Files
home-network-k3s-impl/DECISIONS-LOG.md
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 e20f17b896 K2 DONE: L2 network behavior tests pass against the live cluster
R-NET-01 default-deny + R-NET-02 deny-undeclared PASS via run.sh (JUnit+coverage,
exit 0). Fixed 3 real bugs found by running them:
- chainsaw strict list-matching: assert scalar 'phase: Running' not a conditions[] element.
- default-deny blocks the kubelet readiness probe -> drop probes (dest pods just need to run).
- chainsaw report path ../_artifacts resolved to repo-root -> fix to _artifacts (was exit 1).
- swap agnhost->busybox httpd listeners (cached everywhere; cache-timing-proof).
Logged the kubelet-probe finding for WS-NET's T-2.2 default-deny baseline design.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-16 15:46:00 -05:00

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5.4 KiB
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# Autonomous Session Decision Log (PM)
Program Manager working independently while the operator is AFK (started 2026-08-16). Every
best-effort decision and assumption is recorded here for later review. **Specs were NOT modified**
(PM cannot change `../home-network-k3s`; that requires the System Architect hat). Blocked items that
need the operator are called out.
## Guardrails I'm holding to
- No spec changes. No fabricated secrets (Cloudflare token, PIA creds, SMTP — all await hand-off).
- Don't break the running cluster: `platform/` stays **suspended** in Flux until each component is
filled in + validated; `platform/cilium` must carry `k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11` before it ever
reconciles.
- Everything author-first, `make -C ci gate` green before merge, feature-branch→main.
## Decisions / assumptions (append-only)
| # | Decision / assumption | Why | Review flag |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | Complete Phase 1 T-1.4 via **Option A** (Flux bootstrapped, `platform`+`apps` suspended) | You picked Option A earlier as the safe path; "keep going" authorizes it | Confirm scope |
| A2 | Advance Phase 2 only for components needing **no operator secret**: Longhorn, monitoring, Kyverno-admission, Cilium-parity | cert-manager/externaldns/velero/VPN are blocked on token/PIA/OQ-BKP | — |
| A3 | Dev resource caps for monitoring (short retention, small PVCs, single replicas) from `cluster-vars` | 22 GiB RAM ceiling | Tune later |
| A4 | Host Gitea repo is **public** (NAT-only) so Flux needs no git creds | dev bootstrap simplicity | Fine for dev |
## Autonomous session results (2026-08-16)
- **Phase-2 authoring (author-only, merged):** `platform/longhorn` (3-replica SC + bulk indirection),
`platform/monitoring` (kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy, dev-trimmed ~1.3 GiB, +8 alert rules),
`platform/cilium` (parity fix: k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11 + masquerade, safe to adopt in Phase 2),
`platform/kyverno` (verified). Gate green.
- **Flux INSTALLED** on the cluster (4 controllers Running). Host **Gitea working** (named-volume fix),
repo pushed. GitRepository created → **BLOCKED**: cluster pods can't reach `10.73.0.1:3000`
(firewalld `libvirt` zone drops VM→host:3000).
- **RESOLVED (operator added the ansible-vault become password):** ran `host-prereqs.yml` (firewall
opened via vault→become), VM→Gitea = 200, and **Flux GitRepository is READY=True**
(`main@sha1:a2f3bdc…`). **Phase-1 T-1.4 core is DONE** — Flux installed + reconciling clusters/dev
from the host Gitea. `platform`/`apps` Kustomizations intentionally NOT created (Option A) — the
running cluster is untouched.
- Firewall + Gitea admin/repo/push + host become password are all IaC now (host-prereqs.yml,
bootstrap-gitea.sh automation, vaulted group_vars/hypervisor) → destroy/rebuild is hands-off.
- **NOT deployed:** `platform`/`apps` Kustomizations were deliberately NOT created — the running
cluster (Cilium etc.) is untouched. Only Flux controllers + the GitRepository source exist.
## KNOWN ISSUES to fix before Phase-2 un-suspend (logged, not yet fixed)
| # | Issue | Impact | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| K1 | ~~Substitution-var case mismatch (UPPERCASE refs vs lowercase cluster-vars keys)~~ | — | ✅ **FIXED**: uppercased cluster-vars keys + dev/prod overlay paths; all refs resolve; builds green |
| K2 | ~~Conformance L2 tests partial/unverified~~ | — | ✅ **DONE**: fixed 3 test bugs (see below), ran via run.sh against the live cluster → **R-NET-01 default-deny + R-NET-02 deny-undeclared PASS**, JUnit+coverage written, exit 0. chainsaw v0.2.12 installed (host `~/.local/bin`) |
| K3 | `bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh` used a host bind-mount → rootless-podman perms broke app.ini | initial Gitea start failed | FIXED: switched to a named volume |
| K4 | **Kyverno/chainsaw findings during K2 (fixed in the tests):** (a) chainsaw does STRICT (length-equal) list matching — asserting one condition against a pod's full `conditions[]` fails → used scalar `phase: Running`; (b) a default-deny baseline blocks the **kubelet readiness probe** (node→pod), so probe-bearing pods never go Ready → dropped probes; (c) chainsaw report `path: ../_artifacts` resolved to repo-root → exit 1 → fixed to `_artifacts`; (d) swapped agnhost→busybox httpd (cached, cache-timing-proof) | — | FIXED in the test files/config |
## FINDING for WS-NET (Phase 2, T-2.2 — default-deny baseline design)
The platform's real default-deny baseline **must not break kubelet health/liveness/readiness probes**
(node→pod ingress). A naive `ingress: []` NetworkPolicy in Cilium drops the kubelet TCP probe, so any
pod with a probe never becomes Ready. The baseline must explicitly allow the health-check path (Cilium
host/health-check allowance or an equivalent ingress exception). Surfaced empirically by the R-NET-02
conformance test; **carry into T-2.2**.
## Toolchain note
`chainsaw v0.2.12` is installed on the host (`~/.local/bin`) for local conformance runs; for full
reproducibility it should also be baked into `infra/devcontainer` (pinned) — the in-cluster Chainsaw
Job (ADR-0011) already uses the pinned image. Deferred (non-blocking).
## Blocked on operator (hand-offs)
- **T-2.4p** Cloudflare API token → cert-manager DNS-01 + ExternalDNS (Phase 2 TLS/DNS).
- **T-3.2p** PIA username/password → VPN egress gateway (Phase 3).
- **OQ-BKP** off-cluster backup target → Velero (Phase 4).
- SMTP creds → Alertmanager email (Phase 4).