Prod inventory scaffolding for the three bare-metal nodes, and the become posture the
operator ruled for production.
BECOME: prod does NOT get dev's NOPASSWD sudo. Prod keeps a real sudo boundary and
supplies the password to Ansible as an ansible-vault-encrypted `ansible_become_password`
in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml, mirroring the existing hypervisor and
proxmox_hosts groups. The decrypting passphrase stays outside the repo
(~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass), so plays still run unattended with no plaintext
secret in git. Committed here: README.md + vault.yml.example only — the operator creates
the encrypted vault (`ansible-vault create`), as with every other vaulted group.
PACKAGES BELONG IN THE ROLE (operator ruling): smartmontools is now declared in
node_baseline_packages, not hand-installed on a node. Drive health tooling is a
permanent part of a bare-metal node's baseline — dev nodes are VMs and never needed it.
Same click-ops-never principle as the rest of the repo.
ADDRESSING: nodes .10/.11/.12, reached DIRECTLY on the LAN (no pfSense NAT hop, unlike
dev's 192.168.2.102:225x mapping), so ansible_host is the real node IP. kube-vip
control-plane VIP is 192.168.2.9 — deliberately BELOW the nodes and OUTSIDE the Cilium
LB pool (.20-.30) so kube-vip and LB-IPAM can never contend for an address. The ingress
Gateway VIP (.20) and the LB pool are Flux/cluster-vars concerns and deliberately do
not appear in Ansible.
BLOCKED-BY-DESIGN: node_baseline_longhorn_device / node_baseline_etcd_device are present
but set to an obviously invalid /dev/BLOCKED-... path pending the operator's disk-layout
decision (node 1 is a single SATA SSD; the role's /dev/vdb,/dev/vdc defaults are virtio
names that do not exist on bare metal). Leaving them unset would silently fall back to
those equally-nonexistent defaults — a confusing failure that looks like a wiring bug.
This fails just as hard and says exactly why.
KNOWN FOLLOW-UP: roles/k3s_server and every node-host playbook hardcode the literal
group names k3s_primary/k3s_secondary/k3s_servers, so the k3s_prod_* groups are not
selected by them as-is. Harmless now (nothing can accidentally run against prod) but the
"same roles, unchanged" reuse R-ENV-02 promises needs the target group parameterized
before §6 of PROD-PROVISIONING.md can execute. Documented in hosts.ini and both READMEs.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-SEC-01. Task: T-7.1. Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
R-ENV-02 promises dev and prod differ ONLY by scoped cluster-vars overrides. In fact
dev LAN addresses were hardcoded into base manifests, so clusters/prod would have come
up ANNOUNCING DEV ADDRESSES (192.168.1.x) on the prod LAN (192.168.2.x).
New cluster-vars knobs (base default = dev literal, per the file's existing convention):
K3S_API_HOST platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml (+ the values.yaml mirror)
CILIUM_LB_POOL_START platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml
CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP "
UNIFI_L4_VIP apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml
CRAFTY_L4_VIP platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml, apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,
semaphore}-db.yaml, and platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml
Also fixes GATEWAY_VIP's base default, which was still the RETIRED libvirt address
10.73.0.240, and adds the GATEWAY_VIP patch that clusters/prod was missing entirely.
clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml gains postBuild.substituteFrom (it was the one consuming
Kustomization without it, so a ${TOKEN} there would have shipped as a literal string).
The envsubst contract is documented there: ${VAR} substitutes and escapes as $${VAR};
$VAR and $(cmd) are left alone; ${ARR[0]} hard-errors. The three UOS_URL expansions in
the unifi cloud-init are escaped accordingly.
