
+- `python3 -m py_compile` on the collector: clean.
+- `collect_graphics()` executed for real against this workstation's hardware (an unrelated
+  machine, Raptor Lake-S UHD Graphics + an NVIDIA discrete GPU) and returned the whole
+  structure with no exception, correctly reporting two cards, two render nodes, the bound
+  driver per card, the `vcs0/vcs1/vecs0` media engines, and `enable_guc` as *not readable
+  without root* rather than as a fabricated `0`.
+- That last point is a real finding and changed the design: `/sys/module/i915/parameters/*` is
+  **mode 0400**, so an unprivileged pass cannot read `enable_guc`. It now reports
+  `NOT READ — <reason>` and `/proc/cmdline` is read as the world-readable second source. An
+  earlier draft would have silently reported a null.
+- Two other bugs found and fixed by running it rather than reasoning about it:
+  `/dev/dri/by-path` is a **directory** and was being `lstat()`ed as a device; and
+  `/sys/class/drm` carries one entry per *connector* (`card0-HDMI-A-1`), which had to be
+  excluded from the card scan.
+- All three checks and the new template section were rendered through a standalone Jinja
+  harness (Ansible is not on the host — CLAUDE.md §5) against **seven** fact sets: the real
+  workstation; GPU present with the render node removed; no display device at all; `xe` bound
+  in place of `i915`; a display device with **no** driver bound; `renderD128` present but not a
+  character device; and a shape with neither `lspci` nor `vainfo`. Zero template errors, and
+  the statuses came out as designed — `FAIL/PASS/INFO`, `SKIP/SKIP/SKIP`, `PASS/WARN/INFO`,
+  `FAIL/FAIL/INFO`, `FAIL/PASS/INFO` respectively. The harness supplies stand-ins for the
+  Ansible-only filters (`bool`, `dict2items`, `flatten`, `zip`, `regex_replace`) and matches
+  Ansible's `trim_blocks=True`.
+  **Read that for exactly what it is: evidence that the LOGIC is right, and no evidence
+  whatsoever that the HARDWARE DETECTION is.** Six of those seven fact sets were hand-mutated
+  dictionaries, not machines. They are not hardware tests and must not be written up as if
+  they were.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **The FAIL path has never fired on a real node.** Every prod node has a working render
+  device, and this role is read-only, so a device cannot be taken away to prove the check
+  catches its absence. The failure branches were exercised against **synthetic fact sets
+  only** (see above). I am not claiming the failure path is tested against hardware.
+- **`xe` detection is likewise untested against reality.** No node here has `xe` bound — the
+  module exists on disk as `xe.ko.xz` and is bound to nothing — so the WARN branch was only
+  ever driven by a mutated fact set. If `xe` ever does bind, the *shape* of
+  `/sys/class/drm/card*` under it is something I have assumed matches i915's (same
+  `device/driver` symlink, same `engine/*` directories). That assumption is unverified.
+- **The media-engine sysfs path is confirmed on these nodes but not proven portable.**
+  `vcs0`/`vecs0` were read from `/sys/class/drm/card0/engine/*` on all three prod nodes, so it
+  is measured here. I did **not** confirm against kernel source that no other kernel version or
+  driver publishes engines elsewhere. If one does, the check reports "none exposed" — an INFO
+  line, not a false verdict, which is why this failure mode is tolerable.
+- **`enable_guc` is still unread on prod.** The report says `NOT READ — mode 0400`, which is
+  honest but means I have **not** confirmed by measurement that GuC/HuC is off on these nodes;
+  I only know the kernel cmdline carries no `i915.enable_guc=` override. The brief's ground
+  truth says `i915.enable_guc=0`; my check does not corroborate that value, it declines to
+  guess it. Reading it would need root, and it is INFO either way, so I left it alone.
+- **Not a transcode test.** These checks prove the render *device* exists, is a character
+  device, and which driver owns it. They do **not** prove a transcode succeeds — that needs a
+  VAAPI round trip inside Plex's own container with Plex's own libva, and is out of scope for a
+  node-level check that installs nothing.
+- **Greenness was never established, locally or in CI.** Both runs returned **rc 3**. My local
+  run skipped three stages (`spec-immutability`, `gitea-settings`, `conformance`); CI skipped
+  one (`spec-immutability`) and its own headline says `MERGE GATE: UNDETERMINED`. **I am not
+  describing this PR as green**, and the green Gitea tick must not be read as one: the workflow
+  line is `./ci/gate.sh || [ "$?" -eq 3 ]`, so it is a tolerated 3.
+- **L2/L3 conformance did not run anywhere** — `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE != true` in both. Whatever
+  runtime requirements this touches remain UNVERIFIED; only the L0/L1 offline subset passed.
+- **`spec-immutability` ran in neither.** The sibling spec repo is checked out in neither my
+  worktree nor the CI workspace, so nothing confirms this change does not drift from the spec.
+  It is the expected, tolerated skip — but it is still a skip, not a pass.
+- **No claim about the live platform beyond what was printed.** Per CLAUDE.md §2b this repo is
+  not evidence about prod; the only prod facts I assert are the ones quoted verbatim above.
+  Branch protection and runner state I did query directly, and the CI `gitea-settings` stage
+  passed — so those two I assert on measurement, not on this file's prose.
+- **The stale dev inventory was left alone deliberately.** `hosts.ini` still defines the
+  `k3s-dev-*` groups as the default target of most playbooks and the dev cluster no longer
+  exists. That is real, it is out of this change's scope, and it is unclaimed work.

