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home-network-k3s-impl/clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 daac05e7e8 feat(bulk): prod mounts the NFS export through pfSense's WAN address 
The operator added the pfSense port-forward, so BULK_NFS_SERVER is no longer a
placeholder. Prod gets 192.168.2.102 (pfSense WAN, DNAT tcp/2049 -> 192.168.1.9);
dev stays on the base 192.168.1.9 because it is already on pfSense's LAN.

This value could not be left as a placeholder safely: spec.nfs.server is
unvalidated by Kubernetes, so the PV would be created, the PVC would BIND, and the
failure would only surface as four pods stuck in ContainerCreating.

Verified from k3s-prod-1 before committing, deliberately as uid 1000 rather than
root (the export carries no_root_squash, so a root write proves nothing, and LSIO
images default to PUID 911 which would go Ready and then fail every import EACCES):
mount negotiated nfs4 vers=4.1 proto=tcp, write succeeded, and ln() across
downloads/ -> tv/ gave link count 2 — real hardlinks, so no silent copy-then-delete.

The Nextcloud export was additionally tightened to server-side ro= for prod's three
nodes; a write as root is refused. Its content is config/, config_old/ and
config_backup/ with no data/ directory, so it is an archive, not a live data store.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 16:25:20 -05:00

538 lines
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---
# clusters/prod — DESIGN-ONLY overlay. NOT a build target until roadmap Phase 7 opens prod
# (spec roadmap/phases.md, AGENTS.md §6: "Never build directly on production").
#
# When Phase 7 is opened, `flux bootstrap ... --path=clusters/prod` points the prod cluster's Flux
# here. Like dev, this overlay adds NO resources — it ONLY patches cluster-vars with prod-scoped
# values (R-ENV-02). Promotion to prod is a change to THESE variables, never a base edit.
#
# *** PHASE-7 BLOCKER — READ BEFORE BOOTSTRAPPING PROD ***
# `clusters/base/platform.yaml` now carries `dependsOn: [flux-system]` (the 2026-09-01 substitution-
# race fix). That names the ROOT Kustomization, which clusters/dev supplies as `dev/sync.yaml`
# (path ./clusters/dev). THIS overlay has no sync.yaml yet, so as written a prod bootstrap would
# leave `platform` stuck on "dependency 'flux-system/flux-system' is not ready" FOREVER and nothing
# downstream would reconcile. Phase 7 MUST add `clusters/prod/sync.yaml` — a copy of dev/sync.yaml
# with `path: ./clusters/prod` — as part of opening this overlay. (Adding it now is deliberately NOT
# done here: prod is design-only and its root object is the prod bring-up owner's call.)
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- ../base
- sync.yaml # self-managing root Kustomization -> ./clusters/prod (REQUIRED: see below)
patches:
# --- SOPS decryption (operator decision 2026-09-01: prod uses the SAME age key as dev) ---
# Mirrors clusters/dev exactly, one stanza per Kustomization that carries encrypted Secrets.
# The `sops-age` Secret is created OUT OF BAND on the prod cluster
# (bootstrap/sops/install-age-key.sh) — referenced by NAME only, never inlined.
# Add a stanza here whenever `render.py --emit-waves` introduces a new deepest wave.
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: platform
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: apps-wave-0
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: apps-wave-1
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: apps-wave-2
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: oauth2-proxy
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: headlamp
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: crafty
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: velero
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
# --- GitOps source (operator decision 2026-09-01: prod tracks the SAME BRANCH as dev) ---
#
# ############################################################################################
# ### ###
# ### *** T E M P O R A R Y B O O T S T R A P S O U R C E — NOT PERMANENT *** ###
# ### ###
# ### The url below is a Gitea container running ON THE OPERATOR'S WORKSTATION, outside ###
# ### any cluster. It exists ONLY to get prod's first reconcile off the ground. It MUST ###
# ### be cut over to the in-cluster URL once Gitea runs on prod. If you are reading this ###
# ### and prod has been serving traffic for months, THE CUTOVER WAS NEVER DONE — that is ###
# ### a live single point of failure, not a settled design. See "CUTOVER" below. ###
# ### ###
# ############################################################################################
#
# WHY THE IN-CLUSTER URL CANNOT BE USED YET (blocker found 2026-09-01, still true; the
# unusable value was `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git`).
# Two independent reasons, both consequences of the split-horizon design:
# 1. SELF-HOSTING CIRCULARITY. Gitea runs ON THE DEV CLUSTER. Prod syncing from it means prod's
# GitOps source lives inside the very cluster slated for decommission. Gitea must move to
# prod (or off-cluster) BEFORE dev is retired, or prod loses its source of truth.
# 2. SPLIT-HORIZON DNS SENDS IT TO THE WRONG PLACE. platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml
# answers the ENTIRE home.keithjackson.dev zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}. On prod that is
# 192.168.2.20 — PROD's own gateway, where no Gitea is listening. Prod's Flux would resolve
# gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to itself and never reach a repository.
#
# WHAT THE TEMPORARY SOURCE IS (stood up 2026-09-04 on explicit operator direction):
# bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh with HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132 — a podman container on the
# operator's workstation, Gitea 1.22.6, listening on 192.168.2.132:3000. All three prod nodes
# reach it DIRECTLY on the LAN: no libvirt NAT hop (that network is retired) and no firewall
# change was needed. This is the same "local bootstrap source" pattern dev itself used before
# its Phase-6 cutover (docs/05 "Source-of-truth").
#
# PLAIN HTTP, AND WHY THAT IS ACCEPTED HERE: the bootstrap Gitea has no TLS, so there is no cert
# for Flux to trust and no caCertSecretRef to wire. Traffic is LAN-local between prod nodes and
# the workstation, the repo carries NO plaintext secrets (everything sensitive is SOPS-encrypted,
# .sops.yaml), and the window is the bring-up only. Do NOT extend this posture past cutover.
#
# NO secretRef, DELIBERATELY: the repo is PUBLIC on the bootstrap Gitea, so anonymous clone
# works and Flux needs no git credentials. VERIFIED 2026-09-04 by unauthenticated request:
# curl http://192.168.2.132:3000/api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl -> "private":false
# git ls-remote http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git -> refs/heads/main
# If the GitRepository ever reports an auth failure that looks like a network problem, RE-CHECK
# THAT FIRST: a private repo here fails exactly that way.
#
# *** CUTOVER — the exit condition, mirroring dev's Phase-6 cutover (docs/05) ***
# WHEN: Gitea runs on prod (reconciled in-cluster) and answers gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
# through prod's own Gateway VIP with a publicly-trusted cert.
# DO: 1. push/mirror this repo into the prod in-cluster Gitea;
# 2. change the url below to
# https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
# and DELETE this whole TEMPORARY block (dev's equivalent stanza, ~15 lines above in
# clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml, is what "done" looks like);
# 3. confirm `flux get sources git -n flux-system` reconciles the new revision;
# 4. only THEN stop the workstation container. Keep it stopped-not-deleted as recovery,
# exactly as dev retained its bootstrap Gitea.
# UNTIL THEN: prod's reconciliation depends on a container on a workstation that may be
# powered off. Flux keeps the last-reconciled state running, but NO new revision lands while
# it is down. Tracked as an open blocker in infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §7.
#
# The BRANCH below is settled and correct: prod tracks `main`, the same branch as dev.
# CONSEQUENCE, recorded deliberately: once prod is live, EVERY MERGE TO main RECONCILES BOTH
# CLUSTERS. There is no promotion step and no soak window — dev and prod move together.
# NOTE for bring-up: bootstrap-gitea.sh pushes the operator's CURRENT HEAD to the bootstrap
# Gitea's `main`, whatever branch that is. Before bootstrapping prod, confirm that remote `main`
# is the revision you intend prod to run (`git ls-remote` above, against local `main`).
- patch: |-
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: GitRepository
metadata:
name: flux-system
namespace: flux-system
spec:
# CUTOVER DONE 2026-09-06 (operator direction: "move the repo to prod"). Prod now reconciles
# from PROD'S OWN in-cluster Gitea. The workstation bootstrap container
# (http://192.168.2.132:3000) is retired as prod's source — it was a podman container on the
# operator's workstation holding a DHCP lease on WIFI, i.e. production's source of truth was a
# laptop. It is kept only as a recovery path (bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh).
#
# THIS LINE IS SELF-REFERENTIAL AND THAT IS THE WHOLE DIFFICULTY. The root Kustomization
# renders ./clusters/prod, which contains this patch — so a live `kubectl patch` of
# GitRepository.spec.url is REVERTED on the next reconcile unless the authored value moves
# too. The cutover therefore had to be: (1) push the repo to prod's Gitea, (2) fast-forward
# its `main` to the exact commit prod was already running so the source swap changed nothing
# else, (3) live-patch the url to open a window, (4) land THIS commit through that window so
# the authored value agrees. Dev hit the identical trap on 2026-09-05
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10a "D0/D1 as executed").
#
# Verified before the switch: a throwaway pod INSIDE prod resolved this host through
# in-cluster CoreDNS to the Gateway VIP and cloned over the public LE cert with no CA
# supplied. The workstation being able to reach it proves nothing about pod egress.
url: https://gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
ref:
branch: main
- target:
kind: ConfigMap
name: cluster-vars
patch: |-
- op: replace
path: /data/CLUSTER_ENV
value: "prod"
# trusted, rate-limited real certs in prod — ADR-0006.
- op: replace
path: /data/ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
value: "letsencrypt-prod"
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD DNS IDENTITY (R-DNS-01/02/03) — the fix for the 2026-09-04 incident.
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD SERVES ITS OWN SUBDOMAIN. Until 2026-09-04 every hostname was HARDCODED to
# home.keithjackson.dev in the base manifests, so prod was authored to serve the EXACT SAME
# public names as the live dev cluster out of the SAME Cloudflare zone. Two consequences, one
# of which already happened:
# 1. HAPPENED: prod's external-dns (policy: sync, owner id `default` — the same implicit
# default dev had) concluded it owned dev's records and DELETED EVERY ONE of them.
# 2. QUEUED BEHIND IT: platform-config would have requested a `*.home.keithjackson.dev`
# wildcard from letsencrypt-prod for a cert dev already holds, and both clusters would
# have raced each other's `_acme-challenge` TXT records on that one zone.
# Moving prod to its own suffix dissolves both: the two clusters can no longer name the same
# record. This is what makes ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER: letsencrypt-prod above safe here.
#
# dev -> home.keithjackson.dev (UNCHANGED — dev is live; phase 2 moves it)
# prod -> prod.home.keithjackson.dev (this knob)
#
# CONSEQUENCE — prod's hostnames are NOT the apex names. Prod's Gitea is
# gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, its Keycloak keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and so
# on; the wildcard cert becomes `*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev`. The apex CNAMEs that make
# `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` point at prod are PHASE 2, deliberately not done here — they
# would take traffic off the live dev cluster. infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# [parity] MUST equal k3s_base_domain in infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml.
# The kube-apiserver's oidc-issuer-url is an INSTALL-TIME k3s flag, not a manifest, so it is
# set Ansible-side from that variable and cannot read this one. If they disagree, kubectl SSO
# trusts a different Keycloak than the one prod actually runs.
- op: replace
path: /data/BASE_DOMAIN
value: "prod.home.keithjackson.dev"
# SAFETY NET #2 (independent of the owner id below): narrow ExternalDNS's name scope to prod's
# OWN subtree, so prod cannot create, update or delete any record outside it no matter what the
# TXT registry says. VERIFY ON FIRST RECONCILE — the Cloudflare provider uses this value for
# ZONE selection too, and on the version in use in 2026-08 a strict-subdomain filter dropped
# the parent zone ("no hosted zone matching record DNS Name"). If prod's external-dns logs no
# matching zone, it will create NOTHING — fail-closed, and it can still never delete dev's
# records. Fallback in that case: set this to "keithjackson.dev" (dev's value) and rely on
# EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID below, which is sufficient on its own.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER
# MUST be the Cloudflare ZONE, not prod's subdomain. FINDING F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG,
# 2026-08-17) proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE: ExternalDNS generated the
# record then skipped it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS Name", so prod would
# publish NOTHING. Isolation from dev does NOT come from this filter — it comes from
# (1) prod only requesting *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev hostnames, and
# (2) txtOwnerId: prod, so prod's registry never claims dev's `default`-owned records.
# That pairing is what the 2026-09-04 incident needed and this filter cannot provide.
value: "keithjackson.dev"
# SAFETY NET #1 — THE ACTUAL ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. Both clusters left this unset and so
# both inherited the chart default `default`; prod then treated dev's TXT-registry entries as
# its own and, under policy: sync, deleted the records behind them. This value MUST differ from
# dev's (`default`, pinned in clusters/dev — dev's live records are registered under it and
# cannot be renamed without orphaning them). `prod` is distinct, which is the entire fix.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
value: "prod"
- op: replace
path: /data/LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT
value: "3"
# Longhorn's on-node replica directory: a SUBDIRECTORY of the claimed data partition, not
# the mount root. Prod's ~424 GB partition (LABEL=k3s-data) is mounted at the neutral /data
# and serves TWO tenants — /data/longhorn here, and /data/k3s for k3s's entire data dir
# (embedded etcd + the containerd image store), which had to move off the 11.8 GiB /var:
# measured on dev, containerd alone is 21-25 GB per node, so prod would have filled /var on
# its first image pulls and etcd could not have written its WAL. infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2.
#
# [parity] MUST equal node_baseline_longhorn_data_path in
# infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml — Ansible creates and mounts the
# directory, this tells Longhorn to use it. If they disagree, Longhorn writes replicas to a
# path on the OS filesystem instead of the data partition and /var fills up.
- op: replace
path: /data/LONGHORN_DATA_PATH
value: "/data/longhorn"
# longer retention / larger volumes on prod NVMe.
- op: replace
path: /data/MONITORING_PROMETHEUS_RETENTION
value: "30d"
- op: replace
path: /data/MONITORING_PROMETHEUS_PVC_SIZE
value: "50Gi"
# Size-cap below the 50Gi PVC (headroom for WAL + head + compaction scratch): prod may hit the
# size cap before 30d if series volume is high, keeping the disk from filling either way.
- op: replace
path: /data/MONITORING_PROMETHEUS_RETENTION_SIZE
value: "45GiB"
- op: replace
path: /data/MONITORING_LOKI_PVC_SIZE
value: "50Gi"
# HA control-plane addons in prod.
- op: replace
path: /data/KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS
value: "2"
- op: replace
path: /data/OAUTH2_PROXY_REPLICAS
value: "2"
- op: replace
path: /data/VELERO_RETENTION
value: "720h"
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD LAN ADDRESSING (192.168.2.0/24). Nodes: k3s-prod-1/2/3 = .10 / .11 / .12.
# ==========================================================================================
# These knobs were HARDCODED to the dev LAN inside base manifests until 2026-08-31; prod would
# have come up ANNOUNCING DEV ADDRESSES (192.168.1.x) on the prod LAN. They are knobs now, and
# this overlay supplies every one of them. Anything the operator has NOT yet decided stays an
# INVALID `TBD-PROD-*` placeholder on purpose: base defaults are the DEV values, so an OMITTED
# op means prod silently inherits a dev address — far worse than a failed apply. `TBD-PROD-*`
# is not a valid IP/URL, so Cilium CRD validation / LB-IPAM / CNPG / Velero reject it LOUDLY.
#
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ADDRESS PLAN (operator, 2026-08-31) — see infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4 for the full table.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# nodes 192.168.2.10 / .11 / .12 (Ansible inventory)