PROD ADDRESS PLAN (operator, 2026-08-31):
nodes .10/.11/.12 · control-plane VIP .9 (Ansible-side) · GATEWAY_VIP .20
Cilium LB pool .20-.30
CONTAINMENT INVARIANT, now documented at the pool and in the prod overlay: GATEWAY_VIP
MUST equal CILIUM_LB_POOL_START. The shared Gateway pins no address, so Cilium LB-IPAM
gives it the first free address of a matching pool block. An initial prod proposal put
.20 outside a .21-.30 pool; the Gateway would have come up on .21 while split-horizon
coredns-custom kept answering *.home.keithjackson.dev with .20 — an address nothing
announces — blackholing in-cluster OIDC hairpin traffic while reporting healthy. The
pool was widened to .20-.30. The control-plane VIP (.9) stays outside the pool so
kube-vip and LB-IPAM can never contend.
Values prod still cannot know stay INVALID `TBD-PROD-*` placeholders on purpose: base
defaults are dev values, so an omitted patch means prod silently inherits a dev address
— far worse than a loud failed apply.
DEV IS BYTE-IDENTICAL. Verified by kustomize build over 13 paths before/after, then
flux envsubst with the dev cluster-vars values applied to both sides: zero drift. The
only deltas are the intended additive keys in the overlay ConfigMap itself. No
unresolved ${TOKEN} survives. render-golden green (10 goldens); yamllint clean.
Serves: R-ENV-02. Task: T-7.1 (prerequisite). Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Two operator corrections:
1. PROD DOES NOT GET NOPASSWD SUDO. My initial checklist recommended mirroring dev's
passwordless sudo onto prod — rejected, correctly. Dev's NOPASSWD is a convenience
that must not propagate to production. Prod instead keeps a real sudo boundary and
drives Ansible `become` with an ansible-vault-encrypted `ansible_become_password` in
inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml, mirroring the EXISTING hypervisor and
proxmox_hosts groups. The decrypting passphrase stays outside the repo at
~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass (ansible.cfg :: vault_password_file), so plays
still run unattended with no plaintext secret in git.
2. THE TASK BOARD IS NOT THE STATUS SURFACE — THE REPOSITORY IS. Operator ruling closes
the escalation raised in the previous commit. Requirement/spec status is to be DERIVED
from repo state (what is authored, reconciled, and covered by a green requirement-tagged
test), not from a hand-maintained board. The spec board is left as a historical seed;
no agent edits it and no SPEC_PIN churn is spent on it. ci/spec-immutability.sh keeps
its full strictness — no path exception was added, since weakening an R-TEST-06 gate
for a bookkeeping file would be a defect, not a fix. A repo-derived spec status report
becomes the artifact of record alongside the coverage report and this log.
Serves: R-ENV-03 (prod provisioning posture), R-SEC-01 (no plaintext secrets), R-TEST-06.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The operator added the first production node (k3s-prod-1, 192.168.2.10 — HP EliteDesk
800 G5 Mini, i7-9700T/31GiB, Debian 13, VT-x + /dev/kvm) and opened roadmap Phase 7 for
PREP WORK ONLY: no k3s install until the R-ENV-02 blockers close and the gate is green.
Records the Phase-7 entry-gate position honestly: the operator has declared hardware
ready, but "Phases 1-6 proven in dev/test" is NOT met (37/51 conformance; R-ENV-01/02/03
themselves uncovered). Proceeding is an explicit, accepted risk — not an oversight.
Adds infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md (T-7.1, design-only): firmware/BIOS, disk layout, OS,
network, access, Ansible reuse, repo blockers, build sequence, Phase-7 exit criteria.
Key findings recorded in DECISIONS-LOG:
- R-ENV-02 is violated in the base — dev LAN addresses hardcoded into base manifests
(cilium k8sServiceHost, the Cilium LB pool, crafty/UniFi LB IPs, 3 S3 backup
endpoints). Prod is on 192.168.2.x, so prod would build WRONG today.
- clusters/prod never sets GATEWAY_VIP -> would inherit the base default 10.73.0.240,
an address on the RETIRED libvirt network.
- No NOPASSWD sudo on the prod node -> all Ansible fails at its first become.
- node_baseline device defaults are virtio (/dev/vdb,vdc) and absent on bare metal.
- ESCALATION: agents/task-board.md is structurally unmaintainable — AGENTS.md designates
it the one agent-editable surface, but ci/spec-immutability.sh fails the gate on ANY
spec-repo dirt with no path exception. Explains the all-todo board after six phases.
NOT worked around: exempting it would weaken an R-TEST-06 gate. Operator decision.
Operator decisions: Phase 7 open (prep only); wait for all 3 nodes before cluster-init;
check drive health before choosing the single-SSD disk layout.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03, R-PLAT-01/03. Task: T-7.1.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Appends the definitive current-state/handoff entry to DECISIONS-LOG (SSO fixed via CVE-2025-30162
egress allow, 5 forward-auth UIs gated, 8 vCPU, Gitea Actions CI live, external-snapshotter vendored;
operational gotchas; prioritized Next Steps → Longhorn-SSD, L2/L3-CI, forward-auth long-term,
Phase-6 onboarding). Updates the reconnect guide (6→8 vCPU) and points new agents at the handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The kustomization pulled two REMOTE github bases (?ref=v8.2.0) that Flux's kustomize-controller
git-fetched on every reconcile; those fetches intermittently exceeded the 27s timeout ->
'kustomize build failed' BuildFailed events -> the whole platform tier stalled whenever GitHub was
slow. Vendored the exact v8.2.0 output to local crds.yaml + snapshot-controller.yaml (built with
kubectl kustomize; images transformer still re-pins the controller to v8.2.0), so the build is now
offline + deterministic. No change to what's deployed. platform/kubevirt has the same latent pattern.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
HAND-OFF 2 (L2/L3 conformance wiring) — DEFERRED with a concrete plan, per the
hand-off's escape hatch (too risky to wire live cluster access from CI autonomously;
do NOT hand CI a broad kubeconfig).
The intended seam (in-cluster Chainsaw Job under its own scoped SA; CI holds only a
narrow trigger credential) is mostly scaffolded but not safe to finish autonomously:
- ci/conformance.sh still runs run.sh locally rather than triggering the in-cluster Job.
- conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml has no repo-clone init-container and the stock
chainsaw image lacks bash/python3/kubectl/git that run.sh needs.
- No trigger SA/RBAC/credential exists, and the core blocker is a privilege-escalation
design question: any `create jobs` credential in the conformance namespace can create a
Job running as the privileged conformance-runner SA. This needs an admission constraint
(recommended: narrow trigger SA + a Kyverno policy pinning the admissible Job shape), or
a GitOps-native zero-credential trigger — an operator decision.
- conformance/incluster/ isn't wired into Flux; Gitea vars/secrets aren't provisioned.
docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md captures current state, the security analysis,
the functional gaps, a file-by-file step sequence, validation/rollback, and the open
decisions. gate.yml's conformance placeholder now points to it (still if:false, honest).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
HAND-OFF 1 (make -C ci gate parity).
touched-requirements.sh gained a third scoping rule: after stripping the diff
marker, whole-line YAML/shell `#` comments are dropped BEFORE the R-ID grep. A
requirement cited only in a code-file comment is prose (a REFERENCE), not a
declaration -- the same logic rule 2 already applies to `*.md`. This unblocks the
self-referential trap where editing gate.yml's header (which cites R-TEST-06, a
known-uncovered ID enforced by the spec-immutability STAGE, not a Chainsaw test)
re-attributed R-TEST-06 so the coverage `--require` check false-blocked the merge.
Conservative: only whole-line comments are dropped; an R-ID on a real code/spec
line is still detected, and authoritative declarations never live in a bare comment.
gate.yml now invokes the aggregate `make -C ci gate` (ci/gate.sh) instead of the
individual stage scripts, so CI runs byte-for-byte the same gate a human runs in the
devcontainer (R-TEST-02) and applies the R-TEST-03 decision. A BLOCKED gate exits
non-zero and fails the job. The cluster-gated L2/L3 stage SKIPS honestly (no
CLUSTER_AVAILABLE). spec-immutability is retained as an explicit early UI step.
