jakman85
5ea9c93f58
Operator asked for the default BIOS password. ANSWER: there is none, and no factory default exists to look up. HP business desktops ship with no Setup and no Power-On password; the is_enabled=0 we measured IS the factory state. Recovery for a forgotten password is the PSWD jumper — and 'stringent security' must NOT be enabled, since HP documents that it removes the physical bypass and turns a 5-minute fix into a signed per-serial HP service case. CORRECTION, and the kernel driver misled me: I recorded that the firmware refused our write for lack of BIOS-admin authentication. Wrong. hp-bioscfg passes the return of HP's WMI SetBIOSSetting through hp_wmi_error_and_message(), which is THE ERROR TABLE FOR A DIFFERENT INTERFACE (the "SECU" commands under HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID). Per HP's Client Management Interface white paper, SetBIOSSetting 4 = 'Failed' (generic) and 6 = 'Access Denied'. We got 4, not 6 — and the driver has a separate BIOS_ADMIN_NOT_SET = 0x38 -> -EPERM for the no-password case, which we also did not get. 'Invalid command type' is the driver looking 4 up in the wrong table: a genuine upstream bug worth reporting to platform-driver-x86. Most likely real cause (inferred, testable): with an empty password the driver emits an UNTAGGED empty UTF-16 string, while every HP-documented caller passes Password="<utf-16/>" even when blank — the driver only prepends that prefix for a non-empty string. Setting a password may fix writes, but by flipping onto the tagged code path, NOT because 0x4 meant unauthorised. Also verified from source: hp-bioscfg CANNOT set a password. current_password and new_password both funnel into store_password_instance(), which only strscpy's into driver RAM; new_password is write-only into a buffer nothing ever reads. Count corrected: 241 attributes exposed, 239 with a current_value, 215 non-empty. I had quoted 215 as the total; it was the non-empty subset. Recommendation recorded: land read-only drift detection now (zero risk, no new credential, and it already caught real drift); treat a Setup password as a deliberate experiment on node 3 only; hp-repsetup as fallback but it needs Secure Boot off or a self-signed module; skip Sure Admin/BCU at this scale. Serves: R-ENV-03, R-SEC-01. Task: T-7.1.
home-network-k3s-impl
Implementation of the home k3s + Longhorn platform. This repo holds the reconciled artifacts
(Flux config, Kustomize overlays, KubeVirt/Helm manifests, ServiceDefinitions, Kyverno policies,
Chainsaw conformance tests, CI). It is driven by — and subordinate to — the read-only
specification at ../home-network-k3s.
Rules (from the spec — non-negotiable)
- The spec is read-only. Never modify anything under
../home-network-k3s. Implement against it; escalate spec problems, don't edit them (specAGENTS.md§11, R-TEST-06). - Done = a green, reproducible, requirement-tagged conformance test — never "merged," never a
manual demo (spec
docs/14,agents/definition-of-done.md). - No work on
main. Every change is a feature branch merged intomain(specCONTRIBUTING.md). - No plaintext secrets — SOPS-encrypted only (spec
docs/07). - Phase discipline — only build what the active roadmap phase authorizes (spec
roadmap/phases.md).
Layout
infra/ node provisioning: OpenTofu (Proxmox VE) + cloud-init + Ansible, and the
pinned dev container that carries the whole toolchain
bootstrap/ one-time cluster bootstrap: Flux install, SOPS/age key, host Gitea
platform/ platform CONTROLLERS (Flux HelmReleases / operator bases): kyverno, cilium,
longhorn, external-snapshotter, cert-manager, externaldns, gateway, coredns,
vpn-egress, monitoring, cnpg, keycloak, oauth2-proxy, kubevirt
platform-config/ platform CONFIGS — the custom resources of the CRDs installed above
(ClusterIssuers, Gateway, Kyverno policies, KubeVirt/CDI CRs, Keycloak CRs).
Split out because CRs and the CRDs they use cannot apply in one pass.
apps/ application tier, reconciled as dependency-ordered WAVES:
wave-0/ wave-1/ wave-2/ rendered container apps (see DESIGN-waves.md)
vms/ KubeVirt VirtualMachines (non-gating tier)
catalog/ ServiceDefinition entries (the onboarding surface) + render.py
schemas/ ServiceDefinition JSON Schema + renderer contract
clusters/ Flux entrypoints + dev/ and prod/ overlays
conformance/ Chainsaw behavior/conformance suite + harness + coverage report
ci/ the gate as scripts (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · L1 render · decision)
.gitea/ Gitea Actions CI running that gate on an in-cluster runner
Status
Roadmap phases 0–6 are delivered and deployed on the dev cluster; Phase 7 (prod) is not
open — clusters/prod is a design-only overlay.
| Phase | Delivered |
|---|---|
| 0 Foundations | ServiceDefinition schema + renderer, Kyverno L0 gate, conformance harness, CI |
| 1 Cluster bring-up | 3-node k3s HA on Proxmox VE (192.168.1.50/.51/.52), Cilium, Flux, SOPS |
| 2 Platform core | Cilium · Longhorn · cert-manager (LE-prod wildcard) · ExternalDNS · Gateway API · split-horizon CoreDNS |
| 3 Egress / VPN | ADR-0015 node-level OpenVPN split-tunnel + Cilium egress-gateway steering + host kill-switch |
| 4 Observability | kube-prometheus-stack · Loki · Alloy · Alertmanager. Velero still blocked on OQ-BKP; image-automation authored but disabled |
| 5 IaaS | KubeVirt + CDI on real nested KVM; live-migratable RWX VM storage. The UniFi VM runs, but UniFi OS Server is not yet installed in the guest |
| 6 Identity + CI | Keycloak (Operator + CNPG) · oauth2-proxy forward-auth · Grafana OIDC · kubectl OIDC SSO with group→RBAC · in-cluster Gitea Actions merge gate |
Conformance: 36 / 51 requirements covered (70.6%), 15 gaps, 1 safety-critical gap
(R-STATE-02, Longhorn node-loss). Regenerate with ./conformance/run.sh --coverage-only;
the full report is conformance/_artifacts/coverage/coverage.md.
The running narrative — decisions, root causes, incidents, follow-ups — is
DECISIONS-LOG.md. It, not this table, is the authoritative record.
Working on this repo
Everything the gate needs is baked into the pinned dev container — do not install the toolchain on the host:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh build # once
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run make -C ci gate # the same gate CI runs
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh # interactive shell (sops, flux, kubectl, tofu, ansible)
The container mounts the repo at /work, your age keyring, and the sibling spec repo read-only
so the spec-immutability check can actually run. See
infra/devcontainer/README.md.
A green run prints MERGE GATE: PASS. The L2/L3 conformance layers stay SKIPPED unless
CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true — the static gate never pretends to have run them.