merge: velero works against R2 — plugin pin, NFS volume policy, metrics

feat(velero): scrape the backup controller — three critical alerts could never fire
platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml has shipped VeleroBackupFailure (critical), VeleroBackupPartialFailure and VeleroNoRecentBackup since the observability wave. None of them could ever have fired. The velero chart defaults `metrics.serviceMonitor.enabled: false`, and prod confirms it live: `kubectl -n velero get servicemonitor` returns no resources, so velero_backup_failure_total and velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp were never scraped. A nightly backup could fail — or silently stop running — for weeks with nothing to say so. That is exactly what R-STATE-03 is for, which makes the scrape part of the backup path rather than an observability extra. Both flags verified against chart 12.1.0: `helm template` emits neither object without the monitoring.coreos.com/v1 capability, and emits both PodMonitor and ServiceMonitor with it — so the chart gates on capability detection AND `enabled`, and helm-controller supplies real capabilities from the API server. No additionalLabels are needed: platform/monitoring already sets serviceMonitorSelectorNilUsesHelmValues and podMonitorSelectorNilUsesHelmValues to false, so Prometheus selects every monitor regardless of labels. Independent of the R2/bulk-tier fix in the previous commit; droppable on its own if the PM wants to sequence it separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 17:20:55 -05:00 · 2026-09-12 17:18:26 -05:00 · 2026-09-12 17:18:26 -05:00 · 2026-09-12 17:15:14 -05:00 · 2026-09-12 17:12:05 -05:00 · 2026-09-12 16:35:18 -05:00
147 changed files with 14770 additions and 367 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
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@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
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@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
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+TXT|a-crafty-mc.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=service/crafty/crafty-l4-tcp
+TXT|a-crafty.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/crafty/crafty
+TXT|a-crafty.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/crafty/crafty
+TXT|a-gitea.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/gitea/gitea-3000
+TXT|a-gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/gitea/gitea-3000
+TXT|a-grafana.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/monitoring/grafana
+TXT|a-grafana.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/monitoring/grafana
+TXT|a-headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/headlamp/headlamp
+TXT|a-headlamp.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/headlamp/headlamp
+TXT|a-home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/homepage/homepage
+TXT|a-jackett.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/jackett/jackett-9117
+TXT|a-jackett.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/jackett/jackett-9117
+TXT|a-keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/keycloak/keycloak
+TXT|a-keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/keycloak/keycloak
+TXT|a-nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/nextcloud/nextcloud-80
+TXT|a-nextcloud.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/nextcloud/nextcloud-80
+TXT|a-pihole.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/pihole/pihole-80
+TXT|a-pihole.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/pihole/pihole-80
+TXT|a-plex.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/plex/plex-32400
+TXT|a-plex.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/plex/plex-32400
+TXT|a-prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/homepage/homepage
+TXT|a-qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/qbittorrent/qbittorrent-8080
+TXT|a-qbittorrent.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/qbittorrent/qbittorrent-8080
+TXT|a-radarr.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/radarr/radarr-7878
+TXT|a-radarr.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/radarr/radarr-7878
+TXT|a-seerr.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/seerr/seerr-5055
+TXT|a-seerr.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/seerr/seerr-5055
+TXT|a-semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/semaphore/semaphore-3000
+TXT|a-semaphore.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/semaphore/semaphore-3000
+TXT|a-sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/sonarr/sonarr-8989
+TXT|a-sonarr.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=httproute/sonarr/sonarr-8989
+TXT|a-unifi.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=service/unifi/unifi-l4-tcp
+TXT|a-unifi.prod.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=prod,external-dns/resource=service/unifi/unifi-l4-tcp
+TXT|auth.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
+TXT|crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=service/crafty/crafty-l4-tcp
+TXT|crafty.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/crafty/crafty
+TXT|gitea.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/gitea/gitea-3000
+TXT|grafana.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/monitoring/grafana
+TXT|headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/headlamp/headlamp
+TXT|home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/homepage/homepage
+TXT|jackett.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/jackett/jackett-9117
+TXT|keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/keycloak/keycloak
+TXT|nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/nextcloud/nextcloud-80
+TXT|pihole.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/pihole/pihole-80
+TXT|plex.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/plex/plex-32400
+TXT|qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/qbittorrent/qbittorrent-8080
+TXT|radarr.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/radarr/radarr-7878
+TXT|seerr.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/seerr/seerr-5055
+TXT|semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/semaphore/semaphore-3000
+TXT|sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=httproute/sonarr/sonarr-8989
+TXT|unifi.home.keithjackson.dev|heritage=external-dns,external-dns/owner=default,external-dns/resource=service/unifi/unifi-l4-tcp
@@ -1758,3 +1758,334 @@ into a transient hard Kustomization failure.
