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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 9137bbd0c3 feat(dns): INVERT to operator's simpler layout — dev to subdomain, prod to apex
*** DO NOT MERGE TO main WHILE THE OPERATOR IS AWAY. MERGING IS THE MIGRATION. ***

Operator simplified the architecture, inverting c8c1d29:
  dev  -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev        (was the apex)
  prod -> *.home.keithjackson.dev            (the apex; no prod. subdomain, no CNAME layer)

WHY MERGING IS DANGEROUS, and this is the finding that matters most here:
clusters/dev/sync.yaml self-reconciles ./clusters/dev from `main` every 10 minutes. Merging
these files EXECUTES the cutover on the live dev cluster, unattended. And because the same
commit moves dev's GitRepository url to gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, dev STRANDS — it
stops reconciling and cannot be fixed by pushing, because the broken thing IS the path Flux
reads pushes through. Banners added at the top of clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml and beside
the url itself. That url cannot be tokenized: the root Kustomization declares no
substituteFrom, so `gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}` would ship the literal token.

Verified dev is currently safe: this work is NOT on origin/main, dev is reconciling
main@4809199, and its live BASE_DOMAIN is still home.keithjackson.dev. Deliberately NOT
pushed to the bootstrap Gitea either — prod reconciles from there, and prod on `prod.home.`
cannot collide with dev on the apex, so that is the safer interim for prod.

VALUES
                BASE_DOMAIN                  TXT_OWNER_ID   DOMAIN_FILTER
  base          dev.home.keithjackson.dev    sentinel       keithjackson.dev
  dev           dev.home.keithjackson.dev    dev            keithjackson.dev
  prod          home.keithjackson.dev        prod           keithjackson.dev
Ansible seam inverted too: role default k3s_base_domain = dev's subdomain, group_vars/k3s_prod
overrides to the apex.

dev's txtOwnerId moves `default` -> `dev`. The old value was FORCED (its live apex records
were already registered under `default`, so renaming would have orphaned them). On a new
suffix dev publishes a brand-new record set with no prior registry, so the id is chosen on
merits — and `default` has none: it is what you get by FORGETTING the flag, which is exactly
how both clusters came to share it and delete each other's records. Operationally it also
means dev's old apex records stay owned by a now-unclaimed id, so nothing deletes them
implicitly and vacating the apex becomes an explicit sequenceable step rather than a race
between two reconcile loops. PROD MUST NEVER BE GIVEN `default`: prod inherits the apex
NAMES, so `default` is the one value that would let it adopt and policy:sync-delete dev's
still-live apex records — the same incident with the roles swapped.

DOMAIN_FILTER stays the ZONE for both, with F-DNS1 written into all three files as a
do-not-retry: a subdomain filter drops the parent zone and publishes NOTHING.

VERIFICATION — the property changed, and so did the method. "Dev renders byte-identically" no
longer applies because dev is deliberately migrating. Instead: apply the INVERSE substitution
to the new render and demand byte-identity with the baseline. 145 changed line pairs, every
one classified: 143 hostname-move, 2 declared owner-id, ZERO unexplained, ZERO bare-apex
remnants. cilium and velero show 0 changes and provably contain no hostname, so they are not
blind spots. Prod: 0 occurrences of prod.home., 0 of dev.home., 143 apex names. Certs: dev
*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod *.home.keithjackson.dev.

THREE positive controls, all fire — including one that proves the two checks are not
redundant: injecting a single un-moved hostname SURVIVES the inverse-substitution check and is
caught only by the independent bare-apex scan. That is why both exist.

Ansible probe (connection: local, zero SSH): dev nodes -> keycloak.dev.home..., prod nodes ->
keycloak.home.... Used roles: + --tags probe rather than include_vars, because include_vars
outranks group_vars and would have FALSELY shown prod inheriting dev's value.

Gates all PASS: l0, l1, render-golden (10 goldens), lint, substitution (254 assertions),
render.py --selftest, spec-immutability. Catalog ServiceDefinitions edited, never rendered apps/.

RUNBOOK rewritten in §10 + §10a with the ordering that avoids stranding: D0 snapshot escape
routes -> D1 break the automatic trigger -> D2 publish and PROVE gitea.dev.home + the new
wildcard cert WHILE dev still serves the apex -> D3 merge -> D4 release reconciliation
deliberately -> D5 Keycloak issuer + ~12 clients (headlamp's is SOPS, by hand) -> D6
one-server-at-a-time k3s restart + SSO re-issue (service restart only, NO reboots) -> D7
retire old apex records -> D8 verify the apex is empty AGAINST CLOUDFLARE, not pfSense —
the gate on everything after. Then P1 unsuspend prod.

ACME: prod's wildcard is EXACTLY the name set dev holds today, so prod's orders share dev's
5-per-week duplicate-certificate bucket. Order after D8, delete dev's old Certificate rather
than let it renew, rehearse on staging.

The 6 L2 chainsaw tests hardcoding the apex are enumerated but deliberately NOT edited — while
dev is live on the apex they are correct; they need per-environment parameterisation.

Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01/02/03, R-TLS-01.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-04 23:08:50 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 c8c1d2935d feat(dns): per-environment BASE_DOMAIN — prod moves to its own subdomain
gate / gate (push) Has been cancelled
gate / conformance (push) Has been cancelled
INCIDENT FIX. Prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE OF DEV'S PUBLIC DNS RECORDS. Both
clusters ran policy: sync against the SAME Cloudflare zone with the SAME implicit
txtOwnerId (`default`), so prod believed it owned dev's records, found no matching sources,
and removed them plus their TXT registry entries. Dev recovered ~30s after prod was scaled
to 0; verified restored against Cloudflare directly (my first check went through a pfSense
override and falsely showed healthy — local resolvers are not evidence about public DNS).

THE MISS WAS MINE, and it was a failure of imagination in how I briefed every agent. I put
"never touch dev" in brief after brief and enforced it — separate kubeconfigs, verified
--limit, sha-checked dev's kubeconfig before and after. Every one of those guards held. NONE
of them covered SHARED EXTERNAL RESOURCES. Prod reconciling its OWN correctly-authored
manifests reached across a third party and destroyed dev's state. Cluster-to-cluster
isolation was verified; the dependency that mattered was cluster-to-Cloudflare.

Operator's architecture: dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod ->
*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, apex CNAME <svc>.home -> <svc>.prod.home.

PHASE 1 ONLY (this commit): prod moves to its own subdomain. DEV IS NOT MIGRATED and its
effective hostname stays home.keithjackson.dev, so dev renders byte-identically and nothing
live moves. That alone ends the collision and unblocks prod. Phase 2 (dev -> dev.home. +
apex CNAMEs) is deferred to when the operator is present: it relocates Keycloak's issuer and
12 clients' redirect URIs, forces a rolling k3s restart and kubectl SSO re-issue for every
user, and moves gitea.home. — which is BOTH the GitOps source and the current push target.

BASE_DOMAIN WAS A DEAD KNOB — it existed in cluster-vars but the status report flagged it as
referenced by nothing, because hostnames were hardcoded throughout. Now real: 141 refs.
Searched the AUTHORITATIVE reconciled set by resolving each Flux spec.path transitively via
conformance/lib/status.py — the same resolver the L0 gate uses, so "what Flux reconciles"
has one definition. 185 occurrences across 47 files in 154 reconciled files. Tokenized:
Gateway listeners, the wildcard Certificate, coredns-custom, external-dns, Keycloak
instance/realm (26 redirect URIs), oauth2-proxy, Grafana OIDC, all HTTPRoutes, Homepage's 15
links, 30 runbook_urls, unifi cloud-init, render.py's ZONE constant (which drove
--oidc-issuer-url/--cookie-domain/--whitelist-domain on every forward-auth sidecar) and 11
catalog/ ServiceDefinitions re-rendered canonically. Left alone: 43 comment/prose
occurrences and non-reconciled paths.

TWO THAT CANNOT BE TOKENIZED, flagged not forced:
  - headlamp's OIDC URLs live inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret; re-encrypting rewrites the MAC
    over every value and the OFFLINE harness cannot verify it (kustomize does not decrypt),
    so an error would break live-dev SSO with no pre-flight proof. Prod needs its own copy
    anyway — client secrets are realm-scoped.
  - kube-apiserver --oidc-issuer-url is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so Flux can never
    reach it. Done on the inventory seam instead (k3s_base_domain -> k3s_oidc_issuer_url,
    overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod). Verified per host: dev keeps the default, prod gets
    prod.home.

EXTERNAL-DNS OWNER, the actual incident cause: txtOwnerId is now explicit per environment —
dev renders exactly `default` (the chart default it was already using, so its existing
records stay recognised) and prod gets `prod`. The BASE default is a NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL,
deliberately not `default`, so a future environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and
can delete nothing rather than silently inheriting dev's identity.

I OVERRODE ONE AGENT DECISION against our own prior finding: it narrowed prod's
domainFilters to prod.home.keithjackson.dev as defence in depth. FINDING F-DNS1
(DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) already proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE —
ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS
Name". Prod would have published NOTHING. Set to the ZONE (keithjackson.dev) like dev.
Isolation comes from the subdomain split plus txtOwnerId, which is what the incident
actually needed and what a domain filter cannot provide.

DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED: 11 of 12 substituting paths byte-identical; the 12th differs by
exactly one line, `+ txtOwnerId: default` — the value dev was already using implicitly.
POSITIVE CONTROLS confirm the harness is not blind: perturbing BASE_DOMAIN moves 10 of 12
hashes (the 2 that don't provably contain no hostname), perturbing the owner id moves
exactly 1. Prod's rendered output has ZERO home.keithjackson.dev references outside prod.,
and its cert renders *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev — no overlap with dev's.

L0 substitution assertions 106 -> 254; BASE_DOMAIN is no longer flagged dead. Gate PASS.

PROD REMAINS SUSPENDED (platform + 10 downstream tiers) pending review; nothing applied.

Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-02, R-DNS-03, R-TLS-01.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-04 22:43:54 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 9b8979a427 feat(prod): temp Gitea source + wireless disabled + flux bootstrap path
Autonomous prod bring-up, operator away. Three changes that together clear the last
blockers before `flux bootstrap`.

=== 1. TEMPORARY BOOTSTRAP GITEA — the last hard blocker, cleared ===
clusters/prod's source URL could not work: Gitea runs ON the dev cluster (the one slated for
decommission) and split-horizon DNS resolves gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to PROD's OWN
gateway. Stood up the existing bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh on the operator's
workstation with HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132; all three prod nodes verified reachable
(Gitea 1.22.6 via the API), no firewall change needed — prod is on the same /24, no NAT.

clusters/prod now points at http://192.168.2.132:3000/... under a boxed TEMPORARY banner
with a 5-step cutover checklist ending 'delete this whole block — dev's stanza is what done
looks like'. Repo verified PUBLIC with anonymous read two independent ways (API
"private":false; git ls-remote unauthenticated with GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0), so NO secretRef
is needed — documented so a future auth failure is not misread as a network fault.

bootstrap-gitea.sh's header corrected: it documented HOST_NAT_IP=10.73.0.1, the RETIRED
libvirt NAT, and forbade agent use; the operator has now directed this for prod.

=== 2. WIRELESS DISABLED ON PROD (operator-reported) ===
k3s-prod-3 was on ethernet AND wireless, and the wifi DHCP client was overwriting
/etc/resolv.conf. Root cause of the silence: node_baseline's DNS `contended` detection
checked resolvconf and NetworkManager but NOT dhcpcd, so the role wrote resolvers, reported
success, and dhcpcd reverted them on lease renewal — the exact 'green run that fixed
nothing' the contended branch exists to prevent.

Now IaC, not a one-off: survey wireless hardware, **REFUSE to disable it if the path to the
node runs over the wireless interface** (the guard that meant an agent dying mid-apply cost
nothing), blacklist the driver so it never reloads, stop dhcpcd only where it holds a
wireless interface and nothing else, take links down and unload modules with NO reboot, then
report the resulting state. dhcpcd is now in the contended set without weakening fail-closed.

Applied and verified: node 3's wlp1s0 is GONE from /sys/class/net, dhcpcd inactive and its
unit not-found, ONE default route per node, all three on 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 resolving public
names. Safe and idempotent on nodes 1 and 2, whose wifi hardware was already down.

=== 3. flux_bootstrap PATH PARAMETERISED ===
bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh already read FLUX_ENV_PATH but the role never exported it, so it
ALWAYS bootstrapped clusters/dev — prod was impossible. Two behaviour-bearing lines: role
default clusters/dev + `environment: FLUX_ENV_PATH`, overridden to clusters/prod in
group_vars/k3s_prod. Proven per host with a read-only Ansible probe: prod hosts resolve
clusters/prod, localhost/hypervisor resolves clusters/dev. Only two definitions repo-wide.

DEV PROVEN BYTE-IDENTICAL for the source change: all 12 substituting Flux paths rendered for
both trees, 27/27 SHA-256 artefacts identical, with TWO POSITIVE CONTROLS (an overlay-level
canary and a deep-path content canary) confirming the harness detects change — and both
canaries proven restored. Honest scope note recorded: kustomize strips comments, so the
harness proves the built stream, not source comments.

L0 substitution check: 106 assertions, 0 hazards. ci/l0.sh and ci/lint.sh exit 0.

=== STILL BLOCKING A FULL PROD RECONCILE (operator decisions) ===
- S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT remains TBD-PROD-*: prod CANNOT reach dev's versitygw at
  192.168.1.9:9000 (verified UNREACHABLE from all three — the pfSense boundary), and a prod
  backup target is a deferred operator decision. Deliberately NOT invented: a DR target on a
  workstation container would create false confidence. Velero/CNPG backups will fail loudly.
- Prod's public resolvers mean the API server's oidc-issuer-url resolves PUBLICLY, so kubectl
  SSO will not work on prod until split-horizon is solved for it (§4).
- The temp Gitea is a single container on the operator's workstation — a single point of
  failure for prod reconciliation, acceptable for bring-up only.

Serves: R-GITOPS-01, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-03, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-04 18:53:17 -05:00
65 changed files with 1620 additions and 273 deletions

