e49aebc803c5c787817f63fe050bfcbd1af5357e
127
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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19097e4d4f |
chore(pm-agent): pin agent-runner to the run-394 digest (466f63e, PR #99), bump config-generation
Dispatcher image and PM_WORKER_IMAGE both move to sha256:14a42ba8281ecd98005f5d99ecda4fb729104c783b01584097c32e104ced1bb2, the digest the registry returns for agent-runner:sha-466f63ec3c3d and :main. config-generation 4 -> 5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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664ee82b9a |
fix(pm-agent): log the CLI's stdout envelope when triage fails; add PM_DECISION_MAX_TURNS
`claude --print --output-format json` reports its own failures (API error, usage limit, error_max_turns) as the result envelope on stdout and leaves stderr empty, so ask_pm()'s stderr-only message logged "claude exited 1: " with nothing after it, twice on 2026-10-31. describe_cli_failure() now logs the envelope's diagnostic fields plus stdout/stderr tails, redacted (sk-ant-, Bearer/token, URL userinfo). PM_DECISION_MAX_TURNS (default 1, unchanged) makes the max-turns remedy a ConfigMap change if the envelope turns out to say error_max_turns. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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0d3e51acc4 |
chore(pm-agent): turn PM_DRY_RUN off (operator-approved), bump config-generation to 4
The run-383 worker image (df36d9b, pinned in #96) bakes imagePullSecrets: pm-agent-registry, which admission requires, and the dispatcher's dry-run triage of #97 was read and approved. PM_REQUIRE_LABEL=agent and the worker caps are unchanged. The dry-run status text in the configmap comments, the README and the plan's follow-up 3 is updated to match. Pre-flight (read-only, k3s-prod): pm-agent-job-shape Ready+Enforce; SA/Role/RoleBinding present and can-i create jobs = yes; pm-agent-registry and pm-agent-credentials exist; both egress CNPs Valid. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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6a192ede2a |
chore(pm-agent): pin agent-runner to the run-383 digest (ddd04d4), bump config-generation
c4eba5b (run 340) bakes a worker template without imagePullSecrets, so the new admission rule refuses worker Jobs. df36d9b is agent-runner:main == :sha-ddd04d460ef6 (measured on the registry), and its /etc/pm-agent/worker-job-template.yaml carries imagePullSecrets: pm-agent-registry (read from the published layer). Renovate found df36d9b but holds it under "Awaiting Schedule" on dashboard #91: the operator's dispatch (run 385) was a real run at 12:14 New York, outside the 03:00-06:00 window. The renovate-digest markers are unchanged, so later bumps remain Renovate's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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ddd04d460e |
Merge pull request 'feat(pm-agent): pull credential + admission rule 7, first published digest pinned, dry-run first start, token scopes fixed' (#61) from feat/pm-agent-registry-pull-secret into main
Reviewed-on: #61 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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553d027f7c | Merge branch 'main' into feat/pm-agent-registry-pull-secret | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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183bca6897 |
feat(images): pin pihole, jackett and plex to the digests already running; Renovate follows them
pihole/pihole (no tag) -> 2026.10.0 sha256:d3413471... lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:latest -> v0.24.2865-ls7 sha256:4fcf3cc2... plexinc/pms-docker:latest -> 1.43.4.10903-e5521bd8c sha256:e0ab2739... Each tag was resolved against its registry and matched the pods' imageID, so the image is unchanged (the pod template string does change, so Flux rolls the three workloads). renovate.json5: regex versioning for jackett (-lsN) and plex (build-hex); jackett is looked up on ghcr.io via overridePackageName, because lscr.io is capped at dockerMaxPages=20 pages and jackett's 32k tags put the running one at #31,980 (dry run proposed nothing without it); jackett weekly (13 builds in 12 days); pihole deliberately unheld, year rollover = major. Stale "publishes only latest" prose fixed in renovate.json5 and three runbooks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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74ba90c0b3 | Merge branch 'main' into fix/renovate-hold-auth-and-self | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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8ed4e30201 |
docs(decisions): handoff for feat/renovate-track-keycloak-operator
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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df96be98bf |
fix(renovate): never auto-merge the oauth2-proxy sidecar or Renovate's own version
Operator decision. Both are held at every update type and labelled needs-review: - quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy (render.py constant, rendered sidecars, crafty). Since v7.13.0 oauth2-proxy validates refreshed OIDC sessions against the access token, every sidecar uses --cookie-refresh, and that path is untested against this Keycloak. - ghcr.io/renovatebot/renovate (and renovatebot/github-action if ever reintroduced). Nothing re-validates renovate.json5 against the new version before it takes effect. The validator passes on 44.167.0. Evaluated with Renovate's own packageRules engine: exactly 2 of 29 branch rows change (automerge true -> false, +needs-review); the other 27 are identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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d9571fc6d8 |
fix(renovate): edit catalog sources, track CNPG imageName, honour update.range, guard real-run auto-merges
Audit of the first completed dry runs (353/354) plus a debug-level local reproduction: - App-image updates edited only the generated apps/wave-*. A ServiceDefinition has no apiVersion, so the kubernetes manager extracts nothing from catalog/, and every such PR would fail render-golden (reproduced: GOLDEN DRIFT). New regex managers for catalog source.image and render.py OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE put the source and generated edits in one branch (render-golden rc 0, reproduced). - CNPG Cluster imageName was untracked (3 Clusters), while the grant Job was tracked. New manager. - allowedVersions mirror catalog update.range: this drops gitea 28.x, qbittorrent 20.x, radarr 6, nextcloud 35 and postgresql 18. - Never auto-merge: gitea, act_runner, postgresql (blast radius), flux range widening, python minors. Majors wait for a Dependency Dashboard tick. - velero plugin RC: semver versioning (v1.14.3-rc.2 -> v1.14.4 now proposed). - flux docker duplicates disabled (the "Cannot find replaceString" line). Two false comments corrected. Local dry run: regex deps 7 -> 20, branches 33 -> 29. The validator passes on 44.167.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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0c6ee4921d |
fix(renovate): document and probe the five token scopes Renovate needs; lint daemon-bound actions
Run 350 cleared platform init (/user 200, /version 200, /repos 200), then stopped at GET /api/v1/orgs/Home-Network with Gitea's own 403: token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[read:organization], token scope=read:package,write:repository,read:user The workflow's header listed only those three scopes, and the operator minted exactly that. Renovate's initRepo -> isOrg needs read:organization, and Gitea files /issues and /labels under the issue scope, which the dashboard and PR labels need: write:issue. - renovate.yaml: corrects the scope list (read:user, read:organization, write:repository, write:issue, read:package), with the call each serves. A new preflight step probes them with GETs, the token passed to curl on stdin, and names a missing scope instead of Renovate's bare "Authentication failure". - ci/lint.sh: rejects workflow `uses:` lines that need a Docker daemon (docker://, renovatebot/github-action, docker/*-action), the class fixed in #84. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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365e43cdea |
fix(renovate): run Renovate as the job container; the action needs a Docker daemon jobs do not get
renovatebot/github-action is a wrapper around `docker run`. On this runner a job has no Docker daemon by decision (decisions/2026-10-29-image-pipeline.md), so every run, including dispatch run 343, died before Renovate started: failed to connect to the docker API at unix:///var/run/docker.sock ... no such file or directory The pinned image ghcr.io/renovatebot/renovate:44.167.0 is now the job container, and a run step execs renovate-entrypoint.sh. actions/checkout is dropped, since Renovate clones the repo itself. An optional RENOVATE_GITHUB_COM_TOKEN secret feeds GITHUB_COM_TOKEN. Local dry run (--platform=local, uid 12021, the step body verbatim): 179 deps extracted, 42 updates, and all 4 own-image digest lookups against the Gitea registry succeed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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7f0cbc7ba2 |
