Closes the LAST scaffold-only safety-critical requirement. The operator has attested DR works (Velero -> Proxmox versitygw S3, restore demonstrated), but the L3 test carried the right tag and layer label over a 5-line TODO body — so coverage counted it and reported "0 safety-critical gaps" while the suite asserted nothing. That was test debt, not capability debt. This makes the suite assert what the operator already demonstrated. Three steps: 1. assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster (read-only): BSL must be phase Available (Velero itself reached the store), s3Url host is not localhost/*.svc/*.cluster.local, and the resolved IPv4 is none of — loopback, any Node Internal/ExternalIP, any Service ClusterIP, any Pod IP, inside any node podCIDR, inside any ServiceCIDR. A BSL that exists but never reaches Available FAILS (a live DR defect), it does not skip. 2. assert-backups-are-scheduled: R-STATE-03 says SCHEDULED off-cluster backups — Velero + BSL but zero Schedule in phase Enabled is a fail. 3. The drill: seed a nanosecond-unique canary onto a longhorn PVC in its own scratch namespace; Backup to Completed; assert a PodVolumeBackup for that volume is Completed WITH a non-empty status.snapshotID (the kopia snapshot of volume DATA reached the remote repo, not just resource JSON); ANNIHILATE the source (delete ns, poll until gone, force-delete a lingering PV, FAIL if the original PV survived — a survivor makes the restore prove nothing); Restore with namespaceMapping into a clean namespace; assert the restored PVC bound a DIFFERENT PV and that the canary bytes are identical. Off-cluster proof = endpoint outside every cluster address + BSL Available + kopia snapshotID present + every in-cluster copy destroyed + restore landing on a new PV. The bytes could only have come from outside. Skips GREEN on: no longhorn SC, Velero API absent, no BSL, Velero/node-agent not ready — all three steps re-derive the same gates so it can never half-run. An RBAC denial is deliberately NOT a skip: it fails loudly as a harness defect. Teardown is a step-level `finally` that ALWAYS runs — deletes the Restore, issues a DeleteBackupRequest so objects leave the bucket (2h ttl as backstop), deletes both scratch namespaces by name and by label, releases leftover PVs whose claimRef is one of its own. Everything it destroys is something it created. conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml: authored the R-STATE-03 grants (velero.io backups/ restores/deletebackuprequests create+delete+read; BSL/schedules/podvolume* read-only; persistentvolumes get/list/DELETE — the off-cluster proof requires destroying the PV). Also two pre-existing gaps other tests already depended on: storageclasses get/list (the skip gate of five tests) and apps deployments/daemonsets read. No write verbs on platform controllers. NOT ASSERTED, stated in the file header rather than implied: off-HOST (on dev the nodes are VMs on the same Proxmox host as the S3 target, so this does not survive hypervisor loss); no direct S3 client read (that would hand a privileged test identity the backup credential for weaker evidence); real service data (Nextcloud/Gitea/CNPG drills stay operator exercises); bare-metal rebuild DR; encryption-at-rest; retention/GC. status: scaffold-only 5 -> 4; safety-critical w/o executable L3 1 -> 0 (of 6); executable 35 -> 36. coverage unchanged at 40/51 (correct — coverage only asks whether a tagged test exists). PROVEN stayed 0 / not-derivable: it did NOT flip to proven just because the body is non-empty. AUTHORED, NEVER EXECUTED — carries a conformance.home.k3s/never-executed annotation. No cluster access from this workstation. To convert authored -> proven the operator must, IN A MAINTENANCE WINDOW (it deletes namespaces and PVs and writes/deletes bucket objects): apply the updated rbac.yaml, run `./conformance/run.sh --requirements R-STATE-03 --layer l3`, confirm the log shows DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK and NOT DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK (green but proves nothing), confirm no leaked *-dr-src/*-dr-dst namespaces or orphan PVs or *-dr-backup objects, and record the green run. Serves: R-STATE-03, R-TEST-05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Conformance tests — layout & requirement-tagging convention
Every test is a Chainsaw Test in its own directory:
tests/
l0-static/ L0 — whole-repo invariants over the tracked tree (no cluster)
l1-rendering/ L1 — ServiceDefinition -> rendered resources match golden
l2-behavioral/ L2 — real runtime behavior (probes against a cluster)
l3-fault-injection/ L3 — break something; assert fail-closed / no-data-loss
meta/ harness self-checks (R-TEST-*), cluster-independent
<test-name>/chainsaw-test.yaml
The layer a test belongs to is its subtree and its .../layer annotation; the
coverage generator cross-checks the two.
L0 static (l0-static/) — what belongs here, and what does not
docs/14's L0 row is "Pre-apply, in CI · manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants".
Kyverno (platform/kyverno/) covers the invariants expressible over a single
resource. This subtree covers the L0 invariants that are properties of the repository
as a whole and that no per-resource policy can state — e.g. no plaintext secret exists
anywhere in the tracked tree, no tracked RoleBinding grants a workload identity a
privileged role, the spec-immutability gate actually blocks a modified spec.
Each l0-static/<name>/ dir carries a check.sh: a self-contained offline assertion
script (git + Python stdlib/PyYAML; no cluster, no network) that exits 0/1. It is executed:
- by
conformance/run.sh --layer l0(and as the offline leg of a full run), vialib/run_l1_offline.py, producing a REAL pass/fail JUnit entry — never a skip; and - by the merge gate's
ci/l0.shstage, so these assertions run on every PR; and - by the wrapping Chainsaw
Test, which runs the SAMEcheck.sh, so an in-cluster run executes byte-identical assertions.
Two authoring rules specific to this layer:
- State the gap. A statically-provable half of a requirement is still only half.
Every
check.shheader ends with an explicit "what this does NOT prove" list naming the cluster-layer remainder. Covering a requirement at L0 does not finish it. - Exemptions must be self-policing. Where a check must tolerate something (a
deliberately-plaintext policy fixture, an
.exampletemplate), the exemption is conditioned on a property that would break if the exemption were abused — e.g. the plaintext Secret fixture is exempt only while akyverno-test.yamlasserts the policy rejects it. Never a bare path allowlist.
Requirement-tagging convention (authoritative)
A test declares the requirement(s) it verifies three ways; the label is the source of truth, the annotations must agree with it (the coverage generator fails on drift):
metadata:
name: default-deny
labels:
# ONE label per verified R-* ID. Machine-selectable + coverage source of truth.
conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-01: "true"
annotations:
# Human-readable canonical list — MUST equal the label set.
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-01"
# Declared layer (L0|L1|L2|L3|META) — must match the subtree.
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
# true => R-TEST-05 requires this to be (or have) an L3 fault-injection test.
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
# Given/When/Then intent, for the coverage report and reviewers.
conformance.home.k3s/intent: "Given ... When ... Then ..."
Why a label per requirement (not a comma list): Kubernetes label values can't hold
a comma-separated list, and chainsaw test --selector selects on label keys/values.
One conformance.home.k3s/<R-ID>=true label per requirement makes both subset-selection
and coverage extraction exact and robust.
How this drives the tooling
- Subset runs (merge gate):
run.sh --requirements R-NET-01,R-NET-06resolves the R-IDs to the set of test dirs carrying those labels (union, deduped) and runs each once. - Coverage (
lib/coverage.py): reads these labels from everychainsaw-test.yaml, maps each registry requirement -> its verifying test(s), and flags gaps + any label/annotation mismatch + tags not in the registry. - JUnit: results (real or skipped-scaffold) carry the R-IDs in
classname+ properties, so the JUnit itself stays traceable (R-TEST-04).
Authoring rules (R-TEST-01/02/06)
- Behavior, not existence. Assert what the system does (a probe cannot connect), never that an object merely exists (a policy can exist and not enforce).
- Given/When/Then structure with
given-*/when-*/then-*step names. - Hermetic & self-cleaning. Rely on Chainsaw's per-test namespace + auto-teardown;
put any out-of-namespace fixture cleanup in a
finallyblock. A leaked fixture is a failure. - Bounded, deterministic waits. Use assert/error polling within the config timeouts;
never
sleep-and-hope. - Safety-critical => fault-injection. For a safety-critical requirement, actually
break the thing and assert fail-closed / no-data-loss, with
finallyrestoring state. - Never weaken a test to go green (R-TEST-06). If the spec can't be met, escalate to the PM — do not relax the assertion or the requirement.
Scaffolds in this tree carry TODO(T-x.y) markers where a fixture/assertion lands as a
later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test. lib/status.py treats such a
marker — in the chainsaw-test.yaml, in render-check.sh, or in check.sh — as
outranking any conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true" annotation, so a placeholder body
can never be reported as an executable test.