f341a9b7445ff844a415279dcc68e83ae0c40568
46
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6f61c9622d |
feat(ha): the CNI dials the control-plane VIP — kube-vip becomes a CNI prerequisite
OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-06: "use the VIP as intended — a virtual address to reach
the cluster and provide fault tolerant HA. Without a change it will not work in HA."
THE DEFECT. Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dialled a SINGLE NODE. Re-confirmed live
before changing anything: all three prod cilium-agent pods carried
KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10 — k3s-prod-1's own address — while the kube-vip
VIP 192.168.2.9 was Running on all three nodes with a held lease. Lose prod-1 and the
CNI's control-plane path is dead on an "HA" cluster. clusters/prod's own comment said
the value must be the VIP and NOT .10, then called it "Not yet decided" — I treated
that stale comment as an open question when the evidence already settled it.
SPLIT, NOT REPOINT, because k3s_api_host had two consumers with opposite needs:
k3s_api_host unchanged — the FOUNDER's IP: the cold-bootstrap join
target and a tls-san. infra/tofu/outputs.tf GENERATES this
name, so renaming would ripple into tofu and the runbooks.
k3s_apiserver_endpoint NEW = {{ kube_vip_address }} — the HA address; what Cilium
consumes. Derived, not restated, so an environment overrides
ONE line and the VIP, the SAN and the CNI endpoint move
together. Prod needed no new override.
THE SECOND HAZARD, WHICH MY BRIEF DID NOT NAME and the agent found: pointing Cilium at
the VIP breaks a COLD bootstrap for the same reason the join would — site.yml ran
node-baseline -> k3s -> cilium, so Cilium would install against an address nothing
announced yet. That is the 2026-09-01 deadlock shape. Fixed by SEQUENCE, not value:
site.yml now imports kube-vip.yml BETWEEN k3s and cilium. It cannot go earlier
(kube-vip is a k3s auto-deploy manifest, so it needs a cluster) and it works there
because the DaemonSet is hostNetwork with KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=127.0.0.1 — needing
neither CNI nor kube-proxy. roles/kube_vip gained a read-only `wait_for` on the VIP so
a cold run stops THERE with a named cause instead of surfacing as unreachable agents.
Also fixed a pre-existing bug that only mattered once this play joined site.yml: the
role's read-only interface probe ran without `check_mode: false`, so under --check it
was skipped and the assert fired with a misleading "set kube_vip_interface explicitly".
VERIFIED BY ME, not just reported:
renders dev K3S_API_HOST=192.168.1.49 prod=192.168.2.9 (each environment's VIP)
cilium template consumes k3s_apiserver_endpoint, not k3s_api_host
cold join still `--server https://{{ k3s_api_host }}:6443` — the founder
order site.yml: node-baseline -> k3s -> kube-vip -> cilium -> verify -> flux
gate full CI gate PASS
Agent-side, additionally: in-memory render of cilium-values.yaml.j2 per host showing
k8sServiceHost=the VIP with the join still on the founder; k3s_tls_sans renders
['.10','.9','127.0.0.1','.11','.12'] so NO cert reissue and NO k3s restart is involved
— .9 already answers under full CA verification; and --check --diff of kube-vip.yml
against prod reported 6 ok / 0 changed, i.e. the role edits change nothing about the
kube-vip prod already runs.
ha-control-plane-as-code 92 -> 112 assertions, turning two escalations into machine
checks: the Cilium template must use the endpoint var; the endpoint must derive from
kube_vip_address and k3s_api_host must not; per environment K3S_API_HOST must equal
that environment's VIP and be none of its node IPs (the [parity] contract, now
machine-checked rather than a comment); site.yml must order k3s -> kube-vip -> cilium.
Every new assertion mutation-tested and bites. One honest negative recorded: reverting
only the BASE default is not caught, because both overlays patch the key — the check
reads effective per-environment values, so the base default is unguarded.
APPLY ORDER, and this is the operator's step — nothing was applied:
PROD FIRST, and it is the low-risk direction (prod is the broken one). Push and let
Flux reconcile platform/cilium: the value change rolls the cilium-agent DaemonSet
ONE NODE AT A TIME (maxUnavailable: 1 — the knob that bounded the 2026-09-01
incident), it will not proceed past an unready pod, existing datapath survives an
agent restart, and .9 is already live before the change lands.
DEV SEPARATELY, operator present. Same mechanics but live dev agents dial
192.168.1.50, and dev is mid-DNS-migration on dev-live. Do not fold it into that.
ANSIBLE: nothing to run for either live cluster; the Ansible half matters only for a
cold build. Remove the now-redundant standalone kube-vip.yml step from any runbook.
NEW NAMED GAP, unwritten: the L2 test cannot assert the running agents' live
KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST, which is the drift the L0 check cannot see. Recorded in that
test's gap list.
Refs R-PLAT-01, R-NET-01, R-ENV-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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3ade1d440f |
fix(conformance): status.py read its own detection vocabulary as a TODO marker
`has_todo = "TODO" in text` — a bare whole-file substring. The new L0 check
`placeholder-guard-coupling/check.sh` ENUMERATES placeholder idioms as data
(`SEED = ["TBD","TODO","FIXME",...]`) because detecting them is its entire job, so
the harness classified a 32-assertion executable check as a TODO scaffold.
Consequence: R-STATE-03 — SAFETY-CRITICAL — reported `exec=1 scaffold=1` and
`not-derivable`, because status.py requires all of a requirement's tagged tests to
be proven. A safety requirement mis-reported by a substring match, plus a standing
--strict-coverage conflict that a previous engineer worked AROUND by rewording
prose instead of fixing the detector.
Replaced with two REDUNDANT structural signals, derived from the corpus (all 43
tests read), not invented:
1. `# STATUS: scaffold` with the state as the FIRST token after `STATUS:`. Exactly
3 tests declare it — onboarding-completeness, alerting, gitops-drift — and they
are exactly the three real scaffolds. 19 others declare EXECUTABLE/RUNNABLE, so
a loose `.*scaffold` would have matched prose.
2. A TODO/FIXME marker CARRYING A MESSAGE in the body, where the body starts after
the header comment block. A marker that is the ENTIRE content of a quoted
literal is data, not a note, and is blanked before the scan. Every genuine
scaffold marker in the corpus carries a message, so mid-body comments still count.
The line-322 intent is preserved exactly: each file is classified on its own
structure, either signal in either file sets scaffold + annotation_conflict, the
`executable: "true"` annotation is consulted only AFTER the body verdict, and
ambiguity still only downgrades. Vocabulary stays TODO/FIXME only — TBD/PLACEHOLDER
are excluded because two checks use them in real executable code.
NON-VACUITY, and the redundancy is the point: deleting the `# STATUS: scaffold` line
from all three real scaffolds still catches all three via the body rule. The decisive
perturbation is the reverse — the exact file that caused the bug, degraded to a
TODO-only body while KEEPING its `STATUS: EXECUTABLE` header, its idiom-naming header
prose and its `executable: "true"` annotation, is caught as a scaffold WITH the
annotation conflict raised. The annotation still cannot outrank the body.
TAGGING: the agent RECOMMENDED KEEPING `R-STATE-03` on placeholder-guard-coupling and
reversed my lean, on a ground I had missed and which is load-bearing:
ci/touched-requirements.sh maps `bootstrap/*` -> R-STATE-03, and `run.sh
--requirements` resolves R-IDs to test dirs THROUGH THESE LABELS. Removing the tag
would reopen the exact merge-gate hole
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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cb1916f092 |
feat(conformance): cover R-PLAT-01, R-NET-04, R-SEC-03 — 88.2% -> 94.1%, and fix an unrecordable-proof defect
Coverage 45/51 -> 48/51, gaps 6 -> 3 (R-C2-01, R-C2-02, R-STATE-04), 0 safety-critical. --strict-coverage exit 0; run.sh --layer l0 11/11 PASS. R-PLAT-01 — split L0 + L2, because "3 nodes with production-grade HA control plane" is half authored and half observable. l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code (92 assertions): environments DERIVED from the R-ENV-02 seam (never a hardcoded group name); k3s installed as `server` with no --datastore-endpoint/--disable-etcd anywhere; exactly ONE --cluster-init founder per environment; odd, quorum-capable server count with tolerance >= 1; tls-sans carry the VIP and every server IP; kube-vip leader-elected with cp_enable/svc_enable parsed from the template's OWN env pairs; each VIP outside its environment's LB pool and not a node IP. l2-behavioral/ha-control-plane: control-plane AND etcd role on every node, every node a REGISTERED etcd member, exactly 3 when the cluster says CLUSTER_ENV=prod, and an in-cluster Job curling /readyz through the VIP AND every server's own address — which proves the VIP fronts the API and that every server runs an apiserver, not one founder plus two joiners. An earlier draft probed those endpoints FROM THE RUNNER: that passes from prod's LAN and fails against dev (nodes behind the pfSense NAT), making the test a property of where it was launched. Hence the in-cluster Job. R-NET-04 — what it adds over R-NET-05/07 is the PATH SET and the totality/disjointness of the selecting rules, not another per-service check. l0-static/egress-paths-selected-by-rules (68 assertions): exactly two paths, the same closed set in schema + Kyverno policy + renderer; EXACTLY ONE CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy with a single selector matching only egress-class=vpn; nothing selects `internet` (absence of a rule IS the path); RFC1918 containment computed with `ipaddress` plus every address each overlay assigns itself; the tunnel default route and blackhole confined to table 51820 behind an ip rule that must carry a from/fwmark/iif selector; and the nft chain `policy accept` with every drop qualified — the internet-fails-OPEN direction that R-NET-06's L3 test does not assert. R-SEC-03 — refuses the tautology "a test exists, therefore it is auditable". l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible (78 assertions) drives the real machinery: each of docs/07's five proofs must have an EXECUTABLE test at the layer the spec's wording demands (fault injection and DR drill => L3), taken from status.py's own verdict; run.sh --requirements must resolve and pass the gate's --require assertion; each proof declares a sentinel record_run.py can attribute, computed with record_run.parse_sentinels itself; and TWO FORGERIES are mounted against the real tools — a green JUnit whose log holds only a SKIP token, and a ledger row claiming `proven` at the root commit — which must come back not-proven and stale-proof. The five proofs are parsed from docs/07 when the spec is mounted, not hand-listed. *** A REAL DEFECT FOUND AND FIXED, not asserted around. *** l2-behavioral's default-deny, trusted-tls and gateway-ingress-reachable declared NO pass sentinel, so record_run.py could never attribute a pass to them — the isolation and TLS audit proofs were STRUCTURALLY UNRECORDABLE (landing as unknown-no-sentinel-declared, and status.py requires all of a requirement's tests to be proven). Each now ends with an additive terminal sentinel step reached only when every prior step passed. Verified: all three carry it. TWO HOLLOW DRAFT ASSERTIONS CAUGHT BY THE AGENT ITSELF, both the failure mode this repo keeps hitting: (a) `svc_enable=false` matched a COMMENT in the kube-vip role defaults, so flipping the template to true still passed — now parses the DaemonSet template's env pairs; (b) the nft scoping check searched for the VALUE of a Jinja variable while the template carries its NAME, matching nothing and passing vacuously — templates are now rendered against role defaults first. 30 perturbations across the three checks, all caught, plus 16 synthetic L2 perturbations via a fake-kubectl shim. R-C2-01/02 judged IMPLEMENTATION gaps, so no test was written: Homepage's widgets.yaml carries only datetime and search, kubernetes.yaml is empty, automountServiceAccountToken is false, and its NetworkPolicy allows DNS egress only — no health source is even reachable. It has already drifted (crafty authors a route with no tile). A test today would go red on both; it must ship WITH the config fix. VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. Neither cluster mutated. Refs R-PLAT-01, R-NET-04, R-SEC-03, R-TEST-01..05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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a984442cae |
harden: pin node timezone to UTC, and TEST the guard/value coupling that bit us
Two debt items, both about making a latent problem impossible rather than fixed. === 1. Node timezone pinned to Etc/UTC (node_baseline, `system` tag) === The prod nodes disagreed, measured from k3s's own etcd snapshot annotations: prod-1/2 at -05:00 (Central), prod-3 at -04:00 (Eastern). Functionally harmless — Kubernetes and etcd are UTC internally, and in UTC those snapshots are ~4 minutes apart, which is correct staggering — but it makes cross-node log correlation actively misleading, and this cluster has had two unplanned reboots in two days. `Etc/UTC` chosen on repo convention, not just principle: catalog/plex.yaml records "no other service in the repo sets a timezone ... so use the safe default" with TZ: Etc/UTC, and apps/wave-0/plex.yaml matches (platform/crafty is America/Chicago DELIBERATELY — a user-facing game schedule, not a log clock). Decisive extra fact: THE THREE DEV NODES ARE ALREADY Etc/UTC, so this makes prod match dev rather than inventing a convention. UTC also removes the class — no DST discontinuity, node time == platform time. New knob `node_baseline_timezone`, overridable per environment via group_vars (the same seam as node_baseline_backports_kernel) but deliberately NOT restated there: no environment needs to differ, and a second copy is a second thing to disagree. Guarded by an assert in the role's existing BLOCKED style before the module runs. `--check --diff --tags system -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMS the offset evidence, and is the whole verification — the play was never run for real: k3s-prod-1: -"America/Chicago" +"Etc/UTC" changed k3s-prod-2: -"America/Chicago" +"Etc/UTC" changed k3s-prod-3: -"America/New_York" +"Etc/UTC" changed The same --check against DEV reports the task `ok` on all three — idempotence demonstrated against live hosts, in check mode only. `--list-hosts` confirms `-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` selects the three prod nodes (the diagnostic plays take their OWN var; the wrong flag silently targets dev). *** AUTHORED, NOT APPLIED. *** Applying it is a live-cluster action and was deliberately left for the operator to schedule: prod's Longhorn had only just finished resyncing after a node reboot, and changing a node's clock config during storage recovery is not an unattended move. `ansible-inventory --list` was NOT used anywhere — it prints DECRYPTED vault values (the passphrase is mounted into the dev container) and has leaked the prod become-password to a transcript once already. === 2. New L0 check `placeholder-guard-coupling` (R-ENV-02, R-STATE-03) === On 2026-09-05 the PM changed a placeholder in clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml from `TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT` to `https://TBD-R2-ACCOUNT-ID...`. The guards in bootstrap/standup.sh matched the glob `TBD-*` — a PREFIX. All three silently died, and `resume` would have enabled velero on prod against a nonexistent hostname: installs clean, reports healthy, no backups exist. Found by accident. A guard in one file keyed on the SHAPE of a value in another file, with nothing tying them. The check exercises the REAL predicate — it does not reimplement it. standup.sh is not sourceable (top-level argv parsing hard-exits, cd, export, EXIT trap), so the check extracts the predicate's own source lines and sources only those. Faithfulness is pinned by: discovery of every `*_is_placeholder` (not a hardcoded name), exactly-one-definition, "extracted block is a verbatim substring", a self-containment gate, a canary (must refuse "", must accept a real URL), and a scan for a divergent second copy. If the predicate grows a dependency the check FAILS LOUDLY and names the remedy rather than degrading to testing a copy — the failure mode it exists for. Both sides derive from real files: guarded knobs from a taint trace in standup.sh (`x="$(cvar KEY)"` -> alias hop -> `*_is_placeholder "$x"`); values from base cluster-vars plus each overlay's JSON6902 /data/KEY patches. The independent detector is deliberately NOT the guard: seed idioms UNION the guard's own words with glob anchors STRIPPED — so a prefix-anchored guard cannot pass, and deleting an arm cannot make a value stop being placeholder-shaped. Real tree: 32 assertions, 18 values through the extracted predicate, PASS. NON-VACUITY VERIFIED BY ME, twice, on throwaway copies (the real repo and the read-only spec repo untouched). My first perturbation tripped the self-containment rail instead of the anchoring property, so I redid it shape-preserving — substring globs -> prefix globs, nothing else — and it failed on exactly the right property, naming mid-string and tail acceptances with the diagnosis "This is the 2026-09-05 failure exactly". Control: unperturbed copy exits 0. === 3. ci/touched-requirements.sh: bootstrap/ was UNMAPPED (found by the agent) === The path->requirement map had no `bootstrap/*` entry, so a change touching standup.sh ALONGSIDE any already-mapped path scoped the L0 run to that other path's requirements and silently excluded the new check — the one that exists to catch exactly the 2026-09-05 class. A safety net with a hole where the incident was. Mapped to R-STATE-03 R-GITOPS-01; verified the map now resolves bootstrap paths. VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. `run.sh --layer l0` 8/8 PASS including the new check. Coverage unchanged at 45/51 (the new check tags existing requirements). Refs R-ENV-02, R-STATE-03, R-TEST-01, R-PLAT-01. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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fe45d0f5c5 |
feat(conformance): cover R-TLS-02, R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03 — 42/51 -> 45/51, and find a real gap
DECISIONS-LOG records Phase 7 being opened knowingly while the uncovered set included R-ENV-01/02/03 — the very requirements prod provisioning serves. Two of those three are now covered, plus R-TLS-02. tls-lifecycle-automated R-TLS-02 L0 (in the merge gate) cert-lifecycle-automated R-TLS-02 L2 (authored, NOT executed) dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code R-ENV-01 L0 prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface R-ENV-03 L0 Coverage 42/51 (82.4%) -> 45/51 (88.2%), 6 gaps, 0 safety-critical. Remaining: R-C2-01, R-C2-02, R-NET-04, R-PLAT-01, R-SEC-03, R-STATE-04. Verified through the real runner: --layer l0 7/7 PASS, the three new ones 3/3 PASS, --strict-coverage exit 0 with 0 label/annotation mismatches. *** R-TLS-02 "REVOKED" IS NOT SATISFIED — A REAL GAP, NOT A TEST DEFECT. *** The spec requires certificates be "issued, renewed, AND REVOKED without manual steps", and docs/08 reads revocation as "removing/rotating a certificate is a declarative change". That needs enableCertificateOwnerRef: true; platform/cert-manager/helmrelease.yaml does not set it (chart default false). Verified read-only on BOTH live clusters: gateway/wildcard-home-tls has ZERO ownerReferences, so deleting the Certificate would leave the private key serving indefinitely. The L2 test asserts the requirement AS WRITTEN and will fail until this is decided. It was deliberately NOT softened — weakening a test to match the implementation is how a suite stops meaning anything. NOT FLIPPED UNATTENDED, and the reason is specific rather than caution: the wildcard Certificate lives under ./platform, which runs prune: true. With owner refs ON, any transient prune of that Certificate — exactly what happened to the CDI StorageProfiles hours ago — would delete the SERVING TLS Secret for every host, and reissuance is bounded by Let's Encrypt's duplicate-certificate limit (5/week per identical name set), which could leave a cluster with no trusted cert for a week. Security gap vs a plausible week-long TLS outage is an operator call. NON-VACUITY DEMONSTRATED, which is the part that makes these worth having: 7/7 perturbations fail for R-TLS-02, 8/8 for R-ENV-01, 13/13 for R-ENV-03, and each restored copy passes. Perturbations were applied to a throwaway copy; neither this repo nor the read-only spec repo was modified. TWO CHECKS INITIALLY PASSED WHEN PERTURBED and were rewritten — the exact degrade-to-no-op failure this repo keeps hitting. The first draft asked "is this file's DIRECTORY referenced by a kustomization", which a directory reference always satisfies, and keyed Secrets by name alone, so external-dns's copy of `cloudflare-api-token` satisfied cert-manager's reference. Now a recursive kustomize resource-graph walk from each Flux path, and Secrets keyed by (namespace, name). Both bite. SECURITY NOTE, recorded because this project has already leaked a password once: `ansible-inventory --list` PRINTS DECRYPTED VAULT VALUES — it emitted the prod become-password to stdout during exploration, since the vault passphrase file is mounted into the dev container. Both new checks use only --syntax-check and --list-hosts, and say so in a comment. Confirmed no plaintext value reached disk: vault.yml is still AES256-encrypted and the tree has no assigned value. WHAT IS NOT PROVEN, per requirement: R-TLS-02 "revoked" (above), and issuance + observed renewal await the unexecuted L2. R-ENV-01 cannot prove the running VMs came from this module (needs OpenTofu state) — it proves the four lifecycle stages exist as code and cover every dev node, and that the chain RESOLVES under real ansible-playbook. R-ENV-03 cannot prove the HARDWARE (the K8s API exposes no "am I virtual" fact; mini-PC/bare-metal is operator-attested) — it proves prod is AUTHORED as 3 directly-reached nodes with no IaC creating them, sharing dev's playbooks and roles, with no prod-only manifest, branch or role anywhere. VERIFIED BY ME: coverage delta and the 3/3 L0 pass through the real runner; the zero-ownerReferences finding on both clusters; that the new checks avoid ansible-inventory; that no credential material reached disk. Full CI gate PASS. Refs R-TLS-02, R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-TEST-01..05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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59ffbaf11a |
feat(conformance): L2 tests derive their environment from the cluster, not a literal
Six L2 behavioural tests embedded `home.keithjackson.dev`. They are test INPUTS,
not reconciled manifests, so postBuild substitution never touched them — correct
while dev held the apex, wrong the moment prod came up on
prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and blocking §9's "suite passes green against prod".
Each test now asks the cluster what it is, via a test-level chainsaw binding over
flux-system/cluster-vars — the SAME ConfigMap Flux renders the platform from, so
a test cannot disagree with the cluster it runs on:
bindings:
- name: baseDomain
value: (x_k8s_get($client,'v1','ConfigMap','flux-system','cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
Chosen over a flag or env var because there is nothing to forget at run time, and
test-level scope covers every step (step outputs/bindings are step-scoped).
THE APEX WAS NOT THE ONLY LEAK. dns-exposure and dns-internal-resolution also
hardcoded DEV'S Cilium LB range 192.168.1.53-.60; prod's is 192.168.2.20-.30, so
both were wrong for prod regardless of hostname. Replaced with assertions on the
OBSERVED value — the DNS answer must equal that cluster's GATEWAY_VIP, and the
public record must equal the LB IP the Service was actually assigned — which is
strictly STRONGER than the old range check as well as environment-independent.
sso-forward-auth held the literal only in prose (it talks over Service DNS).
PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED — and the positive control is the important half:
* expressions extracted verbatim from the tracked files resolve to the correct,
DIFFERENT values per cluster (dev home.keithjackson.dev / 192.168.1.53,
prod prod.home.keithjackson.dev / 192.168.2.20);
* the same assert with the HARDCODED apex passes on dev and FAILS on prod
("Invalid value: *.prod.home... Expected: *.home..."), so the harness is
provably not blind — that is exactly the drift removed;
* chainsaw lint VALID on all six; run.sh --lint clean over the whole tree.
END-TO-END L2 RUN AGAINST LIVE DEV: `dns-exposure` PASSED (42.6s) — the binding
produced conformance-dns.home.keithjackson.dev, external-dns published it, and the
probe Job asserted the record against the assigned LB IP. This is the first time
one of these tests has been executed since parameterization, and it exercises the
full path rather than just the binding.
FINDING FROM THAT RUN, worth recording: the test's teardown is ASYNCHRONOUS. It
reports PASS as soon as chainsaw deletes the namespace, but the Cloudflare record
is reaped later by external-dns's own --interval=1m sync. A zone query immediately
after PASS still showed conformance-dns.home.keithjackson.dev plus its owner=default
TXT registry entry. Harmless here, but it means a green dns-exposure does NOT prove
cleanup happened, and if external-dns were suspended the record would persist
silently. Verified separately that it clears.
conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml: its cluster-wide `get configmaps` is now
LOAD-BEARING for these bindings — narrowing it to the test namespace breaks five
tests. Commented so it is not "tidied" later.
l3-fault-injection/dr-restore: its KNOWN-GAPS block said off-host is unproven
because the MinIO shares a Proxmox host with dev's VMs. Still true as run, so the
text now says both — that the R2 move (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c8c1d2935d |
feat(dns): per-environment BASE_DOMAIN — prod moves to its own subdomain
INCIDENT FIX. Prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE OF DEV'S PUBLIC DNS RECORDS. Both
clusters ran policy: sync against the SAME Cloudflare zone with the SAME implicit
txtOwnerId (`default`), so prod believed it owned dev's records, found no matching sources,
and removed them plus their TXT registry entries. Dev recovered ~30s after prod was scaled
to 0; verified restored against Cloudflare directly (my first check went through a pfSense
override and falsely showed healthy — local resolvers are not evidence about public DNS).
THE MISS WAS MINE, and it was a failure of imagination in how I briefed every agent. I put
"never touch dev" in brief after brief and enforced it — separate kubeconfigs, verified
--limit, sha-checked dev's kubeconfig before and after. Every one of those guards held. NONE
of them covered SHARED EXTERNAL RESOURCES. Prod reconciling its OWN correctly-authored
manifests reached across a third party and destroyed dev's state. Cluster-to-cluster
isolation was verified; the dependency that mattered was cluster-to-Cloudflare.
Operator's architecture: dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod ->
*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, apex CNAME <svc>.home -> <svc>.prod.home.
PHASE 1 ONLY (this commit): prod moves to its own subdomain. DEV IS NOT MIGRATED and its
effective hostname stays home.keithjackson.dev, so dev renders byte-identically and nothing
live moves. That alone ends the collision and unblocks prod. Phase 2 (dev -> dev.home. +
apex CNAMEs) is deferred to when the operator is present: it relocates Keycloak's issuer and
12 clients' redirect URIs, forces a rolling k3s restart and kubectl SSO re-issue for every
user, and moves gitea.home. — which is BOTH the GitOps source and the current push target.
BASE_DOMAIN WAS A DEAD KNOB — it existed in cluster-vars but the status report flagged it as
referenced by nothing, because hostnames were hardcoded throughout. Now real: 141 refs.
Searched the AUTHORITATIVE reconciled set by resolving each Flux spec.path transitively via
conformance/lib/status.py — the same resolver the L0 gate uses, so "what Flux reconciles"
has one definition. 185 occurrences across 47 files in 154 reconciled files. Tokenized:
Gateway listeners, the wildcard Certificate, coredns-custom, external-dns, Keycloak
instance/realm (26 redirect URIs), oauth2-proxy, Grafana OIDC, all HTTPRoutes, Homepage's 15
links, 30 runbook_urls, unifi cloud-init, render.py's ZONE constant (which drove
--oidc-issuer-url/--cookie-domain/--whitelist-domain on every forward-auth sidecar) and 11
catalog/ ServiceDefinitions re-rendered canonically. Left alone: 43 comment/prose
occurrences and non-reconciled paths.
TWO THAT CANNOT BE TOKENIZED, flagged not forced:
- headlamp's OIDC URLs live inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret; re-encrypting rewrites the MAC
over every value and the OFFLINE harness cannot verify it (kustomize does not decrypt),
so an error would break live-dev SSO with no pre-flight proof. Prod needs its own copy
anyway — client secrets are realm-scoped.
- kube-apiserver --oidc-issuer-url is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so Flux can never
reach it. Done on the inventory seam instead (k3s_base_domain -> k3s_oidc_issuer_url,
overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod). Verified per host: dev keeps the default, prod gets
prod.home.
EXTERNAL-DNS OWNER, the actual incident cause: txtOwnerId is now explicit per environment —
dev renders exactly `default` (the chart default it was already using, so its existing
records stay recognised) and prod gets `prod`. The BASE default is a NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL,
deliberately not `default`, so a future environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and
can delete nothing rather than silently inheriting dev's identity.
I OVERRODE ONE AGENT DECISION against our own prior finding: it narrowed prod's
domainFilters to prod.home.keithjackson.dev as defence in depth. FINDING F-DNS1
(DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) already proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE —
ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS
Name". Prod would have published NOTHING. Set to the ZONE (keithjackson.dev) like dev.
Isolation comes from the subdomain split plus txtOwnerId, which is what the incident
actually needed and what a domain filter cannot provide.
DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED: 11 of 12 substituting paths byte-identical; the 12th differs by
exactly one line, `+ txtOwnerId: default` — the value dev was already using implicitly.
POSITIVE CONTROLS confirm the harness is not blind: perturbing BASE_DOMAIN moves 10 of 12
hashes (the 2 that don't provably contain no hostname), perturbing the owner id moves
exactly 1. Prod's rendered output has ZERO home.keithjackson.dev references outside prod.,
and its cert renders *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev — no overlap with dev's.
L0 substitution assertions 106 -> 254; BASE_DOMAIN is no longer flagged dead. Gate PASS.
PROD REMAINS SUSPENDED (platform + 10 downstream tiers) pending review; nothing applied.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-02, R-DNS-03, R-TLS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
8a2be824f6 |
feat(ci): substitution-safety gate + escape 6 comment hazards; strict mode is now SAFE
Adds conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution/ — an offline, stdlib-only
L0 check tagged R-ENV-02 + R-GITOPS-01 (deliberately NOT R-TEST-01, which would
overclaim). It reuses lib/status.py's `resources:` walk rather than forking it, so "what a
path renders" has exactly one definition. It asserts: every ${...} on a substituted path
is defined-or-escaped (comments included); no default-operator form on an undefined name;
no unparseable expansion; the rendering path actually substitutes cluster-vars; every
overlay-patched /data/KEY has a base default; and that the gate itself is load-bearing.
WIRED AS AN UNCONDITIONAL STAGE (3c) in ci/l0.sh, and that matters: stage 3b scopes to
touched requirements, and ci/touched-requirements.sh maps only clusters/* to R-ENV-02 —
so an edit to a substituted manifest under apps/ or platform/ would have filtered this
check out of exactly the change that introduces the bug. l0 fail -> BLOCK=1 in gate.sh.
Mutation-tested all five assertion classes (undefined token, indexed expansion, :- form,
missing substituteFrom, un-wired gate); each fails as intended, baseline green.
STRICT MODE IS PROVEN SAFE TO ENABLE — measured, not inspected. For all 11 substituted
paths, `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone <path> | flux envsubst
--strict` exits 0 against cluster-vars base defaults. Negative control confirms the
incident: with K3S_API_HOST unset, non-strict renders k8sServiceHost empty while strict
exits 1 with `variable not set (strict mode)`. The feature gate itself is NOT flipped
here — that is a live-cluster change and the operator's call.
Escapes the six comment hazards that stood in the way (apps/vms/unifi x4,
platform/longhorn x2). All were prose ABOUT the escaping convention; since the repo's own
contract is that $${...} emits a literal ${...}, escaping them is both precise and
self-consistent. kustomize strips these particular comments today, but comment survival is
an implementation detail — a body comment carrying $ WAS observed surviving into built
apps/wave-1 — and a survivor would kill the whole Kustomization.
DOCTRINE CORRECTED (measured against flux 2.4.0): clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml claimed an
indexed expansion is fatal "escaped or not". Escaping is TOTAL — $${ARR[0]} emits the
literal text safely; only the UNESCAPED indexed form is fatal. Corrected in place.
Also empties DOCUMENTED_GAPS in conformance/run.sh with rationale: R-ENV-02 and
R-GITOPS-01 now have a real verifying test, which run.sh's own comment named as the
trigger for removing them.
Advisory output (not failures): 6 dead cluster-vars knobs — BASE_DOMAIN, CLUSTER_ENV,
CLUSTER_POD_CIDR, PIA_REGION, PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_{KEY,VALUE}. The last four are
documented reference-only; BASE_DOMAIN and CLUSTER_ENV look like genuine rot (hostnames
are hardcoded elsewhere) and are worth a follow-up.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. 102 assertions, 0 hazards.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
14be9b68f6 |
test(conformance): dr-restore actually asserts off-cluster restore (R-STATE-03)
Closes the LAST scaffold-only safety-critical requirement. The operator has attested DR works (Velero -> Proxmox versitygw S3, restore demonstrated), but the L3 test carried the right tag and layer label over a 5-line TODO body — so coverage counted it and reported "0 safety-critical gaps" while the suite asserted nothing. That was test debt, not capability debt. This makes the suite assert what the operator already demonstrated. Three steps: 1. assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster (read-only): BSL must be phase Available (Velero itself reached the store), s3Url host is not localhost/*.svc/*.cluster.local, and the resolved IPv4 is none of — loopback, any Node Internal/ExternalIP, any Service ClusterIP, any Pod IP, inside any node podCIDR, inside any ServiceCIDR. A BSL that exists but never reaches Available FAILS (a live DR defect), it does not skip. 2. assert-backups-are-scheduled: R-STATE-03 says SCHEDULED off-cluster backups — Velero + BSL but zero Schedule in phase Enabled is a fail. 3. The drill: seed a nanosecond-unique canary onto a longhorn PVC in its own scratch namespace; Backup to Completed; assert a PodVolumeBackup for that volume is Completed WITH a non-empty status.snapshotID (the kopia snapshot of volume DATA reached the remote repo, not just resource JSON); ANNIHILATE the source (delete ns, poll until gone, force-delete a lingering PV, FAIL if the original PV survived — a survivor makes the restore prove nothing); Restore with namespaceMapping into a clean namespace; assert the restored PVC bound a DIFFERENT PV and that the canary bytes are identical. Off-cluster proof = endpoint outside every cluster address + BSL Available + kopia snapshotID present + every in-cluster copy destroyed + restore landing on a new PV. The bytes could only have come from outside. Skips GREEN on: no longhorn SC, Velero API absent, no BSL, Velero/node-agent not ready — all three steps re-derive the same gates so it can never half-run. An RBAC denial is deliberately NOT a skip: it fails loudly as a harness defect. Teardown is a step-level `finally` that ALWAYS runs — deletes the Restore, issues a DeleteBackupRequest so objects leave the bucket (2h ttl as backstop), deletes both scratch namespaces by name and by label, releases leftover PVs whose claimRef is one of its own. Everything it destroys is something it created. conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml: authored the R-STATE-03 grants (velero.io backups/ restores/deletebackuprequests create+delete+read; BSL/schedules/podvolume* read-only; persistentvolumes get/list/DELETE — the off-cluster proof requires destroying the PV). Also two pre-existing gaps other tests already depended on: storageclasses get/list (the skip gate of five tests) and apps deployments/daemonsets read. No write verbs on platform controllers. NOT ASSERTED, stated in the file header rather than implied: off-HOST (on dev the nodes are VMs on the same Proxmox host as the S3 target, so this does not survive hypervisor loss); no direct S3 client read (that would hand a privileged test identity the backup credential for weaker evidence); real service data (Nextcloud/Gitea/CNPG drills stay operator exercises); bare-metal rebuild DR; encryption-at-rest; retention/GC. status: scaffold-only 5 -> 4; safety-critical w/o executable L3 1 -> 0 (of 6); executable 35 -> 36. coverage unchanged at 40/51 (correct — coverage only asks whether a tagged test exists). PROVEN stayed 0 / not-derivable: it did NOT flip to proven just because the body is non-empty. AUTHORED, NEVER EXECUTED — carries a conformance.home.k3s/never-executed annotation. No cluster access from this workstation. To convert authored -> proven the operator must, IN A MAINTENANCE WINDOW (it deletes namespaces and PVs and writes/deletes bucket objects): apply the updated rbac.yaml, run `./conformance/run.sh --requirements R-STATE-03 --layer l3`, confirm the log shows DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK and NOT DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK (green but proves nothing), confirm no leaked *-dr-src/*-dr-dst namespaces or orphan PVs or *-dr-backup objects, and record the green run. Serves: R-STATE-03, R-TEST-05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
6e77150ae1 |
fix(ci): kill the false-green base resolution; cover R-SEC-01/02 + R-TEST-06 (L0)
Unblocks the enforced Gitea gate, which correctly BLOCKED this branch on ['R-SEC-01','R-SEC-02','R-TEST-06'] being touched but uncovered. Tests were authored; the coverage rule was NOT narrowed. === THE FALSE GREEN (root cause) === `make -C ci gate` locally reported PASS having checked NOTHING. resolve_base() validated nothing, and EVERY way of failing to find a base degraded silently to an empty touched set + exit 0: an `HEAD~1` last resort, a two-dot diff fallback masking a failing three-dot diff, and no check that HEAD is even AHEAD of the base. Run while sitting on `main` (main == origin/main), `origin/main...HEAD` is empty -> "no changed files vs base" -> the empty set means run.sh is invoked with NO --requirements -> coverage.py's --require gate never runs at all. Green by vacuum. Now: candidates are BASE_REF > GITHUB_BASE_REF > origin/main > main, each verified to resolve. HEAD~1 and the two-dot fallback are gone. Unresolvable base / no merge base / failed diff / HEAD-not-ahead -> loud banner, EMPTY stdout, exit 3, and a machine-readable reason (on-base | no-base | diff-failed). gate.sh turns exit 3 into an UNDECIDED decision: `on-base` -> "NOT APPLICABLE — no branch under gate" (exit 0 so push-to-main runs don't break, but it never reads as PASS); `no-base`/`diff-failed` -> BLOCKED. It also now prints the diff base it used. A stale local main warns (widens, never falsely greens). Also fixed `make -C ci test`, which was SWALLOWING failing suites. Regression: ci/tests/touched-requirements-base.test.sh — 31 assertions over 8 throwaway-repo scenarios including the exact false-green case, an already-merged branch, no base ref, a single-commit repo, bogus BASE_REF, a shallow GITHUB_BASE_REF, and origin/main-preferred-over-stale-main. === NEW L0 STATIC LAYER (conformance/tests/l0-static/) === Where docs/14 actually puts these invariants. Each check.sh really executes offline via `run.sh --layer l0` and is wired into ci/l0.sh, so it runs on every PR. No scaffolds. R-SEC-01 no-plaintext-secrets (165 assertions / 445 tracked files): .sops.yaml holds only PUBLIC age recipients; every committed Secret is SOPS-wrapped with a mac and ENC[...] values; ansible vault.yml files are $ANSIBLE_VAULT; no secret-valued ansible key carries a literal outside a vault; no PEM key / age secret key / kubeconfig client-key-data is tracked; Flux declares sops decryption; the disallow-plaintext-secrets policy Enforces and has a proving `result: fail` row. Exemptions are SELF-POLICING, not path allowlists — a .example must be referenced by no kustomization and hold only placeholders, and the Kyverno fixture is exempt ONLY while a test asserts the policy rejects it. Proven against 7 injected violations, including deleting the negative row and weakening Enforce->Audit. R-SEC-02 least-privilege-rbac (41 assertions): no wildcard apiGroup/resource/verb and no escalate|bind|impersonate in any in-repo Role/ClusterRole; no ServiceAccount bound to cluster-admin or a wildcard role; the conformance runner's own test identity is scoped and holds no rights over RBAC objects; the default-deny/host-namespace/egress-class policies Enforce and each carry a negative row. Proven against 6 injected violations. R-TEST-06 spec-immutability-enforced (16 assertions): drives the REAL ci/spec-immutability.sh against HERMETIC throwaway spec repos and asserts its exit code in every state — clean-at-pin 0, edits under docs/ or decisions/ 1, untracked addition 1, unadopted drift 1, explicit pin bump 0, ABSENT spec repo 3 (honest skip, never green), unpinned SPEC_PIN 1 — plus that gate.sh sets BLOCK=1 on its failure, so the mechanism is load-bearing. The real spec repo is never written to. Each check documents what it does NOT cover (runtime decryption, git history, runtime least-privilege, branch protection) rather than overclaiming. status.py now reads check.sh too, so a placeholder L0 body still outranks an `executable: true` annotation. Coverage 37/51 -> 40/51 (11 gaps); executable tests 32 -> 35; scaffold-only stays 5 — no sixth scaffold was added. Serves: R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02, R-TEST-01..06. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
72d4720d58 |
feat(auth): gate pihole UI with per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar (canary)
Close the un-gated-UI security finding for forward-auth apps (R-IDP-02) by rendering the Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar that crafty proves working. catalog/render.py now emits, for any forward-auth app with an exposed UI: the oauth2-proxy sidecar (upstream http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>, :4180, --allowed-group per auth.group), an authproxy :4180 Service port, an HTTPRoute backendRef -> :4180, and a gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy that allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180 (fail-closed: the bare UI is never served un-authenticated). oidc/native/none apps render byte-identical. This is the CANARY: only pihole's golden carries the sidecar and is verified fail-closed in-cluster first. jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr are deferred to the rollout commit (temporarily listed in ci/render-golden.sh) so their UIs keep serving exactly as today until their clients+secrets land. - keycloak: confidential pihole client (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper, bare names). - secret: SOPS/age pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials (client-id/secret/cookie), wired into apps/wave-0 via the renderer's new sidecar-creds wave rule. - L1 render goldens regenerated for the sidecar (forward-auth fixtures). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d60e5531b1 |
test(conformance): correct stale ImageVolume-gate rationale for k3s v1.36.4
The three KubeVirt VM conformance tests (vm-lifecycle, vm-default-deny,
vm-data-survival) carried comments asserting the ALPHA `ImageVolume` feature
gate is DISABLED "on this k3s v1.31 cluster" and that the apiserver therefore
prunes the container-disk `image` volume, breaking the containerDisk boot path.
The cluster was upgraded v1.31 -> v1.36.4. Revalidated the gate live:
- kubernetes_feature_enabled{name="ImageVolume"} = 1 (enabled by default;
stage="" — no longer ALPHA)
- a server-side `kubectl apply --dry-run=server` of a Pod with an `image`
volume RETAINS the volume + mount instead of pruning them.
So the old premise is stale: containerDisk roots would boot on 1.36.4. The
tests never asserted the gate state and never used containerDisk — they boot
from CDI DataVolume roots, which remains the correct choice because it is the
spec-required, rebuild-surviving disk model (docs/06, R-STATE-01); an ephemeral
containerDisk could never satisfy data-survival. Test logic is therefore
unchanged; only the explanatory comments are corrected (v1.31 -> v1.36.4, and
the "containerDisk is broken here" rationale marked stale with the live
evidence).
Merge gate: PASS (lint, l0, render-golden, l1 green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
8a424bcba3 |
test(l1): regenerate render goldens for the keycloak-egress renderer change
The container-workload and egress-class L1 fixtures use auth.mode=forward-auth, so the renderer now emits the keycloak backend egress allow for them too. Regenerate the committed goldens to match the canonical render. MERGE GATE: PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d24a443c7d |
chore(flux): migrate image-automation API v1beta2 -> v1
Migrate image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2 -> /v1 for ImageRepository,
ImagePolicy, and ImageUpdateAutomation ahead of the Flux v2.7+ upgrade
(cluster-upgrade-plan §3.2). Flux v2.4 (current) already serves /v1, so
migrating the manifests now is a safe no-op at runtime.
- catalog/render.py: r_image_automation emits v1 for ImageRepository/ImagePolicy
- platform/image-automation/{image-update-automation,per-service/pihole.example}
- conformance L3 hands-off-update chainsaw applies v1 CRs
- conformance L1 goldens re-rendered to match (apiVersion-only diff)
No spec-field changes required: all spec fields used (image, interval,
imageRepositoryRef, filterTags.pattern/extract, policy.semver.range,
sourceRef, git.*, update.strategy/path) are unchanged in v1; the v1
messageTemplate already uses .Changed (not the removed .Updated).
apps/ golden unaffected (canonical render uses --no-image-automation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
fdf5c69adc |
test(conformance): add L3 node-loss test for R-STATE-02 (Longhorn node-loss resilience)
R-STATE-02 was the last safety-critical requirement with no verifying test,
exempted via DOCUMENTED_GAPS. Author the L3 fault-injection test that proves the
guarantee and remove the exemption.
tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss/chainsaw-test.yaml:
GIVEN a 3-replica Longhorn volume with written data attached on node N,
WHEN N is removed from service (cordon + evict the attached workload, forcing
the volume to detach from N),
THEN a fresh workload on a SURVIVING node re-attaches the same volume and reads
the canary intact — volume stays available, cluster reconverges.
Safe-by-construction for the 3-node embedded-etcd dev cluster:
- Disruption scoped to EXACTLY ONE node, at the scheduling layer only (cordon +
evict our own pod). kubelet/etcd stay up — etcd quorum is never touched.
- Never `kubectl drain`; only our own writer pod is deleted, so no unrelated or
system pod is disturbed.
- Victim node labelled conformance.home.k3s/cordoned-by=<test-ns>; `finally`
ALWAYS uncordons every node with THAT label and removes it — restored even on
failure/timeout, and never touches an operator-cordoned node.
- Self-skips green until a longhorn StorageClass AND >= 3 Ready nodes exist.
Bookkeeping:
- run.sh: remove R-STATE-02 from DOCUMENTED_GAPS; add node-loss to CONF_HEAVY_TESTS
(serial pass, matches the other Longhorn/KubeVirt L3 tests).
- incluster/rbac.yaml: enable the scoped nodes get/list/patch rule the test needs
(cordon/uncordon/label); no eviction rights (no drain).
- README.md / coverage.py docstring: refresh the documented-gap example.
Coverage: 36/51 -> 37/51 (70.6% -> 72.5%); safety-critical gaps 1 -> 0. Only
R-STATE-02 changed ([] -> node-loss); no other requirement or golden touched.
NOTE: LIVE execution is DEFERRED to an operator-chosen maintenance window. This
change AUTHORS + statically validates the test (renders, chainsaw-lints, harness
selects it, coverage updates). The static gate runs L2/L3 as SKIP without a
cluster (expected). The node-disruption test was NOT run live.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
948c390272 |
conformance: serialize heavy L2/L3 tests + author alerting SMTP sink
TASK 1 — reliably single-pass green L2/L3: Split run_chainsaw into a LIGHT pass (concurrent, config parallelism) and a HEAVY pass (serial, parallel=1). The KubeVirt-CDI/Longhorn/DR tests (vm-lifecycle, vm-data-survival, vm-default-deny, data-survival, dr-restore) spike embedded-etcd on the small dev VMs; running them serially in their own pass keeps their etcd spikes from ever coinciding with another test's setup — the coincidence that let one heavy test's apiserver blip fail-close Kyverno admission and abort every in-flight test at 0.01s. Heavy set is keyed by test dir basename and overridable via CONF_HEAVY_TESTS. Each pass writes its own JUnit; lib/merge_junit.py stitches them into the one stable report.junit.xml CI collects, so the split is invisible downstream. Overall rc is the union of both passes (no masking — real failures still surface). Proof: full --layer l2,l3 run now completes single-pass green: 24/24 passed, 0 failures/errors/skipped. vpn-killswitch, which previously failed with an apiserver EOF (etcd blip), passed; no mass environmental setup-aborts. TASK 2 (T-4.1) — author conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/alerting/ fixtures/smtp-sink.yaml: a hermetic Mailpit SMTP capture sink (Service smtp-sink, SMTP 1025, HTTP API 8025) the alerting test applies as its mail sink. restricted-PodSecurity compliant, in-memory (no PVC). Unblocks the previously-aborting alerting scaffold; it now passes. Touches conformance/ + ci-read content only — no apps/ or platform/ workload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d32b5c4ec0 |
fix(renderer): Recreate strategy for Deployments mounting RWO PVCs
Any single-replica app with a `storage:` entry mounts a ReadWriteOnce Longhorn PVC. The default RollingUpdate strategy starts the new pod before terminating the old one, but the old pod still holds the RWO volume -> the new pod hangs in ContainerCreating and the rollout deadlocks (observed on gitea's update). Emit spec.strategy.type=Recreate whenever storage is present so the old pod releases the PVC first. Non-storage apps (and VMs) keep the default (no strategy emitted). Re-rendered apps: gitea, pihole, sonarr, radarr, plex, qbittorrent, jackett now carry strategy: Recreate. Updated the egress-class L1 render goldens (storage fixture) accordingly; all L1 render checks pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
63b87ffe46 |
test(conformance): update DNS tests to Proxmox Gateway VIP 192.168.1.53 (was 10.73.0.24x)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85
|
7e8ae472c9 |
fix(net): renderer emits world/internet egress allow per egress class + fix jackett/plex tags
Root cause the media stack surfaced: the default-deny baseline is DNS-only egress (correct for R-NET-01 east-west), but the egress CLASS (internet/vpn) had no policy ALLOWING north-south egress — so qbittorrent/sonarr/radarr couldn't reach the internet at all (VPN downloaders broken). Add an additive per-app CiliumNetworkPolicy '<app>-allow-internet-egress' with toEntities:[world] (non-cluster); the egress-class steering + kill-switch (ADR-0015) govern the PATH (internet=WAN, vpn=tun0). East-west stays denied except declared dependencies; R-NET-01 baseline unchanged. Re-rendered all apps + regenerated L1 goldens. Also fixed jackett + plex image tags (bad pins -> :latest; Renovate/update policy pins later). |
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|
jakman85
|
5ba3f9d46d |
fix(conformance): trusted-tls verifies LE-prod cert via system trust + split-horizon DNS (R-TLS-01/03)
Rewrote the probe for the LE-production switch: no embedded staging root, no --cacert (system CA bundle validates ISRG Root X1), resolves the hostname via in-cluster split-horizon DNS to the Gateway VIP (the real-client path). PASSES live (9s). Removed the le-staging-root-ca fixture. |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
c6a480eed1 |
test(net): L2 conformance — exposed app reachable through Gateway under default-deny (R-NET-03)
New runnable chainsaw test gateway-ingress-reachable (R-NET-01/02/03): stands up an
exposed-app fixture (namespace default-deny + the renderer's additive gateway-ingress
CiliumNetworkPolicy allowing fromEntities:[ingress] to the declared port 8080 only, a
backend listening on 8080 + an undeclared 9091, and declared/undeclared HTTPRoutes on
the shared Gateway) and proves BEHAVIOR through the REAL Gateway VIP:
* then-reachable-through-gateway -> the Gateway (ingress identity) reaches backend:8080
through default-deny (backend marker returned) [R-NET-02/03]
* then-undeclared-port-denied -> port 9091 (no allow) is NOT reachable through the
Gateway (marker never returned; envoy 503) [R-NET-02]
* then-east-west-still-denied -> a non-ingress in-namespace peer is DROPPED on 8080;
the allow is least-privilege, east-west default-deny intact (hermetic) [R-NET-01]
Verified live: reachable=REACHED (200, marker), undeclared=DENIED, east-west=DENIED.
Self-skipping: the gateway probes classify each attempt REACHED / DENIED / NO-GATEWAY
(curl 000). NO-GATEWAY self-skips (green + note) because a node-local Cilium L7LB/envoy
desync can make pods on an affected node unable to reach the Gateway VIP at all — a
SEPARATE platform fault, not default-deny — so this test never false-fails on it. The
east-west denial is hermetic and always asserts. VIP discovered per-step via a kubectl
output binding (env-agnostic; chainsaw bindings are step-scoped). L2 layer stays gated by
CLUSTER_AVAILABLE in run.sh. chainsaw v0.2.12 quirks honored (scalar/JMESPath asserts,
no readinessProbe under default-deny, step-level finally delete).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
c13ef69e71 |
feat(net): renderer emits gateway-ingress allow for exposed services (R-NET-01/02)
Exposed apps got a default-deny NetworkPolicy with ingress: [] (deny all), so the
Cilium Gateway (Envoy, reserved identity `ingress`) could not reach the backend — an
Accepted HTTPRoute was still unreachable. render.py now emits an ADDITIVE, least-
privilege CiliumNetworkPolicy for any ServiceDefinition that renders an HTTPRoute:
ingress:
- fromEntities: [ingress] # the shared Cilium Gateway/Envoy proxy identity
toPorts: [<exposed service port(s)> TCP]
Verified against the live cluster (Cilium 1.16.5): with default-deny in place, Hubble
shows the Gateway proxy reaching pihole as source identity `(ingress)` and the flow
`Policy denied DROPPED` on :80 — so `fromEntities: [ingress]` is exactly the source the
Gateway uses, scoped to the service targetPort. Default-deny stays intact (ingress: []
unchanged); the allow only opens the north-south path (docs/09), east-west stays denied.
- render.py: add r_gateway_ingress_policy(); emit it after dependency policies; selftest
asserts the allow is additive (default-deny ingress stays []), least-privilege (only the
exposed port, only the ingress identity), and absent for non-exposed services.
- L1 goldens updated for the two exposed fixtures (container-workload, egress-class);
default-deny-baseline golden unchanged (no exposure). --selftest + run.sh --layer l1 green.
- apps/pihole.yaml re-rendered (--no-image-automation) to carry the allow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85
|
c05fd6702a | Merge fix/kubevirt-vm-boot: real-KVM DataVolume VMs (R-PLAT-03/04 green; useEmulation:false, EFI, DataVolume roots) | ||
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jakman85
|
a177d62925 |
fix(conformance): busybox-compatible wget in oidc-sso-grafana probe (R-IDP-01)
busybox wget has no --max-redirect flag → it printed usage, so the probe never saw the 302 and R-IDP-01 falsely failed. Grafana verified live: /login/generic_oauth 302s to the Keycloak homelab authorize endpoint. Use 'wget -S' (dumps the 302 Location before follow). |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
3a59ef1918 |
fix(kubevirt): boot VMs via CDI DataVolume + EFI + real KVM (Phase 5)
VMs did not boot on the dev cluster. Three distinct live-verified causes, all fixed GitOps-side: 1. containerDisk root failed at OCI init: exec "/container-disk-binary/usr/bin/container-disk": no such file. KubeVirt v1.9 supplies that binary to the volumerootdisk init container via a k8s-native `image` volume (VolumeSource.Image), gated by the ALPHA `ImageVolume` feature gate. k3s v1.31 has it DISABLED, so the apiserver silently prunes the image volume + its mount -> binary missing -> crash. (Proved: a server-side dry-run of a pod with an `image` volume drops it.) Fix: convert the VM roots in all three tests to CDI DataVolumes imported onto Longhorn PVCs (mounted disks bypass the container-disk/image-volume path). This is also the spec-required disk model (docs/06, R-STATE-01). vm-lifecycle now PASSES green live (VMI Running on start + restart). 2. Guest dropped to emergency mode: the containerdisks/fedora:41 image is UEFI-native (ESP + /boot mounted via systemd GPT auto-discovery); under KubeVirt's SeaBIOS default the ESP+/boot by-uuid mounts time out -> local-fs.target fails -> cloud-init runcmd/poweroff never runs. Fix: boot the VMs with EFI (OVMF, secureBoot:false) in all three tests and fixtures/vm.yaml. Confirmed live: emergency mode gone with EFI. 3. VMs ran under TCG software emulation (guests ~10x slow, saturating nodes until one went NotReady and VMs were evicted). Cause: useEmulation:true in the KubeVirt CR makes virt-controller NOT request devices.kubevirt.io/ kvm, so /dev/kvm is never mounted and qemu falls back to TCG even though all nodes advertise kvm=1k / hypervisor=true. (Proved: `ls /dev/kvm` in a virt-launcher compute container = "No such file"; qemu accel = tcg.) Fix: useEmulation:false so the kvm device is requested and VMs run on real (nested) KVM. Requires Flux reconcile to take effect live (PM action). The virt-handler clientcertificates tls.crt error is UNRELATED: node-labeller (294 labels, hypervisor=true), device plugins, and VMI scheduling all work. Also raised test exec timeouts to 30m (CDI import + boot) and, in vm-default-deny, import the root BEFORE applying the default-deny NetworkPolicy so the CDI importer's egress to quay.io is not severed by the policy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
|
3b97f5f058 | Merge fix/split-horizon-dns: in-cluster split-horizon DNS (R-DNS-01/03) — unblocks SSO | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
8b199a6780 |
test(dns): internal split-horizon resolution conformance (R-DNS-01/R-DNS-03)
Add dns-internal-resolution (L2 behavioral): an in-cluster Job resolves keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev via the default cluster resolver and asserts the answer is the in-cluster Gateway VIP (10.73.0.24x), not a public/off-cluster hairpin. Complements dns-exposure (R-DNS-02, external record). coverage.py now maps R-DNS-01/R-DNS-03 to this test (covered); chainsaw v0.2.12 lint clean; strict hygiene gate green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
|
186ff23098 | Merge feature/servicedefinition-renderer: ServiceDefinition renderer T-0.3 (R-GITOPS-02) + L1 render tests green | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
a79f24f75e |
Add container-workload-render L1 test (R-PLAT-02)
The renderer's PaaS path (kind: container) had no verifying conformance test — the R-PLAT-02 token appears only in renderer comments, so a change touching catalog/ surfaced it as an uncovered touched-requirement (blocking the merge gate). Adds the container render analog of vm-lifecycle (R-PLAT-03): asserts a kind: container ServiceDefinition renders a Deployment (running the declared image) + a Service, with the egress-class/auth-mode labels admission requires. Offline render-check.sh, wrapped by a chainsaw Test for in-cluster runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
4a017c590e |
Wire L1 render conformance tests to the renderer (R-NET-01, R-NET-05/06/07)
Implements the two L1 rendering tests that were failing scaffolds: - egress-class-render (R-NET-05/06/07): renders vpn + internet fixtures, diffs each against a committed golden, asserts the vpn steering label is present on vpn and absent on internet (fail-closed), and that flipping the class changes ONLY the egress path (R-NET-07). This fixes the --requirements R-NET-05 merge gate. - default-deny-baseline-render (R-NET-01): asserts every render carries the namespaced default-deny baseline, shaped deny-all + both directions. Each test carries a pure-offline render-check.sh (renderer + golden diff, no cluster). run.sh runs L1 render checks offline and emits a REAL pass/fail JUnit (docs/14: L1 rendering assertions run in CI without a cluster) instead of skipping L1 with the cluster-gated layers; the chainsaw-test.yaml wrappers invoke the same render-check.sh so an in-cluster run executes the identical assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
cbe5fab040 |
test(updates): complete hands-off-update L3 conformance (R-UPD-01/02/03)
Runnable, self-skipping (green until image.toolkit CRDs exist). Proves: an ImagePolicy auto-advances to the newest STABLE tag on schedule with no edit and never a pre-release (R-UPD-01/02, via podinfo ImageRepository/ImagePolicy status); a deliberately bad update is health-gated and AUTO-ROLLS-BACK to the last-good revision while the old ReplicaSet keeps serving, and the UpdateHealthGateFailed alert is wired (R-UPD-02/03); and an exact-range (pinned) policy does not advance past its pin (R-UPD-03). Hermetic to the chainsaw per-test namespace; block-style contains() checks per chainsaw v0.2.12. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
|
b95b540468 |
Merge feature/keycloak-auth-stack: Phase 6 Keycloak IdP + oauth2-proxy + CNPG (R-IDP-01..06, R-OBS)
# Conflicts: # platform-config/kustomization.yaml # platform/kustomization.yaml |
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jakman85
|
4bebd4b6d2 | keycloak: coverage tests + dashboard + reword cross-cutting tags | ||
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jakman85
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ce83c6af3b | WIP keycloak stack (gate probe) | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
dbffb8fab8 |
Phase 5: KubeVirt + CDI IaaS proof (R-PLAT-03/04, R-STATE-01, R-NET-01)
- platform/kubevirt: pinned KubeVirt v1.9.0 + CDI v1.66.0 operators (remote bases); KubeVirt/CDI CRs tuned for Longhorn; useEmulation=true (prefer real KVM, emulate fallback). - Controllers/configs split (F-MON1): CRs + ServiceMonitors + alerts via platform-config. - Observability: ServiceMonitors, KubeVirt platform-health alerts (R-OBS-04), VM dashboard. - catalog/vm-demo.yaml (kind: vm) + rendered VirtualMachine/DataVolume fixture. - Conformance: vm-lifecycle (R-PLAT-03/04), vm-data-survival (R-STATE-01, L3), vm-default-deny (R-NET-01) — self-skipping until KubeVirt+longhorn exist. - ci/SPEC_PIN: adopt accepted spec b633b7f (ADR-0015 egress work already merged). - conformance/run.sh: document R-ENV-02/R-GITOPS-01 coverage gaps (WS-GITOPS/INFRA-owned). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
4c21f9f6e3 |
conformance: fix invalid test-level spec.finally for chainsaw v0.2.12
chainsaw v0.2.12 has no test-level `spec.finally` (finally exists only on a
step), and a step-level `finally` accepts only catch-style ops (script/command/
delete/wait), NOT `apply`/`assert`. Both tests failed to parse ("unknown field").
- egress-class: drop the redundant test-level `spec.finally` delete-pods block —
chainsaw auto-deletes applied fixtures on cleanup (skipDelete: false). The
valid step-level `finally` that restores the egress-class label is kept.
- vpn-killswitch: move the SAFETY-CRITICAL self-healing tunnel restart out of the
invalid `spec.finally` and into the STEP-level `finally` of the fault step
`when-force-tunnel-down-then-no-leak`, implemented as a `script` (finally can't
use apply/assert) that `kubectl apply`s the privileged node-pinned restart Job
(name `tunnel-restart`, distinct from `tunnel-stop`) and `kubectl wait`s for it
to complete — the equivalent of `assert succeeded:1`, blocking teardown until
the host confirms the tunnel is up. This finally runs even if the no-leak /
internet-unaffected asserts in the same step's `try` fail, so no path leaves the
gateway tunnel down. The recovery step is now poll-only (restart already
happened in the prior step's finally).
Validation with the pinned binary (~/.local/bin/chainsaw v0.2.12):
`chainsaw lint test --file ...` => "The document is valid" for both; `chainsaw
test ... --no-cluster` loads both past the parse stage (no "unknown field"), then
fails only at runtime for lack of a cluster (expected). yamllint + run.sh
--strict-coverage clean (RC=0). No live apply / fault injection, no spec edits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
0e69c63b55 |
conformance: complete vpn-killswitch L3 test + ADR-0015 RBAC/fixtures
Turn the vpn-killswitch scaffold into a runnable SAFETY-CRITICAL L3 test for R-NET-06 under ADR-0015 (node-level host OpenVPN tunnel steered by Cilium Egress Gateway with a host nftables kill-switch), replacing the obsolete in-cluster gluetun design. - fixtures/vpn-and-internet-pods.yaml: two egress-class probe pods + documented RBAC/PodSecurity/namespace requirements for node-level fault injection. - vpn-killswitch/chainsaw-test.yaml: GIVEN healthy tunnel (vpn egress != WAN); WHEN the host `vpn-egress-tunnel` systemd unit is STOPPED via a privileged, hostPID, node-pinned nsenter Job THEN vpn-class egress is blackholed (curl fails, never returns the WAN IP = no leak) while internet-class is unaffected; WHEN restarted THEN vpn egress recovers. spec-level `finally` ALWAYS runs an idempotent start Job (self-healing) so a mid-test failure never leaves the gateway tunnel down. - incluster/rbac.yaml: grant the runner least-privilege for the delivered tests (namespaces create/delete/patch for the PSA relabel, pods/services/configmaps/ pods-exec/pods-log, batch/jobs) and replace the gluetun-scale rule with the ADR-0015 host-systemd mechanism note (privilege via PodSecurity, not RBAC). Offline validation: python yaml parse (all docs), `run.sh --lint` (structural), `run.sh --coverage-only --strict-coverage` (no tag/annotation drift; R-NET-05/06/ 07 covered, R-NET-06 has its L3 test), yamllint. No live apply, no cluster run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
e7a567db0b |
WIP conformance(egress-class): ADR-0015 assertions (partial — killswitch test TODO)
Session-limit interrupted the WS-TEST agent. egress-class test updated; vpn-killswitch test + host fault-injection fixture still outstanding. Preserved for review/continuation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
34f41a0fba |
phase3(vpn): egress-class conformance fixtures + steering design finding
Author the internet/vpn egress-class fixture pods for the egress-class + vpn-killswitch conformance tests. Record the datapath finding: ADR-0013's preferred steering (Cilium egress gateway -> gluetun tun0) is NOT viable because gluetun must run hostNetwork to put tun0 on the node, and gluetun then redirects the NODE's default route through the VPN (breaks k3s/etcd). Escalated: remaining viable path is option 2 (gateway-pod routing). No steering datapath committed until the mechanism is chosen + validated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
1bf8e3bfc4 |
feat(conformance): implement L3 default-deny-failclosed (R-NET-01/02, fault injection)
Was a scaffold (fixture TODO, fault-injection a no-op echo). Implemented against the live datapath: fixtures/allowed-pair.yaml = default-deny baseline + source + dest(:8080) + the sole explicit allow. The test verifies source->dest works (ALLOWED_OK), then REVOKES both halves of the allow (real fault: kubectl delete networkpolicy), and asserts connectivity fails CLOSED (FAIL_CLOSED_OK) while DNS still resolves (DNS_OK). Proves default-deny is datapath-enforced and fails closed on revocation. DNS check asserts the resolved answer, since busybox nslookup exits non-zero on a successful forward lookup. PASSES (74.8s). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
70c0701d6f |
fix(conformance): block-style chainsaw checks (flow-map broke on contains comma)
My previous commit converted =~ to contains() but kept flow style
'check: { (contains($stdout, 'X')): true }' — the comma inside contains() is a
YAML flow-map separator, so 9 tests failed yamllint ('expected , or }'). Convert
those checks to block style (matching data-survival), where a comma in the key
scalar is fine. Gate PASS; data-survival still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
e0c5c58710 |
fix(conformance): chainsaw checks use contains(), not unsupported =~
Every chainsaw `check` used the regex operator `=~` (`($stdout =~ 'X'): true`),
which chainsaw's expression engine rejects ('SyntaxError: Unknown char: ~') — so
EVERY such test failed on the assertion even when the behavior passed. Proven with
data-survival (R-STATE-01): the Longhorn canary genuinely SURVIVED pod destruction
(DATA_SURVIVED_OK) but the test FAILED on the `=~` syntax. Converted all 10 tests to
JMESPath `contains($stdout, 'X')` (data-survival's alternation → contains||contains).
data-survival now PASSES; the other 9 (later-phase components) are syntactically fixed
for when their phases deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
20de78f5eb |
feat(conformance): author R-TLS + R-DNS L2 tests; fix ExternalDNS zone filter
Phase-2 exit tests (were Phase-0 scaffolds), authored against the live platform:
- trusted-tls (R-TLS-01/03): in-cluster probe dials the gateway Service (env-agnostic
via --connect-to) with wildcard SNI and verifies the served cert CHAINS TO THE LE
STAGING ROOT (operator decision A; dev uses LE-staging per ADR-0006). Fixture embeds
the '(STAGING) Pretend Pear X1' root. Probes public + internal-only hostnames (R-TLS-03).
PASSES.
- dns-exposure (R-DNS-02): a LoadBalancer Service with an external-dns hostname; polls
public DNS until ExternalDNS auto-publishes the record; teardown + policy=sync removes it.
ExternalDNS fix (root cause of the DNS test): domain-filter was the platform SUBDOMAIN
home.keithjackson.dev, which filters OUT the actual Cloudflare zone keithjackson.dev
('no hosted zone matching record DNS Name' — record generated but skipped). Add a
DNS_ZONE cluster-var (keithjackson.dev) and set domainFilters to it. policy=sync +
txt-registry still only manage ExternalDNS-owned records (the pre-existing wildcard is
untouched). Resolves the file's WS-NET R-DNS-02 TODO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
e20f17b896 |
K2 DONE: L2 network behavior tests pass against the live cluster
R-NET-01 default-deny + R-NET-02 deny-undeclared PASS via run.sh (JUnit+coverage, exit 0). Fixed 3 real bugs found by running them: - chainsaw strict list-matching: assert scalar 'phase: Running' not a conditions[] element. - default-deny blocks the kubelet readiness probe -> drop probes (dest pods just need to run). - chainsaw report path ../_artifacts resolved to repo-root -> fix to _artifacts (was exit 1). - swap agnhost->busybox httpd listeners (cached everywhere; cache-timing-proof). Logged the kubelet-probe finding for WS-NET's T-2.2 default-deny baseline design. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
cc89b4b830 |
Autonomous session: Phase-2 platform authoring + Flux bootstrap progress
Author-only Phase-2 components (platform suspended; cluster untouched): - platform/longhorn: 3-replica SC + bulk external-mount indirection (R-STATE) - platform/monitoring: kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy (dev-trimmed) + 8 alert rules (R-OBS) - platform/cilium: parity fix (k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11 + masquerade) safe to adopt Phase 2 - conformance: partial L2 tests (worker hit session limit; incomplete — see DECISIONS-LOG K2) - bootstrap/gitea: fix rootless-podman perms (host bind-mount -> named volume) Flux installed on the cluster; host Gitea up + repo pushed; GitRepository BLOCKED by host firewalld (VM->10.73.0.1:3000) — needs one operator sudo command (DECISIONS-LOG). Known issue K1: cluster-vars substitution-var case mismatch (fix before un-suspend). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
9d8e03892f |
T-0.4 Chainsaw conformance harness + coverage + behavior scaffolds (R-TEST-01..06)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |