Every platform-health alert rule carries `runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34 distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute serving that path: an in-cluster probe of https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read, and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets. No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is made to resolve instead. WHAT LANDS - runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and, where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG 38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the 2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12 clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator. Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop. - Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and 27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss. - Every page states that kubectl only works via `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`, because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. - Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health. SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file. - The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is no path field. - Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier, so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules. - configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md), so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not load anyway. - The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01 emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting. AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode. An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands. PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod /runbooks/node-down HTTP 200 8613 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/keycloak-down HTTP 200 9378 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/cnpg-archiving HTTP 200 11729 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200 9135 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/vpn-down HTTP 200 11092 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/backup-failure HTTP 200 9604 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the `/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence. GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04) 363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still 404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations. Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
161 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
161 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
# longhorn-faulted — A Longhorn volume is FAULTED (data at risk, volume offline)
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**Alert:** `LonghornVolumeFaulted` (critical, 1m)
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**File:** `platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml`, group `platform-health.longhorn`
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**Expression:** `longhorn_volume_robustness == 3`
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## What this means here
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Faulted means Longhorn has **no usable replica**. The volume is offline; the workload's writes are
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failing. This is the most serious storage state on the cluster and the `for: 1m` is deliberate — there
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is no benign transient version of this.
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Understand what is and is not recoverable before you touch anything:
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- The volumes on this cluster are 3-replica with **hard** node anti-affinity, so faulted normally
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means two or three replicas are gone at once — two nodes lost, or one node lost while another
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volume's rebuild had not finished, or a disk that ate its replica.
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- **Standbys and replicas are not backups.** Recorded verbatim for the databases and true for all of
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this: *"Standbys replicate corruption and deletions faithfully; only the Barman archive is a
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backup."* For a CNPG volume (`keycloak-db`, `nextcloud-db`, `semaphore-db`) the real recovery path
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is the object-store archive, not Longhorn. For everything else it is Velero.
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- If this is a **`longhorn-vm`** volume (RWX Block, `migratable: true`) the VM is down, not just the
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disk. If it is **`longhorn-scratch`** (single replica, CDI scratch space) losing it is expected and
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harmless — re-run the import.
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### Verify the alert can even fire (measured 2026-09-13)
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Prometheus on prod scrapes 19 jobs: `apiserver`, `cdi-prometheus-metrics`, `coredns`,
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`keycloak-discovery`, `keycloak-service`, `keycloak/keycloak-db`, `kube-prometheus-stack-alertmanager`,
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`kube-prometheus-stack-grafana`, `kube-prometheus-stack-operator`, `kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus`,
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`kube-state-metrics`, `kubelet`, `kubevirt-prometheus-metrics`, `nextcloud-db/nextcloud-db`,
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`node-exporter`, `oauth2-proxy`, `semaphore-db/semaphore-db`, `velero`, `velero/node-agent`.
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There is **no** Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble/Cilium job. Check the series this
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rule depends on before you trust its silence:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & \
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sleep 5; curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=count by (job) (up)" localhost:19090/api/v1/query'
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```
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**This alert is currently INERT.** `count(longhorn_volume_robustness)` returned **0 series** on prod
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on 2026-09-13 — Longhorn ships no ServiceMonitor here, so the whole `platform-health.longhorn` group
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has no data. A faulted volume today announces itself as an application outage. That is a known open
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defect; treat `volumes.longhorn.io` as the source of truth, not this alert's silence.
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## Running the commands in this runbook
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`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
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container, and the host's `k3s-oidc` context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
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that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
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Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
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defaults its current-context to k3s-**dev**, so a command without `--context` silently answers
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about the wrong cluster. (`CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ...` is equivalent.)
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Do not run two `dev.sh` invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.
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USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind `Backup`:
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`longhorn.io/v1beta2`, `postgresql.cnpg.io/v1` and `velero.io/v1`. The bare short name resolves to
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Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so `kubectl get backup -A` prints **"No resources found"** on
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a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
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"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
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`backups.velero.io`, `backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`,
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`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
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Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
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agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
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Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
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## First commands
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Stop and take inventory before changing anything. Which volume, which workload, which replicas exist:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io \
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-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROBUST:.status.robustness,STATE:.status.state,NODE:.status.currentNodeID | grep -Ev "healthy"'
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```
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get replicas.longhorn.io \
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-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,VOL:.spec.volumeName,NODE:.spec.nodeID,STATE:.status.currentState,FAILED:.spec.failedAt | sort -k2'
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```
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pv -o custom-columns=PV:.metadata.name,CLAIM:.spec.claimRef.namespace/.spec.claimRef.name,SC:.spec.storageClassName | grep <volume-name>'
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```
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What recovery material exists — **fully-qualified names, or you will be told there is nothing**:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod get backups.velero.io -A; echo; \
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kubectl --context k3s-prod get backups.postgresql.cnpg.io -A; echo; \
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kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get backups.longhorn.io'
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```
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`kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on this cluster even when six Velero and 27 CNPG
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backups exist. Never make a recovery decision from the short name.
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Node and disk state:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes; kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get nodes.longhorn.io -o wide'
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```
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## Likely causes, most likely first
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### 1. Two nodes were unavailable at once
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Usually a second reboot or cordon while the first node's rebuilds were still running. Remediation:
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bring the nodes back. Longhorn will reattach if the replica data survived on disk — which is why you
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must not delete replicas before checking.
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### 2. A disk failed and took its replica with it
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`k3s-prod-1`'s original 2011 SSD had 61,440 reallocated sectors before it was replaced; the dev-era
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Seagate had 448 current-pending plus 448 offline-uncorrectable. Check SMART on the node holding the
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failed replica (`/runbooks/node-io` has the command). If the disk is bad, the replica is gone — the
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path forward is restore, not repair.
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### 3. All replicas were evicted or deleted
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Check whether a disk was disabled, a node removed from Longhorn, or a `replicas.longhorn.io` object
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deleted. `staleReplicaTimeout: 30` (minutes) means Longhorn eventually discards replicas it considers
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stale.
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### 4. It is a single-replica volume by design
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`longhorn-scratch` is `numberOfReplicas: 1`. Losing it is not an incident — delete the DataVolume and
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re-import.
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## Remediation, in order
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1. **Do not delete the volume, the PVC, or any replica.** A faulted volume with a stale replica is
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recoverable; a deleted one is not.
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2. If a node is down, restore the node (`/runbooks/node-down`). That is the highest-probability fix.
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3. If Longhorn shows a replica with data but marked failed, an operator can salvage it from the
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Longhorn UI (*Volume → Salvage*) — this is the documented path for "all replicas failed but the
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data is still there".
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4. If the volume backs a **CNPG database**, do not try to salvage Postgres files. Recover the Cluster
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from the Barman archive (`/runbooks/cnpg-archiving` for how to confirm the archive is real first).
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5. Otherwise restore from Velero. Note honestly: `dr-restore` is **authored and has never been
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executed** (`conformance.home.k3s/never-executed`), and the R2 restore path has not been rehearsed.
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Expect to be the first person to run it, and read `/runbooks/backup-failure` for the R2 plugin
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caveats before you rely on a backup's metadata.
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## When to escalate or stop
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- **Get the operator now.** This is a critical, data-at-risk alert; it is not a runbook-and-carry-on
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situation. Everything above is diagnosis, and steps 3–5 are operator actions.
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- **Stop before any destructive command.** Specifically: no `delete pvc`, no `delete
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volumes.longhorn.io`, no `delete replicas.longhorn.io`, no touching files under `/data/longhorn`.
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- **Do not reboot anything** while a volume is faulted.
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- If the affected volume is `keycloak-db`, expect a full SSO outage as a knock-on: kubectl OIDC,
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Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth all depend on it. The certificate-based kubeconfig is an
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independent break-glass path and still works.
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---
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Source of truth: `runbooks/longhorn-faulted.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
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Records: `DECISIONS-LOG.md` (drive failures 2026-08-22 and 2026-09-07; `dr-restore` never executed).
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