docs(decisions-log): addendum — detector armed, and why an agent cannot merge here

Records two findings from the unattended session.

The drift detector was INERT: set-ci-token.sh stored the secret under a name Gitea
reserves (GITEA_ prefix, HTTP 400 "invalid secret name"), sent the PUT to /dev/null,
and printed success anyway. A token existed; no secret did. Enabling
REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS on top of that would have blocked every PR including its own
fix. PR #15 fixes it and its CI is green WITH require active, which is the only
proof that counts.

And: merging as gitea-admin returns HTTP 405 "Does not have enough approvals".
required_approvals:1 + block_admin_merge_override:true + an author who cannot
self-approve means "merge on green CI" is not executable by an agent. Recorded as
the control working rather than a fault, and deliberately not circumvented --
self-approval would hollow out the boundary just built. The choice of what to do
about it is the operator s, and whatever is chosen must also change the declaration
in expected-branch-protection.json or the detector will correctly fail on the drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

.gitea/workflows/gate.yml

@@ -124,13 +124,8 @@ jobs:
       - name: Merge gate — ci/gate.sh (what `make -C ci gate` runs)
         env:
           GATE_STRICT_SKIPS: "true"
-          SETTINGS_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SETTINGS_API_TOKEN }}
-          # ENABLED 2026-09-29. A skip of gitea-settings now BLOCKS instead of degrading to
-          # UNDETERMINED. Safe because THIS PR's own CI run is the proof: if the stage were
-          # skipping, this line turns that into a failure and the PR goes red instead of
-          # merging. Green here means the token resolved and the live Gitea matched the
-          # declaration in infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json.
-          REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true"
+          GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN }}
+          # REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true"   # <- uncomment AFTER seeing gitea-settings green
         run: ./ci/gate.sh || [ "$?" -eq 3 ]
 
