b4ff2879be407f7d5cb3ceb94201c863c5fdbbc2
116
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jakman85
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e8d8601ca6 |
feat(cnpg): required pod anti-affinity + switchover primary rolls
`instances: 3` alone does not keep the three instances apart. All three Clusters used CNPG's default `podAntiAffinityType: preferred`, which is a scheduler HINT — two instances may share a node whenever that scores better, and they WILL on the path that matters: when CNPG recreates an instance after a node loss, the surviving nodes are the only candidates and one of them already runs an instance. `preferred` is how a 3-instance cluster decays back into the single-node failure domain the previous commit exists to remove. `required` makes it a scheduling constraint. On a 3-node cluster with no spare, the cost is that an instance whose node is gone stays Pending until a node returns. That is correct: a replacement squeezed onto an already-occupied node dies with that node while making the cluster LOOK three-way replicated. 2 of 3 instances still serve and CNPG still promotes. ALSO SETS primaryUpdateMethod: switchover. This is not cosmetic. Changing the affinity changes the instance pod spec, so CNPG performs a rolling update, and the CRD default for primaryUpdateMethod is `restart` (verified against the live CNPG 1.30.0 CRD on both clusters) — a delete-and-recreate of the PRIMARY pod, i.e. tens of seconds of no Postgres. On keycloak-db that is an SSO outage, which also means kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth. With standbys now present, `switchover` promotes an already-updated streaming replica instead, reducing the roll to a connection reset. Known constraint documented in the manifest: under `switchover` the operator rejects an update that changes imageName and a postgresql parameter in the same reconcile. Verified satisfiable before merge (read-only): k3s-prod and k3s-dev each have 3 Ready, schedulable, untainted nodes, and every pgdata PVC already has a Longhorn replica on all three (replica-soft-anti-affinity=false), so any instance can attach from any node. DEV IMPACT: identical, and dev can absorb it. Longhorn dev nodes are 124.9 GiB each with 152.0 GiB already scheduled under a 200% over-provisioning ceiling (249.8 GiB); the six new 5Gi volumes add 30 GiB scheduled per node -> 182.0, still inside the ceiling, and only ~600 MiB per volume is really consumed. Prod is far looser: 239 -> 269 GiB scheduled against a 829 GiB ceiling. THIS IS THE DISRUPTIVE COMMIT of the three. Land it on its own reconcile, after the scale-out has produced two Ready standbys per Cluster, so the blast radius is one clean switchover per database rather than a scale-out and a roll at once. Expect a brief SSO interruption for keycloak-db. Verified: yamllint clean; both tiers render the new fields; field names, types and enum values checked against the live clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io CRD (CNPG 1.30.0, identical on prod and dev). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e1d364238d73e6ee99c9a50108fe8b4e09481a7e) |
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jakman85
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f338e91770 |
feat(cnpg): instances 3 on all three Clusters — a standby to fail over to
All three CNPG Clusters ran `instances: 1`. Longhorn's 3-way replication saves the DATA when a node dies; it does not save the SERVICE — a single instance has to be rescheduled, re-attach its volume and replay WAL before Postgres accepts a connection again. With nothing in the spec keeping them apart, all three primaries had drifted onto ONE node (k3s-prod-2 on prod, k3s-dev-3 on dev). On 2026-09-07 that node took SSO, Nextcloud and Semaphore down together, and with SSO went kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth. Three instances give each Cluster a streaming standby CNPG can promote in seconds, repointing the -rw Service with no volume re-attach and no restore. UNBLOCKED BY WORKING BACKUPS, NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THEM. Standbys replicate corruption and deletions faithfully; only the Barman archive is a backup, and adding standbys while archive_mode=on with a failing archive_command would have multiplied the disk-full clock, not hedged it. All three Clusters on both k3s-prod and k3s-dev now report ContinuousArchiving=True with a real firstRecoverabilityPoint (verified read-only, 2026-09-07). Scaling out is non-disruptive on its own: CNPG creates -2 then -3 sequentially, each seeded by pg_basebackup from the RUNNING primary. The primary is not restarted and clients are not disconnected. The anti-affinity change that DOES cause a switchover is deliberately the next commit. DEV IMPACT: identical — dev is on the same shape (three single-instance DBs, all on k3s-dev-3) and gets the same scale-out. Dev has three untainted nodes and Longhorn headroom for it (see the next commit's message for the numbers). Cost: 2 extra 5Gi PVCs per Cluster; ~30 GiB provisioned cluster-wide against live pgdata of ~600 MiB each, on Longhorn with 200% over-provisioning. Verified: yamllint clean; `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone platform-config` and `kubectl kustomize apps/wave-0` both render `instances: 3`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ed6fe6cb019b96f677a92448a0347f979d1a6d02) |
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jakman85
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09265e0381 | merge: OIDC issuer/callback URLs become per-environment | ||
 jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6548f9a89c |
fix(semaphore): per-environment OIDC URLs — same latent break as Headlamp
Semaphore's whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON blob lived inside the SOPS-encrypted
semaphore-bootstrap Secret (key `oidc-providers-json`) because it CONTAINS the confidential
client secret. That buried two environment-specific, NON-SECRET URLs in ciphertext —
provider_url (the realm issuer) and redirect_url — where Flux's ${BASE_DOMAIN} postBuild
substitution cannot reach. Both were frozen at `home.keithjackson.dev`, so prod's Semaphore
was pointed at dev's Keycloak and dev's own redirect URI: identical root cause to the
Headlamp login timeout, not yet reported only because nobody had tried prod SSO.
FIX: split the blob. The URLs are public and now live as a plaintext literal in
catalog/semaphore.yaml (rendered to the apps/wave-1 golden), ${BASE_DOMAIN}-substituted like
every other hostname. Only the client secret stays encrypted, in its own key
`oidc-client-secret`, and the KUBELET splices it back via dependent-env-var expansion:
$(SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET) resolves against the secretKeyRef env var declared
immediately above it (order is load-bearing — the kubelet resolves env in list order and
leaves a forward reference as literal text).
Verified: the new key holds the same value as keycloak-realm-clients/semaphore-client-secret
(the mirror invariant), Semaphore v2.19.10's util.OidcProvider consumes client_secret as
before, and `flux envsubst --strict` leaves $(...) untouched while resolving ${BASE_DOMAIN} —
dev renders keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev, prod keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev.
apps/wave-1/semaphore.yaml is a render golden; regenerated with the canonical
`catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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161430d915 |
feat(backup): the overlay picks the credential — BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX
The previous commit created the two halves. This one wires the choice, so dev renders MinIO
credentials and prod renders R2 credentials from the SAME base manifests (R-ENV-02: the
overlay patch is the entire difference between environments; no base manifest is forked).
cluster-vars BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX base "" | dev "" | prod "-prod"
velero HelmRelease credentials.existingSecret: velero-cloud-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
3x CNPG Cluster s3Credentials.*.name: <db>-backup-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
ONE SUFFIX, NOT FOUR SECRET-NAME KNOBS. Four independent knobs can be updated three-quarters
of the way, leaving one consumer reading the OTHER environment's key with nothing rendering
wrong — and StrictPostBuildSubstitutions cannot catch that: strict mode fails on an UNDEFINED
variable, never on a defined-but-stale one. With one suffix the four move together or not at
all. The cost is that the rendered Secret name is not greppable from the consumer, so both
kustomizations spell the two names out in full beside the resources.
THE BASE DEFAULT IS "" AND THAT IS LOAD-BEARING. It renders the UNSUFFIXED names — objects
that exist in every render, and that dev is running today. The alternative failure mode is
strictly worse than the shared-Secret state this replaces: velero's pod hangs in
ContainerCreating forever when `existingSecret` names a missing Secret (the volume never
mounts), and a CNPG Cluster whose s3Credentials Secret is absent stops archiving WAL — which
under archive_mode=on is a filling pgdata PVC, not a missing backup. So an unresolvable
default breaks the referencing cluster HARDER than a wrong key does. Both overlays state the
value explicitly anyway, so neither inherits it silently.
Prod's overlay change is a cluster-vars op only. The velero Flux Kustomization patch is
untouched (it stays decryption-only, and velero stays suspended on prod).
VERIFIED — `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone` on clusters/dev and
clusters/prod for the cluster-vars values, then on each of the four affected tiers (platform,
platform-config, platform/velero, apps/wave-0) piped through `flux envsubst --strict` with
that environment's variables:
strict envsubst PASSES for all 8 (env x tier) combinations
dev velero existingSecret velero-cloud-credentials
dev keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db <db>-backup-credentials (both key refs each)
prod velero existingSecret velero-cloud-credentials-prod
prod keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db <db>-backup-credentials-prod (both key refs each)
both all EIGHT Secret objects present in the rendered output (dev and prod alike)
no `${...}` survives in any rendered tier except gitea's three DELIBERATE `$${...}` shell
escapes in apps/wave-0, which are pre-existing and unrelated.
Read alongside the endpoints the same overlays already set, the two environments are now
isolated on credential AND target:
dev velero s3://velero (root) + cnpg s3://cnpg @ http://192.168.1.9:9000 region us-east-1
prod velero k3s-prod-backup/velero + barman prefix @ https://<acct>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com region auto
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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e7c4a95c2d |
feat(backup): the four backup credentials become TWO objects each, one per environment
The four backup-credential SOPS Secrets are SHARED BASE manifests: platform/ and apps/ are
rendered by the same Flux tiers on both clusters, and the ONLY per-environment difference in
this repo is cluster-vars substitution (R-ENV-02). So writing the R2 token into all four
(0a6a862) did not "give prod credentials" — it REPLACED DEV'S. Merging that as-is would have
handed dev's Velero and all three dev CNPG Clusters an R2 key id to sign MinIO requests with:
403 on every WAL segment, and archive_mode=on turns that into a disk-full clock on the pgdata
PVC, not a degraded backup. Dev's PROVEN DR restore (R-STATE-03) is the thing that would have
broken.
This commit splits the material. Each credential is now TWO Secret objects, both applied to
BOTH clusters, differing only in name suffix:
dev -> velero-cloud-credentials keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db-backup-credentials
prod -> velero-cloud-credentials-prod ...-db-backup-credentials-prod
The consumer picks one by name; that wiring is the NEXT commit, so this one changes no
rendered reference and is a no-op for both live clusters.
WHY DEV KEEPS THE UNSUFFIXED NAME. Dev is live. Renaming its Secret would change
`s3Credentials.accessKeyId.name` on three running CNPG Clusters — which projects into the
instance pods' environment and therefore ROLLS keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db —
and would roll the velero Deployment, all to rename an object whose contents do not change.
This repo already makes exactly this call for dev's live identifiers (EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
"default", VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX ""): the live cluster keeps the name it is running, and the
NEW environment takes the new one. The asymmetry is deliberate and documented at each
kustomization.
WHERE THE MATERIAL CAME FROM. Neither side is invented:
- the four unsuffixed files are restored byte-for-byte from `main` (the MinIO material as
it stood before 0a6a862), so dev's Secrets are IDENTICAL to what dev is running;
- the four `-prod` files carry the R2 token from 0a6a862 (already on this branch as
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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0a0527e7db |
feat(backup): prod's off-cluster DR lands on R2 — and stops the WAL clock
Prod has been archiving WAL to `TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT` since bootstrap. Verified live 2026-09-07 on all three CNPG Clusters: ContinuousArchiving=False, "unexpected failure invoking barman-cloud-wal-archive: exit status 4". Because archive_mode is ON, that is not a degraded backup — it is a DISK-FULL CLOCK. Postgres will not recycle a segment it has not archived, so keycloak-db's pgdata PVC is at 579 MiB used / 4360 MiB free and climbing monotonically. When it fills, the primary PANICs and takes SSO down, and with it kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and forward-auth. Wiring the endpoint is what lets Postgres drain the whole accumulated backlog in one pass. THE KNOB LAYOUT (three new, one repurposed) and why it is shaped this way. The operator created exactly ONE R2 bucket, `k3s-prod-backup`, but the two backup tools want differently-SHAPED values: the Velero chart takes `bucket` and `prefix` as separate fields, while CNPG's barmanObjectStore.destinationPath is one full s3:// URL whose first path segment IS the bucket. So: S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT dev http://192.168.1.9:9000 prod https://<acct>.r2... S3_BACKUP_REGION dev us-east-1 prod auto VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET dev velero prod k3s-prod-backup VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX dev "" prod velero CNPG_BACKUP_PATH dev s3://cnpg prod s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman There is deliberately NO separate `S3_BACKUP_BUCKET`: CNPG's bucket already lives inside CNPG_BACKUP_PATH, and a second knob holding the same bucket name twice is a rotation waiting to drift. Three knobs, each shaped for its own consumer, and no two of them can contradict each other. TENANCY. Inside k3s-prod-backup, velero and barman get disjoint TOP-LEVEL prefixes — s3://k3s-prod-backup/velero/ and s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/<cluster>/ — with the bucket ROOT left empty so a misrendered prefix lands somewhere obviously wrong instead of silently colliding. This is not tidiness: Velero ADOPTS every backup under its location and TTL-DELETES it on retention, so an overlapping prefix would let it reap WAL segments; and interleaving two Postgres servers' WAL into one prefix corrupts the chain outright. Dev↔prod isolation is doubly independent — different endpoint AND different bucket names — so neither cluster can reach the other's objects even with a mis-substituted prefix. DEV IS UNCHANGED, BYTE-FOR-BYTE, and that is asserted rather than assumed. Base defaults are dev's LIVE values (verified against the running cluster: BSL bucket=velero with NO prefix, region us-east-1; all three CNPG Clusters ContinuousArchiving=True at s3://cnpg on the MinIO), and the dev overlay now restates all five explicitly for the same reason LONGHORN_DATA_PATH is restated — a silent drift in base would ORPHAN the backups dev's PROVEN restore depends on. The empty-prefix case was the one real risk, and it is settled empirically: with prefix "" the chart omits objectStorage.prefix from the rendered BackupStorageLocation ENTIRELY (helm template, chart 12.1.0), so dev's live BSL is unchanged, not merely equivalent. R2's TWO GOTCHAS, both wired up front: - region must be exactly `auto`. head-bucket answers {"BucketRegion":"WNAM"}, which is a PHYSICAL LOCATION HINT, not a signing region. This was hardcoded us-east-1 inside the Velero HelmRelease — correct-by-accident for MinIO, wrong for anything else — so it is a knob now. - checksumAlgorithm: "". velero-plugin-for-aws v1.14.2 bundles an AWS SDK with flexible checksums on by default and sends x-amz-sdk-checksum-algorithm / x-amz-checksum-crc32 on every PUT; R2 rejects those with HTTP 400 InvalidArgument, failing every backup and every kopia blob upload. It must be PRESENT-but-empty (the plugin branches on the key existing), and the chart does emit an empty value — verified by rendering it. Harmless against MinIO, so it is unconditional rather than a fourth knob. WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO. Velero stays SUSPENDED on prod. `spec.suspend: true` is owned by field manager `flux` (verified: kustomize-controller's managedFields do not include f:suspend), so server-side apply will not strip it, and nothing here declares suspension — which would also trip R-ENV-03, since a prod overlay may patch only cluster-vars and a Flux Kustomization's `decryption`. Unsuspending is the operator's, after `standup.sh --s3-endpoint <r2> s3check` proves a round trip. NO DNS KNOB IS TOUCHED. BASE_DOMAIN stays prod.home.keithjackson.dev and every EXTERNALDNS_* value is untouched. The apex inversion on work/prod-standup-campaign was deliberately NOT carried: this branch ports that branch's R2 reasoning knob by knob, and merges nothing. VERIFIED: ci/l0.sh green (flux-postbuild-substitution 272 assertions, 0 hazards, 33 knobs defined / 28 referenced, every new token resolved in BOTH overlays); render-golden, lint, schema, spec-immutability green; touched requirement R-STATE-03 covered. Refs R-STATE-03, R-IDP-05, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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9739e9be91 |
chore(backup): R2 credentials for the off-cluster DR target
Written by platform/backup/set-r2-credentials.sh (operator, 2026-09-07T05:41:34Z) into all four consumers, in the two shapes they need: velero wants an AWS INI file, CNPG/barman wants discrete ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY. All four verified to carry the SAME 32-character key id, so no consumer was missed. Proven from a pod INSIDE prod against https://7ce452a1b3d6c86daf2c020edcb82d37.r2.cloudflarestorage.com: head-bucket on k3s-prod-backup returns BucketRegion WNAM, and PUT and DELETE both succeed. Byte-integrity of GET is NOT yet proven (the aws-cli image has no cmp); s3check is what will establish it. Credentials only — no endpoint or bucket wiring. That is feat/r2-backup-prod. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c8c1d2935d |
feat(dns): per-environment BASE_DOMAIN — prod moves to its own subdomain
INCIDENT FIX. Prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE OF DEV'S PUBLIC DNS RECORDS. Both
clusters ran policy: sync against the SAME Cloudflare zone with the SAME implicit
txtOwnerId (`default`), so prod believed it owned dev's records, found no matching sources,
and removed them plus their TXT registry entries. Dev recovered ~30s after prod was scaled
to 0; verified restored against Cloudflare directly (my first check went through a pfSense
override and falsely showed healthy — local resolvers are not evidence about public DNS).
THE MISS WAS MINE, and it was a failure of imagination in how I briefed every agent. I put
"never touch dev" in brief after brief and enforced it — separate kubeconfigs, verified
--limit, sha-checked dev's kubeconfig before and after. Every one of those guards held. NONE
of them covered SHARED EXTERNAL RESOURCES. Prod reconciling its OWN correctly-authored
manifests reached across a third party and destroyed dev's state. Cluster-to-cluster
isolation was verified; the dependency that mattered was cluster-to-Cloudflare.
Operator's architecture: dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod ->
*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, apex CNAME <svc>.home -> <svc>.prod.home.
PHASE 1 ONLY (this commit): prod moves to its own subdomain. DEV IS NOT MIGRATED and its
effective hostname stays home.keithjackson.dev, so dev renders byte-identically and nothing
live moves. That alone ends the collision and unblocks prod. Phase 2 (dev -> dev.home. +
apex CNAMEs) is deferred to when the operator is present: it relocates Keycloak's issuer and
12 clients' redirect URIs, forces a rolling k3s restart and kubectl SSO re-issue for every
user, and moves gitea.home. — which is BOTH the GitOps source and the current push target.
BASE_DOMAIN WAS A DEAD KNOB — it existed in cluster-vars but the status report flagged it as
referenced by nothing, because hostnames were hardcoded throughout. Now real: 141 refs.
Searched the AUTHORITATIVE reconciled set by resolving each Flux spec.path transitively via
conformance/lib/status.py — the same resolver the L0 gate uses, so "what Flux reconciles"
has one definition. 185 occurrences across 47 files in 154 reconciled files. Tokenized:
Gateway listeners, the wildcard Certificate, coredns-custom, external-dns, Keycloak
instance/realm (26 redirect URIs), oauth2-proxy, Grafana OIDC, all HTTPRoutes, Homepage's 15
links, 30 runbook_urls, unifi cloud-init, render.py's ZONE constant (which drove
--oidc-issuer-url/--cookie-domain/--whitelist-domain on every forward-auth sidecar) and 11
catalog/ ServiceDefinitions re-rendered canonically. Left alone: 43 comment/prose
occurrences and non-reconciled paths.
TWO THAT CANNOT BE TOKENIZED, flagged not forced:
- headlamp's OIDC URLs live inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret; re-encrypting rewrites the MAC
over every value and the OFFLINE harness cannot verify it (kustomize does not decrypt),
so an error would break live-dev SSO with no pre-flight proof. Prod needs its own copy
anyway — client secrets are realm-scoped.
- kube-apiserver --oidc-issuer-url is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so Flux can never
reach it. Done on the inventory seam instead (k3s_base_domain -> k3s_oidc_issuer_url,
overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod). Verified per host: dev keeps the default, prod gets
prod.home.
EXTERNAL-DNS OWNER, the actual incident cause: txtOwnerId is now explicit per environment —
dev renders exactly `default` (the chart default it was already using, so its existing
records stay recognised) and prod gets `prod`. The BASE default is a NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL,
deliberately not `default`, so a future environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and
can delete nothing rather than silently inheriting dev's identity.
I OVERRODE ONE AGENT DECISION against our own prior finding: it narrowed prod's
domainFilters to prod.home.keithjackson.dev as defence in depth. FINDING F-DNS1
(DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) already proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE —
ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS
Name". Prod would have published NOTHING. Set to the ZONE (keithjackson.dev) like dev.
Isolation comes from the subdomain split plus txtOwnerId, which is what the incident
actually needed and what a domain filter cannot provide.
DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED: 11 of 12 substituting paths byte-identical; the 12th differs by
exactly one line, `+ txtOwnerId: default` — the value dev was already using implicitly.
POSITIVE CONTROLS confirm the harness is not blind: perturbing BASE_DOMAIN moves 10 of 12
hashes (the 2 that don't provably contain no hostname), perturbing the owner id moves
exactly 1. Prod's rendered output has ZERO home.keithjackson.dev references outside prod.,
and its cert renders *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev — no overlap with dev's.
L0 substitution assertions 106 -> 254; BASE_DOMAIN is no longer flagged dead. Gate PASS.
PROD REMAINS SUSPENDED (platform + 10 downstream tiers) pending review; nothing applied.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-02, R-DNS-03, R-TLS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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4c4f5355d9 |
fix(sso): postStart hooks must exit 0 — nextcloud crashlooped the moment OIDC ran
LIVE REGRESSION, caught on the reconcile after merging #5. nextcloud went
CrashLoopBackOff with FailedPostStartHook, 7 restarts, and apps-wave-1/2 stalled.
ROOT CAUSE — a latent bug that could never fire until now. The final statement of
nextcloud's postStart script was:
[ "$p" -ge 15 ] && nextcloud_oidc_fail "could not promote ... after retries"
On the SUCCESS path (p < 15) the test returns 1, and as the script's LAST command that
becomes the hook's exit status. A non-zero postStart exit makes the kubelet KILL the
container. This was harmless for as long as the OIDC guard above it was dead code that
exited 0 first (see
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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8a2be824f6 |
feat(ci): substitution-safety gate + escape 6 comment hazards; strict mode is now SAFE
Adds conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution/ — an offline, stdlib-only
L0 check tagged R-ENV-02 + R-GITOPS-01 (deliberately NOT R-TEST-01, which would
overclaim). It reuses lib/status.py's `resources:` walk rather than forking it, so "what a
path renders" has exactly one definition. It asserts: every ${...} on a substituted path
is defined-or-escaped (comments included); no default-operator form on an undefined name;
no unparseable expansion; the rendering path actually substitutes cluster-vars; every
overlay-patched /data/KEY has a base default; and that the gate itself is load-bearing.
WIRED AS AN UNCONDITIONAL STAGE (3c) in ci/l0.sh, and that matters: stage 3b scopes to
touched requirements, and ci/touched-requirements.sh maps only clusters/* to R-ENV-02 —
so an edit to a substituted manifest under apps/ or platform/ would have filtered this
check out of exactly the change that introduces the bug. l0 fail -> BLOCK=1 in gate.sh.
Mutation-tested all five assertion classes (undefined token, indexed expansion, :- form,
missing substituteFrom, un-wired gate); each fails as intended, baseline green.
STRICT MODE IS PROVEN SAFE TO ENABLE — measured, not inspected. For all 11 substituted
paths, `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone <path> | flux envsubst
--strict` exits 0 against cluster-vars base defaults. Negative control confirms the
incident: with K3S_API_HOST unset, non-strict renders k8sServiceHost empty while strict
exits 1 with `variable not set (strict mode)`. The feature gate itself is NOT flipped
here — that is a live-cluster change and the operator's call.
Escapes the six comment hazards that stood in the way (apps/vms/unifi x4,
platform/longhorn x2). All were prose ABOUT the escaping convention; since the repo's own
contract is that $${...} emits a literal ${...}, escaping them is both precise and
self-consistent. kustomize strips these particular comments today, but comment survival is
an implementation detail — a body comment carrying $ WAS observed surviving into built
apps/wave-1 — and a survivor would kill the whole Kustomization.
DOCTRINE CORRECTED (measured against flux 2.4.0): clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml claimed an
indexed expansion is fatal "escaped or not". Escaping is TOTAL — $${ARR[0]} emits the
literal text safely; only the UNESCAPED indexed form is fatal. Corrected in place.
Also empties DOCUMENTED_GAPS in conformance/run.sh with rationale: R-ENV-02 and
R-GITOPS-01 now have a real verifying test, which run.sh's own comment named as the
trigger for removing them.
Advisory output (not failures): 6 dead cluster-vars knobs — BASE_DOMAIN, CLUSTER_ENV,
CLUSTER_POD_CIDR, PIA_REGION, PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_{KEY,VALUE}. The last four are
documented reference-only; BASE_DOMAIN and CLUSTER_ENV look like genuine rot (hostnames
are hardcoded elsewhere) and are worth a follow-up.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. 102 assertions, 0 hazards.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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3484955903 |
fix(sso): gitea + nextcloud OIDC bootstrap was DEAD CODE — envsubst ate the guard
Both ServiceDefinitions guarded their Keycloak OIDC registration with an UNESCAPED
braced expansion:
if [ -z "${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # gitea
if [ -z "${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # nextcloud, then exit 0
apps-wave-0/1 both declare postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars, and neither name is a
cluster-vars key — so Flux's envsubst substituted them away AT RECONCILE TIME, long
before the container ever ran. Verified in the LIVE cluster: the deployed Deployments
literally contain
if [ -z "" ]; then
which is always true. The entire OIDC registration block has been skipped on EVERY boot
of both apps.
WHY NOBODY NOTICED: both apps DO have the provider registered — `gitea admin auth list`
shows keycloak/OAuth2/true and `occ user_oidc:provider` shows the keycloak provider.
Those live in each app's own database, persisted from an earlier successful registration.
SSO works today and DECISIONS-LOG is not wrong. But the idempotent re-registration is
dead, so any PVC rebuild, DB restore, or fresh cluster build comes up with NO OIDC and
only the break-glass local admin. A PROD BUILD FROM THIS REPO WOULD SILENTLY HAVE NO SSO
on gitea or nextcloud.
The irony: the surrounding code was hardened twice — see its own comments about a "silent
first-boot RACE", the verify-then-retry loops, the marker files. All of that hardening was
unreachable, because the guard above it always evaluated true.
Not a regression from the recent R-ENV-02 tokenization — introduced 2026-08-27 (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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1157c1b071 |
fix(gitea-actions): wait for dind to ACCEPT connections, not just write certs
Re-authors the fix stranded on origin/fix/act-runner-dind-readiness (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
3f980d2a17 |
feat(env): tokenize hardcoded dev LAN addresses into cluster-vars (R-ENV-02)
R-ENV-02 promises dev and prod differ ONLY by scoped cluster-vars overrides. In fact
dev LAN addresses were hardcoded into base manifests, so clusters/prod would have come
up ANNOUNCING DEV ADDRESSES (192.168.1.x) on the prod LAN (192.168.2.x).
New cluster-vars knobs (base default = dev literal, per the file's existing convention):
K3S_API_HOST platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml (+ the values.yaml mirror)
CILIUM_LB_POOL_START platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml
CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP "
UNIFI_L4_VIP apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml
CRAFTY_L4_VIP platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml, apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,
semaphore}-db.yaml, and platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml
Also fixes GATEWAY_VIP's base default, which was still the RETIRED libvirt address
10.73.0.240, and adds the GATEWAY_VIP patch that clusters/prod was missing entirely.
clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml gains postBuild.substituteFrom (it was the one consuming
Kustomization without it, so a ${TOKEN} there would have shipped as a literal string).
The envsubst contract is documented there: ${VAR} substitutes and escapes as $${VAR};
$VAR and $(cmd) are left alone; ${ARR[0]} hard-errors. The three UOS_URL expansions in
the unifi cloud-init are escaped accordingly.
PROD ADDRESS PLAN (operator, 2026-08-31):
nodes .10/.11/.12 · control-plane VIP .9 (Ansible-side) · GATEWAY_VIP .20
Cilium LB pool .20-.30
CONTAINMENT INVARIANT, now documented at the pool and in the prod overlay: GATEWAY_VIP
MUST equal CILIUM_LB_POOL_START. The shared Gateway pins no address, so Cilium LB-IPAM
gives it the first free address of a matching pool block. An initial prod proposal put
.20 outside a .21-.30 pool; the Gateway would have come up on .21 while split-horizon
coredns-custom kept answering *.home.keithjackson.dev with .20 — an address nothing
announces — blackholing in-cluster OIDC hairpin traffic while reporting healthy. The
pool was widened to .20-.30. The control-plane VIP (.9) stays outside the pool so
kube-vip and LB-IPAM can never contend.
Values prod still cannot know stay INVALID `TBD-PROD-*` placeholders on purpose: base
defaults are dev values, so an omitted patch means prod silently inherits a dev address
— far worse than a loud failed apply.
DEV IS BYTE-IDENTICAL. Verified by kustomize build over 13 paths before/after, then
flux envsubst with the dev cluster-vars values applied to both sides: zero drift. The
only deltas are the intended additive keys in the overlay ConfigMap itself. No
unresolved ${TOKEN} survives. render-golden green (10 goldens); yamllint clean.
Serves: R-ENV-02. Task: T-7.1 (prerequisite). Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
b2752aec48 |
feat(auth): gate jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr UIs with oauth2-proxy sidecar (rollout)
Roll the verified Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar out to the remaining four forward-auth apps after the pihole canary was confirmed fail-closed (unauthenticated -> 302 to Keycloak, pod 2/2, clean sidecar OIDC discovery). Each app's Gateway route now terminates at its oauth2-proxy sidecar (:4180, --allowed-group=media-users, --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>); the gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180, so the bare UI is never served un-authenticated (fail-closed; R-IDP-02/06). The apps' own app/API ports stay in-Service for EAST-WEST callers (arr -> qbittorrent:8080 / jackett:9117) via the existing reciprocal-ingress allows. - keycloak: confidential jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr clients (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper). - secrets: four SOPS/age <app>-oauth2-proxy-credentials, wired into apps/wave-0 and apps/wave-1 by the renderer's sidecar-creds wave rule. - ci: remove the temporary canary deferral (all five goldens now reproduce). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
72d4720d58 |
feat(auth): gate pihole UI with per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar (canary)
Close the un-gated-UI security finding for forward-auth apps (R-IDP-02) by rendering the Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar that crafty proves working. catalog/render.py now emits, for any forward-auth app with an exposed UI: the oauth2-proxy sidecar (upstream http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>, :4180, --allowed-group per auth.group), an authproxy :4180 Service port, an HTTPRoute backendRef -> :4180, and a gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy that allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180 (fail-closed: the bare UI is never served un-authenticated). oidc/native/none apps render byte-identical. This is the CANARY: only pihole's golden carries the sidecar and is verified fail-closed in-cluster first. jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr are deferred to the rollout commit (temporarily listed in ci/render-golden.sh) so their UIs keep serving exactly as today until their clients+secrets land. - keycloak: confidential pihole client (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper, bare names). - secret: SOPS/age pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials (client-id/secret/cookie), wired into apps/wave-0 via the renderer's new sidecar-creds wave rule. - L1 render goldens regenerated for the sidecar (forward-auth fixtures). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
68690e5019 |
fix(net): allow SSO apps egress to keycloak backend (Cilium 1.20 CVE-2025-30162)
App SSO broke cluster-wide after the Cilium 1.16.5->1.20.1 upgrade: the CVE-2025-30162 fix (in
>=1.16.8/1.17.2) makes the shared Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluate a pod's egress policy against
Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) when it hairpins to keycloak.home.
'toEntities: world' matches the Gateway VIP at L3/L4 but not the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so
OIDC discovery/token 403'd ('Access denied') for every app with a NetworkPolicy (gitea/nextcloud/
semaphore/headlamp/crafty...); Grafana survived only because monitoring has no NetworkPolicy.
Fix: explicit toEndpoints egress allow to the keycloak backend for SSO apps.
- catalog/render.py: emit it for auth.mode in {oidc,forward-auth}; re-rendered 8 app goldens.
- platform/headlamp + platform/crafty: hand-written policies get the same allow.
Split-horizon design unchanged. Verified live: headlamp-ns -> keycloak discovery 403 -> 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d1248e6778 |
feat(backup): wire Velero + CNPG Barman to the live MinIO S3 target
Author the GitOps side of off-cluster backups against the on-Proxmox MinIO (http://192.168.1.9:9000, path-style; buckets velero + cnpg). Velero (R-STATE-03): - HelmRelease (chart 8.x / Velero 1.15) + velero-plugin-for-aws init container + node-agent kopia File System Backup (deployNodeAgent, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). BSL default -> bucket velero, s3ForcePathStyle. - Two daily Schedules: `daily` backs up the whole cluster's resources+PVC data (defaultVolumesToFsBackup opt-out) EXCEPT monitoring+unifi; `daily-resources-only` captures monitoring+unifi RESOURCES only (Prometheus TSDB, Loki 72h logs, and the ~7.4GiB UniFi VM disk are reconstructable — excluded from volume backup). - velero-cloud-credentials SOPS Secret (cloud INI key, ns velero). - Own non-gating Flux tier clusters/base/backup.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) + clusters/dev SOPS decryption patch — mirrors headlamp. CNPG native Barman PITR (R-IDP-05 / R-STATE-03): - keycloak-db, nextcloud-db, semaphore-db gain spec.backup.barmanObjectStore (s3://cnpg/<cluster>, endpointURL MinIO, gzip WAL+data, 30d retention) + a daily ScheduledBackup (6-field cron, immediate) each. - Per-namespace scoped-key SOPS Secrets (<db>-backup-credentials), same-ns only. - render.py: emit-waves now recognizes <svc>-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml as a DB-wave sidecar (+ self-test); wave-0 kustomization regenerated. Creds mirror platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml (scoped key k3s-backup), SOPS round-trip verified with the cluster age key. gate: green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
cde2cd138f |
plex: add env vars (PLEX_UID/GID, TZ, ALLOWED_NETWORKS); homepage: rename Overseerr->Seerr
Plex Deployment had no Plex env vars. Add via the ServiceDefinition env list (rendered verbatim by catalog/render.py): - PLEX_UID/PLEX_GID=1000 (image chowns /config to this and drops; matches the Longhorn ownership convention seerr/semaphore use) - TZ=Etc/UTC (no other service sets TZ repo-wide) - ALLOWED_NETWORKS=10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16 so in-cluster clients (Seerr -> plex:32400) are trusted as LAN (pod CIDR 10.0.0.0/16 + svc 10.43.0.0/16 + LAN) PLEX_CLAIM intentionally not set (4-min TTL is unusable via git; one-time live claim persists on /config). ADVERTISE_IP deferred: the only candidate host resolves via split-horizon DNS to the internal Gateway VIP and its remote reachability is unverified — a wrong value breaks remote access, so omitted per prefer-safety, documented as a follow-up in catalog/plex.yaml. Homepage still labeled seerr as "Overseerr"; renamed the tile to "Seerr" (icon mdi-play-box-multiple keeps — not overseerr-specific). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
fe0ee698c4 |
fix(apps): reconcile goldens to one canonical render + enforce render==golden gate
The committed apps/ goldens were a MIX of two render flag sets: 8 services were rendered with `--no-image-automation` (no image CRs) while gitea and nextcloud carried stale ImageRepository/ImagePolicy CRs from a render WITHOUT the flag. Neither single command reproduced all goldens, and the gate did not catch it. Part A — canonical render: python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation `--no-image-automation` is canonical: image automation is authored-but-DISABLED (DECISIONS-LOG; image-reflector/-automation controllers not installed), and every app was onboarded via this flag. Re-render drops the ImageRepository + ImagePolicy objects from gitea + nextcloud only (52 line deletions, purely the trailing image-automation blocks). No functional content changed — the nextcloud postStart hardening and gitea OIDC hook are untouched. Part B — enforcement: ci/render-golden.sh renders every onboarded catalog service with the canonical command into a temp dir and FAILS on ANY diff vs committed apps/ (missing golden or content drift), across all 10 services (not just the 3 L1 spot-checks). Not-onboarded catalog entries (keycloak, vm-demo) are excluded per DESIGN-waves. Wired as a required no-cluster stage in ci/gate.sh, ci/Makefile, and both the live (.gitea/workflows/gate.yml) and dormant (merge-gate.yaml) pipelines. Proof: tampering a golden makes the stage exit 1 (blocks merge); reverting restores exit 0. `make -C ci gate` green in the devcontainer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
7f86e1099b |
fix(nextcloud-sso): register post-logout redirect URI + harden admin promotion
Two SSO follow-ups the operator hit after Nextcloud OIDC login worked. 1. Sign-out "redirect failed". On logout user_oidc redirects the browser to Keycloak's end_session_endpoint with post_logout_redirect_uri=<Nextcloud base '/'> and client_id=nextcloud but NO id_token_hint (provider sendIdTokenHint=0). Keycloak then validates that redirect against the client's post.logout.redirect.uris attribute, which was empty -> "Invalid redirect uri" -> the operator's "redirect failed". Register https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/* on the nextcloud client (attributes.post.logout.redirect.uris). Applied live via kcadm and captured here so git stays authoritative (a RealmImport no-ops on the existing realm). 2. postStart step (d) mirrors platform-admins -> built-in admin group, but the previous single best-effort pass ran occ group:adduser once with output swallowed and no retry. At early boot (container Started ~9s after create) that call can transiently fail (DB / maintenance race), silently dropping the promotion until the next restart. Harden step (d) with a verify-and-retry loop (like step (c)): re-read group:list and re-add any platform-admins member still missing from admin until verified (bounded ~30s), no-op for existing members. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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01f3dd0044 | Merge fix/nextcloud-oidc-reach: allow_local_remote_servers for private-IP IdP + platform-admins→admin (#2,#5) | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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7f92adfac6 |
fix(nextcloud): allow SSRF to private IdP + promote platform-admins to admin
Task 1 — browser SSO "Could not reach OpenID Connect provider" (confirmed root cause, not guessed). keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev resolves split-horizon to the PRIVATE Cilium gateway VIP (192.168.1.53). Nextcloud's SSRF guard refuses its own server-side HTTP requests to RFC1918 addresses, so user_oidc's discovery/JWKS/token fetch AT LOGIN throws OCP\Http\Client\LocalServerException "violates local access rules" -> surfaced to the user as "Could not reach the provider". Proven from the live pod: nextcloud.log carries the exact LocalServerException from DiscoveryService::obtainDiscovery with Guzzle option allow_local_address:false; a Nextcloud-context IClientService->get() of the discovery URL returns LocalServerException with the flag false and HTTP 200 with it true (A/B toggled). The postStart (b) curl check passed regardless because it uses system libcurl, not Nextcloud's guard — which is why the provider registered yet login still failed. Fix (reproducible, survives pod rolls): the postStart hook now runs `occ config:system:set allow_local_remote_servers --value=true --type=boolean` right after the install/maintenance wait, on every start. Task 2 — promote Keycloak `platform-admins` members to Nextcloud admins (#5). user_oidc 8.11 has NO native group->admin mapping (occ user_oidc:provider offers group PROVISIONING and a login WHITELIST only), so the hook mirrors the provisioned `platform-admins` membership into the built-in `admin` group idempotently (occ group:list --output=json parsed via php argv; occ group:adduser admin per member). A user is promotable after their first OIDC login provisions them + the next pod start (or one manual `occ group:adduser admin <uid>`). The LOCAL admin stays as break-glass (docs/15). apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml re-rendered from catalog (single-file render; byte-diff confined to the embedded hook). Rendered hook passes `sh -n`; parse step validated in-pod. `make -C ci gate` green (lint/l0/l1; conformance + spec-immutability skip: no cluster / spec repo unmounted). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d835a27875 |
fix(plex): mount config PVC at /config (image's real config dir)
The plexinc/pms-docker image writes its identity/claim token and the Library metadata DB under /config, but the config PVC was mounted at the renderer default /data/config. Plex therefore wrote all state to the container's EPHEMERAL layer: the server stayed UNCLAIMED (servers.plex.tv returns 401 with an empty X-Plex-Token) and lost everything on restart, which is why seerr's "add Plex" failed even with SSL off. Set the config volume mountPath to /config in catalog/plex.yaml and re-render apps/wave-0/plex.yaml (only the mountPath line changes; all other services byte-identical). No fsGroup/securityContext needed: verified in-cluster the image inits as root (s6-svscan PID 1), chowns /config to the plex user, then drops privileges (the "Plex Media Server" process runs as plex) — root can chown the mounted PVC regardless of fsGroup. PLEX_CLAIM auto-claim is intentionally NOT wired: the env secretKeyRef schema has no `optional`, so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would crashloop the pod. The claim is an operator step (UI sign-in after the roll, or add a PLEX_CLAIM env from a fresh https://plex.tv/claim token). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d34c639269 |
fix(oidc): make gitea + nextcloud OIDC login-source registration persist
The Keycloak OIDC postStart registration for gitea and nextcloud ran but never persisted, leaving `gitea admin auth list` empty and nextcloud's user_oidc with "No providers configured" despite the apps installing/ enabling and the client secret being present. Two distinct root causes, confirmed by running the registration manually against the live warm pods: - nextcloud: a QUOTING BUG, not a race. The OCC() wrapper runs `su -c "php occ $*"`, which word-split `--scope="openid email profile"` back into three tokens, so occ saw `email profile` as extra positional args -> "Too many arguments to user_oidc:provider" -> exit 1, swallowed by `|| echo failed`. Failed on EVERY boot. Fixed by running the provider call as ONE `su -c` with the scope single-quoted so www-data's shell keeps it a single argument; keep the OCC() wrapper only for single-token subcommands. - gitea: a first-boot RACE. The direct `admin auth add-oauth` persists once the app/network is warm (verified live), but fired too early at postStart and its failure was swallowed (`|| echo ... >&2`, exit 0). Hardening applied to both catalog sources (rendered into apps/wave-*): - wait (bounded ~90s) for the Keycloak discovery doc to return HTTP 200; - nextcloud also waits for `installed: true` AND `maintenance: false`; - register idempotently (create-or-update) then VERIFY the source/provider actually persisted, retrying the whole cycle (guards exit-0-but-nothing- stuck); - on give-up, log LOUDLY to stderr AND a marker file on the persistent volume (/data, /var/www/html) instead of swallowing — next failure is visible; - never crashloop: missing-secret guard retained, break-glass local admin stays usable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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76ba88a51e | Merge feature/oidc-sso-apps: native Keycloak OIDC SSO for gitea, nextcloud, semaphore | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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f163026954 |
feat(nextcloud,semaphore): wire native Keycloak OIDC SSO (break-glass admins retained)
Extends the SSO work to the two remaining `auth: oidc` apps still on local-admin
logins, each as a native confidential client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm with
its local admin kept as break-glass (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `nextcloud` and `semaphore` confidential clients
to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana/gitea) + their
NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET / SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET placeholders. As before, a
KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so both live clients were
ALSO created via kcadm (nextcloud e95049ed-ca10-4085-97d9-4bbef495fe61, semaphore
1835bfe9-b125-4026-8f69-33557519cf4a); the YAML keeps git authoritative.
Secrets (SOPS/age): add nextcloud-client-secret + semaphore-client-secret to
keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns). Mirror the nextcloud secret as
oidc-client-secret into nextcloud-bootstrap (nextcloud ns). For semaphore, the
whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON (which embeds the client secret) is held
encrypted as oidc-providers-json in semaphore-bootstrap (semaphore ns). All values
verified == the live clients; existing keys untouched; no plaintext in git.
App config (catalog source + re-render):
- nextcloud: add NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env + an idempotent postStart hook
that installs/enables user_oidc and runs `occ user_oidc:provider keycloak`
(create-or-update; secret via --clientsecret-env so it never hits argv; occ as
www-data; group provisioning on the `groups` claim). Syntax verified against the
running user_oidc 8.11.0 on Nextcloud 31.0.14; su-to-www-data env passthrough
verified. Missing-secret/not-installed guards prevent crashloops.
- semaphore: add SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env sourced from the encrypted
oidc-providers-json (provider_url=realm issuer/auto-discovery, redirect
/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect). Mechanism verified against semaphore v2.19.10
source (util ConfigType oidc_providers env tag + OidcProvider struct + router
redirect path); no kubelet service-link env collision.
apps/wave-1/{nextcloud,semaphore}.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation` (diffs are env/lifecycle-only).
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; live
homelab clients now include gitea/nextcloud/semaphore; static gate (lint/l0/l1)
green. Browser SSO login for each still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
87388712f0 |
feat(gitea): wire native Keycloak OIDC SSO (break-glass admin retained)
Wires the bootstrapping-critical Gitea git host to the Keycloak `homelab` realm as a native confidential OIDC client, moving it off the local-admin-only login while keeping the local admin as the break-glass path (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06). Realm (source of truth): add the `gitea` confidential client to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana) + its GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder sourced from the keycloak-realm-clients Secret. NOTE: a KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so the live client was ALSO created via kcadm (id 70a6ca60-317a-42ce-8331-a60e380838ee); the YAML keeps git authoritative for a rebuild. Secrets (SOPS/age, never plaintext): add gitea-client-secret to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns) and mirror the same value as oidc-client-secret into apps/wave-0/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml (gitea ns) so the app can read it in-namespace. Both == the live client secret. App config (catalog source + re-render): catalog/gitea.yaml gains the GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env (from the mirrored Secret), [oauth2_client] auto-registration/account-linking app.ini env, and an idempotent postStart step that registers the "keycloak" OAuth2 login source (auto-discovery; groups claim; platform-admins -> Gitea admin). apps/wave-0/gitea.yaml re-rendered via `render.py --no-image-automation`. Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; static gate (lint/l0/l1) green. Browser SSO login still needs a human check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
7b8777c1e1 |
fix(seerr): add fsGroup podSecurityContext to resolve non-root PVC CrashLoop
Seerr v3.4.1 (ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr) runs as the non-root user node:node (UID/GID 1000), unlike the old root-running sctx/overseerr image. Its root-owned Longhorn RWO config PVC at /app/config was not writable by UID 1000, so the pod CrashLoopBackOff'd with: Error: EACCES: permission denied, mkdir '/app/config/logs/' Add a podSecurityContext with fsGroup=1000 (plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot) to the seerr ServiceDefinition — the same schema 1.3.0 mechanism semaphore uses. Longhorn's CSIDriver fsGroupPolicy: ReadWriteOnceWithFSType applies fsGroup to this RWO filesystem volume, group-owning the PVC to GID 1000 so the process can write. Re-rendered apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml from the catalog source. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
8b0dcbf33b |
fix(seerr): move to maintained Seerr image and correct config mountPath
Two operator-flagged defects in the seerr ServiceDefinition, fixed at source (catalog/seerr.yaml) and re-rendered into apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml: - Image: sctx/overseerr:latest (original Overseerr, unmaintained) -> ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr:v3.4.1. Overseerr and Jellyseerr have merged into the actively maintained Seerr project (seerr-team/seerr, docs.seerr.dev); ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr is the officially recommended image. Pinned to the current stable tag v3.4.1 per the arr-stack convention (sonarr/radarr/ qbittorrent/gitea pin explicit tags; R-UPD-01). update.range bumped ">=1.33.0" -> ">=3.4.0" to track the Seerr 3.x line. Plex-native (native auth) support is retained. - Config mountPath: /data/config -> /app/config. Overseerr/Jellyseerr/Seerr store settings + request/cache DB at /app/config; the previous /data/config left the config PVC effectively unused (config not persisted across restarts). Set via the schema-supported storage[].mountPath field. Dependencies (sonarr:8989, radarr:7878, plex:32400), NetworkPolicies, public exposure, and native auth are unchanged. Render == golden verified; lint, schema, and L1 render checks green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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12c40d8c9c |
docs: reconcile the documentation with the deployed reality
The docs had drifted badly behind ~85 commits of delivery. The root README still
said "Phase 0 — Foundations. No cluster exists yet"; the infra docs still
described a libvirt/KVM cluster that has been retired for two days; and
DECISIONS-LOG.md — the PM's authoritative record — stopped at 2026-08-25 AM.
Anyone following these docs would have been working from a false map.
Verified against the live cluster (3/3 nodes, 7/7 Flux Kustomizations Ready,
10/10 HelmReleases Ready) rather than inferred from commit messages.
README.md
- Phase 0 -> a per-phase status table: 0-6 delivered and deployed, 7 not open.
- Layout now shows the wave split, platform-config, apps/vms, infra, bootstrap.
- Real conformance number (36/51, 70.6%) and how to regenerate it.
- Devcontainer workflow; note that the gate was red and why.
infra/PHASE1-STATUS.md — rewritten. Was a `virsh`/libvirt resume guide for a
cluster that no longer exists. Now: the Proxmox substrate, the pfSense NAT
paths, both kubectl access paths (Keycloak OIDC normal / cert break-glass),
the toolchain, off-repo state that must not be lost, and the fact that Flux's
git source is an app inside the cluster (`git push origin main` IS the deploy).
infra/PHASE1-SCOPE.md — historical banner. The exit criteria and sizing
rationale are still worth keeping; the libvirt execution steps are not.
infra/README.md — Proxmox, plus a map of the subtree and where the cluster
actually lives (it is not on this workstation).
infra/devcontainer/README.md — the "run tofu and ansible on the HOST" limitation
is OBSOLETE: it was a dmacvicar/libvirt polkit/PID problem, and bpg/proxmox
talks to an HTTP API. Everything runs in the container now. Documents the full
CI-gate toolchain and what each bind mount is load-bearing for (the age keyring
and the read-only spec repo especially — without the latter, spec-immutability
silently skips instead of verifying).
infra/tofu/README.md — was "Authoring only — nothing here has been applied". It
is applied and live. Disk sizes corrected 40/100 -> 64/128 GiB (confirmed
against the running nodes), pfSense NAT marked done, and a warning that
terraform.tfstate is absent on a fresh workstation — an apply with empty state
would try to recreate the three live nodes.
infra/tofu/variables.tf — section comment disagreed with its own defaults.
infra/cluster.sh — retired-with-instructions header. It silently drives libvirt
domains that do not exist; behaviour unchanged, but it no longer lies.
apps/vms/unifi/README.md — was "NOT WIRED IN", 60Gi, and listed a file that has
since been dropped. Now: live status, 40Gi, resolved open questions marked
resolved, and the two constraints the next person will otherwise rediscover —
KubeVirt's 2048B inline userData cap, and that apps-vms must never carry
postBuild.substituteFrom (envsubst corrupts the cloud-init).
DECISIONS-LOG.md — backfilled the gap as one structured entry: the Proxmox
migration, NAT + kube-vip, the twice-proven oauth2-proxy cold-start deadlock,
the Flux source cutover, CI going live in-cluster, ten app onboardings and the
renderer bugs they exposed, the wave split (verified: DBs adopted, not
recreated — original ages intact, prune restored), KubeVirt storage, the UniFi
VM, and kubectl SSO. Plus verified live state and the carried-forward open list.
Two corrections to the record while verifying:
- kubectl OIDC is LIVE (`kubectl auth whoami` -> oidc:<user>,
[oidc:platform-admins]), so the rolling restart
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
4cf9572c58 |
fix(vms): normalize comma spacing in unifi manifests — unblock the lint gate
The hand-authored UniFi VM manifests used column-aligned inline flow mappings
(`{ name: inform, port: 8080, protocol: TCP }`), which yamllint's `commas`
rule rejects as "too many spaces after comma". That made `make -C ci lint` FAIL,
so the merge gate has been BLOCKED on `main` since the UniFi commits landed —
every other static stage was green.
Collapse each run of spaces after a comma to one, and re-align the trailing
comments so the port tables stay readable. Whitespace only:
`kubectl kustomize apps/vms` renders byte-for-byte identically before and after.
The lint config is left untouched — relaxing the rule to make failing files pass
is moving the goalposts, not fixing the code.
Also refresh these files' stale `STAGING / DRAFT` headers: the tree is live,
reconciled by the non-gating `apps-vms` Flux Kustomization.
Gate after this change: spec-immutability / lint / l0 / l1 all green,
MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
ab592028f6 |
fix(vms): actually apply inline userData + drop secretGenerator (amend 760084e)
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
760084ea8c |
fix(vms): revert UniFi cloud-init to minimal inline userData (1112B)
userDataSecretRef tripped a Flux server-side-apply schema quirk on the KubeVirt
VirtualMachine CRD ("field not declared in schema"). Go back to inline userData,
trimmed to 1112 bytes (< the 2048 limit) by dropping the break-glass SSH key —
no longer needed for debugging now that the postBuild cloud-init corruption is
fixed. Keeps qemu-guest-agent (AgentConnected proves cloud-init ran) and the
public-API UOS resolver + non-interactive install. Removes the secretGenerator +
unifi-cloudinit.yaml. (Add SSH back via userDataSecretRef only if the SSA quirk is
worked around and guest access is needed.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
e99e3d1666 |
fix(vms): deliver UniFi cloud-init via Secret (userDataSecretRef) — 2048B limit
Adding the SSH key pushed the inline cloudInitNoCloud.userData over KubeVirt's
2048-byte limit ("userdata exceeds 2048 byte limit. Should use UserDataSecretRef").
Move the cloud-init into apps/vms/unifi/unifi-cloudinit.yaml and wrap it as the
`unifi-cloudinit` Secret via a Kustomize secretGenerator (disableNameSuffixHash
so the VM can reference it by fixed name); VM now uses userDataSecretRef. Content
is non-sensitive (public key + public installer script), so not SOPS-encrypted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d5f8212415 |
feat(vms): add SSH key + qemu-guest-agent to UniFi VM for ops/debugging
The first UOS bring-up left no way into the guest (cloud-init set no credentials), so the in-guest UOS install couldn't be observed. Add: - ssh_authorized_keys (public key, safe to commit) on the default ubuntu user - qemu-guest-agent (KubeVirt AgentConnected + virtctl guest access) - tee the install-uos output to the serial console + /var/log/uos-install.log, and record the installer exit code, so the install is observable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
7a3da96d9f |
fix(cdi): single-replica scratch class + 40Gi UniFi disk (fix insufficient-storage import)
The UniFi Block import got past the device-permission fix but then failed ReplicaSchedulingFailure / "insufficient storage": CDI sizes scratch ~= the disk virtual size and, on the default 3-replica `longhorn` class, the ~60Gi scratch x3 (189G) on top of the disk's x3 (180G) overflowed the Longhorn tier (~125G/node). - platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml: NEW `longhorn-scratch` StorageClass (numberOfReplicas: 1) — CDI scratch is ephemeral/throwaway, replicating it 3x is waste; if a node dies mid-import CDI just retries. - platform/kubevirt/cdi-cr.yaml: spec.config.scratchSpaceStorageClass -> longhorn-scratch. - apps/vms/unifi/20-datavolume.yaml: boot disk 60Gi -> 40Gi (UOS min is 25Gi; 40Gi is comfortable for a home site and lighter on the replicated tier). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
df5979fceb |
fix(k3s): enable nonroot-devices so CDI can import to Block-mode PVCs
The UniFi VM boot-disk DataVolume (RWX + Block on longhorn-vm) failed to import: CDI's non-root importer (UID 107, cap-drop ALL) hit `blockdev: cannot open /dev/cdi-block-volume: Permission denied`. Kubernetes only applies fsGroup ownership to *filesystem* volumes — it never chowns a raw block device — and Longhorn's CSIDriver (fsGroupPolicy: ReadWriteOnceWithFSType) skips fsGroup on RWX/Block volumes regardless, so the device stays root:root. The CDI-documented fix is the container-runtime setting `device_ownership_from_security_context`, exposed on k3s (>= v1.31.3+k3s1, this cluster is v1.31.5) as `nonroot-devices: true`. It makes containerd set the in-container device node's owner from the pod's securityContext. Added to the Ansible-managed /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml alongside tls-san; applied via the existing rolling `Restart k3s` handler (serial:1, kube-vip keeps the API up, etcd holds 2/3). Node-scoped, security-neutral (pods stay non-root), and preserves the longhorn-vm RWX/Block/migratable contract unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
317b3f02f1 |
feat(vms): onboard UniFi OS Server as a KubeVirt VM on a non-gating track
First KubeVirt VM app + first real CDI http import. UniFi OS Server (UOS) is Ubiquiti's current self-host product (the .deb is deprecated); it bundles UniFi OS + Network app + its own datastore, so no MongoDB companion. - apps/vms/unifi: CDI DataVolume (Ubuntu 24.04 cloud image -> longhorn-vm RWX/Block, live-migratable) + VirtualMachine (evictionStrategy: LiveMigrate) with cloud-init that installs podman/slirp4netns/jq and runs the UOS installer NON-INTERACTIVELY. The installer URL is resolved at boot from Ubiquiti's public firmware API (fw-update.ui.com/api/firmware-latest) — always-latest, no pinned URL to maintain (currently UOS v5.1.37). - L4 exposure: two LoadBalancer Services (TCP+UDP) sharing a pinned, L2-announced Cilium VIP 192.168.1.54 (device inform/adoption + STUN can't ride the L7 Gateway); external-dns publishes unifi.home.keithjackson.dev. UI on :11443. - default-deny + additive CNPs (controller ingress, egress, and CDI-importer egress for the image pull). - clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml: NON-GATING Flux Kustomization (wait:false, dependsOn platform-config) — VMs are a separate lifecycle from the app waves, so a slow VM import/install can't stall the app tier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
36a1a4e1f9 |
refactor(apps): split monolithic apps Kustomization into dependency waves
Replaces the single `apps` Flux Kustomization with dependency-ordered waves
(apps-wave-0..2) so a crashlooping workload isolates to its wave + downstream
instead of stalling the entire app tier. Parallel within a wave, ordered across.
- catalog/render.py: compute waves by longest dependency-path depth over the
ServiceDefinition `dependencies:` edges (a `<svc>-db` is a leaf, so its
consumer lands strictly higher — the "DB below consumer" rule falls out of
longest-path, no special case). `--emit-waves` generates the per-wave
kustomizations + Flux CRs; `--wave-layout` places renders into the right dir.
wave 0: pihole gitea jackett plex qbittorrent nextcloud-db semaphore-db
wave 1: sonarr radarr nextcloud semaphore gitea-actions
wave 2: seerr
- apps/*.yaml -> apps/wave-{0,1,2}/ (byte-identical moves; SOPS files intact).
- clusters/base: apps.yaml removed; apps-wave-{0,1,2}.yaml added (dependsOn
chain: platform-config -> wave-0 -> wave-1 -> wave-2, prune+wait each).
- clusters/dev: one SOPS decryption patch per wave (load-bearing).
- DESIGN-waves.md: wave table, topology, cutover runbook.
Cutover: preceded by disabling prune on `apps` (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
a02c0e2d1a |
apps: re-enable semaphore — both crashloop root causes fixed
Restores the four semaphore resources a peer temp-disabled in
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
41d696e9fe |
fix(apps): semaphore SEMAPHORE_PORT — shadow kubelet service-link injection
With the config PVC now writable (fsGroup), semaphore got past config write and pinged its PostgreSQL successfully, then crashed on: panic: value of field 'Port' is not valid: tcp://<svcIP>:3000 Because the Service is named `semaphore`, the kubelet injects the Docker-link-style SEMAPHORE_PORT=tcp://<clusterIP>:3000, which collides with Semaphore's OWN SEMAPHORE_PORT (its HTTP listen port). Add an explicit SEMAPHORE_PORT=":3000" env entry — user-defined env takes precedence over service-link vars — pinning the listen port back to :3000 (matches containerPort/Service). Uses the existing env field; only apps/semaphore.yaml changes, all others byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
0abadd3131 |
apps: temp-disable semaphore (interactive-setup crashloop blocked apps reconcile)
The semaphoreui/semaphore image falls through to its interactive setup wizard and panics on /etc/semaphore/config.json permission-denied; the env-only pattern doesn't yield a non-interactive config. Backed out to unblock the apps Kustomization; files retained for a proper config-model follow-up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
28498f1099 |
fix(apps): semaphore fsGroup — schema 1.3.0 podSecurityContext for non-root PVC write
The semaphoreui/semaphore image runs as non-root UID 1001 / GID 0 and writes its generated config.json into the config dir on boot. A mounted Longhorn PVC is root:root, so UID 1001 got "permission denied" and the pod crash-looped. First-class the fix into the render contract (same mechanism the retired gitea-bootstrap-patch was replaced by): schema 1.3.0 adds an optional pod-level `podSecurityContext`, emitted verbatim onto spec.template.spec.securityContext by render.py. Absent => every other app renders byte-identical (verified). semaphore declares fsGroup=1001 (kubelet group-owns the PVC + adds the supplemental group so UID 1001 can write) plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot pinning the image identity. render.py selftest extended (verbatim render + absence). L0 (schema+kyverno 17/17), L1 3/3, lint all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
77496f9a8e |
feat(apps): onboard semaphore (Phase 6) — second CNPG-DB + OIDC-target app
Semaphore (Ansible UI, docs/13 row 10): internal exposure, internet egress,
config on Longhorn + external PostgreSQL, auth oidc. Reuses the CNPG-DB pattern
nextcloud established (apps/nextcloud-db.yaml, commit
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
4be6752c71 |
feat(apps): onboard nextcloud (Phase 6) — first CNPG-DB + OIDC-target patterns
Onboard nextcloud (docs/13 row 7): public, DR-critical file sync backed by an external PostgreSQL. Establishes the reusable CNPG-DB pattern for later DB-backed services. - catalog/nextcloud.yaml: ServiceDefinition (image nextcloud:31-apache :80, public, internet, data 20Gi longhorn @/var/www/html, backup daily-offcluster, auth oidc +platform-admins, ingress nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev, dependency nextcloud-db:5432). Uses schema 1.2.0 env for the Postgres connection, break-glass admin, trusted-domain + OVERWRITE* proxy settings. - apps/nextcloud-db.yaml: CloudNativePG Cluster in a dedicated nextcloud-db namespace (modeled on keycloak-db; no default-deny, mirroring the verified keycloak posture), inheritedMetadata stamps app.kubernetes.io/name=nextcloud-db so the rendered egress CNP matches. initdb consumes a pre-provisioned owner secret. - apps/nextcloud-db-app.sops.yaml + apps/nextcloud-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml: SOPS (age) — shared DB password mirrored across the two namespaces (Pods cannot read a Secret cross-namespace), plus the break-glass local admin. - apps/nextcloud.yaml: rendered manifests (catalog/render.py --no-image-automation). - apps/kustomization.yaml: wire in the four new resources. OIDC realm-client wiring DEFERRED (WS-APPS step-3 escape hatch): editing the reconciled realm import in platform-config risks the running Keycloak realm / whole platform-config apply, and nextcloud OIDC needs post-install occ steps with no first-class env — nextcloud comes up INSTALLED on the break-glass local admin (as Gitea did); the Keycloak client is a follow-up. Off-cluster backup awaits Velero/OQ-BKP (intent declared). Gates: render --selftest PASS; other apps byte-identical; ci l0 17/17; l1 3/3; lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
c8dd4f3f9d |
feat(catalog): add SD env/envFrom/lifecycle; retire gitea bootstrap patch
Extend the ServiceDefinition contract with optional per-container `env`, `envFrom`, and `lifecycle` fields (k8s EnvVar / EnvFromSource / Lifecycle shapes) so headless-install / DB-backed apps configure themselves through the SD instead of a supplementary kustomize patch. - schema: bump 1.1.0 -> 1.2.0; add optional env/envFrom/lifecycle to the container kind (literal + secretKeyRef/configMapKeyRef; secretRef/ configMapRef; postStart/preStop exec via $defs/execHandler). Existing fields unchanged; all fields optional -> absent renders byte-identical. - render.py: emit env/envFrom/lifecycle verbatim onto the Deployment app container when present; --selftest coverage for the new fields. - catalog/gitea.yaml: fold the headless-install env (INSTALL_LOCK, fixed SECRET_KEY via secretKeyRef, DOMAIN/ROOT_URL, actions, break-glass admin creds) + the idempotent postStart break-glass admin bootstrap inline. - apps/gitea.yaml: re-rendered with env/lifecycle inline (effective pod spec provably equivalent to base+patch). - DELETE apps/gitea-bootstrap-patch.yaml + drop it from apps/kustomization patches. gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml kept (still sourced by the env). Proves the renderer feature by retiring the known TODO; unblocks env + DB onboarding for nextcloud/semaphore/unifi/minecraft. All other rendered apps byte-identical. Gates: selftest PASS, l0 17/17 + schema, l1 goldens, lint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
b871877c1b |
fix(render): namespace-pin east-west selectors so declared deps actually connect
Follow-up to the reciprocal-ingress fix: in-cluster verification (Hubble) revealed
the east-west path was STILL fully blocked — and that the pre-existing EGRESS half
was also broken, contrary to the original diagnosis. Root cause: a CiliumNetworkPolicy
`toEndpoints`/`fromEndpoints` selector is scoped to the POLICY's OWN namespace unless
it carries the reserved `k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace` label. Every service lives
in its own namespace (== its name) and every dependency crosses a namespace boundary,
so an app-label-only peer selector matched nothing and Cilium silently denied the flow
(Hubble: sonarr->qbittorrent = "EGRESS DENIED ... Policy denied DROPPED").
Pin the peer namespace on BOTH halves — egress toEndpoints (destination ns == dep.to)
and the reciprocal ingress fromEndpoints (source ns == source name). This is a strict
TIGHTENING (more precise, still L3/L4), not a weakening. Verified end-to-end in-cluster:
sonarr->qbittorrent:8080, sonarr->jackett:9117, seerr->{sonarr:8989,radarr:7878,
plex:32400} now CONNECT (were DROPPED); undeclared sonarr->plex:32400 and
seerr->qbittorrent:8080 stay BLOCKED (default-deny holds).
Selftest + L0 (17/17) + L1 (3/3, goldens byte-identical) + lint all pass. NOTE: this
necessarily touches the egress toEndpoints selector, which the task scoped as
ingress-only; the premise that egress already worked was empirically false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
14beb85b65 |
fix(render): emit reciprocal ingress-allow for declared dependencies (R-NET-02)
A `dependencies` edge is declared ONCE on the SOURCE, but with the default-deny-
BOTH-directions baseline (docs/03 R-NET-01/02) it needs TWO matching halves: the
source egress-allow AND the destination ingress-allow. render.py emitted only the
egress half, so every declared east-west dependency was silently dropped by the
destination's default-deny ingress — verified in-cluster: sonarr->qbittorrent:8080,
sonarr->jackett:9117 and seerr->sonarr:8989 were all BLOCKED.
Add a cross-service reverse-dependency pass (build_reverse_map) and render the
reciprocal ingress half (r_reverse_dependency_policies): for each source that
declares a dependency on X, X gains an additive ingress-allow CiliumNetworkPolicy
`X-allow-<source>-<port>` whose fromEndpoints matches the source identity, mirroring
the egress half's L3/L4 granularity. Deterministic (sorted), additive (default-deny
ingress stays []), egress side unchanged. A lone render with no cross-catalog context
renders no reciprocal ingress, so the L1 render goldens are byte-identical.
New ingress CNPs: qbittorrent<-{sonarr,radarr}:8080, jackett<-{sonarr,radarr}:9117,
sonarr<-seerr:8989, radarr<-seerr:7878, plex<-seerr:32400. Selftest + L0 (17/17) +
L1 (3/3) + lint all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
b6f72eab0c |
feat(apps): onboard seerr (Overseerr request UI) — completes arr↔seerr↔plex graph
Phase 6: add the seerr ServiceDefinition and its rendered manifests. seerr is the final missing node in the media dependency graph (docs/13 row 5; docs/03 allow rules). - catalog/seerr.yaml: public | egress internet | config on longhorn (5Gi) | auth native (Plex accounts, documented SSO exception, docs/15) | 3 explicit egress deps: sonarr:8989, radarr:7878, plex:32400. No bulk volume (OQ-2 unresolved). - apps/seerr.yaml: rendered via catalog/render.py --no-image-automation (default-deny DNS-only baseline + 3 dep CiliumNetworkPolicies + gateway-ingress + internet world egress + HTTPRoute seerr.home.keithjackson.dev:5055 + ServiceMonitor + alerts). - apps/kustomization.yaml: add seerr.yaml (with the arr/media stack). Gates: render --selftest PASS; ci lint PASS; L0 kyverno 17/17 (schema + default-deny + egress-class + auth-mode + host-ns); L1 render 3/3. Other apps byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |