jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
f163026954
Extends the SSO work to the two remaining `auth: oidc` apps still on local-admin
logins, each as a native confidential client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm with
its local admin kept as break-glass (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `nextcloud` and `semaphore` confidential clients
to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana/gitea) + their
NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET / SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET placeholders. As before, a
KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so both live clients were
ALSO created via kcadm (nextcloud e95049ed-ca10-4085-97d9-4bbef495fe61, semaphore
1835bfe9-b125-4026-8f69-33557519cf4a); the YAML keeps git authoritative.
Secrets (SOPS/age): add nextcloud-client-secret + semaphore-client-secret to
keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns). Mirror the nextcloud secret as
oidc-client-secret into nextcloud-bootstrap (nextcloud ns). For semaphore, the
whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON (which embeds the client secret) is held
encrypted as oidc-providers-json in semaphore-bootstrap (semaphore ns). All values
verified == the live clients; existing keys untouched; no plaintext in git.
App config (catalog source + re-render):
- nextcloud: add NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env + an idempotent postStart hook
that installs/enables user_oidc and runs `occ user_oidc:provider keycloak`
(create-or-update; secret via --clientsecret-env so it never hits argv; occ as
www-data; group provisioning on the `groups` claim). Syntax verified against the
running user_oidc 8.11.0 on Nextcloud 31.0.14; su-to-www-data env passthrough
verified. Missing-secret/not-installed guards prevent crashloops.
- semaphore: add SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env sourced from the encrypted
oidc-providers-json (provider_url=realm issuer/auto-discovery, redirect
/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect). Mechanism verified against semaphore v2.19.10
source (util ConfigType oidc_providers env tag + OidcProvider struct + router
redirect path); no kubelet service-link env collision.
apps/wave-1/{nextcloud,semaphore}.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation` (diffs are env/lifecycle-only).
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; live
homelab clients now include gitea/nextcloud/semaphore; static gate (lint/l0/l1)
green. Browser SSO login for each still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
platform/
Cluster-wide platform services, Flux-managed (R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01/02/03). Reconciled
by the platform Flux Kustomization defined in clusters/base/platform.yaml,
before apps/.
Governing spec: docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md,
docs/01-architecture-overview.md.
Phase 0 scaffolding only. Every component here is a structurally-correct stub — a Flux HelmRelease and/or Kustomization with a values placeholder, a README citing the governing ADR/spec, and TODOs for the phase that fills it in. No cluster exists; nothing reconciles yet. Do not add working config, secrets, or provisioning under Phase 0 (spec
AGENTS.md§1/§5/§6,roadmap/phases.md).
Reconciliation flow (how a change lands)
git (source of truth)
│ operator PR → CI (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · Chainsaw) → merge to tracked branch
▼
Flux GitRepository (clusters/base/flux-system.yaml)
▼
Flux Kustomization "platform" → ./platform (this dir) ── substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┐
│ prune=true (drift correction, R-GITOPS-03) · wait=true │ R-ENV-02
▼ │
Flux Kustomization "apps" → ./apps (dependsOn platform) ─ substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┘
Git is authoritative; the cluster conforms to git and drift is auto-corrected (R-GITOPS-01/03).
Manual kubectl apply of platform state is prohibited (spec AGENTS.md §5).
The dev ↔ prod overlay model (R-ENV-02)
Platform manifests are authored once. Every value that legitimately differs between environments
is a ${TOKEN} resolved from the cluster-vars ConfigMap via Flux postBuild.substituteFrom. The
clusters/dev and clusters/prod overlays differ only by the values they patch into
cluster-vars (issuer, replica counts, storage sizes, retention). See
clusters/README.md. Base manifests are never forked per environment.
Components (one directory each)
| Dir | Component | Governing ADR / spec | Serves |
|---|---|---|---|
cilium/ |
CNI + kube-proxy replacement + Gateway API + Egress Gateway + Hubble | ADR-0002, docs/03 | R-NET-* |
longhorn/ |
Replicated block storage; 3-replica default StorageClass + bulk tier | ADR-0003, docs/04 | R-STATE-* |
cert-manager/ |
TLS via Let's Encrypt DNS-01 (Cloudflare); staging + prod ClusterIssuers | ADR-0006, docs/08 | R-TLS-* |
externaldns/ |
Automatic DNS records for public services (Cloudflare) | docs/09 | R-DNS-* |
gateway/ |
Gateway API GatewayClass + shared HTTPS Gateway + wildcard cert | ADR-0002/ADR-0006, docs/09 | R-DNS-01, R-TLS-01 |
monitoring/ |
kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Grafana Alloy + Alertmanager | docs/10 | R-OBS-* |
velero/ |
Off-cluster backup/DR of volumes + resource state | ADR-0003, docs/04 | R-STATE-03 |
kubevirt/ |
KubeVirt + CDI (IaaS: application VMs on the same K8s surface) | ADR-0005, docs/06 | R-PLAT-03 |
image-automation/ |
Flux image-update-automation (hands-off image tag advance) | ADR-0009, docs/11 | R-UPD-02 |
keycloak/ |
Platform IdP (OIDC + SAML), config-as-code, PostgreSQL on Longhorn | ADR-0014, docs/15 | R-IDP-* |
oauth2-proxy/ |
Forward-auth at the Gateway for non-OIDC apps → Keycloak | ADR-0014, docs/15 | R-IDP-* |
kyverno/ |
L0 policy-as-code gate — OWNED BY THE POLICY ENGINEER (WS-TEST). | ADR-0011, docs/14 | R-TEST-* |
⚠️ INTEGRATION TODO(PM): wire kyverno into the platform kustomization
platform/kyverno/ is authored by a different agent (the policy engineer, WS-TEST). This
workstream did not create any files under platform/kyverno/ and must not.
platform/kustomization.yaml intentionally omits - kyverno. Once the
policy engineer's files land, the PM must add - kyverno to that list (recommended first, so
policies are present before other components reconcile). The line is present as a commented TODO in
the kustomization.
Secrets
Every secret referenced below (Cloudflare API token, Velero backup-target creds, Keycloak admin/DB, oauth2-proxy cookie/client secrets) is referenced by name only and will be committed SOPS-encrypted (WS-SEC, ADR-0007). No plaintext secret appears anywhere in this tree.
Cross-workstream contracts surfaced by these stubs
- cilium (WS-NET ↔ WS-INFRA): Cilium's initial CNI install is done by Ansible at cluster bootstrap (docs/02, Phase 1). The HelmRelease here manages Cilium config thereafter; its Helm values MUST match the Ansible bootstrap values (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port, API server host) or reconciliation will fight the bootstrap. Contract owner: WS-NET + WS-INFRA.
- gateway + cert-manager + externaldns (WS-NET + WS-SEC): the shared Gateway listener, the
wildcard
*.home.keithjackson.devcert, and the ExternalDNS source all reference each other; they form the "Issuer + Gateway TLS" interface inroadmap/workstreams.md. - image-automation (WS-UPDATE): this dir holds only the cluster-wide ImageUpdateAutomation +
git write-back. Per-service
ImageRepository/ImagePolicyare rendered from each ServiceDefinition'supdateblock (WS-GITOPS/WS-UPDATE), living withapps/. - keycloak/oauth2-proxy (WS-SEC): the SSO/auth contract (
authblock → Keycloak client / oauth2-proxy protection) is owned by WS-SEC; these are placeholders pending that contract.