Two things found while reviewing the Longhorn alert work. Prometheus retentionSize was 45GiB of a 50Gi PVC, under a comment already naming the right intent — 'headroom for WAL + head + compaction scratch'. 5 GiB is not that: retentionSize counts only persisted blocks, and a large compaction can need roughly the size of the blocks being merged. ENOSPC on /prometheus wedges every WAL commit, so scrapes keep succeeding while nothing is stored and every absent()/==0 alert fires falsely at once. Lowered to 36GiB, which costs no history: the TSDB is 11.2 GiB at 30d, so 30d remains the binding limit. runbooks/longhorn-degraded.md asserted that concurrentVolumeBackupRestore- PerNodeLimit and snapshotHeavyTaskConcurrentLimit 'was actually tightened 5 -> 1'. Both read 5 on prod and neither name appears anywhere in this repo — the work is on the unmerged fix/etcd-io-priority branch. The page is read during etcd I/O starvation on a node whose WAL shares a device with Longhorn, so it was telling an operator mid-incident that the cap they depend on is in place when it is not. Corrected, with the two mitigations that ARE real named and a command to verify any of them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
194 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
194 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# longhorn-degraded — A Longhorn volume has been degraded for 10 minutes
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**Alert:** `LonghornVolumeDegraded` (warning, 10m)
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**File:** `platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml`, group `platform-health.longhorn`
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**Expression:** `longhorn_volume_robustness{state="degraded"} == 1` (one-hot over `state`, NOT a 0-3 enum)
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## What this means here
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A volume has fewer healthy replicas than it should. It is **still serving I/O** — that is the
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difference between degraded and faulted (`/runbooks/longhorn-faulted`). What you have lost is
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redundancy, and on a 3-node cluster with hard node anti-affinity
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(`replicaSoftAntiAffinity: false`, `numberOfReplicas: 3`) one degraded volume means one more node
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loss away from data loss.
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**Degraded is the NORMAL state after any node reboot on this cluster, and it is expensive.**
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Recorded plainly in the stabilization notes: *"Longhorn on the HDD: every node reboot degrades all 18
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volumes → full rebuild (slow; 30%+ IO-delay). Roll reboots one node at a time; wait
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`robustness=healthy` before the next."* The rebuild is the thing that hurts, not the degradation:
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rebuild writes land on the same partition as the embedded etcd WAL (`/data/k3s` and `/data/longhorn`
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share one device), and that is the mechanism behind the 2026-09-07 `k3s-prod-1` NotReady outage. So
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the question to answer is never just "why is it degraded" but "is the rebuild about to take a node
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out". Cross-read `/runbooks/node-io`.
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### Verify the alert can fire (measured 2026-09-13, and it was inert TWICE)
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This rule was inert for two independent reasons, both fixed on 2026-09-13, and either one alone was
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enough to make a faulted or degraded volume alert nobody:
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1. **No scrape.** `count(longhorn_volume_robustness)` returned 0 series — the longhorn_* family was
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absent from the TSDB because the chart's `metrics.serviceMonitor.enabled` defaulted false. Fixed
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in `platform/longhorn/helmrelease.yaml`.
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2. **Wrong metric shape.** With the series present the rule STILL could not fire. It read
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`longhorn_volume_robustness == 2` on the assumption of a 0–3 enum; on longhorn 1.12.1 the metric
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is one-hot over a `state` label with values 0/1 only. Measured on prod the same day:
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`count(longhorn_volume_robustness)` = 96 (24 volumes × 4 states),
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`count by (state) (longhorn_volume_robustness == 1)` = `{state="healthy"} 24`, and
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`count(longhorn_volume_robustness == 2)` = **empty**. Fixed by keying on the label.
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Both directions are now pinned offline by `platform/monitoring/tests/longhorn.test.yaml`, which keeps
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a regression case asserting the old `== 2` form matches nothing. Check the live series before
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trusting this alert's silence:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring exec \
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prometheus-kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus-0 -c prometheus -- \
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/bin/promtool query instant http://localhost:9090 \
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'count by (state) (longhorn_volume_robustness)'
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```
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Four states, 24 each, is healthy wiring. Empty means the scrape has broken and this alert is inert
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again — do not infer "no alert, so volumes are fine".
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## Running the commands in this runbook
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`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
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container, and the host's `k3s-oidc` context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
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that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
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Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
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picks a current-context per invocation, and **that default has already changed once** — it was k3s-dev
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until dev was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, and is k3s-prod now. A command that names its context means
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the same thing next month as it does today; one that relies on the default does not, and the failure is
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silent (it answers confidently about the other cluster). `CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run
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kubectl ...` selects it explicitly, and every invocation prints a banner naming the cluster it is about
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to talk to — read it. Do not run two `dev.sh` invocations at once; they share one container and
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interfere.
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USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind `Backup`:
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`longhorn.io/v1beta2`, `postgresql.cnpg.io/v1` and `velero.io/v1`. The bare short name resolves to
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Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so `kubectl get backup -A` prints **"No resources found"** on
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a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
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"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
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`backups.velero.io`, `backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`,
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`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
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Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
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agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy).
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Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
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## First commands
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The truth about robustness, straight from the CRs (this works whether or not the metric does):
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io \
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-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROBUST:.status.robustness,STATE:.status.state,NODE:.status.currentNodeID,SIZE:.spec.size'
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```
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Which replicas are missing, and where:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get replicas.longhorn.io \
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-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,VOL:.spec.volumeName,NODE:.spec.nodeID,RUNNING:.status.currentState | sort -k2'
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```
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Which PVC/workload is affected:
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pv -o custom-columns=PV:.metadata.name,CLAIM:.spec.claimRef.namespace/.spec.claimRef.name,SC:.spec.storageClassName'
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```
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Are the nodes and their disks schedulable, and is a rebuild in flight?
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get nodes.longhorn.io -o wide; echo; \
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kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get settings.longhorn.io concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,VALUE:.value'
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```
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And the pressure that rebuild is causing — the reason this alert matters:
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```
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ssh k3s-prod-1 'cat /proc/pressure/io'
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```
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## Likely causes, most likely first
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### 1. A node rebooted or was briefly NotReady (overwhelmingly the most common)
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Expected, and it self-heals by rebuilding. Your job is to keep the rebuild from taking a node down.
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Remediation (operator, mutating) — freeze rebuilds while replicas will **reattach** (an in-place
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bounce):
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```
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infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
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'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system patch settings.longhorn.io \
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concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit --type=merge -p "{\"value\":\"0\"}"'
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```
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Thaw to `"1"` — never higher — once every volume reads `healthy`. Use `1` rather than `0` when the
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replicas are genuinely gone (an OS re-provision), so replenishment can actually proceed.
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`concurrentReplicaRebuildPerNodeLimit: 1` was **already in force during the 2026-09-07 outage and
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held**; do not "fix" this by setting a knob that is already set. `replicaRebuildingBandwidthLimit` is
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**v2/SPDK-only** and does nothing here; `rebuildConcurrentSyncLimit` is already at its floor of 1.
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What was *intended* after that incident was to tighten every **other** Longhorn I/O source —
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`concurrentVolumeBackupRestorePerNodeLimit` and `snapshotHeavyTaskConcurrentLimit` 5 -> 1.
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> **DO NOT RELY ON THAT: it was never applied.** Measured on prod 2026-09-13,
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> `snapshot-heavy-task-concurrent-limit` = **5** and
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> `concurrent-volume-backup-restore-per-node-limit` = **5**. Neither name appears anywhere in this
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> repository, so nothing declares them and nothing would restore them. The work lives on the
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> UNMERGED branch `fix/etcd-io-priority` ("cap every OTHER I/O source, and delete one setting that
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> was inert"), whose tree is far behind `main` and must be cherry-picked, not merged.
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>
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> Only two of the four mitigations this page implies are real:
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> `concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit` = **1** (its floor, as stated) and
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> `node-drain-policy` = **block-if-contains-last-replica**. Verify any limit before you trust it:
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> `kubectl -n longhorn-system get setting <name> -o jsonpath='{.value}'`.
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>
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> This matters here specifically because the incident being described is etcd I/O starvation on a
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> node whose WAL shares a device with Longhorn. If you are reading this page during that failure,
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> the I/O cap you are counting on is not in place.
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### 2. A node is still down
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Then the rebuild cannot complete and this will not clear. Go to `/runbooks/node-down` first; there is
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nothing to fix in Longhorn.
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### 3. A disk was replaced and Longhorn refuses it
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Signature: `DiskFilesystemChanged` — *"record diskUUID doesn't match the one on the disk"*.
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Remediation, in exactly this order (the validating webhook enforces it): **disable the disk → remove
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the disk entry → re-add it**. Seen during the 2026-09-07 drive swap.
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### 4. No node can hold the replica (anti-affinity or space)
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Hard anti-affinity means a 3-replica volume needs three distinct schedulable nodes. With one node
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cordoned or its disk over `storageMinimalAvailablePercentage: 25`, the third replica cannot be
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placed and the volume stays degraded indefinitely. Check `nodes.longhorn.io` scheduling and
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`/runbooks/longhorn-capacity`.
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### 5. `replicaAutoBalance: best-effort` is shuffling replicas
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Normal background behaviour, transient. If degradation follows a pattern of replicas moving and never
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settling, that is worth an operator's attention.
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## When to escalate or stop
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- **If more than one volume is degraded and I/O-PSI on any node is climbing, freeze rebuilds first
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and then get the operator.** That combination is the 2026-09-07 failure mode in progress.
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- **Never reboot, cordon or re-provision a second node while any volume is degraded.** This is the
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single most important rule in this runbook.
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- **Do not `kubectl drain`.** This cluster deliberately does not drain: there is no Longhorn
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`nodeDrainPolicy` configured anywhere in the repo, the upgrade plan rejects
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system-upgrade-controller because "its auto-drain fights this cluster's slow-HDD Longhorn", and the
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node-loss conformance test evicts only its own writer pod.
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- **Do not delete a degraded volume's replicas to "force a clean rebuild"** unless the operator agrees
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— with 3 replicas and one already missing you are one mistake from `/runbooks/longhorn-faulted`.
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- Escalate for: a node that will not come back, a disk replacement, or a volume degraded for more than
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a few hours with all three nodes Ready (that is a Longhorn bug, not an operational state).
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---
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Source of truth: `runbooks/longhorn-degraded.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
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Records: `DECISIONS-LOG.md` "2026-08-31 — Post-upgrade stabilization" (the reboot tax) and
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"2026-09-07 — k3s-prod-1 NotReady"; `docs/plans/cluster-upgrade-plan.md` §6.2/§7 (the freeze/thaw).
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