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home-network-k3s-impl/runbooks/image-policy-stalled.md
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 8e017fad91
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m34s
gate / gate (push) Successful in 1m34s
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
gate / conformance (push) Has been skipped
docs(runbooks): the PR flow, not git push origin main -- that instruction is now blocked
main became a protected branch on 2026-09-29, so the direct push that 37 of 39 runbooks
instructed is REJECTED. The wording was merely stale before; it is now actively wrong,
and it is the line an operator reads mid-incident.

Every occurrence now describes the real path: push a branch, open a PR, merge once the
gate is green -- that merge is the deploy. 35 files shared one identical block;
flux-reconcile.md, README.md and plex-claim.md each said it their own way and were
corrected individually.

plex-claim.md is rewritten around the delivery loop and records that THE SERVER IS NOW
CLAIMED (PlexOnlineToken present in /config), so PLEX_CLAIM is a permanent no-op and the
page only applies after a /config wipe.

Adds infra/plex/claim-ship.sh, which drives branch -> commit -> push -> PR -> gate ->
merge -> reconcile -> pod roll -> verdict with a stopwatch. Three steps are easy to lose
under time pressure and two are SILENT when skipped: --with-source (without it the
Kustomization applies the previously-fetched revision), the mandatory rollout restart
(only the ciphertext changes, so the pod template is byte-identical and nothing restarts
itself), and the feat/ branch prefix (act_runner capacity is 1, and a prefix inside
gate.yml's push trigger fires a redundant run that serialises ahead of the PR run).

Drops the "~4-minute TTL" the page asserted in four places. It was uncited, and upstream
pms-docker documents no expiry at all. The countdown on plex.tv/claim is the authority.
Measured loop: ~2m45s.

DECISIONS-LOG carries the PM handoff: both halves of the 2026-08-31 CI claim were false,
the stale-.runner root cause, the four-deep Flux dependency cascade, and the correction
that a skipped Gitea job reports success rather than hanging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 01:42:35 -05:00

