Velero was resumed on prod (live `flux resume`; suspension was never in git) and its BackupStorageLocation validated Available against Cloudflare R2 on the first try — bucket k3s-prod-backup, prefix `velero`, region auto, checksumAlgorithm "". Backups still failed, and a second, unrelated hazard was armed. Both are fixed here; both were measured on prod, not reasoned about. 1. velero-plugin-for-aws v1.14.2 cannot write to R2 at all. It sets PutObject's `Tagging` field unconditionally, so the SDK emits an empty `x-amz-tagging` header on every PUT. R2 does not implement object tagging in any form and answers HTTP 501 NotImplemented. Two separate Backups reproduced it on the write of velero/backups/<name>/velero-backup.json: kopia uploaded the volume data fine (it uses its own S3 client), then the backup went phase=Failed with no metadata object — i.e. unrestorable. No config avoids it; `config.tagging` with a real value sends a tag set R2 also rejects. Upstream PR #309 makes the field conditional and landed on release-1.14 after v1.14.2 was cut, so v1.14.3-rc.2 is the earliest build with the fix. Pinned to it, with the exit condition (v1.14.3 GA) stated at the pin. 2. The opt-out FSB schedule would have uploaded the NFS bulk tier. Schedule (1) runs defaultVolumesToFsBackup:true and excludes only monitoring and unifi. Since 2026-09-11 prod also carries four static NFS PVs — plex-media, sonarr-media and radarr-media all bound to the SAME export /mnt/Storage/plex (8.32 TiB measured via zfs list), plus nextcloud-legacy-archive at 270 GiB. The 03:00 run would have read that library three times over NFS and pushed ~8.6 TiB to R2 nightly, retained 720h. Namespace exclusion cannot express the fix: those four namespaces also hold real Longhorn PVCs (plex/sonarr/radarr config, nextcloud-data) whose loss is unrecoverable. So the opt-out is now per VOLUME, by SOURCE TYPE: a velero volume policy (ConfigMap velero-volume-policies) skips any volume whose source is NFS, and schedule (1) references it. That tests the property that makes a volume bulk-tier (R-STATE-04: the bulk tier IS the NFS export) instead of a name list the next PV would slip past. The per-pod backup-volumes-excludes annotation was rejected for failing OPEN — a new NFS mount would be backed up in full until someone remembered. PROVEN on prod (velero 1.18.1 / chart 12.1.0): a Backup of ns nextcloud with defaultVolumesToFsBackup:true plus this policy produced exactly ONE PodVolumeBackup — `data` (nextcloud-data, Longhorn, 875,417,102 bytes, Completed). The NFS `legacy-archive` volume produced none. Residual gap, stated rather than hidden: the rule matches NFS only. A future bulk volume on another out-of-cluster source needs its own condition. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
home-network-k3s-impl
Implementation of the home k3s + Longhorn platform. This repo holds the reconciled artifacts
(Flux config, Kustomize overlays, KubeVirt/Helm manifests, ServiceDefinitions, Kyverno policies,
Chainsaw conformance tests, CI). It is driven by — and subordinate to — the read-only
specification at ../home-network-k3s.
Rules (from the spec — non-negotiable)
- The spec is read-only. Never modify anything under
../home-network-k3s. Implement against it; escalate spec problems, don't edit them (specAGENTS.md§11, R-TEST-06). - Done = a green, reproducible, requirement-tagged conformance test — never "merged," never a
manual demo (spec
docs/14,agents/definition-of-done.md). - No work on
main. Every change is a feature branch merged intomain(specCONTRIBUTING.md). - No plaintext secrets — SOPS-encrypted only (spec
docs/07). - Phase discipline — only build what the active roadmap phase authorizes (spec
roadmap/phases.md).
Layout
infra/ node provisioning: OpenTofu (Proxmox VE) + cloud-init + Ansible, and the
pinned dev container that carries the whole toolchain
bootstrap/ one-time cluster bootstrap: Flux install, SOPS/age key, host Gitea
platform/ platform CONTROLLERS (Flux HelmReleases / operator bases): kyverno, cilium,
longhorn, external-snapshotter, cert-manager, externaldns, gateway, coredns,
vpn-egress, monitoring, cnpg, keycloak, oauth2-proxy, kubevirt
platform-config/ platform CONFIGS — the custom resources of the CRDs installed above
(ClusterIssuers, Gateway, Kyverno policies, KubeVirt/CDI CRs, Keycloak CRs).
Split out because CRs and the CRDs they use cannot apply in one pass.
apps/ application tier, reconciled as dependency-ordered WAVES:
wave-0/ wave-1/ wave-2/ rendered container apps (see DESIGN-waves.md)
vms/ KubeVirt VirtualMachines (non-gating tier)
catalog/ ServiceDefinition entries (the onboarding surface) + render.py
schemas/ ServiceDefinition JSON Schema + renderer contract
clusters/ Flux entrypoints + dev/ and prod/ overlays
conformance/ Chainsaw behavior/conformance suite + harness + coverage report
ci/ the gate as scripts (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · L1 render · decision)
.gitea/ Gitea Actions CI running that gate on an in-cluster runner
Status
Roadmap phases 0–6 are delivered and deployed on the dev cluster; Phase 7 (prod) is not
open — clusters/prod is a design-only overlay.
| Phase | Delivered |
|---|---|
| 0 Foundations | ServiceDefinition schema + renderer, Kyverno L0 gate, conformance harness, CI |
| 1 Cluster bring-up | 3-node k3s HA on Proxmox VE (192.168.1.50/.51/.52), Cilium, Flux, SOPS |
| 2 Platform core | Cilium · Longhorn · cert-manager (LE-prod wildcard) · ExternalDNS · Gateway API · split-horizon CoreDNS |
| 3 Egress / VPN | ADR-0015 node-level OpenVPN split-tunnel + Cilium egress-gateway steering + host kill-switch |
| 4 Observability | kube-prometheus-stack · Loki · Alloy · Alertmanager. Velero still blocked on OQ-BKP; image-automation authored but disabled |
| 5 IaaS | KubeVirt + CDI on real nested KVM; live-migratable RWX VM storage. The UniFi VM runs, but UniFi OS Server is not yet installed in the guest |
| 6 Identity + CI | Keycloak (Operator + CNPG) · oauth2-proxy forward-auth · Grafana OIDC · kubectl OIDC SSO with group→RBAC · in-cluster Gitea Actions merge gate |
Conformance: 36 / 51 requirements covered (70.6%), 15 gaps, 1 safety-critical gap
(R-STATE-02, Longhorn node-loss). Regenerate with ./conformance/run.sh --coverage-only;
the full report is conformance/_artifacts/coverage/coverage.md.
The running narrative — decisions, root causes, incidents, follow-ups — is
DECISIONS-LOG.md. It, not this table, is the authoritative record.
Working on this repo
Everything the gate needs is baked into the pinned dev container — do not install the toolchain on the host:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh build # once
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run make -C ci gate # the same gate CI runs
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh # interactive shell (sops, flux, kubectl, tofu, ansible)
The container mounts the repo at /work, your age keyring, and the sibling spec repo read-only
so the spec-immutability check can actually run. See
infra/devcontainer/README.md.
A green run prints MERGE GATE: PASS. The L2/L3 conformance layers stay SKIPPED unless
CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true — the static gate never pretends to have run them.