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home-network-k3s-impl/platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 b80e8eef82 feat(backup): prod shares dev's MinIO — plus the path tenancy that makes it survivable
Operator ruling: "the S3 backup location is the same as Dev." Prod's
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is now http://192.168.1.9:9000 and the TBD-PROD-* placeholder
is retired. Set EXPLICITLY rather than by omitting the op — an omitted op would
inherit the same value silently, and a shared backup target must be visible in
the overlay that owns it.

SHARING THE ENDPOINT WAS NOT SAFE AS AUTHORED. Nothing about the backup PATHS
was per-environment, and enabling prod against dev's MinIO would have been the
2026-09-04 external-dns incident again, in a worse place:

  VELERO — bucket `velero`, NO prefix, and both clusters run schedules named
    `daily` / `daily-resources-only`. Velero SYNCS backups it finds in its BSL
    into itself as Backup CRs and GARBAGE-COLLECTS them at TTL, so prod would
    have adopted dev's backups and then deleted them on schedule.
  CNPG — the worse one. destinationPath `s3://cnpg` with CNPG appending
    serverName, which defaults to the CLUSTER NAME. Both environments have
    keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db, so prod's Postgres would archive
    WAL into the EXACT prefix dev's does. Two servers interleaving WAL into one
    Barman stream CORRUPTS THE CHAIN and destroys PITR — and dev's restore is
    PROVEN (R-STATE-03). Sharing an endpoint is fine; sharing a path is not.

Two knobs, authored once, environments differing only by scoped overrides
(R-ENV-02):
  VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX  dev ""          | prod "prod"
  CNPG_BACKUP_PATH      dev "s3://cnpg" | prod "s3://cnpg/prod"

THE BASE VALUES ARE DEV'S CURRENT LAYOUT ON PURPOSE. Dev's existing backups live
at the bucket root and at s3://cnpg; giving dev a prefix would ORPHAN the very
backups its proven restore depends on — the same reasoning that keeps dev's
EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID at `default`. Prod has no history to preserve.

*** PROD STILL HAS NO BACKUP COVERAGE — the endpoint is not reachable. ***
Measured from a throwaway pod INSIDE the prod cluster (the workstation proves
nothing about pod egress, and a workstation-side reading has already misled this
project once): curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live → connection timed
out after 15s. pfSense does not route prod's pod network to the dev LAN's MinIO.
OPERATOR ACTION REQUIRED. velero stays suspended; note apps-wave-0 applies GREEN
regardless — the token IS defined so strict substitution succeeds — while every
write fails at RUNTIME. A green apps-wave-0 does not mean backups work.

New `standup.sh s3check` step probes the endpoint from a throwaway in-cluster
pod and fails closed, with `--s3-endpoint <url>` to test a CANDIDATE before
authoring it into cluster-vars. That is how the unreachability above was
established rather than assumed.

VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. flux-postbuild-substitution 254 -> 260 assertions,
and neither new knob appears in the dead-knob advisory list, so both are really
consumed. Rendered both overlays: all three CNPG destinationPaths and Velero's
prefix carry the tokens; dev resolves to its existing layout, prod to the nested
paths.

DELIVERY: prod reconciles the bootstrap Gitea's main at c8c1d29. This branch also
carries the DNS inversion, which must NOT reach prod. Delivering needs a
c8c1d29-based branch with only these commits — no urgency while the routing is
still closed.

Refs R-STATE-03, R-ENV-02, R-IDP-05.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-05 10:59:50 -05:00

