Records K1-K9: extend-vs-sibling and why, the generated+gated desired state, verbatim token pass-through, per-pass fail-closed, order-insensitivity, unmanaged-means-untouched, public clients' URLs managed, one alert pair not two, and the mutation harness. Also records a process note: my first pass reported three false findings (reconciler absent from main, import not templated, BASE_DOMAIN dead) because I diffed against origin/main -- origin is dev's Gitea, stale at4809199, while the live remote is prod-gitea atfa4deac. All three were wrong. The rule for this repo is written down so the next agent does not repeat it: origin is not the source of truth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
platform/keycloak
Keycloak — the platform Identity Provider (SSO via OIDC + SAML), onboarded early (Phase 6 IdP).
- Governing ADR: ADR-0014 — IdP: Keycloak
- Spec: docs/15 — Identity & Access
- Serves: R-IDP-01..06
- Owner: WS-SEC
Image / tooling strategy (F-KY1 landmine avoided)
The original stub used the Bitnami Keycloak chart + bundled Bitnami PostgreSQL. Bitnami's free Docker Hub images were purged (DECISIONS-LOG F-KY1) → that path ImagePullBackOffs. Replaced with:
- Keycloak: the official Keycloak Operator (
quay.io/keycloak/keycloak-operator+quay.io/keycloak/keycloak, v26.0.6) driving aKeycloakCR + aKeycloakRealmImportCR for config-as-code (ADR-0014 permits Operator OR Helm; Operator gives clean CR-driven realm reconcile). - Database: CloudNativePG (
ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg, see../cnpg) — aClusteron the 3-replicalonghornStorageClass (DR-critical, R-IDP-05), with declarative backup hooks.
quay.io + ghcr.io are unaffected by the Bitnami purge. Operator manifests are pinned upstream release files pulled as remote kustomize bases (the kubevirt-stub pattern); Renovate maintains the version.
Layout (controllers / configs split — F-MON1)
| File | Applied by | What |
|---|---|---|
kustomization.yaml (namespace, operator CRDs+Deployment, admin secret, dashboard) |
platform | controllers |
keycloak-instance.yaml (Keycloak CR, ${KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS}) |
platform-config | config |
postgres-cluster.yaml (CNPG Cluster on longhorn) |
platform-config | config |
keycloak-realm-import.yaml (KeycloakRealmImport: realm/groups/clients/MFA) |
platform-config | config |
client-secret-reconciler.yaml (CronJob: client secrets and client URLs ← git, every 15m) |
platform-config | config |
client-urls.yaml (GENERATED ConfigMap: the client-URL desired state) |
platform-config | config |
httproute.yaml (keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev) |
platform-config | config |
servicemonitor.yaml (Prometheus scrape) |
platform-config | config |
Realm config (groups platform-admins/media-users/viewers, OIDC clients grafana+oauth2-proxy,
brute-force ON, and a conditional MFA browser flow that REQUIRES OTP for platform-admins, R-IDP-04)
reconciles purely from git — no console clicking (R-IDP-03).
Admin credential + break-glass (R-IDP-04 / R-IDP-05)
The provisioned keycloak-admin-credentials.sops.yaml (keys admin-user/admin-password) is injected
as the temporary bootstrap/break-glass admin via KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_* env (podTemplate escape
hatch) — this consumes the secret as provisioned, without re-keying it (the operator's native
bootstrapAdmin wants username/password keys, which would require editing the encrypted file).
The Keycloak bootstrap admin is the documented break-glass path so an IdP/SSO outage does not lock the
operator out (ADR-0014); Grafana likewise keeps its local admin login until SSO is proven.
Operator hand-offs (fill before / during deploy)
keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml(keycloak ns) — from.sops.yaml.example. One<clientId>-client-secretkey per confidential client,openssl rand -hex 32each. The realm import injects them into the Keycloak clients viaspec.placeholders. Add tokustomization.yamlonce filled. The key name MUST be<clientId>-client-secret— the reconciler below derives the clientId from it, and CI rejects any other name. (This step used to read "the realm import stays PENDING until this exists". It does not — see the next section. That false belief is what allowed the 2026-09-06 outage.)../oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml(oauth2-proxy ns) —client-id: oauth2-proxy,client-secret= the SAMEoauth2-proxy-client-secretabove,cookie-secret=openssl rand -base64 32.../monitoring/grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml(monitoring ns) —client-secret= the SAMEgrafana-client-secretabove.
(Cross-namespace Secrets can't be shared, so each client secret is stored twice — once for the realm
import in keycloak, once for the consuming app.) See the two .sops.yaml.example templates for the
exact keys + steps. No plaintext secret is ever committed.
Client secrets: the realm import fails OPEN, so a reconciler owns them (2026-09-06)
The realm import is a one-shot that fails open. Measured on both clusters:
- When the operator cannot resolve a
$(env:...)placeholder it stores the literal placeholder text as the client secret — and the import Job still exits 0. There is no PENDING state, no error condition, andHasErrorsstaysFalse. - Once complete the CR rests at
Done=True/Started=Falseand never re-runs, so a Secret key added later is never picked up.
