LIVE REGRESSION, caught on the reconcile after merging #5. nextcloud went
CrashLoopBackOff with FailedPostStartHook, 7 restarts, and apps-wave-1/2 stalled.
ROOT CAUSE — a latent bug that could never fire until now. The final statement of
nextcloud's postStart script was:
[ "$p" -ge 15 ] && nextcloud_oidc_fail "could not promote ... after retries"
On the SUCCESS path (p < 15) the test returns 1, and as the script's LAST command that
becomes the hook's exit status. A non-zero postStart exit makes the kubelet KILL the
container. This was harmless for as long as the OIDC guard above it was dead code that
exited 0 first (see 3484955) — fixing that guard made the block execute for the first
time in these apps' deployed lifetime, and the bug fired immediately.
That is the honest sequence: the previous commit did not introduce this defect, it
UNCOVERED it. Two bugs stacked, and the outer one hid the inner one.
FIX: convert to a plain `if`, then `exit 0` explicitly, with a comment recording why.
Also made gitea's hook explicit. Its last statement already returned 0 on both paths, so
it was correct by accident of ordering; leaving one hook implicitly-safe and one
explicitly-safe invites exactly this class back. Both now end with an unconditional
`exit 0`, and both say why in-file.
Every failure path in both hooks still logs loudly to stderr AND writes a marker file on
the persistent volume, and deliberately does NOT crash the pod — the break-glass local
admin must stay usable. That contract is now actually honoured; before, the success path
was the one that crashed.
Fixed in catalog/ (the ServiceDefinitions are the source of truth) and goldens
regenerated; render==golden green, renderer selftest PASS.
Serves: R-IDP-02, R-IDP-06, R-GITOPS-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Adds conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution/ — an offline, stdlib-only
L0 check tagged R-ENV-02 + R-GITOPS-01 (deliberately NOT R-TEST-01, which would
overclaim). It reuses lib/status.py's `resources:` walk rather than forking it, so "what a
path renders" has exactly one definition. It asserts: every ${...} on a substituted path
is defined-or-escaped (comments included); no default-operator form on an undefined name;
no unparseable expansion; the rendering path actually substitutes cluster-vars; every
overlay-patched /data/KEY has a base default; and that the gate itself is load-bearing.
WIRED AS AN UNCONDITIONAL STAGE (3c) in ci/l0.sh, and that matters: stage 3b scopes to
touched requirements, and ci/touched-requirements.sh maps only clusters/* to R-ENV-02 —
so an edit to a substituted manifest under apps/ or platform/ would have filtered this
check out of exactly the change that introduces the bug. l0 fail -> BLOCK=1 in gate.sh.
Mutation-tested all five assertion classes (undefined token, indexed expansion, :- form,
missing substituteFrom, un-wired gate); each fails as intended, baseline green.
STRICT MODE IS PROVEN SAFE TO ENABLE — measured, not inspected. For all 11 substituted
paths, `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone <path> | flux envsubst
--strict` exits 0 against cluster-vars base defaults. Negative control confirms the
incident: with K3S_API_HOST unset, non-strict renders k8sServiceHost empty while strict
exits 1 with `variable not set (strict mode)`. The feature gate itself is NOT flipped
here — that is a live-cluster change and the operator's call.
Escapes the six comment hazards that stood in the way (apps/vms/unifi x4,
platform/longhorn x2). All were prose ABOUT the escaping convention; since the repo's own
contract is that $${...} emits a literal ${...}, escaping them is both precise and
self-consistent. kustomize strips these particular comments today, but comment survival is
an implementation detail — a body comment carrying $ WAS observed surviving into built
apps/wave-1 — and a survivor would kill the whole Kustomization.
DOCTRINE CORRECTED (measured against flux 2.4.0): clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml claimed an
indexed expansion is fatal "escaped or not". Escaping is TOTAL — $${ARR[0]} emits the
literal text safely; only the UNESCAPED indexed form is fatal. Corrected in place.
Also empties DOCUMENTED_GAPS in conformance/run.sh with rationale: R-ENV-02 and
R-GITOPS-01 now have a real verifying test, which run.sh's own comment named as the
trigger for removing them.
Advisory output (not failures): 6 dead cluster-vars knobs — BASE_DOMAIN, CLUSTER_ENV,
CLUSTER_POD_CIDR, PIA_REGION, PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_{KEY,VALUE}. The last four are
documented reference-only; BASE_DOMAIN and CLUSTER_ENV look like genuine rot (hostnames
are hardcoded elsewhere) and are worth a follow-up.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. 102 assertions, 0 hazards.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Both ServiceDefinitions guarded their Keycloak OIDC registration with an UNESCAPED
braced expansion:
if [ -z "${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # gitea
if [ -z "${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # nextcloud, then exit 0
apps-wave-0/1 both declare postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars, and neither name is a
cluster-vars key — so Flux's envsubst substituted them away AT RECONCILE TIME, long
before the container ever ran. Verified in the LIVE cluster: the deployed Deployments
literally contain
if [ -z "" ]; then
which is always true. The entire OIDC registration block has been skipped on EVERY boot
of both apps.
WHY NOBODY NOTICED: both apps DO have the provider registered — `gitea admin auth list`
shows keycloak/OAuth2/true and `occ user_oidc:provider` shows the keycloak provider.
Those live in each app's own database, persisted from an earlier successful registration.
SSO works today and DECISIONS-LOG is not wrong. But the idempotent re-registration is
dead, so any PVC rebuild, DB restore, or fresh cluster build comes up with NO OIDC and
only the break-glass local admin. A PROD BUILD FROM THIS REPO WOULD SILENTLY HAVE NO SSO
on gitea or nextcloud.
The irony: the surrounding code was hardened twice — see its own comments about a "silent
first-boot RACE", the verify-then-retry loops, the marker files. All of that hardening was
unreachable, because the guard above it always evaluated true.
Not a regression from the recent R-ENV-02 tokenization — introduced 2026-08-27 (8738871).
FIXED AT THE RIGHT SEAM: apps/wave-0/gitea.yaml and apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml are
RENDER-GENERATED, so the fix is in catalog/*.yaml and the goldens are regenerated.
Escaped to $${...}, the convention documented in clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml. Post-envsubst
the container now receives the intended `${VAR:-}` instead of `""`.
STRICT MODE WOULD NEVER HAVE CAUGHT THIS. Flux deliberately exempts default-providing
operators (-, :-, +, :+, =, :=, ?, :?) from StrictPostBuildSubstitutions, because they
"intentionally handle the unset case". So a targeted check was required.
MADE UN-REPEATABLE IN THE RENDERER: catalog/render.py gains a substitution-safety section
wired into emit(), so every render path refuses to emit a manifest containing a braced
expansion that is not exactly ${KNOWN_KEY} for a key read LIVE from cluster-vars (no
hardcoded copy to drift; unreadable => empty set => fail-closed). Dollar-runs are counted
properly ($$ is a literal $ to envsubst, so odd runs are flagged and even runs are not),
and indexed forms get their own hard-error message. Nine new --selftest assertions,
including the exact regression. Proven to bite: rendering the pre-fix catalog files from
HEAD now exits 1 with the precise diagnosis.