# control-plane VIP 192.168.2.9 (Ansible group_vars/k3s_prod — NOT here)
# ingress Gateway VIP 192.168.2.20 (GATEWAY_VIP, below)
# Cilium LB pool 192.168.2.20 - .30 (CILIUM_LB_POOL_*, below)
#
# CONTAINMENT INVARIANT SATISFIED: GATEWAY_VIP (.20) IS CILIUM_LB_POOL_START, mirroring dev
# (.53 of .53-.60). This matters because the `shared` Gateway (platform/gateway/gateway.yaml)
# pins NOTHING — no `lbipam.cilium.io/ips`, no spec.addresses (unlike platform/crafty and
# apps/vms/unifi, which DO pin) — so Cilium LB-IPAM assigns it the FIRST FREE address of a
# matching pool block. Had GATEWAY_VIP stayed outside every pool (the original .21-.30
# proposal), the Gateway would have come up on .21 while split-horizon coredns-custom kept
# answering *.home.keithjackson.dev with .20 — an address nothing announces — blackholing
# in-cluster hairpin traffic (OIDC clients -> Keycloak/Grafana) while looking healthy.
# KEEP GATEWAY_VIP == CILIUM_LB_POOL_START when changing either.
# The control-plane VIP (.9) is deliberately OUTSIDE this pool: kube-vip floats it, and
# LB-IPAM must never be able to hand it to a Service.
- op: replace
path: /data/GATEWAY_VIP
value: "192.168.2.20"
# Cilium LB IP pool, operator-supplied: 192.168.2.20-.30 (START == GATEWAY_VIP, see above).
# Mirror this range into the prod tofu reservation (cilium_l2_vip_range) if prod ever gets one.
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_START
value: "192.168.2.20"
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP
value: "192.168.2.30"
# k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials. This is the prod CONTROL-PLANE VIP
# (kube-vip), NOT .20 (the ingress VIP) and NOT the single node address .10.
#
# *** DECIDED 2026-09-06 by the operator: the VIP, as intended. *** (This block previously
# read "Not yet decided" while shipping .10 — the founder's own address — and that is what
# the LIVE prod cluster is running: all three cilium-agents carry
# KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10 while kube-vip holds .9, verified 2026-09-06. On a
# 3-node HA cluster that makes the CNI's control-plane path depend on k3s-prod-1: lose it and
# the datapath keeps running off Cilium's cache while no service or policy update lands, with
# nothing looking broken. The VIP is a virtual address that reaches the cluster wherever the
# control plane is, which is the whole reason kube-vip exists here.)
#
# It is owned Ansible-side by **k3s_apiserver_endpoint** (group_vars/all.yml, derived from
# this environment's kube_vip_address = 192.168.2.9 in group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml) and MUST
# equal that value — [parity] contract in platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml. NOT k3s_api_host:
# that variable still exists and still holds the FOUNDER's .10, because the cold-bootstrap
# `--server` join needs a host that is up before any VIP is floated. Two addresses, two
# variables, deliberately.
#
# .9 sits OUTSIDE the Cilium LB pool (.20-.30) and is not a node address, so kube-vip and
# LB-IPAM can never be handed the same IP — asserted by
# conformance/tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code.
- op: replace
path: /data/K3S_API_HOST
value: "192.168.2.9"
# --- still UNDECIDED -> loud placeholders (must be real before `flux bootstrap`) ------------
# Pinned L4 VIPs, both carved out of the pool by lbipam.cilium.io/ips. Not yet assigned for
# prod. Leaving the dev literals in place would hand a prod LoadBalancer a dev-LAN address, so
# they stay placeholders; whatever is chosen MUST fall inside [POOL_START, POOL_STOP] and not
# collide with the Gateway VIP or the node IPs (.10/.11/.12).
- op: replace
path: /data/UNIFI_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.2.21"
- op: replace
path: /data/CRAFTY_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.2.22"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# BULK (EXTERNAL NFS) STORAGE HOST — *** NOT YET DECIDED. THIS PLACEHOLDER IS LOAD-BEARING. ***
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Backs every `class: bulk` volume: the 8.33 T media library (Storage/plex — plex, sonarr,
# radarr) and the 270 G legacy Nextcloud archive (Storage/nextcloud).
#
# THE STORAGE HOST IS NOT REACHABLE FROM PROD AT ALL RIGHT NOW. It has one interface,
# vmbr0 192.168.1.9/24, on pfSense's LAN; prod's nodes are on 192.168.2.0/24, pfSense's WAN.
# 22 and 8006 answer from prod only because pfSense port-forwards them via 192.168.2.102;
# 2049 and 111 do not. Opening that path is an OPERATOR decision, and the two candidate
# outcomes give DIFFERENT values here:
# port-forward 192.168.2.102:2049 -> 192.168.1.9:2049 => "192.168.2.102"
# a WAN->LAN route to 192.168.1.0/24 => "192.168.1.9"
# Guessing either one authors a prod cluster that mounts nothing, or — worse, if the guess
# ever became reachable — mounts something unintended. So it stays a placeholder.
#
# WHICH PORTS THE DECISION MUST OPEN: exactly ONE, tcp/2049. The PVs mount nfsvers=4.1, and
# NFSv4 carries mount and lock in-protocol — no rpcbind/111, no mountd, no statd. Choosing v4
# over v3 was in part this decision's cost: v3 would have needed four ports and three of them
# on ephemeral numbers.
#
# WHAT THE EXPORT MUST ALLOW IS ALREADY SETTLED, and it is the same under BOTH outcomes.
# Measured 2026-09-07 from this workstation (192.168.2.132) through the existing port-forward:
# the storage host logged the connection as coming FROM 192.168.2.132, not from a pfSense LAN
# address (`ss -tn` peer 192.168.2.132, and the host's only route off-LAN is its default via
# 192.168.1.1). pfSense DNATs WITHOUT source NAT, so the NFS server will see prod's REAL node
# addresses either way. The additive `zfs set sharenfs=` values are in docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md.
#
# *** BLAST RADIUS — READ BEFORE MERGING THIS TO A BRANCH PROD RECONCILES. ***
# A PersistentVolume's spec.nfs.server is an unvalidated string: the API server ACCEPTS this
# placeholder, the PV is created and the PVC BINDS to it (binding is pure control-plane). The
# failure surfaces only when a pod mounts — MountVolume.SetUp "Failed to resolve server
# TBD-PROD-BULK-NFS-SERVER" — so plex, sonarr, radarr and nextcloud would sit in
# ContainerCreating on prod. Unlike the LAN knobs above, this placeholder does NOT fail at
# apply time and there is no CRD validation to lean on. Set this value BEFORE prod reconciles
# a revision containing the bulk volumes; the dev overlay renders a working value, which is
# where these manifests are meant to be proven first.
- op: replace
path: /data/BULK_NFS_SERVER
# 192.168.2.102 is pfSense's WAN address, which DNATs tcp/2049 through to the Proxmox
# host's REAL address 192.168.1.9 on pfSense's LAN. Prod sits on the WAN side and cannot
# reach 192.168.1.9 directly, so the cluster mounts the NAT address. Dev is on the LAN and
# keeps the base value 192.168.1.9.
#
# PROVEN from k3s-prod-1 on 2026-09-12, not inferred:
# - mount of 192.168.2.102:/mnt/Storage/plex negotiated nfs4 vers=4.1 proto=tcp
# - a write as uid 1000 succeeded. Tested as 1000 and NOT root deliberately: the export
# carries no_root_squash, so a root write would have passed and proved nothing, while
# LSIO images default to PUID 911 and would have gone Ready then failed every import
# with EACCES. The tree is 0755 1000:3000, so uid 1000 is the only writer.
# - ln() across downloads/ -> tv/ returned link count 2 (same inode), so the arrs get
# real atomic moves instead of silently degrading to copy-then-delete on EXDEV.
# pfSense DNATs WITHOUT source NAT (the host logs prod's own node addresses as the peer),
# so the ZFS export ACL names 192.168.2.10/.11/.12 directly rather than one translated IP.
value: "192.168.2.102"
# ==========================================================================================
# OFF-CLUSTER DR TARGET — Cloudflare R2 (operator, 2026-09-05; bucket + token 2026-09-07).
# ==========================================================================================
# Dev's versitygw/MinIO (192.168.1.9:9000) sits on the DEV side of the network and is NOT an
# option for prod, for two independent reasons:
# 1. UNREACHABLE. Prod is on the SOHO network 192.168.2.0/24 — pfSense's WAN — while that
# MinIO is inside pfSense's LAN. Measured from a pod INSIDE prod (the workstation proves
# nothing about pod egress): `curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live` → connection
# timed out after 15s. Reaching it would need a WAN→LAN rule that does not exist.
# 2. NOT OFF-CLUSTER DR. It runs on the same Proxmox host as dev's VMs, so it already shares
# a physical failure domain with dev. R2 is genuinely off-site, and its free egress means
# restore REHEARSALS cost nothing — R-STATE-03 has no financial disincentive to stay proven.
#
# THIS UNBLOCKS AN ACTIVE INCIDENT, not just a roadmap item. All three prod CNPG Clusters ship
# `archive_mode=on` with `endpointURL: TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT`, so barman-cloud-wal-archive
# exits 4 on every segment and Postgres — correctly — REFUSES TO RECYCLE WAL. Verified live
# 2026-09-07: keycloak-db / nextcloud-db / semaphore-db all report
# ContinuousArchiving=False/ContinuousArchivingFailing, and keycloak-db's 5 GiB PVC is at
# 579 MiB used / 4360 MiB free and climbing monotonically. A disk-full PANIC there takes the
# cluster's SSO database down, and with it kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and
# forward-auth. Fixing the endpoint lets Postgres drain the whole backlog.
#
# ENDPOINT IS ACCOUNT-SCOPED, so it stays a prod-overlay value even though it is not a LAN
# address: this is the operator's Cloudflare account id, confirmed from inside a prod pod
# (`head-bucket` on k3s-prod-backup → BucketRegion WNAM; PUT and DELETE both succeed).
# It is NOT put in base, because base is dev's live MinIO and dev is deliberately STAYING
# there — moving dev to R2 would reset its PITR window and orphan the backups its PROVEN
# restore depends on. Two environments, two targets, isolated by URL *and* by bucket.
- op: replace
path: /data/S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT
value: "https://7ce452a1b3d6c86daf2c020edcb82d37.r2.cloudflarestorage.com"
# R2 requires the region string to be exactly `auto`. (`head-bucket` answers
# `{"BucketRegion":"WNAM"}` — that is a PHYSICAL LOCATION HINT, not a signing region; using it
# here produces AuthorizationHeaderMalformed.) Dev keeps the base `us-east-1` its live MinIO
# has always been signed with.
- op: replace
path: /data/S3_BACKUP_REGION
value: "auto"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OBJECT TENANCY INSIDE THE ONE BUCKET. The operator created a SINGLE R2 bucket, so velero and
# barman cannot be separated by bucket the way they are on dev's MinIO (`velero` and `cnpg`).
# They are separated by disjoint TOP-LEVEL PREFIXES instead:
#
# s3://k3s-prod-backup/velero/… Velero: kopia repo + backup metadata
# s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/<clusterName>/… CNPG: WAL + base backups
#
# The bucket ROOT is left empty on purpose — a misrendered prefix then lands somewhere
# obviously wrong instead of silently colliding with a live tenant. Velero's retention TTL
# deletes objects under its own prefix only, so it can never reap a WAL segment; and barman's
# per-cluster serverName subdirectory keeps the three Postgres servers' chains apart, which
# matters because interleaving two servers' WAL into one prefix corrupts the chain outright.
# Dev cannot be reached from any of these: different endpoint AND different bucket names.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- op: replace
path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET
value: "k3s-prod-backup"
- op: replace
path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX
value: "velero"
- op: replace
path: /data/CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
value: "s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHICH CREDENTIAL SIGNS THE REQUESTS TO THAT BUCKET (per-env credential split, 2026-09-07).
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The knobs above moved the ENDPOINT and the OBJECT LAYOUT per environment. The credential did
# not move with them, and it could not: the four backup-credential Secrets are SHARED BASE
# manifests, applied to both clusters by the same Flux tiers. Writing the R2 token into them
# gave prod a working key by TAKING DEV'S AWAY — dev would have signed MinIO requests with an
# R2 key id, and under archive_mode=on that is a filling pgdata PVC, not a missing backup.
#
# So each credential is now two objects, and this suffix selects prod's:
# velero-cloud-credentials-prod the R2 token in the AWS INI `cloud` shape
# <db>-backup-credentials-prod the same token as ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
# for keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db. Both halves ship to both clusters (they are
# base resources); ONLY this value decides which one each consumer reads. It is a SUFFIX rather
# than four secret-name knobs deliberately — four could be updated three-quarters of the way,
# leaving one consumer on dev's MinIO key with nothing rendering wrong, and strict-mode
# substitution cannot catch a defined-but-stale variable.
#
# THE R2 TOKEN IS THE ONE PROVEN FROM INSIDE PROD (chore/r2-credentials 0a6a862): head-bucket on
# k3s-prod-backup returns BucketRegion WNAM, and PUT and DELETE both succeed. Rotating it now
# touches ONLY the four `-prod` files; dev's MinIO keys are untouched objects. That isolation is
# the structural reason for the split, independent of dev's eventual decommission.
- op: replace
path: /data/BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX
value: "-prod"
# TODO(WS-INFRA, Phase 7): pin prod node placement once the bare-metal role labels exist.
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