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8.3 KiB
Markdown

# image-policy-stalled — An ImagePolicy or ImageRepository cannot resolve its tag
**Alert:** `ImagePolicyStalled` (warning, 1h)
**File:** `platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml`, group `platform-health.automated-updates`
**Expression:** `max by (namespace, name, kind) (gotk_reconcile_condition{kind=~"ImagePolicy|ImageRepository", type="Ready", status="False"}) == 1`
## What this means here
An `ImageRepository` cannot scan a registry, or an `ImagePolicy` cannot pick a tag out of what was
scanned. The effect is narrower than `/runbooks/image-automation`: automation itself is healthy, but
**this one service stops receiving updates** (R-UPD-01), while everything else continues. It is
therefore easy to miss, which is what the 1h `for` and the per-object labels are for.
The same framing applies as for image-automation: **this feature is authored and deliberately disabled
on this cluster** and has been since 2026-08-24 (no Gitea write credential, and the
`image-reflector-controller` / `image-automation-controller` components are not installed — the line is
still commented out in `platform/kustomization.yaml`). Rendered apps emit `ImageRepository` and
`ImagePolicy` CRs anyway, so the objects can exist with no controller to reconcile them;
`catalog/render.py --no-image-automation` is the documented workaround. **There is no incident history
for this alert** — the section below is mechanism, honestly labelled.
One live constraint worth knowing while reading registry errors: the images in this platform come from
`docker.io`, `ghcr.io`, `lscr.io`, `quay.io`, `registry.k8s.io` and `registry.gitlab.com`. Docker
Hub's anonymous rate limit is the most likely real-world cause of a scan failure once automation is
switched on.
**This alert is currently INERT.** `count(gotk_reconcile_condition)` returned **0 series** on prod on
2026-09-13 — there is no Flux-controller scrape job among Prometheus's 19 jobs, so every `gotk_*` rule
evaluates against nothing. Read the CRs directly with the commands below, and see
`/runbooks/targets-down` for the full list of inert rule groups.
## Running the commands in this runbook
`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's `k3s-oidc` context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
picks a current-context per invocation, and **that default has already changed once** — it was k3s-dev
until dev was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, and is k3s-prod now. A command that names its context means
the same thing next month as it does today; one that relies on the default does not, and the failure is
silent (it answers confidently about the other cluster). `CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run
kubectl ...` selects it explicitly, and every invocation prints a banner naming the cluster it is about
to talk to — read it. Do not run two `dev.sh` invocations at once; they share one container and
interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind `Backup`:
`longhorn.io/v1beta2`, `postgresql.cnpg.io/v1` and `velero.io/v1`. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so `kubectl get backup -A` prints **"No resources found"** on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
`backups.velero.io`, `backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`,
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands
Which object, and the message (the message is nearly always the whole answer):
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get imagerepositories.image.toolkit.fluxcd.io -A \
-o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,IMAGE:.spec.image,READY:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"Ready\"\)].status,MSG:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"Ready\"\)].message,TAGS:.status.lastScanResult.tagCount; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod get imagepolicies.image.toolkit.fluxcd.io -A \
-o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,READY:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"Ready\"\)].status,LATEST:.status.latestImage,MSG:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"Ready\"\)].message'
```
Are the controllers installed at all?
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n flux-system get deploy | grep -i image || echo "image controllers NOT installed (expected on this cluster)"'
```
The reflector's log:
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n flux-system logs deploy/image-reflector-controller --tail=80 2>&1 | tail -30'
```
Can the cluster reach the registry at all? (Default-deny is the baseline; a new namespace may simply
not be allowed out.)
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pods -A --field-selector status.phase!=Running | head; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod get events -A --field-selector reason=Failed --sort-by=.lastTimestamp | grep -i "pull\|registry" | tail -10'
```
## Likely causes, most likely first
### 1. The image controllers are not installed (expected state here)
The CRs exist because `catalog/render.py` emits them; nothing reconciles them. Remediation: render with
`--no-image-automation`, or have the operator finish enabling automation. Note that the Flux
controllers were installed **imperatively** and are outside Flux's own inventory, so no git change can
install them.
### 2. Registry rate limit
Docker Hub anonymous pulls/scans are limited per IP, and all three nodes share one WAN address. The
message says `toomanyrequests`. Remediation: a registry credential (SOPS-encrypted, in git), or scan
less often via `spec.interval`.
### 3. Registry auth
A private repository with no `secretRef`, or an expired token. The message names it.
### 4. The policy's range matches nothing
`ImagePolicy` semver ranges come from each ServiceDefinition's `update.range` (for example
`">=2024.0.0"` for pihole, `">=24.0.0"` for keycloak). A range that no published tag satisfies — or a
repository that publishes only `latest` (this platform has `lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:latest` and
`plexinc/pms-docker:latest`) — leaves the policy with nothing to select. Remediation: fix the range in
`catalog/<service>.yaml` and re-render; a `latest`-only image cannot participate in automation at all
and should not carry a policy.
### 5. Egress is blocked for that namespace
Default-deny everywhere (R-NET-01) means outbound registry access is an explicit allow. Cross-read
`/runbooks/denied-flows`, and in particular the post-Cilium-upgrade finding that `toEntities: world` no
longer covers a call whose destination resolves to an in-cluster backend.
## When to escalate or stop
- **Warning, 1h, single service: this does not page.** The consequence is one workload pinned at its
current version.
- **Do not widen an `update.range` to make the alert clear.** The range is the service's update policy
(R-UPD-01); loosening it to satisfy a scanner is how an unintended major version arrives.
- **Do not add registry credentials ad hoc** — new secret, DR path, operator's call.
- If the same object has been stalled for days, the honest outcome is to remove its automation CRs
(`--no-image-automation`) rather than leave a permanently-failing object training everyone to ignore
the alert. Alert fatigue is a recorded, expensive failure mode on this cluster.
---
Source of truth: `runbooks/image-policy-stalled.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
Records: `DECISIONS-LOG.md` (image automation authored-and-disabled; `--no-image-automation`);
`catalog/*.yaml` (`update.channel` / `update.range` per service).