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home-network-k3s-impl/runbooks/cnpg-wal-growth.md
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 44983095e1 feat(runbooks): make the 42 alert runbook_url annotations resolve
Every platform-health alert rule carries
`runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34
distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml,
platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and
platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute
serving that path: an in-cluster probe of
https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that
reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read,
and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism
class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets.

No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is
made to resolve instead.

WHAT LANDS
- runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and,
  where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O
  starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four
  mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of
  concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface
  cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG
  38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the
  2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12
  clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero
  R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap
  re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator.
  Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely
  causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop.
- Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the
  kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so
  `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and
  27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss.
- Every page states that kubectl only works via
  `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`,
  because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev.
- Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no
  Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules
  evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health.

SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml
A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at
the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier
(dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file.
- The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound
  to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is
  no path field.
- Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is
  broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these
  runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier,
  so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules.
- configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md),
  so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as
  text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not
  load anyway.
- The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over
  the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01
  emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the
  https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting.

AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately
auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make
runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and
runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode.
An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational
procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute
so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth
enforcement lands.

PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod
  /runbooks/node-down        HTTP 200   8613 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/keycloak-down    HTTP 200   9378 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/cnpg-archiving   HTTP 200  11729 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200   9135 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/vpn-down         HTTP 200  11092 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/backup-failure   HTTP 200   9604 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the
`/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence.

GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04)
363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both
directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook
committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still
404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look
fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations.
Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the
generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 23:49:58 -05:00

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8.9 KiB
Markdown

# cnpg-wal-growth — pg_wal is not being recycled
**Alert:** `CNPGWALVolumeNotRecycling` (warning, 2h)
**File:** `platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml`, group `platform-health.cnpg`
**Expression:**
```
max by (namespace, pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value="count"})
> max by (namespace, pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value="max"})
```
## What this means here
`pg_wal` is holding more WAL segments than `max_wal_size` allows for, which means **checkpoints are no
longer reclaiming space**. On CNPG the units are **segments of 16 MiB**: `max` is `max_wal_size`
(**64 = 1 GiB** on this platform) and `count` is what is currently sitting in `pg_wal`.
This is the **storage escalation** of `/runbooks/cnpg-archiving`, not an independent fault.
`CNPGWALArchiveBacklog` is the day-one signal — it fires within an hour of the archiver getting stuck.
This one fires when the resulting backlog has grown large enough to be a *disk* problem. With
`archive_mode=on` a failing `archive_command` is exactly what this looks like after a while, and because
**`pg_wal` shares the data PVC on every Cluster here** (no `walStorage:` is configured on any of them)
it ends in the volume filling and the postmaster **PANICking**.
It does **not** fire today and is not meant to: measured, prod `keycloak-db` holds 17 segments against
max 64 (dev held 36 against 64), and across all nine prod instances counts ran 16-37 against 64. At
prod's observed ~6.8 MiB/h, `keycloak-db` would reach 64 segments roughly **40 days before** its 5 GiB
PVC actually ran out — so this alert leads the PVC-fill alerts by weeks.
**Why `pod` is kept here, and is required.** Every instance reports its own `count` and `max`, `pg_wal`
is per-instance on a per-instance PVC, and the comparison only means anything pod-against-itself —
aggregating `pod` away would compare one instance's `count` with another's `max`. A `>` shape is also
safe per-pod: no instance can sit permanently true. (Contrast the `== 0` and staleness rules in the same
file, which **must** aggregate `pod` away — that is the 2026-09-12 fix.)
**One metric that looks right and is not:** the CNPG-native
`cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value="volume_size"}` is **NaN on both clusters**, precisely because `pg_wal`
shares the data PVC rather than having its own. Do not build anything on it.
## Running the commands in this runbook
`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's `k3s-oidc` context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
defaults its current-context to k3s-**dev**, so a command without `--context` silently answers
about the wrong cluster. (`CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ...` is equivalent.)
Do not run two `dev.sh` invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind `Backup`:
`longhorn.io/v1beta2`, `postgresql.cnpg.io/v1` and `velero.io/v1`. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so `kubectl get backup -A` prints **"No resources found"** on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
`backups.velero.io`, `backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`,
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
## First commands
Which instance, and how far past `max_wal_size`:
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=max by (namespace,pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value=\"count\"})" localhost:19090/api/v1/query | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E "pod|\"1\""'
```
The same thing from inside the instance, which also shows you the archive backlog and the free space in
one view:
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak exec keycloak-db-2 -c postgres -- bash -c \
"du -sh /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal; \
ls /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal | grep -c \"^0\"; \
ls /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal/archive_status | grep -c ready; \
df -h /var/lib/postgresql/data; \
psql -tAc \"show max_wal_size; show archive_mode; select pg_walfile_name(pg_current_wal_lsn());\""'
```
Is archiving the cause? (It almost always is.)
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -A \
-o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,ARCHIVING:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"ContinuousArchiving\"\)].status,FIRSTPITR:.status.firstRecoverabilityPoint; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak logs keycloak-db-2 -c postgres --tail=200 2>&1 | grep -i archive | tail -20'
```
Is a replication slot or a stale standby holding WAL instead?
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak exec keycloak-db-2 -c postgres -- \
psql -x -c "select slot_name, active, wal_status, safe_wal_size, restart_lsn from pg_replication_slots;" \
-c "select application_name, state, sync_state, replay_lag from pg_stat_replication;"'
```
Compute the runway — free bytes on the PVC divided by the observed growth rate:
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=predict_linear(kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes{job=\"kubelet\",namespace=\"keycloak\"}[24h], 7*24*3600)" localhost:19090/api/v1/query'
```
## Likely causes, most likely first
### 1. WAL archiving is failing (dominant cause)
Go to `/runbooks/cnpg-archiving` — that is the actual fix. Fix the `archive_command` and Postgres recycles
the backlog on its own, without any intervention in `pg_wal`. Historical precedent: prod ran 38+ hours
from bootstrap with `endpointURL: TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT`, all three Clusters at
`ContinuousArchiving=False` with `barman-cloud-wal-archive: exit status 4`.
### 2. An inactive replication slot is pinning WAL
A standby that has been gone long enough leaves a slot holding `restart_lsn`, and Postgres keeps every
segment after it. `pg_replication_slots.wal_status` will read `extended` or `lost`. The healthy fix is to
bring the standby back (CNPG manages the slots), not to drop the slot by hand. Note
`podAntiAffinityType: required` means a lost instance stays **Pending** until a node returns — expected,
and accepted.
### 3. Genuinely heavy write load
Then `count` exceeding `max_wal_size` is checkpointing lagging, not a leak, and it self-corrects. Confirm
that `archive_status/*.ready` is near zero: a large `pg_wal` with an empty ready queue is a busy
database, not a stuck archiver.
### 4. `max_wal_size` was lowered
64 segments = 1 GiB is the configured value on both clusters. A reduction makes this rule fire without
anything actually being wrong. Check the Cluster's postgresql parameters — and note that under
`primaryUpdateMethod: switchover` the operator **rejects an update that changes `imageName` and a
postgresql parameter in the same reconcile**.
### 5. The instance is a replica that fell behind
Replay lag holds WAL on the primary. `pg_stat_replication.replay_lag` shows it.
## When to escalate or stop
- **NEVER delete WAL segments or `archive_status` marker files by hand.** It destroys the database. This
is the single irreversible mistake available here, and the alert's own description says so: *"Fix
archiving — do NOT delete WAL by hand."*
- **Do not drop a replication slot** to free space without the operator: you may make a lagging standby
unrecoverable and force a full re-seed.
- **Do not expand the PVC and stop there.** It buys days and hides the fault.
- **Do not scale the Cluster out** while archiving is failing — that **multiplies** the disk-full clock.
- Escalate when the computed runway is under a week, or when `PersistentVolumeAlmostFull`
(`/runbooks/pvc-capacity`) is also firing for the same PVC — at that point an outage is imminent and a
Postgres data volume under 5% free will PANIC the postmaster.
---
Source of truth: `runbooks/cnpg-wal-growth.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
Records: `platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml` (the measured segment counts, the NaN `volume_size` finding, and the
2026-09-12 scope audit that deliberately KEPT `pod` here).