feat(pm-agent): pin the first published agent-runner digest, start dry, and fix the token scopes
Rebased #61 onto the CI image pipeline (#81). This commit makes the remaining in-git blockers to going live go away: - deployment.yaml and PM_WORKER_IMAGE pin images run 340's digest (sha256:c4eba5b3..., tag sha-523cd9118f95 = main), read from the registry. Renovate markers unchanged. - PM_DRY_RUN=true and PM_REQUIRE_LABEL=agent for the first run. Dry run is required, not just cautious: the run-340 image's baked worker template predates imagePullSecrets, so admission would deny its Jobs until CI re-publishes after this merge and Renovate bumps. - Token scopes: Gitea 1.24.3 scopes GET /api/v1/user (the dispatcher's first call) under read:user. The documented list was missing it. Now read:user, write:repository, write:issue, read:package everywhere. - Org-package read documented as a team (Packages=Read, no repos), not just a scope. - sops is toolbox-only; the .examples say so and give the in-place edit. - runbook: key-name check no longer emits Secret values before the pipe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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a7eadd4054 |
feat(pm-agent): the kubelet's pull credential, and the seventh field admission had not read
The registry had two blockers. #59 fixed the first (nodes resolved the hostname to the non-hairpinned WAN and failed TLS against the router's CN=%D cert). This is the second: the pull is unauthenticated, and this registry refuses unauthenticated clients outright — measured 2026-10-05, its anonymous token carries access: null and every path 401s. pm-agent-registry is a dockerconfigjson Secret (SOPS, placeholders) referenced by imagePullSecrets on the dispatcher Deployment and on the committed worker Job template. It holds the SAME Gitea token as pm-agent-credentials, because the two consumers need two formats: the application reads a raw token from env, the kubelet reads a dockerconfigjson before any container starts. Same one-value-in-two-files pattern as the Keycloak client secret, documented in both .example files. The operator's part is the value plus one new scope: read:package. ADMISSION GAINED A SEVENTH RULE. imagePullSecrets is a pod-spec field no container references, which is exactly why it is easy to leave unread — the same shape of omission as initContainers, ephemeralContainers, env and envFrom before it. The kubelet reads the named Secret, in this namespace, before anything runs. Rule 1's pattern now REQUIRES the committed entry; rule 7 forbids any other and any second one. Both halves are needed: a foreach over an absent list yields no result. The leverage is small and the policy says so: the image is digest-pinned, so a different pull credential cannot change WHAT runs. Pinned anyway — 'only the committed shape' is the premise, and the rule costs four lines. kyverno test: 33 passed, 0 failed (was 28). Three new fixtures, each a real path: the committed entry plus a second one, a different Secret, and none at all. The gate also caught me shipping the Secret in plaintext — I never ran sops -e -i on the placeholder. Recorded in the handoff entry, because the file looked finished. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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262c6e4a97 | Merge branch 'main' into feat/keycloak-passkey-reconcile | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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d2c4bd5194 |
fix(buildkit): allow buildkitd egress to Gitea's backend so the Gateway stops 403ing the push
Images run 337's push failed with "403 Forbidden: Access denied". Measured
read-only: Gitea never logged the request; an unauthenticated GET /v2/ via the
Gateway gets 401 from Gitea when sent from act-runner (egress unrestricted) but
403 from buildkitd; Hubble logs it as an L7 http-request DROPPED with
traffic_direction EGRESS. Cilium >= 1.16.8 (CVE-2025-30162) re-checks the
source pod's egress against the proxied backend identity, and buildkitd's
egress only allowed world and the ingress entity. Same fix as
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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04eb38584a |
fix(conformance): workload-mTLS certificates may use a private CA, if they prove they are workload-internal
R-TLS-01/docs/08 govern externally reachable TLS and ADR-0006 puts workload mTLS out of scope, but tls-lifecycle-automated required ACME for every Certificate, which platform/buildkit's internal CA cannot satisfy. Clause (5b) accepts the tls-scope=workload-mtls annotation only when the certificate proves it: no Gateway serves it, internal names only, namespaced selfSigned/ca issuer backed by an exempt CA certificate. Also fixes yamllint comma spacing in the buildkitd mounts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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f65c12b395 |
feat(images): build on rootless BuildKit over mTLS; verification moves into Containerfile verify stages
Operator decision on PR #81: no CI job may reach a privileged daemon. The act runner is untouched. - platform/buildkit (+ clusters/base/buildkit.yaml): moby/buildkit v0.34.1-rootless pinned by digest, uid 1000, not privileged; caps drop ALL + SETUID/SETGID, seccomp/AppArmor Unconfined, read-only rootfs (each measured under podman). cert-manager CA + server/client certs, ClusterIP :1234, default-deny with ingress only from the act-runner pod (DinD masquerades jobs to it). No Kyverno exception: every applied policy matches app-namespace=true only. - Each Containerfile names its shipped stage and ends in a `verify` stage holding every former `docker run` assertion (uid 65532, RUN --network=none, writable-path inventory standing in for the read-only rootfs). The old `&& echo` checks that could never fail are real assertions now. - images.sh drives buildkitd with a pinned buildx (sha256-checked) via bake; PRs build verify targets with agent-runner FROM the in-run toolbox (target: context); main verifies, then pushes. Fails loudly when the builder secrets are absent or buildkitd is unreachable. - infra/gitea/buildkit-client-secret.sh copies the client cert into Actions secrets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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8f35234fcc |
fix(images): name the measured runner blocker; the job container gets no Docker daemon
PR #81's first images run failed in 6s: act_runner 0.2.11 forces docker_host '-' for a tcp:// DOCKER_HOST, and gitea/act drops every bind when valid_volumes is empty. Giving jobs the privileged DinD daemon is node-root for any workflow author, so it is left to the operator; options are in the handoff entry. The driver's failure now names the cause. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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e539109830 |
feat(images): build, verify and publish the three images in CI; Renovate carries the digests
Operator rule 2026-10-29: image creation, hosting and lifecycle belong to CI/CD, never to a workstation build/push. Nothing had ever been pushed to the Gitea registry. - .gitea/workflows/images.yaml + scripts/images.sh: PRs build+verify (no credential); main builds, verifies and pushes toolbox, agent-runner (FROM toolbox) and conformance-runner as sha-<commit> + main, reading the digest back from the registry. Only changed images build. - Each image's own build-image.sh does the build and in-image verification, now engine-neutral (DinD: no podman-only calls, probe over stdin not a bind mount). New toolbox build-image.sh. - Digest references carry `# renovate-digest:` markers; renovate.json5 gains a custom.regex manager for them. The worker Job template is deliberately untracked (it would loop). - renovate.yaml pins renovate-version 44.167.0: the action's default (39.264.0) rejects the current config's managerFilePatterns, so every run would have died at CONFIG_VALIDATION. - Push credential: REGISTRY_PUSH_TOKEN secret; the Actions token has no package scope in Gitea 1.24.3 (container.go Authenticate). Retention: infra/gitea/registry-retention.sh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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da1b36eb64 |
fix(renovate): pin renovate-version — the action's default (39) rejects renovate.json5
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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6bb8af1d70 |
docs(decisions): handoff for the passkey reconciler review fixes
Also states in bind_browser_flow()'s docstring that it is reached only when git's bind-browser-flow is "true". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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f5931944fa |
feat(keycloak): reconcile the passkey realm config via GitOps, the browser flow blue/green
PR #72 declared the WebAuthn passwordless policy and a restructured browser-mfa flow in the realm import. That declaration could not take effect: a KeycloakRealmImport is a ONE-SHOT, and prod's reads Done=True / Started=False, so every realm-level field and flow declared after the first import is inert -- in git, applied by Flux, reported Ready, reaching the realm never. Merging it changed nothing about how anyone logs in, and nothing anywhere said so. Same failure class as the 2026-09-06 client-secret incident, third field over. A SIBLING reconciler converges all three declared things every 15 minutes. It is a sibling, not a second pass of client-secret-reconciler.yaml, so that reconciler's allow-list -- and its guarantee that prod's real user and the media-users / platform-admins / viewers groups are structurally unreachable -- stays literally true. Its selftest still passes unchanged. pass 1 webAuthnPolicyPasswordless* -- strict read-modify-write of GET/PUT /admin/realms/homelab, readback-verified. pass 2 webauthn-register-passwordless -- strict read-modify-write of ONE literally-named alias; enabled, defaultAction false so enrolment stays opt-in. pass 3 the browser flow -- BLUE/GREEN. PASS 3 NEVER MUTATES THE FLOW USERS ARE LOGGING IN THROUGH. Converging a five-flow, ten-execution tree needs create-subflow, create-execution, set-requirement and bind-config as SEPARATE untransacted calls; doing that to the BOUND flow means a run dying between them leaves a half-built login path for every SSO app and kubectl, and this repo has had a total SSO outage from a realm change. So instead: 1. BUILD under a NEW, unused alias (declared alias + a hash of the desired shape, applied to EVERY alias in the tree -- reusing browser-mfa-forms would mean writing INTO the bound tree). A failure leaves an orphaned, unbound flow and zero user-visible effect. 2. VERIFY by readback -- levels, ordering, authenticators, requirements, and the conditional-OTP config CONTENTS -- before anything is bound, so the regression that once 403'd every platform-admin is caught BEFORE it bites. 3. BIND with ONE atomic PUT setting browserFlow. 4. ROLLBACK is one write; no DELETE exists anywhere in the allow-list, so the old flow survives as the rollback target. The widened allow-list is made safe structurally. It cannot say "but not the bound flow" -- its write entries are alias-parameterised -- so a second guard screens every write against the live browserFlow's WHOLE subtree (sub-flow aliases and execution ids) before a socket opens, FAIL-CLOSED until that binding has been read. The create-flow endpoint carries no alias in its path, so it is screened on its request BODY; the selftest caught that it otherwise escaped the guard. Idempotence is load-bearing: a rebuild-and-reflip every 15 minutes would churn the login path on a schedule. The bound flow is compared STRUCTURALLY and a match produces zero writes and no new flow. Sub-flow and config ALIASES are deliberately not compared -- a built flow carries a hash suffix, so comparing labels would make it permanently unrecognisable as converged. Single source of truth: the desired state is GENERATED from the realm import by ci/render-keycloak-passkey-policy.py and gated with --check, so the RP ID -- baked into every credential at enrolment and never re-keyable -- is declared once. The pod keeps automountServiceAccountToken: false and reads a mounted ConfigMap, so no rbac.yaml is added anywhere. Read from Keycloak 26.0.6 source before being relied on: updateRealm (DefaultExportImportManager 725-894) makes no getUsers/getClients/getGroups/ getRoles/getRequiredActions/getAuthenticationFlows call; it DOES read getBrowserFlow(), which is what makes the atomic bind possible and why the policy write pins it; the passwordless policy is applied all-or-nothing only when RpEntityName is non-empty, with defaults substituted for omitted keys; and updateExecutions compares rep.getPriority(), so a body omitting `priority` would silently reshuffle the whole execution order. Gate coverage: a new whole-repo L0 check extracts the script and runs its --selftest (216 assertions, including a build killed at four different points each asserting the old flow is still bound and the bound subtree was never written), plus mutations.py (30 injected regressions, all caught) proving the selftest can fail. An earlier iteration of this work only AUDITED the flow and left the restructure manual; decisions/2026-10-18-keycloak-passkey-reconciler.md records that design and why it was reconsidered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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aacf361bb8 |
fix(renovate): the workflow still named renovate.json, so every run since #79 died with ENOENT
#79 renamed the config to renovate.json5 and left configurationFile pointing at the old name. Runs 315-322 (2026-10-22..29) all failed in ~1s before Renovate started. Also add a ci/lint.sh assertion that every workflow configurationFile: resolves to a real path — valid YAML, so yamllint could not catch it, and the gate stayed green throughout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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1301af9a4c |
Merge pull request 'fix(renovate): the config was INVALID, so the first manual run errored out' (#79) from fix/renovate-invalid-config into main
Reviewed-on: #79 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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42ce001d71 |
Merge pull request 'fix(renovate): the cron fired outside Renovate's own window, so it would never open a PR' (#77) from fix/renovate-cron-window into main
Reviewed-on: #77 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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0d4bd7297d |
fix(renovate): the cron fired outside Renovate's own window, so it would never open a PR
.gitea/workflows/renovate.yaml shipped with `cron: "15 3 * * *"`. Gitea Actions cron is UTC, and renovate.json carries schedule ["after 3am and before 6am"] with timezone America/New_York -- and THAT inner schedule is authoritative: Renovate re-checks it and declines to open PRs outside it. 03:15 UTC -> 23:15 EDT, the PREVIOUS EVENING in New York window -> 03:00-06:00 local => NOT INSIDE (3h45m early) The original comment claimed the cron sat "slightly ahead" of the window. It sat 3h45m behind it, on the previous day. Every nightly run would have started, logged "not within schedule", opened ZERO PRs and exited SUCCESSFULLY -- a green tick forever, indistinguishable from "nothing needed updating", hiding the ~30 pending updates PR #73 existed to surface. Changed to `15 8 * * *`, chosen to survive DST rather than to look tidy: EDT (UTC-4): local 03:00-06:00 == 07:00-10:00 UTC EST (UTC-5): local 03:00-06:00 == 08:00-11:00 UTC 08:15 UTC is inside BOTH (04:15 EDT / 03:15 EST), verified by computation at both extremes, so neither switchover needs an edit. A cron cannot follow DST. Also confirmed while here: RENOVATE_TOKEN now exists as a repo Actions secret, so the workflow's fail-hard preflight will pass. STILL UNRESOLVED and the likelier remaining bug: renovate.json's `enabledManagers` lists bare `regex`, where modern Renovate names the custom manager `custom.regex`. If the bare name is ignored, every inline `# renovate:` marker in the tree does nothing. Deliberately NOT changed -- guessing at a key that could fail validation and take the whole run down is worse than a question one dry run answers. See the handoff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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713b0c3dba |
fix(renovate): the config was INVALID, so the first manual run errored out
The operator ran the Renovate workflow manually and it failed. The cause is not
the workflow: renovate.json was never a valid Renovate config. It carried five
pseudo-comment keys (_comment, _kubernetes_comment, _unmanageable_comment,
_ignorePaths_comment, _docker_comment) because JSON has no comments, and
Renovate REJECTS unknown top-level options. Proven with the official validator:
ERROR: Found errors in configuration
Invalid configuration option: _comment
Invalid configuration option: _docker_comment
Invalid configuration option: _ignorePaths_comment
Invalid configuration option: _kubernetes_comment
Invalid configuration option: _unmanageable_comment
This is the SECOND independent reason Renovate never worked, on top of PR #77's
cron firing outside renovate.json's own schedule window. Either alone was enough
to produce "nothing ever happens"; #73 shipped both.
Converted renovate.json -> renovate.json5. JSON5 permits real // comments and
Renovate discovers renovate.json5 natively; nothing in .gitea/ or ci/ pins the
old filename and no RENOVATE_CONFIG_FILE is set. Every word of the original
rationale is preserved as positioned comments (74 comment lines) rather than
flattened into a description string.
Verified the conversion dropped nothing: 18 non-comment keys before and after,
no missing/extra keys, no changed values, docker: {enabled: true} still present.
The validator now returns "Config validated successfully".
DISPROVED while here: `enabledManagers` containing bare `regex` was suspected of
needing to be `custom.regex` (which would silently disable every inline
`# renovate:` marker). The validator accepts `regex`; unfounded, unchanged.
Renovate has still never completed a run -- this fixes one of two blockers and
nothing in the gate catches an invalid config. See the handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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fda5c31a94 |
fix(pihole): make the split-horizon answer cacheable, or one blip latches the WAN IP for 5 minutes
Operator reported DNS flapping between the cluster ingress and the router's public IP. PiHole is not at fault -- both replicas answer 192.168.2.20 consistently (6/6 via the VIP, 8/8 from a client). The bug is an asymmetry in CACHEABILITY that we created. Measured: pihole 192.168.2.23 -> 192.168.2.20 TTL=0 public 1.1.1.1 -> wan.home.keithjackson.dev TTL=300 router 192.168.2.1 -> wan.... TTL=153 -> 148 -> 143 (decrementing = caching) dnsmasq answers `address=` entries with TTL 0 unless told otherwise. The router forwards LAN queries to PiHole and caches the result, so the CORRECT answer is uncacheable -- re-queried on every lookup, maximum exposure to any gap -- while the WRONG answer caches for 300s. The instant the router falls back to upstream (standard forwarder behaviour when the target does not answer) it latches the WAN address for the whole LAN for five minutes, then expires, re-queries PiHole, gets TTL 0, and is immediately re-exposed. So ONE sub-second PiHole gap -- pod restart, L2 lease move, ARP flap, kured reboot -- becomes FIVE MINUTES of the house resolving to the WAN IP. That asymmetry, not the gap, is why it reads as "flapping". Fix: local-ttl=60 prepended to FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines. dnsmasq applies local-ttl to replies made from configuration, so one directive covers all five address= names. 60s rides out a pod restart and a lease re-election while a real VIP change still propagates inside a minute; these VIPs are pinned and static. apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml regenerated with the canonical render command (--all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation, NOT --emit-waves); exactly two files changed and the rendered diff is the single local-ttl prefix. UNAPPLIED. Does NOT remove the trigger: .23 still has two independently-elected L2 leases (as do crafty .22 and unifi .21), which the operator has parked. If the TTL is still 0 after merge, suspect FTL silently rejecting the passthrough line -- see the handoff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
|
c340bbfc4b |
Merge pull request 'fix(conformance): one regex made the merge gate take 28 minutes instead of 2' (#76) from fix/ha-check-catastrophic-regex into main
Reviewed-on: #76 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
793c3940a8 |
fix(conformance): one regex made the merge gate take 28 minutes instead of 2
ha-control-plane-as-code/check.sh had: re.search(r"--server https://.*?\n(?:.*\n){0,10}?\s*when:...'secondary'", K3S_TEXT, re.S) With re.S every `.` matches newlines, so `.*?` and the nested `(?:.*\n){0,10}?` can each consume the whole document -- nested unbounded repetition, which backtracks exponentially on a failed or late match. MEASURED in CI via `docker top` on the live job container: python3 at 19:54 of CPU time, which is essentially the entire ~28 minute gate. Localised to the exact line by extracting the inline python and running it under faulthandler.dump_traceback_later, which named re/__init__.py:177 in search from this call -- not inferred from reading. Replaced `.` with `[^\n]*` and dropped re.S, so the {0,10} is a real ten-line window with nothing to backtrack into. On the real input (22,179 chars): 0.2 ms, match still found. Whole check: 0.199s, rc 0, 115 assertions, identical success message. WHY IT SURFACED NOW, AND IT WAS MINE: K3S_TEXT is every *.yml in roles/k3s_server concatenated. The regex was latent for as long as it existed; PR #71 added ~100 lines to that role (kubelet graceful-shutdown config), growing the input past the point where exponential backtracking stopped being survivable. WHY ONLY infra/** WAS SLOW: touched-requirements.sh maps infra/* to R-ENV-01, so the L0 run becomes --include-scope whole-repo --requirements R-ENV-01, which selects this whole-repo check. Doc/platform changes never did -- #69 1m55s and #72 1m53s stayed fast while #71 27m44s, the #73 merge 27m46s and #75 all ran ~28m. The pattern is unique in the repo (grep over all l0-static check.sh files). Not re-timed in CI post-fix; this PR's own run is the first datapoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
ef8ef5ac29 |
fix(unattended-upgrades): Debian has no reboot-sentinel package, so ship the writer
The first real run failed on all three nodes: fatal: [k3s-prod-1]: "No package matching 'update-notifier-common' is available" update-notifier-common is an UBUNTU package and does not exist in Debian -- `apt-cache policy` returns Candidate: (none) on trixie. The role asserted it "owns the hook that creates /var/run/reboot-required", which is true on Ubuntu and false here, so the role could never have worked. Three further measurements settled the replacement: notify-reboot-required is absent; NO linux-image-* postinst references it (invoking it is an Ubuntu patch, so dropping a script at that path would never be called); and no hook under apt.conf.d or /etc/kernel mentions reboot-required. Debian trixie ships no mechanism at all. So the role now provides it: * /usr/local/sbin/k3s-notify-reboot-required -- touches the sentinel when the running kernel is not the newest installed, using `linux-version` (from linux-base, a dependency of every linux-image, measured present) because kernel version ordering is not string ordering. * /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99-k3s-reboot-required -- DPkg::Post-Invoke, `|| true` so it can never abort an apt transaction. /run is tmpfs (measured), so the sentinel self-clears on boot; no cleanup task. The verify assert was ALSO weaker than it looked: a `find` glob for *update-notifier* / *unattended-upgrades* under apt.conf.d would have matched Debian's own unattended-upgrades conffile and reported "writer present" while none existed. It now stats the two exact paths this role owns and requires the script to be executable. Newly verified: the script ran on prod-1 as unprivileged k3s under sh -x -- running=newest=7.1.8+deb13-amd64, took the equal branch, exited 0, wrote nothing. Correct. sh -n and bash -n clean. Still unverified: the WRITING half never executes while running == newest, so the sentinel has not been seen created and kured has not been seen react. The honest test is the next kernel upgrade. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
|
ee196c7bcd |
Merge pull request 'feat(upgrades): automate node reboots (kured) and wire Renovate, which had never run' (#73) from feat/automated-upgrades into main
Reviewed-on: #73 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
|
83d3568150 |
Merge pull request 'feat(shutdown): configure graceful node shutdown, and never scale a Delete-policy StatefulSet' (#71) from feat/graceful-cluster-shutdown into main
Reviewed-on: #71 |
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jakman85
|
24bea918ab |
Merge pull request 'fix(coredns): hold in-cluster DNS at 2 replicas via an HPA, because k3s owns the Deployment' (#74) from fix/coredns-ha into main
Reviewed-on: #74 |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
5642881c4d |
fix(coredns): hold in-cluster DNS at 2 replicas via an HPA, because k3s owns the Deployment
MEASURED on prod 2026-10-18: kube-system/coredns had replicas: 1. In-cluster DNS was a single pod on a single node, so draining or rebooting that node was a CLUSTER-WIDE in-cluster DNS outage until the pod rescheduled -- every Service lookup, every CNPG replica finding its primary, every operator addressing the API by name. It was invisible because 1/1 Ready looks healthy. It is urgent rather than latent now: the scheduled reboot automation on feat/automated-upgrades drains and reboots one node at a time, unattended, overnight -- turning a single point of failure into a recurring one. WHY AN HPA AND NOT replicas: 2 -- the whole decision. k3s OWNS the coredns Deployment: AddOn/coredns, source /data/k3s/server/manifests/coredns.yaml, managedFields managers deploy@k3s-prod-1 + k3s, objectset.rio.cattle.io/hash label. k3s re-stages its bundled manifests on startup, so replicas: 2 written there -- or a kubectl scale -- is reverted on the next restart or upgrade. Rejected alternatives: * coredns.yaml.skip + our own templated copy (the roles/kube_vip pattern). Deterministic, but takes ownership of coredns from k3s permanently so k3s upgrades stop updating it. Too high a price for a replica count. * A Flux patch of the Deployment. Rejected outright: Flux and k3s's deploy controller would both own one object and fight -- the default-deny NetworkPolicy drift-loop shape (~2500 events/10min) this cluster already hit. An HPA is a separate object k3s does not own, driving /scale rather than the Deployment spec, so there is no shared-ownership fight; if k3s re-stages replicas: 1 it is re-asserted within a reconcile. Disclosed cost: a brief window at 1 replica after a k3s restart. It is a FLOOR-HOLDER, not an autoscaler -- the CPU metric exists only so the autoscaling/v2 object is valid. Measured: 5m/4m against a 100m request (~5%), so the 80% target is never approached. scaleDown stabilization 600s because DNS is the worst thing to flap; scaleUp immediate, since that restores redundancy. The kustomization edit is ADDITIVE: platform/coredns/ already existed and holds the coredns-custom split-horizon ConfigMap (R-DNS-01/03), which is untouched. UNAPPLIED. The HPA has never run, and the claim that k3s reverts replicas on restart is reasoned, not observed. After merge check `describe hpa coredns` for ScalingActive=True -- an inert HPA looks identical to a working one because the hand scale already left 2 replicas. See the handoff entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
a2440a3125 |
feat(upgrades): automated OS reboots (kured) + security-only unattended-upgrades, and give Renovate a runner
Two halves of one repeatable upgrade process. Neither works alone. (a) OS upgrades and reboots platform/kured/ — Kubernetes Reboot Daemon, chart 6.1.0/app 1.23.0, in its own Flux Kustomization (dependsOn platform, wait:true). NOT in platform/kustomization.yaml: that tier gates platform-config and every apps wave, so a wedged reboot daemon there could stall every application. A component added to make maintenance safer must not be able to cause an outage. infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades/ — new role (node_baseline is touched by other open branches, and this is a different lifecycle), enabled for prod in group_vars. The human gate is the SENTINEL, which is how this honours node_baseline's "IT DOES NOT REBOOT" (k3s-prod-2 hung on a warm reboot 2026-09-03) and cluster-upgrade-plan.md's rejection of automating away the gate between nodes: u-u is security-only with the kernel blacklisted, so it essentially never writes /var/run/reboot-required. That file appears when an operator deliberately runs node-baseline.yml --tags kernel. kured then does only the mechanical half, including the ordering rule node_baseline has to shout. Quorum: concurrent reboots are structurally impossible, not merely unlikely. concurrency:1 plus kured's single lock annotation (API-server optimistic concurrency), and lockTtl:0 — an expiring lock is exactly the 3-node etcd catastrophe, so a hung node holds it forever and nothing cascades. Longhorn: measured 25 volumes x 3 replicas, hard anti-affinity, 600s replenishment wait, serialized rebuild — so every drain degrades ALL volumes to 2/3 and the inter-node gate must be volume robustness, not pod readiness. Doubled: lockReleaseDelay 30m (unconditional) plus kured's Prometheus alert gate (semantic). alertFilterMatchOnly:true is load-bearing — the flag inverts the regexp's meaning, and under the chart default kured would have been blocked on day one by the five alerts measured firing with no end in sight, and never rebooted anything. Kernel floor (kernel >= 6.13, EFI memattr): excluded TWICE. The running kernel comes from o=Debian Backports, which is not an allowed origin, so u-u cannot see a kernel upgrade; and ^linux- is blacklisted anyway so widening origins later cannot re-arm it. Asserted against apt-config dump, not against the file just written. 6.12 kernels are still installed and bootable on all three nodes, and nothing was held. Closes a silent no-op: update-notifier-common was absent on all three nodes, so NOTHING could create the sentinel. kured alone would have idled forever at 1/1 Running. platform/kured/alerts.yaml — three rules over kured's only metric, with a companion promtool suite pinning each both ways, plus runbooks/node-reboot-automation.md. Window is DAILY 03:00-06:00 because a weekly one forces for:8d, longer than this cluster's 7d Prometheus retention. (b) Image/dependency automation Renovate was aspirational: renovate.json present and complete, with no workflow, no in-cluster workload, and its docker+kubernetes managers disabled — so every plain image: tag was maintained by nothing while seven files claimed otherwise. .gitea/workflows/renovate.yaml — scheduled daily, dry_run default true for a safe first run, and a preflight that FAILS (not skips) without RENOVATE_TOKEN, because a skipped Gitea job reports success and that is how this stayed inert. Renovate now owns both halves; Flux image-automation is formally closed: it pushes commits rather than opening PRs (bypassing CLAUDE.md §1), and it cannot work here anyway — main is protected user_can_push:false and the flux-system GitRepository has no secretRef. Its controllers are installed and have idled 43 days with zero CRs. conformance/: +34/-0, one new SCRAPE_OWNERS entry claiming kured_. Weakens nothing; tightens the check for this component (requires service.create+metrics.create, both chart-default false, plus a companion NetworkPolicy requirement). Required because assertion (3) fails an alert over an unclaimed metric and KNOWN_UNWIRED_METRICS is shrink-only. Sensitive paths touched: clusters/**, conformance/**, .gitea/** — needs a non-author approving review; /approve-override deliberately NOT posted. NOT verified: no OS upgrade run, no node rebooted, no lock observed, the Ansible role never executed, and whether CNPG switches its primary on a drain-induced eviction (the most likely way the first real reboot fails). Full list in the handoff entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
16894b7b73 |
feat(keycloak): declare passkey (WebAuthn passwordless) login for the homelab realm
Adds the realm's WebAuthn Passwordless policy and restructures the browser-mfa
flow so a passkey is an ALTERNATIVE beside the password form. Additive and
optional by design: this IdP gates every SSO app plus kubectl, so a mandatory
passkey flow that misfires is a total lock-out. Enrolment is not forced.
Policy: RP ID is ${BASE_DOMAIN} (not the keycloak host) because a passkey's RP ID
is fixed at enrolment and must not be bound to a name that can move; resident key
required (a non-discoverable credential is a second factor, not a passkey); user
verification required (without it, possession alone is a complete login).
Flow: auth-username-password-form is split into auth-username-form +
auth-password-form, because the server must know who is logging in before it can
decide whether a passkey exists. Conditional OTP for platform-admins is relocated
intact onto the password branch only — a UV-required passkey is already two
phishing-resistant factors.
No requiredActions block is declared, deliberately: Keycloak 26.0.6 treats
requiredActions as REPLACE not merge, so declaring one would delete the default
set including CONFIGURE_TOTP and lock every platform-admin out of the OTP step
this flow still enforces. webauthn-register-passwordless is already registered
enabled-but-not-default by Keycloak's own defaults.
UNAPPLIED: the realm import is a one-shot resting at Done=True/Started=False, so
this reaches the live realm never. See the handoff entry and the README section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
c150327a30 |
fix(oauth2-proxy): gate startup on Keycloak discovery, or a cold boot CrashLoops the proxy
Exposed by the 2026-10-17 whole-cluster shutdown. oauth2-proxy performs OIDC
discovery ONCE at startup and exits 1 if it fails. On a cold boot Keycloak is
not serving yet, the shared Gateway answers 503, and the proxy dies:
[provider.go:55] Performing OIDC Discovery...
[main.go:73] ERROR: Failed to initialise OAuth2 Proxy: ... failed to discover
OIDC configuration: unexpected status "503": no healthy upstream
It then sits in exponential CrashLoopBackOff long after Keycloak is healthy --
one replica was still down minutes later and only a manual pod delete cleared
it. There is no retry flag, a readinessProbe cannot help (the container is
already dead), and CrashLoopBackOff backoff is not tunable per-pod.
Add an extraInitContainers gate (wait-for-idp) that polls the discovery doc
until it answers. A pod in Init accrues no CrashLoopBackOff backoff and retries
promptly. BOUNDED and FAILS OPEN: after ~5m it starts the proxy anyway, so the
worst case is exactly today's behaviour and never something new.
extraInitContainers is the chart's OWN hook for this -- its commented example is
literally `- name: wait-for-idp` -- and the key was CONFIRMED against the pinned
chart (helm show values, 10.7.1) rather than assumed, because a wrong Helm values
key is silently ignored. No new base image: the chart already runs an alpine init
container for its built-in waitForRedis gate; pinned to 3.22 (verified upstream)
rather than the chart's `latest`.
Rejected: Flux postRenderers (no precedent in this tree, and the chart has a
hook); --skip-oidc-discovery (removes the fetch entirely, but needs four
hardcoded endpoints and I could not verify lazy-JWKS offline -- this component
gates SSO for seven apps, so the additive option wins).
Shell vars are written BARE with no braced form: platform declares
postBuild.substituteFrom, and envsubst would blank a braced shell variable and
silently break the loop. Same convention as the gitea/nextcloud OIDC hooks.
UNAPPLIED; the init container has never run, and the race was not re-created to
prove the fix. Check the init container's log on first apply. See the handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
2f2e98aa19 |
feat(shutdown): configure graceful node shutdown, and never scale a Delete-policy StatefulSet
All three nodes had to be powered off to move them onto a UPS, and there was NO procedure: infra/cluster.sh stop is virsh-based and only ever applied to the decommissioned dev cluster. The sequence was improvised live. Two defects came out of doing it. 1. GRACEFUL NODE SHUTDOWN WAS UNCONFIGURED ON EVERY PROD NODE. No shutdownGracePeriod anywhere in infra/ansible/, so `shutdown -h` stopped k3s, containerd went with it, and every pod was SIGKILLed where it stood -- 9 CNPG instances mid-checkpoint, the UniFi VM, 25 attached Longhorn volumes. roles/k3s_server now sets kubelet-arg shutdown-grace-period=90s and shutdown-grace-period-critical-pods=20s. The half that silently defeats the other half: this is enforced by LOGIND, not the kubelet. The kubelet holds an inhibitor DELAY lock and systemd waits at most InhibitDelayMaxSec -- DEFAULT 5 SECONDS -- then proceeds regardless, truncating the drain with no error. The role ships a logind.conf.d drop-in (120) and ASSERTS cap >= grace period, because the failure is invisible. 2. SCALING A StatefulSet TO 0 DELETED ITS PVC AND VOLUME. monitoring/loki carries persistentVolumeClaimRetentionPolicy whenScaled: Delete, so the quiesce destroyed storage-loki-0 outright. Loki stores type: filesystem, so that PVC was the only copy; 72h retention bounded the loss, the mechanism does not. Symptom was the volume count going 25 -> 24, first misread as a miscount. Repaired: scale back to the declared 1 recreated the PVC and loki-0 is 2/2 Running. New infra/maintenance/quiesce.sh (quiesce|resume|status) encodes the sequence that worked and REFUSES to scale any whenScaled: Delete StatefulSet -- it stays running, its volume hard-detaches, and it rebuilds on restart. A rebuild beats a deletion. Discovery is computed from the live cluster, so a newly onboarded service needs no edit here. runbooks/cluster-maintenance-shutdown.md is the operator page: order in both directions, TrueNAS-after-nodes (hard NFS mount wedges kubelet), the un-hibernate-Postgres step Flux will NOT do for you, and a "looks broken but is fine" section separating the 4/19 Flux cascade, the degraded-and-rebuilding volume and the self-recovering keycloak-operator from the one thing that needs a human (a stuck oauth2-proxy replica). THE KUBELET CHANGE HAS NEVER BEEN APPLIED OR TESTED -- it needs a rolling k3s restart, which is an operator action. Review config.yaml's kubelet-arg before applying: a bad config.yaml is how k3s fails to come up. See the handoff entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
0747849837 |
fix(bulk-nfs): repoint at the TrueNAS (192.168.2.30); the PVs must be recreated, not reconciled
Both ZFS pools moved off the Proxmox host onto a standalone TrueNAS on 192.168.2.30 -- prod's OWN /24, so the pfSense crossing that made this knob load-bearing is gone, along with the DNAT at 192.168.2.102 it mounted through. Measured 2026-10-07: 192.168.2.102:2049 no longer answers; .30:2049 and :111 do. BULK_NFS_SERVER -> 192.168.2.30 in prod, base and dev. The dev value is marked inert (dev is decommissioned); it carries the real address only so nothing in the tree renders a host that no longer exists. THE OPERATIONAL POINT, and why this is not just a value change: a bound PersistentVolume's NFS source is immutable. Server dry-run, 2026-10-07: spec.persistentvolumesource: Forbidden: spec.persistentvolumesource is immutable after creation so Flux's apply FAILS rather than updating, and the pods keep their old, dead mount. The five PVs must be deleted and recreated -- safe, because Retain never touches data and render.py emits a pre-set claimRef so each PV rebinds its own PVC. The sequence is docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md section 10 and is an OPERATOR action; this commit does not perform it. Pairs with the hazard already on the page: spec.nfs.server is unvalidated at create (any string binds) and immutable at update. A wrong value is accepted silently and then cannot be corrected in place. docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md: sections 1 and 5 rewritten for TrueNAS -- the measured exports, the service settings that decide whether uid 1000 survives the wire, the three stale ZFS sharenfs properties that had to be cleared, and the ACL hazard (acltype=nfsv4 + aclinherit=passthrough means one click in the ACL editor propagates to the whole future library). Section 7 rewritten now that the placeholder is gone, section 9 retargeted from dev to prod, section 10 new. Sections 2/3/4/6 are unchanged by the move. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
