R-NET-01 default-deny + R-NET-02 deny-undeclared PASS via run.sh (JUnit+coverage, exit 0). Fixed 3 real bugs found by running them: - chainsaw strict list-matching: assert scalar 'phase: Running' not a conditions[] element. - default-deny blocks the kubelet readiness probe -> drop probes (dest pods just need to run). - chainsaw report path ../_artifacts resolved to repo-root -> fix to _artifacts (was exit 1). - swap agnhost->busybox httpd listeners (cached everywhere; cache-timing-proof). Logged the kubelet-probe finding for WS-NET's T-2.2 default-deny baseline design. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
66 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
# Autonomous Session Decision Log (PM)
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Program Manager working independently while the operator is AFK (started 2026-08-16). Every
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best-effort decision and assumption is recorded here for later review. **Specs were NOT modified**
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(PM cannot change `../home-network-k3s`; that requires the System Architect hat). Blocked items that
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need the operator are called out.
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## Guardrails I'm holding to
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- No spec changes. No fabricated secrets (Cloudflare token, PIA creds, SMTP — all await hand-off).
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- Don't break the running cluster: `platform/` stays **suspended** in Flux until each component is
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filled in + validated; `platform/cilium` must carry `k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11` before it ever
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reconciles.
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- Everything author-first, `make -C ci gate` green before merge, feature-branch→main.
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## Decisions / assumptions (append-only)
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| # | Decision / assumption | Why | Review flag |
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| A1 | Complete Phase 1 T-1.4 via **Option A** (Flux bootstrapped, `platform`+`apps` suspended) | You picked Option A earlier as the safe path; "keep going" authorizes it | Confirm scope |
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| A2 | Advance Phase 2 only for components needing **no operator secret**: Longhorn, monitoring, Kyverno-admission, Cilium-parity | cert-manager/externaldns/velero/VPN are blocked on token/PIA/OQ-BKP | — |
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| A3 | Dev resource caps for monitoring (short retention, small PVCs, single replicas) from `cluster-vars` | 22 GiB RAM ceiling | Tune later |
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| A4 | Host Gitea repo is **public** (NAT-only) so Flux needs no git creds | dev bootstrap simplicity | Fine for dev |
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## Autonomous session results (2026-08-16)
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- **Phase-2 authoring (author-only, merged):** `platform/longhorn` (3-replica SC + bulk indirection),
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`platform/monitoring` (kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy, dev-trimmed ~1.3 GiB, +8 alert rules),
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`platform/cilium` (parity fix: k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11 + masquerade, safe to adopt in Phase 2),
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`platform/kyverno` (verified). Gate green.
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- **Flux INSTALLED** on the cluster (4 controllers Running). Host **Gitea working** (named-volume fix),
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repo pushed. GitRepository created → **BLOCKED**: cluster pods can't reach `10.73.0.1:3000`
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(firewalld `libvirt` zone drops VM→host:3000).
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- **RESOLVED (operator added the ansible-vault become password):** ran `host-prereqs.yml` (firewall
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opened via vault→become), VM→Gitea = 200, and **Flux GitRepository is READY=True**
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(`main@sha1:a2f3bdc…`). **Phase-1 T-1.4 core is DONE** — Flux installed + reconciling clusters/dev
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from the host Gitea. `platform`/`apps` Kustomizations intentionally NOT created (Option A) — the
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running cluster is untouched.
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- Firewall + Gitea admin/repo/push + host become password are all IaC now (host-prereqs.yml,
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bootstrap-gitea.sh automation, vaulted group_vars/hypervisor) → destroy/rebuild is hands-off.
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- **NOT deployed:** `platform`/`apps` Kustomizations were deliberately NOT created — the running
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cluster (Cilium etc.) is untouched. Only Flux controllers + the GitRepository source exist.
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## KNOWN ISSUES to fix before Phase-2 un-suspend (logged, not yet fixed)
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| # | Issue | Impact | Fix |
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| K1 | ~~Substitution-var case mismatch (UPPERCASE refs vs lowercase cluster-vars keys)~~ | — | ✅ **FIXED**: uppercased cluster-vars keys + dev/prod overlay paths; all refs resolve; builds green |
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| K2 | ~~Conformance L2 tests partial/unverified~~ | — | ✅ **DONE**: fixed 3 test bugs (see below), ran via run.sh against the live cluster → **R-NET-01 default-deny + R-NET-02 deny-undeclared PASS**, JUnit+coverage written, exit 0. chainsaw v0.2.12 installed (host `~/.local/bin`) |
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| K3 | `bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh` used a host bind-mount → rootless-podman perms broke app.ini | initial Gitea start failed | FIXED: switched to a named volume |
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| K4 | **Kyverno/chainsaw findings during K2 (fixed in the tests):** (a) chainsaw does STRICT (length-equal) list matching — asserting one condition against a pod's full `conditions[]` fails → used scalar `phase: Running`; (b) a default-deny baseline blocks the **kubelet readiness probe** (node→pod), so probe-bearing pods never go Ready → dropped probes; (c) chainsaw report `path: ../_artifacts` resolved to repo-root → exit 1 → fixed to `_artifacts`; (d) swapped agnhost→busybox httpd (cached, cache-timing-proof) | — | FIXED in the test files/config |
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## FINDING for WS-NET (Phase 2, T-2.2 — default-deny baseline design)
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The platform's real default-deny baseline **must not break kubelet health/liveness/readiness probes**
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(node→pod ingress). A naive `ingress: []` NetworkPolicy in Cilium drops the kubelet TCP probe, so any
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pod with a probe never becomes Ready. The baseline must explicitly allow the health-check path (Cilium
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host/health-check allowance or an equivalent ingress exception). Surfaced empirically by the R-NET-02
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conformance test; **carry into T-2.2**.
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## Toolchain note
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`chainsaw v0.2.12` is installed on the host (`~/.local/bin`) for local conformance runs; for full
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reproducibility it should also be baked into `infra/devcontainer` (pinned) — the in-cluster Chainsaw
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Job (ADR-0011) already uses the pinned image. Deferred (non-blocking).
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## Blocked on operator (hand-offs)
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- **T-2.4p** Cloudflare API token → cert-manager DNS-01 + ExternalDNS (Phase 2 TLS/DNS).
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- **T-3.2p** PIA username/password → VPN egress gateway (Phase 3).
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- **OQ-BKP** off-cluster backup target → Velero (Phase 4).
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- SMTP creds → Alertmanager email (Phase 4).
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