jakman85andClaude Opus 5
18f741d744
Both reported by the operator on first use of the runbook merged in #55.
Step 1 said `cd infra/ansible && ./site.sh --tags system --limit k3s_prod`.
There is no site.sh anywhere in this repo. It was wrong four ways at once:
this repo drives Ansible with `ansible-playbook <playbook>` and never a
wrapper (playbooks/site.yml is the full bring-up chain, not this); the module
work is in playbooks/node-baseline.yml; targeting here is `-e k3s_hosts=...`,
not `--limit`; and Ansible exists only in the pinned toolbox, with ansible.cfg
read only from infra/ansible. Replaced with the real command plus why
`-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` matters (the default group is decommissioned dev) and
why `--tags system` must never be dropped (an untagged run also executes the
`disks` tasks, which assert on prod's deliberate placeholder devices).
Step 2 told the operator to stage the server key at /work/.cache/server.key
"inside the repo's gitignored cache". .cache/ is NOT gitignored -- the file was
ignored only incidentally by `*.key` (.gitignore:11). So the path was safe for
a reason I had not identified, and renaming it (server.pem, wg-server) would
have left a committable WireGuard private key in the checkout, which
no-plaintext-secrets does not recognise. The step now names the real rule,
marks the suffix as the load-bearing part, and gives a check-ignore
verification to run before trusting it.
Docs only -- no manifest and no behaviour change. Touches no sensitive path.
Also records the post-merge measurements for #55, whose own entry predates the
merge: Flux applied ad3f56e by the real path, all 18 Kustomizations Ready,
hostNetwork confirmed (pod IPs are the node IPs), and the designed fail-closed
state (Init:0/1 on the missing wg-server-key Secret).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
227 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
227 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# vpn-remote-access — standing up the WireGuard remote-access VPN, and proving it
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**Status: the in-cluster half is shipped; the VPN is INERT until three manual steps are done.**
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All three are off-repo by necessity — a kernel module, a private key, and a router port-forward.
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**Alert:** pod-down is covered generically (`KubePodNotReady` / `KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch`).
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There is **no peer-level alerting** — see "Why there is no connection alert". This is an **operator
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procedure**, not an incident page.
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**Files:** `platform/vpn-ingress/` (namespace, peer register, DaemonSet, baseline policy),
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`clusters/base/vpn-ingress.yaml` (its Flux tier), `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`
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(`WG_CLIENT_CIDR`), `infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline/defaults/main.yml` (the `wireguard` module),
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`infra/vpn-ingress/new-peer.sh` (device enrolment).
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**Design rationale:** `platform/vpn-ingress/README.md` — read "Why `hostNetwork` is required"
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before changing anything about how this is wired.
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**Not to be confused with** `vpn-down` / `vpn-egress-stale`, which are about `platform/vpn-egress`
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(pods *out* through PIA). This page is remote clients *in*.
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## What this gives you
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A device — Android, Linux, Windows, macOS, iOS — dials in over **udp/51820** from anywhere and
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behaves like a machine on the LAN: full reach to `192.168.2.0/24`, the Gateway's web UIs, PiHole
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DNS, and internet egress out the house WAN.
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Authorisation is one thing only: the device's **public key is in
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`platform/vpn-ingress/peers.yaml`**. An unlisted key gets no reply at all.
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> **An enrolled device is as privileged as a machine sitting in the house** — including the three
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> k3s nodes (`192.168.2.10/.11/.12`: apiserver 6443, kubelet 10250, SSH 22). That is what "reach
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> the entire local network" means. Revoke a lost device promptly: delete its stanza, PR, merge.
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## Step 1 — load the `wireguard` module on every node (once)
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The DaemonSet creates its `wg0` link in the host netns with `CAP_NET_ADMIN` only; it is
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deliberately **not** granted `CAP_SYS_MODULE`, so it cannot autoload the module. Without it
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`wg-quick` fails outright and the pod CrashLoops.
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```bash
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# operator action (Ansible is not an agent action). Ansible lives ONLY in the pinned toolbox,
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# and ansible.cfg is only picked up from infra/ansible, so cd there inside the container.
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./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'cd /work/infra/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags system'
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```
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Three details in that command are load-bearing, not style:
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- **`-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod`.** `node-baseline.yml` targets `k3s_servers` by default, which is the
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**dev** group — and dev was decommissioned, so an unqualified run does nothing useful. This is
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the targeting pattern `infra/ansible/README.md` "Targeting prod" documents for every playbook.
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- **`--tags system`, and never an untagged run.** The two kernel-module tasks carry the `system`
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tag. An untagged run would also execute the `disks` tasks, which assert on block-device variables
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prod has deliberately left as placeholders (`infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §2) — the playbook's own
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header warns about this. `--tags system` is broader than the modules alone (it also re-asserts
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sysctls, iscsid, qemu-guest-agent and the swap masking) but every one of those is idempotent and
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already in its desired state on a live node.
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- **It is a playbook, not a wrapper script.** There is no `site.sh` in this repo; `playbooks/site.yml`
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is the full bring-up chain and is the wrong tool here.
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Verify on each node — the module is in-tree since kernel 5.6, so nothing is installed, only loaded:
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```bash
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# expected: a `wireguard` line, and the modules-load.d file naming it for the next boot
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lsmod | grep '^wireguard'
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grep -w wireguard /etc/modules-load.d/k3s-cilium-longhorn.conf
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```
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## Step 2 — create the server key (once)
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This is the **only** secret in the component, and the one thing that must never be generated in an
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agent session or pasted into a transcript. Generate it on your own machine:
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```bash
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mkdir -p ~/.config/wireguard-home && chmod 700 ~/.config/wireguard-home
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umask 077
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wg genkey > ~/.config/wireguard-home/server.key # keep this; see "Back it up" below
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```
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Load it into the cluster. **Do not echo it, do not pass it on an interactive command line that
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lands in shell history, and never print the resulting Secret's `.data`** (CLAUDE.md §6):
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```bash
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./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n vpn-ingress create secret generic wg-server-key \
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--from-file=privatekey=/work/.cache/server.key'
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```
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…where `/work/.cache/server.key` is a path you copied the key to (`.cache/` is not tracked; create
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it if absent). Delete that copy as soon as the Secret exists: `shred -u .cache/server.key`.
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> **KEEP THE `.key` SUFFIX.** That filename is what keeps the key out of git: `.gitignore` line 11
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> is `*.key`, and it is the **only** rule covering this path — `.cache/` itself is NOT ignored
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> (`git check-ignore -v .cache/serverkey.txt` matches nothing). So a copy named `server.pem`,
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> `wg-server` or `privatekey` sitting in that directory is **committable**, and the gate's
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> `no-plaintext-secrets` stage does not know a WireGuard private key when it sees one. Verify before
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> you trust it: `git check-ignore -v .cache/<your-filename>` must print a rule, and
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> `git status --short` must not list the file.
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Confirm it exists **by key name only**:
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```bash
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./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n vpn-ingress get secret wg-server-key -o jsonpath="{.data}" | tr "," "\n" | cut -d: -f1'
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# expected: {"privatekey -- a NAME. If you see base64 payload, you printed the key. Rotate it.
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```
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**Why out of band and not SOPS.** An agent must not mint a long-lived private key, and a key that
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passed through a session transcript would have to be treated as compromised. The trade-off is that
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this Secret is **not reconstructible from git** — so:
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**Back it up.** Keep `server.key` in your password manager. Velero's `daily` schedule excludes only
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`monitoring` and `unifi` (`platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml`), so this namespace *is* captured
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off-cluster to R2 as well. Restoring this one key is what makes every already-enrolled device work
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again after a cluster rebuild — **losing it means re-enrolling every device.**
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## Step 3 — forward udp/51820 on the router (once)
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On the SOHO router at `192.168.2.1`, forward **WAN udp/51820** to **one node address**, e.g.
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`192.168.2.10:51820`. This is hand-made and off-repo; it is the half CI can never check.
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Pick any node — all three run an identical listener. Note which one you chose here:
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```
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# WAN udp/51820 -> 192.168.2.__ (k3s-prod-_) set <date>
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```
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**Node loss = failover is this one line.** Re-point the forward at another node address; every
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device keeps working with the same profile, because all three nodes answer the same keys.
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Do **not** also expose this on tcp, and do not change the port hoping for obscurity — WireGuard is
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already silent to unauthenticated probes (README, "Why this is safe to expose").
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## Step 4 — confirm the listener is healthy
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```bash
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./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n vpn-ingress get ds wireguard -o wide'
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# expected: DESIRED 3 CURRENT 3 READY 3
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./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n vpn-ingress exec ds/wireguard -- wg show'
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# expected: `interface: wg0`, `listening port: 51820`, and (before step 5) NO peers.
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```
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A zero-peer interface that is Ready is the **correct** state before any device is enrolled: it
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listens, and refuses every handshake because no key is trusted.
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The readiness/liveness probe is `wg show wg0`, and that is load-bearing rather than cosmetic: a
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port probe cannot distinguish "wg0 never came up" from "working", because WireGuard is silent to
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unauthenticated traffic either way. If the pod is Ready, the interface exists.
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## Step 5 — enrol a device
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```bash
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./infra/vpn-ingress/new-peer.sh pixel-8 2 # full tunnel (LAN + WAN egress)
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./infra/vpn-ingress/new-peer.sh thinkpad 3 --split # split tunnel (LAN only)
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```
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It generates the keypair **on your machine**, writes a `0600` client profile outside the checkout,
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prints a QR code if `qrencode` is installed, and prints the `[Peer]` stanza to add. Then:
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1. Paste the stanza into `platform/vpn-ingress/peers.yaml` under `data.peers.conf`, keeping the
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`# <name> — <owner>, enrolled <date>` comment. `wg show` can only ever print the key, so that
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comment is the only record of which stanza belongs to which device.
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2. PR → merge. Flux rolls the DaemonSet (~1 min).
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3. Get the profile onto the device (QR scan for phones; "Import tunnel from file" on
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Windows/macOS; `/etc/wireguard/<name>.conf` + `wg-quick@<name>` on Linux).
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4. **Delete the profile from your machine**: `shred -u <path>`. It is the only copy of that
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device's private key — the server never sees it and it cannot be re-derived.
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Until the PR is merged the device handshakes and gets silence, exactly like an unknown key.
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## Step 6 — verify it end to end (from OFF the LAN)
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**This is the only honest test, and it cannot be run from inside the house.** Put the phone on
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cellular, with Wi-Fi off, and check all four — each proves a different hop:
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| # | Check | Proves |
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|---|---|---|
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| 1 | tunnel shows a recent handshake in the WireGuard app | the WAN forward + the server key + the peer stanza |
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| 2 | `ping 192.168.2.1` (the router) | decrypt → FORWARD → LAN, and the SNAT return path |
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| 3 | open `https://plex.home.keithjackson.dev` | PiHole DNS over the tunnel **and** the Gateway accepting a `host`-identity source — the specific thing a pod-networked VPN would have 403'd |
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| 4 | visit an IP-echo site; it should show `136.51.115.252` | full-tunnel WAN egress out the house, not the carrier |
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Then confirm server-side:
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```bash
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./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n vpn-ingress exec ds/wireguard -- wg show'
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# a `latest handshake` under ~3 min, and non-zero transfer, on the expected peer.
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```
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**If check 3 fails while 2 passes**, the tunnel is fine and the problem is DNS or the Gateway, not
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WireGuard. Check the client's `DNS = 192.168.2.23` and that PiHole is up.
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**If 1 and 2 pass but large transfers hang**, it is MTU. The profile ships `MTU = 1420` (1500 − 60
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bytes of WireGuard encapsulation); drop the client to `1280` and re-test.
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**If nothing handshakes at all**, you cannot tell a wrong forward from a wrong key from outside —
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by design. Work inwards: `wg show` on the node holding the forward will show *zero* received bytes
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if the router is not delivering the packets, and a `handshake` with no completed session if it is.
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## Revoking a device
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Delete its `[Peer]` stanza from `peers.yaml`, PR, merge. Nothing else — the key stops working on the
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next reconcile. **Never re-use that address octet**: an old profile would silently start working
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again as a different device.
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## Why there is no connection alert
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A WireGuard exporter would publish `wireguard_latest_handshake_seconds` per peer and make
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"something connected at 03:00" alertable. It needs a second `NET_ADMIN` container inside the pod
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that terminates the internet-facing tunnel, and that was not worth shipping unverified. **It is the
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top follow-up for this component.** Until then:
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* pod-down is covered generically by kube-prometheus-stack's `KubePodNotReady` /
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`KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch`;
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* "who is connected" is an on-demand question — `wg show`, above;
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* **never** `wg showconf` — it prints the server's private key.
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## Known limitations
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* **No IPv6 in the tunnel.** A full-tunnel client with native IPv6 still reaches IPv6 sites outside
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the tunnel. Functionally harmless; a privacy leak if hiding the client's network was the point.
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* **Client IPs are not preserved** on the LAN side: everything arrives SNATed as the node's
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address. A static route for `10.90.0.0/24` → the forwarded node, added on the router, would
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preserve them — at the cost of another hand-maintained off-repo route.
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* **Rollouts briefly drop the forwarded node.** `maxUnavailable: 1`, so one node at a time; clients
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re-handshake automatically (retry every 5s, rekey every 2 min).
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