 - **Prod's source URL cannot work on a cold prod cluster** — split-horizon answers the whole zone
  with `${GATEWAY_VIP}`, so prod would resolve `gitea.home.keithjackson.dev` to its own gateway.
  Bring-up needs a temporary source and a cutover, as `docs/05` describes for dev's own Phase-6.
+
+## 2026-09-07 — LIVE BUG: prod's OIDC clients were pointed at DEV's Keycloak. Secrets are a substitution blind spot.
+
+The operator could not log in to Headlamp on prod:
+
+```
+Get "https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration":
+dial tcp 192.168.1.53:443: i/o timeout
+```
+
+`keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` is **dev's** Keycloak. It resolves to `192.168.1.53`, on the dev
+LAN behind pfSense; prod lives on `192.168.2.0/24` (pfSense's WAN) and cannot route there, so the
+discovery fetch simply hung until it timed out.
+
+### Root cause — the class, not the instance
+
+**Flux's `${BASE_DOMAIN}` postBuild substitution rewrites the RENDERED MANIFEST TEXT. It can never
+reach inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret.** Environment-specific URLs had been stored *inside* two
+encrypted Secrets purely because it was convenient to keep one blob per app:
+
+| File | Buried, un-substitutable values |
+|---|---|
+| `platform/headlamp/headlamp-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml` | `OIDC_ISSUER_URL`, `OIDC_CALLBACK_URL` |
+| `apps/wave-1/semaphore-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml` (`oidc-providers-json`) | the realm issuer + the OIDC redirect URI |
+
+Both were frozen at the apex `home.keithjackson.dev`. **Dev IS the apex, so dev was correct by
+coincidence** — the values were never per-environment, they just happened to match one environment.
+Prod was wrong from the first reconcile. Semaphore on prod was broken the same way and nobody had
+noticed, because nobody had tried prod SSO yet.
+
+This is the same failure shape as the 2026-09-01 nextcloud guard: **a value that silently resolves
+to something plausible is worse than one that fails.** `StrictPostBuildSubstitutions` cannot catch
+it either — there is no `${...}` left unresolved to complain about; the ciphertext never contained
+one.
+
+### The rule this establishes
+
+> **Non-secret, environment-specific values MUST NOT live inside an encrypted Secret.** Issuer URLs,
+> callback URLs, redirect URIs and hostnames are public. Encrypt the secret half only, and template
+> the rest where `${BASE_DOMAIN}` can reach it.
+
+### The fix
+
+- **Headlamp** — `OIDC_ISSUER_URL` / `OIDC_CALLBACK_URL` moved to the HelmRelease's
+  `spec.values.env`, templated `${BASE_DOMAIN}`. The Secret keeps `OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` +
+  the environment-invariant `OIDC_CLIENT_ID` / `OIDC_SCOPES`, still `envFrom`'d.
+  **Exactly one source per variable** — an explicit `env:` entry silently outranks the same name
+  arriving via `envFrom`, so the two sets deliberately do not overlap.
+  Side effect, intended: naming `OIDC_CALLBACK_URL` in `env:` makes chart 0.41.0 finally emit
+  `-oidc-callback-url=$(OIDC_CALLBACK_URL)`; it gates that arg on `env:`/`config.oidc`, which a
+  Secret key alone never tripped — so the Secret's callback URL had been dead weight all along.
+- **Semaphore** — the `SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS` JSON is now a plaintext literal in
+  `catalog/semaphore.yaml` (re-rendered to the `apps/wave-1` golden). Only the client secret stays
+  encrypted, in its own key `oidc-client-secret`, and the **kubelet** splices it back via
+  dependent-env-var expansion: `$(SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET)` resolves against the `secretKeyRef`
+  env var declared immediately above it. **Order is load-bearing** — the kubelet resolves `env` in
+  list order and leaves a forward reference as literal text. `flux envsubst` ignores `$(...)`, so
+  the two expansion layers do not collide (the `$${VAR}` escape in `apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml`
+  documents the one form that DOES need escaping).