Sweep: the complete substituted surface was enumerated from every Kustomization's path.
catalog/ contains exactly TWO braced expansions and both were these bugs; every other
braced expansion on a substituted path is a declared cluster-vars key (zero typos, zero
undeclared names); existing $${UOS_URL} escapes verified intact.
Verified: --selftest PASS; canonical render is byte-identical to the committed apps/ for
all 10 onboarded services; the three L1 render checks pass.
NEXT RECONCILE: both pod templates change, so gitea (wave 0) and nextcloud (wave 1) roll —
strategy: Recreate on RWO Longhorn PVCs, so expect a brief single-pod outage each. The
OIDC block then executes for the first time in these apps' deployed lifetime. Both paths
are idempotent (gitea takes auth update-oauth on the existing id; nextcloud's
user_oidc:provider is create-or-update), so the expected result is a no-op re-write plus
the verify loop logging success. If the SOPS client secret ever diverged from Keycloak's,
this is when it gets corrected instead of silently left stale. Tail both pods after merge.
Serves: R-IDP-02, R-IDP-06, R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Re-authors the fix stranded on origin/fix/act-runner-dind-readiness (242951a), which
applied cleanly but had never been merged.
The act_runner startup waited only for the dind TLS CERT FILE (/certs/client/ca.pem),
but dockerd writes the certs before it begins accepting TLS connections on :2376. A
runner proceeding on the file alone still hard-exits with "cannot ping the docker daemon
at tcp://localhost:2376" — observed crashlooping 11 times in ~8 minutes on a fresh pod
after a node bounce. Adds a second bounded wait (nc -z -w1 127.0.0.1 2376, 60s cap)
mirroring the existing cert-file loop, so the runner starts only once the daemon
actually answers. busybox nc in the Alpine-based gitea/act_runner:0.2.11 supports -z/-w.
This Deployment is the ENFORCED MERGE GATE for the whole repo, so it ships alone.
A REPORTED "latent envsubst bug" in this file was INVESTIGATED AND DISPROVEN. The claim
was that Flux envsubst expands bare `$i`, making the existing `[ "$i" -ge 60 ]` bound a
silent no-op. Running the real `flux envsubst` (v2.4.0) shows bare `$i` is NOT
substituted — even with i set in the environment, `$i` passes through literally while
`${i}` expands. This matches the repo's own contract in clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml,
which was itself written after empirical probing: "`$VAR` -> left alone by envsubst =>
bare shell vars need NO escaping." The existing 60s bound was always real. NO escaping
was applied: `$${i}` would be an ACTIVE REGRESSION, correct only on the envsubst path —
on a plain `kustomize build`/`kubectl apply -k`, sh reads `$$` as its own PID and the
bound compares garbage against 60. Bare is correct on both paths. A comment now records
the real contract so nobody "fixes" the bare form into escaping.
NEAR MISS worth recording: the first draft of that comment spelled the dangerous forms
out literally, and `flux envsubst` HARD-FAILED on it — "unable to parse variable name".
Flux's envsubst runs over the entire manifest INCLUDING YAML COMMENTS, so a braced name
containing punctuation is a fatal parse error that would have failed the whole
apps-wave-1 Kustomization — breaking every merge in the repo. From a comment. The
shipped comment names the forms in words; the file now contains no braced-dollar
sequence at all.
Verified without a cluster: flux envsubst over the file is byte-identical (exit 0, and
--strict 0); post-envsubst YAML parses with containers unchanged; `sh -n` clean; a
dry-run with a stubbed failing nc fires the stage-2 bound and exits 1; render==golden
green (gitea-actions.yaml is an EXTRA_UNITS entry — render.py places the filename into a
wave and never emits its bytes, so it is not among the 10 compared goldens).
Follow-up documented in-file, deliberately NOT done here: convert dind to an
initContainers sidecar (restartPolicy: Always) with a startupProbe that execs `docker
info` over TLS — NOT a bare tcpSocket probe, which would reopen the same "port open but
certs not ready" gap stage 1 closes — periodSeconds 1 / failureThreshold 60 to preserve
the cap, after which runner drops its command: override. k3s v1.36 has GA sidecars, so
this is the correct long-term shape; it ships separately because a failure in the merge
gate must be unambiguous.
Serves: R-GITOPS-01, R-TEST-03.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
R-ENV-02 promises dev and prod differ ONLY by scoped cluster-vars overrides. In fact
dev LAN addresses were hardcoded into base manifests, so clusters/prod would have come
up ANNOUNCING DEV ADDRESSES (192.168.1.x) on the prod LAN (192.168.2.x).
New cluster-vars knobs (base default = dev literal, per the file's existing convention):
K3S_API_HOST platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml (+ the values.yaml mirror)
CILIUM_LB_POOL_START platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml
CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP "
UNIFI_L4_VIP apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml
CRAFTY_L4_VIP platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml, apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,
semaphore}-db.yaml, and platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml
Also fixes GATEWAY_VIP's base default, which was still the RETIRED libvirt address
10.73.0.240, and adds the GATEWAY_VIP patch that clusters/prod was missing entirely.
clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml gains postBuild.substituteFrom (it was the one consuming
Kustomization without it, so a ${TOKEN} there would have shipped as a literal string).
The envsubst contract is documented there: ${VAR} substitutes and escapes as $${VAR};
$VAR and $(cmd) are left alone; ${ARR[0]} hard-errors. The three UOS_URL expansions in
the unifi cloud-init are escaped accordingly.
PROD ADDRESS PLAN (operator, 2026-08-31):
nodes .10/.11/.12 · control-plane VIP .9 (Ansible-side) · GATEWAY_VIP .20
Cilium LB pool .20-.30
CONTAINMENT INVARIANT, now documented at the pool and in the prod overlay: GATEWAY_VIP
MUST equal CILIUM_LB_POOL_START. The shared Gateway pins no address, so Cilium LB-IPAM
gives it the first free address of a matching pool block. An initial prod proposal put
.20 outside a .21-.30 pool; the Gateway would have come up on .21 while split-horizon
coredns-custom kept answering *.home.keithjackson.dev with .20 — an address nothing
announces — blackholing in-cluster OIDC hairpin traffic while reporting healthy. The
pool was widened to .20-.30. The control-plane VIP (.9) stays outside the pool so
kube-vip and LB-IPAM can never contend.
Values prod still cannot know stay INVALID `TBD-PROD-*` placeholders on purpose: base
defaults are dev values, so an omitted patch means prod silently inherits a dev address
— far worse than a loud failed apply.
DEV IS BYTE-IDENTICAL. Verified by kustomize build over 13 paths before/after, then
flux envsubst with the dev cluster-vars values applied to both sides: zero drift. The
only deltas are the intended additive keys in the overlay ConfigMap itself. No
unresolved ${TOKEN} survives. render-golden green (10 goldens); yamllint clean.
Serves: R-ENV-02. Task: T-7.1 (prerequisite). Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Roll the verified Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar out to the remaining
four forward-auth apps after the pihole canary was confirmed fail-closed
(unauthenticated -> 302 to Keycloak, pod 2/2, clean sidecar OIDC discovery).
Each app's Gateway route now terminates at its oauth2-proxy sidecar (:4180,
--allowed-group=media-users, --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>); the
gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180, so
the bare UI is never served un-authenticated (fail-closed; R-IDP-02/06). The
apps' own app/API ports stay in-Service for EAST-WEST callers (arr ->
qbittorrent:8080 / jackett:9117) via the existing reciprocal-ingress allows.
- keycloak: confidential jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr clients (realm-import
+ realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper).
- secrets: four SOPS/age <app>-oauth2-proxy-credentials, wired into apps/wave-0
and apps/wave-1 by the renderer's sidecar-creds wave rule.
- ci: remove the temporary canary deferral (all five goldens now reproduce).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Close the un-gated-UI security finding for forward-auth apps (R-IDP-02) by
rendering the Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar that crafty
proves working. catalog/render.py now emits, for any forward-auth app with an
exposed UI: the oauth2-proxy sidecar (upstream http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>,
:4180, --allowed-group per auth.group), an authproxy :4180 Service port, an
HTTPRoute backendRef -> :4180, and a gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy that
allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180 (fail-closed: the bare UI is never
served un-authenticated). oidc/native/none apps render byte-identical.
This is the CANARY: only pihole's golden carries the sidecar and is verified
fail-closed in-cluster first. jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr are deferred to
the rollout commit (temporarily listed in ci/render-golden.sh) so their UIs
keep serving exactly as today until their clients+secrets land.
- keycloak: confidential pihole client (realm-import + realm-clients mirror),
provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper, bare names).
- secret: SOPS/age pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials (client-id/secret/cookie),
wired into apps/wave-0 via the renderer's new sidecar-creds wave rule.
- L1 render goldens regenerated for the sidecar (forward-auth fixtures).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
App SSO broke cluster-wide after the Cilium 1.16.5->1.20.1 upgrade: the CVE-2025-30162 fix (in
>=1.16.8/1.17.2) makes the shared Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluate a pod's egress policy against
Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) when it hairpins to keycloak.home.
'toEntities: world' matches the Gateway VIP at L3/L4 but not the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so
OIDC discovery/token 403'd ('Access denied') for every app with a NetworkPolicy (gitea/nextcloud/
semaphore/headlamp/crafty...); Grafana survived only because monitoring has no NetworkPolicy.
Fix: explicit toEndpoints egress allow to the keycloak backend for SSO apps.
- catalog/render.py: emit it for auth.mode in {oidc,forward-auth}; re-rendered 8 app goldens.
- platform/headlamp + platform/crafty: hand-written policies get the same allow.
Split-horizon design unchanged. Verified live: headlamp-ns -> keycloak discovery 403 -> 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Plex Deployment had no Plex env vars. Add via the ServiceDefinition env list
(rendered verbatim by catalog/render.py):
- PLEX_UID/PLEX_GID=1000 (image chowns /config to this and drops; matches the
Longhorn ownership convention seerr/semaphore use)
- TZ=Etc/UTC (no other service sets TZ repo-wide)
- ALLOWED_NETWORKS=10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16 so in-cluster clients (Seerr ->
plex:32400) are trusted as LAN (pod CIDR 10.0.0.0/16 + svc 10.43.0.0/16 + LAN)
PLEX_CLAIM intentionally not set (4-min TTL is unusable via git; one-time live
claim persists on /config). ADVERTISE_IP deferred: the only candidate host
resolves via split-horizon DNS to the internal Gateway VIP and its remote
reachability is unverified — a wrong value breaks remote access, so omitted
per prefer-safety, documented as a follow-up in catalog/plex.yaml.
Homepage still labeled seerr as "Overseerr"; renamed the tile to "Seerr"
(icon mdi-play-box-multiple keeps — not overseerr-specific).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The committed apps/ goldens were a MIX of two render flag sets: 8 services
were rendered with `--no-image-automation` (no image CRs) while gitea and
nextcloud carried stale ImageRepository/ImagePolicy CRs from a render WITHOUT
the flag. Neither single command reproduced all goldens, and the gate did not
catch it.
Part A — canonical render:
python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation
`--no-image-automation` is canonical: image automation is authored-but-DISABLED
(DECISIONS-LOG; image-reflector/-automation controllers not installed), and
every app was onboarded via this flag. Re-render drops the ImageRepository +
ImagePolicy objects from gitea + nextcloud only (52 line deletions, purely the
trailing image-automation blocks). No functional content changed — the
nextcloud postStart hardening and gitea OIDC hook are untouched.
Part B — enforcement:
ci/render-golden.sh renders every onboarded catalog service with the canonical
command into a temp dir and FAILS on ANY diff vs committed apps/ (missing
golden or content drift), across all 10 services (not just the 3 L1 spot-checks).
Not-onboarded catalog entries (keycloak, vm-demo) are excluded per DESIGN-waves.
Wired as a required no-cluster stage in ci/gate.sh, ci/Makefile, and both the
live (.gitea/workflows/gate.yml) and dormant (merge-gate.yaml) pipelines.
Proof: tampering a golden makes the stage exit 1 (blocks merge); reverting
restores exit 0. `make -C ci gate` green in the devcontainer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two SSO follow-ups the operator hit after Nextcloud OIDC login worked.
1. Sign-out "redirect failed". On logout user_oidc redirects the browser to
Keycloak's end_session_endpoint with post_logout_redirect_uri=<Nextcloud
base '/'> and client_id=nextcloud but NO id_token_hint (provider
sendIdTokenHint=0). Keycloak then validates that redirect against the
client's post.logout.redirect.uris attribute, which was empty -> "Invalid
redirect uri" -> the operator's "redirect failed". Register
https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/* on the nextcloud client
(attributes.post.logout.redirect.uris). Applied live via kcadm and captured
here so git stays authoritative (a RealmImport no-ops on the existing realm).
2. postStart step (d) mirrors platform-admins -> built-in admin group, but the
previous single best-effort pass ran occ group:adduser once with output
swallowed and no retry. At early boot (container Started ~9s after create)
that call can transiently fail (DB / maintenance race), silently dropping the
promotion until the next restart. Harden step (d) with a verify-and-retry
loop (like step (c)): re-read group:list and re-add any platform-admins
member still missing from admin until verified (bounded ~30s), no-op for
existing members.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Task 1 — browser SSO "Could not reach OpenID Connect provider" (confirmed root
cause, not guessed). keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev resolves split-horizon to the
PRIVATE Cilium gateway VIP (192.168.1.53). Nextcloud's SSRF guard refuses its own
server-side HTTP requests to RFC1918 addresses, so user_oidc's discovery/JWKS/token
fetch AT LOGIN throws OCP\Http\Client\LocalServerException "violates local access
rules" -> surfaced to the user as "Could not reach the provider". Proven from the
live pod: nextcloud.log carries the exact LocalServerException from
DiscoveryService::obtainDiscovery with Guzzle option allow_local_address:false; a
Nextcloud-context IClientService->get() of the discovery URL returns
LocalServerException with the flag false and HTTP 200 with it true (A/B toggled).
The postStart (b) curl check passed regardless because it uses system libcurl, not
Nextcloud's guard — which is why the provider registered yet login still failed.
Fix (reproducible, survives pod rolls): the postStart hook now runs
`occ config:system:set allow_local_remote_servers --value=true --type=boolean`
right after the install/maintenance wait, on every start.
Task 2 — promote Keycloak `platform-admins` members to Nextcloud admins (#5).
user_oidc 8.11 has NO native group->admin mapping (occ user_oidc:provider offers
group PROVISIONING and a login WHITELIST only), so the hook mirrors the provisioned
`platform-admins` membership into the built-in `admin` group idempotently (occ
group:list --output=json parsed via php argv; occ group:adduser admin per member).
A user is promotable after their first OIDC login provisions them + the next pod
start (or one manual `occ group:adduser admin <uid>`). The LOCAL admin stays as
break-glass (docs/15).
apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml re-rendered from catalog (single-file render; byte-diff
confined to the embedded hook). Rendered hook passes `sh -n`; parse step validated
in-pod. `make -C ci gate` green (lint/l0/l1; conformance + spec-immutability skip:
no cluster / spec repo unmounted).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The plexinc/pms-docker image writes its identity/claim token and the
Library metadata DB under /config, but the config PVC was mounted at the
renderer default /data/config. Plex therefore wrote all state to the
container's EPHEMERAL layer: the server stayed UNCLAIMED (servers.plex.tv
returns 401 with an empty X-Plex-Token) and lost everything on restart,
which is why seerr's "add Plex" failed even with SSL off.
Set the config volume mountPath to /config in catalog/plex.yaml and
re-render apps/wave-0/plex.yaml (only the mountPath line changes; all
other services byte-identical). No fsGroup/securityContext needed:
verified in-cluster the image inits as root (s6-svscan PID 1), chowns
/config to the plex user, then drops privileges (the "Plex Media Server"
process runs as plex) — root can chown the mounted PVC regardless of
fsGroup.
PLEX_CLAIM auto-claim is intentionally NOT wired: the env secretKeyRef
schema has no `optional`, so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would
crashloop the pod. The claim is an operator step (UI sign-in after the
roll, or add a PLEX_CLAIM env from a fresh https://plex.tv/claim token).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The Keycloak OIDC postStart registration for gitea and nextcloud ran but
never persisted, leaving `gitea admin auth list` empty and nextcloud's
user_oidc with "No providers configured" despite the apps installing/
enabling and the client secret being present.
Two distinct root causes, confirmed by running the registration manually
against the live warm pods:
- nextcloud: a QUOTING BUG, not a race. The OCC() wrapper runs
`su -c "php occ $*"`, which word-split `--scope="openid email profile"`
back into three tokens, so occ saw `email profile` as extra positional
args -> "Too many arguments to user_oidc:provider" -> exit 1, swallowed
by `|| echo failed`. Failed on EVERY boot. Fixed by running the provider
call as ONE `su -c` with the scope single-quoted so www-data's shell
keeps it a single argument; keep the OCC() wrapper only for single-token
subcommands.
- gitea: a first-boot RACE. The direct `admin auth add-oauth` persists once
the app/network is warm (verified live), but fired too early at postStart
and its failure was swallowed (`|| echo ... >&2`, exit 0).
Hardening applied to both catalog sources (rendered into apps/wave-*):
- wait (bounded ~90s) for the Keycloak discovery doc to return HTTP 200;
- nextcloud also waits for `installed: true` AND `maintenance: false`;
- register idempotently (create-or-update) then VERIFY the source/provider
actually persisted, retrying the whole cycle (guards exit-0-but-nothing-
stuck);
- on give-up, log LOUDLY to stderr AND a marker file on the persistent
volume (/data, /var/www/html) instead of swallowing — next failure is
visible;
- never crashloop: missing-secret guard retained, break-glass local admin
stays usable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Extends the SSO work to the two remaining `auth: oidc` apps still on local-admin
logins, each as a native confidential client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm with
its local admin kept as break-glass (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `nextcloud` and `semaphore` confidential clients
to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana/gitea) + their
NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET / SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET placeholders. As before, a
KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so both live clients were
ALSO created via kcadm (nextcloud e95049ed-ca10-4085-97d9-4bbef495fe61, semaphore
1835bfe9-b125-4026-8f69-33557519cf4a); the YAML keeps git authoritative.
Secrets (SOPS/age): add nextcloud-client-secret + semaphore-client-secret to
keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns). Mirror the nextcloud secret as
oidc-client-secret into nextcloud-bootstrap (nextcloud ns). For semaphore, the
whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON (which embeds the client secret) is held
encrypted as oidc-providers-json in semaphore-bootstrap (semaphore ns). All values
verified == the live clients; existing keys untouched; no plaintext in git.
App config (catalog source + re-render):
- nextcloud: add NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env + an idempotent postStart hook
that installs/enables user_oidc and runs `occ user_oidc:provider keycloak`
(create-or-update; secret via --clientsecret-env so it never hits argv; occ as
www-data; group provisioning on the `groups` claim). Syntax verified against the
running user_oidc 8.11.0 on Nextcloud 31.0.14; su-to-www-data env passthrough
verified. Missing-secret/not-installed guards prevent crashloops.
- semaphore: add SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env sourced from the encrypted
oidc-providers-json (provider_url=realm issuer/auto-discovery, redirect
/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect). Mechanism verified against semaphore v2.19.10
source (util ConfigType oidc_providers env tag + OidcProvider struct + router
redirect path); no kubelet service-link env collision.
apps/wave-1/{nextcloud,semaphore}.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation` (diffs are env/lifecycle-only).
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; live
homelab clients now include gitea/nextcloud/semaphore; static gate (lint/l0/l1)
green. Browser SSO login for each still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Wires the bootstrapping-critical Gitea git host to the Keycloak `homelab` realm
as a native confidential OIDC client, moving it off the local-admin-only login
while keeping the local admin as the break-glass path (docs/15 availability
caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `gitea` confidential client to
platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana) + its
GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder sourced from the keycloak-realm-clients Secret.
NOTE: a KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so the live
client was ALSO created via kcadm (id 70a6ca60-317a-42ce-8331-a60e380838ee);
the YAML keeps git authoritative for a rebuild.
Secrets (SOPS/age, never plaintext): add gitea-client-secret to
platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns) and mirror the
same value as oidc-client-secret into apps/wave-0/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml
(gitea ns) so the app can read it in-namespace. Both == the live client secret.
App config (catalog source + re-render): catalog/gitea.yaml gains the
GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env (from the mirrored Secret), [oauth2_client]
auto-registration/account-linking app.ini env, and an idempotent postStart step
that registers the "keycloak" OAuth2 login source (auto-discovery; groups claim;
platform-admins -> Gitea admin). apps/wave-0/gitea.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation`.
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run;
static gate (lint/l0/l1) green. Browser SSO login still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Seerr v3.4.1 (ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr) runs as the non-root user node:node
(UID/GID 1000), unlike the old root-running sctx/overseerr image. Its root-owned
Longhorn RWO config PVC at /app/config was not writable by UID 1000, so the pod
CrashLoopBackOff'd with:
Error: EACCES: permission denied, mkdir '/app/config/logs/'
Add a podSecurityContext with fsGroup=1000 (plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot)
to the seerr ServiceDefinition — the same schema 1.3.0 mechanism semaphore uses.
Longhorn's CSIDriver fsGroupPolicy: ReadWriteOnceWithFSType applies fsGroup to this
RWO filesystem volume, group-owning the PVC to GID 1000 so the process can write.
Re-rendered apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml from the catalog source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two operator-flagged defects in the seerr ServiceDefinition, fixed at source
(catalog/seerr.yaml) and re-rendered into apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml:
- Image: sctx/overseerr:latest (original Overseerr, unmaintained) ->
ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr:v3.4.1. Overseerr and Jellyseerr have merged into
the actively maintained Seerr project (seerr-team/seerr, docs.seerr.dev);
ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr is the officially recommended image. Pinned to the
current stable tag v3.4.1 per the arr-stack convention (sonarr/radarr/
qbittorrent/gitea pin explicit tags; R-UPD-01). update.range bumped
">=1.33.0" -> ">=3.4.0" to track the Seerr 3.x line. Plex-native (native
auth) support is retained.
- Config mountPath: /data/config -> /app/config. Overseerr/Jellyseerr/Seerr
store settings + request/cache DB at /app/config; the previous /data/config
left the config PVC effectively unused (config not persisted across
restarts). Set via the schema-supported storage[].mountPath field.
Dependencies (sonarr:8989, radarr:7878, plex:32400), NetworkPolicies,
public exposure, and native auth are unchanged. Render == golden verified;
lint, schema, and L1 render checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The docs had drifted badly behind ~85 commits of delivery. The root README still
said "Phase 0 — Foundations. No cluster exists yet"; the infra docs still
described a libvirt/KVM cluster that has been retired for two days; and
DECISIONS-LOG.md — the PM's authoritative record — stopped at 2026-08-25 AM.
Anyone following these docs would have been working from a false map.
Verified against the live cluster (3/3 nodes, 7/7 Flux Kustomizations Ready,
10/10 HelmReleases Ready) rather than inferred from commit messages.
README.md
- Phase 0 -> a per-phase status table: 0-6 delivered and deployed, 7 not open.
- Layout now shows the wave split, platform-config, apps/vms, infra, bootstrap.
- Real conformance number (36/51, 70.6%) and how to regenerate it.
- Devcontainer workflow; note that the gate was red and why.
infra/PHASE1-STATUS.md — rewritten. Was a `virsh`/libvirt resume guide for a
cluster that no longer exists. Now: the Proxmox substrate, the pfSense NAT
paths, both kubectl access paths (Keycloak OIDC normal / cert break-glass),
the toolchain, off-repo state that must not be lost, and the fact that Flux's
git source is an app inside the cluster (`git push origin main` IS the deploy).
infra/PHASE1-SCOPE.md — historical banner. The exit criteria and sizing
rationale are still worth keeping; the libvirt execution steps are not.
infra/README.md — Proxmox, plus a map of the subtree and where the cluster
actually lives (it is not on this workstation).
infra/devcontainer/README.md — the "run tofu and ansible on the HOST" limitation
is OBSOLETE: it was a dmacvicar/libvirt polkit/PID problem, and bpg/proxmox
talks to an HTTP API. Everything runs in the container now. Documents the full
CI-gate toolchain and what each bind mount is load-bearing for (the age keyring
and the read-only spec repo especially — without the latter, spec-immutability
silently skips instead of verifying).
infra/tofu/README.md — was "Authoring only — nothing here has been applied". It
is applied and live. Disk sizes corrected 40/100 -> 64/128 GiB (confirmed
against the running nodes), pfSense NAT marked done, and a warning that
terraform.tfstate is absent on a fresh workstation — an apply with empty state
would try to recreate the three live nodes.
infra/tofu/variables.tf — section comment disagreed with its own defaults.
infra/cluster.sh — retired-with-instructions header. It silently drives libvirt
domains that do not exist; behaviour unchanged, but it no longer lies.
apps/vms/unifi/README.md — was "NOT WIRED IN", 60Gi, and listed a file that has
since been dropped. Now: live status, 40Gi, resolved open questions marked
resolved, and the two constraints the next person will otherwise rediscover —
KubeVirt's 2048B inline userData cap, and that apps-vms must never carry
postBuild.substituteFrom (envsubst corrupts the cloud-init).
DECISIONS-LOG.md — backfilled the gap as one structured entry: the Proxmox
migration, NAT + kube-vip, the twice-proven oauth2-proxy cold-start deadlock,
the Flux source cutover, CI going live in-cluster, ten app onboardings and the
renderer bugs they exposed, the wave split (verified: DBs adopted, not
recreated — original ages intact, prune restored), KubeVirt storage, the UniFi
VM, and kubectl SSO. Plus verified live state and the carried-forward open list.
Two corrections to the record while verifying:
- kubectl OIDC is LIVE (`kubectl auth whoami` -> oidc:<user>,
[oidc:platform-admins]), so the rolling restart 3472f1d deferred has
happened.
- UniFi OS Server is NOT installed in the guest. The VM is healthy (Ubuntu
24.04.4, guest agent connected, live-migratable) but :11443 answers nothing,
and the CNP explicitly permits cluster -> :11443, so it is genuinely not
listening rather than a policy artifact.
Docs and comments only; no manifest semantics change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The hand-authored UniFi VM manifests used column-aligned inline flow mappings
(`{ name: inform, port: 8080, protocol: TCP }`), which yamllint's `commas`
rule rejects as "too many spaces after comma". That made `make -C ci lint` FAIL,
so the merge gate has been BLOCKED on `main` since the UniFi commits landed —
every other static stage was green.
Collapse each run of spaces after a comma to one, and re-align the trailing
comments so the port tables stay readable. Whitespace only:
`kubectl kustomize apps/vms` renders byte-for-byte identically before and after.
The lint config is left untouched — relaxing the rule to make failing files pass
is moving the goalposts, not fixing the code.
Also refresh these files' stale `STAGING / DRAFT` headers: the tree is live,
reconciled by the non-gating `apps-vms` Flux Kustomization.
Gate after this change: spec-immutability / lint / l0 / l1 all green,
MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
760084e only committed the unifi-cloudinit.yaml deletion — the `git add` errored
on that already-staged pathspec and skipped the other two files, leaving the
kustomization still referencing the deleted file (broken build). Commit the
intended changes: 30-virtualmachine.yaml inline userData + kustomization.yaml
without the secretGenerator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
userDataSecretRef tripped a Flux server-side-apply schema quirk on the KubeVirt
VirtualMachine CRD ("field not declared in schema"). Go back to inline userData,
trimmed to 1112 bytes (< the 2048 limit) by dropping the break-glass SSH key —
no longer needed for debugging now that the postBuild cloud-init corruption is
fixed. Keeps qemu-guest-agent (AgentConnected proves cloud-init ran) and the
public-API UOS resolver + non-interactive install. Removes the secretGenerator +
unifi-cloudinit.yaml. (Add SSH back via userDataSecretRef only if the SSA quirk is
worked around and guest access is needed.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Adding the SSH key pushed the inline cloudInitNoCloud.userData over KubeVirt's
2048-byte limit ("userdata exceeds 2048 byte limit. Should use UserDataSecretRef").
Move the cloud-init into apps/vms/unifi/unifi-cloudinit.yaml and wrap it as the
`unifi-cloudinit` Secret via a Kustomize secretGenerator (disableNameSuffixHash
so the VM can reference it by fixed name); VM now uses userDataSecretRef. Content
is non-sensitive (public key + public installer script), so not SOPS-encrypted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The first UOS bring-up left no way into the guest (cloud-init set no
credentials), so the in-guest UOS install couldn't be observed. Add:
- ssh_authorized_keys (public key, safe to commit) on the default ubuntu user
- qemu-guest-agent (KubeVirt AgentConnected + virtctl guest access)
- tee the install-uos output to the serial console + /var/log/uos-install.log,
and record the installer exit code, so the install is observable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The UniFi Block import got past the device-permission fix but then failed
ReplicaSchedulingFailure / "insufficient storage": CDI sizes scratch ~= the disk
virtual size and, on the default 3-replica `longhorn` class, the ~60Gi scratch x3
(189G) on top of the disk's x3 (180G) overflowed the Longhorn tier (~125G/node).
- platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml: NEW `longhorn-scratch` StorageClass
(numberOfReplicas: 1) — CDI scratch is ephemeral/throwaway, replicating it 3x is
waste; if a node dies mid-import CDI just retries.
- platform/kubevirt/cdi-cr.yaml: spec.config.scratchSpaceStorageClass ->
longhorn-scratch.
- apps/vms/unifi/20-datavolume.yaml: boot disk 60Gi -> 40Gi (UOS min is 25Gi;
40Gi is comfortable for a home site and lighter on the replicated tier).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The UniFi VM boot-disk DataVolume (RWX + Block on longhorn-vm) failed to import:
CDI's non-root importer (UID 107, cap-drop ALL) hit
`blockdev: cannot open /dev/cdi-block-volume: Permission denied`.
Kubernetes only applies fsGroup ownership to *filesystem* volumes — it never
chowns a raw block device — and Longhorn's CSIDriver (fsGroupPolicy:
ReadWriteOnceWithFSType) skips fsGroup on RWX/Block volumes regardless, so the
device stays root:root. The CDI-documented fix is the container-runtime setting
`device_ownership_from_security_context`, exposed on k3s (>= v1.31.3+k3s1, this
cluster is v1.31.5) as `nonroot-devices: true`. It makes containerd set the
in-container device node's owner from the pod's securityContext.
Added to the Ansible-managed /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml alongside tls-san;
applied via the existing rolling `Restart k3s` handler (serial:1, kube-vip keeps
the API up, etcd holds 2/3). Node-scoped, security-neutral (pods stay non-root),
and preserves the longhorn-vm RWX/Block/migratable contract unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
First KubeVirt VM app + first real CDI http import. UniFi OS Server (UOS) is
Ubiquiti's current self-host product (the .deb is deprecated); it bundles UniFi
OS + Network app + its own datastore, so no MongoDB companion.
- apps/vms/unifi: CDI DataVolume (Ubuntu 24.04 cloud image -> longhorn-vm
RWX/Block, live-migratable) + VirtualMachine (evictionStrategy: LiveMigrate)
with cloud-init that installs podman/slirp4netns/jq and runs the UOS installer
NON-INTERACTIVELY. The installer URL is resolved at boot from Ubiquiti's public
firmware API (fw-update.ui.com/api/firmware-latest) — always-latest, no pinned
URL to maintain (currently UOS v5.1.37).
- L4 exposure: two LoadBalancer Services (TCP+UDP) sharing a pinned, L2-announced
Cilium VIP 192.168.1.54 (device inform/adoption + STUN can't ride the L7
Gateway); external-dns publishes unifi.home.keithjackson.dev. UI on :11443.
- default-deny + additive CNPs (controller ingress, egress, and CDI-importer
egress for the image pull).
- clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml: NON-GATING Flux Kustomization (wait:false,
dependsOn platform-config) — VMs are a separate lifecycle from the app waves,
so a slow VM import/install can't stall the app tier.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Replaces the single `apps` Flux Kustomization with dependency-ordered waves
(apps-wave-0..2) so a crashlooping workload isolates to its wave + downstream
instead of stalling the entire app tier. Parallel within a wave, ordered across.
- catalog/render.py: compute waves by longest dependency-path depth over the
ServiceDefinition `dependencies:` edges (a `<svc>-db` is a leaf, so its
consumer lands strictly higher — the "DB below consumer" rule falls out of
longest-path, no special case). `--emit-waves` generates the per-wave
kustomizations + Flux CRs; `--wave-layout` places renders into the right dir.
wave 0: pihole gitea jackett plex qbittorrent nextcloud-db semaphore-db
wave 1: sonarr radarr nextcloud semaphore gitea-actions
wave 2: seerr
- apps/*.yaml -> apps/wave-{0,1,2}/ (byte-identical moves; SOPS files intact).
- clusters/base: apps.yaml removed; apps-wave-{0,1,2}.yaml added (dependsOn
chain: platform-config -> wave-0 -> wave-1 -> wave-2, prune+wait each).
- clusters/dev: one SOPS decryption patch per wave (load-bearing).
- DESIGN-waves.md: wave table, topology, cutover runbook.
Cutover: preceded by disabling prune on `apps` (1bfb0db) so removing that
object here does not GC its resources; the wave Kustomizations SSA-adopt the
byte-identical manifests in place (no restart, no PVC churn).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Restores the four semaphore resources a peer temp-disabled in 0abadd3 to unblock
the apps Kustomization while the crashloop was diagnosed. Both root causes are now
fixed and verified against the live image:
1. permission-denied writing /etc/semaphore/config.json (non-root UID 1001 vs
root-owned Longhorn PVC) -> podSecurityContext.fsGroup=1001 (schema 1.3.0);
verified the pod got past config write and successfully pinged its PostgreSQL.
2. config panic on SEMAPHORE_PORT=tcp://<svcIP>:3000 (kubelet Docker-link
injection for the same-named Service colliding with Semaphore's listen port)
-> explicit SEMAPHORE_PORT=":3000" env shadowing the service-link var.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
With the config PVC now writable (fsGroup), semaphore got past config write and
pinged its PostgreSQL successfully, then crashed on:
panic: value of field 'Port' is not valid: tcp://<svcIP>:3000
Because the Service is named `semaphore`, the kubelet injects the Docker-link-style
SEMAPHORE_PORT=tcp://<clusterIP>:3000, which collides with Semaphore's OWN
SEMAPHORE_PORT (its HTTP listen port). Add an explicit SEMAPHORE_PORT=":3000" env
entry — user-defined env takes precedence over service-link vars — pinning the
listen port back to :3000 (matches containerPort/Service). Uses the existing env
field; only apps/semaphore.yaml changes, all others byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The semaphoreui/semaphore image falls through to its interactive setup wizard
and panics on /etc/semaphore/config.json permission-denied; the env-only pattern
doesn't yield a non-interactive config. Backed out to unblock the apps
Kustomization; files retained for a proper config-model follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The semaphoreui/semaphore image runs as non-root UID 1001 / GID 0 and writes its
generated config.json into the config dir on boot. A mounted Longhorn PVC is
root:root, so UID 1001 got "permission denied" and the pod crash-looped.
First-class the fix into the render contract (same mechanism the retired
gitea-bootstrap-patch was replaced by): schema 1.3.0 adds an optional pod-level
`podSecurityContext`, emitted verbatim onto spec.template.spec.securityContext by
render.py. Absent => every other app renders byte-identical (verified). semaphore
declares fsGroup=1001 (kubelet group-owns the PVC + adds the supplemental group so
UID 1001 can write) plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot pinning the image identity.
render.py selftest extended (verbatim render + absence). L0 (schema+kyverno 17/17),
L1 3/3, lint all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Semaphore (Ansible UI, docs/13 row 10): internal exposure, internet egress,
config on Longhorn + external PostgreSQL, auth oidc. Reuses the CNPG-DB pattern
nextcloud established (apps/nextcloud-db.yaml, commit 4be6752).
- catalog/semaphore.yaml: ServiceDefinition (schema >=1.2.0 env) wiring the
SEMAPHORE_DB_* connection to semaphore-db-rw.semaphore-db:5432, break-glass
SEMAPHORE_ADMIN* local admin, and the FIXED base64 SEMAPHORE_ACCESS_KEY_ENCRYPTION.
- apps/semaphore.yaml: rendered (render.py --no-image-automation) — Deployment,
config PVC, Service, default-deny + egress/gateway/internet CNPs, HTTPRoute
semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev:3000, ServiceMonitor, SLI alert.
- apps/semaphore-db.yaml: CNPG Cluster in dedicated ns semaphore-db, initdb from
the owner secret, inheritedMetadata app.kubernetes.io/name=semaphore-db so the
dep-edge egress CNP matches.
- apps/semaphore-db-app.sops.yaml + apps/semaphore-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml:
SOPS(age) owner creds (basic-auth) + mirrored db-password, break-glass admin,
and the persistent access-key encryption key.
OIDC (Keycloak realm client) is DEFERRED like gitea/nextcloud — comes up on the
break-glass local admin; realm-client wiring is the batched follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Onboard nextcloud (docs/13 row 7): public, DR-critical file sync backed by an
external PostgreSQL. Establishes the reusable CNPG-DB pattern for later DB-backed
services.
- catalog/nextcloud.yaml: ServiceDefinition (image nextcloud:31-apache :80, public,
internet, data 20Gi longhorn @/var/www/html, backup daily-offcluster, auth oidc
+platform-admins, ingress nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev, dependency
nextcloud-db:5432). Uses schema 1.2.0 env for the Postgres connection, break-glass
admin, trusted-domain + OVERWRITE* proxy settings.
- apps/nextcloud-db.yaml: CloudNativePG Cluster in a dedicated nextcloud-db namespace
(modeled on keycloak-db; no default-deny, mirroring the verified keycloak posture),
inheritedMetadata stamps app.kubernetes.io/name=nextcloud-db so the rendered egress
CNP matches. initdb consumes a pre-provisioned owner secret.
- apps/nextcloud-db-app.sops.yaml + apps/nextcloud-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml: SOPS
(age) — shared DB password mirrored across the two namespaces (Pods cannot read a
Secret cross-namespace), plus the break-glass local admin.
- apps/nextcloud.yaml: rendered manifests (catalog/render.py --no-image-automation).
- apps/kustomization.yaml: wire in the four new resources.
OIDC realm-client wiring DEFERRED (WS-APPS step-3 escape hatch): editing the reconciled
realm import in platform-config risks the running Keycloak realm / whole platform-config
apply, and nextcloud OIDC needs post-install occ steps with no first-class env — nextcloud
comes up INSTALLED on the break-glass local admin (as Gitea did); the Keycloak client is a
follow-up. Off-cluster backup awaits Velero/OQ-BKP (intent declared).
Gates: render --selftest PASS; other apps byte-identical; ci l0 17/17; l1 3/3; lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Extend the ServiceDefinition contract with optional per-container `env`,
`envFrom`, and `lifecycle` fields (k8s EnvVar / EnvFromSource / Lifecycle
shapes) so headless-install / DB-backed apps configure themselves through
the SD instead of a supplementary kustomize patch.
- schema: bump 1.1.0 -> 1.2.0; add optional env/envFrom/lifecycle to the
container kind (literal + secretKeyRef/configMapKeyRef; secretRef/
configMapRef; postStart/preStop exec via $defs/execHandler). Existing
fields unchanged; all fields optional -> absent renders byte-identical.
- render.py: emit env/envFrom/lifecycle verbatim onto the Deployment app
container when present; --selftest coverage for the new fields.
- catalog/gitea.yaml: fold the headless-install env (INSTALL_LOCK, fixed
SECRET_KEY via secretKeyRef, DOMAIN/ROOT_URL, actions, break-glass admin
creds) + the idempotent postStart break-glass admin bootstrap inline.
- apps/gitea.yaml: re-rendered with env/lifecycle inline (effective pod
spec provably equivalent to base+patch).
- DELETE apps/gitea-bootstrap-patch.yaml + drop it from apps/kustomization
patches. gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml kept (still sourced by the env).
Proves the renderer feature by retiring the known TODO; unblocks env + DB
onboarding for nextcloud/semaphore/unifi/minecraft. All other rendered apps
byte-identical. Gates: selftest PASS, l0 17/17 + schema, l1 goldens, lint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Follow-up to the reciprocal-ingress fix: in-cluster verification (Hubble) revealed
the east-west path was STILL fully blocked — and that the pre-existing EGRESS half
was also broken, contrary to the original diagnosis. Root cause: a CiliumNetworkPolicy
`toEndpoints`/`fromEndpoints` selector is scoped to the POLICY's OWN namespace unless
it carries the reserved `k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace` label. Every service lives
in its own namespace (== its name) and every dependency crosses a namespace boundary,
so an app-label-only peer selector matched nothing and Cilium silently denied the flow
(Hubble: sonarr->qbittorrent = "EGRESS DENIED ... Policy denied DROPPED").
Pin the peer namespace on BOTH halves — egress toEndpoints (destination ns == dep.to)
and the reciprocal ingress fromEndpoints (source ns == source name). This is a strict
TIGHTENING (more precise, still L3/L4), not a weakening. Verified end-to-end in-cluster:
sonarr->qbittorrent:8080, sonarr->jackett:9117, seerr->{sonarr:8989,radarr:7878,
plex:32400} now CONNECT (were DROPPED); undeclared sonarr->plex:32400 and
seerr->qbittorrent:8080 stay BLOCKED (default-deny holds).
Selftest + L0 (17/17) + L1 (3/3, goldens byte-identical) + lint all pass. NOTE: this
necessarily touches the egress toEndpoints selector, which the task scoped as
ingress-only; the premise that egress already worked was empirically false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
A `dependencies` edge is declared ONCE on the SOURCE, but with the default-deny-
BOTH-directions baseline (docs/03 R-NET-01/02) it needs TWO matching halves: the
source egress-allow AND the destination ingress-allow. render.py emitted only the
egress half, so every declared east-west dependency was silently dropped by the
destination's default-deny ingress — verified in-cluster: sonarr->qbittorrent:8080,
sonarr->jackett:9117 and seerr->sonarr:8989 were all BLOCKED.
Add a cross-service reverse-dependency pass (build_reverse_map) and render the
reciprocal ingress half (r_reverse_dependency_policies): for each source that
declares a dependency on X, X gains an additive ingress-allow CiliumNetworkPolicy
`X-allow-<source>-<port>` whose fromEndpoints matches the source identity, mirroring
the egress half's L3/L4 granularity. Deterministic (sorted), additive (default-deny
ingress stays []), egress side unchanged. A lone render with no cross-catalog context
renders no reciprocal ingress, so the L1 render goldens are byte-identical.
New ingress CNPs: qbittorrent<-{sonarr,radarr}:8080, jackett<-{sonarr,radarr}:9117,
sonarr<-seerr:8989, radarr<-seerr:7878, plex<-seerr:32400. Selftest + L0 (17/17) +
L1 (3/3) + lint all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
- install-tools.sh: the kyverno CLI release tarball is named _linux_x86_64, not
_linux_amd64 (mirrors infra/devcontainer/Containerfile). The gate job's kyverno
install 404'd on amd64; map amd64 -> x86_64 for kyverno only.
- act-runner: wait for /certs/client/ca.pem (published by the DinD sidecar) before
exec-ing the entrypoint, eliminating the startup crash-loop race.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
STEP 1 — enable Gitea Actions: pin GITEA__actions__ENABLED=true and
DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL=github in the gitea bootstrap patch (was implicit upstream
default; make it a declared property).
STEP 2 — deploy + register an act_runner in a dedicated non-app namespace
(gitea-actions) so the privileged DinD executor sidecar is admitted without a
Kyverno policy exception (restrict-host-namespaces scopes to app namespaces only).
Docker executor + DinD sidecar over a shared TLS-cert emptyDir; runner state on a
Longhorn PVC (registers once). Registration token delivered as a SOPS-encrypted
Secret decrypted by Flux. Runner mounts no ServiceAccount token (R-SEC-02).
STEP 3 — author .gitea/workflows/gate.yml: the live enforced merge gate running
the STATIC layers (spec-immutability best-effort, lint, Kyverno L0, L1 render) via
`make -C ci lint l0 l1` with the pinned toolchain installed at job start. L2/L3
conformance is an if:false placeholder (needs a toolchain image + scoped cluster
creds — a design decision, not wired). merge-gate.yaml reduced to workflow_dispatch
(dormant full-pipeline blueprint). install-tools.sh gains check-jsonschema so the
schema stage validates in CI instead of skipping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Any single-replica app with a `storage:` entry mounts a ReadWriteOnce Longhorn
PVC. The default RollingUpdate strategy starts the new pod before terminating the
old one, but the old pod still holds the RWO volume -> the new pod hangs in
ContainerCreating and the rollout deadlocks (observed on gitea's update). Emit
spec.strategy.type=Recreate whenever storage is present so the old pod releases
the PVC first. Non-storage apps (and VMs) keep the default (no strategy emitted).
Re-rendered apps: gitea, pihole, sonarr, radarr, plex, qbittorrent, jackett now
carry strategy: Recreate. Updated the egress-class L1 render goldens (storage
fixture) accordingly; all L1 render checks pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two defects blocked in-cluster Gitea from becoming the Flux source:
1. Storage mountPath: the renderer hard-coded /data/<name>, so Gitea's PVC
mounted at /data/data while Gitea writes all state to /data — real repos/DB
landed on the ephemeral rootfs. Add an OPTIONAL `mountPath` to the storage
schema + render.py (default stays /data/<name>, back-compat). catalog/gitea.yaml
sets data.mountPath: /data. Only gitea.yaml's rendered mount changes; every
other app renders byte-identical.
2. Headless install: the instance was un-installed (INSTALL_LOCK=false, ephemeral
SECRET_KEY, no admin, API 404). A Gitea-only supplementary manifest
(apps/gitea-bootstrap-patch.yaml) patches the rendered Deployment with
GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true, a FIXED SECRET_KEY from a persistent SOPS
secret (apps/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml), ROOT_URL/DOMAIN, and a postStart
hook that idempotently creates a break-glass local admin. State persists on the
now-correct /data Longhorn PVC.
The env/lifecycle wiring is a supplementary kustomize patch because the
ServiceDefinition schema/renderer does not yet express env/envFrom/lifecycle —
noted as a renderer follow-up (TODO in the patch).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Root cause the media stack surfaced: the default-deny baseline is DNS-only egress (correct for
R-NET-01 east-west), but the egress CLASS (internet/vpn) had no policy ALLOWING north-south
egress — so qbittorrent/sonarr/radarr couldn't reach the internet at all (VPN downloaders
broken). Add an additive per-app CiliumNetworkPolicy '<app>-allow-internet-egress' with
toEntities:[world] (non-cluster); the egress-class steering + kill-switch (ADR-0015) govern the
PATH (internet=WAN, vpn=tun0). East-west stays denied except declared dependencies; R-NET-01
baseline unchanged. Re-rendered all apps + regenerated L1 goldens. Also fixed jackett + plex
image tags (bad pins -> :latest; Renovate/update policy pins later).
The 39Gi/node Longhorn data disks at 1:1 over-provisioning can't fit the media stack
(plex 20Gi replica failed: 'insufficient storage'). Volumes are thin-provisioned config-only,
so 200% lets the full catalog fit without a disk resize; physical fill risk is low. Also
right-sized plex config (20Gi was excessive for metadata). Prod-grade path: grow the data
disks (WS-STORAGE follow-up).
Add catalog/ ServiceDefinitions for qbittorrent and jackett and their
rendered apps/ manifests, wired into apps/kustomization.yaml.
Both are VPN-class (egress: vpn -> egress-class=vpn pod label steered by the
CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy + host kill-switch, ADR-0015) and internal
forward-auth UIs (oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak, group media-users). Config on
3-replica Longhorn. qBittorrent's bulk downloads volume is DEFERRED pending
OQ-2 (non-provisioning bulk StorageClass stub), mirroring plex/arr.
Traces: R-NET-05/06 (VPN egress + kill-switch), R-IDP-02/06 (forward-auth),
R-STATE-02/03, R-OBS-01, R-UPD-01/03, R-GITOPS-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
jakman85andClaude Opus 5