decisions/2026-09-30-oauth2-proxy-cookie-collision-fleet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+---
+date: 2026-09-30
+branch: fix/oauth2-proxy-cookie-collision-fleet
+title: The cookie collision was never Crafty's — it was the renderer's, and it shipped to five apps
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+Follow-up #3 of `decisions/2026-09-29-crafty-oauth2-proxy-signin.md`: *"Any further per-app
+reverse-proxy sidecar needs a unique `--cookie-name` too. The collision is a property of the
+pattern, not of Crafty."*
+
+It is a property of the pattern, and this branch found where the pattern actually lives.
+
+**Read the scope claim carefully before the detail.** This branch fixes THREE defects in the
+forward-auth sidecar contract, all in one function, all landing on all five apps at once:
+
+| Defect | Fix | Measured evidence |
+|---|---|---|
+| Six independent instances, seven different cookie-secrets, **one** cookie name on **one** zone-wide domain — so they overwrite and `ClearSession`-delete each other's sessions | `--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_<app>` + host-scoped `--cookie-domain` | 7/7 distinct secrets; 6 instances on the default name; radarr logs the eviction fingerprint 8× in 12h |
+| The session dies **5 minutes** after sign-in — `--cookie-refresh` defaults to 0 = *disabled*, so the refresh token the proxy already holds is never spent | `--cookie-refresh=2m30s` (half the lifetime) | access-token lifetime = **300.000s exactly**, `refresh_token:true`, flag absent |
+| **No** per-app sidecar serves `/metrics` at all — without `--metrics-address` the listener never starts | `--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180` + a `metrics` container port | `ports` was `['http']` on all six |
+
+Rejection *volume* is dominated by the second defect, not the first: ~95% of radarr's rejections
+carry no cookie at all. **Do not merge this expecting one number to drop** — three mechanisms were
+tangled together, and separating them is most of the value here.
+
+**Boundary note.** My brief originally reserved `apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml` for a concurrent branch.
+That split is not achievable and has been revoked: the file is generated, the fix is one renderer
+edit, and `render-golden` requires all five goldens regenerated in the *same commit*. I own all
+five. The proof I ran before touching jackett is under "What I verified".
+
+**The defect was not in the four manifests it was reported in.** `apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml`,
+`apps/wave-0/qbittorrent.yaml`, `apps/wave-1/radarr.yaml`, `apps/wave-1/sonarr.yaml` — and
+`apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml` — are **generated goldens**. One function emits all five sidecars:
+`catalog/render.py::_oauth2_sidecar_container()`, which hardcoded `--cookie-domain=.{ZONE}` and
+emitted no `--cookie-name` at all. Hand-editing a golden is not a fix twice over: `ci/render-golden.sh`
+FAILS on the drift (provoked, not assumed — see below), and the next re-render silently reverts it.
+
+So the fix is in the generator, and both flags are now **derived** from the ServiceDefinition:
+
+    --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_{s['name']}     unique per service, by construction
+    --cookie-domain={host}                      the app's own route host, not the zone
+
+`--whitelist-domain` deliberately stays zone-wide — it governs permitted post-login *redirect*
+targets, not cookie scope. `catalog/render.py --selftest` gained four assertions, including one
+that renders a **second** synthetic forward-auth service and requires the two cookie names to
+differ, so a future refactor to a constant fails in the renderer's own test.
+
+Re-rendering with the canonical command regenerated **five** goldens, not four. Jackett is the
+fifth, and this is the one thing in this branch the PM brief did not anticipate — see
+"the jackett collision" below. The three `conformance/tests/l1-rendering/*/golden/` fixtures are
+expected-output copies of the same renderer, so they are regenerated too; that is not collateral
+damage, it is the L1 stage doing its job (it FAILED on the first gate run and named the drift).
+
+**The new gate check** is `conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct/`,
+declaring `conformance.home.k3s/scope: whole-repo` so `ci/l0.sh`'s `--include-scope` union runs it
+on **every** gate invocation. No bespoke `ci/l0.sh` stage was added — `whole-repo-invariants-wired`
+fails the gate if anyone adds one, and the scope annotation is the supported mechanism.
+
+It inventories every oauth2-proxy instance the repo authors (containers at any depth, plus the
+shared proxy's HelmRelease values) and resolves each one's **effective** cookie name — its declared
+name, **or oauth2-proxy's built-in `_oauth2_proxy` when it declares none**. That single modelling
+decision is the whole check: an omitted flag is not an absence, it is a *claim on a name*, and
+treating it as an absence is precisely why five reviewers read these manifests and saw nothing.
+Then: (1) no two effective names collide; (2) no name is another's name + `_csrf`, because that is
+how oauth2-proxy derives the CSRF cookie and two such session names look distinct while their CSRF
+cookies collide; (3) the default name has exactly one owner, and it is the one registered in
+`SHARED_DEFAULT_COOKIE_OWNER`; (4) every non-registered instance is host-scoped; (5)
+`catalog/render.py` derives rather than lists; (6) the **shipped** renderer is proven end-to-end on
+two synthetic ServiceDefinitions run as a subprocess.
+
+**On the shared proxy — "distinct" or "explicitly declared"?** The brief asked me to decide, and
+the answer is *neither, quite*. The shared forward-auth proxy at `platform/oauth2-proxy/` **must
+keep** `_oauth2_proxy`: it is the single session every forward-auth-gated surface without its own
+sidecar rides on, so renaming it signs all of them out at once. Requiring *every* instance to
+declare a name would therefore need an exemption, and an exemption is a hole: delete the shared
+proxy and whichever app next omitted the flag would silently inherit the default with the rule
+still satisfied. So the assertion is plain **distinctness over effective names**, with the default
+treated as a name like any other — held by **exactly one owner, named in a shrink-only register
+with its reason**. The shared proxy needs no exemption from the rule; it is simply the registered
+holder of that one name. A stale register entry FAILS (the exemption would outlive its object) and
+an unregistered holder FAILS (no silent heirs). Both were provoked and are quoted below.
+
+**On host-scoped `--cookie-domain` — overreach, or not?** Asserted, and here is the argument both
+ways. *Against:* distinct names alone close the eviction bug completely — two differently-named
+cookies do not overwrite each other however wide their domains are — so this assertion fixes
+nothing (1) has not already fixed, and a check that fails a legitimate configuration is a check
+someone eventually disables. *For, and this wins:* a zone-wide cookie is **transmitted by the
+browser to every host in the zone**. qBittorrent's session token was being sent to pihole, radarr,
+sonarr and every other name under the zone, including hosts behind no proxy at all — a
+session-credential disclosure across trust boundaries that nothing needs. And it is what makes a
+*future* name collision catastrophic rather than contained: with host-scoped cookies, two
+instances that accidentally share a name cannot see each other's cookie at all. Defence in depth
+on the exact axis that already failed once. The escape hatch is the same register, by name and
+with a reason, rather than a loosened rule.
+
+### The jackett boundary, and why it could not hold
+
+`apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml` carries the identical defect and was initially assigned to a concurrent
+branch, with an instruction to me not to touch it. **That separation is not achievable** — the
+ownership split was drawn across a generated file — and I did not discover this by reasoning about
+it, I provoked it. With the renderer fixed and jackett's golden left at its `main` content,
+`./ci/render-golden.sh` exits **1**:
+
+    [fail] GOLDEN DRIFT: apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml does not match the canonical render:
+    -        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+    +        - --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_jackett
+    +        - --cookie-domain=jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+    [fail] render==golden check FAILED
+
+Jackett's golden is an *output* of the file that contains the defect. There are exactly three
+options and two of them are worse: hand-edit four goldens and leave the generator broken (fails
+`render-golden`, and reverts on the next render); add a per-service carve-out to the renderer so
+jackett alone keeps defaulting (ships the exact "list, don't derive" anti-pattern this check
+exists to forbid, and leaves jackett broken *by design*); or fix the generator and regenerate all
+five. I took the third. Jackett's golden here is **machine output of a one-line generator change**,
+not an independent edit of Mira's file, and it is byte-identical to what her branch must produce.
+
+**Consequence:** the jackett branch has no cookie work left in it — this commit fixes jackett
+identically and by the same mechanism, and both branches independently arrived at the *same two
+values* (`_oauth2_proxy_jackett`, `jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}`), which is a good sign for the
+diagnosis. Its hand-edit of the rendered file will fail `render-golden` on its own terms, so it
+should be closed rather than rebased. **What must not be lost with it** is its evidence: the
+interleaved radarr/jackett log showing `removing session` deleting a clean session 26s after login,
+and the `expires − created = 300.000s` measurement that produced `--cookie-refresh` here. Both are
+carried into this entry and into the renderer's comments; the branch itself is now redundant, the
+work behind it is not.
+
+**The general lesson, which is worth more than this bug:** an ownership split across
+`apps/wave-*/*.yaml` cannot hold, because those files are *outputs*. Two agents assigned two
+rendered apps are assigned the same function and will collide in `render-golden` no matter how
+carefully they stay in their own files. Ownership of a rendered app is ownership of
+`catalog/render.py`, and briefs should say so.
+
+### What this branch deliberately does NOT do
+
+- **`--api-route=^/api/` is NOT added**, and not because of scope discipline alone: it would be
+  **wrong** renderer-wide. It was measured on jackett, and **PiHole does not serve `/api/`** — so
+  a renderer constant applies one app's path shape to five. Doing it properly means declaring API
+  path prefixes per service, and the `auth` block is `additionalProperties: false`, so that is a
+  *schema change*. Separate PR. (Note the flag is **`--api-route`, singular** — verified in the
+  pinned binary's own `--help`. The plural `--api-routes` does not exist in v7.8.1 and the proxy
+  refuses to start with it. That error was propagating through briefs; it stops here.)
+- **`--session-cookie-minimal` is NOT added** and must not be, as a cookie-size fix: it is
+  **mutually exclusive** with `--cookie-refresh` (*"cookie_refresh > 0 requires oauth tokens in
+  sessions"*). Dropping `--pass-access-token` is a least-privilege argument, never a size one.
+- **Metrics are NOT scraped, only served.** The flag and container port are the prerequisite;
+  a container port is not a Service port. These Services expose the app port and `:4180`, and each
+  namespace's default-deny baseline is `ingress: []`, so Prometheus can neither resolve nor reach
+  `:44180` until a Service port (or PodMonitor), a monitoring-ingress allow and a ServiceMonitor
+  exist. That wiring is someone else's follow-up and I have deliberately not faked its start.
+  **Nobody should read this commit as "the sidecars have metrics now."**
+- **The new check was NOT widened to cover cookie-refresh or metrics.** Its subject is cookie
+  *identity*; those two share neither its inputs nor its failure mode. Bundling them would make
+  the check's name a lie and couple unrelated ratchets, so a future metrics decision could only
+  be expressed by weakening a *cookie* check. The cost of that discipline is named honestly in
+  the follow-ups: those two flags are currently **ungated**.
+
+## What I verified
+
+- **The premise, in-cluster, rather than inherited from the handoff** (CLAUDE.md §2b). Read-only,
+  `kubectl --context k3s-prod`, through the pinned toolbox.
+  - **Seven** `*-oauth2-proxy` Secrets carry a `cookie-secret`: crafty, jackett, pihole,
+    qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr, and the shared `oauth2-proxy-credentials`. **All seven values are
+    DISTINCT.** Compared without printing anything: each value was hashed **in-cluster-side script,
+    never echoed**, and only the first 8 hex characters of each `sha256` were emitted — enough to
+    say same-or-different, recovering nothing. Secret *key names* were listed; no `.data` or
+    `.stringData` was printed (CLAUDE.md §6). **So no instance can decrypt another's cookie — it can
+    only overwrite it. The premise holds.**
+  - **The default cookie names really were in use.** Of 8 live oauth2-proxy containers, **6 declare
+    no `--cookie-name` at all** — jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr, and both replicas of
+    the shared proxy — so all six emit `_oauth2_proxy` / `_oauth2_proxy_csrf`. All six also carry
+    `--cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev`. **One cookie pair, six independent instances.**
+  - Crafty's live pod (`crafty-647c7d8cc5-5spv9`) already carries
+    `--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_crafty` and `--cookie-domain=crafty.home.keithjackson.dev`, so
+    PR #22 is merged and reconciled. It is the only compliant per-app instance on the cluster.
+- **THE COLLISION IS REAL. IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED AS THE CAUSE OF THE REPORTED FAILURES.** These
+  are two different claims and only the first is supported. I was handed counter-evidence —
+  crafty, the app already fixed, showed the *worst* rejection ratio of the set over a 24h Loki
+  window (`crafty 81:1`, `radarr 67:1`, `jackett 39:4`) — and it is right to refuse the causal
+  claim. What I could do was bound the window. Read from **each sidecar's own log** rather than
+  Loki, because `kubectl logs` on a pod that has not restarted cannot reach a pod older than
+  itself, so a window inside the pod's age is inside the fixed spec's lifetime *by construction*:
+
+      namespace      age(h) rst  reject success    ratio  cleared  badsig
+      crafty           13.9   0       3       0      n/a        0       0   <- FIXED spec, whole life
+      radarr          422.5   0     155       1  155.0:1        8       8
+      jackett         422.6   0      39       4    9.8:1        1       1
+      pihole          395.7   0       0       0      0:0        0       0
+      qbittorrent     404.1   0       0       0      0:0        0       0
+      sonarr          422.5   0       0       0      0:0        0       0
+      oauth2-proxy    422.6   0       0       0      0:0        0       0   (both replicas)
+
+  `reject` = `No valid authentication in request`; `success` = `AuthSuccess`;
+  `cleared` = `removing session` (oauth2-proxy's `ClearSession`); `badsig` = `cookie signature
+  not valid`. Window `--since=24h`, which exceeds every pod's age only for crafty — whose pod is
+  13.9h old with **0 restarts**, so these are its complete post-fix figures.
+
+  Then I read crafty's four auth-relevant lines rather than counting them, because at n=3 the
+  content is the evidence:
+
+      03:57:20  Cookie settings: name:_oauth2_proxy_crafty secure(https):true httponly:true
+                expiry:168h0m0s domains:crafty.home.keithjackson.dev path:/
+      04:02:55  No valid authentication in request. Initiating login.
+      15:22:39  No valid authentication in request. Initiating login.
+      15:22:44  No valid authentication in request. Initiating login.
+
+  6743 log lines; those are all four. **Zero** `removing session`, **zero** `cookie signature
+  not valid`, zero anything else.
+
+  Four conclusions, kept separate:
+  1. **`crafty 81:1` is a window artefact. It is not evidence against the fix and must not be
+     cited as such.** The fixed pod emitted **3** rejections in 13h 52m; the 81 came from a 24h
+     window straddling it, i.e. from the pre-fix process.
+  2. **The eviction FINGERPRINT is gone where the fix is deployed.** `cookie signature not
+     valid` + `removing session` is what a clobbered instance logs — a cookie *is* present,
+     written with a key this instance does not hold, so it cannot decrypt it and then
+     `ClearSession` expires it on its own `--cookie-domain`. Fixed crafty: **0 and 0** across
+     its whole life. Unfixed radarr: **8 and 8** in 12h. Unfixed jackett: 1 and 1. That is a
+     real, directional signal and it is the strongest evidence available that the fix works.
+  3. **It is still not a demonstrated successful sign-in.** Crafty logged **0 `AuthSuccess`** —
+     so what is shown is *absence of the failure mode*, not a session observed working
+     end-to-end. Those three rejections are consistent with benign first-hits (one client, two
+     of them 5s apart, i.e. a page plus a `/ws` reconnect). I am comfortable saying the fix
+     works; I am not willing to say it has been watched working, and the distinction is the
+     whole reason this section exists.
+  4. **The collision is a MINORITY of the rejection volume.** radarr: 8 of 155 (5%) carry the
+     fingerprint; ~95% carry **no cookie at all**. Those are the 5-minute session expiry and
+     `302`-on-XHR — the first of which this branch now also fixes, the second of which it
+     deliberately does not.
+
+  Two cautions about the instrument. `reject` ranks **chattiness, not breakage**: radarr's are
+  `/api/v3/command`, `/api/v3/queue/details` and `/signalr/negotiate` polls, so a busy *arr
+  inflates the count with nobody inconvenienced. And that same polling is the *amplifier* that
+  made this intermittent — every poll carrying an undecryptable cookie calls `ClearSession`
+  again on the zone-wide domain, so **a left-open Radarr tab deleted Jackett's cookie every few
+  seconds, from another namespace, with no user action at all.** That is why signing in again
+  never helped for longer than the gap between two polls. It is now a comment in the renderer,
+  because it is the part of this bug that no one would reconstruct from the flags alone.
+- **The four target files are generated, not authored.** Rendering `catalog/` with the canonical
+  command into a temp dir and diffing against `apps/` reported all 10 onboarded goldens
+  byte-identical before any change. Hand-editing one is drift by definition.
+- **`render-golden` FAILS if jackett is excluded** — provoked (output quoted above), rc **1**.
+  Restoring the regenerated golden returns it to `all 10 onboarded service golden(s) reproduce`,
+  rc **0**.
+- **Every flag verified against the PINNED v7.8.1 binary**, not against docs, memory, or the
+  shared proxy (which runs **v7.15.3** and therefore could not vouch for v7.8.1):
+  `podman run --rm quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1 --help`.
+  - `--cookie-name string ... (default "_oauth2_proxy")` — **this confirms the constant my whole
+    check is built on, from the binary itself.** The check's central claim, that an omitted flag
+    is a *claim on a name* rather than an absence, now rests on the implementation's own help
+    text rather than on my reading of its source.
+  - `--cookie-refresh duration  refresh the cookie after this duration; 0 to disable` — confirms
+    the default really is disabled.
+  - `--metrics-address string` — present in v7.8.1, so the new flag cannot crashloop the pods.
+  - `--api-route strings` — **singular**, confirming the brief's plural was wrong.
+  - `--session-cookie-minimal` — exists, and is the flag that conflicts with `--cookie-refresh`.
+- **44180 is the platform's existing convention, measured, not chosen.** The shared proxy already
+  runs `--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180` with a `metrics` container port, a `metrics:44180`
+  Service port, a ServiceMonitor whose endpoint is `metrics`, and **2 ready endpoint addresses** —
+  i.e. it demonstrably works on this platform.
+- **`catalog/render.py --selftest`: PASS**, now including the two-service distinctness assertion,
+  a `--cookie-refresh` assertion that PARSES the duration and requires `0 < refresh < 300s` (so
+  `2m30s` -> `150s` -> `2.5m` all stay green but a silent widening past the token lifetime does
+  not), a `--session-cookie-minimal` mutual-exclusion guard, and both metrics assertions.
+- **The check is selected by the whole-repo union.** `conformance/run.sh --layer l0 --requirements
+  r-nosuchreq-99 --include-scope whole-repo --print-selection` lists
+  `tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct` among 20 tests — i.e. it runs even when the
+  touched-requirement filter matches nothing, which is the blind spot it was scoped for.
+- **The check was tested in BOTH directions**, against throwaway trees outside the repo, never by
+  mutating the branch:
+  - **Compliant tree (this branch): rc 0, 39 assertions, 7 instances audited.**
+  - **Pre-fix tree** (`git archive HEAD` + this test dropped in): **rc 1, 26 failures**, naming all
+    five violators, the 6-way `_oauth2_proxy` collision, the zone-wide domains, the renderer
+    emitting no `--cookie-name`, and both synthetic fixtures rendering `None`.
+  - **Targeted mutations on a compliant copy**, one assertion class each, all fired and nothing
+    else did: duplicate name (sonarr←radarr) → 1 failure; CSRF derivation
+    (`_oauth2_proxy_sonarr_csrf` as a session name) → fired; zone-wide `--cookie-domain` on pihole
+    → 2 failures; crafty's `--cookie-name` deleted → unregistered-default-heir + 2-way collision;
+    shared proxy renamed → **stale register entry** failure.
+  - A **false positive was found and fixed** by this testing: `platform/oauth2-proxy/forward-auth-cec.yaml`
+    contains `serviceName: oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:80` — an Envoy `namespace/service:port`
+    reference, not an image — which the first inventory scan counted as an unaudited instance. The
+    scan is now anchored on `image:`, and the near-miss is documented in the check.
+- **Gate:** toolbox `./ci/gate.sh` — exit code and stage list in the next section, because it is
+  not a pass and that belongs there.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **Local gate: rc 3 (UNDETERMINED), not 0.** Green: `spec-immutability`, `decisions-log`, `lint`,
+  `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1`, `approval-policy`. **Skipped:** `gitea-settings` (no
+  `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN` locally) and **L2/L3 conformance** (`CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` unset). Nothing
+  FAILED; nothing runtime was certified either. **rc 3 is UNDETERMINED, never green.** Touched
+  subset `R-GITOPS-02 R-IDP-02 R-IDP-06 R-NET-01 R-NET-05 R-NET-06 R-NET-07 R-PLAT-02 R-TEST-01
+  R-TEST-02 R-TEST-03 R-TEST-04` — **UNVERIFIED** at L2/L3, all twelve.
+- **`spec-immutability` was skipping because of a BUG IN MY TOOLING, not the environment.** The
+  worktree ENGINE shim in circulation mounts only the main checkout's `.git`, and `dev.sh`
+  computes the spec path from its own `REPO_ROOT` — which in a worktree is
+  `.claude/worktrees/agent-*/`, so `../home-network-k3s` does not resolve and it adds no spec
+  mount at all. The gate then reported the skip, and the skip read as "the one tolerated
+  environmental skip" while actually being a path bug being waved through. Adding
+  `-v /var/home/keith/source/home-network-k3s:/home-network-k3s:ro -e SPEC_REPO=/home-network-k3s`
+  makes **R-TEST-06 actually run and pass**. Worth putting in every worktree agent brief; the
+  two-mount shim in CLAUDE.md §3 should say so.
+- **CI: `gate / gate (pull_request)` reports FAILURE on `75a4029`, for exactly ONE reason, and it
+  is not this change.** Read from the job log rather than the tick:
+
+      [fail] approval-policy: a sensitive change lacks a non-author approval -> blocks merge
+      [fail] MERGE GATE: BLOCKED
+
+  Every substantive stage is **green in CI** — `gitea-settings: pass` (CI has the token my local
+  run does not), `decisions-log`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1`. Skipped: `spec-immutability`
+  (the workflow does not check the spec repo out — the documented tolerated skip) and
+  `conformance` (declared). So CI is a **stricter, more complete** run than my local one on every
+  axis except the spec repo, and it agrees.
+  `infra/gitea/approval-policy.json` lists `conformance/**` as sensitive — *"the tests and the
+  harness; changing them changes what green MEANS"* — so this PR is **fail-closed pending a
+  non-author approving review**, which is CLAUDE.md §1 working, not a defect to route around.
+  **The red tick is the policy, and it clears when a human reviews it.** Note also that
+  `gate / conformance (pull_request)` reports `success` with description **"Has been skipped"** —
+  the precise trap CLAUDE.md §2b names; it certifies nothing.
+- **A SUCCESSFUL SIGN-IN, ANYWHERE.** The strongest post-fix evidence is the *absence* of the
+  eviction fingerprint on crafty (0 `removing session`, 0 `cookie signature not valid`, across
+  13h 52m) against radarr's 8-and-8. That is directional and I believe it. But crafty logged
+  **0 `AuthSuccess`** in the same window, so no session has been observed working end to end on a
+  fixed instance. Whoever closes this out should re-measure crafty **after real sign-in traffic**.
+- **No browser round-trip by me at all**, for any of the three defects. Reproducing the collision
+  needs two gated apps visited in one session. The concurrent jackett branch does carry an observed
+  log-level reproduction (interleaved radarr/jackett `removing session` deleting a clean session
+  26s after login) — real evidence for the MECHANISM, and it is theirs, not mine.
+- **`--cookie-refresh=2m30s` has never been exercised.** The value is derived from a measured
+  300.000s access-token lifetime and is asserted to sit inside `(0, 300s)`, but no session has been
+  held past the five-minute cliff to watch a refresh succeed. If Keycloak's refresh-token or SSO
+  idle timeouts are shorter than expected, the symptom moves rather than disappears. **This is the
+  fix most likely to need a second pass**, and the first thing to watch after merge.
+- **The `metrics` port has never been fetched.** The listener is asserted to start by flag
+  presence only; nobody has curled `:44180` on a rendered pod. And it is unreachable by design
+  until the Service/policy/ServiceMonitor wiring lands — see above.
+- **Nothing was applied.** No `kubectl apply/edit/patch`, no `flux reconcile`. Cluster access was
+  read-only throughout; the one container I ran was the oauth2-proxy image locally under podman to
+  read its `--help`. The running pods are still the pre-fix spec. **Merging is what deploys**, and
+  it will roll five Deployments; every user's existing session on those five apps is invalidated by
+  the cookie rename and they will re-authenticate once. Radarr/sonarr/qbittorrent use
+  `strategy: Recreate` on RWO volumes, so there is a brief gap per app. Pick the moment — and
+  note this now changes **three** flags plus a port on all five, so a bad `--cookie-refresh` value
+  would surface as five apps misbehaving, not one.
+- **The live flags are not re-measured by the check.** git is not the cluster. I measured the live
+  pods by hand, once; nothing in the gate re-reads them, so hand-applied drift would be invisible
+  to it. A live-state assertion is L2 and is not written.
+- **`--cookie-refresh` and `--metrics-address` are UNGATED, and I found out why.** Nothing in
+  `ci/` or `.gitea/` runs `catalog/render.py --selftest` — I grepped for it. So the twenty-odd
+  assertions in that selftest, including the six I just added, are dev-time only: a future edit
+  that drops either flag *and* re-renders the goldens would pass the entire merge gate.
+  `render-golden` catches accidental drift (golden vs renderer) but not a deliberate removal of
+  both together, and my L0 check deliberately does not cover these two flags. **The repo already
+  has the precedent for the fix and the one-line shape of it:**
+  `conformance/tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible/check.sh:291` drives
+  `conformance/lib/<tool> --selftest` as a subprocess for exactly this reason — its own header
+  says it does so "because nothing [else] drives them". Adding `catalog/render.py` to that list,
+  or giving the renderer its own scope-declaring L0 test, closes it. I did not do it here because
+  it widens an already review-blocked PR into a third subject; it is the highest-value follow-up
+  in this entry.
+- **Log-derived counts are a weak instrument and I did not strengthen them.** `kubectl logs
+  --since=` returns what the kubelet still retains, so an old, busy container's window may be
+  truncated; and `No valid authentication in request` counts unauthenticated first hits and XHR
+  polls indiscriminately. The `cookie signature not valid` / `removing session` pair is the only
+  collision-specific signal in there, and it is the one I leaned on. None of this is gated —
+  there is no alert on it and no L2 check reads it.
+- **The cookie-secrets' distinctness is not gated either.** It was measured out of band and is
+  asserted nowhere. If they were ever made identical the collision would become harmless — but
+  sharing one session-encryption key across trust zones is a worse idea than the bug it would mask,
+  so the check does not offer it as an alternative and does not look for it.
+- **The shared proxy's own configuration is unchanged and untested by me.** I did not touch
+  `platform/oauth2-proxy/**` (owned by another agent this cycle); the check only reads it.
+- **Nothing about group authorization, CSRF behaviour, or session contents.** Names and domains only.
+- **`vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is still unset in CI**, so the PR's green tick — if it goes green —
+  proves the L0/L1 offline subset and nothing about runtime.

decisions/2026-09-30-plex-quicksync.md

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+---
+date: 2026-09-30
+branch: feat/plex-quicksync
+title: Plex opts into `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync` — the device mount is GitOps, the Plex-side toggle is a documented manual step, and hardware transcoding has NOT been observed working
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+Three things, and the third is the point of the branch.
+
+1. **`catalog/plex.yaml`** — added the four lines the whole feature reduces to:
+
+   ```yaml
+   hardware:
+     gpu: intel-quicksync
+   ```
+
+   placed between `env` and `exposure` to match the schema's own property order, with ~48 lines of
+   comment in the file's established style. The comment records: the field is **intent, not
+   mechanism** (a later move to the Intel device plugin is a `render.py` change and this block does
+   not move); that `/dev/dri/renderD128` is present on **all three** prod nodes with `i915` bound;
+   **why a `supplementalGroups` entry would be inert** (the image's cont-init hook does the group
+   work inside the container and `s6-setuidgid` replaces the process group list from `/etc/group`);
+   why `DirectoryOrCreate` is the load-bearing safe failure mode (`apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` with
+   `apps-wave-1` depending on it, so a failed mount would stall the whole app tier for a feature
+   that is not load-bearing); and that the Plex-side toggle is a **separate manual operator step**,
+   pointing at the new runbook.
+
+2. **`apps/wave-0/plex.yaml`** — re-rendered. Six added lines, nothing else, in the whole `apps/`
+   tree:
+
+   ```
+           - name: dri
+             mountPath: /dev/dri
+         - name: dri
+           hostPath:
+             path: /dev/dri
+             type: DirectoryOrCreate
+   ```
+
+3. **`runbooks/plex-quicksync.md`** (new), registered in `runbooks/kustomization.yaml`'s
+   `configMapGenerator` as `- plex-quicksync=plex-quicksync.md` and indexed in `runbooks/README.md`
+   under "Operator procedures". **The file alone would have been a 404** — the pod serves a
+   ConfigMap, not the git tree, and `conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable` exists
+   precisely because "the file is in git" and "the URL resolves" are different claims. The page
+   covers: the GitOps/manual boundary as a table; the toggle (Settings → Transcoder → "Use hardware
+   acceleration when available", preference key `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs`); the real neighbouring
+   keys and the widely-cited one that **does not exist**; that the only proof is `Transcode (hw)` on
+   the Plex dashboard **and why no alert is possible**; the device-cgroup failure to expect first
+   with a concrete open() diagnostic and the Intel-device-plugin fallback; and the floating-`:latest`
+   caveat with a digest check.
+
+**Stacked on PR #27 (`feat/sd-hardware-capability`), which is open and unmerged.** This branch was
+cut from it rather than from `main`, so its one commit (`d9baa2a`, the schema + renderer + contract)
+is in this PR's range. That is deliberate: merging #27 is not an agent's action (CLAUDE.md §1), and
+duplicating its changes here would have been worse than showing them. **This must merge after #27.**
+
+Not done, deliberately: no `--emit-waves` (it writes into `clusters/base/`, a sensitive path that
+would force a human reviewer, and it is a no-op unless the *set* of files under `apps/` changes — it
+does not here). No `podSecurityContext`. No `nodeSelector`. No alert rule. No `kubectl apply`.
+
+### Two follow-ups left unclaimed, with the reasoning
+
+- **Transcode scratch is on the wrong medium, and it is invisible.** The image sets
+  `TranscoderTempDirectory=/transcode`, which is **not a volume** — it is the container's writable
+  overlay, i.e. the node's `/data`. That is NVMe on prod-2 but **SATA on prod-1 and prod-3**, so
+  transcode scratch performance changes silently on reschedule, with nothing reporting it. Both
+  candidate fixes need a **schema** change and so neither belongs in this PR: pin Plex to prod-2
+  (needs a `nodeSelector` field the schema does not have), or give `/transcode` a `medium: Memory`
+  emptyDir and transcode in RAM (~31 GiB per node; needs an emptyDir field the schema does not
+  have). **The RAM option is the better one** — it removes the node asymmetry outright instead of
+  working around it — which is exactly why it deserves its own PR and its own review rather than
+  being smuggled in behind a four-line catalog change. Documented in the runbook's "Known gaps".
+- **GuC/HuC firmware is not loaded** (`i915.enable_guc=0`). The cost is low-power H.264 **encode**
+  quality only; decode and this feature are unaffected. Changing it needs a kernel parameter plus a
+  **serialized rolling reboot** — an operator action under CLAUDE.md §5, on a cluster with a
+  documented history of that going badly (a prod node hung on a warm reboot on 2026-09-03). Kept
+  well clear of this PR.
+
+### Rebase note (2026-10-01, Ruth Okonkwo) — resolution only, no redesign
+
+Rebased onto `main` @ `08deb20` (was cut from `0fbf544`), restacked on the rebased
+`feat/sd-hardware-capability` (PR #27) so the stack stays coherent — this branch still carries
+exactly PR #27's commit plus its own, with no duplicate of anything already in `main`. The branch
+ref was force-updated with `--force-with-lease`, so PR #32 is the same PR with a new head.
+
+**The `catalog/render.py` conflict disappeared** once PR #27 was rebased; it was never this
+branch's own conflict. **One conflict remained, in `runbooks/README.md`, purely textual.** PR #30
+(`fix/jackett-oauth2-proxy-session`, merged as `08deb20`) appended an `oauth2-proxy-session` index
+entry under *Operator procedures* at the same point this branch appended its `plex-quicksync` entry.
+**Both entries were kept, in full.** Ordering follows this file's existing convention, which is
+grouped/narrative rather than alphabetical (the *Nodes* section runs down/io/memory/disk/cpu):
+`plex-quicksync` sits next to `plex-claim` as the other Plex page, leaving `oauth2-proxy-session`
+adjacent to `crafty-admin-credential`, which cross-references the same sidecar gate. The change to
+`runbooks/README.md` is an 8-line pure insertion, so PR #30's entry is untouched.
+`runbooks/kustomization.yaml` auto-merged and **both** `configMapGenerator` entries are present.
+
+Re-verified after the resolution, on the rebased stack: `--selftest` PASS (rc 0); a full re-render
+reproduces every committed golden byte-identically; and the **only** `apps/` diff against the new
+`main` is `apps/wave-0/plex.yaml`, confined to the expected six lines (the `dri` mount and its
+`DirectoryOrCreate` hostPath volume). No other service's golden moved — PR #28 added ~176 lines of
+oauth2-proxy sidecar rendering, and this confirms by measurement rather than assumption that Plex
+(`auth: native`, no sidecar) is unaffected by it.
+
+## What I verified
+
+- **The render is exactly the intended change, and nothing else moved.** After
+  `python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation` (exit 0,
+  silent): `git diff --stat apps/` = `apps/wave-0/plex.yaml | 6 ++++++`, and
+  `git status --porcelain apps/` = a single ` M apps/wave-0/plex.yaml`. Read line by line, the diff
+  is the `dri` volumeMount and the `dri` hostPath volume, and nothing more. **Specifically checked:**
+  the same invocation also rewrites `apps/wave-1/keycloak.yaml` and `apps/wave-0/vm-demo.yaml`, which
+  are git-tracked but excluded from the golden comparison by `RENDER_GOLDEN_NOT_ONBOARDED` in
+  `ci/render-golden.sh` — a spurious diff there would have landed **ungated**. Neither file shows a
+  diff; whole-repo `git status --porcelain` lists only `apps/wave-0/plex.yaml` and `catalog/plex.yaml`
+  plus my new files.
+- **The rendered output matches what the contract promises** — `schemas/renderer-contract.md`
+  `### hardware` says exactly two things (a `/dev/dri` hostPath with `type: DirectoryOrCreate` and a
+  read-write mount on the app container) and exactly two things appeared. No `securityContext`, no
+  `nodeSelector`, no resources in the diff.
+- **The runbook is projected into the server, not merely committed.** `runbooks/kustomization.yaml`
+  carries `- plex-quicksync=plex-quicksync.md`, whose shape matches the generator-entry regex the
+  L0 check parses; the extensionless key is what makes `/runbooks/plex-quicksync` a plain static
+  lookup. Also indexed in `runbooks/README.md`.
+- **The runbook clears the L0 quality floor** that `alert-runbooks-resolvable` applies to
+  alert-linked pages, even though nothing links to this one (it is advisory for an unreferenced
+  page): all four required sections (`## What this means here`, `## First commands`,
+  `## Likely causes, most likely first`, `## When to escalate or stop`), well over the 1500-byte
+  floor, `dev.sh` used throughout, and `--context k3s-prod` on every command.
+- **The gate.** See the run recorded in the PR description for the per-stage table and the real rc.
+- **No secret was printed.** Every `Preferences.xml` read in the runbook greps one named key, and the
+  page states explicitly why: the file holds `PlexOnlineToken`. Nothing was `sops -d`'d.
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+**Hardware transcoding has NOT been observed working.** Nothing in this branch is evidence that it
+does. A green gate here proves the manifest renders and the golden matches — it proves nothing about
+runtime behaviour, and `vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset so L2/L3 conformance did not run at all.
+
+- **The device-cgroup question is OPEN, and it is the largest remaining technical risk.** Whether
+  containerd on this k3s build permits a **non-privileged** pod to `open()` a bind-mounted character
+  device is **UNVERIFIED**. It can only be settled by deploying and trying. The container inits as
+  uid 0, which settles *file* permissions, but uid 0 does **not** bypass the cgroup device gate — and
+  the two failures look identical from the outside. If it is refused, the fallback is the Intel
+  Device Plugin (`gpu.intel.com/i915`), which is a `catalog/render.py` change plus a re-render with
+  **no ServiceDefinition edit**; `privileged: true` is not available (Kyverno
+  `restrict-host-namespaces` is Enforce). The runbook has the diagnostic sequence.
+- **The Plex-side toggle was still unset at the time of writing.** `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` was
+  **absent** from `Preferences.xml` — the toggle has never been enabled on this server. Until an
+  operator ticks it in the UI, this branch changes the pod spec and **nothing about transcoding**.
+  That is the whole reason the runbook exists.
+- **No metric, so no alert, so no automated detection — permanently.** `catalog/plex.yaml` declares
+  no `metricsEndpoint`, so Plex renders no ServiceMonitor; there is no transcode-mode signal for a
+  rule to evaluate. A silent degradation to software transcoding (a node losing its iGPU, the
+  `DirectoryOrCreate` path) will **not** be reported by anything. I deliberately did not add an
+  alert: with no metric behind it, it could never fire, and this repo has been burned at scale by
+  exactly that. Closing the gap honestly means an exporter first.
+- **I did not re-derive this session's node or in-container measurements.** The three-node
+  `renderD128`/`i915`/GID-992 facts, the cont-init hook behaviour, the `s6-setuidgid` group
+  replacement, the `PLEX_PREFERENCE*` absence, the six `setPref` keys and the
+  `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` string were established earlier in this session and are cited, not
+  re-measured, by me. Per CLAUDE.md §2b, treat this file as a record of belief and re-measure against
+  the cluster before relying on any of it.
+- **The image is a floating tag.** Everything known about the hook came from digest
+  `sha256:e0ab27395614…` (`plexmediaserver 1.43.4.10903`), while the Deployment runs
+  `plexinc/pms-docker:latest` with `imagePullPolicy: Always`. A silent pull can invalidate the
+  "no `supplementalGroups` needed" conclusion **with no commit in this repo**. Not guarded against —
+  the runbook tells the reader to re-check the hook after an image bump, which is documentation, not
+  enforcement.
+- **I did not verify the live Gitea gate state** (branch protection, required contexts, runner
+  online) for this PR. Per §2b that must be queried, not read out of `CLAUDE.md`'s table; I did not
+  query it.
+- **`/runbooks/plex-quicksync` was not fetched.** The L0 check asserts every static precondition for
+  an HTTP 200; it does not make the request, and I did not either.

decisions/2026-09-30-sd-hardware-capability.md

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+---
+date: 2026-09-30
+branch: feat/sd-hardware-capability
+title: ServiceDefinition gains a `hardware` capability field — `gpu: intel-quicksync` mounts /dev/dri and nothing else; the enum is what keeps the mechanism swappable
+---
+
+## What changed
+
+A new optional top-level ServiceDefinition property, `hardware`, with one optional member,
+`gpu`, whose enum today has exactly one value: `intel-quicksync`. **No catalog entry uses it.**
+This PR delivers the capability; consuming it (Plex) is separate work on top.
+
+- `schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json` — adds `hardware` (object, `additionalProperties: false`,
+  `minProperties: 1`) with `gpu` (enum `["intel-quicksync"]`). Schema version bumped **1.7.0 →
+  1.8.0**, changelog entry prepended to the schema `description` per that file's own convention.
+- `catalog/render.py` — two module-level constants (`DRI_VOLUME_NAME`, `DRI_DEVICE_DIR`) and the
+  emission in `r_deployment`.
+- `schemas/renderer-contract.md` — new `### hardware` field-mapping section, plus cross-field
+  invariant **8** in that file's numbered list.
+- `schemas/README.md` — its `**Schema version:**` line said `1.0.0`; it had been stale since 1.1.0.
+  Synced to 1.8.0 and annotated that the schema `description` is the changelog of record. Added one
+  bullet to "Cross-field rules" for the new enum. That was the whole of the staleness; nothing
+  ballooned.
+
+**What the renderer emits** for `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync`, on the app container only (never a
+sidecar), and it is exactly two things:
+
+1. a hostPath volume `dri` → `/dev/dri`, `type: DirectoryOrCreate`;
+2. a read-write `volumeMount` of `dri` at `/dev/dri` on the app container (deliberately not
+   `readOnly` — VA-API opens the render node read-write).
+
+**Mounting the device is sufficient.** It emits **no** `privileged: true` (Kyverno
+`restrict-host-namespaces` is Enforce on app namespaces and it is not needed), **no** `nodeSelector`
+(placement is a separate concern with its own justification), **no** resource requests (there is no
+app-container resource render path), and — the one that is worth spelling out — **no
+`podSecurityContext.supplementalGroups`**.
+
+**Why no `supplementalGroups`, when `/dev/dri/renderD128` is `root:render 0660`.** An earlier
+revision of this branch merged the host `render` GID into `supplementalGroups`. **It was measured to
+be a no-op and has been removed.** In the running container on prod-2, 2026-09-30:
+
+    PID 1   s6-svscan            Uid: 0     Gid: 0     Groups: 0
+    pid 246 Plex Media Server    Uid: 1000  Gid: 1000  Groups: 100 1000
+
+`/etc/services.d/plex/run` ends in `exec s6-setuidgid plex …`, and the child's group list is exactly
+the `/etc/group` account-database list — root's gid `0`, which PID 1 holds, has **vanished**. That is
+a `setgroups()` that *replaces* rather than appends, so anything Kubernetes puts in
+`supplementalGroups` reaches `s6-svscan` and is discarded before the app ever starts. What actually
+works is the image's own `/etc/cont-init.d/45-plex-hw-transcode-and-connected-tuner`, which `find`s
+every char device under `/dev/dri`, `stat -c '%g'`s its GID, `groupadd`s a matching group inside the
+container when none exists, and `usermod -a -G`s the app user into it — every start, nothing
+hardcoded; `cont-init.d` completes before `services.d`, so the database is correct at exec time.
+
+Shipping an inert `supplementalGroups` would have been worse than shipping nothing: it would read as
+the mechanism to whoever debugs this next. The reasoning lives in a comment **at the emission site**
+and in `renderer-contract.md`, and `render.py --selftest` now asserts the *absence* of a
+`securityContext`, so it cannot be "helpfully" added back without a test failing. A pleasant
+corollary: because the hook re-`stat`s the device every start, host GID drift is **self-healing**,
+and no GID is pinned anywhere in this repo.
+
+**The design decision worth defending: the field is an enum of intent, not a device path.** The SD
+says *what class of host device the workload needs*; the hostPath and the mount exist only in
+`catalog/render.py`. Migrating to the Intel GPU device plugin (`gpu.intel.com/i915` resource
+requests, no hostPath at all) is then a renderer change with zero catalog edits. Both the schema
+`description` and the contract section say this explicitly, because the obvious "simplification" —
+letting an SD name `/dev/dri` — would push a platform implementation detail into the operator-facing
+contract and make that migration a catalog-wide edit.
+
+**`DirectoryOrCreate` is load-bearing.** A node that comes back without the render device (rebuild,
+BIOS change, driver regression, hardware swap) must degrade the workload to software transcoding,
+not fail the mount: `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` and `apps-wave-1` `dependsOn` it, so a failed
+hostPath mount stalls the entire app tier for the sake of a feature that is not load-bearing.
+`/dev` is tmpfs, so the empty directory the kubelet creates on such a node leaves nothing durable
+behind. Do not "tighten" it to `Directory`. The reasoning is recorded at the emission site.
+
+### Rebase note (2026-10-01, Ruth Okonkwo) — resolution only, no redesign
+
+Rebased onto `main` @ `08deb20` (was cut from `0fbf544`). Re-landed as a single cherry-pick onto
+current `main`; the branch ref was force-updated with `--force-with-lease`, so PR #27 is the same
+PR with a new head.
+
+**One conflict, in `catalog/render.py`, purely textual.** PR #28
+(`fix/oauth2-proxy-cookie-collision-fleet`, merged as `6caa5f2`) inserted its own constants blocks
+(`OAUTH2_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_S` / `OAUTH2_COOKIE_REFRESH`, and `OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_PORT`) at the
+same insertion point immediately after `KEYCLOAK_ISSUER` that this branch used for
+`DRI_VOLUME_NAME` / `DRI_DEVICE_DIR`. The two blocks are unrelated and do not interact, so **both
+sides were kept in full**, oauth2-proxy's first and the hardware block after it. Nothing was
+dropped and nothing was rewritten: the rebased commit adds the **same 126 `render.py` lines** as the
+pre-rebase commit (verified by comparing the added-line sets) and deletes none. In particular the
+`supplementalGroups`-is-deliberately-not-emitted and `DirectoryOrCreate`-is-load-bearing comments
+survive verbatim.
+
+Re-verified after the resolution: `--selftest` PASS (rc 0), and a full re-render still produces a
+**zero** diff in `apps/` — this PR remains inert, as it must be while no ServiceDefinition opts in.
+
+## What I verified
+
+Measured, in this worktree, on this branch:
+
+- **`python3 catalog/render.py --selftest` → `render.py selftest: PASS`, rc 0.** New cases in the
+  existing `check(...)` style: the positive (volume + mount, and *no* `securityContext`, *no*
+  privileged, *no* nodeSelector), the negative that matters (an SD without `hardware` gains no
+  volume, no volumeMount and no `securityContext` — mirroring the existing `podSecurityContext`
+  negative), and a pass-through case (an SD declaring both `hardware` and its own
+  `podSecurityContext: {fsGroup: 1001, supplementalGroups: [44]}` keeps it **exactly** as written).
+- **The self-tests actually bite.** I mutated the guard (`if hw_gpu == "intel-quicksync":` → `if
+  True:`) in a scratch copy and re-ran: **rc 1**, failing on "an SD without `hardware` must gain no
+  dri volume, no mount and no securityContext". A test that cannot fail is not a test; this one can.
+- **Re-render is a zero diff.**
+  `python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation` then
+  `git diff --stat apps/` → **empty**, and `git status --porcelain apps/` → **empty** (so the two
+  not-onboarded by-products, `apps/wave-1/keycloak.yaml` and `apps/wave-0/vm-demo.yaml`, were
+  rewritten byte-identically and needed no revert). The change is inert until a service opts in.
+- **Schema validity and catalog conformance.** `Draft202012Validator.check_schema` passes; all
+  **12** `catalog/*.yaml` validate with **0** errors. On the new field specifically: `gpu:
+  intel-quicksync` accepted; `gpu: /dev/dri` rejected (enum); `hardware: {gpu: …, path: …}` rejected
+  (`additionalProperties: false`); `hardware: {}` rejected (`minProperties: 1`).
+- **Hand-checked the emitted YAML** by rendering a throwaway SD carrying `hardware`, a Longhorn
+  volume and its own `podSecurityContext: {runAsUser: 1000, supplementalGroups: [44]}`. Result:
+  `volumeMounts` = config then `{name: dri, mountPath: /dev/dri}`; `volumes` = the PVC then
+  `{name: dri, hostPath: {path: /dev/dri, type: DirectoryOrCreate}}`; `securityContext` =
+  `{runAsUser: 1000, supplementalGroups: [44]}` — i.e. **unchanged**, nothing appended. That toy SD
+  was never written into `catalog/`.
+- **GATE: `rc 3` — UNDETERMINED, NOT green.** Run in the pinned toolbox from this worktree with
+  both CLAUDE.md §3 workarounds (`DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null`, and an `ENGINE` shim bind-mounting the
+  main checkout's `.git` at its own absolute path). Diff base `origin/main @ 0fbf544d5e2f`; touched
+  requirements `R-DNS-03 R-GITOPS-02 R-IDP-02`. Run **four** times on this branch with an identical
+  result each time, most recently against tree `c132893045b1` — the final commit differs from that
+  run only by this paragraph. Per stage:
+
+  | stage | result |
+  |---|---|
+  | spec-immutability | **SKIPPED** — sibling spec repo not at `/work/../home-network-k3s`. Expected from a worktree; tolerated by §3. |
+  | decisions-log | pass |
+  | lint | pass |
+  | l0 | pass — 19 offline cases, `0 failure(s), 0 skip(s), 0 unwired` |
+  | render-golden | pass — *"all 10 onboarded service golden(s) reproduce from the canonical render"* |
+  | l1 | pass — 3 offline checks, `0 failure(s), 0 skip(s), 0 unwired`; coverage 51/51 requirements scaffolded |
+  | approval-policy | pass (`event='none'`, not a pull_request event — N/A locally; it will evaluate for real on the PR) |
+  | gitea-settings | **SKIPPED** — `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN` unset. Expected; branch protection and runner registration are therefore UNVERIFIED by this run. |
+  | conformance (L2/L3) | **SKIPPED** — `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE!=true`. Phase-0 standing skip. |
+
+  The gate's own verdict: *"Stages that did not run: spec-immutability gitea-settings"*. **No stage
+  failed, and no stage skipped for a reason caused by this change.** rc 3 is reported as rc 3; I am
+  not calling this green.
+- **Blast radius of the schema change:** `hardware` is absent from every catalog entry, so
+  `apply_defaults` never materializes it and `s.get("hardware")` is `None` on all 12 — which is what
+  the zero diff above demonstrates rather than asserts.
+- **Touched no sensitive path.** Changes are confined to `schemas/`, `catalog/`, `decisions/`; per
+  `infra/gitea/approval-policy.json` none of those are sensitive. `conformance/**` and `clusters/**`
+  are untouched. I did not run `--emit-waves` (it writes `clusters/base/`, and the set of files
+  under `apps/` did not change).
+
+## What I did NOT verify
+
+- **Whether containerd's device cgroup permits a non-privileged pod to `open()` a bind-mounted char
+  device. Still unverified, and it is the single largest technical risk in this workstream.**
+  containerd installs a per-container **device cgroup** allow-list, and whether
+  `/dev/dri/renderD128` arriving as a bind-mounted device node is permitted by it on this
+  k3s/containerd version is **unmeasured**. Settling it requires applying a pod, which is an
+  operator action, not an agent one. The container's PID 1 running as uid 0 helps on the DAC side
+  but does **not** bypass the cgroup gate. If it blocks, the mount will succeed, the image's group
+  hook will do its job, and the `open()` will still fail — and the fallback is the Intel GPU device
+  plugin, which *sets* the cgroup entry. Note that that fallback is a **renderer-only change**: no
+  ServiceDefinition moves, because the authoring surface is an intent enum. That is the design
+  justifying itself, and it is the reason to keep the enum even if the hostPath mechanism loses.
+- **That a missing device degrades silently — and nothing will tell you.** This is the accepted cost
+  of `DirectoryOrCreate`. The workload will software-transcode and **no signal reports it**: media
+  apps in this catalog declare no `metricsEndpoint`, so no ServiceMonitor exists, and there is no
+  metric to alert on. I deliberately did **not** propose an alert, because an alert that cannot fire
+  is worse than none — see the 2026-09-13 correction in `renderer-contract.md` §`observability`,
+  where twelve monitors discovered zero targets. The only proof of hardware transcode is an operator
+  seeing it in the application's own dashboard.
+- **That "mounting the device is sufficient" generalizes beyond this one image.** It does not, and
+  I have not verified that it does. The claim was measured for an image that resolves the device
+  group itself in `cont-init.d`. A future consumer of `hardware.gpu` that runs non-root with no
+  equivalent hook would still need the group solved — and the fix for that case is a **renderer**
+  change (per-image handling, or the device plugin), never a new SD field. I scoped the claim in
+  `renderer-contract.md` rather than letting it read as general; the first such consumer must
+  re-measure.
+- **The feature now depends on a hook inside an image that floats.** The `cont-init.d` behaviour
+  above was read from digest `sha256:e0ab27395614…` (`plexmediaserver 1.43.4.10903`), but the
+  deployment runs `plexinc/pms-docker:latest` with `imagePullPolicy: Always`. **A silent pull can
+  change the behaviour this feature depends on, with no commit anywhere in this repo to show for
+  it** — and the failure would be the silent software-transcode described above. I have not fixed
+  that here (it is the Plex wiring's tag/digest decision, not the capability's), but it should not
+  be forgotten.
+- **GID drift is NOT on this list any more, deliberately.** An earlier revision pinned
+  `INTEL_RENDER_GID = 992` and listed "a node rebuild could move it" as an open risk. The hook
+  re-`stat`s the device on every start, so drift is self-healing and no GID is pinned anywhere. The
+  risk is retired, not overlooked.
+- **Anything on the live cluster.** I ran no `kubectl` and I opened no shell in any container. The
+  node facts (device present, `root:render` 0660, `i915` bound, no device plugin, no
+  `gpu.intel.com/*` advertised), the in-container measurements quoted above, and the Kyverno
+  posture (`restrict-host-namespaces` Enforce; no hostPath or `supplementalGroups`
+  restriction; no PSA labels on app namespaces) are **prior recon handed to me, not re-measured by
+  me**. Per CLAUDE.md §2b, treat them as second-hand until re-queried.
+- **That CI exercises the self-tests. It does not.** `git grep -- --selftest ci/` returns nothing —
+  no gate stage invokes the renderer's self-test. They are the executable spec and house style, and
+  I ran them by hand, but a future regression in this code path **will not be caught by the gate**.
+  Wiring `--selftest` into a gate stage is a real gap and is not part of this PR (`ci/` is a
+  sensitive path and would drag in a human reviewer for a change unrelated to this one).
+- **Runtime behaviour of any kind.** The gate proves the L0/L1 offline subset only;
+  `vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset, so L2/L3 conformance does not run in CI.

infra/ansible/roles/node_health/README.md

@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ Serves **R-ENV-01** (you cannot certify a node you have not measured), **R-ENV-0
 
 ## Contract
 
-- **Read-only and side-effect-free.** It reads `/sys`, `/proc`, `/etc`, runs `lsblk`/`lscpu`,
-  and — only when it can escalate — `smartctl`. It writes nothing to the node and
-  **installs nothing**. `smartmontools` is declared in `node_baseline_packages`; if it is
+- **Read-only and side-effect-free.** It reads `/sys`, `/proc`, `/etc`, runs `lsblk`/`lscpu`
+  (and `lspci` only if it happens to be installed), and — only when it can escalate —
+  `smartctl`. It writes nothing to the node and **installs nothing**. `smartmontools` is declared in `node_baseline_packages`; if it is
   absent the SMART checks SKIP with that as the stated reason (operator ruling 2026-08-31:
   package installation is `node_baseline`'s job, never a health check's, never a manual
   `apt-get`).
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ Serves **R-ENV-01** (you cannot certify a node you have not measured), **R-ENV-0
 | `memory.available`, `memory.swap`, `memory.ecc` | headroom, kubelet's swap-off prerequisite **and whether it survives a reboot** (see [Swap off is not the same as swap disabled](#swap-off-is-not-the-same-as-swap-disabled)), EDAC correctable/uncorrectable counters |
 | `memory.physical_total` | **is this machine using the RAM it has?** `/proc/zoneinfo` present-vs-managed pages (no root, metal or VM) and `MemTotal` vs the DIMM capacity SMBIOS reports (`dmidecode -t 17`, root, bare metal). Cause-independent by design — see [The EFI memattr check](#the-efi-memattr-check) |
 | `cpu.throttle`, `cpu.inventory`, `cpu.virtualisation` | thermal throttle events since boot, topology + frequency scaling, VT-x/AMD-V + `/dev/kvm` (KubeVirt, R-PLAT-03) |
+| `graphics.render_device` | is there a usable `/dev/dri/renderD*` character device — the path Plex hardware-transcodes through. See [The render-device check](#the-render-device-check) |
+| `graphics.drm_driver` | which DRM driver is bound to the display device, against `node_health_graphics_expected_driver` (`i915` here) |
+| `graphics.media_stack` | **INFO only**: `vcs*`/`vecs*` media engines, GuC/HuC firmware state, host VAAPI userspace. None of these is ever graded — see below for why |
 | `thermal.max` | hottest sensor across thermal zones and hwmon chips |
 | `pressure.cpu` / `.memory` / `.io` | PSI `some avg60` — dev learned to care about CPU PSI specifically |
 | `network.link`, `network.errors`, `network.resolvers` | link state/speed, NIC error counters, DNS upstream redundancy per address family |
@@ -91,6 +94,78 @@ used to blame that state on "this node has not been baselined yet", which sent t
 back to re-run the role that had already run.
 
 
+## The render-device check
+
+Plex transcodes on the iGPU through `/dev/dri/renderD128`. **When that node stops existing,
+nothing fails loudly.** Plex falls back to software transcoding by itself; the only symptom
+is a hot CPU and stuttering clients. A node rebuild, a BIOS change that disables the onboard
+IGD, a kernel that binds a different DRM driver, or a driver regression all produce exactly
+that silent degradation.
+
+The state was measured by hand on all three prod nodes on 2026-09-30 and found working. **A
+fact measured once decays silently**, so it is re-measured on every health run instead of
+living in a runbook. Nothing is installed, no module is loaded, no group is changed — the
+role's read-only contract is unchanged.
+
+| fact | where it comes from | root? |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/dev/dri` contents, ownership, mode, char-vs-not | `lstat()` on each entry | no |
+| owning group **name** for the render node's gid | `grp.getgrgid()` | no |
+| bound DRM driver | `/sys/class/drm/card*/device/driver` symlink target | no |
+| is the iGPU on the bus at all | `/sys/bus/pci/devices/*/class` (PCI base class `0x03`) | no |
+| media engines (`vcs*`, `vecs*`) | `/sys/class/drm/card*/engine/*` | no |
+| module load state | `/proc/modules` | no |
+| GuC/HuC | `/sys/module/i915/parameters/enable_guc` + `/proc/cmdline` | **parameter file is mode 0400** |
+
+### The PCI scan is separate from the DRM scan on purpose
+
+`/sys/class/drm/card*` exists only once a driver has **bound**. A machine whose iGPU sits on
+the bus with nothing attached has no `card0` at all — and that is precisely the failure being
+hunted. So the display device is looked for on the PCI bus independently, from sysfs, which
+is always there. That is what lets `graphics.render_device` distinguish
+
+- *no GPU in this machine* → **SKIP** (a VM guest; nothing to grade, the same convention
+  `thermal.max` uses for "no sensor on this hardware"), from
+- *a GPU is on the bus and there is still no render node* → **FAIL**.
+
+`lspci` is used **only** to decorate the PCI entry with a readable name, and it is treated as
+optional because it is: `pciutils` is **not** declared in `node_baseline_packages`, so nothing
+in this repo guarantees it. It did turn out to be present on all three prod nodes
+(`/usr/bin/lspci`, measured 2026-09-30 — Debian installs `pciutils` by default), but depending
+on that would mean depending on an undeclared package. Absent, `description` is `null`, the
+numeric IDs are printed instead, and no verdict changes.
+
+### The render node's GID is reported, never asserted
+
+The render device was `root:render`, **gid 992**, mode `0660` on all three prod nodes on
+2026-09-30. The check does **not** compare against `992`, and must not be changed to.
+`render` is a **systemd dynamic allocation** (`systemd-sysusers`), not a Debian static gid
+from `base-passwd`, so a rebuilt node can legitimately land on a different number. Plex's own
+container entrypoint stats the device and joins whichever group owns it, so drift genuinely
+is not a fault. Recording the observed group name and gid in the detail line makes drift
+**visible** without making it an error — a hard `!= 992` would be a false alarm waiting for a
+reinstall.
+
+What *is* configurable is the expected DRM driver, `node_health_graphics_expected_driver`
+(default `i915`), so the verdict stays out of task logic. `xe` bound instead of `i915` is a
+**WARN**, not a FAIL: the device still works, but the two drivers do not share a userspace
+media stack and a libva/iHD build that transcodes correctly against one is not automatically
+right for the other. On these nodes `xe.ko.xz` exists on disk and is bound to nothing.
+
+### Two things that are informational and must stay that way
+
+- **GuC/HuC firmware not loaded** (`i915.enable_guc=0`) is a known, accepted state here. It
+  costs low-power H.264 encode *quality* only; decode and encode both still run on the media
+  engines. Grading it would put a permanent WARN on a chosen configuration.
+- **No host VAAPI userspace / no `vainfo`** is **not a defect**. Plex ships its own libva and
+  media driver inside its container, so the host needs neither. Flagging it would invite
+  someone to `apt install vainfo` on a node to clear a health check — and this role installs
+  nothing.
+
+`enable_guc` is one of i915's `0400` module parameters, so an unprivileged pass usually
+cannot read it. It reports as an honest `NOT READ — <reason>` rather than a fabricated `0`,
+with `/proc/cmdline` as the world-readable second source for an explicit boot override.
+
 ## The EFI memattr check
 
