jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
cde2f2330c
Operator chose Option A. cert-manager solves ACME DNS-01 and ExternalDNS manages *.home.keithjackson.dev records via a scoped Cloudflare token (Zone.DNS.Edit, keithjackson.dev), stored SOPS-encrypted. Operator provides the token once (new prereq T-2.4p); T-2.4/T-2.5 unblocked. Only OQ-BKP (off-cluster DR backup target, Phase 4) remains open. Updated: docs 00,08,09; task board. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
82 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
# 08 — TLS & Certificates
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Serves: **R-TLS-01/02/03**, **R-DNS-01**. Related: [ADR-0006 (cert-manager + Let's Encrypt)](../decisions/adr-0006-tls-cert-manager-letsencrypt.md).
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## Requirement recap
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Every externally reachable service presents TLS from a **credible, trusted, non-self-signed**
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authority, with certificates **auto issued, renewed, and revoked** — including for **internal-only**
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services (R-TLS-01/02/03).
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## Solution: cert-manager + Let's Encrypt via DNS-01
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- **cert-manager** runs in the cluster and manages the full certificate lifecycle.
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- **Let's Encrypt** is the trusted, non-self-signed CA (publicly trusted; free; automatable) —
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satisfies R-TLS-01.
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- **ACME DNS-01 challenge** against the `keithjackson.dev` DNS zone (Cloudflare or equivalent, per
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OQ-4). DNS-01 is the key choice because it validates domain control **without exposing the service
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publicly** — so internal-only services get real, trusted certs (R-TLS-03), and **wildcard**
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certificates (`*.home.keithjackson.dev`) are possible.
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## Issuance model
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- A `ClusterIssuer` for Let's Encrypt production (and one for staging, used during bring-up to avoid
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rate limits).
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- Certificates are requested declaratively — either a **wildcard** `*.home.keithjackson.dev` cert
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shared by the Gateway, or **per-service** certs, decided per ADR-0006. Recommendation: a wildcard
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cert for `*.home.keithjackson.dev` terminated at the Gateway simplifies onboarding (a new service
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needs no new cert), with per-service certs available where isolation warrants.
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- The DNS provider API token is a SOPS-encrypted secret ([07](07-security-and-secrets.md)).
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## DNS-01 challenge access (OQ-4 — RESOLVED: scoped Cloudflare API token)
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Cloudflare already has a wildcard `*.keithjackson.dev` → public-IP record, which covers
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*reachability* but not certificate issuance (ACME DNS-01 must **write `_acme-challenge` TXT records**,
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and that wildcard does not match two-label-deep names like `plex.home.keithjackson.dev`).
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**Decision (OQ-4):** use a **scoped Cloudflare API token** — `Zone·DNS·Edit` limited to the
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`keithjackson.dev` zone — stored **SOPS-encrypted** ([07](07-security-and-secrets.md)). With it:
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- **cert-manager** solves DNS-01 by writing/removing TXT challenge records automatically (issue,
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renew, revoke — R-TLS-02), including the wildcard `*.home.keithjackson.dev` cert and internal-only
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services (R-TLS-03).
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- **ExternalDNS** manages the `*.home.keithjackson.dev` records automatically ([09](09-dns-and-ingress.md),
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R-DNS-02) — no manual record editing for public services.
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**Operator prerequisite:** create the scoped token in Cloudflare and hand it over once; it is then
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committed SOPS-encrypted and never touched manually again. The token is least-privilege (single zone,
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DNS edit only) so its blast radius is bounded (R-SEC-02). Rotation = re-encrypt + commit.
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## Renewal & revocation (R-TLS-02)
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- cert-manager renews well before expiry automatically; no human action.
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- Revocation: removing/rotating a certificate is a declarative change; cert-manager handles
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issuance of replacements. Expiry monitoring is an alert condition ([10](10-observability-and-alerting.md), R-OBS-04).
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## Where TLS terminates
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- **North-south**: at the **Gateway API** listener (implemented by Cilium, [09](09-dns-and-ingress.md)),
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using the cert-manager-issued cert. Public services are reached via the edge router forwarding to
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the Gateway; internal services resolve to the Gateway on the LAN.
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- Internal service-to-service traffic relies primarily on network policy for security; mTLS between
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workloads is **optional** future hardening (could be added via Cilium/service mesh) and is not a
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launch requirement — record as a possible future ADR.
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## Trust chain for internal clients
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Because certs come from Let's Encrypt (publicly trusted), internal clients trust them with no custom
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CA distribution. Split-horizon DNS ([09](09-dns-and-ingress.md)) resolves
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`<service>.home.keithjackson.dev` to the internal Gateway while the same trusted cert is served.
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## Acceptance gates
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- `https://<service>.home.keithjackson.dev` serves a valid, non-self-signed, unexpired certificate
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(verified by an external TLS checker), including for internal-only services.
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- Certificates renew automatically ahead of expiry with no manual step (observed across a renewal).
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- Certificate expiry and issuance failures raise alerts.
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- Onboarding a new service requires no manual certificate step.
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## Resolved
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- **OQ-4** — DNS-01 via a **scoped Cloudflare API token** (`Zone·DNS·Edit`, `keithjackson.dev`),
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SOPS-encrypted; drives both cert-manager DNS-01 and ExternalDNS. Phase 2 TLS/DNS is unblocked once
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the operator provides the token.
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- Wildcard vs. per-service certs default — **wildcard** `*.home.keithjackson.dev` (ADR-0006).
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