+
+### Proof
+
+Rendered per overlay (`kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone`, then
+`flux envsubst --strict` with that overlay's `cluster-vars`), plus `helm template` of headlamp
+0.41.0 against the substituted values:
+
+| | dev | prod |
+|---|---|---|
+| Headlamp `OIDC_ISSUER_URL` | `https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab` | `https://keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab` |
+| Headlamp `OIDC_CALLBACK_URL` | `https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev/oidc-callback` | `https://headlamp.prod.home.keithjackson.dev/oidc-callback` |
+| Semaphore `provider_url` | `https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab` | `https://keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab` |
+| Semaphore `redirect_url` | `https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev/api/...` | `https://semaphore.prod.home.keithjackson.dev/api/...` |
+
+Dev's values are byte-identical to what it runs today — this change moves prod only.
+
+### [parity] the apiserver invariant HOLDS
+
+Prod's kube-apiserver `oidc-issuer-url` is an **install-time k3s flag** derived from
+`k3s_base_domain` (`infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` = `prod.home.keithjackson.dev`),
+not from `cluster-vars` — it cannot read the Flux variable. Headlamp forwards the user's `id_token`
+to the apiserver, so the two must name the same issuer. After this change they do, in both
+environments, because both derive from the same per-environment domain. Unchanged risk, now written
+down in `platform/headlamp/README.md`: moving one without the other 401s every request.
+
+### Also fixed for the next person
+
+`headlamp-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml.example` used to *teach* the broken pattern — it listed
+`OIDC_ISSUER_URL` and `OIDC_CALLBACK_URL` as keys to fill in. It now says, in the file, that adding
+either key back re-breaks prod.
+## 2026-09-07 — k3s-prod-1 NotReady: etcd starved of disk I/O by Longhorn (branch `fix/etcd-io-priority`)
+
+**06:05:21Z, `k3s-prod-1` went NotReady** (`Kubelet stopped posting node status`) with the host
+up, pingable and SSH-able. The embedded etcd could not complete a WAL `fdatasync`:
+
+```
+slow fdatasync                took=3.56s / 6.71s / 4.95s / 3.40s   (etcd expects 1s)
+apply request took too long   took=8.30s                           (expects 100ms)
+etcdserver: too many requests
+Failed to check local etcd status for learner management: context deadline exceeded
+```
+
+No OOM, no MCE, no hung task — **this is not the §0b memattr bug and not memory**. It is the §2
+shared-device risk, which §2 recorded as "accepted to be MEASURED, not assumed". The measurement
+came back, in production, 2 d 7 h after bring-up. `/proc/pressure/io` **full avg300**: node 1
+**11.36**, node 2 (NVMe) 0.75, node 3 (WD Blue SATA) 1.29. Node 1's drive is a 2011
+`C400-MTFDDAC512MAM` with 61,440 reallocated sectors and no power-loss protection. §2's premise —
+"every prod node is SSD or NVMe, where rebuild I/O costs latency rather than collapsing it" — was
+right about node 2 and wrong about node 1. §2 now records this under "THE MEASUREMENT CAME BACK".
+
+**The exit condition is OPEN and the fix is hardware: replace node 1's drive, or give etcd its own
+device (`node_baseline_etcd_source: device`, the path the role still supports). That is the
+operator's.** Three software mitigations shipped meanwhile, none of which is the fix.
+
+### 1. The outage was invisible to the monitoring stack — fixed first
+
+There were alerts for **CPU** PSI and memory and **none for I/O**, so the first signal was a node
+already out of the cluster. Added `NodeIOPressureHigh` (full IO PSI > 5% for 10m) and
+`NodeIOPressureCritical` (> 10% for 5m), thresholds taken from the numbers above against a ~1%
+steady state, plus an I/O row on the node-pressure dashboard. Verified live that node-exporter
+already exports `node_pressure_io_{stalled,waiting}_seconds_total` on all three nodes.
