main became a protected branch on 2026-09-29, so the direct push that 37 of 39 runbooks instructed is REJECTED. The wording was merely stale before; it is now actively wrong, and it is the line an operator reads mid-incident. Every occurrence now describes the real path: push a branch, open a PR, merge once the gate is green -- that merge is the deploy. 35 files shared one identical block; flux-reconcile.md, README.md and plex-claim.md each said it their own way and were corrected individually. plex-claim.md is rewritten around the delivery loop and records that THE SERVER IS NOW CLAIMED (PlexOnlineToken present in /config), so PLEX_CLAIM is a permanent no-op and the page only applies after a /config wipe. Adds infra/plex/claim-ship.sh, which drives branch -> commit -> push -> PR -> gate -> merge -> reconcile -> pod roll -> verdict with a stopwatch. Three steps are easy to lose under time pressure and two are SILENT when skipped: --with-source (without it the Kustomization applies the previously-fetched revision), the mandatory rollout restart (only the ciphertext changes, so the pod template is byte-identical and nothing restarts itself), and the feat/ branch prefix (act_runner capacity is 1, and a prefix inside gate.yml's push trigger fires a redundant run that serialises ahead of the PR run). Drops the "~4-minute TTL" the page asserted in four places. It was uncited, and upstream pms-docker documents no expiry at all. The countdown on plex.tv/claim is the authority. Measured loop: ~2m45s. DECISIONS-LOG carries the PM handoff: both halves of the 2026-08-31 CI claim were false, the stale-.runner root cause, the four-deep Flux dependency cascade, and the correction that a skipped Gitea job reports success rather than hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
7.8 KiB
node-disk — A node filesystem is filling up
Alert: NodeDiskFillingUp (warning, 15m)
File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.nodes
Expression: node_filesystem_avail_bytes{fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay|squashfs"} / node_filesystem_size_bytes{...} < 0.10
What this means here
Less than 10% free on a real filesystem on a node, for 15 minutes. Read the mountpoint label
first, because on these nodes it tells you which of two very different problems you have.
/data is the one that matters. Both the embedded etcd WAL (/data/k3s) and every
Longhorn replica (/data/longhorn) live on that single partition —
node_baseline_etcd_source: shared-data-partition, not a dedicated device, and the exit condition
for splitting them is still open (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2). If /data fills:
- etcd cannot write its WAL. A control-plane member with a full WAL partition does not degrade gracefully; it stops, and this is a 3-member cluster.
- Longhorn stops being able to hold replicas and volumes go degraded, which triggers rebuilds, which need more space.
So /data at 10% free is not a warning, it is the last comfortable moment to act.
/ filling up is usually logs, container images or a stuck journal. Lower stakes, but there is
history: in the dev era the host root filled to ~99% because VM disks sat under a snapper-snapshotted
subvolume, and the hypervisor paused the k3s VMs on I/O error. Recovery was deleting 11 snapper
timeline snapshots plus virsh destroy on the paused VMs (which were holding rsync-unlinked inodes):
99% → 30%.
Longhorn's own guard rails are already tight and are why this alert usually fires before anything
breaks: storageReservedPercentageForDefaultDisk: 20,
storageMinimalAvailablePercentage: 25, storageOverProvisioningPercentage: 200.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
picks a current-context per invocation, and that default has already changed once — it was k3s-dev
until dev was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, and is k3s-prod now. A command that names its context means
the same thing next month as it does today; one that relies on the default does not, and the failure is
silent (it answers confidently about the other cluster). CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... selects it explicitly, and every invocation prints a banner naming the cluster it is about
to talk to — read it. Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once; they share one container and
interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git. main is a protected branch — a direct push
is rejected. A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
First commands
Which filesystem, on which node:
ssh k3s-prod-1 'df -h -x tmpfs -x overlay; echo; du -xh --max-depth=1 /data 2>/dev/null | sort -h | tail -10; echo; du -xh --max-depth=1 / 2>/dev/null | sort -h | tail -10'
What Longhorn thinks it has:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get nodes.longhorn.io -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,READY:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"Ready\"\)].status,SCHED:.spec.allowScheduling; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,SIZE:.spec.size,ACTUAL:.status.actualSize,ROBUST:.status.robustness'
Journal and image bloat on /:
ssh k3s-prod-1 'sudo journalctl --disk-usage; sudo crictl images | wc -l; sudo du -sh /var/lib/rancher/k3s/agent/containerd 2>/dev/null'
Likely causes, most likely first
1. Longhorn replicas grew, or replicas landed here after a rebuild
Hard node anti-affinity (replicaSoftAntiAffinity: false) means one replica per node per volume, but
replicaAutoBalance: best-effort moves them. Prod sits around 269 GiB scheduled against an 829 GiB
ceiling, so this is rarely tight — but a rebuild storm plus snapshots can spike it.
Remediation: check for orphaned replicas and stale snapshots in the Longhorn UI. Orphan cleanup is
manual: orphanAutoDeletion: true sat in platform/longhorn/helmrelease.yaml and had been
silently inert since Longhorn 1.12 — renamed orphanResourceAutoDeletion (a list), and the chart
drops unknown defaultSettings keys with no error. Removed 2026-09-13 and deliberately not replaced.
Snapshot purge also runs one at a time per node now (snapshotHeavyTaskConcurrentLimit: 1, the etcd
WAL protection), so reclaim after a rebuild is serial by design.
2. A CNPG database is not recycling WAL
The single most dangerous cause, because it is unbounded. With archive_mode=on and a failing
archive_command, Postgres refuses to recycle unarchived WAL segments and pg_wal grows forever
— on prod's keycloak-db that was measured at ~6.8 MiB/h, 17 segments / ~268 MiB, about 29 days to
fill a 5 GiB PVC. pg_wal shares the data PVC (no walStorage: is configured on any Cluster).
Check /runbooks/cnpg-archiving before you free any space, and never delete WAL by hand —
that destroys the database.
3. Journal / container images on /
journalctl --vacuum-size=200M and pruning unused images are safe. Do not prune images for
workloads that may need to restart while the registry is unreachable.
4. A Velero or CDI staging write
Velero's kopia uploads and CDI's scratch space both stage locally. longhorn-scratch
(single-replica) exists precisely because the 3-replica default failed the UniFi 60Gi import on
insufficient storage.
5. The disk is smaller than the platform now needs
docs/plans/longhorn-ssd-tiering.md holds the planned hot tier (~51 GB: Prometheus, CNPG, Loki,
Gitea). Working set measured ~79 GB against ~323 GB free on SSD, so the "won't fit" blocker was a
measurement artifact. This is operator planning work, not an incident fix.
When to escalate or stop
- If the mountpoint is
/dataand free space is under 5%, treat it as an imminent control-plane outage and get the operator. etcd and Longhorn are both on it. - Never delete anything under
/data/longhornor a Postgrespg_waldirectory by hand. Both are irreversible. Free space elsewhere, or fix the cause. - Do not
kubectl drainthe node to move load off it — this cluster does not drain. - If the cause is a CNPG archive failure, this runbook is the wrong one: go to
/runbooks/cnpg-archiving, which is the actual fix.
Source of truth: runbooks/node-disk.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: DECISIONS-LOG.md "Disk/drive incident + k3s relocated to NVMe (2026-08-22)";
platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml header (the WAL disk-full clock).