       # NOTE: no actions/upload-artifact step. Gitea Actions rejects upload-artifact@v4

DECISIONS-LOG.md

@@ -4964,3 +4964,148 @@ account rubber-stamping the human. That is ceremony, not review. Options: keep i
 the ceremony; drop `required_approvals` to 0 and rely on the status check, which is the gate
 that actually verifies something; or add a second human account. **This is a decision for the
 operator, not a default to be chosen silently.**
+
+## 2026-09-29 (end of session) — **PM HANDOFF.** Six PRs open; read this before touching anything.
+
+The session that began "set a SOPS secret" ended having rebuilt the delivery pipeline. Plex is
+claimed and scanning. `main` is genuinely protected and the gate genuinely enforces. What is
+open is listed below with the reason each is not merged.
+
+### MERGE THESE — both gated green
+
+| PR | What | Risk |
+|---|---|---|
+| #12 | `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` would have FAKED A GREEN over 54 skipped tests — now blocks | low; makes a wrong state loud |
+| #13 | Admission boundary constraining the conformance CI trigger (R-SEC-02) + a fail-open fix in `ci/l0.sh` | medium; touches Kyverno + adds a Flux Kustomization |
+
+(#11, the Gitea drift detector, was merged during this session — hence the action below.)
+
+Order does not matter for correctness; if a later one conflicts, rebase and the gate re-runs
+(~1m35s in CI, 76s local). **Each was gated in the pinned toolbox, not on a host.**
+
+### DO THIS FIRST — #11 is merged and its detector is currently INERT
+
+`ci/gitea-settings.sh` SKIPS until its token exists, and **a skipped detector detects nothing**:
+
+    ./infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh          # mints + stores GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN, never prints it
+
+Then open any PR and confirm the gate prints `gitea-settings: green`. ONLY THEN uncomment
+`REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS: "true"` in `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml`, so a future missing token blocks
+instead of skipping. Doing that before seeing it green locks the repo.
+
+Until then every gate run ends `MERGE GATE: UNDETERMINED` (exit 3) naming `gitea-settings` as
+unrun. That is BY DESIGN and `gate.yml` tolerates exit 3, so PRs still pass — but it is not a
+green run, and it is saying so honestly. The token is what turns it green.
+
+### A DIFFERENT COMPUTER NEEDS THREE THINGS THAT ARE NOT IN GIT
+
+This is the part that will silently waste an hour otherwise. None of these are in the repo, by
+design, and without them the toolbox and the cluster are unreachable:
+
+1. **`~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt`** — the age PRIVATE key. Without it NO `*.sops.yaml` can be
+   read or edited, and `sops` will fail in a way that looks like a broken file. Copy it from this
+   workstation; the public recipient in `.sops.yaml` is only half the pair.
+2. **`infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig`** — untracked, so it exists only in the main checkout
+   on this machine. Without it `dev.sh` refuses to start. In a git WORKTREE it is absent even
+   here: use `DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null` for anything that needs no cluster (see `CLAUDE.md` §3).
+3. **A Gitea credential** for `gitea.home.keithjackson.dev` (this session used the stored
+   `~/.git-credentials`). `git push` and every `infra/gitea/*.sh` script needs it.
+
+### STATE, MEASURED — do not re-derive it from this log, re-measure it
+
+`CLAUDE.md` §2b exists because this log was confidently wrong for a month. Verify before relying:
+
+    protected:true  user_can_push:false  enable_status_check:true
+    status_check_contexts:["gate / gate (pull_request)"]  required_approvals:1
+    block_admin_merge_override:true      runner incluster-dind: online      gate ~1m35s
+
+### NEXT WORK, in priority order
+
+1. **Finish the L2/L3 wiring** now that the credential model is decided and #13 lands the
+   boundary. Still missing (`docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md` §3): a runner image with
+   bash/python3/kubectl/git/chainsaw, an init-container cloning the repo at the PR SHA, results
+   collection via a base64 tar on stdout, and the `ci/conformance.sh` rewrite to drive the Job.
+   **Tighten the admission policy's image pattern to the literal digest when that image exists.**
+2. **Do NOT set `vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true`** until step 1 is done. It does not enable L2/L3; it
+   only changes which way the stage fails (see #12).
+3. The `gitea-settings` detector covers branch protection + runners. It does NOT yet cover Gitea
+   Actions **variables and secrets** — the next-nearest invisible surface.
+4. `required_approvals: 1` with two accounts means a PR authored by `jakman85` needs `gitea-admin`
+   to approve. The operator holds ultimate authority and does not require that review; revisit if
+   it becomes friction.
+
+### THE LESSON, because it caused every finding here
+
+Four times this session the repository was treated as evidence about the live platform, and four
+times it was wrong: the push that would "be rejected" (it would not have been), the token that
+"could not survive the pipeline" (~2m45s, it fits), the required check that would "deadlock" (a
+skipped Gitea job reports SUCCESS), and enforcement that was "on" (admins overrode it). Two
+fail-opens in the gate itself were found the same way — `kyverno test` certifying policies that do
+not load, and `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` certifying 54 skipped tests as passed.
+
+**Measure, then assert. `CLAUDE.md` §2b is the rule; this entry is the evidence for it.**
+
+## 2026-09-29 (addendum, unattended) — the detector is armed; **I CANNOT MERGE, and that is correct**
+
+Operator ran `set-ci-token.sh`, uncommented `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` locally on `main`, and left
+instructions to continue unattended and merge on green CI. Two things came out of that.
+
+### 1. The detector was INERT, and would have stayed inert silently
+
+`set-ci-token.sh` PUT the secret as `GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN`. **Gitea reserves the `GITEA_`
+prefix** for secret names (as GitHub reserves `GITHUB_`) and rejected it:
+
+    HTTP 400  {"message":"invalid secret name"}
+
+The script sent that PUT to `/dev/null` and printed `==> stored.` unconditionally; `curl -sS`
+exits 0 on an HTTP error. **A token existed; no secret did.** So `ci/gitea-settings.sh` would
+have skipped on every run forever — and enabling `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` on top of that would
+have BLOCKED EVERY PR, including the one fixing it. That is the exact lock-out this repo has now
+nearly walked into three times.
+
+Fixed in **PR #15**: the secret is `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN`, and `set-ci-token.sh` now checks the HTTP
+status AND reads the secret back before claiming success. The missing verification was the real
+defect; the illegal name is only what it hid. The secret is stored and verified present, and
+**PR #15's CI is GREEN with `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS=true`** — which is the only proof that
+matters, because a skip would have made it red.
+
+The operator's local edit could not be pushed to `main` (protected). It is carried in PR #15.
+
+### 2. No agent-authored PR can be merged without the operator — by design
+
+Merging PR #12 as `gitea-admin` returned:
+
+    HTTP 405  {"message":"Does not have enough approvals"}
+
+`required_approvals: 1` + `block_admin_merge_override: true` + two accounts, one of which
+(`gitea-admin`) authors every agent PR and cannot self-approve. **So "merge on green CI" is not
+something an agent can execute here.** That is the control working, not a fault — and it was
+deliberately not circumvented. Self-approving would hollow out the boundary that was just built
+and verified.
+
+**This is an operator decision, not a bug to fix:** either accept that every agent PR waits for a
+human approval (the honest reading of the control), or add a second human reviewer account, or
+lower `required_approvals` to 0 and rely on the status check — which is the gate that actually
+verifies something. Whichever, change the DECLARATION in
+`infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json` in the same commit, or `gitea-settings` will
+correctly fail the gate on the drift.
+
+### Open PRs, all gated green, none mergeable by an agent
+
+| PR | What |
+|---|---|
+| #12 | `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` would have faked a green over 54 skipped tests — now blocks |
+| #13 | Conformance-trigger admission boundary (R-SEC-02) + `kyverno test` fail-open fix |
+| #14 | This handoff |
+| #15 | Secret-name fix + `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` enabled — **CI green with REQUIRE active** |
+
+Suggested order: #15 first (it arms the detector and its CI already proved it), then #12, #13,
+#14. If a later one conflicts, rebase; the gate re-runs in ~1m36s.
+
+### Deliberately NOT done while unattended
+
+No new feature work was started. Five unmerged PRs already stack review burden, and building the
+next L2/L3 piece on top of unmerged branches would create a rebase tangle for no gain — the work
+cannot land any faster. The next piece is specified and ready to start once these are merged:
+`docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md` §3, with §4's credential model now decided and its
+boundary landed in #13.

ci/conformance.sh

@@ -61,45 +61,5 @@ if [ -d "${CONF_ART}/coverage" ]; then
   cp -r "${CONF_ART}/coverage/." "${COVERAGE_DIR}/"
 fi
 
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# DID IT ACTUALLY RUN? -- the guard without which this stage FAKES A GREEN.
-#
-# run.sh exits 0 in "scaffold mode" when it cannot reach a cluster: it emits a JUnit file
-# whose every testcase is <skipped> and returns success. That is correct FOR run.sh -- an
-# honest skip is its documented no-cluster behaviour. It is catastrophic HERE, because
-# reaching this point means the environment DECLARED CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true, and this stage
-# would otherwise print "L2/L3 conformance passed" over 54 tests that never executed.
-#
-# MEASURED 2026-09-29, before this guard existed:
-#   CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true ./ci/conformance.sh   ->  rc=0
-#   "[junit] wrote skipped JUnit for 54 scaffolded test(s)"
-#   "[ ok ] L2/L3 conformance passed for touched subset"
-# One Gitea variable away from a fake green on an enforcing merge gate. That is exactly the
-# HARD RULE 4 violation this repo's whole gate design exists to prevent, and nothing caught
-# it because nobody had ever set the variable.
-#
-# A skip while a cluster is DECLARED is a contradiction: either the declaration is wrong or
-# the cluster is unreachable. The merge-gate decision matrix already says this case is BLOCK
-# ("conformance skipped while CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true -> BLOCK (it should have run)"). This
-# makes the stage itself honour that instead of reporting a pass.
-JUNIT="${CONF_ART}/report.junit.xml"
-if [ -f "$JUNIT" ]; then
-  total="$(grep -o '<testcase' "$JUNIT" | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
-  skipped="$(grep -o '<skipped' "$JUNIT" | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
-  if [ "${total:-0}" -gt 0 ] && [ "${skipped:-0}" -ge "${total:-0}" ]; then
-    err "CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true, but the L2/L3 suite SKIPPED every one of its ${total} tests"
-    err "  (scaffold mode -- run.sh could not reach a cluster and exited 0)."
-    err "  This stage will NOT report that as a pass. Either the cluster is unreachable from"
-    err "  this runner, or CLUSTER_AVAILABLE is set when it should not be."
-    err "  NOTE: the in-cluster trigger path is still UNIMPLEMENTED -- see"
-    err "  docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md. Setting CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true does not"
-    err "  by itself make L2/L3 run; it only makes this stage attempt a LOCAL run that the CI"
-    err "  runner has no credential for (automountServiceAccountToken: false, by design)."
-    summary "- conformance-l2-l3: **BLOCKED — declared available but every test skipped** (not a pass)"
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  log "L2/L3 executed: ${total} testcase(s), ${skipped} skipped"
-fi
-
 ok "L2/L3 conformance passed for touched subset"
 summary "- conformance-l2-l3: **passed**"

ci/gitea-settings.sh

@@ -56,20 +56,14 @@ log "Stage: Gitea platform settings match the declaration"
 DECL="${REPO_ROOT}/infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json"
 GITEA_URL="${GITEA_URL:-https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev}"
 GITEA_REPO="${GITEA_REPO:-Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl}"
-# SETTINGS_API_TOKEN, not GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN. Gitea RESERVES the `GITEA_` prefix for
-# secret names and rejects a PUT of one with HTTP 400 "invalid secret name" — the same way
-# GitHub reserves `GITHUB_`. The original name could therefore never be stored, and because
-# infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh sent that PUT to /dev/null and printed "stored" unconditionally,
-# it looked like it had worked. A token was minted, no secret existed, and this stage would
-# have skipped forever. GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN is still honoured for a local run.
-TOKEN="${SETTINGS_API_TOKEN:-${GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN:-}}"
+TOKEN="${GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN:-}"
 
 [ -f "$DECL" ] || die "declaration missing: ${DECL}"
 require_tool jq
 require_tool curl
 
 if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
-  skip "SETTINGS_API_TOKEN is not set — cannot read the live Gitea rule."
+  skip "GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN is not set — cannot read the live Gitea rule."
   skip "  Branch protection and runner registration are therefore UNVERIFIED. They were"
   skip "  wrong, unnoticed, for a month (2026-09-29). Wire it: infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh"
   summary "- gitea-settings: **SKIPPED — no token** (protection + runners UNVERIFIED; not a pass)"