Adds ci/tests/touched-requirements.test.sh (+ `make -C ci test`) asserting rule 3:
comment-only R-IDs (added or removed) are not attributed while real-line R-IDs are.
ci/lib.sh REPO_ROOT is now env-overridable so tests can run the real script against a
throwaway git repo (default unchanged).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Roll the verified Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar out to the remaining
four forward-auth apps after the pihole canary was confirmed fail-closed
(unauthenticated -> 302 to Keycloak, pod 2/2, clean sidecar OIDC discovery).
Each app's Gateway route now terminates at its oauth2-proxy sidecar (:4180,
--allowed-group=media-users, --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>); the
gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180, so
the bare UI is never served un-authenticated (fail-closed; R-IDP-02/06). The
apps' own app/API ports stay in-Service for EAST-WEST callers (arr ->
qbittorrent:8080 / jackett:9117) via the existing reciprocal-ingress allows.
- keycloak: confidential jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr clients (realm-import
+ realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper).
- secrets: four SOPS/age <app>-oauth2-proxy-credentials, wired into apps/wave-0
and apps/wave-1 by the renderer's sidecar-creds wave rule.
- ci: remove the temporary canary deferral (all five goldens now reproduce).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Close the un-gated-UI security finding for forward-auth apps (R-IDP-02) by
rendering the Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar that crafty
proves working. catalog/render.py now emits, for any forward-auth app with an
exposed UI: the oauth2-proxy sidecar (upstream http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>,
:4180, --allowed-group per auth.group), an authproxy :4180 Service port, an
HTTPRoute backendRef -> :4180, and a gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy that
allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180 (fail-closed: the bare UI is never
served un-authenticated). oidc/native/none apps render byte-identical.
This is the CANARY: only pihole's golden carries the sidecar and is verified
fail-closed in-cluster first. jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr are deferred to
the rollout commit (temporarily listed in ci/render-golden.sh) so their UIs
keep serving exactly as today until their clients+secrets land.
- keycloak: confidential pihole client (realm-import + realm-clients mirror),
provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper, bare names).
- secret: SOPS/age pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials (client-id/secret/cookie),
wired into apps/wave-0 via the renderer's new sidecar-creds wave rule.
- L1 render goldens regenerated for the sidecar (forward-auth fixtures).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Investigation + phased implementation plan to move the churn-heavy,
latency-sensitive Longhorn volumes (Prometheus, the CNPG Postgres DBs,
Loki, gitea) off the slow/failing HDD 'Storage' pool onto a tagged
SSD-backed Longhorn disk on local-zfs, ending the reboot rebuild storm.
Key finding: the recorded 'SSD does not fit Longhorn' blocker was based
on the 384 GiB provisioned figure; actual working set is ~79 GB
cluster-wide (~26 GB/node) since all bulk media is on NFS, not Longhorn.
Hot tier is ~51 GB actual / 114 GiB provisioned and fits the ~323 GiB
SSD AVAIL with headroom. Read-only investigation; no live storage
touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The three KubeVirt VM conformance tests (vm-lifecycle, vm-default-deny,
vm-data-survival) carried comments asserting the ALPHA `ImageVolume` feature
gate is DISABLED "on this k3s v1.31 cluster" and that the apiserver therefore
prunes the container-disk `image` volume, breaking the containerDisk boot path.
The cluster was upgraded v1.31 -> v1.36.4. Revalidated the gate live:
- kubernetes_feature_enabled{name="ImageVolume"} = 1 (enabled by default;
stage="" — no longer ALPHA)
- a server-side `kubectl apply --dry-run=server` of a Pod with an `image`
volume RETAINS the volume + mount instead of pruning them.
So the old premise is stale: containerDisk roots would boot on 1.36.4. The
tests never asserted the gate state and never used containerDisk — they boot
from CDI DataVolume roots, which remains the correct choice because it is the
spec-required, rebuild-surviving disk model (docs/06, R-STATE-01); an ephemeral
containerDisk could never satisfy data-survival. Test logic is therefore
unchanged; only the explanatory comments are corrected (v1.31 -> v1.36.4, and
the "containerDisk is broken here" rationale marked stale with the live
evidence).
Merge gate: PASS (lint, l0, render-golden, l1 green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Research + implementation plan (no live change) on whether Cilium 1.20.1's
native Gateway API ExternalAuth filter (GEP-1494) can replace the un-wired
forward-auth CEC template and Crafty's oauth2-proxy sidecar.
Verdict: DEFER. The filter exists in 1.20.1 code (shipped 1.20.0, PR #45739) but
is EXPERIMENTAL-channel Gateway API; the cluster runs the standard-channel CRDs
(verified: HTTPRoute filters[].type enum lacks ExternalAuth), so it is not even
installable today. Also: fail-open bug (#47178, fixed#47265) in a brand-new
security filter, no 1.20 docs, and the ext_authz hop would hit the same
enforce_policy_on_l7lb hairpin re-evaluation just fixed for Keycloak (68690e5).
Plan is phased/reversible (pihole canary first) and keeps the working sidecar.
Resolves the DECISIONS-LOG open item on ext_authz workaround relevance under 1.20.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Steady-state CPU PSI 15-23% + 15-min load 5.6-8.0 on 6 cores (run queue at/over core count) left no
headroom for bursty workloads. Proxmox host has 24 cores at ~4% load, so 3x8 = 24 vCPU is 1:1 with
zero oversubscription. In-place tofu update (cores change is pending until a per-node VM stop/start);
rolled one node at a time to keep etcd quorum. Comment also corrected 16->24 GiB (stale).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The container-workload and egress-class L1 fixtures use auth.mode=forward-auth, so the renderer now
emits the keycloak backend egress allow for them too. Regenerate the committed goldens to match the
canonical render. MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
App SSO broke cluster-wide after the Cilium 1.16.5->1.20.1 upgrade: the CVE-2025-30162 fix (in
>=1.16.8/1.17.2) makes the shared Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluate a pod's egress policy against
Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) when it hairpins to keycloak.home.
'toEntities: world' matches the Gateway VIP at L3/L4 but not the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so
OIDC discovery/token 403'd ('Access denied') for every app with a NetworkPolicy (gitea/nextcloud/
semaphore/headlamp/crafty...); Grafana survived only because monitoring has no NetworkPolicy.
Fix: explicit toEndpoints egress allow to the keycloak backend for SSO apps.
- catalog/render.py: emit it for auth.mode in {oidc,forward-auth}; re-rendered 8 app goldens.
- platform/headlamp + platform/crafty: hand-written policies get the same allow.
Split-horizon design unchanged. Verified live: headlamp-ns -> keycloak discovery 403 -> 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The browser-mfa conditional-user-role authenticator used config key 'condition.evaluated.user.role',
which is not a real Keycloak property — the role resolved to null, so Keycloak logged 'Invalid role
name submitted: null' and the REQUIRED conditional-OTP step threw, 403-ing every platform-admins login
(Headlamp, Grafana admin, etc.). Correct key for Keycloak 26 is condUserRole=platform-admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Adds NodeCPUPressureHigh (CPU PSI 'some' > 15% for 15m) and NodeCPULoadHigh (load5/core > 1 for 15m)
to platform-health.nodes, plus a 'Nodes — CPU / Memory Pressure' Grafana dashboard (PSI + load-per-core
+ utilization). These surface the bursty CPU contention that averaged CPU%/kubectl top hides — the
signal behind 'spikes cause blips of delay'. Makes the 6->8 vCPU resize measurable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Both were pinned at ~98% of their limits (Prometheus 2002/2048Mi, Grafana 499/512Mi) with no
headroom for TSDB compaction / dashboard-render spikes — the classic OOM setups. Nodes are 24Gi at
38-44% used (~14Gi free each; the '~22 GiB ceiling' comment predates the 16->24Gi node bump), so the
extra headroom is comfortable. Grafana request 256->384Mi, Prometheus request unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
A node rebuild (tofu -replace / fresh OS) wipes host-level config Flux/Helm don't manage.
site.yml omits kube-vip.yml and vpn.egress.gateway.yml, so a re-provision missed the node-host
OpenVPN on k3s-dev-3 and dropped all egress-class=vpn pod traffic. Document the node-host layers
that must be re-run after any re-provision, and correct the stale author-only banner (these plays
are live).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
chart 7 major bump. Verified chart 7.3.0 renders identically for this SingleBinary/filesystem/
Longhorn config (one loki StatefulSet, no extra read/write/backend/cache pods, no schema errors).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Text-only cleanup after the upgrade campaign. Updates stale version
strings, prose, and comments to the verified current facts; no
Kubernetes behavior or version pins changed except the kubectl
toolchain bump (below).
Verified facts applied: k3s v1.36.4+k3s1, Debian 13 trixie,
Cilium 1.20.1 / Gateway API v1.6.1, Longhorn 1.12.1, node RAM 24 GiB,
dedicated virtio2 SSD etcd disk per node, Velero chart 12.x / v1.18,
Grafana 13.2.0.
- Version strings across infra/ and platform/ READMEs + comments
- kubectl toolchain 1.31.4 -> 1.36.4 (devcontainer/ci/conformance
versions.env; 1.31 vs a 1.36 cluster exceeded the +-1 skew)
- Retired-single-apps-Kustomization refs -> apps-wave-0/1/2 + apps-vms
with per-wave SOPS decryption (flux/clusters docs + bootstrap.sh)
- COMPLETED/historical banners on the three executed plan docs
- Resolved TODO(WS-SEC) markers -> Renovate-maintained ranges
- Appended dated DECISIONS-LOG entry (2026-08-30) superseding the
2026-08-26 LIVE STATE line
Left as revalidation items (not blind-edited): external-snapshotter
v8.2.0 vs 1.36, Cilium ext_authz/forward-auth relevance under 1.20.1,
conformance ImageVolume feature-gate assertions under 1.36.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Manifest env-var config (manager/cp_enable/svc_enable/vip_arp/leaderelection) is unchanged across
0.8->1.2, so the bump is image + re-applied auto-deploy manifest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Grafana 12.x bundled in kps 88 OOMKilled (exit 137) at 256Mi during grafana-apiserver/unified-storage
startup — no fatal log, just SIGKILL. The new Grafana pod never became Ready, so Helm --wait ran the full
20m and rolled back to 65.8.1 every time. 512Mi holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The 65->88 multi-major upgrade exceeded the default 5m Helm timeout (full operator/KSM/
node-exporter + Prometheus/Alertmanager StatefulSet rollout), so Flux rolled back to 65.8.1
four times and Stalled, blocking the platform kustomization and everything downstream.
CRDs pre-applied server-side at operator v0.93.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
All 3 k3s nodes re-provisioned to Debian 13 (kernel 6.12) via immutable tofu -replace,
one at a time, primary/leader last (secondary-join to avoid cluster-init split-brain).
- variables.tf image defaults -> debian-13-generic (generic, not genericcloud)
- k3s_server: ensure /etc/rancher/k3s exists (fresh-node re-provision fix)
- gitignore vendored ansible collections (installed for re-provision)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
All 3 k3s nodes re-provisioned to Debian 13 (kernel 6.12) via immutable tofu -replace,
one at a time, leader/primary last. variables.tf image defaults -> trixie generic.
k3s_server role: ensure /etc/rancher/k3s exists (fresh-node re-provision fix).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Root cause of a W5 wedge: default 5m Helm timeout on slow-HDD Longhorn upgrades caused
a rollback attempt after the data had already migrated to the new minor, which the old
manager fatally refuses. Give the upgrade room and never auto-rollback (fail forward).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Gateway API CRDs bumped v1.2.1->v1.3.0 (required by Cilium 1.18; applied server-side).
Land on current k8s 1.32 before the 1.33 hop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Land the two pacing components on current k8s 1.31 before the 1.32 k3s hop.
Cilium 1.17 supports k8s 1.29-1.32; Longhorn 1.8 supports 1.25+; Gateway API CRDs
stay v1.2.1 (Cilium 1.17 targets v1.2.x). Also commits the full upgrade plan doc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Prereq for the Flux v2.7+ upgrade (W4). Flux 2.4 already serves image.toolkit/v1,
so this is safe now. render.py source + platform/image-automation + L3 test + L1 goldens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Migrate image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2 -> /v1 for ImageRepository,
ImagePolicy, and ImageUpdateAutomation ahead of the Flux v2.7+ upgrade
(cluster-upgrade-plan §3.2). Flux v2.4 (current) already serves /v1, so
migrating the manifests now is a safe no-op at runtime.
- catalog/render.py: r_image_automation emits v1 for ImageRepository/ImagePolicy
- platform/image-automation/{image-update-automation,per-service/pihole.example}
- conformance L3 hands-off-update chainsaw applies v1 CRs
- conformance L1 goldens re-rendered to match (apiVersion-only diff)
No spec-field changes required: all spec fields used (image, interval,
imageRepositoryRef, filterTags.pattern/extract, policy.semver.range,
sourceRef, git.*, update.strategy/path) are unchanged in v1; the v1
messageTemplate already uses .Changed (not the removed .Updated).
apps/ golden unaffected (canonical render uses --no-image-automation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Dedicated SSD (rpool/local-zfs) virtio2 disk per k3s VM, etcd migrated to
/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db on /dev/vdc, isolating etcd WAL fsync from the
HDD Longhorn churn. Applied live one node at a time (dev-2/dev-1/dev-3, leader
last) with rebuild-freeze; dev-3 also bumped 16->24GB. All 3 nodes verified:
etcd on SSD, 3/3 healthy, 18/18 volumes healthy, tofu plan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Interim bridge to stop Longhorn replica-rebuild I/O storms on the shared HDD
Storage pool from starving etcd WAL fsync (crash-looping k3s / flapping the
kube-vip VIP). Adds a small dedicated SSD disk per node for etcd only; Longhorn
stays on HDD. See docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md.
tofu (infra/tofu):
- New vars etcd_ssd_datastore (default "local-zfs" = rpool/data, Micron 5100
SATA SSD mirror w/ PLP) and etcd_disk_gib (default 16).
- New virtio2 disk block on the SSD datastore per VM: discard=on, cache=none
(honor guest fsync straight to the ZFS ZIL — safe on PLP SSD), iothread=false.
Kept last (ascending interface) so bpg does not reorder virtio0/virtio1.
- Revert the debian_cloud_image resource to the long type name
proxmox_virtual_environment_download_file to match the R2 state: bpg >= 0.111
dropped the cross-type moved{} linkage to the short proxmox_download_file, so
the stale moved block failed EVERY plan with "Resource type mismatch" (broken
on main too). Aligning code to state yields a clean plan with no image
re-download. Short-name migration is deferred to a deliberate `tofu state mv`.
ansible (node_baseline):
- Format /dev/vdc (label k3s-etcd) and mount it at
/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db (defaults,noatime; no nofail so a missing etcd
disk fails loudly rather than silently landing etcd on the root HDD) before
k3s starts, so a rebuilt node comes up with etcd isolated on SSD. Data-safe:
filesystem module never reformats an existing fs.
Phase 1 only: non-disruptive. No tofu apply, no node/VM/etcd/Longhorn changes.
tofu plan verified: 0 to add, 3 to change, 0 to destroy — every VM an in-place
disk ADD (virtio2), dev-3 also an in-place memory 16384->24576; no VM replace.
Merge gate green (render==golden included).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