Together those produced a total SSO outage on prod (all 12 clients holding the literal placeholder;
every login rejected with "Invalid client or Invalid client credentials") and a single broken client
on dev (oauth2-proxy, whose key was added after dev's import had already completed). Every cluster
signal was green throughout, including the conformance test that asserts Done=True.
Three layers now cover it:
| Layer | Where | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Prevent | conformance/tests/l0-static/keycloak-client-secret-reconciler (runs on every merge, unconditionally, from ci/l0.sh) |
Every placeholder is defined, reads keycloak-realm-clients, and names an existing key called <clientId>-client-secret; public clients declare no secret; and the Flux Kustomization applying the Secret is a real transitive dependsOn ancestor (wait: true) of the ones applying the import and the reconciler. A missing SOPS key is now unmergeable. |
| Heal | client-secret-reconciler.yaml — CronJob, every 15m, two passes |
Compares each client's stored secret with the mounted keycloak-realm-clients value and PUTs the minimal {clientId, secret} representation only where they differ; a second, independent pass does the same for the client URLs against the generated client-urls.yaml (see below). Skips correct clients, never logs a secret, holds a hard endpoint allow-list so users/groups/roles/flows are unreachable, and needs no Kubernetes API access (automountServiceAccountToken: false). |
| Detect | conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/keycloak-client-secrets-match-git + alerts KeycloakClientSecretReconcilerFailing / …Stale |
Runs the same script in read-only --audit mode against the live realm and fails on any mismatch, literal placeholder or drifted client URL; the alerts make the reconciler's silence observable in prod. |
The reconciler's own --selftest (run by the L0 gate, which extracts the script from the shipped
ConfigMap) proves compare-then-write, idempotence (zero writes on a converged realm),
no-secret-logging, the endpoint allow-list, and fail-closed behaviour.
Manual repair / one-off run (the CronJob normally does this):
kubectl -n keycloak create job --from=cronjob/keycloak-client-secret-reconciler kc-fix-$(date +%s)
kubectl -n keycloak logs -l app.kubernetes.io/name=keycloak-client-secret-reconciler --tail=-1
Client URLs: the same one-shot failure, one field over
Moving an environment's BASE_DOMAIN re-renders every declared redirectUris / webOrigins /
rootUrl / baseUrl / adminUrl in git — and reaches the realm never, because a completed
import does not re-run. Measured on prod: stored redirect URIs still on the pre-migration hostname
while git declared the new one. Every OIDC login then fails with a redirect_uri mismatch, the
KeycloakRealmImport still reads Done=True, and nothing alerts.
Pass 2 of the same CronJob closes it. It was made a second pass of the existing reconciler rather
than a sibling CronJob for one decisive reason: a URL write needs no new endpoint. It is the same
minimal PUT /admin/realms/<realm>/clients/<uuid>, and the current URLs already come back in the
allow-listed client lookup — so the hard allow-list that makes /users, /groups, /roles and
/authentication unreachable is widened by nothing, and is preserved rather than re-declared in a
second copy. (The ConfigMap also carries exactly one script key by L0 contract, so a sibling would
have had to fork ~300 lines of safety-critical code the header explicitly forbids forking.)
The desired state is generated, not authored. client-urls.yaml is rendered from
keycloak-realm-import.yaml by ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py, and the L0 gate runs that
renderer with --check on every merge, so the committed file cannot disagree with the import. URL
strings are copied verbatim — a ${BASE_DOMAIN} token passes through unchanged, and both files are
rendered by the same Flux Kustomization, so both are substituted in one pass with one value. The
renderer never parses a hostname and never reads cluster-vars: there is no second place the domain
can be decided.
# regenerate after editing a client URL in the realm import (the gate will demand it)
python3 ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py --write
Properties, each proved by --selftest and each shown to be falsifiable by
conformance/tests/l0-static/keycloak-client-secret-reconciler/mutations.py:
- Converged ⇒ zero writes. List fields compare order-insensitively (
sorted, notset— duplicates are still drift), because Keycloak does not preserve the authored order ofredirectUris; an order-sensitive compare would rewrite every client forever while reporting success. - Gaining and losing a URI both work. The declared list is exact, so a URI removed from git is removed from the realm — a stale wildcard left behind quietly widens what the realm will redirect to.
- Undeclared ⇒ unmanaged. A field the desired state omits is left exactly as it is. Absence never means "force to empty".
- Public clients' URLs are managed (their secrets are not):
kubernetesis PKCE-public and its localhost callbacks are whatkubectllogins land on. - The two passes are independent. Each reads its own desired state and fails closed for its own fields only. A malformed URL ConfigMap cannot stop client-secret repair, and an unmounted Secret cannot stop URL repair.
- URLs are logged in full (they are public hostnames, and the before/after is what makes a migration auditable); secrets are still never logged.
What the reconciler does NOT fix: anything outside client secrets and those five URL fields. A
NEW client, a new protocol mapper or a changed scope still needs the realm import to actually re-run
(it will not on its own) or a deliberate admin-API/kcadm change. Done=True is never evidence that
a realm edit landed.
Exceptions that keep native auth (do not force SSO) — ADR-0014
Plex/Seerr (Plex auth), Minecraft (Mojang/Microsoft), UniFi (native).