conformance/tests/l0-static/admission-policies-actually-applied/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — every authored admission policy is actually APPLIED  (R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02)
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS. `kyverno test` proves a policy is CORRECT. Nothing proved it was DEPLOYED.
+# platform/kyverno/ holds three lists and only platform-config/kustomization.yaml applies
+# anything; the other two are a reference copy and a namespace+HelmRelease render root. On
+# 2026-09-29 the R-SEC-02 boundary policy was added to the reference copy: it parsed, its
+# kyverno test passed, the gate passed, Flux reported the tier Ready at the new revision — and
+# the cluster ran the conformance-trigger ServiceAccount with nothing bounding it.
+#
+# WHOLE-REPO SCOPE, DELIBERATELY. The failure mode is a policy that is present but wired
+# nowhere, which by definition touches no requirement the diff attributes. A path-scoped run
+# would have skipped this check on the very commit that introduced the defect.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: admission-policies-actually-applied
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-01: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-02: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-SEC-01,R-SEC-02"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Every ClusterPolicy authored under platform/kyverno/ is either referenced by
+      platform-config/kustomization.yaml (so Flux applies it) or is a documented CI-only
+      exemption that is genuinely not applied — so a policy cannot be authored, tested,
+      green, and absent from the cluster.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: every-authored-policy-is-applied-or-documented-ci-only
+      description: >-
+        Enumerate the ClusterPolicy files under platform/kyverno/ and assert each is wired
+        into the Kustomization that actually applies Kyverno CRs, or exempted with a reason.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh

conformance/tests/l0-static/admission-policies-actually-applied/check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — admission-policies-actually-applied
+# Serves: R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02 (admission enforcement is only real if it is APPLIED)
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS — a policy that ships green and never reaches the cluster.
+#
+# platform/kyverno/ holds THREE lists, and only one of them applies anything:
+#   1. platform/kyverno/admission/kustomization.yaml  — reference only. Its own sibling says
+#      "kept as reference; THIS file is the buildable render root".
+#   2. platform/kyverno/kustomization.yaml            — that render root: namespace +
+#      HelmRelease ONLY. It explicitly notes the ClusterPolicies are applied elsewhere.
+#   3. platform-config/kustomization.yaml             — THE ONE. Kyverno CRs go here because
+#      they need the CRDs from the HelmRelease in (2), so they reconcile a tier later.
+#
+# On 2026-09-29 a ClusterPolicy (conformance-trigger-job-shape, the R-SEC-02 boundary bounding
+# what the conformance CI trigger may create) was added to (1). Everything went green: the file
+# parsed, `kyverno test` exercised it BY PATH and passed, the gate passed, Flux reported
+# `platform` Ready at the new revision — and the policy was never in any applied set. The
+# cluster ended up running the conformance-trigger ServiceAccount with NOTHING bounding it,
+# which is precisely the state that identity's own RBAC header says must never exist.
+#
+# Nothing could have caught it. `kyverno test` proves a policy is CORRECT, not that it is
+# DEPLOYED. This check asserts the second thing.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  every file under platform/kyverno/ that declares a ClusterPolicy is enumerated,
+# THEN  each one is either referenced by platform-config/kustomization.yaml (so Flux applies
+#       it), or named in CI_ONLY below with a reason — and CI_ONLY itself may not name a
+#       policy that IS applied, so the exemption list cannot rot into a lie either way.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+exec python3 - "$ROOT" <<'PY'
+import sys, subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES, CHECKS = [], 0
+
+def check(cond, desc):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(desc)
+
+# Policies authored for the CI L0 gate that are deliberately NOT applied in-cluster. Each needs
+# a reason, and each is asserted BELOW to really be absent from the applied set — an exemption
+# that silently starts being applied is as much a lie as one that silently stops.
+CI_ONLY = {
+    "disallow-plaintext-secrets":
+        "CI-only by design: it requires a top-level `sops` block, which is IMPOSSIBLE at "
+        "admission because Flux decrypts before the Secret reaches the API server. Its "
+        "in-cluster counterpart is admission/secret-provenance.yaml.",
+}
+
+tracked = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "-z", "--", "platform/kyverno/**/*.yaml",
+                          "platform/kyverno/*.yaml"],
+                         cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
+files = [ROOT / p for p in tracked.stdout.split("\0") if p]
+
+# A ClusterPolicy file, identified without a YAML parse of every doc: cheap and sufficient.
+policies = {}
+for f in files:
+    try:
+        txt = f.read_text()
+    except Exception:
+        continue
+    if "kind: ClusterPolicy" not in txt:
+        continue
+    for line in txt.splitlines():
+        st = line.strip()
+        if st.startswith("name:") and "  name:" in line:
+            policies[f.relative_to(ROOT).as_posix()] = st.split("name:", 1)[1].strip()
+            break
+
+check(len(policies) >= 6,
+      f"(0) the scan found {len(policies)} ClusterPolicy file(s) under platform/kyverno/ — "
+      f"too few means the scan broke, and every assertion below would be vacuous")
+
+applied_txt = (ROOT / "platform-config" / "kustomization.yaml").read_text()
+
+unapplied, wrongly_exempt = [], []
+for rel, name in sorted(policies.items()):
+    # platform-config references these as ../platform/kyverno/...
+    referenced = rel in applied_txt or rel.replace("platform/", "../platform/", 1) in applied_txt
+    if name in CI_ONLY:
+        if referenced:
+            wrongly_exempt.append(f"{name} ({rel}) is listed CI_ONLY but IS applied by platform-config")
+    elif not referenced:
+        unapplied.append(f"{name} ({rel})")
+
+check(not unapplied,
+      f"(1) every in-cluster ClusterPolicy is referenced by platform-config/kustomization.yaml "
+      f"— an unreferenced policy is authored, tested, green, and NEVER APPLIED {unapplied if unapplied else ''}")
+
+check(not wrongly_exempt,
+      f"(2) no CI_ONLY exemption names a policy that IS applied — a stale exemption hides a "
+      f"real deployment {wrongly_exempt if wrongly_exempt else ''}")
+
+for name, reason in CI_ONLY.items():
+    check(bool(reason.strip()),
+          f"(3) CI_ONLY['{name}'] carries a reason — an unexplained exemption is how this "
+          f"list stops being reviewable")
+
+check(CHECKS >= 4,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (admission-policies-actually-applied): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"check OK: admission-policies-actually-applied — {CHECKS} assertions; "
+      f"{len(policies)} ClusterPolicy file(s), {len(policies) - len(CI_ONLY)} applied by "
+      f"platform-config, {len(CI_ONLY)} CI-only with reasons. Proves policies are DEPLOYED, "
+      f"not that they are correct — `kyverno test` is what proves correctness.")
+PY

platform-config/kustomization.yaml

@@ -34,6 +34,14 @@ resources:
   # policies, the next import is blocked in the gap.
   - ../platform/kyverno/policies/label-cdi-worker-pods.yaml
   - ../platform/kyverno/admission/secret-provenance.yaml
+  # R-SEC-02 — bounds what the conformance CI trigger may create. MUST be listed HERE: this
+  # Kustomization is what actually applies ClusterPolicies. Adding a policy only to
+  # platform/kyverno/admission/kustomization.yaml is a SILENT NO-OP — that file is reference
+  # only ("kept as reference; THIS file is the buildable render root" in
+  # platform/kyverno/kustomization.yaml, which itself ships only the namespace + HelmRelease).
+  # That is exactly how this policy shipped green and never reached the cluster on 2026-09-29,
+  # leaving the conformance-trigger identity live with nothing bounding it.
+  - ../platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
   # cilium: L2 LB IP pool + announcement policy (cilium.io CRDs already registered by Cilium)
   - cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml
   - cilium/l2-announcement-policy.yaml