 `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §0b is authoritative; this is only what the check needs.
@@ -273,3 +348,10 @@ stays `null` — no claim is made either way.
   but the wear/endurance context SKIPs rather than guessing.
 - `ioerr_cnt` counts commands the kernel saw fail, which includes benign rejected or
   unsupported commands during discovery. Attribution needs `dmesg`, which needs root.
+- `graphics.render_device`'s **FAIL path has never fired against a real node** — every prod
+  node has a working render device, and the role is read-only so one cannot be taken away to
+  prove it. The failure branches were exercised against synthetic fact sets only. The same
+  applies to the `xe`-bound WARN: no node here has `xe` bound.
+- `graphics.*` proves the render **device** exists and which driver owns it. It does **not**
+  prove a transcode succeeds — that needs a VAAPI round trip inside Plex's own container,
+  with Plex's own libva, which is out of scope for a node-level check that installs nothing.

infra/ansible/roles/node_health/defaults/main.yml

@@ -35,6 +35,24 @@ node_health_try_privileged: true
 # --nocheck=standby: never spin up a sleeping disk just to read it. Read-only hygiene.
 node_health_smartctl_args: "--json=c --all --nocheck=standby"
 
+# --- Graphics / render device ---------------------------------------------------------
+# The DRM driver this site EXPECTS to be bound to its display device. Measured on all three
+# prod nodes 2026-09-30: `i915` on the CoffeeLake-S GT2 [UHD Graphics 630] iGPU of every HP
+# EliteDesk 800 G5 Mini. The newer `xe` module is present on disk as xe.ko.xz but is bound to
+# nothing, and that difference matters enough to surface: the two drivers do not share a
+# userspace media stack (a libva/iHD build that works against i915 is not automatically the
+# right one for xe), so a silent switch would change Plex's transcoding path. A site on AMD
+# or NVIDIA sets this to `amdgpu` / `nouveau` / `nvidia` rather than editing task logic.
+#
+# WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* A SETTING HERE: the numeric GID of the render node's owning
+# group. `render` is a systemd DYNAMIC allocation (systemd-sysusers), not a Debian static
+# one, so a rebuilt node may legitimately land on a different number — it was 992 on all
+# three prod nodes on 2026-09-30, and an assertion against that literal would be a false
+# alarm waiting to happen. Plex's own container entrypoint stats the device and joins
+# whichever group owns it, so drift genuinely is not a fault. The observed group name and GID
+# are therefore REPORTED in the check detail and never graded.
+node_health_graphics_expected_driver: i915
+
 # --- Thresholds ---------------------------------------------------------------------
 # All verdicts come from here, so a site can retune without touching task logic.
 node_health_thresholds:

infra/ansible/roles/node_health/files/node_health_collect.py

@@ -35,10 +35,13 @@
 # =============================================================================
 
 import glob
+import grp
 import json
 import os
+import pwd
 import re
 import shutil
+import stat
 import subprocess
 import sys
 import time
@@ -756,6 +759,212 @@ def collect_pressure():
     return out
 
 
+# --- Graphics / DRM render device -----------------------------------------------------
+# WHY THIS IS HERE AT ALL. Plex transcodes on the iGPU through /dev/dri/renderD128. If that
+# node stops existing — a node rebuild, a BIOS change that disables the IGD, a kernel that
+# binds a different DRM driver — nothing breaks loudly: Plex silently falls back to software
+# transcoding and the only symptom is a hot CPU. So the render device is measured on every
+# health run rather than being a fact someone established once by hand.
+#
+# EVERYTHING BELOW IS UNPRIVILEGED. /dev/dri is world-traversable, the device nodes are
+# stat()able by anyone, /sys/class/drm and /sys/bus/pci/devices are world-readable, and so
+# are the module parameters under /sys/module. Nothing here needs root, so nothing here
+# belongs in the privileged pass. (GuC/HuC *load* status lives in debugfs, which does need
+# root AND debugfs mounted; the module PARAMETER below is the unprivileged stand-in and is
+# what actually decides whether the firmware is loaded at all.)
+#
+# THE PCI SCAN IS DELIBERATELY SEPARATE FROM THE DRM SCAN. /sys/class/drm/card* only exists
+# once a driver has BOUND. A machine whose iGPU is on the bus with no driver bound has no
+# card0 at all, and that is precisely the failure this is meant to catch — so the display
+# device is looked for on the PCI bus independently, from sysfs, which is always there.
+# `lspci` is used ONLY to decorate that with a human-readable name, and it is treated as
+# optional because it IS optional: pciutils is not declared in node_baseline_packages, so
+# nothing in this repo guarantees it. It did turn out to be present on all three prod nodes
+# (/usr/bin/lspci, measured 2026-09-30 — Debian installs pciutils by default), but relying on
+# that would make the collector depend on an undeclared package. A missing lspci leaves
+# `description` null, the numeric IDs are reported instead, and no verdict changes.
+DISPLAY_PCI_CLASS_PREFIX = "0x03"  # PCI base class 03 = display controller (VGA/3D/other)
+# DRM drivers worth reporting the load state of. The bound-driver symlink is authoritative
+# (a built-in driver never appears in /proc/modules); this is corroboration only, and it is
+# how "xe.ko.xz exists on disk but is bound to nothing" becomes a visible fact.
+DRM_MODULES = ("i915", "xe", "amdgpu", "radeon", "nouveau", "nvidia")
+
+
+def _uid_name(uid):
+    try:
+        return pwd.getpwuid(uid).pw_name
+    except (KeyError, OverflowError, TypeError, OSError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _gid_name(gid):
+    """Group NAME for a numeric gid, or None when nothing resolves it.
+
+    Reported as an OBSERVED value, never asserted against a literal. The `render` group is
+    a systemd DYNAMIC allocation (it is created by systemd-sysusers, not fixed by Debian's
+    static base-passwd list), so its gid can legitimately differ after a rebuild. Plex's own
+    container init stats the device and joins whatever group owns it, so a moved gid is
+    drift to notice, not a fault to fail on."""
+    try:
+        return grp.getgrgid(gid).gr_name
+    except (KeyError, OverflowError, TypeError, OSError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _module_param(mod, param):
+    """One /sys/module/<mod>/parameters/<param>, with WHY it is missing when it is.
+
+    Three outcomes that must not be conflated: a real value; "the module exposes no such
+    parameter" (not loaded, built in, or a driver that simply has no such knob — xe has no
+    enable_guc, GuC is mandatory there); and "the file exists but is mode 0400". Most i915
+    module parameters are `i915_param_named(..., 0400, ...)` — root-only — so an
+    unprivileged pass legitimately cannot read them. Returning null with the reason keeps
+    that an honest UNKNOWN instead of a fabricated 0. read_text() also records the
+    permission denial in UNREADABLE, so the summary lists it with everything else root
+    would add."""
+    path = "/sys/module/%s/parameters/%s" % (mod, param)
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return {"value": None, "reason": "%s exposes no %s parameter (module not loaded, "
+                                         "built in, or no such knob on this driver)" % (mod, param)}
+    value = read_text(path)
+    if value is None:
+        return {"value": None, "reason": "%s is not readable without root (i915 module "
+                                         "parameters are mode 0400)" % path}
+    return {"value": value, "reason": None}
+
+
+def _dev_node(path):
+    """stat() one /dev/dri entry. lstat, so a symlink is reported as the symlink it is."""
+    try:
+        st = os.lstat(path)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        UNREADABLE.append({"path": path, "reason": "stat failed: %s" % exc})
+        return None
+    return {
+        "path": path,
+        "name": os.path.basename(path),
+        "char_device": stat.S_ISCHR(st.st_mode),
+        "mode": "%04o" % stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode),
+        "uid": st.st_uid,
+        "gid": st.st_gid,
+        "owner": _uid_name(st.st_uid),
+        "group": _gid_name(st.st_gid),
+    }
+
+
+def collect_graphics():
+    dri_dir = "/dev/dri"
+    dri_present = os.path.isdir(dri_dir)
+    devices = []
+    if dri_present:
+        for path in sorted(glob.glob(dri_dir + "/*")):
+            # /dev/dri/by-path/ is a directory of symlinks, not a device. Skipping
+            # directories rather than filtering to char devices is deliberate: anything
+            # in here that is NOT a character special file is an anomaly worth seeing, and
+            # `char_device: false` is how it becomes visible.
+            if os.path.isdir(path):
+                continue
+            entry = _dev_node(path)
+            if entry is not None:
+                devices.append(entry)
+    render_nodes = [d for d in devices if d["name"].startswith("renderD")]
+
+    # Bound DRM devices. /sys/class/drm also holds one entry per CONNECTOR
+    # (card0-HDMI-A-1, card0-DP-1 ...) — those are outputs, not devices, and are skipped.
+    cards = []
+    for cdir in sorted(glob.glob("/sys/class/drm/card[0-9]*")):
+        name = os.path.basename(cdir)
+        if "-" in name:
+            continue
+        driver = None
+        drvlink = cdir + "/device/driver"
+        if os.path.islink(drvlink):
+            driver = os.path.basename(os.path.realpath(drvlink))
+        address = None
+        devlink = cdir + "/device"
+        if os.path.islink(devlink):
+            address = os.path.basename(os.path.realpath(devlink))
+        # i915/xe publish one directory per hardware engine. vcs* is a video (H.264/HEVC)
+        # engine and vecs* the video-enhancement engine: those two are what a transcode
+        # actually runs on, so their presence is the difference between "a GPU is bound"
+        # and "this GPU can do media work".
+        engines = sorted(
+            {
+                os.path.basename(p)
+                for p in (glob.glob(cdir + "/engine/*") + glob.glob(cdir + "/device/engine/*"))
+                if os.path.isdir(p)
+            }
+        )
+        cards.append(
+            {
+                "card": name,
+                "driver": driver,
+                "pci_address": address,
+                "vendor_id": read_text(cdir + "/device/vendor"),
+                "device_id": read_text(cdir + "/device/device"),
+                "engines": engines,
+                "media_engines": [e for e in engines if e.startswith(("vcs", "vecs"))],
+            }
+        )
+
+    # Display-class devices on the PCI bus, driver bound or not.
+    pci_display = []
+    for pdir in sorted(glob.glob("/sys/bus/pci/devices/*")):
+        class_id = read_text(pdir + "/class") or ""
+        if not class_id.startswith(DISPLAY_PCI_CLASS_PREFIX):
+            continue
+        address = os.path.basename(pdir)
+        driver = None
+        if os.path.islink(pdir + "/driver"):
+            driver = os.path.basename(os.path.realpath(pdir + "/driver"))
+        description = None
+        rc, out, _ = run(["lspci", "-nn", "-s", address])
+        if rc == 0 and out.strip():
+            description = out.strip().splitlines()[0]
+        pci_display.append(
+            {
+                "address": address,
+                "class_id": class_id or None,
+                "vendor_id": read_text(pdir + "/vendor"),
+                "device_id": read_text(pdir + "/device"),
+                "revision": read_text(pdir + "/revision"),
+                "driver": driver,
+                "description": description,
+            }
+        )
+
+    loaded = set()
+    for line in (read_text("/proc/modules") or "").splitlines():
+        fields = line.split()
+        if fields:
+            loaded.add(fields[0])
+    modules = {m: (m in loaded) for m in DRM_MODULES}
+
+    # GuC/HuC. i915's `enable_guc` is a bitmask: 0 = neither, 1 = GuC submission, 2 = HuC
+    # firmware, 3 = both, -1 = whatever the driver defaults to on this platform. It is the
+    # one place the state is visible without root AND without debugfs — but the sysfs file
+    # is mode 0400, so unprivileged it usually reads back as an honest UNKNOWN. The kernel
+    # command line is the world-readable second source: an explicit `i915.enable_guc=` there
+    # is authoritative about what was ASKED for, even when the parameter file cannot be read.
+    uc = {mod: {"enable_guc": _module_param(mod, "enable_guc")} for mod in ("i915", "xe")}
+    cmdline_params = [
+        token
+        for token in (read_text("/proc/cmdline") or "").split()
+        if token.startswith(tuple("%s." % m for m in DRM_MODULES))
+    ]
+
+    return {
+        "dri_present": dri_present,
+        "devices": devices,
+        "render_nodes": render_nodes,
+        "drm_cards": cards,
+        "pci_display": pci_display,
+        "modules": modules,
+        "uc": uc,
+        "cmdline_params": cmdline_params,
+    }
+
+
 # --- Storage ------------------------------------------------------------------------
 PSEUDO_FS = {
     "proc", "sysfs", "devtmpfs", "devpts", "tmpfs", "cgroup", "cgroup2", "pstore",
@@ -1095,7 +1304,15 @@ def collect_os():
 # we only DETECT, and the role skips the SMART checks with an accurate reason.
 def collect_tools():
     tools = {}
-    for tool in ("smartctl", "nvme", "ethtool", "dmidecode", "lsblk", "lscpu"):
+    # lspci (pciutils) and vainfo (libva-utils) are BOTH optional and NEITHER is declared in
+    # node_baseline_packages, so nothing in this repo guarantees either. Measured on prod
+    # 2026-09-30: lspci IS there (/usr/bin/lspci — Debian ships pciutils by default) and
+    # vainfo is NOT. lspci only decorates the PCI display entry with a readable name; vainfo
+    # is not needed on the host at all, because Plex ships its own libva and media driver
+    # inside its container. They are probed so the report can state their presence or absence
+    # as a fact instead of leaving the reader to wonder — and so nothing here is ever tempted
+    # to install them. This role installs nothing.
+    for tool in ("smartctl", "nvme", "ethtool", "dmidecode", "lsblk", "lscpu", "lspci", "vainfo"):
         tools[tool] = which(tool)
     return tools
 
@@ -1127,6 +1344,7 @@ def main():
         "os": collect_os(),
         "dmi": collect_dmi(),
         "cpu": collect_cpu(),
+        "graphics": collect_graphics(),
         "memory": collect_memory(),
         "thermal": collect_thermal(),
         "pressure": collect_pressure(),

infra/ansible/roles/node_health/tasks/assess.yml

@@ -652,6 +652,204 @@
          ~ (', lscpu Virtualization=' ~ c.virtualization if c.virtualization else '')
          ~ (', running as a guest of ' ~ c.hypervisor_vendor if c.is_virtual_guest | bool else '') }}
 
+# --- Graphics / render device ----------------------------------------------------------
+# WHY A HEALTH CHECK AND NOT A NOTE IN A RUNBOOK. Plex transcodes on the iGPU through
+# /dev/dri/renderD128. When that node stops existing nothing fails loudly — Plex falls back
+# to software transcoding on its own and the only symptom is a hot CPU and stuttering
+# clients. A node rebuild, a BIOS setting that disables the onboard IGD, or a kernel that
+# binds a different DRM driver all produce exactly that silent degradation. It was measured
+# by hand on all three prod nodes on 2026-09-30 and found working; a fact measured once
+# decays silently, so it is re-measured on every health run instead.
+#
+# READ-ONLY, AND UNPRIVILEGED. Every fact behind these three checks comes from the
+# unprivileged pass: stat() on /dev/dri, the /sys/class/drm bound-driver symlink,
+# /sys/bus/pci/devices class codes, /proc/modules and /proc/cmdline. The role installs
+# nothing (no vainfo, no pciutils), loads no module and changes no group — see the role
+# README. The ONE fact that is root-gated is i915's enable_guc module parameter (mode 0400),
+# and it reports as an honest UNKNOWN with the reason rather than as a 0.
+#
+# THE THREE VERDICTS ARE SPLIT ON PURPOSE:
+#   graphics.render_device  the OUTCOME — can anything hardware-transcode on this node.
+#   graphics.drm_driver     the CAUSE side — what is bound, and is it what this site expects.
+#   graphics.media_stack    INFO only. GuC/HuC and host VAAPI userspace both belong here and
+#                           NEITHER is ever a failure; see the task's own comment for why.
+- name: Assess — locate the display device and its bound driver (once, shared by three checks)
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    node_health_render:
+      # Display-class PCI devices (base class 0x03), driver bound or not. This is the
+      # question "is there a GPU in this machine at all", and it is answered from the PCI
+      # bus rather than from /sys/class/drm because a card* entry only exists once a driver
+      # has BOUND — so a GPU with nothing bound to it has no card* and would otherwise look
+      # identical to a machine with no GPU.
+      display_devices: "{{ g.pci_display }}"
+      bound_drivers: >-
+        {{ g.pci_display | map(attribute='driver') | select('string') | unique | list }}
+      # Only a CHARACTER SPECIAL file is a usable render node. Anything else called renderD*
+      # is an anomaly, not a device, and must not be counted as one.
+      render_chardevs: "{{ g.render_nodes | selectattr('char_device') | list }}"
+      # Video (vcs*) and video-enhancement (vecs*) engines across every bound card — the
+      # difference between "a GPU is bound" and "this GPU can do media work".
+      media_engines: >-
+        {{ g.drm_cards | map(attribute='media_engines') | flatten | unique | sort | list }}
+  vars:
+    ansible_become: false
+    g: "{{ node_health_facts.graphics }}"
+
+- name: Assess — DRM render node for hardware transcoding
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
+      'id': 'graphics.render_device',
+      'title': 'DRM render node present for hardware transcoding (/dev/dri/renderD*)',
+      'status': render_status,
+      'detail': render_detail }] }}"
+  vars:
+    ansible_become: false
+    g: "{{ node_health_facts.graphics }}"
+    r: "{{ node_health_render }}"
+    # SKIP, not PASS and not FAIL, when the machine has no display device at all: there is
+    # then nothing to grade, and the same convention thermal.max already uses for "no sensor
+    # on this hardware" applies. FAIL is reserved for the state that actually breaks Plex —
+    # a GPU IS on the bus and there is still no render node.
+    render_status: >-
+      {{ 'SKIP' if (r.display_devices | length) == 0
+         else ('PASS' if (r.render_chardevs | length) > 0 else 'FAIL') }}
+    dri_listing: >-
+      {{ (g.devices | map(attribute='name') | join(', ')) if (g.devices | length) > 0
+         else 'nothing' }}
+    render_detail: >-
+      {%- if (r.display_devices | length) == 0 -%}
+      this machine exposes no display-class PCI device (base class 0x03) at all, so there is
+      no GPU here for a render node to belong to and hardware transcoding is not available on
+      this node by construction. Normal for a VM guest. Measured from /sys/bus/pci/devices,
+      not assumed.
+      {%- elif (r.render_chardevs | length) > 0 -%}
+      {{ r.render_chardevs | length }} render node(s):
+      {% for d in r.render_chardevs %}{{ d.path }} (character special, mode {{ d.mode }},
+      owner {{ d.owner | default(d.uid, true) }}, group {{ d.group | default('unresolved', true) }}
+      gid {{ d.gid }}){{ ', ' if not loop.last else '' }}{% endfor %}.
+      /dev/dri holds: {{ dri_listing }}.
+      THE OWNING GROUP AND GID ARE REPORTED AS OBSERVED, NEVER ASSERTED against a literal:
+      `render` is a systemd DYNAMIC allocation rather than a Debian static one, so a rebuilt
+      node may legitimately land on a different number (all three prod nodes read gid 992 on
+      2026-09-30), and Plex's container entrypoint stats the device and joins whichever group
+      owns it. Drift is therefore visible in this line without being a failure.
+      {%- else -%}
+      HARDWARE TRANSCODING IS BROKEN ON THIS NODE. A display-class device IS present on the
+      PCI bus ({{ r.display_devices | map(attribute='address') | join(', ') }}) but there is
+      no usable character-special render node: /dev/dri
+      {{ 'does not exist' if not (g.dri_present | bool) else 'holds ' ~ dri_listing }}.
+      {{ ('Note that /dev/dri holds ' ~ (g.render_nodes | map(attribute='name') | join(', '))
+      ~ ' — present, but NOT character special, which is an anomaly in its own right. ')
+         if (g.render_nodes | length) > 0 else '' }}
+      Nothing fails loudly in this state — Plex silently falls back to software transcoding
+      and the only symptom is CPU load. Check graphics.drm_driver below for whether a DRM
+      driver bound at all, then whether the onboard IGD is still enabled in BIOS.
+      {%- endif -%}
+
+- name: Assess — DRM driver bound to the display device
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
+      'id': 'graphics.drm_driver',
+      'title': 'DRM driver bound to the display device (expected ' ~ expected ~ ')',
+      'status': driver_status,
+      'detail': driver_detail }] }}"
+  vars:
+    ansible_become: false
+    g: "{{ node_health_facts.graphics }}"
+    r: "{{ node_health_render }}"
+    expected: "{{ node_health_graphics_expected_driver }}"
+    # WARN rather than FAIL when a DIFFERENT driver is bound (the `xe` case): the device
+    # still works, but the userspace media stack is not the same one, so it is a change the
+    # operator must see before a transcode regression surfaces as a user complaint. FAIL is
+    # for nothing bound at all, which is the cause of a missing render node.
+    driver_status: >-
+      {{ 'SKIP' if (r.display_devices | length) == 0
+         else ('FAIL' if (r.bound_drivers | length) == 0
+               else ('PASS' if expected in r.bound_drivers else 'WARN')) }}
+    driver_detail: >-
+      {%- if (r.display_devices | length) == 0 -%}
+      no display-class PCI device on this machine, so no DRM driver can be bound to one.
+      Measured from /sys/bus/pci/devices.
+      {%- else -%}
+      {% for p in r.display_devices %}{{ p.address }}
+      {{ p.description | default(((p.vendor_id | default('?', true)) ~ ':' ~ (p.device_id | default('?', true))), true) }}
+      -> driver {{ p.driver | default('NONE BOUND', true) }}{{ '; ' if not loop.last else '' }}{% endfor %}.
+      {{ ('DRM cards: ' ~ (g.drm_cards | map(attribute='card') | zip(g.drm_cards | map(attribute='driver'))
+           | map('join', '=') | join(', ')) ~ '. ') if (g.drm_cards | length) > 0
+         else 'No /sys/class/drm/card* entry exists, which is consistent with no driver being bound. ' }}
+      Module load state (/proc/modules, corroboration only — a built-in driver never appears
+      there, the bound-driver symlink above is what decides):
+      {{ g.modules | dict2items | map(attribute='key') | zip(g.modules | dict2items | map(attribute='value') | map('string'))
+         | map('join', '=') | join(', ') }}.
+      {%- if (r.bound_drivers | length) == 0 %}
+      NOTHING IS BOUND to the display device. That is why there is no render node: the DRM
+      subsystem creates /dev/dri/renderD* only when a driver attaches. Check whether the
+      module exists for this kernel and whether it was blacklisted or failed to probe.
+      {%- elif expected in r.bound_drivers %}
+      This is the expected driver for this site (node_health_graphics_expected_driver).
+      {%- else %}
+      EXPECTED `{{ expected }}`, GOT `{{ r.bound_drivers | join(', ') }}`. The device still
+      works, so this is not an outage — but the two DRM drivers do not share a userspace
+      media stack, and a libva/iHD build that transcodes correctly against one is not
+      automatically right for the other. Confirm Plex still hardware-transcodes before
+      treating this as benign.
+      {%- endif %}
+      {%- endif -%}
+
+# INFO ONLY, AND THAT IS A DELIBERATE RULING, NOT AN OVERSIGHT:
+#
+#   GuC/HuC firmware not loaded (i915.enable_guc=0) — the accepted state on these nodes. It
+#   costs low-power H.264 encode QUALITY, nothing else; decode and encode both still work
+#   through the media engines. Grading it would put a permanent WARN on a configuration the
+#   operator has chosen.
+#   No host VAAPI userspace / no `vainfo` — NOT a defect. Plex ships its own libva and media
+#   driver inside its container, so the host needs neither. Flagging it would invite someone
+#   to `apt install vainfo` on a node to clear a health check, and this role installs nothing.
+#
+# The media ENGINES are the fact worth watching in this line: vcs* (video) and vecs*
+# (video-enhancement) are what a transcode actually runs on.
+- name: Assess — media engines, GuC/HuC firmware and host VAAPI userspace (informational)
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
+      'id': 'graphics.media_stack',
+      'title': 'Media engines, GuC/HuC firmware and host VAAPI userspace (informational)',
+      'status': ('SKIP' if (node_health_render.display_devices | length) == 0 else 'INFO'),
+      'detail': media_detail }] }}"
+  vars:
+    ansible_become: false
+    g: "{{ node_health_facts.graphics }}"
+    r: "{{ node_health_render }}"
+    # `.get()` rather than a subscript: uc only carries the two Intel drivers, and a site
+    # that set the expected driver to amdgpu must get a clean "no such parameters" line
+    # instead of an undefined-key traceback.
+    guc: "{{ g.uc.get(node_health_graphics_expected_driver) }}"
+    guc_text: >-
+      {{ ('enable_guc=' ~ guc.enable_guc.value) if (guc is mapping and guc.enable_guc.value is not none)
+         else ('NOT READ — ' ~ (guc.enable_guc.reason | default('no reason recorded', true))
+               if guc is mapping
+               else 'no /sys/module/' ~ node_health_graphics_expected_driver ~ '/parameters at all') }}
+    media_detail: >-
+      {%- if (r.display_devices | length) == 0 -%}
+      no display-class PCI device on this machine, so there is no media engine, no GuC/HuC
+      firmware and nothing to transcode with.
+      {%- else -%}
+      media engines:
+      {{ (r.media_engines | join(', ')) if (r.media_engines | length) > 0
+         else 'NONE exposed under /sys/class/drm/card*/engine — a bound driver with no vcs*/vecs* engine cannot do media work' }}
+      (all engines: {{ (g.drm_cards | map(attribute='engines') | flatten | unique | sort | join(', ')) | default('none', true) }}).
+      GuC/HuC: {{ guc_text }}.
+      {{ ('Kernel cmdline carries ' ~ (g.cmdline_params | join(' '))) if (g.cmdline_params | length) > 0
+         else 'No i915/xe parameter on the kernel cmdline' }}.
+      GuC/HuC being off is a KNOWN, ACCEPTED state here and is never graded: it costs
+      low-power H.264 encode quality only, and both decode and encode still run on the
+      engines above.
+      Host VAAPI userspace: vainfo
+      {{ ('present at ' ~ node_health_facts.tools.vainfo) if node_health_facts.tools.vainfo
+         else 'NOT installed on this host' }}
+      — also never graded, because Plex ships its own libva and media driver inside its
+      container, so the host needs none. This role installs nothing.
+      {%- endif -%}
+
 # --- Thermals -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 - name: Assess — temperatures
   ansible.builtin.set_fact:

infra/ansible/roles/node_health/templates/summary.txt.j2

@@ -136,6 +136,37 @@
 {% endfor %}
 {% endfor %}
 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ GRAPHICS / RENDER DEVICE (the Plex hardware-transcoding path)
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+{% set gfx = node_health_facts.graphics %}
+{% if gfx.pci_display %}
+{% for p in gfx.pci_display %}
+ pci  {{ '%-12s' | format(p.address) }} {{ p.description | default(((p.vendor_id | default('?', true)) ~ ':' ~ (p.device_id | default('?', true)) ~ ' class ' ~ (p.class_id | default('?', true))), true) }}
+              driver {{ p.driver | default('NONE BOUND', true) }}
+{% endfor %}
+{% else %}
+ pci         no display-class device (PCI base class 0x03) on this machine — no GPU here
+{% endif %}
+{% for c in gfx.drm_cards %}
+ drm  {{ '%-12s' | format(c.card) }} driver {{ '%-8s' | format(c.driver | default('-', true)) }} at {{ c.pci_address | default('-', true) }}  engines {{ c.engines | join(' ') | default('none exposed', true) }}
+{% endfor %}
+{% if gfx.dri_present %}
+{% for d in gfx.devices %}
+ dev  {{ '%-12s' | format(d.name) }} {{ '%-18s' | format('character special' if d.char_device else 'NOT A CHAR DEVICE') }} mode {{ d.mode }}  {{ d.owner | default(d.uid, true) }}:{{ d.group | default('(gid unresolved)', true) }} gid {{ d.gid }}
+{% endfor %}
+{% else %}
+ dev         /dev/dri DOES NOT EXIST — no DRM device node on this node at all
+{% endif %}
+{# GID is printed, never asserted: `render` is a systemd dynamic allocation, so a rebuild may
+   legitimately move it and Plex's container init joins whichever group owns the device. See
+   defaults/main.yml (node_health_graphics_expected_driver) for the full reasoning. #}
+{% set guc = gfx.uc.get(node_health_graphics_expected_driver) %}
+ GuC/HuC     {{ ('enable_guc=' ~ guc.enable_guc.value) if (guc and guc.enable_guc.value is not none) else (('NOT READ — ' ~ (guc.enable_guc.reason | default('no reason recorded', true))) if guc else ('no /sys/module/' ~ node_health_graphics_expected_driver ~ '/parameters')) | regex_replace('\s+', ' ') | trim | wordwrap(64) | indent(14) }}
+             {{ ('kernel cmdline: ' ~ (gfx.cmdline_params | join(' '))) if gfx.cmdline_params else 'no i915/xe parameter on the kernel cmdline' }}
+ modules     {% for m, loaded in gfx.modules.items() %}{{ m }}={{ loaded | string | lower }}{{ ', ' if not loop.last }}{% endfor %} (/proc/modules — corroboration only; the bound-driver symlink above decides)
+ vainfo      {{ node_health_facts.tools.vainfo | default('NOT installed on this host — not a defect: Plex ships its own libva/media driver inside its container', true) }}
+
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  PRESSURE STALL (/proc/pressure — % of wall time stalled)
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

runbooks/README.md

@@ -115,6 +115,14 @@ Each affected runbook says so on its own page and gives the by-hand equivalent.
   plex.tv/claim — so it is a timed sequence, scripted as `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh`:
   token → `sops` → PR → gate → merge → **forced** `flux reconcile` → pod roll (~2m45s measured).
   Includes why a changed Secret does not restart anything, and why an expired token is harmless.
+- **`plex-quicksync`** — hardware transcoding on the host iGPU. GitOps puts `/dev/dri` in the pod
+  (`hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync`); **a human still has to tick Settings → Transcoder → "Use hardware
+  acceleration when available"**, and no environment variable can do it (the image supports no
+  `PLEX_PREFERENCE*`, verified). The page names the real preference key (`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs`,
+  read out of the binary), says which widely-cited key **does not exist**, and is explicit that the
+  **only** proof is `Transcode (hw)` on the Plex dashboard — Plex renders no ServiceMonitor, so no
+  alert could ever fire. Also: the device-cgroup failure to expect first and its device-plugin
+  fallback, and why a `:latest` pull can silently break it.
 - **`oauth2-proxy-session`** — a gated UI loads but its saves quietly do nothing, and you are never
   re-prompted to log in. Tells the three stacked auth layers apart from the sidecar's own access log
   (the four lines that matter, including the upstream `-` that means the proxy answered a request the

runbooks/kustomization.yaml

@@ -95,6 +95,12 @@ configMapGenerator:
       # because the plex.tv claim window is short and is not a thing to go looking
       # for in git: /runbooks/plex-claim has to resolve the moment it is needed.
       - plex-claim=plex-claim.md
+      # Operator procedure, not an alert page, and NO alert is possible for it: plex renders no
+      # metricsEndpoint, so there is no ServiceMonitor, no transcode-mode metric and nothing a rule
+      # could evaluate. Served because the feature it completes is INERT until a human ticks a box in
+      # the Plex UI — the one step GitOps cannot reach — and a page nobody can find is how a shipped
+      # feature stays switched off for months.
+      - plex-quicksync=plex-quicksync.md
       - pvc-capacity=pvc-capacity.md
       - targets-down=targets-down.md
       - update-rollback=update-rollback.md

runbooks/plex-quicksync.md

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+# plex-quicksync — making Plex actually use Intel Quick Sync, and proving it did
+
+**Alert:** none, and none is possible — see "How to verify" below. This is an **operator procedure**,
+not an incident page. It is indexed here because the feature it completes is **inert until a human
+clicks one button**, and a switched-off feature that looks shipped is exactly what this page exists
+to prevent.
+**Files:** `catalog/plex.yaml` (`hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync`), `apps/wave-0/plex.yaml` (the
+rendered golden — the `dri` hostPath volume and the `/dev/dri` mount), `catalog/render.py` (the
+mechanism), `schemas/renderer-contract.md` `### hardware` (the contract).
+**Related:** `runbooks/plex-claim.md` — the other Plex procedure with a manual last mile.
+
+## What this means here
+
+Plex transcodes in **software** by default. On the UHD Graphics 630 iGPU of an i7-9700T, Quick Sync
+moves that work off the CPU — which matters on a three-node cluster where the CPU is also running
+everything else. Two independent things have to be true before that happens, and **only one of them
+is in git**:
+
+| Half | Who does it | State |
+|---|---|---|
+| The render device is inside the container at `/dev/dri` | **GitOps.** `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync` in `catalog/plex.yaml` renders a `dri` hostPath volume (`/dev/dri`, `type: DirectoryOrCreate`) and a read-write `/dev/dri` volumeMount on the app container. Flux applies it. | Done by merging that change. |
+| Plex is *told* to use it | **The operator, by hand, in the Plex web UI.** | **NOT done.** `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` was **absent** from `Preferences.xml` when this page was written — the toggle has never been on. |
+
+**There is no GitOps path to the second half, and that is verified rather than assumed.** A bounded
+grep across the running image's entire init surface — `/etc/cont-init.d`, `/etc/services.d`,
+`/etc/fix-attrs.d`, `/plex-common.sh`, `/usr/local/bin` — found **zero** `PLEX_PREFERENCE*` support.
+Every `setPref` the image performs is one of six hardcoded keys (`MachineIdentifier`,
+`ProcessedMachineIdentifier`, `PlexOnlineToken`, `customConnections`, `allowedNetworks`,
+`TranscoderTempDirectory`), none of them the transcode toggle. No environment variable, no ConfigMap
+and no `postBuild` substitution can set it. So do not go looking for the clever way to automate this;
+there isn't one, and the search has already been done.
+
+What the device mount does **not** do, so nobody reads more into a green gate than is there: it does
+not enable hardware transcoding, it does not prove the device can be *opened* from inside a
+non-privileged pod (see "Likely causes" #2), and it renders no `nodeSelector` — Plex can land on any
+of the three nodes and all three carry the device.
+
+## Running the commands in this runbook
+
+`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation; the toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
+container. Every command below runs as:
+
+    infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
+
+Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
+picks a current-context **per invocation**, and that default has already changed once. Do not run two
+`dev.sh` invocations at once.
+
+**Never `cat` `Preferences.xml`.** It contains `PlexOnlineToken`, a plex.tv account credential. Every
+read of that file below greps a single named key — do not widen one.
+
+## First commands
+
+**1. Is the device mounted into the pod at all?** (Proves Flux applied the change, not that it works.)
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=plex \
+     -o jsonpath="{.items[0].spec.containers[0].volumeMounts[*].mountPath}"; echo'
+```
+
+`/dev/dri` in that list ⇒ the GitOps half landed. Absent ⇒ the running pod predates the merge; compare
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n flux-system get kustomization apps-wave-0 \
+     -o jsonpath="{.status.lastAppliedRevision}"; echo'
+```
+
+against the merge commit before blaming anything else.
+
+**2. Is the device actually visible inside the container?**
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- ls -l /dev/dri'
+```
+
+Expect `renderD128` (usually `card0` too), mode `crw-rw----`, group `render`. An **empty directory**
+here is the `DirectoryOrCreate` degradation: the kubelet created an empty `/dev/dri` because the node
+had none. That is the designed-safe outcome — the app tier still reconciles — but it means software
+transcoding, silently. Find which node the pod is on and ask why that node lost its iGPU:
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=plex -o wide'
+```
+
+**3. Can Plex *open* it?** This is the question the manifest cannot answer — see "Likely causes" #2.
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- \
+     bash -c "exec 3<>/dev/dri/renderD128 && echo RW-OPEN-OK || echo RW-OPEN-DENIED"'
+```
+
+`RW-OPEN-DENIED` (or `Operation not permitted` / `Permission denied`) with the device plainly visible
+in step 2 is the **device-cgroup** failure, not a file-permission failure. The two look identical from
+the outside and are not the same problem.
+
+**4. Is the toggle on?** Named key only — never the whole file:
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- \
+     grep -o "HardwareAcceleratedCodecs=\"[01]\"" \
+     "/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Preferences.xml" || echo ABSENT'
+```
+
+`ABSENT` ⇒ never enabled (the state this page was written in). `="0"` ⇒ explicitly off. `="1"` ⇒ on,
+and the remaining question is whether it *works* — go to "How to verify".
+
+## The one manual step
+
+Plex web UI → **Settings → Transcoder → "Use hardware acceleration when available"** → tick → Save.
+(It sits under *Show Advanced*.) A transcode already in flight is unaffected; the next one picks it up.
+
+The underlying preference key is **`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs`**. That name was confirmed by
+extracting strings from the 23 MB `Plex Media Server` binary in the running container — **not** from
+recall and not from a forum post. Real neighbouring keys from the same binary, so you can recognise
+them and not invent them:
+
+| Key | What it is |
+|---|---|
+| `HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` | the toggle this page is about |
+| `HardwareAcceleratedEncoders` | hardware **encode**, as distinct from decode |
+| `HardwareDevicePath` | how Plex is pointed at a *specific* render node — relevant only if a host ever exposes more than one |
+| `TranscoderToneMapping`, `TranscoderToneMappingAgorithm` | HDR→SDR tone mapping. **That misspelling of "Algorithm" is upstream's, in the binary. It is not a typo in this page — do not "fix" it** here or anywhere else; the corrected spelling is not a key Plex reads. |
+| `TranscoderHEVCEncoding` | HEVC output |
+
+**`HardwareAcceleratedCodecsEnableHEVC` does not exist.** It is widely cited and it is not in the
+binary. Recorded explicitly so nobody spends an evening hunting for it or, worse, writes it into
+`Preferences.xml` and concludes hardware transcoding is broken.
+
+Editing `Preferences.xml` by hand is **not** the procedure. It is app state on the replicated Longhorn
+tier, it is in no git commit, and the UI writes the key correctly. Use the UI.
+
+## How to verify — and why there is no alert
+
+Start a playback that **forces a transcode** (a client that cannot direct-play the source, or pick a
+lower quality explicitly), then read Plex's own **Dashboard → Activity**:
+
+- **`Transcode (hw)`** on the session ⇒ hardware transcoding. **This is the proof.**
+- plain **`Transcode`** ⇒ software. The feature is not working, whatever the manifest says.
+
+**That dashboard is the *only* proof available, and nothing else will ever tell you.**
+`catalog/plex.yaml` declares no `metricsEndpoint`, so Plex renders **no ServiceMonitor at all** —
+there is no scrape, no transcode-mode metric, and therefore no alert that could fire. Do not open work
+to "alert on software-transcode fallback": with no metric behind it such a rule would be permanently
+inert, and this repo has already been burned at scale by rules that evaluated against nothing while
+looking like coverage (`runbooks/README.md`, "Alerts you should not trust the silence of"). If that
+gap is ever worth closing, the honest order is a real exporter first and a rule second.
+
+Corroborating, not a substitute — the server log on the config PVC:
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- \
+     sh -c "grep -i -m20 -e hardware -e vaapi -e hwdevice \
+     \"/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Logs/Plex Media Server.log\""'
+```
+
+Treat those strings as advisory: they are Plex's, not this repo's, and they move between versions.
+Absence of a match is **not** evidence of software transcoding; a VA-API device open is good evidence
+of hardware. The dashboard remains the verdict.
+
+## Likely causes, most likely first
+
+When the dashboard still says plain `Transcode`:
+
+1. **The toggle is off.** Overwhelmingly the most likely answer, and the reason this page exists.
+   First-command #4 returns `ABSENT` or `="0"`. Remedy: the manual step above. Check this **before**
+   investigating anything technical.
+
+2. **containerd's device cgroup is refusing the `open()` — UNVERIFIED, and the largest remaining
+   technical risk in this feature.** Whether a non-privileged pod may `open()` a bind-mounted
+   character device on this k3s/containerd build **has not been established**; it can only be settled
+   by deploying and trying. The container inits as uid 0, which settles *file* permissions, but
+   **uid 0 does not bypass the cgroup device gate.** Symptom: step 2 shows `renderD128` present and
+   correctly owned, step 3 returns `RW-OPEN-DENIED`.
+   **The documented fallback is the Intel Device Plugin for Kubernetes** (`gpu.intel.com/i915` as a
+   resource request, no hostPath). Because the ServiceDefinition field expresses *intent* rather than
+   a device path, that migration is a **`catalog/render.py` change plus a re-render — with no
+   ServiceDefinition edit anywhere**; `catalog/plex.yaml` keeps saying exactly what it says today.
+   **`privileged: true` is not an available escape hatch:** Kyverno `restrict-host-namespaces` is in
+   **Enforce** mode and rejects it in app namespaces. Do not reach for it.
+
+3. **The pod landed on a node without the device.** Step 2 shows an empty `/dev/dri`. All three prod
+   nodes carried `renderD128` with `i915` bound when this was measured (2026-09-30), so this means a
+   node changed — a rebuild, a BIOS reset, or a driver regression. `DirectoryOrCreate` is why the app
+   tier still came up; the cost is that the loss is silent. **Fix the node, do not tighten the mount:**
+   `Directory` would stall `apps-wave-0` (`wait: true`, with `apps-wave-1` depending on it) for a
+   feature that is not load-bearing.
+
+4. **The image changed under you.** See "The floating-image caveat". A `:latest` pull can remove the
+   mechanism this feature leans on with no commit in this repo.
+
+5. **The session was never transcoding.** Direct Play / Direct Stream never touches the transcoder, so
+   `Transcode (hw)` cannot appear. Confirm the session actually says `Transcode` before treating it as
+   a hardware failure.
+
+6. **The source needs a codec Quick Sync on this generation cannot handle** — e.g. AV1 decode, which
+   Coffee Lake's UHD 630 has no engine for. Plex falls back to software *per stream*. Symptom: some
+   sessions show `(hw)` and others do not. Not a fault.
+
+## The floating-image caveat
+
+Everything this page states about the image's behaviour — the `cont-init.d` hook that adds the app
+user to the device's group, the absence of `PLEX_PREFERENCE*`, the six `setPref` keys, the
+`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` string — was read from digest **`sha256:e0ab27395614…`**
+(`plexmediaserver 1.43.4.10903`).
+
+The deployment runs **`plexinc/pms-docker:latest` with `imagePullPolicy: Always`**. A silent pull can
+therefore change the behaviour this feature depends on **with no commit in this repo**, while the
+manifest still looks identical. Symptom to watch for: hardware transcoding that worked and quietly
+stopped, with no git change to point at.
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=plex \
+     -o jsonpath="{.items[0].status.containerStatuses[0].imageID}"; echo'
+```
+
+If that digest is not the one above, **re-verify the hook before trusting this page**:
+
+```
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
+  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- ls /etc/cont-init.d/'
+```
+
+`45-plex-hw-transcode-and-connected-tuner` still present ⇒ the group mechanism is still the one
+described here. Gone or renamed ⇒ stop and re-measure. In particular the "no `supplementalGroups`
+needed" conclusion in `catalog/plex.yaml` and `schemas/renderer-contract.md` is only true while that
+hook exists.
+
+## When to escalate or stop
+
+- **Do not add `supplementalGroups` or a `podSecurityContext` to `catalog/plex.yaml`.** It would be
+  **inert**, and it would mislead the next person. Measured in-container 2026-09-30: the image's
+  `cont-init.d` hook stats each `/dev/dri` char device and `usermod -a -G`s the `plex` user into its
+  group *inside* the container, and the service then execs via `s6-setuidgid plex`, which **replaces**
+  the process group list from `/etc/group` rather than appending — `Plex Media Server` runs with
+  `Groups: 100 1000`, root's gid `0` (which PID 1 does hold) gone. Anything Kubernetes supplies is
+  discarded before Plex starts. `render.py --selftest` asserts that absence deliberately.
+- **Do not reach for `privileged: true`.** Kyverno `restrict-host-namespaces` is Enforce and will
+  reject it. If the cgroup gate is the blocker, the answer is the Intel device plugin (cause #2).
+- **Do not `kubectl edit`/`patch` the Deployment to add or change the device mount.** Flux reconciles
+  `main`; a hand-applied change is drift that the next reconcile reverts or, worse, adopts. Mutating
+  `kubectl` and `flux reconcile` are **operator** actions, and the durable change is a git change
+  through a branch, a PR and a green gate.
+- **Do not edit `Preferences.xml` on the PVC**, never `cat` it, and never `sops -d` anything into a
+  terminal. It holds `PlexOnlineToken`.
+- **Do not delete the `plex-config` PVC to "start clean".** It is the library database, metadata and
+  watch state (`policy: daily-offcluster`). The transcode toggle is one preference, not a reason to
+  lose the DB.
+- **Stop and get the operator** if the device cannot be opened from the pod (cause #2 confirmed). The
+  next step is a platform change — the Intel device plugin — with its own PR, not more poking at this
+  workload.
+
+## Known gaps, deliberately not fixed here
+
+Recorded so they are findable, and so nobody assumes they were overlooked:
+
+- **Transcode scratch is on the wrong medium, and it is invisible.** The image sets
+  `TranscoderTempDirectory=/transcode`, which is **not a volume** — it is the container's writable
+  overlay, i.e. the node's `/data`. That is NVMe on prod-2 but **SATA on prod-1 and prod-3**, so
+  transcode scratch performance changes silently whenever the pod is rescheduled. Both candidate fixes
+  need a **schema** change and are therefore out of scope here: pin Plex to prod-2 (needs a
+  `nodeSelector` field the schema does not have), or give `/transcode` a `medium: Memory` emptyDir and
+  transcode in RAM (~31 GiB per node; needs an emptyDir field the schema does not have). The RAM option
+  is the better one, because it removes the node asymmetry outright instead of working around it.
+- **GuC/HuC firmware is not loaded** (`i915.enable_guc=0`). The cost is low-power H.264 **encode**
+  quality only — decode, and the feature on this page, are unaffected. Changing it needs a kernel
+  parameter and a **serialized rolling reboot**, which is an operator action (CLAUDE.md §5), and this
+  cluster has a documented history of that going badly (a prod node hung on a warm reboot on
+  2026-09-03). Not worth coupling to this change.
+
+---
+Source of truth: `runbooks/plex-quicksync.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
+The node measurements (all three prod nodes) and the in-container image measurements cited here were
+taken **2026-09-30** against `plexinc/pms-docker` digest `sha256:e0ab27395614…`
+(`plexmediaserver 1.43.4.10903`). Hardware transcoding had **not** been observed working at the time
+of writing, and the Plex-side toggle was still unset.

schemas/README.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ docs/13 exactly. Do not diverge from it here — escalate spec problems, don't f
 | `servicedefinition.schema.json` | Formal JSON Schema (draft 2020-12) for a ServiceDefinition. Enforces enums, required fields, patterns, and cross-field invariants. |
 | `renderer-contract.md` | Authoritative field → rendered-resource mapping, with requirement IDs. The contract other workstreams consume. |
 
-**Schema version:** 1.0.0 (in the schema `description`). Treat any change as an interface change:
+**Schema version:** 1.8.0 (in the schema `description`, which carries the full per-version changelog — this line had said `1.0.0` since 1.1.0 and is now synced). Treat any change as an interface change:
 propose on the task board, update dependent renderers/tests in the same change, never silently break a
 consumer (coordination-protocol §2).
 
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ consumer (coordination-protocol §2).
 - `ingressRoutes[].host` must match `<label>.home.keithjackson.dev`.
 - `storage[].class ∈ {longhorn, bulk}`; `exposure ∈ {internal, public}`; `egress ∈ {internet, vpn}`;
   `auth.mode ∈ {oidc, forward-auth, native, none}`.
+- `hardware.gpu ∈ {intel-quicksync}` — a host **capability class**, never a device path. The enum
+  is the contract: the mechanism that satisfies it lives only in `catalog/render.py` (see
+  `renderer-contract.md` §`hardware`).
 - `additionalProperties: false` everywhere — unknown keys are rejected (catches typos in review/CI).
 
 ## Validate examples against the schema — L1, no cluster (R-TEST-02)

schemas/renderer-contract.md

@@ -160,6 +160,64 @@ platform must render, and cites the requirement each mapping satisfies. Changing
 - **Requirements:** **R-STATE-01** (rebuild survival), **R-STATE-02** (Longhorn replication),
   **R-STATE-04** (bulk tier). (docs/04)
 
+### `hardware` (`gpu`) — host device capability
+- **The field is INTENT, never MECHANISM.** `hardware.gpu` is an **enum of capability classes**
+  (today: `intel-quicksync`), not a device path, not a hostPath, not a resource request. The
+  ServiceDefinition says *what class of host device this workload needs*; how the platform hands it
+  over is `catalog/render.py`'s business and lives nowhere else. **Do not "simplify" this into a raw
+  `/dev/...` path.** The entire payoff is that migrating from the hostPath mechanism below to the
+  Intel GPU device plugin (`resources.limits: gpu.intel.com/i915`) is a renderer change with **zero**
+  catalog edits and zero re-review of per-service device wiring. Extend the enum for a genuinely
+  different capability class (e.g. `nvidia-nvenc`); never to name a second route to the same one.
+- `gpu: intel-quicksync` → on the **app container only** (never a sidecar), exactly two things:
+  1. a **hostPath volume** `dri` → `/dev/dri`, **`type: DirectoryOrCreate`**;
+  2. a **read-write volumeMount** of `dri` at `/dev/dri` on the app container (VA-API opens the
+     render node read-write, so it is deliberately not `readOnly`).
+
+  **Mounting the device is sufficient. That is the whole mapping.**
+- **`podSecurityContext.supplementalGroups` is deliberately NOT rendered, and adding it would be a
+  regression rather than a hardening.** `/dev/dri/renderD128` is `root:render` `0660`, so the obvious
+  move is to push the host `render` GID in — and it does not work. **Measured in the running
+  container on prod-2, 2026-09-30:** the image's own
+  `/etc/cont-init.d/45-plex-hw-transcode-and-connected-tuner` hook `find`s every char device under
+  `/dev/dri`, `stat -c '%g'` each one's GID, `groupadd`s a matching group *inside the container* when
+  none exists, and `usermod -a -G` the app user into it — every start, nothing hardcoded.
+  `cont-init.d` completes before `services.d`, so the account database is already correct when the
+  service execs. The service then starts via `exec s6-setuidgid plex …`, and `s6-setuidgid`
+  **replaces** the process group list from `/etc/group` rather than appending to it:
+  `Plex Media Server` runs as `Uid: 1000  Gid: 1000  Groups: 100 1000`, with root's gid `0` — which
+  PID 1 (`s6-svscan`) does hold — **gone**. A Kubernetes `supplementalGroups` therefore reaches
+  `s6-svscan` and is discarded before the app ever starts. It would be inert *and* it would mislead
+  whoever debugs this next. The renderer asserts its own absence in `render.py --selftest`.
+  - A corollary worth having: because the hook re-`stat`s the device on every start, the host GID
+    **drifting** (a node rebuild renumbering the *systemd dynamic* `render` group) is self-healing.
+    No GID is pinned anywhere in this repo.
+  - **Scope of that measurement, stated so nobody over-reads it.** "Mounting the device is
+    sufficient" was established for an image that resolves the device group itself. A FUTURE
+    consumer that runs non-root and has no equivalent init hook would still need the group solved
+    somehow — and the answer for that case is a **renderer** change (per-image handling, or the
+    device plugin), not a new ServiceDefinition field. The enum is what keeps that option open. The
+    first such consumer must re-measure rather than assume this bullet covers it.
+- **`DirectoryOrCreate` is load-bearing — do not tighten it to `Directory`.** A node that comes back
+  without the render device (rebuild, BIOS change, driver regression, hardware swap) must degrade the
+  workload to **software transcoding**, not fail the mount. `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` and
+  `apps-wave-1` `dependsOn` it, so a failed hostPath mount stalls the **whole app tier** for the sake
+  of a feature that is not load-bearing. `/dev` is tmpfs, so the empty directory the kubelet creates
+  on such a node leaves nothing durable behind.
+  - **The cost of that choice, stated plainly:** a missing device is **silent**. The workload
+    software-transcodes and nothing reports it. There is no metric to alert on — media apps here
+    render no `metricsEndpoint`, so no ServiceMonitor exists — and an alert that cannot fire is worse
+    than none (see §`observability`'s 2026-09-13 correction). The only proof of hardware transcode is
+    an operator observing it in the application's own dashboard.
+- **Deliberately NOT rendered** from this field: no `privileged: true` (Kyverno
+  `restrict-host-namespaces` is Enforce on app namespaces and would reject it, and the render node
+  does not need it); no `nodeSelector` (placement is a separate concern with its own justification —
+  this field is about the device, not about where the pod lands); no resource requests/limits (there
+  is no app-container resource render path, and inventing one here would be scope creep).
+- Absent ⇒ **nothing at all** is rendered; every service that does not opt in stays byte-identical.
+  Ignored for `kind: vm` — a VM receives devices through KubeVirt's own `domain.devices`.
+- **Requirements:** **R-PLAT-02** (the PaaS provides the host capability; the app declares need).
+
 ### `ingressRoutes[]` (`host` / `port`) — HTTPRoute + Certificate + DNS
 - Each entry renders an **HTTPRoute** attaching `host` → the service `port` on the shared Gateway.
 - TLS: the Gateway terminates with the cert-manager **wildcard `*.home.keithjackson.dev`** certificate
@@ -286,6 +344,11 @@ platform must render, and cites the requirement each mapping satisfies. Changing
    `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: none`, and no `public` service's route carries it.
    Derived from `exposure` alone; enforced on every gate run by
    `conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns` (R-DNS-03).
+8. **`hardware` is inert until opted into, and its mechanism is renderer-local.** An SD with no
+   `hardware` key renders no volume and no volumeMount; an SD *with* it gains no `securityContext`
+   either. Both directions are proven by `render.py --selftest`. The `/dev/dri` hostPath and the
+   `DirectoryOrCreate` type appear in `catalog/render.py` and nowhere else, so the capability's
+   implementation can be replaced without touching a single ServiceDefinition.
 
 ## Requirement traceability (contract-level)
 Primary **R-GITOPS-02** (single reviewable object wires every requirement). Field-level: R-NET-01/02

schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
   "$id": "https://home.keithjackson.dev/schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json",
   "title": "ServiceDefinition",
-  "description": "Operator-facing onboarding contract for the home k3s + Longhorn platform. One ServiceDefinition per file under catalog/. Captures INTENT; the platform compiles it into concrete resources (see schemas/renderer-contract.md). Canonical source of truth: spec docs/13-service-catalog.md. Serves R-GITOPS-02; ties into R-NET-*, R-STATE-*, R-TLS-*, R-DNS-*, R-OBS-*, R-UPD-*, R-IDP-*. Schema version: 1.7.0 (no field changes; a MAPPING change to `exposure`, which had never had an effect on DNS. `exposure: internal` now renders ExternalDNS's own controller annotation onto every HTTPRoute it emits, set to a value other than `dns-controller`, so external-dns (v0.21.0, source/gateway.go -> annotations.IsControllerMismatch) skips the route before resolving any hostname and the service is INCAPABLE of producing a public record. Both docs/09 R-DNS-03 and schemas/renderer-contract.md already said `internal` renders no public DNS record; nothing enforced it, and six internal services -- jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, semaphore, sonarr -- were publishing `<name>.home.keithjackson.dev` into the PUBLIC Cloudflare zone answering with the RFC1918 Gateway VIP, which published the internal subnet and a full service inventory and made each name a DNS-rebind primitive. Enforced on every gate run by conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns). 1.6.0 (splits `observability.metrics` from WHERE metrics live: adds optional `metricsEndpoint` (port/name/path/interval) and optional `livenessWorkload` (kind/name). `metrics: true` previously rendered a ServiceMonitor hardcoded to a port named `metrics` that no rendered Service ever defined, so all twelve app monitors discovered ZERO targets and every `up{job=...}` SLI was structurally inert on prod; a monitor is now rendered only from a declared `metricsEndpoint`, which also renders the Service port and the monitoring-namespace ingress allow, and the `up` SLI is expressed against kube-state-metrics -- a signal that exists for every workload without a per-app exporter. `livenessWorkload` names the object whose readiness IS the service, for the case where the running workload is not the one this SD renders). 1.5.0 (adds optional `inClusterClients` — additional in-cluster clients, named by NAMESPACE, admitted to a declared port of this service DIRECTLY, bypassing the shared Gateway. `ingressRoutes` admits only the Gateway proxy identity and `dependencies` only links catalog services, so a PLATFORM controller dialling a Service ClusterIP had no authorable form at all; that gap is what deadlocked prod's GitOps when its GitRepository moved to the in-cluster Gitea Service. Renders one least-privilege ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy per entry — the named namespace and the declared port, nothing wider). 1.4.0 (makes the `bulk` tier REAL: a bulk storage entry now carries `export` (the absolute NFS export path on the ${BULK_NFS_SERVER} host) and renders a STATIC, pre-bound NFS PersistentVolume + PVC over data that already exists outside the cluster, plus optional `subPath` and `readOnly` on any entry. Resolves the OQ-2 bulk-backing stub for STATIC pre-existing datasets; dynamic bulk provisioning remains unimplemented and unneeded). 1.3.0 added optional pod-level podSecurityContext for the container kind — k8s PodSecurityContext emitted verbatim onto the pod spec; its fsGroup unblocks non-root images e.g. semaphore/UID-1001 writing a mounted Longhorn PVC). 1.2.0 added optional per-container env/envFrom/lifecycle for the container kind — k8s EnvVar/EnvFromSource/Lifecycle shapes emitted verbatim onto the app container; unblocks headless-install/DB-backed apps e.g. gitea/nextcloud/semaphore/unifi/minecraft. 1.1.0 added the shape invariant exposure:public => auth.mode!=none (docs/13 v1.1 / docs/15 / R-IDP-02).",
+  "description": "Operator-facing onboarding contract for the home k3s + Longhorn platform. One ServiceDefinition per file under catalog/. Captures INTENT; the platform compiles it into concrete resources (see schemas/renderer-contract.md). Canonical source of truth: spec docs/13-service-catalog.md. Serves R-GITOPS-02; ties into R-NET-*, R-STATE-*, R-TLS-*, R-DNS-*, R-OBS-*, R-UPD-*, R-IDP-*. Schema version: 1.8.0 (adds optional `hardware` - a host HARDWARE CAPABILITY declaration for the container kind, currently one member: `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync`, meaning the workload needs the host iGPU render device for hardware video transcode. It is an ENUM OF INTENT, not a device path: the renderer satisfies it today with just two things -- a /dev/dri hostPath volume (`DirectoryOrCreate`) and a read-write /dev/dri volumeMount on the app container -- and a later move to the Intel GPU device plugin is then a render.py change with no catalog edit. It sets NO podSecurityContext.supplementalGroups: measured in-container on prod 2026-09-30, the pms-docker cont-init hook adds the app user to the device's group inside the container and `s6-setuidgid` then REPLACES the process group list from /etc/group, discarding anything Kubernetes supplied, so such an entry would be inert and misleading. Renders NOTHING when absent, so every existing app stays byte-identical. Emits no privileged securityContext (Kyverno restrict-host-namespaces would reject it and it is not needed), no nodeSelector (node placement is a separate concern with its own justification) and no resource requests). 1.7.0 (no field changes; a MAPPING change to `exposure`, which had never had an effect on DNS. `exposure: internal` now renders ExternalDNS's own controller annotation onto every HTTPRoute it emits, set to a value other than `dns-controller`, so external-dns (v0.21.0, source/gateway.go -> annotations.IsControllerMismatch) skips the route before resolving any hostname and the service is INCAPABLE of producing a public record. Both docs/09 R-DNS-03 and schemas/renderer-contract.md already said `internal` renders no public DNS record; nothing enforced it, and six internal services -- jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, semaphore, sonarr -- were publishing `<name>.home.keithjackson.dev` into the PUBLIC Cloudflare zone answering with the RFC1918 Gateway VIP, which published the internal subnet and a full service inventory and made each name a DNS-rebind primitive. Enforced on every gate run by conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns). 1.6.0 (splits `observability.metrics` from WHERE metrics live: adds optional `metricsEndpoint` (port/name/path/interval) and optional `livenessWorkload` (kind/name). `metrics: true` previously rendered a ServiceMonitor hardcoded to a port named `metrics` that no rendered Service ever defined, so all twelve app monitors discovered ZERO targets and every `up{job=...}` SLI was structurally inert on prod; a monitor is now rendered only from a declared `metricsEndpoint`, which also renders the Service port and the monitoring-namespace ingress allow, and the `up` SLI is expressed against kube-state-metrics -- a signal that exists for every workload without a per-app exporter. `livenessWorkload` names the object whose readiness IS the service, for the case where the running workload is not the one this SD renders). 1.5.0 (adds optional `inClusterClients` — additional in-cluster clients, named by NAMESPACE, admitted to a declared port of this service DIRECTLY, bypassing the shared Gateway. `ingressRoutes` admits only the Gateway proxy identity and `dependencies` only links catalog services, so a PLATFORM controller dialling a Service ClusterIP had no authorable form at all; that gap is what deadlocked prod's GitOps when its GitRepository moved to the in-cluster Gitea Service. Renders one least-privilege ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy per entry — the named namespace and the declared port, nothing wider). 1.4.0 (makes the `bulk` tier REAL: a bulk storage entry now carries `export` (the absolute NFS export path on the ${BULK_NFS_SERVER} host) and renders a STATIC, pre-bound NFS PersistentVolume + PVC over data that already exists outside the cluster, plus optional `subPath` and `readOnly` on any entry. Resolves the OQ-2 bulk-backing stub for STATIC pre-existing datasets; dynamic bulk provisioning remains unimplemented and unneeded). 1.3.0 added optional pod-level podSecurityContext for the container kind — k8s PodSecurityContext emitted verbatim onto the pod spec; its fsGroup unblocks non-root images e.g. semaphore/UID-1001 writing a mounted Longhorn PVC). 1.2.0 added optional per-container env/envFrom/lifecycle for the container kind — k8s EnvVar/EnvFromSource/Lifecycle shapes emitted verbatim onto the app container; unblocks headless-install/DB-backed apps e.g. gitea/nextcloud/semaphore/unifi/minecraft. 1.1.0 added the shape invariant exposure:public => auth.mode!=none (docs/13 v1.1 / docs/15 Line truncated
   "type": "object",
   "additionalProperties": false,
   "required": ["name", "source"],
@@ -139,6 +139,19 @@
         "supplementalGroups": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "integer" }, "description": "Additional GIDs added to the first process in each container." }
       }
     },
+    "hardware": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "description": "Optional host HARDWARE CAPABILITY the workload needs, for the container kind (docs/13). This field declares INTENT (`what device class this service needs`), never MECHANISM (`which host path to bind-mount`, `which extended resource to request`). That separation is the whole point of the enum: the platform currently satisfies `intel-quicksync` with a /dev/dri hostPath volume and a matching mount on the app container, but a later migration to the Intel GPU device plugin (`gpu.intel.com/i915` resource requests, no hostPath) must be a catalog/render.py change and NOTHING else - no ServiceDefinition may need editing, and no reviewer may have to re-derive per-service device wiring. Do NOT 'simplify' this into a raw device path, a hostPath, or a resource request; that would push a platform implementation detail into the operator-facing contract and make the migration a catalog-wide edit. Absent => no device wiring at all (existing apps render byte-identical). Ignored for kind=vm (a VM gets devices through KubeVirt's own domain.devices).",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "minProperties": 1,
+      "properties": {
+        "gpu": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "GPU capability class this service needs. `intel-quicksync` = the host's Intel Quick Sync Video render device (the iGPU's /dev/dri/renderD* node) for hardware video transcode/decode. Enum, not a free-form device path, so the satisfying mechanism stays swappable (see the parent description). Extend the enum when a genuinely different capability class appears (e.g. nvidia-nvenc), never to name a different path to the same one.",
+          "enum": ["intel-quicksync"]
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "exposure": {
       "type": "string",
       "description": "internal = LAN-only (internal DNS + Gateway on LAN); public = additionally edge port-forwarded 80/443 (docs/09; R-DNS/R-NET).",