Every platform-health alert rule carries `runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34 distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute serving that path: an in-cluster probe of https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read, and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets. No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is made to resolve instead. WHAT LANDS - runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and, where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG 38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the 2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12 clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator. Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop. - Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and 27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss. - Every page states that kubectl only works via `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`, because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. - Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health. SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file. - The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is no path field. - Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier, so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules. - configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md), so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not load anyway. - The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01 emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting. AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode. An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands. PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod /runbooks/node-down HTTP 200 8613 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/keycloak-down HTTP 200 9378 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/cnpg-archiving HTTP 200 11729 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200 9135 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/vpn-down HTTP 200 11092 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/backup-failure HTTP 200 9604 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the `/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence. GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04) 363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still 404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations. Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
158 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
158 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
# cnpg-wal-growth — pg_wal is not being recycled
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**Alert:** `CNPGWALVolumeNotRecycling` (warning, 2h)
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**File:** `platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml`, group `platform-health.cnpg`
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**Expression:**
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```
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max by (namespace, pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value="count"})
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> max by (namespace, pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value="max"})
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```
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## What this means here
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`pg_wal` is holding more WAL segments than `max_wal_size` allows for, which means **checkpoints are no
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longer reclaiming space**. On CNPG the units are **segments of 16 MiB**: `max` is `max_wal_size`
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(**64 = 1 GiB** on this platform) and `count` is what is currently sitting in `pg_wal`.
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This is the **storage escalation** of `/runbooks/cnpg-archiving`, not an independent fault.
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`CNPGWALArchiveBacklog` is the day-one signal — it fires within an hour of the archiver getting stuck.
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This one fires when the resulting backlog has grown large enough to be a *disk* problem. With
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`archive_mode=on` a failing `archive_command` is exactly what this looks like after a while, and because
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**`pg_wal` shares the data PVC on every Cluster here** (no `walStorage:` is configured on any of them)
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it ends in the volume filling and the postmaster **PANICking**.
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It does **not** fire today and is not meant to: measured, prod `keycloak-db` holds 17 segments against
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max 64 (dev held 36 against 64), and across all nine prod instances counts ran 16-37 against 64. At
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prod's observed ~6.8 MiB/h, `keycloak-db` would reach 64 segments roughly **40 days before** its 5 GiB
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PVC actually ran out — so this alert leads the PVC-fill alerts by weeks.
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**Why `pod` is kept here, and is required.** Every instance reports its own `count` and `max`, `pg_wal`
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is per-instance on a per-instance PVC, and the comparison only means anything pod-against-itself —
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aggregating `pod` away would compare one instance's `count` with another's `max`. A `>` shape is also
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safe per-pod: no instance can sit permanently true. (Contrast the `== 0` and staleness rules in the same
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file, which **must** aggregate `pod` away — that is the 2026-09-12 fix.)
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**One metric that looks right and is not:** the CNPG-native
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`cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value="volume_size"}` is **NaN on both clusters**, precisely because `pg_wal`
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shares the data PVC rather than having its own. Do not build anything on it.
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## Running the commands in this runbook
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`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
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container, and the host's `k3s-oidc` context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
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that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
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Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
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defaults its current-context to k3s-**dev**, so a command without `--context` silently answers
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about the wrong cluster. (`CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ...` is equivalent.)
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Do not run two `dev.sh` invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.
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USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind `Backup`:
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`longhorn.io/v1beta2`, `postgresql.cnpg.io/v1` and `velero.io/v1`. The bare short name resolves to
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Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so `kubectl get backup -A` prints **"No resources found"** on
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a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
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"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
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`backups.velero.io`, `backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`,
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`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
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Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
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agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
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Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
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## First commands
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Which instance, and how far past `max_wal_size`:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
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curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=max by (namespace,pod) (cnpg_collector_pg_wal{value=\"count\"})" localhost:19090/api/v1/query | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E "pod|\"1\""'
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```
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The same thing from inside the instance, which also shows you the archive backlog and the free space in
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one view:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak exec keycloak-db-2 -c postgres -- bash -c \
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"du -sh /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal; \
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ls /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal | grep -c \"^0\"; \
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ls /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal/archive_status | grep -c ready; \
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df -h /var/lib/postgresql/data; \
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psql -tAc \"show max_wal_size; show archive_mode; select pg_walfile_name(pg_current_wal_lsn());\""'
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```
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Is archiving the cause? (It almost always is.)
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -A \
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-o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,ARCHIVING:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"ContinuousArchiving\"\)].status,FIRSTPITR:.status.firstRecoverabilityPoint; echo; \
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kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak logs keycloak-db-2 -c postgres --tail=200 2>&1 | grep -i archive | tail -20'
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```
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Is a replication slot or a stale standby holding WAL instead?
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak exec keycloak-db-2 -c postgres -- \
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psql -x -c "select slot_name, active, wal_status, safe_wal_size, restart_lsn from pg_replication_slots;" \
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-c "select application_name, state, sync_state, replay_lag from pg_stat_replication;"'
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```
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Compute the runway — free bytes on the PVC divided by the observed growth rate:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
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curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=predict_linear(kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes{job=\"kubelet\",namespace=\"keycloak\"}[24h], 7*24*3600)" localhost:19090/api/v1/query'
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```
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## Likely causes, most likely first
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### 1. WAL archiving is failing (dominant cause)
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Go to `/runbooks/cnpg-archiving` — that is the actual fix. Fix the `archive_command` and Postgres recycles
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the backlog on its own, without any intervention in `pg_wal`. Historical precedent: prod ran 38+ hours
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from bootstrap with `endpointURL: TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT`, all three Clusters at
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`ContinuousArchiving=False` with `barman-cloud-wal-archive: exit status 4`.
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### 2. An inactive replication slot is pinning WAL
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A standby that has been gone long enough leaves a slot holding `restart_lsn`, and Postgres keeps every
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segment after it. `pg_replication_slots.wal_status` will read `extended` or `lost`. The healthy fix is to
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bring the standby back (CNPG manages the slots), not to drop the slot by hand. Note
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`podAntiAffinityType: required` means a lost instance stays **Pending** until a node returns — expected,
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and accepted.
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### 3. Genuinely heavy write load
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Then `count` exceeding `max_wal_size` is checkpointing lagging, not a leak, and it self-corrects. Confirm
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that `archive_status/*.ready` is near zero: a large `pg_wal` with an empty ready queue is a busy
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database, not a stuck archiver.
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### 4. `max_wal_size` was lowered
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64 segments = 1 GiB is the configured value on both clusters. A reduction makes this rule fire without
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anything actually being wrong. Check the Cluster's postgresql parameters — and note that under
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`primaryUpdateMethod: switchover` the operator **rejects an update that changes `imageName` and a
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postgresql parameter in the same reconcile**.
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### 5. The instance is a replica that fell behind
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Replay lag holds WAL on the primary. `pg_stat_replication.replay_lag` shows it.
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## When to escalate or stop
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- **NEVER delete WAL segments or `archive_status` marker files by hand.** It destroys the database. This
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is the single irreversible mistake available here, and the alert's own description says so: *"Fix
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archiving — do NOT delete WAL by hand."*
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- **Do not drop a replication slot** to free space without the operator: you may make a lagging standby
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unrecoverable and force a full re-seed.
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- **Do not expand the PVC and stop there.** It buys days and hides the fault.
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- **Do not scale the Cluster out** while archiving is failing — that **multiplies** the disk-full clock.
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- Escalate when the computed runway is under a week, or when `PersistentVolumeAlmostFull`
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(`/runbooks/pvc-capacity`) is also firing for the same PVC — at that point an outage is imminent and a
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Postgres data volume under 5% free will PANIC the postmaster.
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---
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Source of truth: `runbooks/cnpg-wal-growth.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
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Records: `platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml` (the measured segment counts, the NaN `volume_size` finding, and the
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2026-09-12 scope audit that deliberately KEPT `pod` here).
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