Files
home-network-k3s-impl/DECISIONS-LOG.md
T
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 e20f17b896 K2 DONE: L2 network behavior tests pass against the live cluster
R-NET-01 default-deny + R-NET-02 deny-undeclared PASS via run.sh (JUnit+coverage,
exit 0). Fixed 3 real bugs found by running them:
- chainsaw strict list-matching: assert scalar 'phase: Running' not a conditions[] element.
- default-deny blocks the kubelet readiness probe -> drop probes (dest pods just need to run).
- chainsaw report path ../_artifacts resolved to repo-root -> fix to _artifacts (was exit 1).
- swap agnhost->busybox httpd listeners (cached everywhere; cache-timing-proof).
Logged the kubelet-probe finding for WS-NET's T-2.2 default-deny baseline design.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-16 15:46:00 -05:00

5.4 KiB

Autonomous Session Decision Log (PM)

Program Manager working independently while the operator is AFK (started 2026-08-16). Every best-effort decision and assumption is recorded here for later review. Specs were NOT modified (PM cannot change ../home-network-k3s; that requires the System Architect hat). Blocked items that need the operator are called out.

Guardrails I'm holding to

  • No spec changes. No fabricated secrets (Cloudflare token, PIA creds, SMTP — all await hand-off).
  • Don't break the running cluster: platform/ stays suspended in Flux until each component is filled in + validated; platform/cilium must carry k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11 before it ever reconciles.
  • Everything author-first, make -C ci gate green before merge, feature-branch→main.

Decisions / assumptions (append-only)

# Decision / assumption Why Review flag
A1 Complete Phase 1 T-1.4 via Option A (Flux bootstrapped, platform+apps suspended) You picked Option A earlier as the safe path; "keep going" authorizes it Confirm scope
A2 Advance Phase 2 only for components needing no operator secret: Longhorn, monitoring, Kyverno-admission, Cilium-parity cert-manager/externaldns/velero/VPN are blocked on token/PIA/OQ-BKP —
A3 Dev resource caps for monitoring (short retention, small PVCs, single replicas) from cluster-vars 22 GiB RAM ceiling Tune later
A4 Host Gitea repo is public (NAT-only) so Flux needs no git creds dev bootstrap simplicity Fine for dev

Autonomous session results (2026-08-16)

  • Phase-2 authoring (author-only, merged): platform/longhorn (3-replica SC + bulk indirection), platform/monitoring (kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy, dev-trimmed ~1.3 GiB, +8 alert rules), platform/cilium (parity fix: k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11 + masquerade, safe to adopt in Phase 2), platform/kyverno (verified). Gate green.
  • Flux INSTALLED on the cluster (4 controllers Running). Host Gitea working (named-volume fix), repo pushed. GitRepository created → BLOCKED: cluster pods can't reach 10.73.0.1:3000 (firewalld libvirt zone drops VM→host:3000).
    • RESOLVED (operator added the ansible-vault become password): ran host-prereqs.yml (firewall opened via vault→become), VM→Gitea = 200, and Flux GitRepository is READY=True (main@sha1:a2f3bdc…). Phase-1 T-1.4 core is DONE — Flux installed + reconciling clusters/dev from the host Gitea. platform/apps Kustomizations intentionally NOT created (Option A) — the running cluster is untouched.
    • Firewall + Gitea admin/repo/push + host become password are all IaC now (host-prereqs.yml, bootstrap-gitea.sh automation, vaulted group_vars/hypervisor) → destroy/rebuild is hands-off.
  • NOT deployed: platform/apps Kustomizations were deliberately NOT created — the running cluster (Cilium etc.) is untouched. Only Flux controllers + the GitRepository source exist.

KNOWN ISSUES to fix before Phase-2 un-suspend (logged, not yet fixed)

# Issue Impact Fix
K1 Substitution-var case mismatch (UPPERCASE refs vs lowercase cluster-vars keys) — ✅ FIXED: uppercased cluster-vars keys + dev/prod overlay paths; all refs resolve; builds green
K2 Conformance L2 tests partial/unverified — ✅ DONE: fixed 3 test bugs (see below), ran via run.sh against the live cluster → R-NET-01 default-deny + R-NET-02 deny-undeclared PASS, JUnit+coverage written, exit 0. chainsaw v0.2.12 installed (host ~/.local/bin)
K3 bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh used a host bind-mount → rootless-podman perms broke app.ini initial Gitea start failed FIXED: switched to a named volume
K4 Kyverno/chainsaw findings during K2 (fixed in the tests): (a) chainsaw does STRICT (length-equal) list matching — asserting one condition against a pod's full conditions[] fails → used scalar phase: Running; (b) a default-deny baseline blocks the kubelet readiness probe (node→pod), so probe-bearing pods never go Ready → dropped probes; (c) chainsaw report path: ../_artifacts resolved to repo-root → exit 1 → fixed to _artifacts; (d) swapped agnhost→busybox httpd (cached, cache-timing-proof) — FIXED in the test files/config

FINDING for WS-NET (Phase 2, T-2.2 — default-deny baseline design)

The platform's real default-deny baseline must not break kubelet health/liveness/readiness probes (node→pod ingress). A naive ingress: [] NetworkPolicy in Cilium drops the kubelet TCP probe, so any pod with a probe never becomes Ready. The baseline must explicitly allow the health-check path (Cilium host/health-check allowance or an equivalent ingress exception). Surfaced empirically by the R-NET-02 conformance test; carry into T-2.2.

Toolchain note

chainsaw v0.2.12 is installed on the host (~/.local/bin) for local conformance runs; for full reproducibility it should also be baked into infra/devcontainer (pinned) — the in-cluster Chainsaw Job (ADR-0011) already uses the pinned image. Deferred (non-blocking).

Blocked on operator (hand-offs)

  • T-2.4p Cloudflare API token → cert-manager DNS-01 + ExternalDNS (Phase 2 TLS/DNS).
  • T-3.2p PIA username/password → VPN egress gateway (Phase 3).
  • OQ-BKP off-cluster backup target → Velero (Phase 4).
  • SMTP creds → Alertmanager email (Phase 4).