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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 e7508931ca fix(ci): convert dind to a native sidecar; delete both hand-rolled wait loops
gate / gate (push) Successful in 1m34s
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m35s
gate / conformance (push) Has been skipped
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
Executes the FOLLOW-UP that has been carried in this manifest since the readiness fix,
now that k3s is v1.36 and sidecar containers are GA.

dind moves into initContainers as the first entry with restartPolicy: Always -- the one
field that makes an initContainer a sidecar: it starts before the regular containers,
runs alongside them, and is terminated after them. kubelet therefore enforces the
ordering that the runner used to hand-roll, so the runner drops its command: override
and runs the image's own entrypoint.

The startupProbe execs a full TLS-verified `docker ... info`, NOT a tcpSocket probe. A
tcpSocket probe would re-open the exact gap the old Stage 1 existed to close: dockerd
writes the TLS certs and only THEN starts listening, so the port can accept a connection
while the certs are absent, and act_runner hard-exits on a missing
/certs/client/ca.pem. `docker info` proves both that the certs are usable and that the
daemon answers. periodSeconds 1 x failureThreshold 60 preserves the previous 60s cap.

It also removes the one-per-start dockerd log line
  http: TLS handshake error from 127.0.0.1: EOF
which was the old `nc -z` probe opening a TCP connection and closing it without a TLS
handshake -- an error we were generating ourselves and then reading in the logs.

SECONDARY WIN: deleting the shell deletes an envsubst hazard. apps-wave-1 runs postBuild
substitution over this ENTIRE manifest, comments included, and those loops depended on
bare dollar-names passing through untouched -- a braced or double-dollar spelling would
have silently unbounded the waits or failed the whole Kustomization. The only dollar left
in the file is the intended ${BASE_DOMAIN}.

LANDS ALONE, DELIBERATELY. This Deployment is the merge gate for the entire repository:
if the conversion is wrong, nothing can merge. Merge this BEFORE enabling the required
status check, and watch a real workflow run green on the converted pod before doing so --
otherwise a bad conversion locks the repo with no way to revert through the gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 01:54:47 -05:00
12 changed files with 92 additions and 266 deletions

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+14 -28
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@@ -40,15 +40,9 @@ and ADR-0011: **CI holds no broad kubeconfig.** L2/L3 run as an in-cluster **Cha
*collects* its artifacts, using a narrow trigger credential referenced **by secret name only**
(`secrets.CONFORMANCE_TRIGGER_KUBECONFIG`) — never a plaintext secret, never a cluster-admin kubeconfig.
## Honest SKIP — never fake green
## Honest SKIP — never fake green (Phase 0)
**NOTE (2026-09-29):** this section is written in the past's voice — "Phase 0", "no cluster
exists". **A cluster has existed for weeks** and Flux has been reconciling against it. The
skip logic below is still correct and still honest, but read it as describing a **live
coverage gap** (L2/L3 is not wired into CI) rather than an expected phase. Its being
phrased as a phase is part of why the gap went unexamined.
Originally: The gate is deliberately built so unavailable checks **SKIP loudly,
**No cluster exists in Phase 0.** The gate is deliberately built so unavailable checks **SKIP loudly,
they do not pass**:
- The `conformance` job is `if: ${{ vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE == 'true' }}` — with no cluster it is
@@ -83,29 +77,21 @@ Both dirs are git-ignored (see [`.gitignore`](../../.gitignore)).
## Triggers & branch model (CONTRIBUTING.md)
- `pull_request` → `main`: **PRs are the enforced merge gate into `main`.**
- `push` → `main` only. The per-branch prefix list was removed: `act_runner` runs at capacity 1,
so a branch push fires a redundant run that serialises *ahead* of the PR run for the same tree.
**No work on `main`** — and since 2026-09-29 that is enforced, not conventional: `main` is a
protected branch and a direct push is rejected by the pre-receive hook (verified, not assumed).
- `push` → `feature/**`, `fix/**`, `docs/**`, `chore/**`: fast feedback on the branch. **No work on `main`.**
## Transition: COMPLETE (2026-09-29)
## Transition: generic-CI-now → Gitea-Actions-after-Gitea-is-up
This section used to describe a migration as pending. It has happened. Gitea is live at
`gitea.home.keithjackson.dev`, the runner `incluster-dind` is registered and online, and
`gate.yml` runs on every PR.
Per [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](../../../home-network-k3s/CONTRIBUTING.md) and
[`docs/05` §"local bootstrap → self-hosted Gitea"](../../../home-network-k3s/docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md):
**What took a month to notice:** the migration was recorded as done on 2026-08-31 without
anyone checking the platform. In reality `main` had **no branch protection** and **zero
runners were registered** until 2026-09-29. Every "the gate enforces this" statement in
between rested on an assertion nobody verified. PR #1 — the first pull request this
repository ever had — sat `pending` for 30.6 minutes because nothing existed to run it.
So: **do not read this file, or the DECISIONS-LOG, as evidence about the live platform.**
Query the API. `infra/gitea/` holds the scripts and the measured state.
Still genuinely outstanding: `vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` and
`secrets.CONFORMANCE_TRIGGER_KUBECONFIG` are unset, so L2/L3 conformance does not run in
CI. That is a real coverage gap, not a phase.
1. **Now (interim):** there is **no remote git host** on this network. This workflow file is dormant —
but the **identical gate runs locally today** via `make -C ci gate` (R-TEST-02). Development is
local feature-branch → `main`, the gate enforced by convention + the local runner.
2. **Gitea comes online early** (one of the first services onboarded) at `gitea.home.keithjackson.dev`.
3. **CI moves to Gitea Actions:** this workflow activates unchanged. The only operational steps are
enabling a Gitea Actions runner and setting `vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` +
`secrets.CONFORMANCE_TRIGGER_KUBECONFIG` once a dev/test cluster exists. PRs then become the
**platform-enforced** merge gate — the same no-work-in-main rule, now enforced by machine.
## Configuration (set in Gitea; referenced by name only)
+5 -8
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@@ -11,14 +11,11 @@
# v
# merge-gate decision [R-TEST-03: touched subset green]
#
# STATUS (corrected 2026-09-29): Gitea IS hosted and Gitea Actions IS enabled; the runner
# `incluster-dind` is online and gate.yml is the live PR gate. The text that used to sit here
# ("Today there is no Gitea host, so this file is dormant") was stale by weeks -- it was written
# as a plan and never revisited once the plan completed.
#
# THIS file is still dormant, but for the reason in the DORMANT block below -- its spec checkout
# and L2/L3 seams are unwired -- NOT because there is no host. Do not read a stale plan as a
# statement about the live platform; query the API instead (see infra/gitea/).
# Transition (CONTRIBUTING.md / docs/05 §"local bootstrap -> self-hosted Gitea"):
# Today there is no Gitea host, so this file is dormant. The SAME gate is runnable
# now via `make -C ci gate` (R-TEST-02). Once Gitea is self-hosted and Gitea
# Actions is enabled, this workflow becomes the ENFORCED PR merge gate into main —
# no code change required, only turning on the runner and setting CLUSTER_AVAILABLE.
#
# CI holds NO broad kubeconfig. L2/L3 run as an in-cluster Chainsaw Job whose own
# scoped ServiceAccount holds cluster access (docs/14, R-SEC-02); CI uses only a
-29
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@@ -45,35 +45,6 @@ the toolbox gate yourself and quote its numbers. Never describe a PR as "green"
strength of a check you have not seen report — and note that a **skipped** Gitea job
reports as `success`, so a green tick is not by itself evidence that anything ran.
## 2b. Never infer platform state from this repository
**This repo is not evidence about the live platform.** Neither is `DECISIONS-LOG.md`.
Both describe what someone believed at the time of writing, and both have been
confidently wrong for a month at a stretch.
On 2026-09-29 the log stated the merge gate was a required status check with a runner
online. The API said `branch_protections: []` and **zero** runners. Everything downstream
of that belief — "the gate enforces this", "your push would be rejected", "CI covers it" —
was wrong, and nothing in the tree could have revealed it, because the tree was the source
of the error.
**So, before asserting that any gate, protection, runner, secret, or workload is in a
given state: query the thing itself.**
| Claim about... | Check |
|---|---|
| branch protection / required checks | `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches/main` |
| a runner exists | `GET /api/v1/admin/actions/runners` |
| CI actually ran | the commit's `/statuses` — and read the **description**; a *skipped* Gitea job reports `success` with "Has been skipped" |
| a workload / Secret / env | `kubectl --context k3s-prod ...` (read-only is fine for agents) |
| Flux applied your commit | compare `.status.lastAppliedRevision` against the GitRepository's artifact revision |
Quote the measured field, not the prose. If you cannot measure it, say so explicitly —
"unverified" is a legitimate report, and a far better one than a confident guess that
matches the docs.
**A green tick is not proof anything ran.** Read what actually executed.
## 3. Gate before you push
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c './ci/gate.sh'
-7
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@@ -1192,13 +1192,6 @@ fresh agent should read this entry + `infra/PHASE1-STATUS.md` + `docs/plans/` an
Platform-admins require TOTP MFA.
- **Gitea Actions CI is LIVE + enforcing**: `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml` runs `make -C ci gate` on push/PR to main;
required status check; runner `incluster-dind` online (ns gitea-actions).
> **[CORRECTION, 2026-09-29 — THIS BULLET WAS FALSE WHEN WRITTEN AND STAYED FALSE FOR A MONTH.]**
> Measured against the live Gitea API on 2026-09-29: `branch_protections` returned `[]` (`main`
> `protected:false`, `enable_status_check:false`, `user_can_push:true`) and **zero** Actions runners
> were registered at repo, org or site level. The gate was neither enforced nor able to run. PR #1
> — the first pull request this repo ever had — was opened on 2026-09-29 and sat `pending` for
> 30.6 minutes with nothing to execute it. Both halves of this bullet were asserted, not verified.
> See the 2026-09-29 entries for the root cause and the fix.
### What changed this session (durable)
1. **SSO cluster-wide break→fix — root cause Cilium CVE-2025-30162.** The 1.16→1.20 security fix makes the shared
+6 -14
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@@ -7,20 +7,12 @@
# substitution). A braced token quoted from the upstream shell script would be a live hazard here,
# not prose, so the upstream conditions below are described in words.
#
# THIS FILE NO LONGER HOLDS THE PLACEHOLDER. Corrected 2026-09-29: the server was CLAIMED on that
# date, and the value here is the SPENT token from that claim. It is inert and safe to leave --
# upstream gates the exchange on PlexOnlineToken being ABSENT from /config, and it is now present on
# the plex-config PVC, so this value is a NO-OP on every start whatever it holds. Deleting the Secret
# would NOT be safe (see below), which is why a spent token stays here rather than being blanked.
#
# The claim token is SHORT-LIVED -- minutes. Read the countdown that plex.tv/claim renders when it
# issues one; do NOT budget against a number written in this tree. Earlier revisions of this comment
# asserted a "~4-minute TTL" as established fact with no citation, and upstream plexinc/pms-docker
# documents no expiry at all. That uncited number was load-bearing for the whole procedure design.
#
# This file exists to make the Secret — and therefore the env reference — ALWAYS RESOLVABLE IN THE
# FLUX GRAPH, not to carry a working token. Re-claiming (only needed after a /config wipe) is
# scripted: infra/plex/claim-ship.sh, measured at ~2m45s end to end.
# THE VALUE SHIPPED WITH THIS FILE IS A PLACEHOLDER, DELIBERATELY — the literal string
# `replace-me-with-a-fresh-plex-tv-claim-token`, not a credential. A https://plex.tv/claim token has
# a ~4-minute TTL, far shorter than commit -> push -> Flux reconcile -> pod-roll, so no token
# committed here is ever still valid when the pod starts. This file exists to make the Secret — and
# therefore the env reference — ALWAYS RESOLVABLE IN THE FLUX GRAPH, not to carry a working token.
# The real token is injected by the operator inside that 4-minute window: runbooks/plex-claim.md.
#
# WHY SHIPPING A PLACEHOLDER IS SAFE (verified against plexinc/pms-docker branch `master`, the
# s6-overlay v2 script root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run, cross-checked byte-identical against
@@ -4,13 +4,7 @@
# against Gitea. Flux decrypts it via the sops-age key at reconcile (apps Kustomization
# decryption is wired in clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml). Rotate by resetting the token
# in Gitea (admin -> actions -> runners) and re-encrypting a fresh value here.
# ROTATE: ./infra/gitea/runner-token-rotate.sh -- it mints a fresh instance-level token from the
# Gitea API and writes it here via `sops set`, without the value ever being printed.
# Do NOT `sops -d` this file into a terminal, a log, or an agent transcript. To check only that
# it still decrypts, redirect: `sops -d <file> > /dev/null`.
# NOTE: a fresh token alone may not re-register the runner. act_runner registers ONCE and keeps
# its identity in /data/.runner on the act-runner-data PVC; if Gitea no longer holds a matching
# row it skips registration silently. Clearing that PVC is what forces a real re-registration.
# Recover/inspect: infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops -d apps/gitea-actions-runner-secret.sops.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
+61 -106
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@@ -99,70 +99,71 @@ spec:
# CI holds no cluster credentials — do not mount a SA token into the runner or
# (via the shared netns) the job containers (R-SEC-02, docs/14).
automountServiceAccountToken: false
# ---- Docker-in-Docker: the job executor daemon (privileged) -------------------
#
# NATIVE SIDECAR (k3s v1.36; sidecar containers are GA). It is an initContainer with
# `restartPolicy: Always`, which means: it starts BEFORE the regular containers, keeps
# running alongside them, and is terminated after them. kubelet holds `runner` until
# this container's startupProbe passes, so the ordering is enforced by the kubelet
# instead of hand-rolled shell in the runner.
#
# This REPLACES two bounded wait-loops that used to live in the runner's `command:`.
# Deleting them also deletes an envsubst hazard: clusters/base/apps-wave-1.yaml runs
# postBuild substitution over this ENTIRE manifest, comments included, and those loops
# depended on bare dollar-names surviving it untouched. There is now no shell here at
# all, so there is nothing to escape or mis-escape.
#
# WHY THE PROBE IS `exec docker ... info` AND NOT `tcpSocket`. A tcpSocket probe would
# re-open the exact gap the old Stage 1 existed to close: dockerd writes the TLS certs
# and only THEN begins listening, so the port can accept a connection while the certs
# are absent or incomplete -- and act_runner hard-exits on a missing
# /certs/client/ca.pem. A full TLS-verified `docker info` proves BOTH that the certs
# are usable and that the daemon answers. It also removes the one-per-start
# "TLS handshake error ... EOF" that the old `nc -z` probe logged in dockerd.
#
# periodSeconds 1 x failureThreshold 60 preserves the previous 60s cap.
initContainers:
- name: dind
restartPolicy: Always # <- this field is what makes it a SIDECAR
image: docker:27-dind
securityContext:
privileged: true
env:
# Generate + publish TLS certs into the shared emptyDir; dockerd then listens
# on tcp://0.0.0.0:2376 (TLS) which the runner reaches at localhost:2376.
- name: DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR
value: /certs
volumeMounts:
- name: certs
mountPath: /certs
- name: dind-storage
mountPath: /var/lib/docker
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
startupProbe:
exec:
command:
- docker
- --host=tcp://127.0.0.1:2376
- --tlsverify
- --tlscacert=/certs/client/ca.pem
- --tlscert=/certs/client/cert.pem
- --tlskey=/certs/client/key.pem
- info
periodSeconds: 1
failureThreshold: 60
containers:
# ---- act_runner: registers with Gitea, dispatches jobs to the DinD daemon ----
- name: runner
image: gitea/act_runner:0.2.11
# TWO-STAGE BOUNDED WAIT on the DinD sidecar, then exec the image's normal
# entrypoint (/sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh), which registers-from-env on first
# boot and runs `act_runner daemon`.
#
# STAGE 1 — the certs must EXIST: act_runner reads /certs/client/ca.pem at startup
# and hard-exits if it is missing (a startup race against the sidecar).
# STAGE 2 — the daemon must actually ACCEPT a connection: the cert FILE appearing is
# necessary but NOT sufficient. dockerd writes the certs and only THEN begins
# listening on :2376, so a runner that proceeds on the file alone still hard-exits
# with "cannot ping the docker daemon at tcp://localhost:2376" — observed
# crashlooping 11 times in ~8 minutes on a fresh pod after a node bounce.
# Both loops are bounded (60 x 1s) and exit 1 on timeout, so a genuinely dead sidecar
# surfaces as a CrashLoopBackOff with a clear message instead of hanging forever.
#
# ENVSUBST SAFETY — the BARE $i / $j below are CORRECT. Do not "tidy" them into the
# braced form or the double-dollar form; both are wrong here, for different reasons.
# clusters/base/apps-wave-1.yaml carries postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars, so
# Flux envsubst runs over this ENTIRE manifest — YAML comments very much included.
# Its contract (drone/envsubst; the same one spelled out in clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml,
# and re-verified against this exact file with `flux envsubst`, flux v2.4.0) is:
# - A bare $name is NOT a reference to envsubst: it passes through untouched, and
# that holds even when the name IS set in cluster-vars. So $i and $j reach the
# cluster verbatim and both 60s bounds below are real, enforced bounds.
# - $((i + 1)) is likewise untouched: "(" cannot begin a variable name.
# - A BRACED dollar-name IS a reference and gets replaced — with the empty string
# when the name is unset. One of those here would make a bound read [ "" -ge 60 ],
# which errors, short-circuits the &&, and silently turns the wait UNBOUNDED.
# - A DOUBLE-dollar braced name is envsubst's escape and survives as the braced
# form — still wrong for us, because on any path where envsubst does NOT run
# (a plain `kustomize build` or `kubectl apply -k` of this directory) the shell
# reads that leading double-dollar as its own PID, so a bound would compare a
# string like 1234{i} against 60. The bare form is the only spelling that is
# correct on BOTH paths.
# - A braced name containing punctuation is a HARD ERROR ("unable to parse variable
# name") that fails this whole Kustomization — and this Kustomization gates every
# merge in the repo. So never write one anywhere in this file, INCLUDING in a
# comment. That is why this note names the three forms in words rather than
# showing them: an earlier draft of it spelled them out literally and broke
# `flux envsubst` on the file. (Same trap the indexed-expansion warning in
# clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml describes.)
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- |
# Stage 1: the sidecar's TLS client certs must appear in the shared emptyDir.
i=0
until [ -f /certs/client/ca.pem ]; do
i=$((i + 1))
[ "$i" -ge 60 ] && { echo "dind certs never appeared" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "waiting for dind TLS certs ($i)"; sleep 1
done
# Stage 2: dockerd must actually accept a connection on :2376. busybox nc in this
# Alpine-based image (gitea/act_runner:0.2.11) supports -z (scan) and -w (timeout).
j=0
until nc -z -w1 127.0.0.1 2376; do
j=$((j + 1))
[ "$j" -ge 60 ] && { echo "dind daemon never accepted a connection on 2376" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "waiting for dind daemon on :2376 ($j)"; sleep 1
done
exec /sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh
# No `command:` override. The image's own entrypoint (/sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh)
# registers from env on first boot and runs `act_runner daemon`. The two wait-loops
# that used to live here are gone: kubelet now holds this container until the dind
# sidecar's startupProbe passes (see initContainers above).
env:
- name: GITEA_INSTANCE_URL
value: https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -198,52 +199,6 @@ spec:
memory: 128Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi
# ---- Docker-in-Docker: the job executor daemon (privileged) ----
#
# FOLLOW-UP (deliberately NOT bundled into the readiness fix above — own change):
# Convert this container into a NATIVE SIDECAR and delete both shell wait-loops.
# k3s is now v1.36, where sidecar containers are GA, so kubelet can enforce the
# ordering that the loops above hand-roll — which also removes the envsubst hazard
# from this file entirely (no shell, no $i/$j, nothing to escape or mis-escape).
# Shape to build:
# 1. Move this whole container into `initContainers:` as the FIRST entry.
# 2. Add `restartPolicy: Always` to it. That single field is what makes an
# initContainer a sidecar: it starts before the regular containers, keeps
# running alongside them, and is terminated after them.
# 3. Give it a `startupProbe` that succeeds only when dockerd accepts a TLS
# connection — e.g. `exec` a `docker -H tcp://127.0.0.1:2376 --tlsverify
# --tlscacert /certs/client/ca.pem --tlscert /certs/client/cert.pem
# --tlskey /certs/client/key.pem info`. Do NOT use a bare `tcpSocket` probe:
# it would re-open the same "port accepting but TLS/certs not ready" gap that
# Stage 1 above exists to close. `periodSeconds: 1` + `failureThreshold: 60`
# preserves today's 60s cap.
# 4. kubelet then holds the `runner` container until that startupProbe passes, so
# `runner` can drop its `command:` override completely and run the image's
# default entrypoint.
# Why it is a separate change: this Deployment is the ENFORCED MERGE GATE for this
# entire repository. If the conversion is wrong, nothing can merge — so it must land
# alone, where the failure is unambiguous and not entangled with anything else, and
# only after a real workflow run has been observed green on the converted pod.
- name: dind
image: docker:27-dind
securityContext:
privileged: true
env:
# Generate + publish TLS certs into the shared emptyDir; dockerd then listens
# on tcp://0.0.0.0:2376 (TLS) which the runner reaches at localhost:2376.
- name: DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR
value: /certs
volumeMounts:
- name: certs
mountPath: /certs
- name: dind-storage
mountPath: /var/lib/docker
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
+5 -11
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@@ -38,17 +38,11 @@ env:
# UNCLAIMED, so this is wired; it was previously left out on the reasoning below, and only one
# half of that reasoning survived contact with the upstream source.
#
# A SHORT TTL IS THE OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINT, not a reason to abstain. A https://plex.tv/claim token
# expires in MINUTES — read the countdown the claim page renders; do not budget against a number
# written in this tree. (This comment previously asserted "~4 minutes" as established fact. It was
# UNCITED, upstream plexinc/pms-docker documents no expiry at all, and that number was load-bearing
# for the whole procedure design — including a since-disproven claim that the delivery pipeline was
# too slow to fit inside it. Measured 2026-09-29: the full loop is ~2m45s and fits.)
#
# The live token is injected by the operator inside that window, with an explicit `flux reconcile`
# to collapse the wait. Scripted end to end as infra/plex/claim-ship.sh; runbooks/plex-claim.md is
# the procedure. SERVER CLAIMED 2026-09-29 — this env is now a permanent no-op (see below), and the
# committed value is the spent token from that claim rather than the original placeholder.
# THE 4-MINUTE TTL IS STILL TRUE, and it is now the OPERATIONAL constraint rather than a reason to
# abstain. A https://plex.tv/claim token expires in ~4 minutes — far shorter than commit -> push ->
# Flux reconcile -> pod-roll if that cycle is left to its own timers. So the committed value is a
# documented PLACEHOLDER and the live token is injected by the operator inside that window, with an
# explicit `flux reconcile` to collapse the wait: runbooks/plex-claim.md is the timed procedure.
#
# ONE-SHOT, AND SAFE TO SIT HERE EXPIRED. Verified from plexinc/pms-docker's own first-run script
# (branch `master`, root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run, confirmed byte-identical to the file in
-14
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@@ -1,19 +1,5 @@
# `ci/` — portable merge gate (runnable today, without Gitea)
> **STATUS NOTE (2026-09-29) — read before trusting the "Phase 0" framing below.**
> This document speaks as though no cluster exists and the platform is scaffolding. **A
> three-node k3s cluster has existed for weeks** and Flux has been reconciling against it.
> Gitea is live, the Actions runner `incluster-dind` is online, and `main` is a protected
> branch. Where the text says "Phase 0", "stub", or "no cluster exists", read it as
> describing a **live gap** rather than an expected stage — most importantly, L2/L3
> conformance still does not run in CI (`vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset), which is a real
> coverage hole, not a phase.
>
> This mismatch is not cosmetic. A month of "the gate enforces this" claims rested on
> documentation rather than measurement, and `main` was unprotected with zero runners
> registered the whole time. **Query the live API before asserting platform state.**
**Task T-0.2 · R-TEST-02 (reproducible, single-command) · Owner WS-GITOPS (CI).**
The same merge gate the Gitea Actions workflow runs
-14
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@@ -1,19 +1,5 @@
# clusters/
> **STATUS NOTE (2026-09-29) — read before trusting the "Phase 0" framing below.**
> This document speaks as though no cluster exists and the platform is scaffolding. **A
> three-node k3s cluster has existed for weeks** and Flux has been reconciling against it.
> Gitea is live, the Actions runner `incluster-dind` is online, and `main` is a protected
> branch. Where the text says "Phase 0", "stub", or "no cluster exists", read it as
> describing a **live gap** rather than an expected stage — most importantly, L2/L3
> conformance still does not run in CI (`vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset), which is a real
> coverage hole, not a phase.
>
> This mismatch is not cosmetic. A month of "the gate enforces this" claims rested on
> documentation rather than measurement, and `main` was unprotected with zero runners
> registered the whole time. **Query the live API before asserting platform state.**
Flux entrypoints and the environment-overlay model (**R-ENV-02**, **R-GITOPS-01/02/03**).
Governing spec: [`docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md`](../../home-network-k3s/docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md),
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@@ -1,19 +1,5 @@
# conformance/ — the home-k3s conformance harness (WS-TEST)
> **STATUS NOTE (2026-09-29) — read before trusting the "Phase 0" framing below.**
> This document speaks as though no cluster exists and the platform is scaffolding. **A
> three-node k3s cluster has existed for weeks** and Flux has been reconciling against it.
> Gitea is live, the Actions runner `incluster-dind` is online, and `main` is a protected
> branch. Where the text says "Phase 0", "stub", or "no cluster exists", read it as
> describing a **live gap** rather than an expected stage — most importantly, L2/L3
> conformance still does not run in CI (`vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset), which is a real
> coverage hole, not a phase.
>
> This mismatch is not cosmetic. A month of "the gate enforces this" claims rested on
> documentation rather than measurement, and `main` was unprotected with zero runners
> registered the whole time. **Query the live API before asserting platform state.**
This subtree is the **definition of "done"** for the whole platform. Nothing is accepted
on a demo, a screenshot, or "it reconciled": every requirement is proven by an
**automated, reproducible, behavior-based test** tagged with the requirement ID(s) it
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@@ -1,19 +1,5 @@
# In-cluster conformance Job (L2/L3)
> **STATUS NOTE (2026-09-29) — read before trusting the "Phase 0" framing below.**
> This document speaks as though no cluster exists and the platform is scaffolding. **A
> three-node k3s cluster has existed for weeks** and Flux has been reconciling against it.
> Gitea is live, the Actions runner `incluster-dind` is online, and `main` is a protected
> branch. Where the text says "Phase 0", "stub", or "no cluster exists", read it as
> describing a **live gap** rather than an expected stage — most importantly, L2/L3
> conformance still does not run in CI (`vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` is unset), which is a real
> coverage hole, not a phase.
>
> This mismatch is not cosmetic. A month of "the gate enforces this" claims rested on
> documentation rather than measurement, and `main` was unprotected with zero runners
> registered the whole time. **Query the live API before asserting platform state.**
Per **ADR-0011** and **docs/14 "Where each layer runs"**: L0/L1 run in CI without a
cluster, but **L2 behavioral and L3 fault-injection run as an in-cluster Chainsaw Job**
on the dev/test cluster that **CI triggers and waits for**. CI holds **no** cluster