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+1 -1
View File
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ spec:
userData: |-
#cloud-config
hostname: unifi
fqdn: unifi.home.keithjackson.dev
fqdn: unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}
package_update: true
package_upgrade: false
packages: [qemu-guest-agent, podman, uidmap, slirp4netns, ca-certificates, curl, jq, cloud-guest-utils]
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ metadata:
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "${UNIFI_L4_VIP}"
# external-dns (source: service) publishes A unifi.home.keithjackson.dev -> the pinned VIP.
# This is the browser + device target; UI is https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443.
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: "unifi.home.keithjackson.dev"
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: "unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
externalTrafficPolicy: Local
+4 -4
View File
@@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ spec:
name: gitea-bootstrap
key: secret-key
- name: GITEA__server__DOMAIN
value: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
value: gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: GITEA__server__ROOT_URL
value: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/
value: https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}/
- name: GITEA__actions__ENABLED
value: 'true'
- name: GITEA__actions__DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ spec:
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- "# Idempotent break-glass admin bootstrap. Runs alongside the gitea entrypoint\n# (which, with INSTALL_LOCK=true, headless-installs + migrates the DB on first\n# boot). Waits for the DB, then creates the admin only if it does not exist.\nset -u\nexport HOME=/data/git\ni=0\nuntil su-exec git gitea admin user list >/dev/null 2>&1; do\n i=$((i + 1))\n [ \"$i\" -ge 150 ] && { echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] DB not ready after wait; skipping\" >&2; exit 0; }\n sleep 2\ndone\nif su-exec git gitea admin user list --admin 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR>1{print $2}' | grep -qx \"$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME\"; then\n echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] admin '$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME' already present\"\nelse\n n=0\n until su-exec git gitea admin user create \\\n --username \"$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME\" \\\n --password \"$GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD\" \\\n --email \"[email protected]\" \\\n --admin --must-change-password=false; do\n n=$((n + 1))\n [ \"$n\" -ge 10 ] && { echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] admin create failed after retries\" >&2; break; }\n sleep 3\n done\n echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] created break-glass admin '$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME'\"\nfi\n# --- Keycloak OIDC login source (idempotent add-or-update; R-IDP-02/06) ---\n# Registers the confidential `gitea` client as the OAuth2 login source \"keycloak\" against the\n# homelab realm's discovery doc. The `groups` claim maps platform-admins -> Gitea admin\n# (--admin-group). Missing secret => skip (break-glass admin still works), so an unfilled\n# secret never crashes the pod.\n#\n# HARDENED (was a silent first-boot RACE): this step used to fire before the app/network was\n# ready and swallow its failure (|| echo ... >&2, exit 0), so SSO silently never registered.\n# Now it (1) waits \u2014 bounded, ~90s \u2014 for the Keycloak discovery doc to serve HTTP 200,\n# (2) registers (update-in-place if present, else create), (3) VERIFIES the source actually\n# persisted and retries the whole cycle, and (4) on give-up logs LOUDLY to stderr AND a marker\n# file on the persistent /data volume WITHOUT crashlooping the pod (break-glass admin stays\n# usable). The verify-then-retry loop is the real guarantee against \"exit 0 but nothing stuck\".\nGITEA_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration\ngitea_oidc_fail() {\n echo \"[gitea-oidc] FAILED to register 'keycloak' login source: $1\" >&2\n { echo \"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) [gitea-oidc] FAILED: $1\"; } >> /data/gitea-oidc-bootstrap.log 2>/dev/null || true\n}\n# NOTE the `$$` escape below \u2014 it is load-bearing. apps-wave-0 declares postBuild.\n# substituteFrom cluster-vars, so Flux envsubst rewrites this whole manifest at RECONCILE\n# time, before any container runs. Written unescaped, `$${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}` is not\n# a cluster-var, so envsubst blanked it and the guard reconciled as `[ -z \"\" ]` \u2014 ALWAYS TRUE\n# \u2014 making every line below (discovery wait, add/update-oauth, verify-then-retry) DEAD CODE on\n# every boot since 8738871 (2026-08-27). SSO kept working only because the login source was\n# already in the DB; a PVC rebuild or fresh cluster would have come up with NO OIDC at all.\n# Flux STRICT substitution cannot catch this \u2014 it EXEMPTS default-operator forms by design.\n# `$${VAR}` is the escape: envsubst emits it back as a plain brace expansion for the shell.\n# Bare `$VAR` and `$(cmd)` are left alone and need NO escaping \u2014 which is why the\n# `$GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` uses below always worked and only the guards broke.\n# Contract: clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml. Enforced at render time by catalog/render.py.\nif [ -z \"$${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}\" ]; then\n echo \"[gitea-oidc] GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET unset; skipping OIDC source (break-glass admin only)\"\nelse\n # (1) Wait up to ~90s for the Keycloak discovery doc to be reachable (HTTP 200).\n d=0; disc_ok=0\n while [ \"$d\" -lt 45 ]; do\n if [ \"$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 5 \"$GITEA_DISCOVERY_URL\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"200\" ]; then\n disc_ok=1;\
- "# Idempotent break-glass admin bootstrap. Runs alongside the gitea entrypoint\n# (which, with INSTALL_LOCK=true, headless-installs + migrates the DB on first\n# boot). Waits for the DB, then creates the admin only if it does not exist.\nset -u\nexport HOME=/data/git\ni=0\nuntil su-exec git gitea admin user list >/dev/null 2>&1; do\n i=$((i + 1))\n [ \"$i\" -ge 150 ] && { echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] DB not ready after wait; skipping\" >&2; exit 0; }\n sleep 2\ndone\nif su-exec git gitea admin user list --admin 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR>1{print $2}' | grep -qx \"$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME\"; then\n echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] admin '$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME' already present\"\nelse\n n=0\n until su-exec git gitea admin user create \\\n --username \"$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME\" \\\n --password \"$GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD\" \\\n --email \"[email protected]\" \\\n --admin --must-change-password=false; do\n n=$((n + 1))\n [ \"$n\" -ge 10 ] && { echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] admin create failed after retries\" >&2; break; }\n sleep 3\n done\n echo \"[gitea-bootstrap] created break-glass admin '$GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME'\"\nfi\n# --- Keycloak OIDC login source (idempotent add-or-update; R-IDP-02/06) ---\n# Registers the confidential `gitea` client as the OAuth2 login source \"keycloak\" against the\n# homelab realm's discovery doc. The `groups` claim maps platform-admins -> Gitea admin\n# (--admin-group). Missing secret => skip (break-glass admin still works), so an unfilled\n# secret never crashes the pod.\n#\n# HARDENED (was a silent first-boot RACE): this step used to fire before the app/network was\n# ready and swallow its failure (|| echo ... >&2, exit 0), so SSO silently never registered.\n# Now it (1) waits \u2014 bounded, ~90s \u2014 for the Keycloak discovery doc to serve HTTP 200,\n# (2) registers (update-in-place if present, else create), (3) VERIFIES the source actually\n# persisted and retries the whole cycle, and (4) on give-up logs LOUDLY to stderr AND a marker\n# file on the persistent /data volume WITHOUT crashlooping the pod (break-glass admin stays\n# usable). The verify-then-retry loop is the real guarantee against \"exit 0 but nothing stuck\".\nGITEA_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration\ngitea_oidc_fail() {\n echo \"[gitea-oidc] FAILED to register 'keycloak' login source: $1\" >&2\n { echo \"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) [gitea-oidc] FAILED: $1\"; } >> /data/gitea-oidc-bootstrap.log 2>/dev/null || true\n}\n# NOTE the `$$` escape below \u2014 it is load-bearing. apps-wave-0 declares postBuild.\n# substituteFrom cluster-vars, so Flux envsubst rewrites this whole manifest at RECONCILE\n# time, before any container runs. Written unescaped, `$${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}` is not\n# a cluster-var, so envsubst blanked it and the guard reconciled as `[ -z \"\" ]` \u2014 ALWAYS TRUE\n# \u2014 making every line below (discovery wait, add/update-oauth, verify-then-retry) DEAD CODE on\n# every boot since 8738871 (2026-08-27). SSO kept working only because the login source was\n# already in the DB; a PVC rebuild or fresh cluster would have come up with NO OIDC at all.\n# Flux STRICT substitution cannot catch this \u2014 it EXEMPTS default-operator forms by design.\n# `$${VAR}` is the escape: envsubst emits it back as a plain brace expansion for the shell.\n# Bare `$VAR` and `$(cmd)` are left alone and need NO escaping \u2014 which is why the\n# `$GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` uses below always worked and only the guards broke.\n# Contract: clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml. Enforced at render time by catalog/render.py.\nif [ -z \"$${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}\" ]; then\n echo \"[gitea-oidc] GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET unset; skipping OIDC source (break-glass admin only)\"\nelse\n # (1) Wait up to ~90s for the Keycloak discovery doc to be reachable (HTTP 200).\n d=0; disc_ok=0\n while [ \"$d\" -lt 45 ]; do\n if [ \"$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 5 \"$GITEA_DISCOVERY_URL\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"200\" ]; then\n disc_ok=1;\
\ break\n fi\n d=$((d + 1)); sleep 2\n done\n [ \"$disc_ok\" = 1 ] || gitea_oidc_fail \"Keycloak discovery endpoint not reachable (HTTP 200) within timeout\"\n # (2)+(3) Register (update-in-place or create) then VERIFY it persisted; retry the whole cycle.\n r=0; reg_ok=0\n while [ \"$r\" -lt 10 ]; do\n oidc_id=$(su-exec git gitea admin auth list 2>/dev/null | awk '$2==\"keycloak\"{print $1; exit}')\n if [ -n \"$oidc_id\" ]; then\n su-exec git gitea admin auth update-oauth --id \"$oidc_id\" \\\n --name keycloak --provider openidConnect --key gitea \\\n --secret \"$GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET\" \\\n --auto-discover-url \"$GITEA_DISCOVERY_URL\" \\\n --scopes \"openid email profile\" --group-claim-name groups --admin-group platform-admins >/dev/null 2>&1 || true\n else\n su-exec git gitea admin auth add-oauth \\\n --name keycloak --provider openidConnect --key gitea \\\n --secret \"$GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET\" \\\n --auto-discover-url \"$GITEA_DISCOVERY_URL\" \\\n --scopes \"openid email profile\" --group-claim-name groups --admin-group platform-admins >/dev/null 2>&1 || true\n fi\n # VERIFY: the \"keycloak\" source must actually be listed now (guards the exit-0-but-nothing-persisted race).\n if su-exec git gitea admin auth list 2>/dev/null | awk '$2==\"keycloak\"{f=1} END{exit !f}'; then\n reg_ok=1; break\n fi\n r=$((r + 1)); sleep 3\n done\n if [ \"$reg_ok\" = 1 ]; then\n echo \"[gitea-oidc] login source 'keycloak' registered and verified\"\n else\n gitea_oidc_fail \"add/update-oauth ran but the 'keycloak' source did not persist after retries\"\n fi\nfi\n# A postStart hook MUST exit 0 \u2014 a non-zero exit makes the kubelet KILL the container\n# (FailedPostStartHook -> CrashLoopBackOff). This hook already ends 0 on both paths, but\n# it is made EXPLICIT so the guarantee does not depend on whatever statement happens to\n# be last. nextcloud's equivalent hook did depend on that and crashlooped on 2026-09-01,\n# the moment its OIDC guard was fixed and the block actually ran for the first time.\nexit 0\n"
volumes:
- name: data
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
- gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+5 -5
View File
@@ -91,16 +91,16 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:9117
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
- --oidc-groups-claim=groups
- --allowed-group=media-users
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://jackett.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --redirect-url=https://jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- jackett.home.keithjackson.dev
- jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+5 -5
View File
@@ -91,16 +91,16 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:80
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
- --oidc-groups-claim=groups
- --allowed-group=platform-admins
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://pihole.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --redirect-url=https://pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- pihole.home.keithjackson.dev
- pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- plex.home.keithjackson.dev
- plex.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+5 -5
View File
@@ -91,16 +91,16 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8080
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
- --oidc-groups-claim=groups
- --allowed-group=media-users
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --redirect-url=https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev
- qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ spec:
exec /sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh
env:
- name: GITEA_INSTANCE_URL
value: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
value: https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
+7 -7
View File
@@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ spec:
name: nextcloud-bootstrap
key: admin-password
- name: NEXTCLOUD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS
value: nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
value: nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: OVERWRITEHOST
value: nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
value: nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: OVERWRITEPROTOCOL
value: https
- name: OVERWRITECLIURL
value: https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
value: https://nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
@@ -125,9 +125,9 @@ spec:
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- "# Idempotent Keycloak OIDC wiring (R-IDP-02/06). Runs alongside the nextcloud entrypoint\n# (which installs/upgrades on first boot). Installs+enables the user_oidc app and creates OR\n# updates the \"keycloak\" login provider (occ user_oidc:provider is create-or-update by\n# identifier). Auto-discovery pulls the realm's endpoints; the `groups` claim drives Nextcloud\n# group provisioning. occ runs as www-data (owns config.php); the client secret is passed via\n# --clientsecret-env so it never lands on a command line. Safe to re-run every start; a missing\n# secret or not-yet-installed instance is skipped so the pod never crashloops (the local\n# break-glass admin still works).\nset -u\n# OCC runs occ as www-data (owns config.php). NOTE: this wrapper word-splits its args via $*,\n# so it is used ONLY for single-token subcommands (status/app:list/app:install/...). The\n# provider call below carries a MULTI-WORD value (--scope 'openid email profile') and is run as\n# ONE su -c with the scope single-quoted, so the inner shell keeps it a single argument.\nOCC() { su -s /bin/sh www-data -c \"php /var/www/html/occ $*\"; }\nNEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration\nnextcloud_oidc_fail() {\n echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] FAILED to configure 'keycloak' provider: $1\" >&2\n { echo \"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) [nextcloud-oidc] FAILED: $1\"; } >> /var/www/html/nextcloud-oidc-bootstrap.log 2>/dev/null || true\n}\n# (a) Wait for the instance to be installed AND out of maintenance mode. The entrypoint holds\n# maintenance mode during first-boot install/upgrade; occ writes made in that window do not\n# stick \u2014 a second race on top of the quoting bug fixed at (c).\ni=0\nuntil OCC status 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"installed: true\" && ! OCC status 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"maintenance: true\"; do\n i=$((i + 1))\n [ \"$i\" -ge 300 ] && { echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] occ not ready (installed/maintenance) after wait; skipping\" >&2; exit 0; }\n sleep 2\ndone\n# Let Nextcloud's OWN server-side HTTP client reach the private-network IdP. The Keycloak\n# FQDN resolves (split-horizon) to the PRIVATE Cilium gateway VIP (RFC1918), and Nextcloud's\n# SSRF guard otherwise REFUSES that request \u2014 OCP\\Http\\Client\\LocalServerException \"violates\n# local access rules\" \u2014 during user_oidc's discovery/JWKS/token fetch AT LOGIN, surfacing to\n# the user as \"Could not reach the provider\". (The (b) curl check below uses system libcurl,\n# NOT this guard, so it passes while the browser login still failed.) Idempotent; re-applied\n# every start so it survives pod rolls / PVC rebuilds. Confirmed root cause 2026-08-27.\nOCC config:system:set allow_local_remote_servers --value=true --type=boolean >/dev/null 2>&1 \\\n || echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] WARN: failed to set allow_local_remote_servers\" >&2\n# NOTE the `$$` escape below \u2014 it is load-bearing. apps-wave-1 declares postBuild.\n# substituteFrom cluster-vars, so Flux envsubst rewrites this whole manifest at RECONCILE\n# time, before any container runs. Written unescaped, `$${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}` is\n# not a cluster-var, so envsubst blanked it and the guard reconciled as `[ -z \"\" ]` \u2014 ALWAYS\n# TRUE \u2014 so this hook `exit 0`d here on EVERY boot since 8738871 (2026-08-27), never\n# installing/enabling user_oidc nor registering the provider. SSO kept working only because\n# the provider was already in the DB; a PVC rebuild or fresh cluster would have come up with\n# NO OIDC at all. Flux STRICT substitution cannot catch this \u2014 it EXEMPTS default-operator\n# forms by design. `$${VAR}` is the escape: envsubst emits it back as a plain brace expansion\n# for the shell. Bare `$VAR` and `$(cmd)` are left alone and need NO escaping \u2014 which is why\n# `--clientsecret-env` and the bare uses below always worked and only the guard broke.\n# Contract: clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml. Enforced at render time by catalog/render.py.\nif [ -z \"$${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}\" ]; then\n echo \"\
[nextcloud-oidc] client secret unset; skipping OIDC (break-glass admin only)\"\n exit 0\nfi\nif ! OCC app:list 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"user_oidc\"; then\n OCC app:install user_oidc || echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] app:install user_oidc failed\" >&2\nfi\nOCC app:enable user_oidc >/dev/null 2>&1 || true\n# (b) Wait up to ~90s for the Keycloak discovery doc to be reachable (HTTP 200) before registering.\nd=0; disc_ok=0\nwhile [ \"$d\" -lt 45 ]; do\n if [ \"$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 5 \"$NEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"200\" ]; then\n disc_ok=1; break\n fi\n d=$((d + 1)); sleep 2\ndone\n[ \"$disc_ok\" = 1 ] || nextcloud_oidc_fail \"Keycloak discovery endpoint not reachable (HTTP 200) within timeout\"\n# (c) Configure (create-or-update by identifier) then VERIFY it persisted; retry the whole cycle.\n# HARDENED: run as ONE su -c so www-data's shell parses --scope='openid email profile' as a\n# single argument. The previous `OCC user_oidc:provider ... --scope=\"openid email profile\"`\n# form fed the value back through the wrapper's $*, which SPLIT it into extra positionals ->\n# occ \"Too many arguments\" -> silent failure on EVERY boot. Secret via --clientsecret-env\n# (never on argv). The verify-then-retry loop guarantees the provider actually persisted.\nr=0; reg_ok=0\nwhile [ \"$r\" -lt 10 ]; do\n su -s /bin/sh www-data -c \"php /var/www/html/occ user_oidc:provider keycloak \\\n --clientid=nextcloud \\\n --clientsecret-env=NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET \\\n --discoveryuri=$NEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL \\\n --scope='openid email profile' \\\n --unique-uid=0 \\\n --mapping-uid=preferred_username \\\n --mapping-email=email \\\n --mapping-display-name=name \\\n --group-provisioning=1 \\\n --mapping-groups=groups\" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true\n if OCC user_oidc:provider 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"keycloak\"; then\n reg_ok=1; break\n fi\n r=$((r + 1)); sleep 3\ndone\nif [ \"$reg_ok\" = 1 ]; then\n echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] provider 'keycloak' configured and verified\"\nelse\n nextcloud_oidc_fail \"user_oidc:provider ran but the provider did not persist after retries\"\nfi\n# (d) Promote Keycloak 'platform-admins' members to Nextcloud admins (#5). user_oidc 8.11 has\n# NO native group->admin mapping (occ user_oidc:provider offers group PROVISIONING and a\n# login WHITELIST only), so mirror the provisioned 'platform-admins' membership into the\n# built-in 'admin' group (the sole source of admin rights in Nextcloud). Idempotent every\n# start: occ group:adduser is a no-op for an existing member. A user is promotable only\n# AFTER their first OIDC login provisions them into the group, so a brand-new admin gains\n# rights on their next login + the following pod start (or run `occ group:adduser admin\n# <uid>` once). The LOCAL break-glass admin is unaffected (docs/15). The group name is\n# passed to php as argv (never interpolated) so group:list JSON parses robustly.\nADMIN_SRC_GROUP=platform-admins\n# HARDENED (verify-and-retry, like step (c)): the previous single pass ran `occ group:adduser`\n# exactly once with its output swallowed (>/dev/null 2>&1) and NO retry, so an early-boot\n# transient failure (DB / maintenance race in the first seconds after container start) silently\n# dropped the promotion until the NEXT pod restart. This loop re-reads group:list and re-adds\n# any platform-admins member still missing from 'admin' until all are verified (bounded ~30s);\n# it is a no-op for members already in 'admin'. Group names are passed to php as argv (never\n# interpolated) so the JSON parses robustly.\nparse_group() { su -s /bin/sh www-data -c \"php /var/www/html/occ group:list --output=json\" 2>/dev/null | php -r '$d=json_decode(stream_get_contents(STDIN),true);$g=$argv[1];if(is_array($d)&&!empty($d[$g])&&is_array($d[$g])){foreach($d[$g] as $u){echo $u,\"\\n\";}}' -- \"$1\" 2>/dev/null; }\np=0\nwhile [ \"$p\" -lt 15 ]; do\n current_admins=$(parse_group admin)\n missing=0\n for uid in $(parse_group \"\
$ADMIN_SRC_GROUP\"); do\n if printf '%s\\n' \"$current_admins\" | grep -qxF -- \"$uid\"; then\n continue\n fi\n missing=1\n if OCC group:adduser admin \"$uid\" >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] ensured '$uid' is a Nextcloud admin (member of $ADMIN_SRC_GROUP)\"\n fi\n done\n [ \"$missing\" = 0 ] && break\n p=$((p + 1)); sleep 2\ndone\nif [ \"$p\" -ge 15 ]; then\n nextcloud_oidc_fail \"could not promote all $ADMIN_SRC_GROUP members into 'admin' after retries\"\nfi\n# A postStart hook MUST exit 0. A non-zero exit makes the kubelet KILL the container\n# (FailedPostStartHook -> CrashLoopBackOff), which is exactly what happened on 2026-09-01:\n# the final statement used to be `[ \"$p\" -ge 15 ] && nextcloud_oidc_fail ...`, so on the\n# SUCCESS path the test returned 1 and became the script's exit status. That was latent for\n# as long as the OIDC guard above was dead code and exited 0 first; fixing the guard\n# exposed it immediately. Every failure path here logs loudly and writes a marker file and\n# deliberately does NOT crash the pod \u2014 the break-glass local admin must stay usable.\nexit 0\n"
- "# Idempotent Keycloak OIDC wiring (R-IDP-02/06). Runs alongside the nextcloud entrypoint\n# (which installs/upgrades on first boot). Installs+enables the user_oidc app and creates OR\n# updates the \"keycloak\" login provider (occ user_oidc:provider is create-or-update by\n# identifier). Auto-discovery pulls the realm's endpoints; the `groups` claim drives Nextcloud\n# group provisioning. occ runs as www-data (owns config.php); the client secret is passed via\n# --clientsecret-env so it never lands on a command line. Safe to re-run every start; a missing\n# secret or not-yet-installed instance is skipped so the pod never crashloops (the local\n# break-glass admin still works).\nset -u\n# OCC runs occ as www-data (owns config.php). NOTE: this wrapper word-splits its args via $*,\n# so it is used ONLY for single-token subcommands (status/app:list/app:install/...). The\n# provider call below carries a MULTI-WORD value (--scope 'openid email profile') and is run as\n# ONE su -c with the scope single-quoted, so the inner shell keeps it a single argument.\nOCC() { su -s /bin/sh www-data -c \"php /var/www/html/occ $*\"; }\nNEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration\nnextcloud_oidc_fail() {\n echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] FAILED to configure 'keycloak' provider: $1\" >&2\n { echo \"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) [nextcloud-oidc] FAILED: $1\"; } >> /var/www/html/nextcloud-oidc-bootstrap.log 2>/dev/null || true\n}\n# (a) Wait for the instance to be installed AND out of maintenance mode. The entrypoint holds\n# maintenance mode during first-boot install/upgrade; occ writes made in that window do not\n# stick \u2014 a second race on top of the quoting bug fixed at (c).\ni=0\nuntil OCC status 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"installed: true\" && ! OCC status 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"maintenance: true\"; do\n i=$((i + 1))\n [ \"$i\" -ge 300 ] && { echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] occ not ready (installed/maintenance) after wait; skipping\" >&2; exit 0; }\n sleep 2\ndone\n# Let Nextcloud's OWN server-side HTTP client reach the private-network IdP. The Keycloak\n# FQDN resolves (split-horizon) to the PRIVATE Cilium gateway VIP (RFC1918), and Nextcloud's\n# SSRF guard otherwise REFUSES that request \u2014 OCP\\Http\\Client\\LocalServerException \"violates\n# local access rules\" \u2014 during user_oidc's discovery/JWKS/token fetch AT LOGIN, surfacing to\n# the user as \"Could not reach the provider\". (The (b) curl check below uses system libcurl,\n# NOT this guard, so it passes while the browser login still failed.) Idempotent; re-applied\n# every start so it survives pod rolls / PVC rebuilds. Confirmed root cause 2026-08-27.\nOCC config:system:set allow_local_remote_servers --value=true --type=boolean >/dev/null 2>&1 \\\n || echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] WARN: failed to set allow_local_remote_servers\" >&2\n# NOTE the `$$` escape below \u2014 it is load-bearing. apps-wave-1 declares postBuild.\n# substituteFrom cluster-vars, so Flux envsubst rewrites this whole manifest at RECONCILE\n# time, before any container runs. Written unescaped, `$${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}` is\n# not a cluster-var, so envsubst blanked it and the guard reconciled as `[ -z \"\" ]` \u2014 ALWAYS\n# TRUE \u2014 so this hook `exit 0`d here on EVERY boot since 8738871 (2026-08-27), never\n# installing/enabling user_oidc nor registering the provider. SSO kept working only because\n# the provider was already in the DB; a PVC rebuild or fresh cluster would have come up with\n# NO OIDC at all. Flux STRICT substitution cannot catch this \u2014 it EXEMPTS default-operator\n# forms by design. `$${VAR}` is the escape: envsubst emits it back as a plain brace expansion\n# for the shell. Bare `$VAR` and `$(cmd)` are left alone and need NO escaping \u2014 which is why\n# `--clientsecret-env` and the bare uses below always worked and only the guard broke.\n# Contract: clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml. Enforced at render time by catalog/render.py.\nif [ -z \"$${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}\" ]; then\n echo \"[nextcloud-oidc]\
\ client secret unset; skipping OIDC (break-glass admin only)\"\n exit 0\nfi\nif ! OCC app:list 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"user_oidc\"; then\n OCC app:install user_oidc || echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] app:install user_oidc failed\" >&2\nfi\nOCC app:enable user_oidc >/dev/null 2>&1 || true\n# (b) Wait up to ~90s for the Keycloak discovery doc to be reachable (HTTP 200) before registering.\nd=0; disc_ok=0\nwhile [ \"$d\" -lt 45 ]; do\n if [ \"$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 5 \"$NEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"200\" ]; then\n disc_ok=1; break\n fi\n d=$((d + 1)); sleep 2\ndone\n[ \"$disc_ok\" = 1 ] || nextcloud_oidc_fail \"Keycloak discovery endpoint not reachable (HTTP 200) within timeout\"\n# (c) Configure (create-or-update by identifier) then VERIFY it persisted; retry the whole cycle.\n# HARDENED: run as ONE su -c so www-data's shell parses --scope='openid email profile' as a\n# single argument. The previous `OCC user_oidc:provider ... --scope=\"openid email profile\"`\n# form fed the value back through the wrapper's $*, which SPLIT it into extra positionals ->\n# occ \"Too many arguments\" -> silent failure on EVERY boot. Secret via --clientsecret-env\n# (never on argv). The verify-then-retry loop guarantees the provider actually persisted.\nr=0; reg_ok=0\nwhile [ \"$r\" -lt 10 ]; do\n su -s /bin/sh www-data -c \"php /var/www/html/occ user_oidc:provider keycloak \\\n --clientid=nextcloud \\\n --clientsecret-env=NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET \\\n --discoveryuri=$NEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL \\\n --scope='openid email profile' \\\n --unique-uid=0 \\\n --mapping-uid=preferred_username \\\n --mapping-email=email \\\n --mapping-display-name=name \\\n --group-provisioning=1 \\\n --mapping-groups=groups\" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true\n if OCC user_oidc:provider 2>/dev/null | grep -q \"keycloak\"; then\n reg_ok=1; break\n fi\n r=$((r + 1)); sleep 3\ndone\nif [ \"$reg_ok\" = 1 ]; then\n echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] provider 'keycloak' configured and verified\"\nelse\n nextcloud_oidc_fail \"user_oidc:provider ran but the provider did not persist after retries\"\nfi\n# (d) Promote Keycloak 'platform-admins' members to Nextcloud admins (#5). user_oidc 8.11 has\n# NO native group->admin mapping (occ user_oidc:provider offers group PROVISIONING and a\n# login WHITELIST only), so mirror the provisioned 'platform-admins' membership into the\n# built-in 'admin' group (the sole source of admin rights in Nextcloud). Idempotent every\n# start: occ group:adduser is a no-op for an existing member. A user is promotable only\n# AFTER their first OIDC login provisions them into the group, so a brand-new admin gains\n# rights on their next login + the following pod start (or run `occ group:adduser admin\n# <uid>` once). The LOCAL break-glass admin is unaffected (docs/15). The group name is\n# passed to php as argv (never interpolated) so group:list JSON parses robustly.\nADMIN_SRC_GROUP=platform-admins\n# HARDENED (verify-and-retry, like step (c)): the previous single pass ran `occ group:adduser`\n# exactly once with its output swallowed (>/dev/null 2>&1) and NO retry, so an early-boot\n# transient failure (DB / maintenance race in the first seconds after container start) silently\n# dropped the promotion until the NEXT pod restart. This loop re-reads group:list and re-adds\n# any platform-admins member still missing from 'admin' until all are verified (bounded ~30s);\n# it is a no-op for members already in 'admin'. Group names are passed to php as argv (never\n# interpolated) so the JSON parses robustly.\nparse_group() { su -s /bin/sh www-data -c \"php /var/www/html/occ group:list --output=json\" 2>/dev/null | php -r '$d=json_decode(stream_get_contents(STDIN),true);$g=$argv[1];if(is_array($d)&&!empty($d[$g])&&is_array($d[$g])){foreach($d[$g] as $u){echo $u,\"\\n\";}}' -- \"$1\" 2>/dev/null; }\np=0\nwhile [ \"$p\" -lt 15 ]; do\n current_admins=$(parse_group admin)\n missing=0\n for uid in $(parse_group \"$ADMIN_SRC_GROUP\"\
); do\n if printf '%s\\n' \"$current_admins\" | grep -qxF -- \"$uid\"; then\n continue\n fi\n missing=1\n if OCC group:adduser admin \"$uid\" >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n echo \"[nextcloud-oidc] ensured '$uid' is a Nextcloud admin (member of $ADMIN_SRC_GROUP)\"\n fi\n done\n [ \"$missing\" = 0 ] && break\n p=$((p + 1)); sleep 2\ndone\nif [ \"$p\" -ge 15 ]; then\n nextcloud_oidc_fail \"could not promote all $ADMIN_SRC_GROUP members into 'admin' after retries\"\nfi\n# A postStart hook MUST exit 0. A non-zero exit makes the kubelet KILL the container\n# (FailedPostStartHook -> CrashLoopBackOff), which is exactly what happened on 2026-09-01:\n# the final statement used to be `[ \"$p\" -ge 15 ] && nextcloud_oidc_fail ...`, so on the\n# SUCCESS path the test returned 1 and became the script's exit status. That was latent for\n# as long as the OIDC guard above was dead code and exited 0 first; fixing the guard\n# exposed it immediately. Every failure path here logs loudly and writes a marker file and\n# deliberately does NOT crash the pod \u2014 the break-glass local admin must stay usable.\nexit 0\n"
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
- nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+5 -5
View File
@@ -91,16 +91,16 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:7878
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
- --oidc-groups-claim=groups
- --allowed-group=media-users
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://radarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --redirect-url=https://radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- radarr.home.keithjackson.dev
- radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ spec:
- name: SEMAPHORE_ADMIN_NAME
value: Semaphore Admin
- name: SEMAPHORE_ADMIN_EMAIL
value: admin@home.keithjackson.dev
value: admin@${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: SEMAPHORE_ACCESS_KEY_ENCRYPTION
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev
- semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+5 -5
View File
@@ -91,16 +91,16 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8989
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
- --oidc-groups-claim=groups
- --allowed-group=media-users
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --redirect-url=https://sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev
- sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- seerr.home.keithjackson.dev
- seerr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+11 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# bootstrap.sh — the SINGLE Flux + SOPS bootstrap entrypoint for the dev cluster.
# bootstrap.sh — the SINGLE Flux + SOPS bootstrap entrypoint. ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC: which overlay
# it applies is FLUX_ENV_PATH (default clusters/dev). roles/flux_bootstrap exports that from
# `flux_bootstrap_env_path`, overridden to clusters/prod in group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml — so the
# same script bootstraps dev and prod with no fork (R-ENV-02).
#
# Phase 1, T-1.4 · ADR-0004 (Flux) · ADR-0007 (SOPS+age) · R-GITOPS-01 · R-SEC-01.
# =============================================================================
@@ -33,7 +36,7 @@
# 2. sops-age Secret — the operator installs the age PRIVATE key out-of-band BEFORE reconcile so
# decryption works on first pass (../sops/age-key-secret.md). This script
# only VERIFIES it exists; it never handles key material.
# 3. `kubectl apply -k clusters/dev` — materialises the authored reconciliation graph:
# 3. `kubectl apply -k ${FLUX_ENV_PATH}` — materialises the authored reconciliation graph:
# GitRepository `flux-system` (source) -> Kustomization `platform` ->
# `platform-config` -> the app-wave Kustomizations `apps-wave-0/1/2`
# (chained dependsOn) + `apps-vms`, with cluster-vars overlay
@@ -52,7 +55,10 @@
set -euo pipefail
# --- config (env-overridable) ------------------------------------------------
FLUX_ENV_PATH="${FLUX_ENV_PATH:-clusters/dev}" # dev is the ONLY Phase-1 build target
# Which environment overlay to apply. Dev is the DEFAULT (it was the only Phase-1 build target);
# prod passes clusters/prod via roles/flux_bootstrap. Changing the default would silently retarget
# every existing caller — override it, never edit it.
FLUX_ENV_PATH="${FLUX_ENV_PATH:-clusters/dev}"
FLUX_NAMESPACE="${FLUX_NAMESPACE:-flux-system}"
SOPS_SECRET_NAME="${SOPS_SECRET_NAME:-sops-age}"
# The two Phase-4 image-automation controllers are installed alongside the default set so their CRDs
@@ -62,7 +68,7 @@ FLUX_COMPONENTS_EXTRA="${FLUX_COMPONENTS_EXTRA:-image-reflector-controller,image
script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
repo_root="$(git -C "${script_dir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || (cd "${script_dir}/../.." && pwd))"
echo "==> Flux + SOPS bootstrap (dev) — path=${FLUX_ENV_PATH}"
echo "==> Flux + SOPS bootstrap — path=${FLUX_ENV_PATH}"
# --- 0. tooling present (from infra/devcontainer; versions pinned there) ------
for bin in flux kubectl; do
@@ -134,7 +140,7 @@ if ! kubectl -n "${FLUX_NAMESPACE}" get secret "${SOPS_SECRET_NAME}" >/dev/null
exit 1
fi
# --- 3. apply the authored dev entrypoint ------------------------------------
# --- 3. apply the authored environment entrypoint ----------------------------
echo "==> [3/3] kubectl apply -k ${FLUX_ENV_PATH}"
kubectl apply -k "${repo_root}/${FLUX_ENV_PATH}"
+51 -10
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,30 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh — run a SINGLE Gitea container on the HOST (outside the
# cluster) as the Phase-1 GitOps bootstrap source. While the cluster is built, Flux (in-cluster)
# reconciles this repo from the host Gitea over the k3s-dev NAT gateway. This is the "local
# bootstrap source" that migrates to in-cluster Gitea in Phase 6 (docs/05 "Source-of-truth",
# CONTRIBUTING.md).
# cluster) as the GitOps bootstrap source. While a cluster is built, Flux (in-cluster) reconciles
# this repo from the host Gitea. This is the "local bootstrap source" that migrates to in-cluster
# Gitea at cutover (docs/05 "Source-of-truth", CONTRIBUTING.md). Dev has already cut over; PROD is
# using it now.
#
# Run by the OPERATOR at bring-up — NOT during author-only, NOT by any agent.
# HOW THE CLUSTER REACHES THE HOST — read this before setting HOST_NAT_IP.
# It is an ADDRESS OF THIS HOST as seen from the cluster nodes, and it differs per environment:
#
# PROD (bare metal, current use): HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132
# The prod nodes (192.168.2.10/.11/.12) and this workstation are on the SAME LAN. There is
# NO NAT hop of any kind, and NO firewall change was needed — verified 2026-09-04 from all
# three nodes. The firewalld note further down is a DEV-ERA libvirt concern; it does not
# apply to prod, so do not "fix" prod by opening zones.
#
# DEV (libvirt VMs, HISTORICAL): HOST_NAT_IP=10.73.0.1 was the k3s-dev libvirt NAT gateway.
# *** THAT NETWORK IS RETIRED. 10.73.0.1 is stale and must not be reused. *** Dev's own
# bootstrap Gitea was later reached on 192.168.2.103:3000 and is retained STOPPED as
# recovery (see the comment on the GitRepository patch in clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml).
#
# WHO RUNS THIS: the OPERATOR, or an agent the operator has EXPLICITLY DIRECTED to stand up a
# bootstrap source for a specific bring-up (as happened 2026-09-04 for prod). It is NOT part of
# author-only work and must never be fired off casually or "to see if it works": it starts a
# long-lived container, generates and writes admin credentials to $HOME, creates an org and repo,
# and PUSHES THE CURRENT HEAD to that repo's `main` — which is the revision a cluster pointed at
# it will then reconcile. Know which HEAD you are publishing before you run it.
set -euo pipefail
ENGINE="${ENGINE:-podman}"
GITEA_IMAGE="${GITEA_IMAGE:-docker.io/gitea/gitea:1.22}" # pinned; bump if needed
@@ -16,11 +35,24 @@ SSH_PORT="${GITEA_SSH_PORT:-2222}"
# subuid that can't write a host-owned dir, so Gitea fails to create /data/gitea/conf/app.ini.
DATA_VOLUME="${GITEA_DATA_VOLUME:-gitea-bootstrap-data}"
DATA_DIR="podman volume ${DATA_VOLUME}" # display label only (data lives in the named volume)
# The cluster VMs reach the host on the k3s-dev NAT gateway (10.73.0.1). ROOT_URL must match so
# The address the CLUSTER uses to reach this host (see the header). ROOT_URL must match it so
# clone/redirect URLs are correct from inside the cluster.
# NOTE: firewalld's `libvirt` zone (owns virbrN) blocks VM->host:3000 by default. Open it once:
#
# The DEFAULT IS DELIBERATELY UNSET — there is no correct default any more. The old default
# (10.73.0.1) was the retired k3s-dev libvirt NAT gateway; leaving it in place would silently
# publish a ROOT_URL no cluster can resolve, and Flux would report what looks like a network fault.
# Pass it explicitly, e.g. for prod: HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132 bash bootstrap-gitea.sh
#
# NOTE (DEV/libvirt ONLY, historical): firewalld's `libvirt` zone (owns virbrN) blocked
# VM->host:3000 by default and had to be opened once with
# sudo firewall-cmd --zone=libvirt --add-port=3000/tcp --permanent && sudo firewall-cmd --reload
HOST_NAT_IP="${HOST_NAT_IP:-10.73.0.1}"
# PROD needs NO firewall change: same-LAN, no libvirt zone involved (verified 2026-09-04).
if [ -z "${HOST_NAT_IP:-}" ]; then
echo "ERROR: HOST_NAT_IP is not set — it is this host's address AS SEEN FROM THE CLUSTER." >&2
echo " prod: HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132 (same LAN as the nodes, no NAT, no firewall change)" >&2
echo " There is no safe default: the old one (10.73.0.1) is the RETIRED libvirt NAT." >&2
exit 1
fi
ORG="${GITEA_ORG:-Home-Network}"
REPO="${GITEA_REPO:-home-network-k3s-impl}"
@@ -75,8 +107,17 @@ cat <<EOF
Gitea bootstrap source ready (${DATA_DIR}).
UI (host): ${BASE}/${ORG}/${REPO}
Flux GitRepository (cluster): http://${HOST_NAT_IP}:${HTTP_PORT}/${ORG}/${REPO}.git (clusters/dev)
Flux GitRepository (cluster): http://${HOST_NAT_IP}:${HTTP_PORT}/${ORG}/${REPO}.git
(patch this url into the overlay being bootstrapped:
clusters/prod today; clusters/dev has already cut over)
Admin creds (host, 0600): ${ADMIN_CRED_FILE}
Prerequisite: firewalld must allow VM->host:${HTTP_PORT} —
Reachability: prod nodes reach ${HOST_NAT_IP}:${HTTP_PORT} directly on the LAN — no NAT, no
firewall change (verified 2026-09-04). For libvirt-based clusters ONLY, firewalld's libvirt zone
must allow VM->host:${HTTP_PORT} —
ansible-playbook infra/ansible/playbooks/host-prereqs.yml --ask-become-pass
REMINDER: the push above published the CURRENT HEAD as this repo's \`main\`. Whatever cluster points
at this source will reconcile THAT revision.
TEMPORARY BY DESIGN: this container is outside every cluster and is a single point of failure for
any cluster reconciling from it. Cut over to in-cluster Gitea (docs/05); for prod the cutover
procedure is written on the GitRepository patch in clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml.
EOF
+5 -5
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ env:
name: gitea-bootstrap
key: secret-key
- name: GITEA__server__DOMAIN # correct public clone/redirect URLs for the TLS-terminated host
value: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
value: gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: GITEA__server__ROOT_URL
value: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/
value: https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}/
- name: GITEA__actions__ENABLED # Phase 6 CI/CD: declared (not implicit upstream default) so the
value: "true" # in-cluster act_runner (ns gitea-actions) registers against it
- name: GITEA__actions__DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL # resolve `uses: <org>/<action>@ref` from github.com (cluster
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ lifecycle:
# persisted and retries the whole cycle, and (4) on give-up logs LOUDLY to stderr AND a marker
# file on the persistent /data volume WITHOUT crashlooping the pod (break-glass admin stays
# usable). The verify-then-retry loop is the real guarantee against "exit 0 but nothing stuck".
GITEA_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration
GITEA_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration
gitea_oidc_fail() {
echo "[gitea-oidc] FAILED to register 'keycloak' login source: $1" >&2
{ echo "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) [gitea-oidc] FAILED: $1"; } >> /data/gitea-oidc-bootstrap.log 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ lifecycle:
# be last. nextcloud's equivalent hook did depend on that and crashlooped on 2026-09-01,
# the moment its OIDC guard was fixed and the block actually ran for the first time.
exit 0
exposure: public # edge-forwarded git host at gitea.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/09; R-DNS/R-NET)
exposure: public # edge-forwarded git host at gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/09; R-DNS/R-NET)
egress: internet # normal WAN egress (docs/03; R-NET-05)
storage:
- name: data
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ storage:
# the default /data/<name> would strand real state on the ephemeral rootfs (R-STATE-01)
dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; git clients reach it north-south via the Gateway (R-NET-01/02)
ingressRoutes:
- host: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 3000 # Gitea HTTP web/API; TLS terminates at the shared Gateway (docs/08, docs/09)
auth:
mode: oidc # native Keycloak OIDC client (docs/13 SSO row, docs/15 "Native OIDC" set; R-IDP-02)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ name: jackett
kind: container
source:
image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:latest
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at jackett.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/13 row 4; R-DNS/R-NET)
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 4; R-DNS/R-NET)
egress: vpn # indexer scraping via node PIA tunnel + kill-switch (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
storage:
- name: config
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ storage:
class: longhorn # indexer definitions/API keys on 3-replica Longhorn (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
ingressRoutes:
- host: jackett.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 9117 # Jackett WebUI; protected at the Gateway by forward-auth (docs/09, docs/15)
auth:
mode: forward-auth # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ dependencies:
port: 5432
protocol: tcp
ingressRoutes:
- host: keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 8080 # HTTP listener; TLS terminates at the Gateway (docs/08, docs/09)
auth:
mode: native # it IS the IdP; own admin login is local + MFA (docs/15; ADR-0014). Documented exception.
+5 -5
View File
@@ -50,13 +50,13 @@ env:
# the vhost answer for the public FQDN; OVERWRITE* make Nextcloud emit https:// self-URLs even
# though it speaks plain HTTP behind the proxy. ---
- name: NEXTCLOUD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS
value: nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
value: nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: OVERWRITEHOST
value: nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
value: nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- name: OVERWRITEPROTOCOL
value: https
- name: OVERWRITECLIURL
value: https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
value: https://nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
# --- Keycloak native OIDC SSO (auth.mode oidc; docs/15 "Native OIDC"; R-IDP-02/06). The confidential
# `nextcloud` realm client's secret is mirrored into this namespace's nextcloud-bootstrap Secret
# (oidc-client-secret; same value SOPS-held in keycloak-realm-clients). The postStart hook reads it
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ lifecycle:
# provider call below carries a MULTI-WORD value (--scope 'openid email profile') and is run as
# ONE su -c with the scope single-quoted, so the inner shell keeps it a single argument.
OCC() { su -s /bin/sh www-data -c "php /var/www/html/occ $*"; }
NEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration
NEXTCLOUD_DISCOVERY_URL=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration
nextcloud_oidc_fail() {
echo "[nextcloud-oidc] FAILED to configure 'keycloak' provider: $1" >&2
{ echo "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) [nextcloud-oidc] FAILED: $1"; } >> /var/www/html/nextcloud-oidc-bootstrap.log 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ dependencies:
port: 5432 # Renders the egress half; the DB namespace mirrors keycloak-db (no
protocol: tcp # default-deny), so Cilium's default-allow accepts the reciprocal ingress.
ingressRoutes:
- host: nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 80 # apache HTTP; wildcard TLS terminates at the shared Gateway (docs/08/09)
auth:
mode: oidc # native Keycloak OIDC client (docs/13 SSO row, docs/15 "Native OIDC"; R-IDP-02)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ storage:
class: longhorn # replicated config state; DR-critical (docs/04 line 118; R-STATE-02/03)
dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; it PROVIDES DNS (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
ingressRoutes:
- host: pihole.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 80 # admin web UI, protected at the Gateway by forward-auth (docs/09)
auth:
mode: forward-auth # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ storage:
# so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would crashloop the pod. See operator hand-off.
dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; clients/Seerr reach IT (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
ingressRoutes:
- host: plex.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: plex.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 32400 # Plex web UI + API served on 32400 (wildcard TLS at the Gateway; docs/08/09)
auth:
mode: native # Plex account auth — documented exception, NOT Keycloak (docs/13/15; R-IDP-02)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ name: qbittorrent
kind: container
source:
image: lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:5.1.2 # pinned stable tag (R-UPD-01); update.range governs advancement
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/13 row 13; R-DNS/R-NET)
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 13; R-DNS/R-NET)
egress: vpn # ALL public egress via node PIA tunnel + kill-switch (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
storage:
- name: config
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ storage:
class: longhorn # settings/categories/session on 3-replica Longhorn; DR-critical (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
ingressRoutes:
- host: qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 8080 # qBittorrent WebUI; protected at the Gateway by forward-auth (docs/09, docs/15)
auth:
mode: forward-auth # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ name: radarr
kind: container
source:
image: lscr.io/linuxserver/radarr:5.21.1 # pinned stable v5 tag (R-UPD-01); update.range governs advancement
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at radarr.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/13 row 3; R-DNS/R-NET)
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 3; R-DNS/R-NET)
egress: vpn # indexer scrape + downloader handoff steered via the shared VPN egress gateway,
# kill-switch enforced OUTSIDE the workload (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
storage:
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ dependencies:
port: 9117
protocol: tcp
ingressRoutes:
- host: radarr.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 7878 # Radarr web/API; TLS terminates at the shared Gateway (docs/08, docs/09)
auth:
mode: forward-auth # bare UI, no usable OIDC: oauth2-proxy → Keycloak at the Gateway (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
+11 -2
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,16 @@ except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - explicit, actionable failure
# --- Label / naming conventions (match platform/kyverno/policies + platform/*/) --------
LBL = "homelab.keithjackson.dev"
ZONE = "home.keithjackson.dev"
# The platform hostname suffix, emitted as the Flux post-build TOKEN rather than a literal.
# Every rendered manifest lands under a Flux path whose Kustomization declares
# postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars, so `${BASE_DOMAIN}` is resolved per environment at
# reconcile time: dev renders dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod renders home.keithjackson.dev (the
# APEX — operator decision 2026-09-04; prod IS the apex, so there is no `prod.` label and no CNAMEs).
# It is a DECLARED cluster-vars knob (clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml), so it is written BARE —
# the escape contract below reserves `$${...}` for expansions meant for a container's shell.
# Hardcoding the literal here is what let prod be authored to serve dev's public hostnames,
# and prod's external-dns then deleted dev's records (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10).
ZONE = "${BASE_DOMAIN}"
GATEWAY_NAME = "shared"
GATEWAY_NS = "gateway"
KP_RELEASE = "kube-prometheus-stack" # ServiceMonitor/PrometheusRule discovery label
@@ -598,7 +607,7 @@ def r_internet_egress(s: dict) -> dict:
def r_httproutes(s: dict) -> list:
"""One HTTPRoute per ingressRoute, attaching host -> service port on the shared Gateway.
TLS is the Gateway's wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev cert (no per-service cert step);
TLS is the Gateway's wildcard *.${BASE_DOMAIN} cert (no per-service cert step);
ExternalDNS manages the record from the HTTPRoute (R-TLS/R-DNS, renderer-contract).
"""
out = []
+1 -1
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ dependencies:
port: 32400
protocol: tcp
ingressRoutes:
- host: seerr.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: seerr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 5055 # Overseerr web UI + API; wildcard TLS terminates at the shared Gateway (docs/08/09)
auth:
mode: native # Plex account auth — documented exception, NOT Keycloak (docs/13/15; R-IDP-02)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ env:
- name: SEMAPHORE_ADMIN_NAME
value: Semaphore Admin
- name: SEMAPHORE_ADMIN_EMAIL
value: admin@home.keithjackson.dev
value: admin@${BASE_DOMAIN}
# --- Persistent access-key encryption key (see header): FIXED base64 32-byte key from SOPS so the
# SSH keys / credentials Semaphore stores in the DB stay decryptable across restarts. ---
- name: SEMAPHORE_ACCESS_KEY_ENCRYPTION
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ dependencies:
port: 5432 # Renders the egress half; the DB namespace mirrors keycloak-db (no
protocol: tcp # default-deny), so Cilium's default-allow accepts the reciprocal ingress.
ingressRoutes:
- host: semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 3000 # Semaphore HTTP web/API; wildcard TLS terminates at the shared Gateway (docs/08/09)
auth:
mode: oidc # native Keycloak OIDC client (docs/13 SSO row, docs/15 "Native OIDC"; R-IDP-02)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ name: sonarr
kind: container
source:
image: lscr.io/linuxserver/sonarr:4.0.15 # pinned stable v4 tag (R-UPD-01); update.range governs advancement
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/13 row 2; R-DNS/R-NET)
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 2; R-DNS/R-NET)
egress: vpn # indexer scrape + downloader handoff steered via the shared VPN egress gateway,
# kill-switch enforced OUTSIDE the workload (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
storage:
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ dependencies:
port: 9117
protocol: tcp
ingressRoutes:
- host: sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev
- host: sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
port: 8989 # Sonarr web/API; TLS terminates at the shared Gateway (docs/08, docs/09)
auth:
mode: forward-auth # bare UI, no usable OIDC: oauth2-proxy → Keycloak at the Gateway (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
+92 -4
View File
@@ -17,15 +17,103 @@ data:
CLUSTER_ENV: "base" # dev | prod (overlays set this)
# --- DNS / TLS ---
BASE_DOMAIN: "home.keithjackson.dev" # platform hostname suffix (same both envs; split-horizon)
DNS_ZONE: "keithjackson.dev" # the actual Cloudflare ZONE (BASE_DOMAIN is a subdomain of it);
# ExternalDNS domain-filter must be the zone, not the subdomain
# THE platform hostname suffix. Every public hostname the cluster serves is `<svc>.${BASE_DOMAIN}`,
# the wildcard cert is `*.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, coredns-custom answers the `${BASE_DOMAIN}` zone with
# ${GATEWAY_VIP}, and every OIDC issuer/redirect URI is built from it.
#
# THIS KNOB WAS DEAD UNTIL 2026-09-04 — declared here but referenced by NO manifest, because every
# hostname was hardcoded. That is what made the 2026-09-04 incident possible: prod and dev were
# authored to serve the SAME hostnames out of the SAME Cloudflare zone, so prod's external-dns
# (policy: sync, owner `default`) concluded it owned dev's public records and DELETED ALL OF THEM.
# See infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10. The fix is architectural: each environment gets its OWN
# suffix, so the two clusters can no longer describe the same name.
#
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (a subdomain; = this base default)
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX — prod IS the apex, no `prod.` label)
#
# OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-04 (supersedes the interim split committed earlier the same day, which
# had prod on `prod.home.` with apex CNAMEs pointing at it). PROD IS THE APEX. That deletes the
# whole CNAME layer — `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` is prod's real name, not an alias — and it is
# DEV that carries a label. Convention is unchanged from GATEWAY_VIP / LONGHORN_DATA_PATH: the base
# default is the DEV value (dev restates it verbatim) and prod overrides it. What changed is which
# string dev holds.
#
# DEV'S VALUE IS A MIGRATION, NOT A VARIABLE CHANGE. The live dev cluster is serving the APEX right
# now: its wildcard cert, every public DNS record, its Keycloak issuer, ~12 OIDC clients' redirect
# URIs, kubectl SSO, and gitea.home.keithjackson.dev — which IS this repo's GitOps source AND the
# push target. Flipping this value on dev without first standing up the new host set STRANDS DEV:
# Flux's GitRepository url moves to gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, which has no DNS record and no
# cert, so dev stops reconciling and cannot be fixed by pushing. ORDERED CUTOVER, operator present:
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# DEV MUST VACATE THE APEX BEFORE PROD PUBLISHES THERE. Both clusters describing
# `*.home.keithjackson.dev` at once is the 2026-09-04 incident precondition, re-created.
BASE_DOMAIN: "dev.home.keithjackson.dev"
# ExternalDNS `--domain-filter` (platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml). SAFETY NET #2 behind
# EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID: a record whose name falls outside this filter is not even considered,
# so it cannot be created, updated or deleted regardless of TXT ownership.
#
# BOTH ENVIRONMENTS USE THE CLOUDFLARE **ZONE**, `keithjackson.dev`. This value is NOT a per-
# environment isolation knob and must not be narrowed to either environment's BASE_DOMAIN.
#
# FINDING F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) — the Cloudflare provider uses --domain-filter for ZONE
# SELECTION as well as name filtering, so a filter that is a STRICT SUBDOMAIN of the hosted zone
# matches NO zone: ExternalDNS generates the record and then skips it with "no hosted zone matching
# record DNS Name", publishing NOTHING. This has been tried and reverted more than once (an agent
# narrowed prod to prod.home.keithjackson.dev on 2026-09-04; overridden in review). DO NOT "harden"
# it — the change is not defence in depth, it is a total outage of DNS publication.
#
# WHERE ISOLATION ACTUALLY COMES FROM, and it is sufficient:
# (1) the two environments request DISJOINT hostname sets (dev.home.… vs the apex), and
# (2) EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID differs, so neither registry ever claims the other's records.
# That pairing is what the 2026-09-04 incident needed; a domain filter cannot provide it, because
# both environments live in the one zone either way.
EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER: "keithjackson.dev"
# ExternalDNS TXT registry owner id (`--txt-owner-id`). THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE 2026-09-04 INCIDENT:
# neither cluster set it, so both inherited the chart default `default`, and ExternalDNS treats a
# record whose TXT registry entry carries ITS OWN owner id as its own to reconcile — and with
# `policy: sync`, to DELETE when no local resource claims it. Two clusters sharing an owner id on
# one zone therefore garbage-collect each other. Each environment MUST have a distinct value.
#
# dev -> `dev` prod -> `prod` base default -> a non-colliding sentinel (below)
#
# DEV IS `dev`, NOT `default` (changed 2026-09-04 with the move to dev.home.keithjackson.dev). Until
# this migration dev HAD to render `default`, because its LIVE apex records were already registered
# in Cloudflare's TXT registry under that owner and renaming would have orphaned every one of them.
# THAT CONSTRAINT NO LONGER BINDS: dev is publishing an ENTIRELY NEW record set under
# *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, with no pre-existing registry entries to recognise, so the owner id
# is now free to be chosen on its merits. Two reasons to take `dev`:
# - `default` is THE VALUE YOU GET BY FORGETTING (it is the external-dns chart default, and both
# clusters silently shared it, which IS the incident). An environment whose identity is the
# forget-value can never be told apart from a misconfigured newcomer. No environment should
# hold it.
# - It makes vacating the apex an EXPLICIT, ORDERED, VERIFIABLE step. Dev's old apex records stay
# owned by `default`, which no environment now claims, so nothing deletes them implicitly on
# some future reconcile — they are retired deliberately, and prod's publish is gated on that
# retirement being confirmed in Cloudflare (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10) rather than on a
# race between two reconcile loops.
#
# PROD STAYS `prod` AND MUST NOT BECOME `default`, even though prod now serves the apex names that
# dev's `default`-owned records currently occupy. Giving prod `default` would hand prod ownership of
# the LIVE dev cluster's records while dev is still serving them, and under `policy: sync` prod
# would delete the ones no prod source claims. That is the 2026-09-04 incident, re-armed, with the
# roles swapped. Prod inherits the apex NAMES; it must never inherit the apex OWNER ID.
#
# THE BASE DEFAULT IS A NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL, deliberately NOT `default` and not any real
# environment's id. A new environment that forgets this knob must not silently inherit another's
# identity — that is precisely the incident. With this sentinel such a cluster owns nothing, so it
# can DELETE nothing; it would publish under a visibly wrong owner id (grep the TXT records)
# instead of destroying a live environment's DNS.
EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID: "unset-see-cluster-vars"
ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER: "letsencrypt-staging" # dev: staging | prod: letsencrypt-prod (ADR-0006)
GATEWAY_VIP: "192.168.1.53" # in-cluster split-horizon target (R-DNS-01/03): the L2-announced
# ingress VIP of the `shared` Gateway. MUST equal the FIRST address of
# ${CILIUM_LB_POOL_START}..${CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP} below — the Gateway
# takes the pool's first free IP, and coredns-custom answers
# *.home.keithjackson.dev with THIS so pod -> public-hostname traffic
# *.${BASE_DOMAIN} with THIS so pod -> public-hostname traffic
# hairpins through the Gateway (correct SNI -> wildcard cert).
# Base default = the DEV LAN VIP (was 10.73.0.240, an address on the
# long-RETIRED libvirt network — corrected 2026-08-31 so an overlay that
+87 -2
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,20 @@
# reconciliation graph and patches the shared cluster-vars ConfigMap with dev-scoped values (R-ENV-02).
# It also adds a self-managing ROOT Kustomization (sync.yaml) so the whole graph reconciles from git
# on every push — no more manual `kubectl apply -k` for cluster-vars/overlay changes (F-OPS1).
#
# ##############################################################################################
# ### *** DO NOT MERGE THIS FILE TO `main` UNATTENDED (as of 2026-09-04) *** ###
# ### ###
# ### This overlay now carries dev's DNS MIGRATION target: BASE_DOMAIN moves from the apex ###
# ### `home.keithjackson.dev` to `dev.home.keithjackson.dev`, and the GitRepository url ###
# ### moves with it. sync.yaml reconciles ./clusters/dev from `main` EVERY 10 MINUTES, so a ###
# ### merge to main IS the cutover — it executes on the live dev cluster with nobody present. ###
# ### Dev's Gitea is both its GitOps source and the push target: if the new host is not up ###
# ### with a Ready cert first, dev stops reconciling and pushing cannot repair it. ###
# ### ###
# ### Run the ordered runbook: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10 (steps D1-D8), operator ###
# ### present. Merging is step D3, not step one. ###
# ##############################################################################################
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
@@ -131,7 +145,24 @@ patches:
# via coredns -> Gateway VIP, and the LE-prod wildcard cert is publicly trusted so NO
# secretRef/caCert is needed. Recovery: restart bootstrap Gitea (192.168.2.103:3000) and
# revert this url (docs/05).
url: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
#
# *** THE STRAND. THIS URL IS THE MOST DANGEROUS LINE IN THE REPOSITORY. ***
# It is BOTH dev's GitOps source AND the operator's push target, and it is NOT tokenized —
# it cannot be: the `flux-system` root Kustomization that renders ./clusters/dev declares NO
# postBuild.substituteFrom, so `gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}` here would ship the LITERAL token and
# break the source outright (the L0 flux-postbuild-substitution check asserts exactly this).
# So it is a hand-maintained literal that must be moved in lockstep with BASE_DOMAIN below.
#
# It has been moved to dev's NEW suffix as part of the 2026-09-04 migration authoring. That
# makes this file the TARGET state, NOT a safe unattended merge: dev's root Kustomization
# (sync.yaml) reconciles ./clusters/dev from `main` every 10m, so MERGING THIS TO main WHILE
# DEV IS LIVE MIGRATES DEV UNATTENDED. If gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev does not already
# resolve and serve a valid cert at that instant, dev stops reconciling and CANNOT BE FIXED
# BY PUSHING — the broken thing is the path Flux uses to read pushes.
# ORDERING THAT AVOIDS IT (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10, steps D1-D3): suspend dev's root
# Kustomization or park this url on the bootstrap Gitea (http://192.168.2.132:3000/...) for
# the migration window, and only restore the in-cluster url after the new host is proven.
url: https://gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
ref:
branch: main
# --- dev-scoped cluster-vars (R-ENV-02) ---
@@ -148,6 +179,60 @@ patches:
- op: replace
path: /data/ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
value: "letsencrypt-prod"
# ==========================================================================================
# DEV DNS IDENTITY (R-DNS-01/02/03) — DEV MOVES OFF THE APEX. **NOT YET APPLIED.**
# ==========================================================================================
# OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-04, superseding the interim split committed earlier the same day:
#
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (this knob; = the base default, restated)
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX — prod IS the apex, no `prod.` label,
# and therefore no apex CNAME layer at all)
#
# *** THIS VALUE IS AHEAD OF THE LIVE CLUSTER. *** The dev cluster is serving the APEX right
# now. Merging this file does not perform the migration — it DEFINES the target. The cutover is
# an ORDERED, OPERATOR-PRESENT runbook: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# WHY IT CANNOT BE A PLAIN VARIABLE FLIP — THE STRAND. `spec.url` of the GitRepository ~20
# lines above is https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/... . Dev's Gitea is BOTH dev's GitOps
# source AND the operator's push target. The moment BASE_DOMAIN moves, dev's Gitea HTTPRoute,
# DNS record and wildcard cert all move to gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev. If that host does
# not ALREADY resolve with a valid, Ready cert, dev stops reconciling — and it CANNOT BE FIXED
# BY PUSHING, because the thing that is broken is the path Flux uses to read pushes. Recovery
# is then hands-on (point the source at the bootstrap Gitea on 192.168.2.132:3000, or repair
# in-cluster by hand). §10 states the ordering that avoids it: publish and verify the new host
# FIRST, or park the source on the bootstrap Gitea for the window.
#
# ALSO MOVED BY THIS ONE LINE, all on a live cluster: the `*.` wildcard Certificate (a fresh
# ACME order), Keycloak's issuer URL and ~12 OIDC clients' redirect URIs, kubectl SSO (a k3s
# server flag => a rolling restart + every user re-issuing their kubeconfig), coredns-custom's
# split-horizon zone, Homepage's links, and 6 L2 chainsaw tests that hardcode the apex.
- op: replace
path: /data/BASE_DOMAIN
value: "dev.home.keithjackson.dev"
# ExternalDNS scope. MUST stay the Cloudflare ZONE — NOT dev.home.keithjackson.dev. FINDING
# F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17): the Cloudflare provider uses this for ZONE SELECTION, so a
# strict-subdomain filter matches no zone and publishes NOTHING ("no hosted zone matching
# record DNS Name"). Dev moving to a subdomain does NOT make narrowing safe — it makes it
# newly tempting, which is why this comment is here. Same value the retired DNS_ZONE knob held.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER
value: "keithjackson.dev"
# OWNER ID: `dev` (was `default` until 2026-09-04). The old value was FORCED — dev's live apex
# records were already in Cloudflare's TXT registry under owner `default`, so renaming would
# have orphaned every one of them. THE MIGRATION DISSOLVES THAT CONSTRAINT: on the new suffix
# dev publishes a brand-new record set with no prior registry entries to recognise, so the id
# is chosen on its merits, and `default` has none — it is the value external-dns uses when you
# FORGET the flag, which is exactly how both clusters came to share it. Consequences, both
# deliberate:
# - dev's OLD apex records remain owned by `default`, which no environment now claims, so
# nothing deletes them implicitly. Retiring them is an explicit §10 step, and prod's first
# publish is gated on that retirement being CONFIRMED — not on two reconcile loops racing.
# - prod stays `prod` and must NEVER be given `default`, or prod would own the live dev
# cluster's apex records and sync-delete them. Prod inherits the apex NAMES, not its OWNER.
# dev != prod is the load-bearing invariant; the base default stays a non-colliding sentinel.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
value: "dev"
# --- dev LAN addressing (192.168.1.0/24 on the Proxmox LAN) -----------------------------
# EVERY knob in cluster-vars' "LAN addressing" block is restated here EXPLICITLY, even where it
# equals the base default. These values are what the LIVE dev cluster is running right now, so
@@ -156,7 +241,7 @@ patches:
#
# Split-horizon DNS target: the Cilium-L2 VIP of the `shared` Gateway on the Proxmox LAN
# (= CILIUM_LB_POOL_START, the pool's first address). coredns-custom answers
# *.home.keithjackson.dev with this so in-cluster OIDC clients reach Keycloak via the Gateway.
# *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev with this so in-cluster OIDC clients reach Keycloak via the Gateway.
- op: replace
path: /data/GATEWAY_VIP
value: "192.168.1.53"
+142 -13
View File
@@ -115,24 +115,78 @@ patches:
name: sops-age
# --- GitOps source (operator decision 2026-09-01: prod tracks the SAME BRANCH as dev) ---
#
# *** BOOTSTRAP BLOCKER — this URL CANNOT work on a cold prod cluster. READ BEFORE BRING-UP. ***
# ############################################################################################
# ### ###
# ### *** T E M P O R A R Y B O O T S T R A P S O U R C E — NOT PERMANENT *** ###
# ### ###
# ### The url below is a Gitea container running ON THE OPERATOR'S WORKSTATION, outside ###
# ### any cluster. It exists ONLY to get prod's first reconcile off the ground. It MUST ###
# ### be cut over to the in-cluster URL once Gitea runs on prod. If you are reading this ###
# ### and prod has been serving traffic for months, THE CUTOVER WAS NEVER DONE — that is ###
# ### a live single point of failure, not a settled design. See "CUTOVER" below. ###
# ### ###
# ############################################################################################
#
# Two independent reasons, both consequences of the split-horizon design:
# 1. SELF-HOSTING CIRCULARITY. Gitea runs ON THE DEV CLUSTER. Prod syncing from it means prod's
# GitOps source lives inside the very cluster slated for decommission. Gitea must move to
# prod (or off-cluster) BEFORE dev is retired, or prod loses its source of truth.
# 2. SPLIT-HORIZON DNS SENDS IT TO THE WRONG PLACE. platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml
# answers the ENTIRE home.keithjackson.dev zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}. On prod that is
# 192.168.2.20 — PROD's own gateway, where no Gitea is listening. Prod's Flux would resolve
# gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to itself and never reach a repository.
# WHY THE IN-CLUSTER URL CANNOT BE USED YET (blocker found 2026-09-01, still true; the
# unusable value was `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git`).
# REASONING UPDATED 2026-09-04 for the new suffix direction (prod = the apex, dev = dev.home.),
# which changes WHY the blocker holds but not THAT it holds:
# 1. SELF-HOSTING CIRCULARITY — still true, and now the only reason. The Gitea this repo is
# pushed to runs ON THE DEV CLUSTER. Prod syncing from it would put prod's GitOps source
# inside the very cluster slated for decommission. Gitea must move to prod (or off-cluster)
# BEFORE dev is retired, or prod loses its source of truth.
# NOTE the suffix change makes the two Giteas DIFFERENT HOSTS: dev's is now
# gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev and prod's is gitea.home.keithjackson.dev. Prod pointing at
# the apex name therefore means "prod's OWN Gitea", never dev's — which is what makes the
# cutover below a one-line change once prod actually runs Gitea.
# 2. SPLIT-HORIZON DNS — NO LONGER A BLOCKER, and the note is kept because the old reasoning is
# easy to re-derive incorrectly. platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml answers the whole
# ${BASE_DOMAIN} zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}; when prod's BASE_DOMAIN was `prod.home.` that meant
# prod resolved gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to PROD's gateway (192.168.2.20) where no Gitea
# listened — a misdirection. Now that prod IS the apex, resolving gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
# to prod's own Gateway is CORRECT: that is where prod's Gitea will be served from. What
# remains is purely reason 1 — the Gitea is not there YET.
#
# Bring-up therefore needs a TEMPORARY source (the bootstrap host-Gitea, or an off-cluster
# mirror), with a cutover to the in-cluster URL once Gitea actually runs on prod — exactly the
# sequence docs/05 describes for dev's own Phase-6 cutover. Tracked in PROD-PROVISIONING.md §7.
# WHAT THE TEMPORARY SOURCE IS (stood up 2026-09-04 on explicit operator direction):
# bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh with HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132 — a podman container on the
# operator's workstation, Gitea 1.22.6, listening on 192.168.2.132:3000. All three prod nodes
# reach it DIRECTLY on the LAN: no libvirt NAT hop (that network is retired) and no firewall
# change was needed. This is the same "local bootstrap source" pattern dev itself used before
# its Phase-6 cutover (docs/05 "Source-of-truth").
#
# PLAIN HTTP, AND WHY THAT IS ACCEPTED HERE: the bootstrap Gitea has no TLS, so there is no cert
# for Flux to trust and no caCertSecretRef to wire. Traffic is LAN-local between prod nodes and
# the workstation, the repo carries NO plaintext secrets (everything sensitive is SOPS-encrypted,
# .sops.yaml), and the window is the bring-up only. Do NOT extend this posture past cutover.
#
# NO secretRef, DELIBERATELY: the repo is PUBLIC on the bootstrap Gitea, so anonymous clone
# works and Flux needs no git credentials. VERIFIED 2026-09-04 by unauthenticated request:
# curl http://192.168.2.132:3000/api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl -> "private":false
# git ls-remote http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git -> refs/heads/main
# If the GitRepository ever reports an auth failure that looks like a network problem, RE-CHECK
# THAT FIRST: a private repo here fails exactly that way.
#
# *** CUTOVER — the exit condition, mirroring dev's Phase-6 cutover (docs/05) ***
# WHEN: Gitea runs on prod (reconciled in-cluster) and answers gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
# through prod's own Gateway VIP with a publicly-trusted cert.
# DO: 1. push/mirror this repo into the prod in-cluster Gitea;
# 2. change the url below to
# https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
# and DELETE this whole TEMPORARY block (dev's equivalent stanza, ~15 lines above in
# clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml, is what "done" looks like);
# 3. confirm `flux get sources git -n flux-system` reconciles the new revision;
# 4. only THEN stop the workstation container. Keep it stopped-not-deleted as recovery,
# exactly as dev retained its bootstrap Gitea.
# UNTIL THEN: prod's reconciliation depends on a container on a workstation that may be
# powered off. Flux keeps the last-reconciled state running, but NO new revision lands while
# it is down. Tracked as an open blocker in infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §7.
#
# The BRANCH below is settled and correct: prod tracks `main`, the same branch as dev.
# CONSEQUENCE, recorded deliberately: once prod is live, EVERY MERGE TO main RECONCILES BOTH
# CLUSTERS. There is no promotion step and no soak window — dev and prod move together.
# NOTE for bring-up: bootstrap-gitea.sh pushes the operator's CURRENT HEAD to the bootstrap
# Gitea's `main`, whatever branch that is. Before bootstrapping prod, confirm that remote `main`
# is the revision you intend prod to run (`git ls-remote` above, against local `main`).
- patch: |-
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: GitRepository
@@ -140,7 +194,9 @@ patches:
name: flux-system
namespace: flux-system
spec:
url: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
# TEMPORARY bootstrap source — workstation container, NOT in any cluster. See the block
# above for the cutover to https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/... . Do not treat as final.
url: http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
ref:
branch: main
- target:
@@ -154,6 +210,79 @@ patches:
- op: replace
path: /data/ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
value: "letsencrypt-prod"
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD DNS IDENTITY (R-DNS-01/02/03) — PROD **IS** THE APEX.
# ==========================================================================================
# OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-04, superseding the interim split committed earlier the same day
# (prod on `prod.home.` behind apex CNAMEs). The simpler target, and the one authored here:
#
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (dev carries the label; clusters/dev)
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX — this knob)
#
# There is NO `prod.` label and NO CNAME layer. `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` is prod's REAL
# name, so nothing has to alias anything: prod's Gitea is gitea.home.keithjackson.dev, its
# Keycloak keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev, and the wildcard cert is `*.home.keithjackson.dev`.
#
# BACKGROUND — WHY THE SUFFIXES HAD TO SPLIT AT ALL. Until 2026-09-04 every hostname was
# HARDCODED to home.keithjackson.dev in the base manifests, so prod was authored to serve the
# EXACT SAME public names as the live dev cluster out of the SAME Cloudflare zone. Two
# consequences, one of which already happened:
# 1. HAPPENED: prod's external-dns (policy: sync, owner id `default` — the same implicit
# default dev had) concluded it owned dev's records and DELETED EVERY ONE of them.
# 2. QUEUED BEHIND IT: platform-config would have requested a `*.home.keithjackson.dev`
# wildcard from letsencrypt-prod for a cert dev already holds, and both clusters would
# have raced each other's `_acme-challenge` TXT records on that one zone.
#
# *** THE ORDERING CONSTRAINT THIS VALUE CREATES — READ BEFORE UNSUSPENDING ANYTHING. ***
# Prod now claims the very names the LIVE dev cluster is serving today. Both hazards above are
# therefore still armed until DEV HAS VACATED THE APEX. Prod's `platform` and its 10 downstream
# tiers are SUSPENDED for exactly this reason. The gate is not "review is done", it is:
# (a) dev is reconciling on *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev with a Ready wildcard cert, AND
# (b) dev's old apex A/CNAME records and their TXT registry entries are GONE from Cloudflare
# (verified against Cloudflare directly — a pfSense override is NOT evidence about public
# DNS; that mistake was made on 2026-09-04), AND
# (c) dev's old `*.home.keithjackson.dev` cert/Certificate is released, because prod ordering
# that same name set while dev's still exists counts against LE's duplicate-certificate
# limit (5 per week per identical name set).
# Full ordered runbook: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10. Unsuspending before (a)-(c) re-creates
# the 2026-09-04 incident with the roles reversed.
#
# [parity] MUST equal k3s_base_domain in infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml.
# The kube-apiserver's oidc-issuer-url is an INSTALL-TIME k3s flag, not a manifest, so it is
# set Ansible-side from that variable and cannot read this one. If they disagree, kubectl SSO
# trusts a different Keycloak than the one prod actually runs.
- op: replace
path: /data/BASE_DOMAIN
value: "home.keithjackson.dev"
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER
# MUST be the Cloudflare ZONE. Prod now serves the apex, so `home.keithjackson.dev` looks
# like a tighter, more honest filter than the zone — IT IS NOT, IT IS AN OUTAGE. FINDING
# F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) proved a STRICT SUBDOMAIN of the hosted zone drops the
# zone entirely: ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching
# record DNS Name", so prod publishes NOTHING. An agent narrowed this to
# prod.home.keithjackson.dev on 2026-09-04 and it was reverted in review; do not retry it.
# Isolation from dev does NOT come from this filter — it comes from
# (1) the two clusters requesting DISJOINT hostname sets (apex vs dev.home.), and
# (2) txtOwnerId: prod vs dev, so neither registry ever claims the other's records.
# That pairing is what the 2026-09-04 incident needed and this filter cannot provide.
value: "keithjackson.dev"
# SAFETY NET #1 — THE ACTUAL ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. Both clusters left this unset and so
# both inherited the chart default `default`; prod then treated dev's TXT-registry entries as
# its own and, under policy: sync, deleted the records behind them.
#
# PROD MUST NOT BE GIVEN `default`, however tempting it now looks. Prod is taking over the apex
# NAMES, and dev's existing apex records are registered under owner `default` — so `default` is
# the one value that would let prod adopt them. It would also let prod SYNC-DELETE the ones no
# prod source claims, on a cluster dev is still serving. Prod inherits the apex names; it must
# never inherit the apex OWNER ID. `prod` keeps prod fail-safe: records owned by `default` are
# invisible to it, so an early unsuspend cannot destroy dev's DNS the way 2026-09-04 did — it
# simply fails to publish until those records are retired, which is the correct behaviour.
# dev is `dev` (clusters/dev, changed with dev's migration); the base default is a
# non-colliding sentinel. All three differ.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
value: "prod"
- op: replace
path: /data/LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT
value: "3"
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8080
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ spec:
- --allowed-group=platform-admins
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://paas-demo.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8989
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ spec:
- --allowed-group=media-admins
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8989
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ spec:
- --allowed-group=media-admins
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
+381 -9
View File
@@ -1172,6 +1172,7 @@ no extra vars is byte-for-byte the dev behaviour it always had (verified by a be
| `192.168.1.55` (crafty) | `platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.54` (UniFi VM) | `apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.9:9000` (S3 backup) | `platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml`, `apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,semaphore}-db.yaml` | reachable prod backup target |
| ~~`home.keithjackson.dev` (every hostname)~~ | ~~HTTPRoutes, Gateway, wildcard cert, coredns-custom, Keycloak realm, oauth2-proxy, Homepage, `catalog/`~~ | **CLOSED 2026-09-04 — see §10.** This one was not merely "would build wrong": it **already destroyed dev's public DNS**. `BASE_DOMAIN` was a declared-but-DEAD knob; it is now real. Prod's value was inverted the same day to the APEX `home.keithjackson.dev`, with dev moving to `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` — see §10a, which is authored but NOT yet applied. |
- [ ] **Tokenize each into a `cluster-vars` knob** with a base default, then set the value in *both*
overlays. Adding a knob before referencing `${KNOB}` is the sanctioned mechanism (see the
@@ -1193,12 +1194,15 @@ no extra vars is byte-for-byte the dev behaviour it always had (verified by a be
as dev**. Eight `decryption: {provider: sops, secretRef: sops-age}` patches mirror dev
exactly. The `sops-age` Secret is still created OUT OF BAND on the prod cluster
(`bootstrap/sops/install-age-key.sh`) — the overlay references it by name only.
- [~] **GitRepository source** — BRANCH settled, URL still blocked. Operator decision
2026-09-01: **prod tracks `main`, the same branch as dev**, because dev is temporary and
will be decommissioned once prod is stable. Recorded consequence: once prod is live,
**every merge to `main` reconciles BOTH clusters** — no promotion step, no soak window.
The URL is patched in but **cannot work on a cold prod cluster**, for two independent
reasons found 2026-09-01:
- [~] **GitRepository source** — **MITIGATED 2026-09-04, NOT SOLVED.** Branch settled; the
in-cluster URL is still unusable, so prod now points at a **temporary bootstrap source**.
Operator decision 2026-09-01: **prod tracks `main`, the same branch as dev**, because dev
is temporary and will be decommissioned once prod is stable. Recorded consequence: once
prod is live, **every merge to `main` reconciles BOTH clusters** — no promotion step, no
soak window.
**Why the in-cluster URL (`https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/...`) cannot work on a
cold prod cluster** — two independent reasons, found 2026-09-01, both still true:
1. **Self-hosting circularity** — Gitea runs on the DEV cluster, the one slated for
decommission. Gitea must move to prod (or off-cluster) BEFORE dev is retired, or prod
loses its source of truth. **This is the decommission plan's first task, not its last.**
@@ -1206,9 +1210,56 @@ no extra vars is byte-for-byte the dev behaviour it always had (verified by a be
`home.keithjackson.dev` zone with `${GATEWAY_VIP}`, which on prod is `192.168.2.20`:
prod's OWN gateway, where no Gitea listens. Prod's Flux would resolve
`gitea.home.keithjackson.dev` to itself and never reach a repository.
Bring-up needs a TEMPORARY source (bootstrap host-Gitea, or an off-cluster mirror) and a
cutover once Gitea runs on prod — the same sequence `docs/05` describes for dev's own
Phase-6 cutover.
**The mitigation now in `clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml`** (operator directed this to be
stood up, 2026-09-04):
| | |
|---|---|
| GitRepository url | `http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git` |
| Branch | `main` (unchanged — same branch as dev) |
| What it is | Gitea 1.22.6 in a **podman container on the operator's workstation**, started by `bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh` with `HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132` |
| Reachability | All three prod nodes reach it **directly on the LAN** — no NAT hop (the libvirt network is retired), **no firewall change needed**. Verified from all three nodes. |
| Auth | **None, deliberately.** The repo is PUBLIC on that Gitea, so Flux needs no `secretRef`. Verified anonymously: `curl .../api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl` → `"private":false`, and `git ls-remote` returns `refs/heads/main`. |
| Transport | **Plain HTTP, no TLS.** Accepted for the bring-up window only: LAN-local, and the repo holds no plaintext secrets (all SOPS-encrypted). |
| Admin creds | `~/.config/home-k3s-bootstrap-gitea-admin.txt`, mode 0600, host-only, never committed. |
**THIS IS A SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE FOR PROD'S RECONCILIATION, and it is not even in a
cluster.** It is one container on one workstation, with no HA, no backup of its own, and
no restart guarantee beyond `--restart unless-stopped`. If that workstation is powered
off, suspended, or the podman volume `gitea-bootstrap-data` is lost:
- already-reconciled state **keeps running** — Flux does not tear anything down;
- but **no new revision can land on prod**, and every `GitRepository` reconcile fails.
So prod is *not* self-sufficient while this stands. Do not treat prod as production-ready
on this footing, and do not let it become the steady state by inattention.
**One bring-up footgun:** `bootstrap-gitea.sh` pushes the operator's **current `HEAD`** to
the bootstrap Gitea's `main`, whatever branch that HEAD is on. Before bootstrapping prod,
confirm that remote `main` is the revision prod should run
(`git ls-remote http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git` vs local
`main`). As of 2026-09-04 the remote `main` is the tip of the working branch, **not** local
`main`.
**EXIT CONDITION (the cutover) — mirrors dev's own Phase-6 cutover, `docs/05`.**
This item is not closable until all of it is done:
- [ ] Gitea runs **on prod**, reconciled in-cluster, answering
`gitea.home.keithjackson.dev` through prod's Gateway VIP with a publicly-trusted cert.
- [ ] This repo is pushed/mirrored into that in-cluster Gitea.
- [ ] The `clusters/prod` GitRepository url is changed to
`https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git`
and the TEMPORARY comment block is **deleted** (dev's stanza is what "done" looks like).
- [ ] `flux get sources git -n flux-system` on prod reconciles a revision from the new URL.
- [ ] **Only then** stop the workstation container — kept stopped-not-deleted as recovery,
exactly as dev retained its own bootstrap Gitea.
- [x] **`roles/flux_bootstrap` could only bootstrap dev** — FIXED 2026-09-04. It invoked
`bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh` without ever exporting `FLUX_ENV_PATH`, so the script fell
through to its `clusters/dev` default and §8 step 4 (`--path=clusters/prod`) was
unreachable without editing the role. Now parameterised on the standard group_vars seam:
role default `flux_bootstrap_env_path: clusters/dev` (defaults/main.yml) is exported as
`FLUX_ENV_PATH` by the role's task, and
`inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` overrides it to `clusters/prod` — the same
mechanism as `kube_vip_address` / `k3s_data_dir` / `cluster_kubeconfig_name`. Dev has no
override anywhere, so dev resolves `clusters/dev` exactly as before.
- [ ] Confirm prod's backup target: dev's S3 (`versitygw` on the Proxmox host, `192.168.1.9`) is on
the dev side of the network. Off-cluster backup is DR-critical (R-STATE-03).
@@ -1232,3 +1283,324 @@ single-server-etcd window, and avoids a later member-add dance.
specifically.
- [ ] Monitoring and alerts live on prod.
- [ ] The conformance suite passes green **against the prod cluster**, not just dev (R-TEST-03).
Blocked on parameterizing the L2 tests that hardcode `home.keithjackson.dev` — see §10a
"The L2 tests hardcode the apex".
- [ ] **Prod serves the apex DNS/TLS identity** and dev's records are provably untouched (§10/§10a):
distinct `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` (`prod` vs `dev`), prod wildcard cert
`*.home.keithjackson.dev`, dev migrated to `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` with its old apex
records retired (§10a step D8), and prod's own Keycloak realm + per-service client secrets.
## 10. DNS/TLS environment split — **the 2026-09-04 incident, and the target architecture**
> **Current state (2026-09-04):** the target below is **AUTHORED, NOT APPLIED.** Prod's
> `platform` tier and its 10 downstream tiers are SUSPENDED. Dev is **live on the apex**. The
> ordered cutover is **§10a**, and merging the authored change to `main` is step **D3** of it,
> not step one — dev self-reconciles `main`, so a merge outside the runbook window executes
> the migration unattended.
### What happened
Prod's `external-dns` **deleted every one of dev's public DNS records.**
Both clusters ran `policy: sync` against the **same Cloudflare zone**, served the **same
hostnames**, and — because neither overlay set `txtOwnerId` — both inherited the external-dns
chart's default owner id **`default`**. ExternalDNS decides what it may delete by reading its own
owner id back out of the TXT registry. Prod read dev's TXT entries, saw its own owner id, found no
local resource claiming those names, and garbage-collected the records behind them. Dev recovered
once prod was stopped. Prod's `platform` tier and everything downstream were then **suspended**, and
remain suspended, so it cannot recur before this change is reviewed.
`policy: sync` was not the bug and has not been changed. What was missing was **identity**.
### The second bug, queued directly behind it
`platform-config` would have requested a `*.home.keithjackson.dev` wildcard `Certificate` from
**letsencrypt-prod** — for a cert **dev already holds** — and both clusters would then have raced
each other's `_acme-challenge` TXT records on that one zone. Neither would reliably solve DNS-01.
This never fired only because the tier was suspended first.
### Root cause, stated precisely
Not external-dns. **Every hostname in the repo was a hardcoded literal.** `BASE_DOMAIN` existed in
`clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml` but was referenced by **no reconciled manifest** — the repo-derived
status report flagged it as a dead knob. R-ENV-02 promises dev and prod differ only by `cluster-vars`
values; for DNS and TLS that promise was false, so `clusters/prod` was *authored* to serve dev's
public identity. Two clusters that describe the same DNS name will fight over it no matter how the
DNS controller is configured.
### The architecture decision (operator) — **INVERTED 2026-09-04, this is the current target**
```
dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev
prod -> *.home.keithjackson.dev gitea.home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX)
```
**Prod *is* the apex. There is no `prod.` label and no CNAME layer at all** —
`<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` is prod's real name, not an alias for one. This **supersedes** the
interim split committed earlier the same day (`c8c1d29`), which put prod on
`*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev` behind apex CNAMEs pointing at it. That layer is deleted: fewer
moving parts, no CNAME chain to keep in step, and prod ends up on the names users already type.
The cost of the inversion is that **dev must move**, and dev is the live cluster. The interim split
was chosen precisely because it moved only the unbuilt environment; this one does not have that
property, so the whole of §10's remaining risk now sits on dev's side, and it is sequenced below.
### The values, per environment
| | `BASE_DOMAIN` | `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` | `EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER` | Ansible `k3s_base_domain` |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| base default | `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` | `unset-see-cluster-vars` (non-colliding sentinel) | `keithjackson.dev` | `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` (role default) |
| **dev** | `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` | `dev` | `keithjackson.dev` | (inherits the role default) |
| **prod** | `home.keithjackson.dev` | `prod` | `keithjackson.dev` | `home.keithjackson.dev` (`group_vars/k3s_prod`) |
`[parity]`: `k3s_base_domain` must equal the same cluster's `BASE_DOMAIN`. The kube-apiserver's
`oidc-issuer-url` is a k3s **server flag** in `/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml`, not a manifest, so Flux
post-build substitution can never reach it — hence one fact in two places. If they disagree the
apiserver validates tokens against a different Keycloak than the cluster runs: kubectl SSO fails
while the cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working, so it presents as "SSO is broken", not as skew.
**`EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER` is the Cloudflare ZONE for BOTH, and must stay that way.** FINDING
F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17): the Cloudflare provider uses this value for **zone selection** as
well as record matching, so a filter that is a strict subdomain of the hosted zone matches **no
zone** — external-dns generates the record and then skips it with *"no hosted zone matching record
DNS Name"*, publishing **nothing**. This has been "hardened" and reverted more than once. It is not
defence in depth; it is a total outage of DNS publication. Isolation comes from the two guards below,
which a domain filter cannot provide anyway: both environments live in the one zone regardless.
**The two guards that actually work:**
1. **`txtOwnerId`, per-environment identity** — a cluster only ever reconciles records its own owner
id claims in the TXT registry. This is the direct fix for the incident.
2. **Disjoint hostname sets** — after the migration the two clusters never describe the same record,
so there is nothing to fight over. *This guard does not exist during the migration window*, which
is the entire reason the ordering below is mandatory.
#### Why dev's owner id changed from `default` to `dev`
Until this migration dev **had** to render `default`: its live apex records were already registered
in Cloudflare's TXT registry under that owner, and renaming would have orphaned every one of them.
**The migration dissolves that constraint** — on `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` dev publishes an
entirely new record set with no prior registry entries to recognise, so the id is free and is chosen
on its merits. `default` has none: it is the value external-dns uses when you **forget** the flag,
which is exactly how both clusters came to share it, and an environment whose identity is the
forget-value can never be told apart from a misconfigured newcomer. Consequences, both deliberate:
- Dev's **old apex records stay owned by `default`**, which no environment now claims, so nothing
deletes them implicitly on some future reconcile. Retiring them is an explicit step (**D7**) and
prod's first publish is gated on that retirement being *confirmed* — not on two reconcile loops
racing each other.
- **Prod stays `prod` and must never be given `default`.** Prod is taking over the apex *names*, and
dev's existing apex records are registered under `default` — so `default` is the one value that
would let prod adopt them, and under `policy: sync` delete the ones no prod source claims, on a
cluster dev is still serving. That is the 2026-09-04 incident re-armed with the roles swapped.
Prod inherits the apex **names**; it must never inherit the apex **owner id**.
All three values differ, and the base default remains a sentinel so an environment that forgets the
knob owns nothing and can therefore delete nothing.
### PHASE 1 — prod tokenized and moved off dev's names (`c8c1d29`, done; suffix since inverted)
`BASE_DOMAIN` was a **dead knob** — declared in `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml` and referenced by
no reconciled manifest, because every hostname was a hardcoded literal. `c8c1d29` made it real (141
references across the reconciled set) and gave prod its own suffix. That work stands; only the
*value* prod holds has changed, from `prod.home.keithjackson.dev` to the apex.
### What could NOT be tokenized, and why
- **`OIDC_ISSUER_URL` / `OIDC_CALLBACK_URL` in `platform/headlamp/headlamp-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml`**
— SOPS-encrypted (`encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$`), so the two hostnames are ciphertext.
Re-encrypting needs the operator's age key, rewrites the MAC over every value in the file, and
**cannot be verified by the offline render harness** (`kustomize` does not decrypt), so a mistake
would break Headlamp SSO on the live dev cluster with no pre-flight proof. Left as-is deliberately.
**Both environments now need action:** dev's copy must move to `keycloak.dev.home.keithjackson.dev`
as part of step **D5**, and prod needs its own copy with `keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` and a
client secret from prod's own realm — which it needs regardless, since every `*.sops.yaml` client
secret is realm-scoped.
- **`oidc-issuer-url` in the kube-apiserver flags** (`roles/k3s_server/tasks/main.yml`) — a k3s
server flag, not a manifest. Handled on the **Ansible** seam instead: role default
`k3s_base_domain` (dev's value) + derived `k3s_oidc_issuer_url`, overridden for prod in
`inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` — the same inventory seam as `k3s_data_dir`/`k3s_api_host`,
so a fourth prod server inherits it from group membership. Verified per host by a read-only probe
(`connection: local`, zero SSH, `changed=0`): all three dev servers resolve
`https://keycloak.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`, all three prod servers resolve
`https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`.
- **`spec.url` of dev's `GitRepository`** (`clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml`) — see the strand below.
It *cannot* be tokenized: the `flux-system` root Kustomization that renders `./clusters/dev`
declares no `postBuild.substituteFrom`, so `gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}` there would ship the **literal
token** and break the source outright (the L0 `flux-postbuild-substitution` check asserts exactly
this). It is a hand-maintained literal that must move in lockstep with `BASE_DOMAIN`.
---
## 10a. THE MIGRATION RUNBOOK — ordering is load-bearing
> **Prod's `platform` tier and its 10 downstream tiers are SUSPENDED and must stay suspended until
> step P1.** Nothing below is safe to run out of order, and nothing below should be run while the
> operator is away.
### The two ways this goes wrong
**(1) BOTH CLUSTERS ON THE APEX — the 2026-09-04 incident, recreated.** If prod publishes
`*.home.keithjackson.dev` before dev has vacated it, two clusters describe the same records in the
same zone again. Distinct `txtOwnerId`s stop prod from *deleting* dev's records — that guard holds —
but they do not stop the second failure mode: both clusters requesting a `letsencrypt-prod` wildcard
for the **same name set** and racing each other's `_acme-challenge` TXT records, so neither reliably
solves DNS-01. **Rule: dev vacates the apex first, and the vacate is verified against Cloudflare
before prod is unsuspended.**
**(2) THE STRAND — dev's GitOps source is the thing that moves.** `spec.url` of dev's
`GitRepository` is `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/...`, which is **both** dev's GitOps source
**and** the PM's push target. Flipping dev's `BASE_DOMAIN` moves Gitea's HTTPRoute, its public DNS
record and the wildcard cert covering it to `gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` all at once. If that
host does not already resolve and serve a valid, Ready cert at that instant, **dev stops reconciling
and cannot be fixed by pushing** — the broken thing *is* the path Flux uses to read pushes. Recovery
is then hands-on and needs LAN access to the cluster.
**(2b) AND THE MERGE ITSELF IS THE TRIGGER.** `clusters/dev/sync.yaml` is a self-managing root
Kustomization reconciling `./clusters/dev` from **`main`** every 10 minutes, and prod tracks `main`
too. **A merge to `main` therefore *executes* this migration on the live dev cluster, unattended.**
The authored change is a *target*, not a deployment. **Do not merge these files to `main` outside the
runbook window.** Park them on a branch until the operator is at the keyboard and step **D1** has
been done.
### D — dev vacates the apex (operator present, in this order)
- [ ] **D0. Snapshot the escape routes before touching anything.** Confirm a working break-glass
**cert-based** admin kubeconfig for dev (not the OIDC one — OIDC breaks in D6). Confirm the
retained bootstrap Gitea can be started (`bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh`; dev's historical
recovery host was `192.168.2.103:3000`, prod's current bootstrap is `192.168.2.132:3000`).
Record dev's current Cloudflare record set (names + TXT registry owners) so D7 has a checklist
and so an accidental deletion is detectable.
- [ ] **D1. Break the automatic trigger.** Either `flux suspend kustomization flux-system -n
flux-system` on dev (stops the root from self-applying the merge), **or** re-point dev's
`GitRepository` url at the bootstrap Gitea for the window. Do this **before** the merge, not
after. This is what converts "merging strands dev" into "merging is inert until you say go".
- [ ] **D2. Publish and prove the new host set *while dev still serves the apex*.** The new names
must exist before anything depends on them:
- a `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` + `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` **wildcard Certificate issued
and `Ready`** (LE prod, DNS-01) — see the ACME note below before ordering it;
- public DNS for `gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` resolving to dev's Gateway VIP
(192.168.1.53), **checked against Cloudflare / a public resolver, never through the pfSense
override** — that mistake was made on 2026-09-04 and produced a false healthy reading;
- `curl -sS https://gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/api/v1/version` succeeding with a
publicly-trusted cert from a host on the dev LAN.
Until D2 is green, D3 is not safe.
- [ ] **D3. Merge the authored change to `main`** (`clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`,
`clusters/dev/`, `clusters/prod/`, the two Ansible files, `platform/externaldns`,
`catalog/render.py`). With D1 in place nothing moves yet.
- [ ] **D4. Release dev's reconciliation deliberately.** Resume the root Kustomization (or restore
the in-cluster url, now pointing at `gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev`) and watch
`flux get kustomizations -A` converge. Dev's Gateway listeners, HTTPRoutes, coredns-custom zone
and Homepage links all move here. Dev's external-dns publishes the new record set under owner
`dev`.
- [ ] **D5. Keycloak: issuer + every client.** Dev's realm issuer becomes
`https://keycloak.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`. The issuer is baked into every
token, and **~12 OIDC clients** need their redirect URIs moved in the same change: `grafana`,
`gitea`, `nextcloud`, `semaphore`, `headlamp`, `crafty`, `pihole`, `jackett`, `qbittorrent`,
`radarr`, `sonarr`, plus the `kubernetes` public client. Most are reconciled from
`platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml` and move with D4; **headlamp's is the exception**
— its issuer/callback live in a SOPS-encrypted Secret and must be re-encrypted by hand.
- [ ] **D6. Rolling k3s restart + kubectl SSO re-issue.** `k3s_base_domain` now renders a different
`oidc-issuer-url` into `/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml`, so the `k3s_server` role is **no longer
a no-op on dev**: it rewrites the file and fires the Restart handler on all three servers. Run
it **one server at a time**, confirming `kubectl get nodes` between each. Every user's OIDC
kubeconfig is invalidated and must be re-issued; the cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working
throughout, which is what makes this step recoverable. **Do not reboot nodes** — restart the
`k3s` service only.
- [ ] **D7. Retire dev's old apex records.** They are owned by `default`, which no environment now
claims, so nothing removes them automatically. Delete the `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` A
records, the apex record, **and their TXT registry entries** (`external-dns-*` TXT), plus any
stale `_acme-challenge.home.keithjackson.dev`. *Alternative, if you prefer external-dns to do
its own cleanup:* set dev's `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` back to `default` for exactly one
reconcile after D4 — `policy: sync` will then garbage-collect the apex set it no longer has
sources for — and only then switch it to `dev`. That is two commits and needs watching; the
direct deletion is preferred because it is verifiable in one place.
- [ ] **D8. Verify the apex is EMPTY, against Cloudflare.** `dig +short <svc>.home.keithjackson.dev
@1.1.1.1` returns nothing for every service name, and no TXT registry entry for those names
remains. **This is the gate on the whole P sequence.** A pfSense/PiHole override is not
evidence about public DNS.
### P — prod takes the apex
- [ ] **P1. Only now unsuspend prod**, in dependency order: `flux resume kustomization platform`,
then the 10 downstream tiers. Confirm D8 first, in Cloudflare, not from a local resolver.
- [ ] **P2. Prod's external-dns publishes under owner `prod`.** Check the logs for a matching hosted
zone (F-DNS1 fail-closed mode: no zone selected ⇒ nothing created — which is safe, but means
the filter was narrowed against instruction). Confirm the new TXT registry entries read owner
`prod` and that no record owned by `dev` was touched.
- [ ] **P3. Prod's wildcard cert `*.home.keithjackson.dev` + `home.keithjackson.dev` is `Ready`** and
solved DNS-01 without colliding with any `_acme-challenge` dev still holds.
- [ ] **P4. Prod's kubectl SSO works without an `/etc/hosts` pin.** Prod nodes resolve
`keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` through **public** upstreams (§4), so this only becomes true
once P2 has published that name at prod's Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20). Before then a prod node
resolving its own issuer reaches **dev**. Use the break-glass cert kubeconfig until P2 is done.
- [ ] **P5. Cut prod's GitOps source over** from the workstation bootstrap Gitea
(`http://192.168.2.132:3000/...`) to `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/...` once prod runs
its own Gitea — the block in `clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml` owns that procedure. Note the
inversion **simplified** this: prod's apex Gitea name and dev's `gitea.dev.home...` are now
different hosts, so prod pointing at the apex means "prod's own Gitea", never dev's.
### ACME: the duplicate-certificate limit
Let's Encrypt rate-limits **duplicate certificates — 5 per week for an identical set of names.**
Prod's wildcard is `*.home.keithjackson.dev` + `home.keithjackson.dev`, which is **exactly the name
set dev holds today**. Every prod order therefore counts against the same bucket as dev's historical
renewals of that pair, and a retry loop during P3 can exhaust it and leave prod with **no trusted
cert for up to a week**. Mitigations:
- Order prod's cert **after** D8, so dev is no longer renewing the same pair.
- Let dev's old `*.home.keithjackson.dev` `Certificate`/Secret be **deleted** in D4/D7 rather than
left to renew in the background.
- Rehearse against **letsencrypt-staging** first (`ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER`) — staging has its own,
far looser limits — and only switch prod to `letsencrypt-prod` when the DNS-01 solve is proven.
- Do **not** delete-and-recreate prod's `Certificate` to "retry"; each recreation is a fresh order.
### The L2 tests hardcode the apex
Six behavioural (L2) chainsaw tests embed `home.keithjackson.dev` as a literal:
| test | file |
|---|---|
| `dns-exposure` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/dns-exposure/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `dns-internal-resolution` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/dns-internal-resolution/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `gateway-ingress-reachable` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/gateway-ingress-reachable/chainsaw-test.yaml` (+ `fixtures/app-and-probe.yaml`) |
| `oidc-sso-grafana` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/oidc-sso-grafana/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `sso-forward-auth` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/sso-forward-auth/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `trusted-tls` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/trusted-tls/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
They are **test inputs, not reconciled manifests**, so they are deliberately left alone by the
authoring change: they are the only thing still asserting the apex, and while dev is live on the apex
they are *correct*. Under the new direction the literal happens to become right for **prod** and
wrong for **dev**, so they must be **parameterized per environment** (not merely edited) before
either §9's *"suite passes green against the prod cluster"* or a green L2 run against migrated dev
can be claimed. Until then, expect the dev L2 suite to fail between D4 and that parameterization —
a known, scheduled failure, not a regression.
The L1 *rendering* tests need no change: their goldens carry `${BASE_DOMAIN}` as a token, and the
literal hostnames in them come from each test's own fixture `ingressRoutes[].host`, which is
environment-independent by construction.
### Offline proof carried out for the authoring change (no cluster touched)
All 12 `substituteFrom` paths were rendered for **both** overlays through the real toolchain
(`kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone <spec.path> | flux envsubst --strict`,
with each overlay's effective `cluster-vars` taken from `kubectl kustomize clusters/<env>`), before
and after the change.
- **Dev's diff is *only* the hostname move.** Proven by inverse substitution rather than by reading
the diff: applying `s/dev.home.keithjackson.dev/home.keithjackson.dev/` to the new render restores
the baseline **byte-for-byte** in all 12 paths, plus 2 declared `txtOwnerId: default → dev` lines.
145 changed line pairs, all classified: 143 hostname-move, 2 declared owner-id, **0 unexplained**,
and **0 bare-apex remnants**. The 2 paths with no change (`cilium`, `velero`) provably contain no
hostname at all (`grep -c keithjackson.dev` = 0).
- **Prod lands on the bare apex:** **0** occurrences of `prod.home.keithjackson.dev` and **0** of
`dev.home.keithjackson.dev` anywhere in prod's rendered output; 143 apex names.
- **Certs:** dev `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` + `dev.home.keithjackson.dev`; prod
`*.home.keithjackson.dev` + `home.keithjackson.dev`.
- **Positive controls** (the harness is provably not blind): perturbing an unrelated knob
(`GATEWAY_VIP`) surfaces 1 unexplained line; perturbing `BASE_DOMAIN` to a wrong value fails 10 of
12 paths; injecting a single un-moved hostname is caught by the independent bare-apex scan (which
the byte-identity check alone cannot see — which is why both exist).
- Gates: `ci/l0.sh`, `ci/l1.sh`, `ci/render-golden.sh`, `ci/lint.sh`,
`flux-postbuild-substitution/check.sh` (254 assertions), `catalog/render.py --selftest`,
`ci/spec-immutability.sh` — all **PASS**.
@@ -289,15 +289,70 @@ node_baseline_dns_servers:
# LAN clients -> PiHole. Not a cluster concern.
# nodes -> THIS FILE. Public resolvers, so the zone resolves PUBLICLY.
#
# THE ONE THING THAT BREAKS: the k3s API SERVER is a node process and carries
# `oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`
# (roles/k3s_server/tasks/main.yml). It reaches the issuer through the NODE resolver, so on
# prod it would get the PUBLIC record instead of the prod Gateway VIP — breaking kubectl
# OIDC SSO. Dev avoids this because its node resolver is PiHole, which answers the zone
# with the dev Gateway VIP.
# THE k3s API SERVER is a node process and carries `oidc-issuer-url=...` (built from
# k3s_base_domain, below). It reaches the issuer through the NODE resolver, i.e. through
# these PUBLIC upstreams — not through CoreDNS's split-horizon answer.
#
# NOT blocking today (prod has no cluster and no Keycloak yet). Options, in
# PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4: a narrow Ansible-managed /etc/hosts entry pinning
# keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev -> 192.168.2.20 on prod nodes; or a local resolver on the
# prod LAN serving the zone; or run prod on the cert kubeconfig and defer OIDC.
# ORDERING HAZARD, NOT YET CLEARED. Prod's issuer is keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev — an APEX
# name, because prod IS the apex under the 2026-09-04 inversion (k3s_base_domain below).
# That is the name the LIVE DEV CLUSTER answers today, and its public A record currently
# points at DEV's Gateway VIP (192.168.1.53) — the wrong cluster, on the wrong LAN. A prod
# node resolving its own issuer through these public upstreams therefore reaches dev until:
# (1) dev has migrated to *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev and RETIRED its apex records, and
# (2) PROD's own external-dns has published keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev at PROD's
# Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20).
# Only then do the public answer and the in-cluster split-horizon answer AGREE, and no
# /etc/hosts pin is needed. Until then kubectl OIDC SSO on prod cannot work; the cert-based
# admin kubeconfig is the break-glass path and always works. Ordering, not a design gap —
# the ordered steps are infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
node_baseline_dns_search: []
# --- platform hostname suffix, ANSIBLE SIDE (R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01) --------------------
# PROD **IS** THE APEX. [parity] MUST equal BASE_DOMAIN in clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml —
# the same one-fact-in-two-places contract as k3s_data_dir and k3s_api_host. The Flux side
# cannot supply this: the kube-apiserver's oidc-issuer-url is a k3s server FLAG written to
# /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml, not a manifest, so postBuild.substituteFrom never sees it.
# Full rationale in roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml, where k3s_oidc_issuer_url derives.
#
# WHY THE SUFFIXES SPLIT (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10): both clusters were authored to serve
# the SAME hostnames from the SAME Cloudflare zone, and on 2026-09-04 prod's external-dns
# deleted every one of dev's public records.
#
# WHICH WAY ROUND — INVERTED 2026-09-04 by operator decision, superseding the interim split
# committed earlier the same day (prod on `prod.home.` behind apex CNAMEs). The simpler target:
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX; this variable — no `prod.` label, no CNAMEs)
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml)
# So prod's Keycloak issuer is https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab, and the
# `kubernetes` OIDC client in PROD's OWN Keycloak realm is what prod's kubectl SSO authenticates
# against.
#
# ORDERING HAZARD SPECIFIC TO THIS VARIABLE. keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev is the name the LIVE
# dev cluster answers today, and prod's nodes resolve the issuer through PUBLIC upstreams (see
# node_baseline_dns_search above). So until dev has vacated the apex and PROD's external-dns has
# published that name at PROD's Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20), a prod node resolving its own issuer
# gets DEV's VIP (192.168.1.53) — the wrong cluster, on the wrong LAN. kubectl OIDC SSO on prod
# therefore does not work until §10's dev-vacate steps are complete; the cert-based admin
# kubeconfig is the break-glass path and always works. Ordering, not a design gap.
k3s_base_domain: "home.keithjackson.dev"
# --- Flux bootstrap: WHICH overlay this environment reconciles from (R-ENV-02) -----
# roles/flux_bootstrap defaults flux_bootstrap_env_path to `clusters/dev` (dev is LIVE
# and group_vars/all.yml carries no override, so dev keeps resolving exactly that).
# Prod bootstraps its OWN overlay. Before this seam existed the role could bootstrap
# clusters/dev ONLY — bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh's FLUX_ENV_PATH default was never
# exported by the role — so `flux bootstrap ... --path=clusters/prod` (§8 step 4 of
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md) was simply not reachable without editing the role.
#
# Same seam as kube_vip_address / k3s_api_host / k3s_data_dir / cluster_kubeconfig_name /
# node_baseline_backports_kernel above: set once for the [k3s_prod] umbrella group, so a
# FOURTH prod node inherits it from group membership with no per-host or per-run flag.
#
# WHAT clusters/prod STILL NEEDS before this is safe to run — do NOT invoke the
# flux_bootstrap role until these are true (PROD-PROVISIONING.md §7):
# - the remaining TBD-PROD-* placeholders in clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml are real
# (S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT); they are INVALID on purpose so an early apply fails loudly;
# - the GitRepository url there is the TEMPORARY workstation Gitea
# (http://192.168.2.132:3000/...) and that container is actually running and reachable
# from the prod nodes — it is outside every cluster and can simply be powered off;
# - the `sops-age` Secret is installed out of band on prod (bootstrap/sops).
flux_bootstrap_env_path: "clusters/prod"
+13 -2
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,20 @@ cilium_namespace: "kube-system"
# Cilium 1.20.1 targets Gateway API v1.6.1.
gateway_api_version: "v1.6.1"
gateway_api_crd_urls:
# ONE URL, deliberately. As of v1.6.0 the STANDARD channel bundle already contains
# TLSRoute (plus TCPRoute, UDPRoute, ListenerSet and BackendTLSPolicy), so the separate
# experimental TLSRoute manifest this list used to carry is redundant — and worse than
# redundant: v1.6 also ships a ValidatingAdmissionPolicy,
# `safe-upgrades.gateway.networking.k8s.io`, which REJECTS an experimental-channel CRD
# applied over a standard-channel one. Applying the old second URL therefore fails hard:
# ValidatingAdmissionPolicy 'safe-upgrades.gateway.networking.k8s.io' ... denied request:
# Installing experimental CRDs on top of standard channel CRDs is prohibited by default.
# Verified 2026-09-04 on the prod bootstrap: standard-install.yaml v1.6.1 alone produces the
# exact 10 gateway.networking.k8s.io CRDs the LIVE dev cluster is running, tlsroutes included
# and annotated channel=standard, bundle-version=v1.6.1 — so this is parity with dev, not a
# reduction. Dev needs no reapply; it already has them. If gateway_api_version is ever moved
# BACK below v1.6.0, the experimental TLSRoute URL has to come back with it.
- "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/gateway-api/releases/download/{{ gateway_api_version }}/standard-install.yaml"
# TLSRoute (experimental) is required by Cilium's Gateway API support.
- "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes-sigs/gateway-api/{{ gateway_api_version }}/config/crd/experimental/gateway.networking.k8s.io_tlsroutes.yaml"
# Local kubeconfig fetched from the primary. *.kubeconfig is gitignored. The FILENAME
# comes from cluster_kubeconfig_name (group_vars) so a prod run cannot overwrite the dev
@@ -19,5 +19,22 @@ flux_bootstrap_repo_root: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../../.."
flux_bootstrap_sops_cmd: "bash {{ flux_bootstrap_repo_root }}/bootstrap/sops/install-age-key.sh"
# Assumed interface of bootstrap/flux (GitOps Engineer, T-1.4):
# runs `flux bootstrap ... --path=clusters/dev` against this cluster.
# runs `flux install` + `kubectl apply -k <env path>` against this cluster.
flux_bootstrap_flux_cmd: "bash {{ flux_bootstrap_repo_root }}/bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh"
# --- WHICH ENVIRONMENT OVERLAY THIS BOOTSTRAPS (R-ENV-02) -------------------------
# The one thing that makes this role environment-agnostic. bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh
# reads FLUX_ENV_PATH (default clusters/dev) and ends with `kubectl apply -k <that>`;
# tasks/main.yml exports this value into that variable, so the role NEVER names an
# environment and the task graph is identical for dev and prod.
#
# THE DEFAULT IS DEV ON PURPOSE — dev is LIVE, and group_vars/all.yml carries no
# override, so a dev run resolves exactly the value it always had (clusters/dev) and
# behaves byte-for-byte as before.
#
# PROD OVERRIDES IT in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml — the same group_vars
# seam as kube_vip_address / k3s_data_dir / cluster_kubeconfig_name /
# node_baseline_backports_kernel. No role fork, no per-run extra-var, no second
# playbook: group membership decides. Before this existed the role could bootstrap
# ONLY clusters/dev, so prod bring-up was impossible without editing the role.
flux_bootstrap_env_path: "clusters/dev"
@@ -4,11 +4,17 @@
# — it calls the entrypoints the Security + GitOps Engineers author there.
#
# Order matters: install the age decryption key FIRST (so Flux can decrypt on its
# very first reconcile), THEN run `flux bootstrap` at clusters/dev.
# very first reconcile), THEN bootstrap Flux at the environment's overlay.
#
# The two commands are variables (see defaults/main.yml). If the bootstrap workers
# expose different entrypoints, override flux_bootstrap_sops_cmd / _flux_cmd — the
# task graph does not change.
#
# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): this role names NO environment. Which overlay gets
# bootstrapped comes from `flux_bootstrap_env_path` (defaults/main.yml, default
# clusters/dev), exported below as FLUX_ENV_PATH — the variable bootstrap/flux/
# bootstrap.sh already reads. Prod overrides it in group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml, the
# same seam as kube_vip_address / k3s_data_dir / cluster_kubeconfig_name.
- name: Assert the bootstrap/ subtree exists (authored by the other worker)
ansible.builtin.stat:
@@ -29,11 +35,14 @@
run_once: true
changed_when: true
- name: Bootstrap Flux against clusters/dev (bootstrap/flux)
- name: Bootstrap Flux against this environment's overlay (bootstrap/flux)
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: "{{ flux_bootstrap_flux_cmd }}"
environment:
KUBECONFIG: "{{ flux_bootstrap_kubeconfig }}"
# The ONLY per-environment input. clusters/dev by default (dev unchanged);
# clusters/prod for [k3s_prod] hosts via group_vars.
FLUX_ENV_PATH: "{{ flux_bootstrap_env_path }}"
delegate_to: localhost
become: false
run_once: true
@@ -66,3 +66,44 @@ k3s_tls_sans: >-
{{ ([k3s_api_host, kube_vip_address, '127.0.0.1']
+ (groups[k3s_servers_group] | map('extract', hostvars, 'k3s_node_ip') | list))
| unique }}
# --- Keycloak OIDC issuer for kubectl SSO (R-IDP-03, R-ENV-02) -----------------------
# THE ANSIBLE-SIDE HALF OF ${BASE_DOMAIN}, and it cannot be the Flux-side half.
#
# The kube-apiserver's `oidc-issuer-url` is a k3s SERVER FLAG written into
# /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml by this role — it is NOT a Kubernetes manifest, so Flux never
# sees it and `postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars` cannot reach it. The platform hostname
# suffix therefore exists as ONE FACT IN TWO PLACES, and they must agree:
#
# Flux side clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml BASE_DOMAIN (per-overlay)
# Ansible side THIS variable k3s_base_domain (per-inventory-group)
#
# [parity] k3s_base_domain MUST equal the BASE_DOMAIN the SAME cluster's Flux overlay sets.
# If they disagree, the apiserver validates ID tokens against a DIFFERENT Keycloak than the
# one the cluster actually runs: every `kubectl` SSO login fails with an issuer mismatch,
# while the cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working — so it looks like "SSO is broken",
# not like a config skew. The break-glass cert kubeconfig is why this is recoverable.
#
# THE DEFAULT IS THE DEV VALUE — the same convention as k3s_data_dir above and cluster-vars'
# GATEWAY_VIP / LONGHORN_DATA_PATH: the role default is dev's value and prod overrides it in
# inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml (the same inventory seam k3s_data_dir / k3s_api_host /
# kube_vip_address use, so a FOURTH prod server inherits it from group membership rather than
# from anyone remembering).
#
# *** WHICH DEV VALUE — UPDATED 2026-09-04, AND IT IS AHEAD OF THE LIVE DEV CLUSTER. ***
# The operator inverted the suffix split: PROD is now the apex `home.keithjackson.dev` and DEV
# carries the label `dev.home.keithjackson.dev`. This default therefore moved from the apex to
# dev's subdomain, mirroring BASE_DOMAIN in clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml.
#
# CONSEQUENCE — this default no longer matches what the live dev nodes are running, so unlike
# every previous edit to this file A DEV RE-RUN IS NOT A NO-OP. Rendering config.yaml with the
# new issuer CHANGES the file, FIRES the Restart handler, and rolls k3s on all three dev
# servers, which also invalidates every user's OIDC kubeconfig (SSO must be re-issued). That is
# a deliberate step of the dev DNS migration, NOT a side effect to discover during unrelated
# work: DO NOT run the k3s_server role against dev until step D6 of
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10, and never while the operator is away. The break-glass
# cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working throughout, which is what makes the step safe.
k3s_base_domain: "dev.home.keithjackson.dev"
# Derived, so the realm path is stated once. Override k3s_base_domain, not this.
k3s_oidc_issuer_url: "https://keycloak.{{ k3s_base_domain }}/realms/homelab"
+19 -6
View File
@@ -75,13 +75,19 @@
# OIDC (Keycloak SSO for kubectl). The API server trusts ID tokens from the homelab realm;
# the `kubernetes` PUBLIC client (PKCE) + kubelogin mint them, and RBAC binds the `groups`
# claim (platform/keycloak/k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml: oidc:platform-admins->cluster-admin,
# oidc:viewers->view). Nodes resolve keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev to the Cilium gateway VIP
# (192.168.1.53) and trust its public LE-prod cert, so NO oidc-ca-file is needed. The `oidc:`
# oidc:viewers->view). Nodes resolve keycloak.<k3s_base_domain> to the Cilium gateway VIP
# and trust its public LE-prod cert, so NO oidc-ca-file is needed. The `oidc:`
# prefixes namespace federated identities away from cert / service-account subjects.
# ADDITIVE + break-glass-safe: the cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps full access with or
# without Keycloak, so a bad realm/OIDC state can never lock you out of the cluster.
#
# NOT a Flux ${BASE_DOMAIN} token: this is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so
# postBuild.substituteFrom never touches it. k3s_oidc_issuer_url derives from
# k3s_base_domain (defaults/main.yml), whose [parity] contract with the cluster's
# BASE_DOMAIN is documented there. Dev's default renders the value it already runs, so
# config.yaml is unchanged and the Restart handler does not fire.
kube-apiserver-arg:
- "oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab"
- "oidc-issuer-url={{ k3s_oidc_issuer_url }}"
- "oidc-client-id=kubernetes"
- "oidc-username-claim=email"
- "oidc-username-prefix=oidc:"
@@ -98,15 +104,20 @@
INSTALL_K3S_VERSION: "{{ k3s_version }}"
when: k3s_server_mode == 'primary'
# PATH FOLLOWS --data-dir. k3s writes the node-token to <data-dir>/server/token, NOT to
# the literal /var/lib/rancher/k3s. On dev k3s_data_dir IS /var/lib/rancher/k3s (the role
# default, restated explicitly above) so this is byte-for-byte the old path; on prod
# --data-dir is /data/k3s (group_vars/k3s_prod) and the hardcoded path did not exist at all
# — this task would have timed out after 180s and the two secondaries could never join.
- name: Wait for the k3s node-token to exist (primary)
ansible.builtin.wait_for:
path: /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token
path: "{{ k3s_data_dir }}/server/token"
timeout: 180
when: k3s_server_mode == 'primary'
- name: Read the k3s node-token (primary)
ansible.builtin.slurp:
src: /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token
src: "{{ k3s_data_dir }}/server/token"
register: k3s_token_raw
when: k3s_server_mode == 'primary'
@@ -126,9 +137,11 @@
# "The primary" is resolved through k3s_primary_group (group_vars: `k3s_primary` for
# dev, `k3s_prod_primary` for prod), never a literal group name — so a prod secondary
# delegates to the PROD primary using this same role, unchanged (R-ENV-02).
# k3s_data_dir is a CLUSTER-WIDE value (group_vars for prod, role default for dev), so the
# secondary's own copy of it is also the primary's data dir — correct for the delegated read.
- name: Fetch the k3s node-token directly from the primary (secondary)
ansible.builtin.slurp:
src: /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token
src: "{{ k3s_data_dir }}/server/token"
delegate_to: "{{ groups[k3s_primary_group][0] }}"
register: k3s_primary_token_raw
when:
+11 -1
View File
@@ -31,4 +31,14 @@ kube_vip_retry_period: 2
# k3s auto-deploy manifests dir: k3s applies anything here on start, so kube-vip
# is reproducible and independent of Flux/Helm.
kube_vip_manifest_path: "/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/manifests/kube-vip.yaml"
#
# THE PATH FOLLOWS --data-dir. k3s reads auto-deploy manifests from
# <data-dir>/server/manifests, so this must be derived from the cluster-wide
# k3s_data_dir (roles/k3s_server turns the same variable into --data-dir), not from the
# literal /var/lib/rancher/k3s. Dev leaves k3s_data_dir unset outside roles/k3s_server's
# own defaults, so the fallback below reproduces dev's existing path exactly; prod sets
# k3s_data_dir: /data/k3s in group_vars/k3s_prod, where the old hardcoded path was simply
# not the directory k3s watches — the manifest would have been written and silently never
# applied, and the control-plane VIP would never have come up.
kube_vip_manifest_path: >-
{{ k3s_data_dir | default('/var/lib/rancher/k3s') }}/server/manifests/kube-vip.yaml
+14 -5
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,22 @@
---
# Deploy kube-vip (control-plane HA VIP) via the k3s auto-deploy manifests dir.
# k3s applies /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/manifests/*.yaml on start, so this is
# reproducible and independent of Flux. The same manifest is written on every
# k3s applies <data-dir>/server/manifests/*.yaml on start, so this is
# reproducible and independent of Flux (see kube_vip_manifest_path in defaults/main.yml —
# the dir follows k3s's --data-dir, which prod moves to /data/k3s). The same manifest is written on every
# server so the DaemonSet survives the loss of any single node.
- name: Detect the LAN interface holding the node's 192.168.1.5x address
# WHICH INTERFACE kube-vip ARPs THE VIP ON. Detected from this node's OWN k3s_node_ip
# (inventory, per host) rather than a hardcoded subnet: the previous awk matched the
# literal 192.168.1.5[0-2], i.e. DEV's node addresses, so on prod (192.168.2.10/.11/.12)
# it returned nothing and the assert below aborted the play. k3s_node_ip is the same
# address k3s advertises with --node-ip and is defined for dev and prod alike, so this
# resolves eno1 on prod and the identical dev interface it always resolved before.
# `ip addr show to <ip>/32` does the matching in iproute2 instead of a regex over dotted
# quads (where `.` would match any character).
- name: Detect the LAN interface holding this node's k3s_node_ip
ansible.builtin.shell: >-
set -o pipefail;
ip -o -4 addr show | awk '/192\.168\.1\.5[0-2]\//{print $2; exit}'
ip -o -4 addr show to {{ k3s_node_ip }}/32 | awk '{print $2; exit}'
args:
executable: /bin/bash
register: kube_vip_iface_detect
@@ -25,7 +34,7 @@
- kube_vip_vip_interface is defined
- kube_vip_vip_interface | length > 0
fail_msg: >-
Could not detect the 192.168.1.5x LAN interface for kube-vip on
Could not detect the interface holding {{ k3s_node_ip }} for kube-vip on
{{ inventory_hostname }} — set kube_vip_interface explicitly.
- name: Ensure the k3s auto-deploy manifests directory exists
@@ -183,6 +183,29 @@ node_baseline_protected_mounts:
- /home
- /tmp
# --- WIRELESS (tasks/main.yml, tag `wireless`) ---------------------------------------
# A CLUSTER NODE GETS EXACTLY ONE PATH ONTO THE NETWORK. ON by default — unlike the
# backports kernel above, which is a prod-only deviation, this is a cluster-wide policy and
# it is a provable NO-OP where it does not apply: the tasks act only on interfaces the node
# reports as real 802.11 devices (a `phy80211` link in sysfs), and dev's Proxmox VMs have
# none, so on dev nothing is written, nothing is unloaded and nothing changes. Defaulting it
# true is what makes a FOURTH node with a wifi card inherit the policy from being a cluster
# node, rather than from someone remembering to set a flag.
#
# WHY IT EXISTS: k3s-prod-3 came up on both eno1 (192.168.2.12, the inventory address) and
# wlp1s0 (192.168.2.195, DHCP on the same /24). The wifi lease's dhcpcd run rewrote
# /etc/resolv.conf three minutes after this role wrote it, and a second address on the LAN
# where kube-vip floats 192.168.2.9 and Cilium L2-announces .20-.30 is a problem in its own
# right. See the `wireless` block in tasks/main.yml for the full reasoning, including why the
# DRIVER MODULE is the layer that gets blocked rather than the link, a service, or rfkill.
#
# SET IT FALSE for a host that must genuinely keep wifi (there is none today). That does NOT
# undo an already-applied block — delete the file below on the node as well.
node_baseline_disable_wireless: true
# Where the persistent block lives. 99- so it is read last and overrides any earlier
# permissive rule; the name says what it does, on a node with no repo checkout to hand.
node_baseline_wireless_modprobe_file: /etc/modprobe.d/99-k3s-no-wireless.conf
# --- DNS resilience (R-DNS-01 / R-DNS-03) -------------------------------------------
# These are the DEV values. Prod overrides them in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml
# (the same seam kube_vip_address / k3s_api_host / cluster_kubeconfig_name use) — NOT in
+412 -14
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
# TAGS — every task here carries one of `packages`, `kernel`, `system`, `disks` or `dns`. An
# untagged run is unchanged (all five run, in this order). The split exists because the PACKAGE floor
# TAGS — every task here carries one of `packages`, `kernel`, `system`, `wireless`, `disks` or
# `dns`. An untagged run is unchanged (all six run, in this order). The split exists because the PACKAGE floor
# and the DATA-DISK work have different readiness: packages are safe on any node from
# first contact, while the disk tasks need block devices that a new environment may not
# have decided yet (prod: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2, whose decision is itself blocked
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@
# is: it is the ONE thing that must land on a prod node BEFORE k3s is installed (§0b), and
# it must be runnable without touching a disk decision that is still open:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags kernel
# `wireless` (a cluster node gets exactly ONE path onto the network) is separated for a third
# reason: it must be runnable BEFORE `dns` and without touching packages, the kernel or a disk
# decision, because a node with a second DHCP-managed interface reverts the `dns` write. It is
# placed before the disk work for the same reason, and the pair is the whole remedy for the
# k3s-prod-3 incident:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags wireless,dns
- name: Install baseline packages (guest agent, Longhorn/iscsi/nfs prereqs)
ansible.builtin.apt:
@@ -314,6 +320,304 @@
state: "{{ 'started' if node_baseline_qga_channel.stat.exists else 'stopped' }}"
tags: [system]
# =====================================================================================
# WIRELESS — tag `wireless`: a cluster node gets exactly ONE path onto the network
# =====================================================================================
# WHAT WENT WRONG (k3s-prod-3, reported by the operator 2026-09-04). The node was up on BOTH
# eno1 (192.168.2.12 — the inventory address) and wlp1s0 (192.168.2.195, DHCP, the SAME /24).
# The wifi lease carried a dhcpcd run with it, and dhcpcd's `20-resolv.conf` hook REWROTE
# /etc/resolv.conf, undoing the resolvers this role had just written: the file read
# "# Generated by dhcpcd from wlp1s0.dhcp, wlp1s0.dhcp6, wlp1s0.ra" with nameserver
# 192.168.2.1 plus two Google IPv6 servers, timestamped THREE MINUTES AFTER the role's own
# write (01:32 -> 01:35). The role had reported `changed` and green. That is exactly the
# "successful run that fixed nothing" the `contended` branch of the DNS block below exists to
# prevent, and the detection blind spot that let it through is closed there.
#
# WHY THE INTERFACE IS REMOVED RATHER THAN JUST REPORTED. Closing the detection hole alone
# would have turned a silent revert into a loud failure — an improvement, but it leaves the
# node with a second, DHCP-managed path onto the LAN, and on a k3s server that is three
# distinct problems beyond DNS:
# * a SECOND DEFAULT ROUTE, whose metric decides which source address the node uses;
# * a SECOND ADDRESS ON THE SAME L2 — the segment where kube-vip floats 192.168.2.9 and
# Cilium L2-announces 192.168.2.20-.30 (§4). One host answering ARP on one subnet from
# two NICs is the exact shape neither mechanism can reason about;
# * an UNMANAGED address: nothing in this repo knows about .195, and the DHCP server is
# free to hand out a different one after any lease expiry.
# None of that is a resolver bug, and none of it is fixed by writing resolv.conf harder.
#
# WHY THE DRIVER LAYER — the four alternatives, and why each is weaker. What has to hold is:
# survives a REBOOT, survives a LEASE RENEWAL, and cannot be undone by a routine `ifup`.
# Measured on the nodes themselves — all three are HP EliteDesk 800 G5 minis, eno1 is
# `e1000e`, the wifi NIC is an Intel AX200 on `iwlwifi`, and the OS is Debian 13 trixie with
# ifupdown + `networking.service`, NO NetworkManager, NO systemd-networkd, NO systemd-resolved:
# `ip link set <wifi> down` — NOT persistent. Any `ifup`, any hotplug event, any reboot
# undoes it. It is what had already been done by hand on node 3, and the stale dhcpcd
# /etc/resolv.conf outlived it — the link was down and the wrong resolvers were still
# in the file, across a reboot.
# mask the service that manages it — THERE IS NO SUCH SERVICE HERE. dhcpcd on these nodes
# is `dhcpcd-base`: no dhcpcd.service exists at all (`systemctl is-enabled dhcpcd` =
# not-found), it is spawned per-interface by ifupdown. The only unit that can bring
# wireless up is `networking.service` — which ALSO owns eno1's static address, so
# masking it would cut the one SSH path to a machine whose operator is not on site.
# `rfkill` soft-block — weaker on every axis. The netdev still EXISTS, so ifupdown and
# dhcpcd can still be pointed at it; persistence depends on systemd-rfkill restoring
# saved state (the kernel's own `persistent` flag reads 0 on these devices, and the
# `rfkill` CLI is not even installed); and one `rfkill unblock wlan` undoes it.
# the BIOS `M.2 WLAN/BT` toggle — genuinely the deepest layer, and it reads `Enable` on all
# three nodes (hp-bioscfg survey, §1b). NOT taken here: it needs a REBOOT to take
# effect, and a prod reboot is a serialized, supervised operator step (§0b "SECOND
# FAULT" — k3s-prod-2 hung on a warm reboot and needed the power button). It also
# disables Bluetooth on the same M.2 card. Left as an operator recommendation in §4.
# THE DRIVER MODULE — chosen. `blacklist` plus `install <module> /bin/false` in
# /etc/modprobe.d means kmod refuses to load the wifi driver on this boot and every
# future one, so THE NETDEV NEVER EXISTS. No interface means no DHCP lease, no
# resolv.conf hook, no second route, no second address — and every re-activation path
# above (udev hotplug, a hand-run `ifup`, wpa_supplicant, a hand-run dhcpcd) needs a
# device that is not there. `blacklist` alone would still allow a dependency- or
# hand-triggered `modprobe`; the `install ... /bin/false` line is what makes it refuse
# outright. It is ONE declarative file, readable on the node, and undone by deleting
# it. Paired with the runtime unload below, it needs NO reboot to take effect.
#
# SAFE AND IDEMPOTENT ON ALL THREE PROD NODES *AND* ON THE LIVE DEV CLUSTER. Nothing here is
# hostname- or hardware-specific: the block acts only on interfaces the node itself reports as
# real 802.11 devices (a `phy80211` link in sysfs) and on the driver modules behind them.
# * dev (Proxmox VMs, virtio NICs) has no such interface, so the discovery comes back empty,
# every task below is skipped, and NOT EVEN THE modprobe.d FILE IS WRITTEN. The block
# cannot touch dev's networking, which is why it is safe to have on by default.
# * k3s-prod-1 (wlp1s0) and k3s-prod-2 (wlp2s0) already have the link DOWN, so the link-down
# task is skipped by its own `when` and only the modprobe.d file and the module unload
# remain — and both are no-ops on a re-run.
# * k3s-prod-3 (wlp1s0) is the reported node.
# A re-run changes nothing on any of them: the file is content-identical, `ip link set down`
# is gated on the link not already being down, and the unload is gated on the module still
# being loaded.
#
# AND IT REFUSES TO CUT ITS OWN PATH IN. The assert below stops the play if the address
# Ansible is connected to is bound to a wireless interface, or if the default route leaves
# over one, or if the wireless driver module is also the driver of the default-route
# interface. That is the one case where doing this would lock everybody out of a machine
# nobody can walk up to, so it is checked per node, on every run, from that node's own facts.
- name: Survey this node's 802.11 devices, their drivers and any live DHCP client
ansible.builtin.shell:
executable: /bin/sh
cmd: |
set -u
# Flat KEY|value lines so the Ansible side needs one single-group regex per fact and
# no parsing cleverness. A wireless interface is one with a phy80211 link in sysfs —
# that is the kernel's own answer to "is this 802.11", not a name pattern like wlp*.
wifi=''
for d in /sys/class/net/*; do
[ -e "$d/phy80211" ] || continue
i=$(basename "$d")
wifi="$wifi $i"
m=$(basename "$(readlink -f "$d/device/driver" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)")
state=$(cat "$d/operstate" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
printf 'IFACE|%s\n' "$i"
printf 'DETAIL|%s driver=%s operstate=%s\n' "$i" "$m" "$state"
# LIVE means "not already down" — the link-down task keys off this, so a node whose
# radio is already down reports no change.
[ "$state" = down ] || printf 'IFACE_LIVE|%s\n' "$i"
ip -o addr show dev "$i" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print "IFACE_ADDR|" $4}'
[ "$m" = unknown ] || printf 'MODULE|%s\n' "$m"
done
for m in $(printf '%s\n' $wifi | while read -r i; do
[ -n "$i" ] && basename "$(readlink -f "/sys/class/net/$i/device/driver" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
done | sort -u); do
[ "$m" = unknown ] && continue
[ -d "/sys/module/$m" ] || continue
printf 'MODULE_LOADED|%s\n' "$m"
# Holders must be unloaded FIRST: `modprobe -r iwlwifi` fails while iwlmvm still
# holds it. Read from sysfs rather than assumed, so a different wifi driver stack
# (ath*, rtw*, mt76*) works without editing this role.
for h in $(ls "/sys/module/$m/holders" 2>/dev/null); do printf 'MODULE_HOLDER|%s\n' "$h"; done
done
dr=$(ip -o route show default 2>/dev/null | awk '{for (i = 1; i < NF; i++) if ($i == "dev") print $(i + 1)}' | head -1)
printf 'DEFROUTE_IFACE|%s\n' "${dr:-none}"
if [ -n "${dr:-}" ] && [ -e "/sys/class/net/$dr" ]; then
printf 'DEFROUTE_MODULE|%s\n' "$(basename "$(readlink -f "/sys/class/net/$dr/device/driver" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)")"
fi
# Any DHCP client process, with the interfaces it was started for. Used only to stop a
# client that holds a WIRELESS interface and nothing else.
for p in $(pgrep -x dhcpcd 2>/dev/null; pgrep -x dhclient 2>/dev/null); do
printf 'DHCPCLIENT|%s\n' "$(tr '\0' ' ' < "/proc/$p/cmdline" 2>/dev/null)"
done
exit 0
register: node_baseline_wifi_scan
changed_when: false
check_mode: false
when: node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
tags: [wireless]
- name: Interpret the wireless survey
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_baseline_wifi_ifaces: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^IFACE\\|(.+)$') }}"
node_baseline_wifi_live: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^IFACE_LIVE\\|(.+)$') }}"
node_baseline_wifi_addrs: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^IFACE_ADDR\\|(\\S+)') | map('regex_replace', '/.*$', '') | list }}"
node_baseline_wifi_modules: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^MODULE\\|(.+)$') | unique }}"
node_baseline_wifi_modules_loaded: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^MODULE_LOADED\\|(.+)$') | unique }}"
node_baseline_wifi_module_holders: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^MODULE_HOLDER\\|(.+)$') | unique }}"
node_baseline_wifi_detail: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^DETAIL\\|(.+)$') }}"
node_baseline_wifi_dhcp_clients: "{{ scan | regex_findall('(?m)^DHCPCLIENT\\|(.+)$') }}"
node_baseline_defroute_iface: "{{ (scan | regex_findall('(?m)^DEFROUTE_IFACE\\|(.+)$') | first) | default('none', true) }}"
node_baseline_defroute_module: "{{ (scan | regex_findall('(?m)^DEFROUTE_MODULE\\|(.+)$') | first) | default('unknown', true) }}"
vars:
scan: "{{ node_baseline_wifi_scan.stdout | default('') }}"
when: node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
tags: [wireless]
- name: Report this node's wireless hardware
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: >-
wireless devices = {{ node_baseline_wifi_detail | default([]) | join('; ') | default('(none)', true) }}
| driver modules = {{ node_baseline_wifi_modules | default([]) | join(', ') | default('(none)', true) }}
(loaded: {{ node_baseline_wifi_modules_loaded | default([]) | join(', ') | default('(none)', true) }},
held by: {{ node_baseline_wifi_module_holders | default([]) | join(', ') | default('(none)', true) }})
| default route via {{ node_baseline_defroute_iface | default('?') }}
(driver {{ node_baseline_defroute_module | default('?') }})
when: node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
tags: [wireless]
# The one way this block could do real harm is by removing the interface it is being run
# over. Checked from the node's own facts, per node, every run — not assumed from the fact
# that prod "should" be wired.
- name: Refuse to disable wireless if the path to this node runs OVER the wireless interface
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- node_baseline_defroute_iface not in node_baseline_wifi_ifaces
- node_baseline_defroute_module not in node_baseline_wifi_modules
- (ansible_host | default(inventory_hostname)) not in node_baseline_wifi_addrs
fail_msg: >-
REFUSING to disable wireless on this node: the connection to it appears to BE the
wireless path. ansible_host={{ ansible_host | default(inventory_hostname) }}, wireless
interfaces={{ node_baseline_wifi_ifaces | join(', ') }} carrying
{{ node_baseline_wifi_addrs | join(', ') | default('no addresses', true) }}, default route
via {{ node_baseline_defroute_iface }} (driver {{ node_baseline_defroute_module }}).
Disabling the driver here would drop this node off the network with no remote way back.
Give the node a wired address, point the inventory at it, and re-run.
quiet: true
when:
- node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
- node_baseline_wifi_ifaces | length > 0
tags: [wireless]
# THE PERSISTENT HALF. This file is the whole reboot story: kmod consults /etc/modprobe.d on
# every load attempt, so from here on the driver cannot be loaded by udev at boot, as a
# dependency, or by hand. Written ONLY when the node actually has a wireless driver, so a
# node without wifi hardware (every dev VM) gets no file and no change at all.
# `update-initramfs` is deliberately NOT run: no wifi module is loaded from the initramfs on
# these nodes (root is a local SATA/NVMe device), the driver is autoloaded by udev after
# switch-root, and re-generating an initramfs on a prod node is a bigger risk than the one it
# would cover.
- name: Block the wireless driver module(s) from ever loading again
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: "{{ node_baseline_wireless_modprobe_file }}"
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0644"
content: |
# Managed by the Ansible node_baseline role (tags: wireless) — do not edit by hand.
#
# WHY THIS NODE HAS NO WIRELESS. A k3s server gets exactly ONE path onto the network.
# A second, DHCP-managed interface on the same LAN gives the node a second default
# route, a second address nothing in the cluster's config knows about, and a DHCP
# client whose resolv.conf hook silently overwrites the resolvers Ansible manages
# (that is what happened on k3s-prod-3, 2026-09-04). The link is also brought down and
# the module unloaded at the same time, so no reboot is needed for this to take effect.
#
# `blacklist` stops udev's alias-driven autoload; the `install ... /bin/false` line is
# what also refuses a dependency-triggered or hand-run `modprobe`. Both are needed.
#
# TO RE-ENABLE WIRELESS ON THIS NODE: delete this file and `modprobe` the module(s)
# below (or reboot). To stop Ansible putting it back, set
# node_baseline_disable_wireless: false for this host first — otherwise the next
# node-baseline run recreates it. Full rationale: roles/node_baseline/tasks/main.yml,
# the `wireless` block, and infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4.
{% for module in node_baseline_wifi_modules %}
blacklist {{ module }}
install {{ module }} /bin/false
{% endfor %}
when:
- node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
- node_baseline_wifi_modules | length > 0
tags: [wireless]
# THE RUNTIME HALF — everything below makes the change true NOW, so the node does not have to
# be rebooted to stop carrying a second address (this role never reboots: §0b "SECOND FAULT").
#
# Stop a DHCP client that is holding a wireless interface first, so it releases its lease
# instead of being left holding a device that is about to disappear. HEAVILY GUARDED: it runs
# only for clients whose command line names a wireless interface and names NO non-wireless
# interface, because `dhcpcd -x` against a shared master process would also drop a wired
# lease. On these prod nodes eno1 is a static ifupdown address with no DHCP client at all, so
# this task has nothing to do; it exists so the ordering is correct on a node where wifi is
# still actively leasing.
- name: Stop the dhcpcd instance that holds a wireless interface (and nothing else)
ansible.builtin.command:
argv: [dhcpcd, --exit, "{{ item }}"]
loop: "{{ node_baseline_wifi_ifaces }}"
register: node_baseline_wifi_dhcpcd_exit
changed_when: rc == 0
failed_when: false
when:
- node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
- node_baseline_wifi_dhcp_wifi_only | length > 0
- node_baseline_wifi_dhcp_wifi_only | select('search', 'dhcpcd') | list | length > 0
vars:
# A client is "wireless-only" when its argv mentions a wireless interface and mentions no
# other interface this node has. Empty interface sets are turned into a pattern that
# cannot match, so an odd node fails towards doing nothing rather than towards guessing.
node_baseline_non_wifi_ifaces: "{{ ansible_facts['interfaces'] | default([]) | difference(node_baseline_wifi_ifaces) | difference(['lo']) }}"
node_baseline_wifi_dhcp_wifi_only: >-
{{ node_baseline_wifi_dhcp_clients
| select('search', '\b(' ~ ((node_baseline_wifi_ifaces | join('|')) | default('__no_such_interface__', true)) ~ ')\b')
| reject('search', '\b(' ~ ((node_baseline_non_wifi_ifaces | join('|')) | default('__no_such_interface__', true)) ~ ')\b')
| list }}
tags: [wireless]
- name: Take each wireless link down now
ansible.builtin.command:
argv: [ip, link, set, dev, "{{ item }}", down]
loop: "{{ node_baseline_wifi_live }}"
changed_when: true
when: node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
tags: [wireless]
# Unload the driver so the netdev is gone immediately — holders (iwlmvm on these nodes) first,
# then the driver itself, because `modprobe -r` refuses a module that is still held.
# NOT fatal on failure: the persistent block above is already in place, so a module that
# cannot be unloaded right now is gone at the next boot regardless. The report below says so
# out loud rather than letting a green play imply the radio is already off.
- name: Unload the wireless driver module(s) now (no reboot needed)
community.general.modprobe:
name: "{{ item }}"
state: absent
loop: "{{ node_baseline_wifi_module_holders + node_baseline_wifi_modules_loaded }}"
register: node_baseline_wifi_unload
failed_when: false
when: node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
tags: [wireless]
- name: Report the wireless state this node is left in
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: >-
{{ 'No 802.11 device on this node — nothing to disable (no modprobe.d file written).'
if (node_baseline_wifi_ifaces | length) == 0
else ((('WIRELESS DISABLED: ' ~ (node_baseline_wifi_modules | join(', ')) ~ ' blocked in '
~ node_baseline_wireless_modprobe_file ~ ' (survives reboot) and unloaded now; '
~ (node_baseline_wifi_ifaces | join(', ')) ~ ' is down and the netdev is gone.')
if (failed_unloads | length) == 0
else ('WIRELESS BLOCKED FOR THE NEXT BOOT BUT STILL LOADED NOW: could not unload '
~ (failed_unloads | join(', ')) ~ '. ' ~ node_baseline_wireless_modprobe_file
~ ' is in place, so the driver will not load again after a reboot, but the '
~ 'radio is live until then — check `ip link` and whether something still '
~ 'holds the device.'))) }}
vars:
failed_unloads: >-
{{ (node_baseline_wifi_unload.results | default([]))
| selectattr('failed', 'defined') | selectattr('failed') | map(attribute='item') | list }}
when: node_baseline_disable_wireless | bool
tags: [wireless]
# =====================================================================================
# DATA DISKS — tag `disks`, in tasks/disks.yml
# =====================================================================================
@@ -377,6 +681,11 @@
# node and the matching seam is written. Adding a third mechanism means adding a branch
# here, not rewriting the role.
#
# AND DETECTION IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE SET OF OWNERS IT KNOWS ABOUT. It originally looked for
# resolvconf/openresolv and NetworkManager, missed dhcpcd, and therefore reported a green,
# `changed` run on k3s-prod-3 whose resolvers a wifi lease reverted three minutes later. dhcpcd
# is now part of that set — see the detection task below and the `contended` failure.
#
# All of it is `dns`-tagged, so `--tags packages` (the prod package-floor escape hatch
# documented at the top of this file) still installs nothing but packages.
@@ -396,6 +705,55 @@
check_mode: false
tags: [dns]
# THE dhcpcd BLIND SPOT, CLOSED (k3s-prod-3, 2026-09-04). dhcpcd's `20-resolv.conf` hook
# rewrites /etc/resolv.conf on every lease, renewal and carrier change, and it is a THIRD
# way to own that file — neither resolvconf nor NetworkManager. On node 3 it silently reverted
# this role's write three minutes later, and because nothing below looked for it the role had
# already reported `changed` and green: the precise failure the `contended` branch exists to
# make impossible.
#
# WHY THIS LOOKS FOR A LIVE CLIENT AND NOT FOR AN INSTALLED PACKAGE. `dhcpcd-base` is
# installed on all three prod nodes and always will be — it is the DHCP client ifupdown
# reaches for — and there is NO dhcpcd.service on them at all (`systemctl is-active dhcpcd` =
# not-found; it is spawned per-interface by ifupdown). Keying off the package, or off a unit
# that does not exist, would put every prod node permanently in `contended` and leave the DNS
# block unable to configure a node it is perfectly safe to configure. What actually matters is
# whether a DHCP client CAN still write the file, so all three real signals are checked:
# CLIENT| a dhcpcd/dhclient process running right now (with the argv that started it);
# UNIT| a dhcpcd/dhclient unit that IS active or IS enabled, on a distro that has one;
# STANZA| an UNCOMMENTED `iface <x> inet[6] dhcp` in /etc/network/interfaces{,.d} — the
# configuration that makes ifupdown spawn a client at the next boot or `ifup`, even
# when none is running at this instant.
# Any one of them means "another manager is in play" and the play stops below. None of them
# means no client can run, and the file is genuinely ours to own.
- name: Determine whether a DHCP client (dhcpcd/dhclient) can rewrite /etc/resolv.conf
ansible.builtin.shell:
executable: /bin/sh
cmd: |
set -u
for p in $(pgrep -x dhcpcd 2>/dev/null; pgrep -x dhclient 2>/dev/null); do
printf 'CLIENT|%s\n' "$(tr '\0' ' ' < "/proc/$p/cmdline" 2>/dev/null)"
done
for u in dhcpcd dhcpcd5 dhclient isc-dhcp-client; do
a=$(systemctl is-active "$u" 2>/dev/null || true)
e=$(systemctl is-enabled "$u" 2>/dev/null || true)
# Compared exactly, never with a substring match: `is-active` answers "inactive",
# which contains the word "active".
if [ "$a" = active ] || [ "$e" = enabled ] || [ "$e" = enabled-runtime ]; then
printf 'UNIT|%s active=%s enabled=%s\n' "$u" "$a" "$e"
fi
done
# `^[[:space:]]*iface` cannot match a commented-out stanza, which is how the wireless
# stanza is left on these nodes.
grep -rhE '^[[:space:]]*iface[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]+[[:space:]]+inet6?[[:space:]]+dhcp' \
/etc/network/interfaces /etc/network/interfaces.d/ 2>/dev/null \
| sed -e 's/^[[:space:]]*/STANZA|/'
exit 0
register: node_baseline_dhcp_client_scan
changed_when: false
check_mode: false
tags: [dns]
# follow: false — we need to know whether /etc/resolv.conf IS a symlink and where it
# points, which is the strongest single signal of who owns the file.
- name: Inspect /etc/resolv.conf itself (symlink or real file, and its target)
@@ -426,9 +784,10 @@
# resolved's loopback stub (127.0.0.53 / 127.0.0.54). Writing a resolved drop-in is
# then the ONLY thing that changes real behaviour; writing resolv.conf would be
# overwritten by resolved (or, worse, land in /run and vanish at reboot).
# contended — nobody's stub, but resolvconf or NetworkManager is present/running and
# would regenerate the file underneath us. We do NOT write. The role fails loudly
# below rather than leaving an operator believing a change stuck when it did not.
# contended — nobody's stub, but resolvconf, NetworkManager or a DHCP client (dhcpcd /
# dhclient) is present/running/configured and would regenerate the file underneath us.
# We do NOT write. The role fails loudly below rather than leaving an operator
# believing a change stuck when it did not.
# resolv-conf-file — a plain, directly-managed /etc/resolv.conf (prod's shape today).
# Safe to own outright.
# resolved running but NOT owning resolv.conf correctly falls through to the file branch:
@@ -438,13 +797,21 @@
node_baseline_dns_mechanism: >-
{{
'systemd-resolved' if (node_baseline_resolved_running and node_baseline_resolved_owns_resolv)
else ('contended' if (node_baseline_nm_running or node_baseline_resolvconf_present)
else ('contended' if (node_baseline_nm_running or node_baseline_resolvconf_present
or node_baseline_dhcp_client_live)
else 'resolv-conf-file')
}}
# Kept as facts (not just task vars) so the failure message, the report and the
# reclaim note below all quote the SAME evidence this decision was made on.
node_baseline_dhcp_client_evidence: "{{ (node_baseline_dhcp_client_scan.stdout | default('')) | regex_findall('(?m)^(?:CLIENT|UNIT|STANZA)\\|(.+)$') }}"
# A file dhcpcd WROTE, versus a dhcpcd that can still write it — two different facts, and
# only the second one is contention. See the reclaim note below.
node_baseline_resolv_dhcpcd_written: "{{ 'Generated by dhcpcd' in (node_baseline_resolv_slurp.content | default('') | b64decode) }}"
vars:
node_baseline_resolved_running: "{{ (node_baseline_resolved_active.stdout | default('') | trim) == 'active' }}"
node_baseline_nm_running: "{{ (node_baseline_nm_active.stdout | default('') | trim) == 'active' }}"
node_baseline_resolvconf_present: "{{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }}"
node_baseline_dhcp_client_live: "{{ (node_baseline_dhcp_client_scan.stdout | default('')) is search('(?m)^(?:CLIENT|UNIT|STANZA)\\|') }}"
node_baseline_resolv_text: "{{ (node_baseline_resolv_slurp.content | default('') | b64decode) }}"
node_baseline_resolv_ns: "{{ node_baseline_resolv_text | regex_findall('(?m)^\\s*nameserver\\s+(\\S+)') }}"
node_baseline_resolved_owns_resolv: >-
@@ -461,7 +828,9 @@
NetworkManager is-active={{ node_baseline_nm_active.stdout | default('') | trim }},
/etc/resolv.conf islnk={{ node_baseline_resolv_stat.stat.islnk | default(false) }}
target={{ node_baseline_resolv_stat.stat.lnk_source | default('(not a symlink)') }},
resolvconf dir={{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }})
resolvconf dir={{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }},
DHCP client evidence={{ node_baseline_dhcp_client_evidence | default([]) | join(' ; ') | default('(none)', true) }},
resolv.conf written by dhcpcd={{ node_baseline_resolv_dhcpcd_written | default(false) }})
tags: [dns]
# Same shape, and the same reason, as the data-disk assert above: this environment's
@@ -494,16 +863,45 @@
- name: Refuse to manage /etc/resolv.conf while another resolver manager owns it
ansible.builtin.fail:
msg: >-
/etc/resolv.conf on this node is not the systemd-resolved stub, but
resolvconf/openresolv (/etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d present:
{{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }}) or NetworkManager
(is-active: {{ node_baseline_nm_active.stdout | default('') | trim }}) is in play and
would regenerate the file underneath this role. Writing it here would look like it
worked and silently revert. Add the matching branch to roles/node_baseline (the
`dns`-tagged block) for whichever manager this node really uses — do not force it.
/etc/resolv.conf on this node is not the systemd-resolved stub, but something else would
regenerate the file underneath this role: resolvconf/openresolv
(/etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d present:
{{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }}), NetworkManager
(is-active: {{ node_baseline_nm_active.stdout | default('') | trim }}), or a DHCP client
that can still write it — dhcpcd/dhclient evidence:
{{ node_baseline_dhcp_client_evidence | default([]) | join(' ; ') | default('(none)', true) }}.
Writing it here would look like it worked and silently revert — which is exactly what
happened on k3s-prod-3 on 2026-09-04, where a wifi lease's dhcpcd hook reverted this
role's resolvers three minutes after a green run. If the evidence above is a DHCP client
on a WIRELESS interface, the fix is the `wireless` block earlier in this role (a cluster
node gets one network path) — run it, then re-run this. If it is a DHCP client on the
node's real interface, or another manager entirely, add the matching branch to
roles/node_baseline for the manager this node really uses — do not force it.
when: node_baseline_dns_mechanism == 'contended'
tags: [dns]
# THE CORPSE CASE, and why it is NOT a hole in the fail-closed rule above. After the
# `wireless` block disables the radio, k3s-prod-3 is left with a /etc/resolv.conf that dhcpcd
# WROTE (its "# Generated by dhcpcd from wlp1s0.dhcp..." header, the gateway as sole IPv4
# resolver, two Google IPv6 servers) and NO dhcpcd that can ever run again. `contended` means
# "another manager is live and will undo this write"; a file left behind by a client that no
# longer exists is not a manager, it is the damage — and refusing to write here would leave the
# node permanently mis-resolved, which is the very outcome the operator reported. So the file
# branch below reclaims it, and says so.
- name: Note that a dhcpcd-written /etc/resolv.conf is being reclaimed
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: >-
/etc/resolv.conf on this node was written by dhcpcd, but no DHCP client can write it any
more (no process, no active/enabled unit, no `inet dhcp` stanza). Taking ownership and
replacing it with the declared upstreams
({{ node_baseline_dns_servers | join(', ') }}). If a DHCP client ever comes back on this
node, the `contended` check above will stop the play instead of letting it revert
silently.
when:
- node_baseline_dns_mechanism == 'resolv-conf-file'
- node_baseline_resolv_dhcpcd_written | default(false)
tags: [dns]
# --- Mechanism A: systemd-resolved (dev's shape today) -------------------------------
# A drop-in, never an edit of /etc/systemd/resolved.conf, so a package upgrade of that file
# never conflicts. `DNS=` is one ORDERED list inside a single resolved scope: resolved uses
+2 -2
View File
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ metadata:
data:
# Filename `home.server` -> imported as a standalone server block for the whole zone.
home.server: |
home.keithjackson.dev:53 {
${BASE_DOMAIN}:53 {
errors
# Answer EVERY name in the zone (apex + all `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev`) with the Gateway
# Answer EVERY name in the zone (apex + all `<svc>.${BASE_DOMAIN}`) with the Gateway
# VIP. The template plugin's default match is `.*`, so this covers current and FUTURE app
# hostnames without editing this file per service. `{{ .Name }}` echoes the queried FQDN.
template IN A {
+4 -4
View File
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ spec:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
# Gate the co-located Crafty UI. Crafty serves HTTPS with a SELF-SIGNED cert, so skip verify
# on this in-pod (127.0.0.1) hop; the browser-facing TLS is the trusted wildcard at the Gateway.
- --upstream=https://127.0.0.1:8443
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ spec:
- --allowed-group=platform-admins
# Single provider => 302 straight to Keycloak, no oauth2-proxy interstitial button.
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://crafty.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --whitelist-domain=.home.keithjackson.dev
- --redirect-url=https://crafty.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- crafty.home.keithjackson.dev
- crafty.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ metadata:
lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: "crafty"
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}"
# external-dns publishes A crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev -> the pinned VIP (Java server target).
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: "crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev"
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: "crafty-mc.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
externalTrafficPolicy: Local
+39 -8
View File
@@ -29,15 +29,46 @@ spec:
sources:
- gateway-httproute
- service
# domain-filter MUST be the actual Cloudflare ZONE (keithjackson.dev), not the platform subdomain
# (home.keithjackson.dev) — ExternalDNS filters the account's zones by this value, and a subdomain
# filter drops the parent zone → "no hosted zone matching record DNS Name" and nothing is created.
# Scope stays effectively home.keithjackson.dev because that's the only suffix services request;
# policy=sync + registry=txt only ever touch ExternalDNS-OWNED records, never the pre-existing
# wildcard or other keithjackson.dev records. (docs/09; resolves the WS-NET TODO below.)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CROSS-CLUSTER DNS OWNERSHIP. Read before changing either knob below.
#
# On 2026-09-04 prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE of dev's public records. Both clusters ran
# `policy: sync` against the SAME Cloudflare zone, served the SAME hostnames, and — because
# NEITHER set txtOwnerId — both inherited the chart default owner id `default`. Prod therefore
# read dev's TXT registry entries as its own, found no local resource claiming those names, and
# garbage-collected them. `policy: sync` is correct and stays; what was missing was identity.
# Full write-up: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# THE TWO GUARDS THAT ACTUALLY PREVENT A RECURRENCE — note that neither is domainFilters:
# 1. txtOwnerId — per-environment identity; a cluster only ever touches records it owns.
# 2. DISJOINT HOSTNAME SETS — the two environments serve different suffixes, so they never
# describe the same record in the first place. dev = *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev,
# prod = *.home.keithjackson.dev (prod IS the apex; operator decision 2026-09-04).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Which names this instance may manage at all. BOTH ENVIRONMENTS RENDER THE CLOUDFLARE **ZONE**
# `keithjackson.dev` HERE, and this is NOT an oversight to be tightened.
#
# FINDING F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17): the Cloudflare provider uses this value for ZONE
# SELECTION as well as record matching, so a filter that is a STRICT SUBDOMAIN of the hosted zone
# matches NO zone — external-dns generates the record and then skips it with "no hosted zone
# matching record DNS Name", publishing NOTHING. This has been "improved" and reverted more than
# once (an agent narrowed prod to prod.home.keithjackson.dev on 2026-09-04; overridden in
# review). It is not defence in depth; it is a total outage of DNS publication. Isolation comes
# from the two guards above, which a domain filter cannot provide anyway — both environments live
# in the ONE zone regardless of what this says. See clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml.
domainFilters:
- "${DNS_ZONE}"
policy: sync # create + update + delete records as services come and go
- "${EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER}"
# The TXT-registry owner id. MUST be distinct per environment — this is the knob whose absence
# caused the incident. dev renders `dev`, prod renders `prod`, and the BASE default is a
# non-colliding sentinel so a new environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and can delete
# nothing. NOTHING renders `default` any more (the external-dns chart default, and the value both
# clusters silently shared): dev held it only because its live apex records were registered under
# it, and dev's move to *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev retired that constraint along with those
# records. Prod must NOT be given `default` even though it inherits the apex NAMES — that would
# hand prod ownership of dev's old apex records and let `policy: sync` below delete them.
txtOwnerId: "${EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID}"
policy: sync # create + update + delete records as services come and go — but ONLY
# records this owner id owns AND this domainFilter admits (see above).
# Cloudflare API token: SOPS-encrypted secret, referenced BY NAME only (OQ-4, ADR-0007).
env:
- name: CF_API_TOKEN
+4 -4
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ spec:
- name: https
protocol: HTTPS
port: 443
hostname: "*.home.keithjackson.dev"
hostname: "*.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
tls:
mode: Terminate
certificateRefs:
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
- name: http-redirect
protocol: HTTP
port: 80
hostname: "*.home.keithjackson.dev"
hostname: "*.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
allowedRoutes:
namespaces:
from: Selector
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ spec:
- name: https-apex
protocol: HTTPS
port: 443
hostname: "home.keithjackson.dev"
hostname: "${BASE_DOMAIN}"
tls:
mode: Terminate
certificateRefs:
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ spec:
- name: http-apex-redirect
protocol: HTTP
port: 80
hostname: "home.keithjackson.dev"
hostname: "${BASE_DOMAIN}"
allowedRoutes:
namespaces:
from: Selector
+2 -2
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ metadata:
spec:
secretName: wildcard-home-tls # consumed by the Gateway HTTPS listener below
dnsNames:
- "*.home.keithjackson.dev"
- "home.keithjackson.dev" # apex for the C2 UI (docs/09)
- "*.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
- "${BASE_DOMAIN}" # apex for the C2 UI (docs/09)
issuerRef:
kind: ClusterIssuer
# ${ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER}: dev -> letsencrypt-staging, prod -> letsencrypt-prod (cluster-vars).
+1 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev
- headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+15 -15
View File
@@ -36,63 +36,63 @@ data:
---
- Platform:
- Headlamp:
href: https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Kubernetes dashboard (per-user OIDC RBAC)
icon: mdi-kubernetes
- Grafana:
href: https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://grafana.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Metrics, logs & dashboards (fronts Prometheus/Loki/Alertmanager)
icon: mdi-chart-areaspline
- Semaphore:
href: https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Ansible automation & CI
icon: mdi-cog-play
- Gitea:
href: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Git hosting & Actions (GitOps source of truth)
icon: mdi-git
- Keycloak:
href: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Identity provider (SSO / OIDC)
icon: mdi-account-key
- Media:
- Plex:
href: https://plex.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://plex.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Media streaming
icon: mdi-plex
- Seerr:
href: https://seerr.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://seerr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Media requests
icon: mdi-play-box-multiple
- Sonarr:
href: https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: TV library manager
icon: mdi-television-classic
- Radarr:
href: https://radarr.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Movie library manager
icon: mdi-movie-open
- Jackett:
href: https://jackett.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Indexer proxy
icon: mdi-magnify
- qBittorrent:
href: https://qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Download client (VPN egress)
icon: mdi-download-network
- Network & Infra:
- Pi-hole:
href: https://pihole.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Network-wide DNS & ad-blocking
icon: mdi-shield-check
- UniFi:
href: https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443
href: https://unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}:11443
description: Network controller (UOS)
icon: mdi-router-network
- Nextcloud:
href: https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
description: Files, calendar & contacts
icon: mdi-cloud
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ data:
href: https://gitea.keithjackson.dev
- Auth portal:
- abbr: SSO
href: https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev
href: https://auth.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- Reference:
- Homepage docs:
- abbr: HP
+1 -1
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ spec:
# REQUIRED by Homepage >= 1.0 — requests whose Host header is not in this list get 403.
# The public apex host (served via the Gateway) + the pod IP (for kubelet probes).
- name: HOMEPAGE_ALLOWED_HOSTS
value: "home.keithjackson.dev,$(MY_POD_IP):3000"
value: "${BASE_DOMAIN},$(MY_POD_IP):3000"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 25m
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https-apex # the apex listener (wildcard `https` won't match the bare apex)
hostnames:
- home.keithjackson.dev
- ${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
- keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
poolMaxSize: 20
# --- Exposure: TLS at the Gateway; Keycloak serves HTTP and trusts the proxy headers. ---
hostname:
hostname: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
hostname: https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}
http:
httpEnabled: true # TLS is terminated at the Gateway (edge), not in Keycloak
proxy:
+26 -26
View File
@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev/login/generic_oauth
- https://grafana.${BASE_DOMAIN}/login/generic_oauth
webOrigins:
- https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://grafana.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://*.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://*.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- https://auth.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
webOrigins:
- https://*.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://*.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -209,9 +209,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/user/oauth2/keycloak/callback
- https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}/user/oauth2/keycloak/callback
webOrigins:
- https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -240,9 +240,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/apps/user_oidc/code
- https://nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}/apps/user_oidc/code
webOrigins:
- https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}
# Post-logout redirect allow-list (#logout "redirect failed"). On sign-out user_oidc redirects the
# browser to Keycloak's end_session_endpoint with post_logout_redirect_uri=<Nextcloud base '/'> and
# client_id=nextcloud but NO id_token_hint (provider sendIdTokenHint=0), so Keycloak validates the
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ spec:
# "redirect failed". The wildcard covers the base URL and any logout landing path. Keycloak stores
# this as the client attribute `post.logout.redirect.uris` (## separates multiple values).
attributes:
post.logout.redirect.uris: https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/*
post.logout.redirect.uris: https://nextcloud.${BASE_DOMAIN}/*
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -279,9 +279,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect
- https://semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect
webOrigins:
- https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -318,9 +318,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:HEADLAMP_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev/oidc-callback
- https://headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oidc-callback
webOrigins:
- https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://headlamp.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -363,9 +363,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:CRAFTY_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://crafty.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://crafty.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
webOrigins:
- https://crafty.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://crafty.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -398,9 +398,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:PIHOLE_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://pihole.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
webOrigins:
- https://pihole.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://pihole.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -433,9 +433,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:JACKETT_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://jackett.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
webOrigins:
- https://jackett.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -459,9 +459,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:QBITTORRENT_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
webOrigins:
- https://qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -485,9 +485,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:RADARR_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://radarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
webOrigins:
- https://radarr.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
@@ -511,9 +511,9 @@ spec:
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
secret: "$(env:SONARR_CLIENT_SECRET)"
redirectUris:
- https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
- https://sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
webOrigins:
- https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev
- https://sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}
defaultClientScopes:
- email
- profile
+4 -4
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "KubeVirt VM(s) failing to launch in {{ $labels.namespace }}"
description: "One or more VirtualMachineInstances are in the Failed phase in namespace {{ $labels.namespace }} for 5m — a failed VM launch (image import, scheduling, or qemu error). Check `kubectl get vmi -n {{ $labels.namespace }}` and the virt-launcher pod events."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/kubevirt-launch-failed"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/kubevirt-launch-failed"
# Crash-loop: the VM's virt-launcher pod is restarting repeatedly (guest kernel panic, OOM, or a
# crashing qemu). >3 restarts in 15m is a crash-loop, not a one-off reboot.
- alert: KubeVirtVMCrashLooping
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "KubeVirt VM crash-looping: {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.pod }}"
description: "virt-launcher pod {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.pod }} has restarted more than 3 times in 15m — the guest VM is crash-looping (panic / OOM / qemu crash)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/kubevirt-crashloop"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/kubevirt-crashloop"
# Control plane down: no virt-controller or virt-api replica reports ready, so no VM lifecycle
# operations can proceed. The metrics are `kubevirt_virt_{controller,api}_ready_status` (per-pod
# 1=ready); sum()==0 means every replica is unready. The absent() clause also fires if the whole
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "KubeVirt control plane degraded"
description: "The KubeVirt control plane (virt-controller/virt-api) is not ready or its metrics are absent for 10m — VM lifecycle operations (create/start/stop) will fail (docs/06)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/kubevirt-control-plane"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/kubevirt-control-plane"
# CDI import stuck: a DataVolume import/clone still in flight after 30m blocks the VM it backs.
# kubevirt_cdi_import_pods_high_restart counts importer pods stuck restarting; a positive value
# sustained means an import is not progressing (metric name confirmed against CDI at bring-up).
@@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "CDI DataVolume import stuck: {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }}"
description: "A CDI DataVolume import/clone in {{ $labels.namespace }} has not completed after 30m — the VM disk it backs cannot start. Check the importer pod (often an egress/default-deny block on the image source, or a slow mirror)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/cdi-import-stuck"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/cdi-import-stuck"
+26 -26
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Node exporter down on {{ $labels.instance }}"
description: "Prometheus cannot scrape node-exporter on {{ $labels.instance }} for 5m — the node may be down or unreachable."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/node-down"
- alert: NodeMemoryPressureHigh
expr: (1 - (node_memory_MemAvailable_bytes / node_memory_MemTotal_bytes)) > 0.90
for: 10m
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Memory pressure high on {{ $labels.instance }}"
description: "Available memory below 10% for 10m on {{ $labels.instance }} — the ~22 GiB box is under pressure."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-memory"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/node-memory"
- alert: NodeDiskFillingUp
expr: |
(node_filesystem_avail_bytes{fstype!~"tmpfs|overlay|squashfs"}
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Disk filling up on {{ $labels.instance }} ({{ $labels.mountpoint }})"
description: "Less than 10% free on {{ $labels.mountpoint }} of {{ $labels.instance }} for 15m."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-disk"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/node-disk"
- alert: NodeCPUPressureHigh
# PSI "some" for CPU = fraction of wall-clock time at least one task was stalled waiting to
# run. <5% is healthy; sustained >15% means bursty workloads are queueing against the vCPU
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "CPU pressure high on {{ $labels.instance }}"
description: "CPU PSI (some) above 15% for 15m on {{ $labels.instance }} — tasks are being delayed waiting for CPU (bursts exceeding the node's vCPU headroom). Add vCPUs or trim CPU-heavy workloads."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-cpu"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/node-cpu"
- alert: NodeCPULoadHigh
# 5-min load average per core. Sustained >1 means the run queue exceeds the core count (more
# runnable/blocked tasks than CPUs). Core count = number of idle-mode cpu series per node.
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Load per core high on {{ $labels.instance }}"
description: "5-min load average per core above 1.0 for 15m on {{ $labels.instance }} — the node's run queue exceeds its core count."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-cpu"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/node-cpu"
# =====================================================================================
# Storage — Longhorn
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Longhorn volume degraded: {{ $labels.volume }}"
description: "Volume {{ $labels.volume }} has been degraded (replica rebuild / missing replica) for 10m."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/longhorn-degraded"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/longhorn-degraded"
- alert: LonghornVolumeFaulted
expr: longhorn_volume_robustness == 3
for: 1m
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Longhorn volume FAULTED: {{ $labels.volume }}"
description: "Volume {{ $labels.volume }} is faulted — data at risk / offline. Immediate attention required."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/longhorn-faulted"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/longhorn-faulted"
- alert: LonghornVolumeCapacityHigh
expr: (longhorn_volume_actual_size_bytes / longhorn_volume_capacity_bytes) > 0.85
for: 30m
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Longhorn volume near capacity: {{ $labels.volume }}"
description: "Volume {{ $labels.volume }} is over 85% used for 30m."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/longhorn-capacity"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/longhorn-capacity"
- alert: LonghornNodeStorageHigh
expr: (longhorn_node_storage_usage_bytes / longhorn_node_storage_capacity_bytes) > 0.85
for: 30m
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Longhorn node storage near capacity: {{ $labels.node }}"
description: "Longhorn node {{ $labels.node }} is over 85% of its storage capacity for 30m."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/longhorn-capacity"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/longhorn-capacity"
# =====================================================================================
# GitOps — Flux
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Flux resource not ready: {{ $labels.kind }}/{{ $labels.name }}"
description: "{{ $labels.kind }} {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} has failed to reconcile (Ready=False) for 15m — GitOps drift/failure (R-GITOPS-03)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/flux-reconcile"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/flux-reconcile"
- alert: FluxResourceSuspended
expr: |
max by (namespace, name, kind) (gotk_suspend_status) == 1
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Flux resource suspended: {{ $labels.kind }}/{{ $labels.name }}"
description: "{{ $labels.kind }} {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} has been suspended for 1h — reconciliation/drift-correction is off."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/flux-suspended"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/flux-suspended"
# =====================================================================================
# Certificates — cert-manager
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Certificate expiring soon: {{ $labels.name }}"
description: "Certificate {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} expires in under 14 days."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/cert-expiry"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/cert-expiry"
- alert: CertificateExpiryImminent
expr: (certmanager_certificate_expiration_timestamp_seconds - time()) < (3 * 24 * 3600)
for: 1h
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Certificate expiry imminent: {{ $labels.name }}"
description: "Certificate {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} expires in under 3 days and has not renewed."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/cert-expiry"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/cert-expiry"
- alert: CertificateNotReady
expr: certmanager_certificate_ready_status{condition="False"} == 1
for: 1h
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Certificate not ready / issuance failing: {{ $labels.name }}"
description: "Certificate {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} has been in a not-ready state for 1h (ACME issuance failure?)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/cert-issuance"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/cert-issuance"
# =====================================================================================
# Networking — VPN / egress-gateway / denied flows (Hubble)
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Egress VPN tunnel down"
description: "The egress-gateway VPN tunnel is down (or its metric is absent) for 5m — outbound traffic could leak or stall (leak risk, docs/07)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/vpn-down"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/vpn-down"
# (ADR-0015) The former `EgressGatewayUnhealthy` pod-readiness alert was REMOVED with the gluetun
# retirement: there is no in-cluster egress-gateway pod anymore (the tunnel is a host systemd
# service, steering is Cilium eBPF). Tunnel + gateway-node health is covered by `VPNTunnelDown`
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Spike in policy-denied network flows"
description: "Policy-denied flow rate is elevated for 10m — a NetworkPolicy regression or an intrusion probe (security audit, docs/07)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/denied-flows"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/denied-flows"
# =====================================================================================
# Backups — Velero
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Velero backup failed: schedule {{ $labels.schedule }}"
description: "One or more Velero backups failed in the last hour (R-STATE-03 — off-cluster DR at risk)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/backup-failure"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/backup-failure"
- alert: VeleroBackupPartialFailure
expr: increase(velero_backup_partial_failure_total[1h]) > 0
for: 5m
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Velero backup partially failed"
description: "A Velero backup completed with partial failures in the last hour — some resources/volumes were skipped."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/backup-partial"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/backup-partial"
- alert: VeleroNoRecentBackup
expr: (time() - velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""}) > (24 * 3600)
for: 1h
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "No successful Velero backup in 24h: {{ $labels.schedule }}"
description: "Schedule {{ $labels.schedule }} has not produced a successful backup in over 24h (missed schedule)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/backup-missed"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/backup-missed"
# =====================================================================================
# Identity — Keycloak (SSO is a critical dependency — docs/15)
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Keycloak IdP down"
description: "No ready Keycloak pod for 5m — SSO is unavailable and dependent services cannot authenticate (docs/15)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/keycloak-down"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/keycloak-down"
- alert: KeycloakDatabaseDown
# Keycloak's PostgreSQL runs as a CloudNativePG Cluster `keycloak-db` (pods keycloak-db-N).
# DR-critical, Longhorn-backed. (CNPG also exports cnpg_* metrics via its PodMonitor.)
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Keycloak database unavailable"
description: "Keycloak's PostgreSQL is not ready for 5m — the IdP will fail (docs/15)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/keycloak-db"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/keycloak-db"
# =====================================================================================
# The monitor's own capacity — don't let the monitor blind itself (docs/10)
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Monitoring PVC filling up: {{ $labels.persistentvolumeclaim }}"
description: "PVC {{ $labels.persistentvolumeclaim }} (Prometheus/Loki) is under 15% free — retention/PVC size may need raising before the monitor goes blind."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/monitoring-capacity"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/monitoring-capacity"
- alert: PrometheusTargetsMissing
expr: |
(count(up == 0) / count(up)) > 0.10
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "More than 10% of Prometheus targets are down"
description: "Over 10% of scrape targets have been down for 15m — a broad monitoring blind spot."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/targets-down"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/targets-down"
# =====================================================================================
# Automated updates — Flux image-automation + hands-off update health (docs/11, ADR-0009)
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Flux image-update-automation failing: {{ $labels.name }}"
description: "ImageUpdateAutomation {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} cannot reconcile (git write-back) for 30m — stable image advances have stopped (R-UPD-02). Check the git write credential."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/image-automation"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/image-automation"
# An ImagePolicy/ImageRepository can't resolve the latest stable tag (registry rate-limit /
# auth / bad range) → that service stops receiving updates even though automation is healthy.
- alert: ImagePolicyStalled
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Image scan/policy stalled: {{ $labels.kind }}/{{ $labels.name }}"
description: "{{ $labels.kind }} {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} cannot resolve its stable tag for 1h (registry rate-limit / creds / range) — no longer receiving updates (R-UPD-01)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/image-policy-stalled"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/image-policy-stalled"
# A bad update was health-gated and AUTO-ROLLED-BACK (or is stuck mid-remediation). helm-controller
# holds Ready=False while a failed upgrade remediates/rolls back to the last-good revision
# (HelmRelease.spec.upgrade.remediation + .spec.rollback). This is the R-UPD-03 safety rail firing.
@@ -461,4 +461,4 @@ spec:
annotations:
summary: "Update health-gate failed / rolled back: {{ $labels.name }}"
description: "HelmRelease {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.name }} failed its health-gated upgrade and is rolling back to the last-good revision (bad-update auto-rollback — R-UPD-03). Consider an `update.pin` escape hatch (docs/11)."
runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/update-rollback"
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/update-rollback"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
- grafana.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
@@ -194,15 +194,15 @@ spec:
optional: true
grafana.ini:
server:
root_url: https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
root_url: https://grafana.${BASE_DOMAIN}
auth.generic_oauth:
enabled: true
name: Keycloak
client_id: grafana
scopes: "openid email profile"
auth_url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/auth
token_url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/token
api_url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
auth_url: https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/auth
token_url: https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/token
api_url: https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
login_attribute_path: preferred_username
email_attribute_path: email
# Map Keycloak groups (the `groups` claim) to Grafana roles (R-IDP-06): platform-admins ->
+4 -4
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ spec:
existingSecret: oauth2-proxy-credentials
extraArgs:
provider: oidc
oidc-issuer-url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
oidc-issuer-url: https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
# Forward-auth (ext-auth) mode: no upstream app; return 202 for an authenticated session so the
# Gateway ext-authz can allow/deny. Auth headers are surfaced to the backend.
reverse-proxy: "true"
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ spec:
pass-access-token: "true"
email-domain: "*"
# Single sign-in/callback host for all forward-auth-protected services on the platform zone.
redirect-url: https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
whitelist-domain: ".home.keithjackson.dev"
cookie-domain: ".home.keithjackson.dev"
redirect-url: https://auth.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
whitelist-domain: ".${BASE_DOMAIN}"
cookie-domain: ".${BASE_DOMAIN}"
cookie-secure: "true"
# Expose group membership so per-service group authorization (R-IDP-06) can be enforced. The
# Keycloak `oauth2-proxy` client emits a `groups` claim (full.path=false => bare names like
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ spec:
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- auth.home.keithjackson.dev
- auth.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
+3 -3
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
"properties": {
"name": {
"type": "string",
"description": "DNS label -> <name>.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/13, docs/09). Must be a valid RFC 1123 DNS label.",
"description": "DNS label -> <name>.${BASE_DOMAIN}, i.e. <name>.home.keithjackson.dev on dev and <name>.prod.home.keithjackson.dev on prod (docs/13, docs/09). Must be a valid RFC 1123 DNS label.",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 63
@@ -223,8 +223,8 @@
"properties": {
"host": {
"type": "string",
"description": "FQDN under the platform zone. Must be a <label>.home.keithjackson.dev name (docs/09).",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?\\.home\\.keithjackson\\.dev$"
"description": "Hostname under the platform zone, as a single DNS label plus the ${BASE_DOMAIN} token — e.g. 'gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}' (docs/09). ${BASE_DOMAIN} is the per-environment hostname suffix from clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml, resolved by Flux postBuild substitution at reconcile time (dev: home.keithjackson.dev, prod: prod.home.keithjackson.dev). AUTHOR THE TOKEN, NOT A LITERAL: a literal suffix is what let prod be authored to serve dev's public hostnames out of the shared Cloudflare zone, and prod's external-dns then deleted dev's records (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10). The literal 'home.keithjackson.dev' form stays accepted so the L1 render fixtures — which are renderer INPUTS, not reconciled manifests — keep validating unchanged.",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?\\.(\\$\\{BASE_DOMAIN\\}|home\\.keithjackson\\.dev)$"
},
"port": {
"type": "integer",