jakman85andClaude Opus 5
99560c2d22
PR #28 fixed the cookie collision, the 5-minute session and the missing metrics
listener in one renderer function, and deliberately declined `--api-route`
because the config model could not express the difference between two apps.
This adds the hook it was missing and sets the flag only where a measurement
says to.
THE DEFECT. oauth2-proxy answers an unauthenticated request with a 302 to
Keycloak. Its AJAX guard would send 401 instead, but it fires only on an EXACT
`Accept: application/json`, which these apps' JavaScript does not consistently
send. So a browser XHR gets a 302, FOLLOWS IT INVISIBLY, has it satisfied
silently by the live SSO session, and resolves 200 carrying the app's HTML where
the JavaScript expected JSON. On a write it is worse: a browser following a 302
re-issues a POST as a GET and DROPS THE BODY, so the operator's change is
discarded and the UI reports success.
MEASURED, on two apps and two different paths -- which is the whole argument:
jackett 2026-09-30: 33 x 302 vs 2 x 401 on /api/ paths, and 4 of 6 POSTs
answered by the proxy and never reaching Jackett (upstream `-`).
radarr 2026-10-01, 23h after PR #28 deployed (pod radarr-7d55cbffb9-42hmh,
0 restarts): 232 unauthenticated requests in the pod's whole life and
ALL 232 are the same call -- POST /signalr/messages/negotiate from a
browser, 302, upstream `-`. A left-open tab whose session the cookie
rename orphaned, polling forever, silently redirected every time and
NEVER re-prompting. The reported symptom, still in production.
So radarr's broken path is /signalr/ and jackett's is /api/, and PIHOLE SERVES
NO /api/ AT ALL. One function renders all five sidecars, so the cheap fix is a
constant -- and a constant applies one app's measurement to four apps nobody
measured. `auth` was `additionalProperties: false`, so there was no per-app
hook. Adding one named, documented key is the change; the block stays closed.
schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json 1.8.0 -> 1.9.0: optional
`auth.apiRoutes`, a list (radarr needs two, and --api-route is natively
repeatable) of anchored path regexes. Plus the shape invariant that a
non-empty list requires mode: forward-auth, since no sidecar is rendered
for oidc/native/none and declaring it there would be a SILENT NO-OP.
catalog/render.py emits one --api-route per entry, in order, and RAISES on
an unanchored entry. The flag is SINGULAR -- verified against the pinned
v7.8.1 binary's own --help; --api-routes does not exist and the proxy
refuses to start with it.
catalog/{jackett,radarr}.yaml the two measured apps.
catalog/{pihole,sonarr,qbittorrent}.yaml comments recording that they get
NOTHING, and why. Sonarr and qBittorrent were measured (0 unauthenticated
requests in 23h) and left alone: that is evidence of no TRAFFIC, not of no
need, and sonarr being nearly radarr's codebase is what makes the guess
tempting and still a guess.
apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml, apps/wave-1/radarr.yaml regenerated. Only TWO
goldens change; pihole/qbittorrent/sonarr are byte-identical to main,
which is the per-app property proving itself on the real tree.
BREADTH IS THE DANGEROUS DIRECTION AND IT IS NOT SYMMETRIC. A missing
--api-route is a silent 302. A too-broad one answers a plain PAGE LOAD with
401, so a logged-out operator gets a bare error page and is never offered a
sign-in -- the service looks permanently broken. Each entry must therefore
match `^\^/[A-Za-z0-9._~/-]+(\.\*|\$)?$`: anchored at ^/ then literal path
characters. `^/`, `^/.*`, `.*`, `/api/` and `^/api/|^/` are all rejected, all
five provoked. Alternation is refused rather than supported because the flag is
repeatable, so one entry per route costs nothing.
NEW GATE CHECK: conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-api-routes-per-app
(whole-repo scope, so ci/l0.sh's --include-scope union runs it on every
invocation; no bespoke stage, which whole-repo-invariants-wired would fail).
It is a SIBLING of oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct, not an extension of it:
that check's subject is cookie IDENTITY and shares neither inputs nor failure
mode with this, so bundling them would make its name a lie and let a future
api-route decision be expressed only by weakening a COOKIE check.
The check exists for one reason the other gates cannot cover: render-golden
compares the render to the goldens, so a RENDERER CONSTANT plus regenerated
goldens AGREE WITH EACH OTHER while both being wrong. Provoked: the regen exits
0 -- render-golden is happy -- and this check exits 1 with 15 failures naming
pihole, qbittorrent, radarr and sonarr individually. It also asserts the
anchoring pattern is the SAME in the schema and the renderer, because three
surfaces guard this and if they drift the loosest wins silently.
Tested in both directions on throwaway trees outside the repo: compliant tree
rc 0 / 43 assertions / 6 sidecars; pre-change tree rc 1 / 11 failures; and four
targeted mutations (hand-edited golden, widened regex, renderer constant,
deleted schema pattern) each firing their own assertion class and nothing else.
ALSO FOLDED IN (coordinator's request; defect is in the file I own). _selftest()
reached _cookie_name() through a bare `next(genexpr)` with NO default, so
deleting the --cookie-name emission -- the exact mutation that assertion exists
to catch -- raised StopIteration, which escaped _selftest() BEFORE its collected
`SELFTEST FAIL:` lines were printed. Right verdict, zero diagnostics, and it
masked every other assertion the same mutation broke (found by Desmond Oyelaran
while wiring the selftest into the render-golden stage; his PR #33 is not in this
base -- origin/main @ cdf3e14 drives the selftest from no stage, checked). Fixed
with `next(..., None)` plus an explicit check(), so a missing flag reports as a
NAMED assertion. Provoking it exposed three more instances of the same class in
the same block -- `side = fa_containers[1]`, `side["env"][0]`, and the fa_svc
lookup all raise rather than assert when the sidecar is absent -- so all four are
now None-tolerant, and the two fixtures added for --api-route were written that
way from the start. Measured on throwaway copies:
--cookie-name deleted: before rc 1 / 0 FAIL lines / StopIteration
after rc 1 / 3 FAIL lines / no traceback
sidecar not appended: before rc 1 / 0 FAIL lines / IndexError
after rc 1 / 20 FAIL lines / no traceback
Goldens are unchanged by this part; it touches _selftest() only.
NOT verified, in full in the handoff entry: no browser round-trip by anyone for
this flag -- that a 401 REPAIRS the operator's experience is reasoned from HTTP
semantics, not watched. `^/api/` on radarr is PR #30's measurement of radarr's
pre-fix pod, not mine; the current pod has zero /api/ traffic. Sonarr and
qBittorrent are UNMEASURED, not cleared. --cookie-refresh is still unexercised
(0 AuthSuccess on all five pods). Nothing was applied; the live pods are still
the pre-change spec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
82 lines
5.5 KiB
YAML
82 lines
5.5 KiB
YAML
# ServiceDefinition: jackett
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# Source of truth: spec docs/13-service-catalog.md row 4; docs/03-networking-isolation-and-egress.md;
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# docs/15-identity-and-access.md; decisions/adr-0015 (VPN egress steering).
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# internal indexer proxy | egress VPN + kill-switch | config on Longhorn | auth forward-auth
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# (bare web UI, no native OIDC).
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#
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# VPN-class (docs/13 row 4; docs/03 "VPN-class set"): Jackett scrapes public torrent indexers/trackers;
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# that egress MUST leave via the node PIA tunnel, never the WAN. `egress: vpn` renders the
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# homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class=vpn pod label the shared CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy
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# (platform/vpn-egress/egress-steering.yaml) selects on to steer + kill-switch the traffic OUTSIDE the
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# workload (R-NET-05/06/07). No independent egress path; fail-closed if tun0 is down.
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#
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# Inbound reachability (← sonarr, ← radarr) is an EAST-WEST allow rendered on the arr side when those
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# services are onboarded. This service initiates nothing east-west, so dependencies is empty (reaches
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# only DNS + VPN internet). Validates against schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json.
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name: jackett
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kind: container
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source:
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image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:latest
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exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 4; R-DNS/R-NET)
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egress: vpn # indexer scraping via node PIA tunnel + kill-switch (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
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storage:
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- name: config
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size: 2Gi
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class: longhorn # indexer definitions/API keys on 3-replica Longhorn (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
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mountPath: /config # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
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# LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
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# /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
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# holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
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# configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
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# every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
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# 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
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# dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
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# This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
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# The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
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# so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
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dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
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ingressRoutes:
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- host: jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
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port: 9117 # Jackett WebUI; protected at the Gateway by forward-auth (docs/09, docs/15)
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auth:
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mode: forward-auth # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
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groups:
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- media-users # authenticated AND in an authorized group (R-IDP-06)
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# platform-admins is a SUPERSET, not a widening. --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
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# listing both means "media consumers OR platform operators". Without it the media UIs are
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# reachable by NOBODY the moment media-users is empty: on prod the realm's only user is the
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# operator, who is in platform-admins only, so jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr answered an
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# immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback (no login prompt, because the Keycloak SSO session
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# already existed) while pihole/crafty — which already gate on platform-admins — worked.
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# This grants no real privilege: platform-admins already maps to cluster-admin via
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# k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins), so a member can already exec into these pods.
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- platform-admins # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
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# Answer Jackett's OWN API with 401 instead of a 302 to Keycloak (schema 1.9.0; renders
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# --api-route, singular and repeatable, onto the oauth2-proxy sidecar).
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#
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# MEASURED on this pod's access log, 2026-09-30: on /api/ paths, 33 x 302 against 2 x 401 —
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# and 4 of 6 POSTs were answered BY THE PROXY and never reached Jackett (access-log upstream
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# field `-`, not `/`), including both `/api/v2.0/server/update` calls. Jackett's jQuery does
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# not send the exact `Accept: application/json` oauth2-proxy's AJAX guard requires, so the
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# 302 was followed invisibly, satisfied silently by the live Keycloak SSO session, and
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# resolved 200 carrying the dashboard's HTML where the JavaScript expected JSON. A browser
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# following a 302 also re-issues a POST as a GET and DROPS THE BODY, which is why "adding an
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# indexer silently does nothing" was the user-visible symptom and nothing logged a failure.
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#
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# SCOPE: `/api/` only. Jackett serves its UI at /UI/ and its static assets elsewhere, and a
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# browser never NAVIGATES to /api/ — so a plain page load is still 302'd into a silent SSO
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# sign-in, which is the behaviour that must not change.
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apiRoutes:
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- ^/api/
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update:
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channel: stable # R-UPD-01
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range: ">=0.22.0" # stay on the Jackett 0.22.x stable line
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cadence: "0 4 * * *"
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autoRollbackOnFailedHealth: true # R-UPD-03
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observability:
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metrics: true
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slis:
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- up # indexer proxy down -> alert (docs/10; R-OBS-01)
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backup:
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policy: daily-offcluster # indexer config/API keys backed up off-cluster (docs/04; R-STATE-03)
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