2acfed460a |
fix(vpn-ingress): content-hash the peer register, or a merged peer never reaches the tunnel
The operator enrolled a phone, merged the peer, and `wg show` listed none. Measured on prod 2026-10-06 with the peer already on main: live wg-peers ConfigMap, active AllowedIPs .. 0 DaemonSet volume reference ................. configMap.name: wg-peers (FIXED) DaemonSet generation/observedGeneration .... 1 / 1 (never rolled) init container, all three pods ............. "0 peer(s)" Part of it was just the 10m reconcile interval. The defect is the fixed name: Flux updates a fixed-name ConfigMap IN PLACE, so the pod template is byte-identical, so no rollout is triggered -- and the init container assembles wg0.conf ONCE at pod start into a tmpfs, so the running tunnel keeps the old peer list indefinitely. Adding or revoking a peer had no effect until something unrelated restarted the pods. For a REVOCATION that is a security defect, not an inconvenience: delete a stanza, see a green PR, device keeps working. The runbook and README both claimed "PR -> merge -> Flux rolls the DaemonSet". Never true. And this repo already documents the fix, in a file I had read -- runbooks/kustomization.yaml: "The generated name carries kustomize's content hash, so editing any runbook rolls the server automatically and a stale projection is impossible." So: peers.yaml (inline ConfigMap) -> peers.conf (plain file) + a configMapGenerator. The operator's enrolled peer is carried across verbatim. Every line is WireGuard config and `#` is a legal comment there, so the documentation now lives inside the file that is actually mounted. `namespace: vpn-ingress` on the kustomization is REQUIRED, not tidiness: a generated ConfigMap inherits no namespace, everything else here declares vpn-ingress, and kustomize's nameReference will not rewrite across a namespace boundary -- without it the build mounts the unhashed name and the pods wedge on a missing volume. Caught only by building the output and reading the volumes. new-peer.sh: PEERS_FILE repointed, and a missing register is now FATAL rather than skipped -- the old `[ -r "$PEERS_FILE" ] && grep ...` guard meant that after the rename the only symptom would have been duplicate detection quietly never firing again. Stale peers.yaml references swept from six files including the script's own user-facing output. Verified: the DaemonSet now mounts wg-peers-m9kcckcb5t; the hash tracks content (edit -> dgg7ht9c74 -> restore -> m9kcckcb5t); the enrolled peer is byte-identical to main's; and `new-peer.sh dupe 2` is now correctly refused by the operator's real allocation. No sensitive paths; merges on a green gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
146dd9a906 |
fix(vpn-ingress): new-peer.sh counted its own commented-out example as an allocated address
The first real enrolment failed:
$ ./infra/vpn-ingress/new-peer.sh keith-phone 2
new-peer.sh: 10.90.0.2/32 is already allocated ... Pick another octet.
Nothing was allocated -- peers.yaml had zero peers, as the pod's init
container reported (`0 peer(s)`). The duplicate-address check grepped the
whole file, and peers.yaml line 66 is a COMMENTED-OUT example stanza I wrote
containing literally `# AllowedIPs = 10.90.0.2/32`. So .2 -- the first
address anyone would ask for, and the one my own runbook uses as its example
-- was permanently un-allocatable, with a message asserting the opposite of
the truth.
Fixed on both sides, because either alone leaves the trap half-set:
* the check strips comment lines before matching, which is the correct
predicate rather than a patch: a real stanza's AllowedIPs line is never
commented, while the template and every peer's `# <name> — <owner>` label
always are.
* the example now uses placeholders that cannot match anything real
(`10.90.0.<octet>/32`, `<device-name>`), so a future grep cannot be fooled
by it either.
The bug class is worth naming: a documentation example that is byte-identical
to real data will eventually be parsed as real data. This is its third
instance in this component -- flux-postbuild-substitution flagged a `${...}`
written inside a comment explaining that hazard, and no-plaintext-secrets
flagged the .sops.yaml.example because a kustomization named it in a comment.
Make examples structurally unmatchable, not merely commented out.
Verified by running it: .2 now renders a profile (via the real
`sops -d | wg pubkey` path, which this also proves against the operator's
actual key for the first time), and an uncommented duplicate stanza is still
correctly refused.
No sensitive paths; merges on a green gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
5c43fbac65 |
fix(vpn-ingress): stop trying to set net.ipv4.ip_forward — a hostNetwork pod cannot, and wg-quick dies on a failed PostUp
The tunnel never came up on its first reconcile with a real key. One line of my
own manifest was the whole cause. Measured on prod 2026-10-06:
[#] ip link add dev wg0 type wireguard <- fine
[#] wg addconf wg0 /dev/fd/63 <- fine
[#] ip -4 address add 10.90.0.1/24 dev wg0 <- fine
[#] ip link set mtu 1420 up dev wg0 <- fine
[#] sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
sysctl: permission denied on key "net.ipv4.ip_forward"
[#] ip link delete dev wg0
**** Tunnel failed, will stop all others! ****
Not a missing capability: with hostNetwork the runtime mounts /proc/sys
READ-ONLY (confirmed in the pod's /proc/mounts), because those sysctls are the
HOST's globals. CAP_NET_ADMIN cannot lift a read-only mount, so the write can
never succeed here -- and wg-quick treats a failed PostUp as fatal, so it
deleted the interface it had just built.
The line was never needed. node_baseline already sets ip_forward=1, and reading
it from the pod returns 1. My header comment said exactly that ("so no pod
sysctl is needed") and then emitted the sysctl anyway, justified as "re-asserted
so this component does not silently depend on another role's sysctl file". That
defensive re-assertion is the entire outage. In a hostNetwork pod: VERIFY host
state, never write it.
Replaced with a read in the init container -- `grep -qx 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward` -- failing closed with a message naming the
node_baseline role. Still fail-closed on purpose: a tunnel that comes up unable
to forward satisfies every probe here and silently drops all client traffic.
Also documents, in the manifest and the runbook, that the image's `chown:
Operation not permitted` run and its "we will not provide support for it"
warning are expected and harmless -- capabilities are dropped to NET_ADMIN so
its s6 init has no CAP_CHOWN, /config is a writable tmpfs, everything runs as
root, and wg-quick proceeds (it did; the failure was 30 lines later).
Three other unknowns closed by the same reconcile, now recorded in the README:
the kernel module reaches the pod (ip link add type wireguard works, no
CAP_SYS_MODULE needed); allowPrivilegeEscalation:false does NOT break the s6
init; and the image's iptables is nf_tables (xtables-nft-multi) matching Debian
13, which closes the worst documented fear -- rules landing in a table the
kernel never consults.
No sensitive paths; merges on a green gate with no override.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85
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4791653f2b |
Merge pull request 'fix(vpn-ingress): keep the server key in source through SOPS, not as an out-of-band Secret' (#60) from fix/vpn-server-key-in-sops into main
Reviewed-on: #60 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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8059297036 |
fix(devcontainer): bake wg + qrencode into the image instead of splitting the VPN procedure across host and container
Operator correction: "sop, wg, and any other tool requirement is supposed to be
baked into the devcontainer."
My previous commit discovered that `wg` existed only on the host, `sops` only in
the container, and `qrencode` on neither -- and fixed it the wrong way, by
splitting every step of the key procedure across the boundary and telling the
operator to `dnf install qrencode` on their workstation. That breaks CLAUDE.md §5
and the devcontainer README's "Don't install the toolchain on the host", produces
a procedure that cannot be reproduced in CI, and is miserable to follow.
wireguard-tools + qrencode are now distro packages in the Containerfile. Both are
in Fedora 44's repos (wireguard-tools 1.0.20260223 -- the same upstream version as
the image this component runs -- and qrencode 4.1.1), unpinned like every other
dnf package there: the pinned thing is the Fedora base, and neither is a gate tool
whose version changes what green means.
Three things got SIMPLER rather than merely relocated, which is the tell that the
rule was right:
* Step 2 is one pipeline in one shell -- `sops set ... "$(wg genkey)"` writes the
key straight into the already-encrypted document. No staged copy in .cache, no
`*.key`-suffix warning, no sha256 comparison to prove the right bytes landed.
* new-peer.sh derives the server public key from wg-server-key.sops.yaml itself
(`sops -d --extract | wg pubkey`), so there is no local key copy to keep in
step with the encrypted one, and no magic host path it must live at.
* `.cache/` is gitignored at the repo root (mirroring infra/ansible/.gitignore),
giving the container a persistent non-committable scratch dir. new-peer.sh
writes profiles to .cache/wg-peers/ -- necessary because the repo bind-mount is
the container's only persistent read-write mount, so a profile in /tmp there is
gone before it can reach a desktop. Its blanket "refuse to write inside the
checkout" guard is now a `git check-ignore` test of the real property.
Verified by execution, not reasoning: the image rebuilds; wg/qrencode/sops all
resolve in it; `sops -d | wg pubkey` runs in one shell; new-peer.sh refuses the
REPLACE-ME placeholder with an actionable message; and a full run with a throwaway
server key renders a correct profile at 0600 under a 0700 gitignored dir, prints
the QR, and refuses a non-ignored destination inside the repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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90a79d29d3 |
docs(node): name the exact Ansible command that applies the pin, not 'run the play'
Node configuration in this project is Ansible's — declared in the inventory, reviewed,
version-controlled — and for prod it is the ONLY surface: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md
records prod as 3x bare metal with the dev OpenTofu -> Proxmox -> cloud-init path
explicitly not applying, so there is no tofu/cloud-init half to keep in parity for an
/etc/hosts pin.
The pin was already in the right place; what the docs lacked was the command. All four
places now carry the scoped, idempotent one:
cd infra/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml \
-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags hosts
--tags hosts runs ONLY the /etc/hosts task, so applying this pin cannot drift any other
baseline setting.
Also verified the mechanism is not inert, which is the failure mode this repo keeps
meeting: roles/node_baseline/tasks/main.yml renders node_baseline_hosts_pins into a marked
blockinfile with backup: true, and state: absent when the list empties — so a removed
entry really does leave the node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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523a463fd7 |
fix(node): pin gitea to the Gateway VIP — containerd was resolving it to the non-hairpinned WAN
The pm-agent image pull failed TLS verification, and the previous entry on this branch
recorded it honestly as not diagnosed. Diagnosed now, and it is not about the image.
containerd pulls as a NODE process, so it resolves through node_baseline_dns_servers (the
LAN gateway, deliberately not PiHole) and gets the public answer: a CNAME to
wan.home.keithjackson.dev -> 136.51.115.252, measured via both 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8. This
router does not hairpin, so WAN:443 answers with its own placeholder certificate —
measured with the right SNI from the workstation:
subject=C=ZZ, ST=Somewhere, L=Unknown, O=%D342e7e6b, CN=%D
No extensions in certificate
No extensions means no subjectAltName, which is exactly 'certificate is not valid for any
names'. Meanwhile 192.168.2.20 IS the shared Gateway's VIP and its https listener serves
the real Let's Encrypt *.home.keithjackson.dev. The Gateway, the wildcard cert and the
digest were never implicated — only the node's answer.
This file already documents the identical failure for the Keycloak issuer, measured from
k3s-prod-2/-3 on 2026-10-03 (curl exit 60, ssl_verify_result=18), and already carries the
mechanism that fixes it. gitea is simply the second node process to need it; containerd is
a node process and nobody had added it. An operator must run the node_baseline play.
Also records, where an operator reads them, that the agent authenticates to Gitea with a
local account and a scoped PAT by decision — and why the federated alternative is not
merely unchosen but unavailable: Gitea implements only the Authorization Code Grant and
validates no third-party OIDC token, so a Keycloak service-account token cannot
authenticate to its API or to git-over-HTTP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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e35612dc7e |
fix(vpn-ingress): keep the server key in source through SOPS, not as an out-of-band Secret
Operator correction: secrets are kept in source through sops. #55 shipped the WireGuard server private key as a Secret to `kubectl create` by hand. Two real costs, not just a convention break: * R-SEC-01 / spec docs/07 -- secrets live in source, SOPS-encrypted, and reach the cluster only through Flux. * It broke DR for the one credential that cannot be re-derived. A rebuild restores everything in git; it does not restore a hand-made Secret, and losing this key means re-enrolling EVERY device, because each client profile pins its public half. #55 papered over that with "keep a copy in your password manager". (Note secret-provenance did NOT forbid the original shape -- it scopes to app-namespace=true and vpn-ingress is deliberately a platform namespace. The rule broken was the written requirement, not an enforced control.) An agent still must not mint a long-lived private key (CLAUDE.md §6), so the file is committed ALREADY ENCRYPTED with `privatekey: REPLACE-ME`. That makes the wiring complete and green from the first commit -- resource line plus both overlay decryption patches -- leaving the operator exactly one act: replace the value. A commented-out resource to uncomment later is the "in git, no generator entry, reviewed, merged, still broken" shape this repo keeps hitting. The init guard is now a validation rather than an emptiness check: the value is piped through `wg pubkey`, which accepts only a real curve25519 private key, and the pod names which case it hit -- placeholder, empty, mangled, or (the silent one) still `ENC[` ciphertext because an overlay is missing its decryption patch, which otherwise applies cleanly with every Flux condition green. Second, independent finding that also fixes #55's step 2: `wg` is on the HOST only and `sops` is in the CONTAINER only, so `sops -d | wg pubkey` cannot run in one shell -- the command #55 documented could not have worked. Every step is now split by where it runs, and the written key is verified by comparing sha256 digests rather than printing anything. `qrencode` is on neither, so the QR step says so and gives the install command. Touches clusters/** and adds a **/*.sops.yaml, so approval-policy will block pending the operator's /approve-override. Deliberately not posted by me. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |