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home-network-k3s-impl/runbooks/node-cpu.md
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 44983095e1 feat(runbooks): make the 42 alert runbook_url annotations resolve
Every platform-health alert rule carries
`runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34
distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml,
platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and
platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute
serving that path: an in-cluster probe of
https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that
reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read,
and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism
class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets.

No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is
made to resolve instead.

WHAT LANDS
- runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and,
  where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O
  starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four
  mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of
  concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface
  cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG
  38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the
  2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12
  clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero
  R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap
  re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator.
  Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely
  causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop.
- Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the
  kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so
  `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and
  27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss.
- Every page states that kubectl only works via
  `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`,
  because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev.
- Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no
  Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules
  evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health.

SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml
A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at
the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier
(dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file.
- The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound
  to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is
  no path field.
- Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is
  broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these
  runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier,
  so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules.
- configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md),
  so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as
  text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not
  load anyway.
- The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over
  the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01
  emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the
  https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting.

AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately
auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make
runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and
runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode.
An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational
procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute
so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth
enforcement lands.

PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod
  /runbooks/node-down        HTTP 200   8613 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/keycloak-down    HTTP 200   9378 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/cnpg-archiving   HTTP 200  11729 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200   9135 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/vpn-down         HTTP 200  11092 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/backup-failure   HTTP 200   9604 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the
`/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence.

GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04)
363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both
directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook
committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still
404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look
fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations.
Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the
generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 23:49:58 -05:00

6.0 KiB
Raw Blame History

node-cpu — CPU pressure or run-queue depth high on a node

Alerts: NodeCPUPressureHigh (warning, 15m) and NodeCPULoadHigh (warning, 15m) File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.nodes Expressions: rate(node_pressure_cpu_waiting_seconds_total[5m]) > 0.15 node_load5 / count without (cpu, mode) (node_cpu_seconds_total{mode="idle"}) > 1

What this means here

NodeCPUPressureHigh is PSI "some" for CPU: the fraction of wall-clock time during which at least one task was stalled waiting for a CPU. Under 5% is healthy. Averaged CPU% — what kubectl top shows — hides this entirely, which is why the alert uses PSI: it is the metric that surfaces the "spikes cause blips of delay" symptom operators actually notice.

NodeCPULoadHigh is 5-minute load average divided by core count. Sustained above 1 means the run queue is longer than the number of CPUs.

Read them together. CPU-PSI high and load high = genuine CPU contention. Load high and CPU-PSI normal = the queue is full of tasks blocked on I/O, not CPU — go to /runbooks/node-io, which on this cluster is the more dangerous of the two (etcd WAL and Longhorn replicas share one partition).

Measured history: steady CPU PSI ran 15–23% with load at or above core count, which is what drove the node resize from 6 to 8 vCPU; afterwards PSI measured ~4.5–7.7%. So 0.15 is not an arbitrary threshold, it is the level the cluster actually lived at before the resize.

Running the commands in this runbook

kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires — that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'

Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.) Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.

USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup: longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as "the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io, settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.

Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy). Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.

First commands

Distinguish CPU contention from I/O contention — do this first:

ssh k3s-prod-1 'cat /proc/pressure/cpu; echo; cat /proc/pressure/io; echo; uptime; nproc'

Who is burning it:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod top nodes; echo; kubectl --context k3s-prod top pods -A --sort-by=cpu | head -20'
ssh k3s-prod-1 'top -b -n1 | head -20'

Are there VMs, and are any of them emulated (the worst case)?

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod get vmi -A -o wide'
ssh k3s-prod-1 'grep -c -E "vmx|svm" /proc/cpuinfo; ls -l /dev/kvm'

Likely causes, most likely first

1. It is actually I/O, not CPU

Most common misread. A node blocked on disk has a long run queue and normal CPU-PSI. Confirm with /proc/pressure/io and go to /runbooks/node-io. On 2026-09-07 the node that died had I/O-PSI full at 11.36 while CPU looked unremarkable.

2. A KubeVirt VM running under TCG emulation

useEmulation: true silently forces TCG on KubeVirt v1.9 — it is set to false on purpose. A VM that lost /dev/kvm or was authored with emulation burns a whole core per vCPU. Heavy sustained TCG load has also degraded the Cilium datapath into intermittent LB-VIP unreachability (cleared by a restart), so an "intermittent networking" report alongside this alert is probably one cause, not two. Check grep -c -E "vmx|svm" /proc/cpuinfo (nested KVM is verified working; Proxmox nodes use cpu_type=host).

3. A Longhorn rebuild's checksumming

Rebuilds are I/O-heavy but not free on CPU. Same remediation as /runbooks/longhorn-degraded: freeze with concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit 0, thaw to 1.

4. Prometheus rule evaluation or a Loki query

PersistentVolumeFillingUpPredicted runs predict_linear over a 24h window across every PVC; a Grafana panel doing the same interactively is heavier still. Bursty, self-limiting, usually harmless.

5. Genuine capacity

If nothing is anomalous the node is simply undersized again. The 6 → 8 vCPU resize is the precedent. A bpg cores change reboots the VM, so roll one node at a time, waiting for Longhorn robustness=healthy between each.

When to escalate or stop

  • If I/O-PSI is also elevated, stop treating this as a CPU problem and switch to /runbooks/node-io. Wrong runbook is the main risk here.
  • Alone and steady, this alert is a capacity signal — schedule it, do not page on it. That is why it is a warning with a 15m for.
  • Do not drain or cordon to shed CPU load; this cluster does not drain.
  • Escalate to the operator for a vCPU change (it reboots the node) or to kill a VM you did not create.

Source of truth: runbooks/node-cpu.md. Index: /runbooks/ Records: DECISIONS-LOG.md (node vCPU 6→8 and the post-resize PSI measurements; KubeVirt useEmulation finding).