140 lines
7.2 KiB
YAML

---
# Velero — off-cluster backup/DR of cluster resources + PVC data (ADR-0003, R-STATE-03). LIVE.
#
# TARGET: the MinIO S3 endpoint ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (cluster-vars; dev http://192.168.1.9:9000 on
# Proxmox — plain HTTP, path-style), bucket
# `velero`. region us-east-1 is a placeholder MinIO ignores (S3 clients still require one).
#
# WHY THIS SHAPE:
# - provider aws + velero-plugin-for-aws (init container) drives the S3-compatible MinIO target.
# - File System Backup (kopia) via the node-agent DaemonSet — storage-agnostic PVC backup that does
# NOT depend on CSI VolumeSnapshots or a data-mover (the simplest path that still captures the
# Longhorn PVC *data*). snapshotsEnabled:false → no VolumeSnapshotLocation is created/needed.
# - Credentials: the `cloud` INI key of the SOPS Secret velero-cloud-credentials (ns velero) — the
# SCOPED MinIO key limited to the velero+cnpg buckets. Kept in sync with the staging source of
# truth platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml and the Proxmox host ansible-vault.
#
# VOLUME OPT-OUT (per the sizing decision) is implemented with TWO schedules (a single Backup has one
# cluster-wide defaultVolumesToFsBackup, so per-namespace volume policy needs two): see `schedules`.
#
# NON-GATING TIER: reconciled by clusters/base/backup.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false).
# A backup controller must NEVER gate the platform graph (mirror headlamp/oauth2-proxy).
apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
metadata:
name: velero
namespace: velero
spec:
interval: 30m
chart:
spec:
chart: velero
version: ">=12.0.0 <13.0.0" # Velero v1.18.x line (k8s-1.36 catch-up). CRDs pre-applied server-side (upgradeCRDs:false). Renovate maintains
sourceRef:
kind: HelmRepository
name: vmware-tanzu
namespace: velero
install:
remediation:
retries: 3
upgrade:
remediation:
retries: 3
values:
# --- CRD install strategy. The chart's pre-install `velero-upgrade-crds` HOOK job runs
# docker.io/bitnami/kubectl, whose public Docker Hub catalog Bitnami REMOVED (Aug 2025) —
# `docker.io/bitnami/kubectl:1.31` now 404s, leaving the hook in Init:ImagePullBackOff so Velero
# never installs. The hook exists ONLY to UPDATE CRDs on chart upgrades; it is NOT how CRDs are
# first installed. The chart ships all 13 Velero CRDs (backups/restores/backupstoragelocations/
# schedules/podvolumebackups/…) in its native `crds/` directory, which Helm applies
# UNCONDITIONALLY on install — before hooks — regardless of this flag.
# Disabling the hook therefore drops the fragile external-kubectl-image dependency entirely while
# the CRDs still install via Helm's crds/ handling. Trade-off: Helm never manages crds/ after the
# initial install, so CRD *schema upgrades* on future chart bumps become a manual/Renovate step —
# acceptable: Velero's CRDs are stable, and this is far less fragile than pinning a shell-bearing
# kubectl mirror (rancher/kubectl is distroless → no /bin/sh for the hook's copy-binary step). ---
upgradeCRDs: false
# --- AWS object-store plugin (BSL provider=aws → MinIO S3-compatible), loaded as an init container.
# Image minor MUST track the Velero minor (chart 12.x = Velero 1.18 → plugin v1.14.x). ---
initContainers:
- name: velero-plugin-for-aws
image: velero/velero-plugin-for-aws:v1.14.2
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /target
name: plugins
# --- File System Backup (kopia): the node-agent DaemonSet mounts each pod's volumes and copies
# the data into S3. Storage-agnostic; no CSI-snapshot / data-mover wiring. ---
deployNodeAgent: true
snapshotsEnabled: false # no VolumeSnapshotLocation — kopia FSB is the volume-data path
configuration:
uploaderType: kopia
backupStorageLocation:
- name: default
provider: aws
bucket: velero
# PER-ENVIRONMENT PREFIX (cluster-vars). Empty on dev = the bucket root it already uses;
# `prod` on prod. Without it both clusters share one BackupStorageLocation — and Velero
# SYNCS backups it finds there into itself as Backup CRs and GARBAGE-COLLECTS them when
# their TTL expires, so prod would adopt and then delete dev's backups. Both clusters also
# run schedules named `daily`/`daily-resources-only`, so even the object keys would collide.
prefix: ${VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX}
default: true
config:
region: us-east-1 # placeholder; MinIO ignores it (S3 clients require one)
s3Url: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} # on-Proxmox MinIO, plain HTTP (cluster-vars)
s3ForcePathStyle: "true" # MinIO is path-style
credentials:
existingSecret: velero-cloud-credentials # SOPS Secret carrying the `cloud` INI key (ns velero)
# --- Daily backups. TWO schedules implement the opt-out volume policy: capture every PVC's data
# by default (opt-out), but skip the two reconstructable heavy volumes' DATA while still
# capturing their Kubernetes resources. ---
schedules:
# (1) The whole cluster EXCEPT monitoring+unifi: all resources + all pod-volume data via kopia.
# defaultVolumesToFsBackup:true is the OPT-OUT model — nothing with real data is forgotten.
daily:
disabled: false
schedule: "${VELERO_BACKUP_SCHEDULE}"
useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
template:
ttl: "${VELERO_RETENTION}"
storageLocation: default
snapshotVolumes: false
defaultVolumesToFsBackup: true
excludedNamespaces:
- monitoring # volume DATA excluded here; resources captured by schedule (2)
- unifi
# (2) monitoring + unifi: RESOURCES ONLY (defaultVolumesToFsBackup:false → no volume data). Their
# PVCs are reconstructable and excluded from data backup per the sizing decision:
# - monitoring: the Prometheus TSDB PVC (ephemeral/reconstructable) and the Loki 72h-log PVC
# (Grafana/Alertmanager are emptyDir — no PVC). Grafana dashboards are GitOps-provisioned.
# - unifi: the ~7.4 GiB KubeVirt VM disk (huge + reconstructable; UniFi is protected by its
# own config export, not this disk).
# Backing up their K8s objects (VM/DataVolume/Services/HelmRelease-owned CRs) still aids DR.
daily-resources-only:
disabled: false
schedule: "${VELERO_BACKUP_SCHEDULE}"
useOwnerReferencesInBackup: false
template:
ttl: "${VELERO_RETENTION}"
storageLocation: default
snapshotVolumes: false
defaultVolumesToFsBackup: false
includedNamespaces:
- monitoring
- unifi
# Modest home-dev footprint (mirror the other platform components).
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi
nodeAgent:
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi