home-network-k3s-impl/infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md

# Prod bare-metal provisioning checklist (T-7.1)

**Task:** T-7.1 · **Workstream:** WS-INFRA · **Serves:** R-ENV-01, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03, R-PLAT-01/03
**Status:** Phase 7 **opened by the operator 2026-08-31** — *prep only*. Nothing is installed on prod
hardware until the blockers in §7 are closed and `make -C ci gate` is green.

> **Entry-gate note (recorded, not waived).** `roadmap/phases.md` gates Phase 7 on *"Phases 1–6
> proven in dev/test; operator declares prod hardware ready."* The operator has declared hardware
> ready. The first condition is **not** met: conformance is 37/51, and the uncovered set includes
> **R-ENV-01/02/03** — the very requirements this document serves. We proceed with prep work
> knowingly; see `DECISIONS-LOG.md` (2026-08-31 Phase-7 entry).

Prod is **3× mini-PC bare metal** ([spec docs/02](../../home-network-k3s/docs/02-environments-and-provisioning.md)).
The dev path (OpenTofu → Proxmox VM → cloud-init) **does not apply**: there is no hypervisor API to
call. Stage 1 "Create" is a human imaging a box. Stages 2–4 (baseline, cluster-join, manage) reuse
the *same* Ansible roles and the *same* Flux base as dev — that reuse is the R-ENV-02 obligation.

---

## 0. Node inventory

Fill a row per node as it lands. Node 1 is as-found on 2026-08-31.

| | node 1 | node 2 | node 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hostname | `k3s-prod-1` | `k3s-prod-2` | `k3s-prod-3` |
| LAN IP | `192.168.2.10` | `192.168.2.11` | `192.168.2.12` |
| Model | HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Desktop Mini | | |
| CPU | i7-9700T, 8c/8t, VT-x | | |
| RAM | 31 GiB | | |
| Disks | 1× 477 GB SATA SSD (`C400-MTFDDAC512M`) | | |
| OS | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel 6.12 | | |
| Firmware | HP R21 Ver. 02.26.00 | | |
| `/dev/kvm` | present | | |

Dev nodes for comparison: 8 vCPU / 24 GiB / Debian 13, **two** dedicated data disks (Longhorn + etcd).

---

## 0b. OPEN HARDWARE FAULT — `k3s-prod-2` can only address ~2.6 GiB of its 16 GB

Found 2026-09-01 by `playbooks/node-health.yml` on node 2's first health run. **Do not install
more RAM until this is understood** — see the warning at the end.

| Evidence | Reading |
|---|---|
| DMI (`dmidecode -t memory`) | **16 GB Samsung M471A2K43DB1-CTD in DIMM1 @ 2667 MT/s**, DIMM3 empty |
| BIOS e820 map | reports ~16 GiB usable, incl. `0x100000000-0x42f7fffff` |
| Kernel summary | `Memory: 2568544K/16546088K available (13958980K reserved)` |
| `last_pfn` | revised **down** from `0x42f800` (~16.7 GiB) to `0xc3c10` (~3.06 GiB) in early boot |
| Zones | `Normal` zone `present 3340288` pages (~12.7 GiB) but **`managed 0`** |
| `MemTotal` | **2,753,284 kB ≈ 2.6 GiB** |
| Memory blocks | 127 online, 128 MiB block size |

**The DIMM is healthy.** It is present, correctly identified, and running at its rated speed. The
kernel *sees* all 16 GB and then reserves 13.3 GiB of it. Everything below ~3 GiB is usable and
everything above 4 GiB is present-but-unmanaged — the classic signature of **memory remapping
above 4 GB not being applied**, not of failing memory.

Node 1 is the control: **identical** HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Mini, **identical** BIOS R21 Ver. 02.26.00,
identical i7-9700T — and it addresses its full 31 GiB. So this is not a firmware-version defect; it
is per-machine state.

**BIOS settings compared programmatically (2026-09-01).** Both nodes load the `hp-bioscfg`
kernel driver, which exposes **215 BIOS attributes** read/write at
`/sys/class/firmware-attributes/hp-bioscfg/attributes/<name>/current_value`. No BIOS passwords
are set (`authentication/*/is_enabled` = 0), so these are also **writable from the OS** — see
§1, this changes how the firmware checklist can be enforced.

What the comparison ruled OUT as the cause:
- **Firmware inventory is correct.** Node 2's BIOS itself reports `Memory Size=16384 MB` and
  `Processor 1 DIMM1=16 GB Samsung` / `DIMM3=Empty`. The firmware is not under-counting.
- **No memory-remap / above-4G-decoding attribute exists** on this platform — not present on
  either node, so it cannot be a mis-set option.
- **MTRRs are effectively identical** between the nodes and there is **no MTRR trim warning**,
  which rules out the classic "BIOS bug: MTRRs don't cover all of memory, losing N MB" path.
- **`/proc/iomem` registers `100000000-42f7fffff` as `System RAM`** and 127 × 128 MiB memory
  blocks report `online`. The memory reaches the kernel and is then reserved.

Real BIOS differences found (node 1 = works, node 2 = broken):

| Attribute | node 1 | node 2 |
|---|---|---|
| **After Power Loss** | Power On | **Power Off** ← violates §1 |
| **Fast Boot** | Disable | **Enable** ← leading hypothesis |
| Legacy Boot Options | Disable | Enable |
| TPM Activation Policy | F1 to Boot | Allow user to reject |
| Microsoft/Windows UEFI CA 2023 | Enable | Disable |
| Memory Size | 32768 MB (2×16 GB Micron) | 16384 MB (1×16 GB Samsung) |

**Leading hypothesis: `Fast Boot=Enable`.** HP Fast Boot reuses *cached memory-training data*
rather than retraining at each boot. If the DIMM was fitted while Fast Boot was on, stale
training data is a plausible route to memory being present, inventoried, handed over — and then
reserved. It is also the one memory-relevant setting that differs from the working node. This is
a hypothesis, not a conclusion: it was NOT tested, because changing it requires a firmware write
and a reboot, which needs operator sanction.

To investigate, cheapest first:
- [ ] **Set `Fast Boot=Disable` and reboot** (tests the hypothesis directly, and matches node 1).
      Can be done from the OS — see §1 — or in the F10 setup menu.
- [ ] **Set `After Power Loss=Power On`** regardless of the memory question — §1 requires it and
      node 2 currently violates it.
- [ ] Clear CMOS / load setup defaults on node 2 to force a full memory retrain, then re-check.
- [ ] Compare node 2's BIOS settings against node 1 directly. Look for a memory remap / "Above 4G
      decoding" style option, and for any memory-limit or 32-bit-addressing setting.
- [ ] Clear CMOS / load setup defaults on node 2, then re-check `MemTotal`.
- [ ] Reseat the DIMM; try it in DIMM3; try it in node 1 (swap test) — that isolates DIMM vs slot
      vs board in one move.
- [ ] `memtest86+` if the above do not resolve it.

> ⚠ **Do not assume the incoming 32 GB fixes this.** If the fault is the slot, the board, or a BIOS
> setting rather than the DIMM, 32 GB will present exactly the same way and the money is wasted.
> **Verify `MemTotal` after any RAM change** — `playbooks/node-health.yml -e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod`
> reports it. A node that can address 2.6 GiB cannot run k3s + Longhorn + a workload share.

## 1. Firmware / BIOS (per node, before OS install)

> **These are now MACHINE-CHECKABLE, not just eyeball-at-F10 items.** The `hp-bioscfg` driver
> exposes 215 BIOS attributes at `/sys/class/firmware-attributes/hp-bioscfg/attributes/`, and
> with no BIOS password set they are **writable from the OS**. That means the checklist below can
> be *asserted* by `roles/node_health` and *enforced* by a role, instead of trusted to whoever
> was last in the setup menu — which is exactly how node 2 ended up with `After Power Loss=Power
> Off` and `Fast Boot=Enable` while node 1 has the opposite. **Follow-up worth doing: extend
> node_health to assert the firmware checklist, and add a role to converge it.**


- [ ] **Virtualization enabled** — VT-x *and* VT-d. Required for KubeVirt (R-PLAT-03); verify after
      boot with `/dev/kvm` present and `grep -cE 'vmx|svm' /proc/cpuinfo` non-zero.
- [ ] **AC power recovery = Power On.** A homelab node must return after a power cut without a
      human pressing the button. (`docs/02` calls out wake/boot behaviour explicitly.)
- [ ] **Wake-on-LAN enabled** on the onboard NIC (remote recovery when the box is off).
- [ ] **Boot order** — internal disk first; USB above it only while imaging. Disable network boot
      unless PXE is adopted.
- [ ] **Secure Boot** — record the setting. k3s itself is fine either way; note it so all three
      nodes match.
- [ ] **Firmware version recorded** in §0 and consistent across all three nodes.

## 2. Disk layout — **OPEN DECISION, blocks the build**

`docs/02` requires the OS-vs-Longhorn device split to be **documented before prod build**. Dev went
further and added a *third* device for etcd after HDD contention starved etcd WAL fsync
(`docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md`).

Node 1 as-found is a **single** 477 GB SATA SSD carrying everything:

```
sda  477G  C400-MTFDDAC512M (SSD, ~2011-era Micron/Crucial)
├─sda1 976M  /boot/efi
├─sda2  30G  /
├─sda3  12G  /var
├─sda4 977M  swap
└─sda5 433G  /srv          <- the only large free space
```

Consequences to settle before imaging nodes 2 and 3:

- [x] **Drive health MEASURED 2026-09-01** (`smartctl -a /dev/sda`, via the baseline package
      floor — see §5). Raw attributes, so the numbers are auditable:

      | | |
      |---|---|
      | Model | Crucial/Micron RealSSD m4/C400/P400 (`C400-MTFDDAC512MAM`, fw `070H`) |
      | SMART self-assessment | **PASSED** — no attribute in `WHEN_FAILED` |
      | Power-on hours | 6,814 (~284 days) · 147 power cycles |
      | **Rated life used** | **31%** (`202`), i.e. 69% remaining (`173` VALUE 069) |
      | **Grown failing blocks** | **15** (`170`), reallocation events **15** (`196`) |
      | **Erase failures** | **187** (`172`) |
      | **Unexpected power losses** | **32** (`174`) |
      | Pending / offline-uncorrectable / reported-uncorrectable | **0 / 0 / 0** (`197`/`198`/`187`) |
      | UDMA CRC errors | 0 (`199`) — cabling is clean |

      **Read attribute `5` carefully.** Its raw value is `61440`, which is NOT a bad-sector
      count: `61440 = 15 x 4096`, and both `170` and `196` independently read **15**. Its
      normalised VALUE is 100 against a THRESH of 10. So the drive has **15 grown bad blocks**,
      not sixty-one thousand bad sectors. The first `node_health` run FAILED on that raw value;
      the check now judges on normalised VALUE/THRESH, `WHEN_FAILED`, and the vendor-independent
      uncorrectable counters instead.

      **Verdict: usable, but not for production state.** Nothing says imminent failure — no
      pending or uncorrectable sectors, SMART self-assessment passes. But this is a ~2011
      consumer MLC drive that has already consumed **31% of its rated life**, grown **15** bad
      blocks, logged **187** erase failures, and taken **32** unclean power losses **with no
      power-loss protection**, in a single failure domain. etcd is the worst possible tenant for
      it: etcd fsyncs constantly, and an unclean power loss on a drive without PLP is exactly how
      a member corrupts — this drive has already logged 32 of them.
      (Non-ECC RAM is a separate, **accepted** risk — operator decision 2026-09-01, see
      `DECISIONS-LOG.md`. It is not part of this verdict.)
- [ ] **Decide the layout.**- [ ] **Decide the layout.** `roles/node_baseline` expects *block devices*
      (`node_baseline_longhorn_device`, `node_baseline_etcd_device`) and makes a filesystem on them.
      Its defaults `/dev/vdb` and `/dev/vdc` are **virtio names that do not exist on bare metal** —
      prod must override them in `group_vars`. On a single-disk node there is no second device at
      all, so one of:
      - **Add a second drive** (M.2 NVMe if the chassis has a free slot; verify physically — only a
        SATA controller is populated today). Cleanest: matches dev's isolation, gives etcd its own
        spindle.
      - **Use `/dev/sda5`** (the 433 GB `/srv` partition) as the Longhorn device, etcd stays on `/`.
        Buildable today, zero spend, but re-creates the shared-spindle contention dev was burned by.
      - **Repartition** into dedicated OS / etcd / Longhorn partitions. Better isolation, still one
        physical failure domain.
- [ ] **All three nodes get the identical layout.** Longhorn replica placement assumes symmetry.
- [ ] Record the chosen device paths here and set them in
      `infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` (they are deliberately
      `/dev/BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision-…` placeholders today — do **not** guess). A full
      `node-baseline` run against a node still carrying those placeholders now stops on an explicit
      assert naming this section, instead of failing obscurely at `mkfs` time.
- [x] **The SMART-vs-smartmontools circular dependency is broken** (2026-08-31). `roles/node_baseline`
      is tagged `packages` / `system` / `disks`, so the package floor can land **without** the disk
      tasks this decision blocks — see §5's drive-health box for the exact command.

## 3. OS install (per node)

- [ ] **Debian 13 (trixie)**, matching dev exactly — same kernel series, same package baseline.
- [ ] Hostname `k3s-prod-N`.
- [ ] Partition per the §2 decision.
- [ ] **No cloud-init needed.** Dev's first-boot work was deliberately moved into
      `roles/node_baseline` when provisioning became API-only (`infra/cloud-init/` is a README now),
      so the same role covers bare metal. Nothing to port.

## 4. Network (per node)

- [ ] **Static IP** on the prod LAN, recorded in §0. Node 1 is `192.168.2.10/24`, gateway
      `192.168.2.1`.
- [x] **Prod address plan — DECIDED (operator, 2026-08-31).**

      | Role | Address | Owned by |
      |---|---|---|
      | `k3s-prod-1` / `-2` / `-3` | `192.168.2.10` / `.11` / `.12` | Ansible inventory |
      | **kube-vip control-plane VIP** | `192.168.2.9` | Ansible (`group_vars/k3s_prod`) |
      | **Ingress Gateway VIP** (`GATEWAY_VIP`) | `192.168.2.20` | Flux (`clusters/prod`) |
      | **Cilium L2 announcement pool** | `192.168.2.20` – `.30` | Flux (`platform-config/cilium`) |

      Two deliberate properties, both mirroring dev:
      - The **control-plane VIP sits outside the LB pool** (`.9`, below the nodes), so kube-vip and
        Cilium LB-IPAM can never contend for the same address. Dev achieves this the other way
        round (`.49` control-plane, pool `.53-.60`).
      - **`GATEWAY_VIP` is the FIRST address of the pool.** Cilium LB-IPAM can only allocate from a
        defined pool block, so a Gateway VIP outside every pool would not be allocatable — the pool
        was widened from `.21-.30` to `.20-.30` for exactly this reason. Dev has the same shape
        (`GATEWAY_VIP` `.53` = first of `.53-.60`).
- [ ] **Reserve all of `192.168.2.9` and `.20-.30` outside any DHCP range** on the prod LAN before
      the build, and confirm nothing else on the network already answers on them.
- [ ] **Resolver: SECOND UPSTREAM IS AN OPEN DECISION — blocks `node-baseline.yml --tags dns`.**
      Node 1 has a single IPv4 nameserver, `192.168.2.1`, which is also the LAN gateway. A single
      upstream is a known SPOF that has already bitten this project — it broke containerd image
      pulls and CoreDNS forwarding on dev.

      The MECHANISM is now in the repo and needs no further work: the `dns`-tagged block in
      `roles/node_baseline` detects whether a node uses systemd-resolved (dev: writes
      `/etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/99-k3s-dns.conf`, restarts resolved) or a directly-managed
      `/etc/resolv.conf` (prod's shape: writes the file, refusing if resolvconf/NetworkManager
      owns it), and configures the ordered upstream list either way. The earlier
      `fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream` branch was **dropped, not merged** — it wrote a netplan
      drop-in and ran `netplan apply`, and netplan is not installed on these Debian 13 trixie
      nodes, so it would have broken `node-baseline.yml` on every host.

      What is still MISSING is the VALUE. `group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` sets
      `node_baseline_dns_servers` to `192.168.2.1` followed by the deliberately invalid
      `BLOCKED-pending-second-upstream-decision-see-PROD-PROVISIONING-md-4`, and the role's assert
      stops the play on it before writing anything. Choosing the second upstream is a **network
      decision, not a default the role may take**: a public resolver (`8.8.8.8`, `1.1.1.1`) would
      resolve reliably but would also bypass any local zone and any filtering the gateway applies.
      Decide between — and record the choice HERE, in the same change that edits the group_vars:
      - a second on-LAN resolver on `192.168.2.x`;
      - the dev-side PiHole `192.168.1.18`, **if** prod can actually route to it (unverified —
        prod sits on the workstation side of the pfSense boundary);
      - an explicit, written-down acceptance of a public resolver as fallback-only.

      Also decide whether node 1's current IPv6 nameservers (`2001:4860:4860::8888` / `::8844`)
      are kept: the direct-file write path replaces `/etc/resolv.conf` with exactly the listed
      servers, so keeping them means listing them explicitly.
      `node_baseline_dns_search` is `[]` (no search domain, node 1's behaviour today) until prod's
      local domain is decided.
- [ ] Confirm the prod LAN's relationship to the dev LAN (`192.168.1.x`) and to the pfSense NAT —
      prod on `192.168.2.x` sits on the *workstation* side of the boundary dev lives behind.

## 5. Access (per node) — **blocks all Ansible**

- [ ] **`k3s` user with the `home_network` SSH key.** Working on node 1.
- [ ] **Password-protected sudo, driven by Ansible `become` + a vaulted password.**
      **Prod does NOT use NOPASSWD sudo** (operator decision, 2026-08-31). Dev nodes do; prod
      deliberately keeps the sudo password in place and supplies it to Ansible as an
      **ansible-vault-encrypted** var, exactly like the existing `hypervisor` and `proxmox_hosts`
      groups:
      ```
      inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/
        README.md     how to (re)create the vault — committed
        vault.yml     ansible_become_password: "..."  — committed, ENCRYPTED
      ```
      The passphrase that decrypts it lives **outside the repo** at
      `~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass` (`ansible.cfg :: vault_password_file`), so plays still
      run unattended without a plaintext secret ever touching git.
      ```bash
      ansible-vault create inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml   # ansible_become_password: ...
      ```
      Prod nodes must therefore set `ansible_become: true` in their group_vars and must **not**
      inherit any passwordless-sudo assumption from `group_vars/all.yml`.
- [ ] **Drive health baseline** (§2). **Do not hand-install the tooling** — package installation is
      the `node_baseline` role's job, never a manual `apt-get` on a node (operator ruling,
      2026-08-31; same click-ops-never principle as the rest of the repo). `smartmontools` is part
      of `node_baseline_packages`, so it arrives with the baseline play — but a *full* baseline
      would hit the disk tasks §2 has not decided yet. Run the **packages-only** baseline instead
      (the `disks`-tagged tasks, including the BLOCKED-device assert, are not selected at all, so
      the placeholder device paths are never even templated):
      ```bash
      cd infra/ansible
      ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml \
        -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages --limit k3s-prod-1
      ```
      (Needs `group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml` to exist first — the become password above.) Reading
      the drive is then:
      ```bash
      sudo smartctl -a /dev/sda   # Power_On_Hours, Percent_Lifetime_Remaining, reallocated sectors
      ```
      Record the result in §2 and close the layout decision in the same change that replaces the
      two `node_baseline_*_device` placeholders.

## 6. Ansible baseline & cluster join

Reuses the dev roles **unchanged** — that reuse **is** R-ENV-02. Only inventory and group_vars
differ, plus a target-group override on the command line.

### How prod is targeted (done, 2026-08-31)

Every node-host play used to hardcode the literal dev groups `k3s_servers` / `k3s_primary` /
`k3s_secondary`, so nothing here could select prod at all. Two knobs now close that, deliberately
kept separate because Ansible resolves them at different times:

| Layer | Knob | Set via |
|---|---|---|
| Which hosts a play **runs on** | `k3s_hosts`, `k3s_primary_hosts`, `k3s_secondary_hosts` (each defaults to the dev group) | `-e` **extra vars only** — a play's `hosts:` is templated before any host exists, so `group_vars` is not readable there |
| Which group a **role** means by "my primary" / "my servers" | `k3s_primary_group`, `k3s_servers_group`, `cluster_kubeconfig_name` | `group_vars` — dev in `all.yml`, prod in `k3s_prod/vars.yml`; **no per-run flag** |

So `roles/k3s_server` finds the prod `--cluster-init` founder, builds the prod join target and
tls-san list, and `roles/cilium` fetches the prod kubeconfig, with **no role fork**. Running with
no extra vars is byte-for-byte the dev behaviour it always had (verified by a before/after
`--list-hosts` diff on every playbook). Full detail: `infra/ansible/README.md` → **Targeting prod**.

- [x] Add a `k3s_prod` inventory group (`k3s_prod_primary` / `k3s_prod_secondary`). Prod is reached
      **directly** on the LAN — no NAT port-forward hop, unlike dev's `192.168.2.102:225x` mapping.
      (Nodes 2/3 stay commented out until they are physically on the bench.)
- [x] `inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml`: `kube_vip_address` (`192.168.2.9`),
      `cluster_controller_api_server`, `k3s_api_host`, the group-name overrides above — **and** the
      §2 device overrides for `node_baseline_longhorn_device` / `node_baseline_etcd_device`, which
      are still BLOCKED placeholders.
- [ ] `inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml` — the vaulted `ansible_become_password` (§5). Until
      it exists **no** prod play can escalate, and `--check` against prod cannot work either.
- [ ] Run the **packages-only** baseline first, to unblock the §2 drive-health read:
      ```bash
      ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages
      ```
- [ ] Run the **full** `playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` → packages, kernel
      modules, sysctls, iscsid, data-disk filesystems + mounts. **Blocked until §2 is decided**: it
      asserts on the placeholder device paths and stops. (`qemu-guest-agent` is a no-op on bare
      metal — the role already only *starts* it when the virtio channel exists, so it degrades
      cleanly.)
- [ ] Run `playbooks/k3s.yml -e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary`
      → HA embedded etcd, flannel/kube-proxy/Traefik/servicelb disabled. **Only once all three
      nodes are present** — see §8.
- [ ] Run `playbooks/kube-vip.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` → control-plane VIP (`192.168.2.9`) on the
      prod LAN.
- [ ] Run `playbooks/cilium.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` → CNI at bootstrap; Flux's HelmRelease adopts
      it afterwards. The bootstrap values and the HelmRelease **must stay in parity**
      (`kubeProxyReplacement`, `k8sServiceHost`/`Port`) or the two layers fight over CNI config
      (`docs/02`). Note the prod kubeconfig is fetched to `.cache/prod.kubeconfig`, never over the
      dev one the dev container exports as `$KUBECONFIG`.
- [ ] Run `playbooks/verify.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod`.
- [ ] `playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` **retargets but is not yet correct**:
      `roles/flux_bootstrap` shells out to `bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh`, which bootstraps
      `--path=clusters/dev`. Prod needs `--path=clusters/prod` — a `bootstrap/` change, not a
      target-group change. Tracked with the other repo blockers in §7.
- [ ] Decide whether prod runs a VPN egress gateway node (dev uses `k3s-dev-3`, ADR-0015).
      `playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml` takes `-e vpn_egress_gateway_hosts=<group>`, but there is
      deliberately no prod egress group in the inventory yet, and it would need its **own** vaulted
      PIA credentials — the existing vault is scoped to the dev group.

## 7. Repo blockers — **prod cannot be reconciled until these land**

`clusters/prod` is design-only today and **would build wrong**. R-ENV-02 promises dev and prod differ
*only* by `cluster-vars` values; in practice dev LAN addresses are hardcoded into base manifests:

| Hardcoded value | Where | Prod needs |
|---|---|---|
| `k8sServiceHost: 192.168.1.50` | `platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml:50`, mirrored in `values.yaml:16` | prod primary node IP |
| LB pool `192.168.1.53–.60` | `platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml:15` | a prod-LAN pool |
| `192.168.1.55` (crafty) | `platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.54` (UniFi VM) | `apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.9:9000` (S3 backup) | `platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml`, `apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,semaphore}-db.yaml` | reachable prod backup target |

- [ ] **Tokenize each into a `cluster-vars` knob** with a base default, then set the value in *both*
      overlays. Adding a knob before referencing `${KNOB}` is the sanctioned mechanism (see the
      header comment in `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`). `platform`, `platform-config`, the app
      waves, `apps-vms` and `crafty` all already carry `postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars`, so
      the seam exists.
- [ ] **`clusters/prod` must set `GATEWAY_VIP`.** It currently doesn't, so prod would inherit the
      base default `10.73.0.240` — an address from the **retired libvirt network**. The base file's
      own comment flags this as owed "when hardware is built."
- [ ] **Dev overlay sets every new knob to today's exact value** so rendered dev output is
      byte-identical and the live cluster sees zero drift. Verify with `make -C ci render-golden`.
- [ ] **`clusters/prod` is NOT bootstrappable as-is** — three gaps, found 2026-09-01 while landing
      the `dependsOn` fix. Only the first is now closed:
      - [x] **Root Kustomization** — `clusters/prod/sync.yaml` authored, mirroring dev. This became
            *load-bearing*, not cosmetic: `clusters/base/platform.yaml` now carries
            `dependsOn: [flux-system]`, so without a root object on prod, `platform` would block
            forever on a dependency that does not exist and nothing downstream would reconcile.
      - [x] **SOPS decryption** — DONE. Operator decision 2026-09-01: **prod uses the SAME age key
            as dev**. Eight `decryption: {provider: sops, secretRef: sops-age}` patches mirror dev
            exactly. The `sops-age` Secret is still created OUT OF BAND on the prod cluster
            (`bootstrap/sops/install-age-key.sh`) — the overlay references it by name only.
      - [~] **GitRepository source** — BRANCH settled, URL still blocked. Operator decision
            2026-09-01: **prod tracks `main`, the same branch as dev**, because dev is temporary and
            will be decommissioned once prod is stable. Recorded consequence: once prod is live,
            **every merge to `main` reconciles BOTH clusters** — no promotion step, no soak window.
            The URL is patched in but **cannot work on a cold prod cluster**, for two independent
            reasons found 2026-09-01:
            1. **Self-hosting circularity** — Gitea runs on the DEV cluster, the one slated for
               decommission. Gitea must move to prod (or off-cluster) BEFORE dev is retired, or prod
               loses its source of truth. **This is the decommission plan's first task, not its last.**
            2. **Split-horizon sends it to the wrong place** — `coredns-custom` answers the entire
               `home.keithjackson.dev` zone with `${GATEWAY_VIP}`, which on prod is `192.168.2.20`:
               prod's OWN gateway, where no Gitea listens. Prod's Flux would resolve
               `gitea.home.keithjackson.dev` to itself and never reach a repository.
            Bring-up needs a TEMPORARY source (bootstrap host-Gitea, or an off-cluster mirror) and a
            cutover once Gitea runs on prod — the same sequence `docs/05` describes for dev's own
            Phase-6 cutover.
- [ ] Confirm prod's backup target: dev's S3 (`versitygw` on the Proxmox host, `192.168.1.9`) is on
      the dev side of the network. Off-cluster backup is DR-critical (R-STATE-03).

## 8. Build sequence (operator decision, 2026-08-31: **wait for all three nodes**)

Node 1 is baselined now; the cluster is **not** initialized until nodes 2 and 3 are on the bench.
This keeps prod spec-conformant (3-node HA embedded etcd) from its first boot, avoids a
single-server-etcd window, and avoids a later member-add dance.

1. Per-node §1–§5 on each of the three boxes.
2. §7 repo work lands on `main` with the gate green.
3. `node-baseline` → `k3s` (all three) → `kube-vip` → `cilium`.
4. `flux bootstrap ... --path=clusters/prod`.
5. Conformance against prod (§9).

## 9. Exit criteria (Phase 7)

- [ ] Prod runs the same config as dev via the prod overlay, **no base edits** (R-ENV-02).
- [ ] Node destroy/rebuild from IaC + Ansible without data loss (R-ENV-01, R-STATE-01).
- [ ] Full **automated** prod DR drill (R-STATE-03) — `definition-of-done.md` requires this for prod
      specifically.
- [ ] Monitoring and alerts live on prod.
- [ ] The conformance suite passes green **against the prod cluster**, not just dev (R-TEST-03).