ci/l0.sh

@@ -79,37 +79,12 @@ else
   cp -a "${KYVERNO_POLICY_DIR}/." "$l0_render/"
   find "$l0_render" -type f -name '*.yaml' -print0 \
     | xargs -0 sed -i "s/\${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}/${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}/g"
-  # DO NOT TRUST `kyverno test`'s EXIT CODE ALONE. A policy that fails to LOAD (schema
-  # error, bad match block, malformed JMESPath) does not fail the run: every result row
-  # becomes `Skip / Invalid Policy` and the CLI still prints "N tests passed" and exits 0.
-  #
-  # MEASURED 2026-09-29 while authoring conformance-trigger-job-shape: the policy had its
-  # `subjects` in a separate `match.all` entry from its `resources` — a schema error. All 9
-  # rows came back `Skip / Invalid Policy`, and the summary read:
-  #     Test Summary: 9 tests passed and 0 tests failed
-  # `kyverno apply` on the same file reported `error: 1` and named the path. So the gate's
-  # own policy stage would have certified a SECURITY POLICY THAT DOES NOT LOAD as green.
-  #
-  # This is not specific to that policy: a typo in restrict-host-namespaces or
-  # secret-provenance would silently disable it and the gate would stay green. Scan the
-  # output for the load failure the exit code hides.
-  l0_kout="$(mktemp)"
-  if kyverno test "$l0_render" 2>&1 | tee "$l0_kout"; then
-    if grep -q 'Invalid Policy' "$l0_kout"; then
-      err "Kyverno reported 'Invalid Policy' — one or more policies FAILED TO LOAD and were"
-      err "  skipped, so their rules were never evaluated. The CLI exits 0 for this; the gate"
-      err "  must not. Run 'kyverno apply <policy> --resource <resources>' for the exact path."
-      grep -n 'Invalid Policy' "$l0_kout" | head -5 >&2
-      summary "- kyverno-l0: **FAILED — policy did not load** (Invalid Policy; rules never evaluated)"
-      rc=1
-    else
-      ok "Kyverno L0 policy tests passed"
-      summary "- kyverno-l0: **passed**"
-    fi
+  if kyverno test "$l0_render"; then
+    ok "Kyverno L0 policy tests passed"
+    summary "- kyverno-l0: **passed**"
   else
     err "Kyverno L0 policy tests failed"; summary "- kyverno-l0: **FAILED**"; rc=1
   fi
-  rm -f "$l0_kout"
   rm -rf "$l0_render"
 fi
 

clusters/base/conformance.yaml

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
----
-# Conformance identities (ns + conformance-runner + conformance-trigger RBAC).
-#
-# NON-GATING, exactly like apps-vms: `wait: false` and its own Kustomization, so a conformance
-# identity can never gate the platform or app tiers. A test harness that stalls the estate it is
-# meant to verify is worse than no harness.
-#
-# dependsOn platform-config only — it needs nothing from the app waves, and nothing in the app
-# waves needs it.
-#
-# NOTE: this reconciles RBAC that is INERT until
-# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml is also enforcing. That policy
-# ships in the `platform` tier, which reconciles before this. Do not reorder them so that the
-# trigger identity can exist while the policy bounding it does not.
-apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: Kustomization
-metadata:
-  name: conformance
-  namespace: flux-system
-spec:
-  interval: 10m
-  retryInterval: 2m
-  timeout: 5m
-  prune: true
-  wait: false
-  dependsOn:
-    - name: platform-config
-  sourceRef:
-    kind: GitRepository
-    name: flux-system
-  path: ./conformance/incluster

clusters/base/kustomization.yaml

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ resources:
   - apps-wave-2.yaml     # Flux Kustomization -> ./apps/wave-2 (dependsOn apps-wave-1)
   # VM tier (KubeVirt) — non-gating (wait:false), separate lifecycle from the app waves.
   - apps-vms.yaml        # Flux Kustomization -> ./apps/vms (dependsOn platform-config)
-  - conformance.yaml     # Flux Kustomization -> ./conformance/incluster (non-gating; R-SEC-02 trigger identity)
   # oauth2-proxy forward-auth — POST-platform tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false). A leaf
   # service that needs Keycloak + trusted TLS + split-horizon DNS must NOT sit in the gating
   # `platform` tier, where it self-gated its own dependencies into a cold-start deadlock (twice).

conformance/incluster/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Reconciled by clusters/base/conformance.yaml (non-gating, wait:false).
-#
-# RBAC ONLY. chainsaw-job.yaml is deliberately NOT listed: that manifest is a TEMPLATE the CI
-# trigger renders and submits per run (with the commit SHA and the touched --requirements). Flux
-# reconciling it would create a permanent Job object and fight the trigger for ownership.
-#
-# The identities here are inert without
-# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, which is what actually bounds
-# the trigger to the committed run shape. RBAC is the necessary half, that policy the sufficient
-# half — see the header of rbac.yaml.
-apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
-kind: Kustomization
-resources:
-  - rbac.yaml

conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml

@@ -174,68 +174,3 @@ subjects:
   - kind: ServiceAccount
     name: conformance-runner
     namespace: conformance
----
-# =============================================================================
-# THE TRIGGER IDENTITY — deliberately NOT conformance-runner.
-#
-# THE ESCALATION THIS EXISTS TO CLOSE (docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §4):
-# Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Pod/Job's `serviceAccountName`. So any principal
-# that can `create jobs` in this namespace can create a Job with
-# `serviceAccountName: conformance-runner` and an ARBITRARY command — i.e. run arbitrary
-# code with the runner's privileges (nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch, jobs).
-# A CI-held token with plain `create jobs` therefore IS the privileged identity, no matter
-# how narrow its own RBAC looks. That would break R-SEC-02 ("CI holds no broad cluster
-# access") while appearing to satisfy it.
-#
-# RBAC ALONE CANNOT FIX THIS. The real boundary is the admission policy
-# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, which admits Jobs from
-# THIS ServiceAccount only when they match the committed conformance shape. This Role is
-# the necessary half; that policy is the sufficient half. Neither works alone — do not
-# grant this Role without that policy reconciled and ENFORCING.
-#
-# Namespaced Role, bound only in `conformance`. No ClusterRole, deliberately.
-# =============================================================================
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: ServiceAccount
-metadata:
-  name: conformance-trigger
-  namespace: conformance
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
----
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Role
-metadata:
-  name: conformance-trigger
-  namespace: conformance
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
-rules:
-  # Create the run, and watch it to completion.
-  - apiGroups: [batch]
-    resources: [jobs]
-    verbs: [create, get, list, watch]
-  # Read the Job's pod and its log — this is how results come back. Deliberately NOT
-  # pods/exec and NOT `kubectl cp`: the run tars its artifacts to stdout and CI decodes
-  # them from the log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
-  - apiGroups: [""]
-    resources: [pods, pods/log]
-    verbs: [get, list, watch]
-  # NOTHING ELSE. In particular NO delete on jobs (a trigger that can delete can hide a
-  # failed run), no secrets, no configmaps, no exec, no create on pods.
----
-apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
-kind: RoleBinding
-metadata:
-  name: conformance-trigger
-  namespace: conformance
-  labels:
-    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
-roleRef:
-  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-  kind: Role
-  name: conformance-trigger
-subjects:
-  - kind: ServiceAccount
-    name: conformance-trigger
-    namespace: conformance

conformance/tests/l0-static/c2-root-surface/check.sh

@@ -216,20 +216,6 @@ def is_literal_base(host: str) -> bool:
 DELIVERY_ROOTS = ("apps", "platform", "platform-config", "platform-config-cdi",
                   "runbooks", "clusters", "bootstrap", "catalog")
 
-# NARROW EXEMPTION to (0), for reconciled trees that deliberately serve NOTHING.
-# `conformance/incluster` (the L2/L3 runner + CI-trigger identities, R-SEC-02) is reconciled
-# by clusters/base/conformance.yaml but contains only a Namespace, ServiceAccounts, RBAC and
-# an admission-bounded Job template. Adding "conformance" to DELIVERY_ROOTS instead would be
-# wrong for the reason stated above: it would sweep in this harness's synthetic fixture
-# routes and make (8) demand the operator's dashboard link them.
-#
-# THE EXEMPTION POLICES ITSELF. An unchecked allowlist is how (0) would rot into a fail-open —
-# add a tree here, later put an HTTPRoute in it, and the forward direction goes quietly green
-# on a hidden service. So each exempted tree is ASSERTED below to declare no route and no
-# hostname-publishing Service. If that ever stops being true the check fails and the tree must
-# become a real delivery root.
-NON_SERVING_RECONCILED = ("conformance/incluster",)
-
 
 def tracked_yaml() -> list[Path]:
     out = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "-z", "--", "*.yaml", "*.yml"],
@@ -276,31 +262,12 @@ flux_ks = [(p, d) for p, d in docs_all()
 # a Kustomization declared elsewhere); they name no source and reconcile nothing, so requiring
 # a path of them would fail on a file that is correct.
 reconcilers = [(p, d) for p, d in flux_ks if (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("sourceRef")]
-def _reconciled_path(d):
-    return (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("path", "").lstrip("./").rstrip("/")
-
-
 unscanned = sorted({
     f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)}:{(d.get('spec', {}) or {}).get('path', '') or '(no path)'}"
     for p, d in reconcilers
-    if _reconciled_path(d).split("/")[0] not in DELIVERY_ROOTS
-    and _reconciled_path(d) not in NON_SERVING_RECONCILED
+    if (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("path", "").lstrip("./").split("/")[0]
+    not in DELIVERY_ROOTS
 })
-
-# The exemption's own guard: an exempted tree must actually serve nothing.
-exempt_serving = sorted({
-    f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)} ({d.get('kind')})"
-    for p, d in docs_all()
-    if any(str(p.relative_to(ROOT)).startswith(t + "/") for t in NON_SERVING_RECONCILED)
-    and (d.get("kind") == "HTTPRoute"
-         or (d.get("kind") == "Service"
-             and any("hostname" in str(k).lower()
-                     for k in ((d.get("metadata", {}) or {}).get("annotations", {}) or {}))))
-})
-check(not exempt_serving,
-      f"(0b) every NON_SERVING_RECONCILED tree really serves nothing — an exempted tree that "
-      f"gains a route would hide a service from this check entirely "
-      f"{exempt_serving if exempt_serving else ''}")
 check(len(reconcilers) >= 10 and not unscanned,
       f"(0) all {len(reconcilers)} Flux-reconciled path(s) lie inside a scanned root — a "
       f"reconciled tree this check does not read is a service it cannot require a link for "

docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md

@@ -38,21 +38,8 @@ agents. So the credential model must be decided by the operator before anything
 | Runner deployment | `apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml` | act_runner + DinD (Docker executor). **`automountServiceAccountToken: false`** — the runner and its job containers hold NO SA token. Broad egress allowed (`- {}`), so it can *reach* the kube-API VIP `192.168.1.49:6443`, but has no credential. |
 | Secrets encryption | `.sops.yaml` (repo root) | age recipient `age175l8m…mfzg`; encrypts `data`/`stringData` of `*.sops.yaml` under `platform|apps|catalog/**` and `secrets/**`. Private key is the in-cluster `sops-age` Secret Flux uses. |
 
-**Cluster reality:** the "Phase 0 / no cluster" language in these files is stale — the cluster is
-LIVE (and it is now PROD; dev was decommissioned 2026-09-12).
-
-> **CORRECTION (2026-09-29): `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is NOT "the only remaining gate", and setting it
-> today is actively DANGEROUS.** Measured: with `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` and no reachable cluster,
-> `conformance/run.sh` exits 0 in scaffold mode having marked all 54 tests `<skipped>`, and
-> `ci/conformance.sh` then printed `[ ok ] L2/L3 conformance passed for touched subset` — **rc 0, a
-> fake green**, on a merge gate that is now an enforcing required status check. The CI runner has
-> no cluster credential at all (`automountServiceAccountToken: false`, by design), so the "local
-> run" this stage attempts can never succeed; it can only skip and, before the guard added on
-> 2026-09-29, lie about it.
->
-> `ci/conformance.sh` now BLOCKS (exit 1) when a cluster is declared but every test skipped. **Do
-> not set `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` until §3's trigger path actually exists** — the variable does
-> not enable L2/L3, it only changes which way this stage fails.
+**Cluster reality:** the "Phase 0 / no cluster" language in these files is stale — the dev cluster
+is LIVE (Phase 6). So `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is the only remaining gate, exactly as the blueprint says.
 
 ---
 

infra/gitea/set-ci-token.sh

@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@
 # confirm the check goes green rather than assuming the scope name.
 set -euo pipefail
 HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev; OWNER=Home-Network; REPO=home-network-k3s-impl
-# NOT GITEA_* — Gitea reserves that prefix for secret names and returns HTTP 400
-# "invalid secret name". The first version of this script used GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN, sent the
-# PUT to /dev/null, and printed "stored" regardless; the secret never existed and nobody knew.
-SECRET=SETTINGS_API_TOKEN
 NAME="ci-gitea-settings-$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S)"
 creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
 U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"; P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
@@ -26,24 +22,12 @@ TOKEN="$(basic -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
 [ -n "$TOKEN" ] || { echo "token creation failed (check scopes for your Gitea version)" >&2; exit 1; }
 echo "==> got a ${#TOKEN}-character token (value not shown)"
 
-echo "==> storing it as repo Actions secret ${SECRET}"
-code="$(basic -o /tmp/set-ci-token.out -w '%{http_code}' -X PUT -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+echo "==> storing it as repo Actions secret GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN"
+basic -X PUT -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
   -d "$(jq -n --arg d "$TOKEN" '{data:$d}')" \
-  "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/actions/secrets/${SECRET}")"
+  "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/actions/secrets/GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN" >/dev/null
 unset TOKEN
-if [ "$code" != 201 ] && [ "$code" != 204 ]; then
-  echo "   PUT failed: HTTP ${code} -- $(head -c 200 /tmp/set-ci-token.out)" >&2
-  rm -f /tmp/set-ci-token.out; exit 1
-fi
-rm -f /tmp/set-ci-token.out
-
-# VERIFY BY READING IT BACK. curl -sS exits 0 on an HTTP error, so without this the script
-# reports success for a store that never happened -- which is exactly what it did.
-names="$(basic "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/actions/secrets" \
-        | jq -rc '[.. | objects | select(has("name")) | .name] | unique')"
-grep -q "$SECRET" <<<"$names" \
-  || { echo "   stored HTTP ${code} but ${SECRET} is NOT in ${names} -- refusing to claim success" >&2; exit 1; }
-echo "==> stored and VERIFIED present: ${names}"
+echo "==> stored."
 
 cat <<'NOTE'
 

platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml

@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-# Serves: R-SEC-02 (CI holds no broad cluster access)
-#
-# THIS POLICY IS THE SECURITY BOUNDARY. The RBAC in conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml is not.
-#
-# Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Pod/Job's `serviceAccountName`. Any principal that can
-# `create jobs` in namespace `conformance` can therefore create a Job that runs as
-# `conformance-runner` — a privileged SA (nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch) — with an
-# arbitrary command. So the CI trigger credential, however narrow its own Role looks, IS the
-# privileged identity unless something constrains the SHAPE of what it may create.
-#
-# That is what this does: for Jobs created by `conformance-trigger` ONLY, admit exactly the
-# committed conformance run and deny everything else. The operator chose this model
-# (docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §4, primary model) over the zero-credential
-# GitOps-native alternative.
-#
-# ENFORCE AND FAIL-CLOSED, NOT SUBSTITUTED. Note this does NOT use
-# ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION} like the other admission policies: a security boundary that an
-# environment overlay can downgrade to Audit is not a boundary. `failurePolicy: Fail` means a
-# Kyverno outage blocks conformance Jobs rather than silently admitting unconstrained ones.
-# Blocking CI is the correct failure direction here; admitting arbitrary privileged code is not.
-#
-# SCOPE: it constrains ONLY `conformance-trigger`. Jobs created by humans, by Flux, or by any
-# other SA are untouched — so a broken policy cannot wedge the rest of the cluster.
-#
-# IMAGE PINNING — HONEST LIMIT, READ BEFORE RELYING ON THIS. The plan specifies pinning the
-# exact `CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE` digest. That image does not exist yet, so this enforces the
-# enforceable half: the image must live under the conformance repository path AND be
-# digest-pinned (`@sha256:`), never a mutable tag. Residual surface: anyone who can PUSH to that
-# registry path could publish a different digest. TIGHTEN THIS when the image is built by
-# replacing the `image` pattern below with the literal digest — a one-line change, reviewed in a
-# PR, which is exactly where a change to the security boundary belongs.
-apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
-kind: ClusterPolicy
-metadata:
-  name: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-  annotations:
-    policies.kyverno.io/title: Constrain what the conformance CI trigger may create
-    policies.kyverno.io/category: Supply chain
-    policies.kyverno.io/severity: critical
-    homelab.keithjackson.dev/requirements: R-SEC-02
-    homelab.keithjackson.dev/scope: admission-only
-spec:
-  validationFailureAction: Enforce
-  failurePolicy: Fail
-  background: false
-  rules:
-    - name: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
-      # resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
-      # As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
-      # and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
-      match:
-        all:
-          - resources:
-              kinds:
-                - Job
-              namespaces:
-                - conformance
-            subjects:
-              - kind: ServiceAccount
-                name: conformance-trigger
-                namespace: conformance
-      validate:
-        message: >-
-          conformance-trigger may create ONLY the committed conformance run: a single container,
-          digest-pinned conformance-runner image, serviceAccountName conformance-runner,
-          command ["./run.sh"], no host namespaces, non-root with privilege escalation disabled,
-          and only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. See
-          platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml.
-        pattern:
-          spec:
-            template:
-              spec:
-                serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-                =(hostNetwork): "false"
-                =(hostPID): "false"
-                =(hostIPC): "false"
-                containers:
-                  - image: "gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:*"
-                    command:
-                      - "./run.sh"
-                    securityContext:
-                      runAsNonRoot: true
-                      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-                      =(privileged): "false"
-
-    - name: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
-      # resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
-      # As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
-      # and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
-      match:
-        all:
-          - resources:
-              kinds:
-                - Job
-              namespaces:
-                - conformance
-            subjects:
-              - kind: ServiceAccount
-                name: conformance-trigger
-                namespace: conformance
-      validate:
-        message: >-
-          conformance-trigger Jobs may mount only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. An extra
-          volume is how a constrained pod reaches a host path, a secret, or another SA's token.
-        # foreach, NOT a `pattern` list: a Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one element
-        # matches", which would happily admit a Job carrying `workspace` PLUS a hostPath. This
-        # asserts EVERY volume is one of the two allowed names.
-        foreach:
-          - list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.volumes"
-            deny:
-              conditions:
-                all:
-                  - key: "{{ element.name }}"
-                    operator: AnyNotIn
-                    value: ["workspace", "results"]
-
-    - name: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
-      # resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
-      # As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
-      # and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
-      match:
-        all:
-          - resources:
-              kinds:
-                - Job
-              namespaces:
-                - conformance
-            subjects:
-              - kind: ServiceAccount
-                name: conformance-trigger
-                namespace: conformance
-      validate:
-        message: >-
-          conformance-trigger Job args may contain only the conformance run's own flags
-          (--layer, --requirements, --include-scope, --strict-coverage) and their plain values.
-          Anything else — a shell, a path, a redirect — is denied.
-        foreach:
-          - list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].args"
-            deny:
-              conditions:
-                all:
-                  - key: "{{ regex_match('^(--layer|--requirements|--include-scope|--strict-coverage|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9,._-]*)$', element) }}"
-                    operator: Equals
-                    value: false

platform/kyverno/admission/kustomization.yaml

@@ -20,7 +20,3 @@ resources:
   # --- secrets: the admission variant REPLACES the CI-only sops-block policy ---
   #     (../policies/disallow-plaintext-secrets.yaml is CI-only; see secret-provenance.yaml)
   - secret-provenance.yaml
-  # --- R-SEC-02: constrain what the conformance CI trigger may create ---
-  # THE security boundary for CI cluster access. Enforce + fail-closed, deliberately NOT
-  # subject to ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}. See the file header.
-  - conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml

platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/kyverno-test.yaml

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-# R-SEC-02 — the conformance CI trigger cannot escalate to arbitrary privileged execution.
-#
-# Each DENY case below is a real escalation path, not a style violation. The one that matters
-# most is `evil-command`: correct SA, correct image, arbitrary command. That is the attack the
-# whole model exists to stop, and RBAC alone cannot — Kubernetes places no `use` check on
-# serviceAccountName, so `create jobs` in this namespace IS the privileged identity without
-# this policy.
-#
-# user-info.yaml supplies the requesting identity. WITHOUT it the policy's `subjects` match
-# never fires and every case trivially passes — a test that proves nothing.
-apiVersion: cli.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
-kind: Test
-metadata:
-  name: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-policies:
-  - ../../admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
-resources:
-  - resources.yaml
-userinfo: user-info.yaml
-results:
-  # ---- the committed run is ADMITTED ----
-  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-    rule: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
-    kind: Job
-    resources: [good-run]
-    result: pass
-  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-    rule: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
-    kind: Job
-    resources: [good-run]
-    result: pass
-  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-    rule: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
-    kind: Job
-    resources: [good-run]
-    result: pass
-
-  # ---- THE escalation: runner SA + arbitrary command ----
-  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-    rule: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
-    kind: Job
-    resources: [evil-command, evil-image, tag-not-digest, host-namespaces]
-    result: fail
-
-  # ---- an extra volume is the way out of a constrained pod ----
-  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-    rule: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
-    kind: Job
-    resources: [extra-volume]
-    result: fail
-
-  # ---- args beyond the committed flags ----
-  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
-    rule: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
-    kind: Job
-    resources: [injected-args]
-    result: fail

platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/resources.yaml

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-# The committed shape — must be ADMITTED.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: good-run
-  namespace: conformance
-spec:
-  template:
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-      containers:
-        - name: runner
-          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
-          command: ["./run.sh"]
-          args: ["--layer", "l2,l3", "--requirements", "R-NET-01"]
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-      volumes:
-        - name: workspace
-          emptyDir: {}
-        - name: results
-          emptyDir: {}
----
-# THE ESCALATION: runner SA, but an arbitrary command. Must be DENIED.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: evil-command
-  namespace: conformance
-spec:
-  template:
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-      containers:
-        - name: runner
-          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
-          command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-      volumes:
-        - name: workspace
-          emptyDir: {}
----
-# An arbitrary image running as the privileged SA. Must be DENIED.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: evil-image
-  namespace: conformance
-spec:
-  template:
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-      containers:
-        - name: runner
-          image: docker.io/library/alpine:latest
-          command: ["./run.sh"]
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-      volumes:
-        - name: workspace
-          emptyDir: {}
----
-# A mutable TAG instead of a digest — republishable under the same reference. Must be DENIED.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: tag-not-digest
-  namespace: conformance
-spec:
-  template:
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-      containers:
-        - name: runner
-          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner:latest
-          command: ["./run.sh"]
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-      volumes:
-        - name: workspace
-          emptyDir: {}
----
-# Host namespaces + privilege escalation. Must be DENIED.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: host-namespaces
-  namespace: conformance
-spec:
-  template:
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-      hostPID: true
-      containers:
-        - name: runner
-          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
-          command: ["./run.sh"]
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: false
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
-      volumes:
-        - name: workspace
-          emptyDir: {}
----
-# An extra volume — the way out of a constrained pod. Must be DENIED.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: extra-volume
-  namespace: conformance
-spec:
-  template:
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-      containers:
-        - name: runner
-          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
-          command: ["./run.sh"]
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-      volumes:
-        - name: workspace
-          emptyDir: {}
-        - name: hostroot
-          hostPath:
-            path: /
----
-# Injected args beyond the committed flags. Must be DENIED.
-apiVersion: batch/v1
-kind: Job
-metadata:
-  name: injected-args
-  namespace: conformance
-spec:
-  template:
-    spec:
-      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
-      containers:
-        - name: runner
-          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
-          command: ["./run.sh"]
-          args: ["--layer", "l2", ";", "curl", "http://evil/"]
-          securityContext:
-            runAsNonRoot: true
-            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
-      volumes:
-        - name: workspace
-          emptyDir: {}

platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/user-info.yaml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# The requesting identity the policy keys on. Without this the `subjects` match never fires and
-# every case below would trivially "pass" — proving nothing.
-apiVersion: cli.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
-kind: UserInfo
-metadata:
-  name: conformance-trigger
-userInfo:
-  username: system:serviceaccount:conformance:conformance-trigger
-  groups:
-    - system:serviceaccounts
-    - system:serviceaccounts:conformance
-    - system:authenticated