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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 989649e64a
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m49s
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feat(cilium): export Plex's pre-SNAT client address via Hubble, scoped to tcp/32400
The requirement is log visibility only -- which address connected to Plex.

Plex's own log cannot show it. Every LoadBalancer Service here is
externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster, so the node holding the VIP's L2 lease SNATs
the client before forwarding to the backend pod. Measured: Plex had logged
3,214 requests from 10.0.1.x (lease holder k3s-prod-3's own address, Cilium
identity 1 = reserved:host) and ZERO from any 192.168.x address, ever. No
X-Forwarded-For either -- it serves raw tcp/32400, not HTTP via the Gateway.
Nothing on the router does this; there is no hairpin NAT. It is Cilium.

The address is not lost, only unrecorded. Cilium observes the flow at ingress,
BEFORE its own translation, so Hubble already has it:

  192.168.2.133 -> 10.0.0.135   real LAN client -> the Plex pod
  10.0.1.78     -> 10.0.0.135   same traffic post-SNAT, what Plex sees

What was missing is RETENTION: 4095/4095 flows at ~303/s is about thirteen
seconds of history, metrics disabled, no exporter configured.

So enable the static exporter, port-scoped, to the agent's stdout -- Alloy
already tails every pod into Loki, so this needs no new mount, no rotation
handling and no Alloy change.

  {namespace="kube-system", app="cilium"} |= "32400"

Scoped BY PORT, not namespace, on evidence: --to-namespace plex returned only
the post-SNAT flows; the record carrying the real client address did not match
it. A namespace filter would drop exactly what this exists to capture.

Rejected, with reasons: eTP:Local is incompatible with cilium 1.20's L2
announcer per upstream docs for this version ("may cause service IPs to be
announced on nodes without pods causing traffic drops") -- and the VIP is on
prod-3 while the pod is on prod-1, so it would black-hole 32400 immediately;
making it safe costs Plex its ability to reschedule. DSR: routing-mode is
vxlan, not native/geneve, and DSR returns bypass the ingress node, breaking
the router's stateful NAT on the remote path.

Also corrects the repo's own record: 2026-10-03 says the SNAT lands in
192.168.0.0/16 (the node's LAN address). It is 10.0.1.x, the cilium_host
inside the pod CIDR -- which is why LanNetworksBandwidth can never separate
local from remote while eTP is Cluster.

UNVERIFIED and stated in the handoff: nothing is reconciled; `filePath: stdout`
is taken from a verbatim upstream sentence but not confirmed against 1.20.1
source (a wrong notation is a silent no-op, with the file+Alloy fallback
documented); the port FlowFilter has no upstream example; and this change
ROLLS CILIUM -- prod-3 announces the Gateway, PiHole DNS and Plex VIPs, so a
lease move during the rollout could briefly interrupt LAN DNS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-10-04 16:36:12 -05:00
..

platform/

Cluster-wide platform services, Flux-managed (R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01/02/03). Reconciled by the platform Flux Kustomization defined in clusters/base/platform.yaml, before apps/.

Governing spec: docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md, docs/01-architecture-overview.md.

Phase 0 scaffolding only. Every component here is a structurally-correct stub — a Flux HelmRelease and/or Kustomization with a values placeholder, a README citing the governing ADR/spec, and TODOs for the phase that fills it in. No cluster exists; nothing reconciles yet. Do not add working config, secrets, or provisioning under Phase 0 (spec AGENTS.md §1/§5/§6, roadmap/phases.md).

Reconciliation flow (how a change lands)

git (source of truth)
   │  operator PR → CI (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · Chainsaw) → merge to tracked branch
   ▼
Flux GitRepository (clusters/base/flux-system.yaml)
   ▼
Flux Kustomization "platform"  → ./platform  (this dir)     ── substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┐
   │  prune=true (drift correction, R-GITOPS-03) · wait=true                                  │ R-ENV-02
   ▼                                                                                          │
Flux Kustomization "apps"      → ./apps  (dependsOn platform) ─ substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┘

Git is authoritative; the cluster conforms to git and drift is auto-corrected (R-GITOPS-01/03). Manual kubectl apply of platform state is prohibited (spec AGENTS.md §5).

The dev ↔ prod overlay model (R-ENV-02)

Platform manifests are authored once. Every value that legitimately differs between environments is a ${TOKEN} resolved from the cluster-vars ConfigMap via Flux postBuild.substituteFrom. The clusters/dev and clusters/prod overlays differ only by the values they patch into cluster-vars (issuer, replica counts, storage sizes, retention). See clusters/README.md. Base manifests are never forked per environment.

Components (one directory each)

Dir Component Governing ADR / spec Serves
cilium/ CNI + kube-proxy replacement + Gateway API + Egress Gateway + Hubble ADR-0002, docs/03 R-NET-*
longhorn/ Replicated block storage; 3-replica default StorageClass + bulk tier ADR-0003, docs/04 R-STATE-*
cert-manager/ TLS via Let's Encrypt DNS-01 (Cloudflare); staging + prod ClusterIssuers ADR-0006, docs/08 R-TLS-*
externaldns/ Automatic DNS records for public services (Cloudflare) docs/09 R-DNS-*
gateway/ Gateway API GatewayClass + shared HTTPS Gateway + wildcard cert ADR-0002/ADR-0006, docs/09 R-DNS-01, R-TLS-01
monitoring/ kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Grafana Alloy + Alertmanager docs/10 R-OBS-*
velero/ Off-cluster backup/DR of volumes + resource state ADR-0003, docs/04 R-STATE-03
kubevirt/ KubeVirt + CDI (IaaS: application VMs on the same K8s surface) ADR-0005, docs/06 R-PLAT-03
image-automation/ Flux image-update-automation (hands-off image tag advance) ADR-0009, docs/11 R-UPD-02
keycloak/ Platform IdP (OIDC + SAML), config-as-code, PostgreSQL on Longhorn ADR-0014, docs/15 R-IDP-*
oauth2-proxy/ Forward-auth at the Gateway for non-OIDC apps → Keycloak ADR-0014, docs/15 R-IDP-*
kyverno/ L0 policy-as-code gate — OWNED BY THE POLICY ENGINEER (WS-TEST). ADR-0011, docs/14 R-TEST-*

⚠️ INTEGRATION TODO(PM): wire kyverno into the platform kustomization

platform/kyverno/ is authored by a different agent (the policy engineer, WS-TEST). This workstream did not create any files under platform/kyverno/ and must not.

platform/kustomization.yaml intentionally omits - kyverno. Once the policy engineer's files land, the PM must add - kyverno to that list (recommended first, so policies are present before other components reconcile). The line is present as a commented TODO in the kustomization.

Secrets

Every secret referenced below (Cloudflare API token, Velero backup-target creds, Keycloak admin/DB, oauth2-proxy cookie/client secrets) is referenced by name only and will be committed SOPS-encrypted (WS-SEC, ADR-0007). No plaintext secret appears anywhere in this tree.

Cross-workstream contracts surfaced by these stubs

  • cilium (WS-NET ↔ WS-INFRA): Cilium's initial CNI install is done by Ansible at cluster bootstrap (docs/02, Phase 1). The HelmRelease here manages Cilium config thereafter; its Helm values MUST match the Ansible bootstrap values (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port, API server host) or reconciliation will fight the bootstrap. Contract owner: WS-NET + WS-INFRA.
  • gateway + cert-manager + externaldns (WS-NET + WS-SEC): the shared Gateway listener, the wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev cert, and the ExternalDNS source all reference each other; they form the "Issuer + Gateway TLS" interface in roadmap/workstreams.md.
  • image-automation (WS-UPDATE): this dir holds only the cluster-wide ImageUpdateAutomation + git write-back. Per-service ImageRepository/ImagePolicy are rendered from each ServiceDefinition's update block (WS-GITOPS/WS-UPDATE), living with apps/.
  • keycloak/oauth2-proxy (WS-SEC): the SSO/auth contract (auth block → Keycloak client / oauth2-proxy protection) is owned by WS-SEC; these are placeholders pending that contract.