Files
home-network-k3s-impl/infra
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 b19c5db9ae feat(prod): node 3 onboarded — and it is NOT immune; BIOS-setting hypothesis disproven
k3s-prod-3 online at the planned 192.168.2.12 (serial 8CC015307N, same chassis/BIOS/CPU),
enabled in inventory, vaulted become confirmed, package floor installed. Health: 0 FAIL /
4 WARN / 14 PASS / 1 SKIP — the only node with zero FAILs. WD Blue WDS500G2B0A SATA SSD at
100% life, 3213 h, 0 grown bad blocks, 0 erase fails. Matched Crucial 2x16 GB pair — the only
node with symmetric memory.

*** NODE 3 IS NOT IMMUNE TO THE §0b BUG. *** Its firmware DOES publish a MAT
(MEMATTR=0xbeece018); the ABSENCE of a memattr diagnostic line means the kernel read a VALID
table, which is the opposite of immunity. There are THREE outcomes, not two: bail-out on a
garbage version >2, a valid parse with a sane size, and the catastrophic path. Seven boots across
three machines show the MAT address MOVES BOOT-TO-BOOT on every node with settings constant, and
each node has been seen on more than one path. Blast radius widens from two nodes to ALL THREE;
all three need the >= 6.13 kernel.

THE CORRUPTING BYTES ARE THE OS BOOT CHAIN, not firmware and not DRAM: garbage version
1463964749 = 0x5742544D appeared on node 2 AND node 3 — two different machines, identical bytes.
The overwriter is the shared shim/GRUB/EFI-stub/initrd placement writing into the page the
firmware pointed at. So initrd size, module set and boot device are part of the causal chain.

BIOS-SETTING HYPOTHESIS: DISPROVEN, and the three-way diff cannot support it even in principle.
All 240 attributes read on all three; firmware identical fleet-wide. The discriminating set (both
working nodes agree, broken differs) is seven attributes, of which:
  - Fast Boot is the ONLY live candidate, and only as a probability-shifter — HP documents it
    'skips some preboot initialization steps', which changes the heap top and hence where the MAT
    lands. Different mechanism from the previously-killed MRC-caching theory; that stays dead.
  - Legacy Boot Options is AFFIRMATIVELY INERT: 'Configure Legacy Support and Secure Boot' =
    'Legacy Support Disable and Secure Boot Enable' on ALL THREE, Option ROM Launch Policy =
    'All UEFI' on all three. No CSM is built on node 2 either. A naive diff gets this wrong.
  - the rest are coincidence. After Power Loss is ELIMINATED by node 3, which works and shares
    node 2's Power Off — though it is now a §1 checklist violation on TWO nodes.
FATAL CONFOUND: the 1=3!=2 partition is perfectly collinear with node 2 being the only
single-DIMM AND the only NVMe-booting node. Adding node 3 did not break the confound, it DOUBLED
it. No setting can be the cause anyway: node 2 booted good once and bad twice with settings held
constant.

EXPERIMENT DESIGN RECORDED because the obvious approach is statistically worthless: p(bad) is
known only to n=3, 95% CI ~0.09-0.99, so even 8 clean boots prove nothing. Elimination needs ~20
boots/arm; an odds shift needs ~50. Zero-touch first step: 20 reboots of node 2 unchanged, logging
MEMATTR address vs outcome — both failures were at exactly 0xbeeb0018 and all five successes
elsewhere, so if outcome maps onto a narrow address range the mechanism is settled without
touching anything.

ROLE BUG FIXED: node 3's WD drive reports a SMART threshold for only 1 of 25 attributes, and
smartctl OMITS the key rather than emitting 0 — summary.txt.j2 dereferenced a.thresh bare in five
places and the report task died, so no artifact was written. Added a thr() macro rendering 'n/a'
(deliberately not 0, which would read as a real ATA cannot-trip threshold). Would have hit any
drive of this class.

Also: three nodes, three different disk models, only one NVMe, and every node has a single disk
with no unpartitioned spare — so §2's identical-layout requirement is unmet on all three.

Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-OBS-04. Task: T-7.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-03 22:32:25 -05:00
..

infra/ — node provisioning and the toolchain

OpenTofu (Proxmox VE) + cloud-init + Ansible bring up the 3-node k3s/Cilium dev cluster. Spec: ../home-network-k3s/docs/02-environments-and-provisioning.md.

Path What
tofu/ The "Create" stage: 3 cloud-init'd VMs on the Proxmox box (bpg/proxmox provider)
cloud-init/ First-boot baseline shipped as a Proxmox user-data snippet
ansible/ The "Baseline"/"Configure" stages: k3s HA, Cilium, kube-vip, the VPN egress gateway
devcontainer/ The pinned toolchain (tofu, ansible, sops, age, flux, kubectl, helm and the whole CI gate toolchain)
cluster.sh RETIRED — drove the old libvirt VMs; does not work against Proxmox
PHASE1-STATUS.md Current state of the cluster and how to reconnect to it
PHASE1-SCOPE.md Historical Phase-1 scoping doc (libvirt era — superseded)

Where the cluster actually lives

The dev cluster is not on this workstation. It runs on a Proxmox VE host; the nodes sit on the Proxmox LAN and are reached across a pfSense NAT:

Nodes k3s-dev-1/2/3 at 192.168.1.50/.51/.52 — 6 vCPU, 24 GiB, Debian 13, k3s v1.36.4
kube-API kube-vip VIP 192.168.1.49:6443, reached from the workstation via NAT 192.168.2.50:6443
Node SSH pfSense NAT 192.168.2.102:2250/2251/2252 → node :22 (Ansible only)
Ingress VIP 192.168.1.53 (Cilium L2, shared Gateway); .53–.60 reserved for LB VIPs

The earlier libvirt/KVM cluster on 10.73.0.0/24 is retired. Any doc or command referencing virsh, qemu:///system, or 10.73.0.x for the cluster is historical.