Files
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 9137bbd0c3 feat(dns): INVERT to operator's simpler layout — dev to subdomain, prod to apex
*** DO NOT MERGE TO main WHILE THE OPERATOR IS AWAY. MERGING IS THE MIGRATION. ***

Operator simplified the architecture, inverting c8c1d29:
  dev  -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev        (was the apex)
  prod -> *.home.keithjackson.dev            (the apex; no prod. subdomain, no CNAME layer)

WHY MERGING IS DANGEROUS, and this is the finding that matters most here:
clusters/dev/sync.yaml self-reconciles ./clusters/dev from `main` every 10 minutes. Merging
these files EXECUTES the cutover on the live dev cluster, unattended. And because the same
commit moves dev's GitRepository url to gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, dev STRANDS — it
stops reconciling and cannot be fixed by pushing, because the broken thing IS the path Flux
reads pushes through. Banners added at the top of clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml and beside
the url itself. That url cannot be tokenized: the root Kustomization declares no
substituteFrom, so `gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}` would ship the literal token.

Verified dev is currently safe: this work is NOT on origin/main, dev is reconciling
main@4809199, and its live BASE_DOMAIN is still home.keithjackson.dev. Deliberately NOT
pushed to the bootstrap Gitea either — prod reconciles from there, and prod on `prod.home.`
cannot collide with dev on the apex, so that is the safer interim for prod.

VALUES
                BASE_DOMAIN                  TXT_OWNER_ID   DOMAIN_FILTER
  base          dev.home.keithjackson.dev    sentinel       keithjackson.dev
  dev           dev.home.keithjackson.dev    dev            keithjackson.dev
  prod          home.keithjackson.dev        prod           keithjackson.dev
Ansible seam inverted too: role default k3s_base_domain = dev's subdomain, group_vars/k3s_prod
overrides to the apex.

dev's txtOwnerId moves `default` -> `dev`. The old value was FORCED (its live apex records
were already registered under `default`, so renaming would have orphaned them). On a new
suffix dev publishes a brand-new record set with no prior registry, so the id is chosen on
merits — and `default` has none: it is what you get by FORGETTING the flag, which is exactly
how both clusters came to share it and delete each other's records. Operationally it also
means dev's old apex records stay owned by a now-unclaimed id, so nothing deletes them
implicitly and vacating the apex becomes an explicit sequenceable step rather than a race
between two reconcile loops. PROD MUST NEVER BE GIVEN `default`: prod inherits the apex
NAMES, so `default` is the one value that would let it adopt and policy:sync-delete dev's
still-live apex records — the same incident with the roles swapped.

DOMAIN_FILTER stays the ZONE for both, with F-DNS1 written into all three files as a
do-not-retry: a subdomain filter drops the parent zone and publishes NOTHING.

VERIFICATION — the property changed, and so did the method. "Dev renders byte-identically" no
longer applies because dev is deliberately migrating. Instead: apply the INVERSE substitution
to the new render and demand byte-identity with the baseline. 145 changed line pairs, every
one classified: 143 hostname-move, 2 declared owner-id, ZERO unexplained, ZERO bare-apex
remnants. cilium and velero show 0 changes and provably contain no hostname, so they are not
blind spots. Prod: 0 occurrences of prod.home., 0 of dev.home., 143 apex names. Certs: dev
*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod *.home.keithjackson.dev.

THREE positive controls, all fire — including one that proves the two checks are not
redundant: injecting a single un-moved hostname SURVIVES the inverse-substitution check and is
caught only by the independent bare-apex scan. That is why both exist.

Ansible probe (connection: local, zero SSH): dev nodes -> keycloak.dev.home..., prod nodes ->
keycloak.home.... Used roles: + --tags probe rather than include_vars, because include_vars
outranks group_vars and would have FALSELY shown prod inheriting dev's value.

Gates all PASS: l0, l1, render-golden (10 goldens), lint, substitution (254 assertions),
render.py --selftest, spec-immutability. Catalog ServiceDefinitions edited, never rendered apps/.

RUNBOOK rewritten in §10 + §10a with the ordering that avoids stranding: D0 snapshot escape
routes -> D1 break the automatic trigger -> D2 publish and PROVE gitea.dev.home + the new
wildcard cert WHILE dev still serves the apex -> D3 merge -> D4 release reconciliation
deliberately -> D5 Keycloak issuer + ~12 clients (headlamp's is SOPS, by hand) -> D6
one-server-at-a-time k3s restart + SSO re-issue (service restart only, NO reboots) -> D7
retire old apex records -> D8 verify the apex is empty AGAINST CLOUDFLARE, not pfSense —
the gate on everything after. Then P1 unsuspend prod.

ACME: prod's wildcard is EXACTLY the name set dev holds today, so prod's orders share dev's
5-per-week duplicate-certificate bucket. Order after D8, delete dev's old Certificate rather
than let it renew, rehearse on staging.

The 6 L2 chainsaw tests hardcoding the apex are enumerated but deliberately NOT edited — while
dev is live on the apex they are correct; they need per-environment parameterisation.

Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01/02/03, R-TLS-01.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-04 23:08:50 -05:00
..

platform/

Cluster-wide platform services, Flux-managed (R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01/02/03). Reconciled by the platform Flux Kustomization defined in clusters/base/platform.yaml, before apps/.

Governing spec: docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md, docs/01-architecture-overview.md.

Phase 0 scaffolding only. Every component here is a structurally-correct stub — a Flux HelmRelease and/or Kustomization with a values placeholder, a README citing the governing ADR/spec, and TODOs for the phase that fills it in. No cluster exists; nothing reconciles yet. Do not add working config, secrets, or provisioning under Phase 0 (spec AGENTS.md §1/§5/§6, roadmap/phases.md).

Reconciliation flow (how a change lands)

git (source of truth)
   │  operator PR → CI (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · Chainsaw) → merge to tracked branch
   ▼
Flux GitRepository (clusters/base/flux-system.yaml)
   ▼
Flux Kustomization "platform"  → ./platform  (this dir)     ── substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┐
   │  prune=true (drift correction, R-GITOPS-03) · wait=true                                  │ R-ENV-02
   ▼                                                                                          │
Flux Kustomization "apps"      → ./apps  (dependsOn platform) ─ substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┘

Git is authoritative; the cluster conforms to git and drift is auto-corrected (R-GITOPS-01/03). Manual kubectl apply of platform state is prohibited (spec AGENTS.md §5).

The dev ↔ prod overlay model (R-ENV-02)

Platform manifests are authored once. Every value that legitimately differs between environments is a ${TOKEN} resolved from the cluster-vars ConfigMap via Flux postBuild.substituteFrom. The clusters/dev and clusters/prod overlays differ only by the values they patch into cluster-vars (issuer, replica counts, storage sizes, retention). See clusters/README.md. Base manifests are never forked per environment.

Components (one directory each)

Dir Component Governing ADR / spec Serves
cilium/ CNI + kube-proxy replacement + Gateway API + Egress Gateway + Hubble ADR-0002, docs/03 R-NET-*
longhorn/ Replicated block storage; 3-replica default StorageClass + bulk tier ADR-0003, docs/04 R-STATE-*
cert-manager/ TLS via Let's Encrypt DNS-01 (Cloudflare); staging + prod ClusterIssuers ADR-0006, docs/08 R-TLS-*
externaldns/ Automatic DNS records for public services (Cloudflare) docs/09 R-DNS-*
gateway/ Gateway API GatewayClass + shared HTTPS Gateway + wildcard cert ADR-0002/ADR-0006, docs/09 R-DNS-01, R-TLS-01
monitoring/ kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Grafana Alloy + Alertmanager docs/10 R-OBS-*
velero/ Off-cluster backup/DR of volumes + resource state ADR-0003, docs/04 R-STATE-03
kubevirt/ KubeVirt + CDI (IaaS: application VMs on the same K8s surface) ADR-0005, docs/06 R-PLAT-03
image-automation/ Flux image-update-automation (hands-off image tag advance) ADR-0009, docs/11 R-UPD-02
keycloak/ Platform IdP (OIDC + SAML), config-as-code, PostgreSQL on Longhorn ADR-0014, docs/15 R-IDP-*
oauth2-proxy/ Forward-auth at the Gateway for non-OIDC apps → Keycloak ADR-0014, docs/15 R-IDP-*
kyverno/ L0 policy-as-code gate — OWNED BY THE POLICY ENGINEER (WS-TEST). ADR-0011, docs/14 R-TEST-*

⚠️ INTEGRATION TODO(PM): wire kyverno into the platform kustomization

platform/kyverno/ is authored by a different agent (the policy engineer, WS-TEST). This workstream did not create any files under platform/kyverno/ and must not.

platform/kustomization.yaml intentionally omits - kyverno. Once the policy engineer's files land, the PM must add - kyverno to that list (recommended first, so policies are present before other components reconcile). The line is present as a commented TODO in the kustomization.

Secrets

Every secret referenced below (Cloudflare API token, Velero backup-target creds, Keycloak admin/DB, oauth2-proxy cookie/client secrets) is referenced by name only and will be committed SOPS-encrypted (WS-SEC, ADR-0007). No plaintext secret appears anywhere in this tree.

Cross-workstream contracts surfaced by these stubs

  • cilium (WS-NET ↔ WS-INFRA): Cilium's initial CNI install is done by Ansible at cluster bootstrap (docs/02, Phase 1). The HelmRelease here manages Cilium config thereafter; its Helm values MUST match the Ansible bootstrap values (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port, API server host) or reconciliation will fight the bootstrap. Contract owner: WS-NET + WS-INFRA.
  • gateway + cert-manager + externaldns (WS-NET + WS-SEC): the shared Gateway listener, the wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev cert, and the ExternalDNS source all reference each other; they form the "Issuer + Gateway TLS" interface in roadmap/workstreams.md.
  • image-automation (WS-UPDATE): this dir holds only the cluster-wide ImageUpdateAutomation + git write-back. Per-service ImageRepository/ImagePolicy are rendered from each ServiceDefinition's update block (WS-GITOPS/WS-UPDATE), living with apps/.
  • keycloak/oauth2-proxy (WS-SEC): the SSO/auth contract (auth block → Keycloak client / oauth2-proxy protection) is owned by WS-SEC; these are placeholders pending that contract.