+
+**Gap left open for the operator:** etcd's own `etcd_disk_wal_fsync_duration_seconds` — the metric
+§2's exit condition literally asks for — is **not collected**. `kubeEtcd` is deliberately disabled
+in `platform/monitoring/kube-prometheus-stack.yaml` for k3s. Enabling it (k3s
+`--etcd-expose-metrics` + a scrape target) would make §2 directly measurable instead of inferred
+from PSI. Not done here: it is a k3s server-flag change requiring a rolling restart, which is not
+something to bundle into an incident fix.
+
+### 2. Longhorn was already throttled as far as Longhorn goes
+
+`concurrentReplicaRebuildPerNodeLimit: 1` was **in force during the outage and it held** — the 18
+volumes rebuilt one at a time and the node stalled anyway. Recorded plainly because it would be
+easy to "fix" this incident by setting a knob that was already set. For the v1 data engine there is
+no further rebuild lever: `replicaRebuildingBandwidthLimit` is v2/SPDK only (live Setting reads
+`{"v2":"0"}`, no v1 key) and `rebuildConcurrentSyncLimit` is already at its floor of 1.
+
+So what was tightened is every *other* Longhorn I/O source, each defaulting to 5 concurrent
+operations per node: `concurrentVolumeBackupRestorePerNodeLimit` 5→1 (an R-STATE-03 restore of 18
+volumes would otherwise run five parallel full-volume writes onto the disk etcd fsyncs to),
+`snapshotHeavyTaskConcurrentLimit` 5→1, plus pins on `replicaReplenishmentWaitInterval`,
+`backup`/`restoreConcurrentLimit` and `concurrentAutomaticEngineUpgradePerNodeLimit`.
+
+**And one setting in that file was inert.** `orphanAutoDeletion: true` has been silently dropped
+since the 1.11→1.12 upgrade — Longhorn 1.9 renamed it `orphanResourceAutoDeletion` (a list, not a
+bool) and the chart drops unknown `defaultSettings` keys with no error. Confirmed from both ends:
+absent from chart v1.12.1's `templates/default-setting.yaml`, and absent from the rendered
+`longhorn-default-setting` ConfigMap in the live cluster. Removed, deliberately not replaced. That
+is the **third** time this repo has shipped config that looked applied and was not.
+
+### 3. Block-layer arbitration — and four mechanisms that are inert on these nodes
+
+`roles/etcd_io_priority` + `playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml`: BFQ on the shared disk, `nr_requests`
+64→32, `IOWeight=10000` on `system.slice` **and** `k3s.service`, then every value read back out of
+the kernel and asserted. Enabled for `[k3s_prod]`; **applies nothing until the operator runs it**.
+
+The investigation's main value is the negative results, all checked on the live nodes:
+
+- **`IOSchedulingClass=realtime` on `k3s.service` is a footgun, not a fix.** `mq-deadline` does
+  honour the priority class, so it looks correct — but ioprio is inherited across `fork` and kept
+  across `exec` (`block/blk-ioc.c` `__copy_io` copies `ioc->ioprio`), and **containerd is a child
+  of the k3s server process** (verified: containerd pid 84553, ppid 84333 = `k3s-server`; and
+  `ionice -c2 -n0 -- sh -c 'ionice -p $$; sh -c "ionice -p \$\$"'` reports best-effort prio 0 at
+  both levels). Realtime for k3s would be realtime for every container including Longhorn.
+- **`IOSchedulingPriority` (level within a class) is a no-op** — `mq-deadline` buckets by class only.
+- **`io.latency` is unavailable** — `CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_IOLATENCY` is not built in Debian trixie's
+  7.1.8 kernel (only `IOCOST` is), and no `io.latency` exists under `/sys/fs/cgroup`.
+- **A bare `IOWeight=` drop-in is decoration.** systemd writes it to `io.weight` (blk-iocost —
+  compiled in but disabled; `io.cost.qos` is empty) and `io.bfq.weight` (BFQ — not loaded). Neither
+  reader exists on the stock nodes. And `IOWeight=1000` would map to `io.bfq.weight` ≈ 101 against
+  BFQ's unweighted default of 100 — hence 10000, and an asserted floor of 500.
+
+**What none of it fixes, stated so it is not forgotten:** etcd and Longhorn still share one ext4
+filesystem, and no cgroup or scheduler control arbitrates the **jbd2 journal** that etcd's
+`fdatasync` waits on and Longhorn's writes dirty. Software raises the load level at which this
+happens; it does not remove it.
+
+**Unproven.** The role fails loudly if its settings do not *land*; it cannot tell you they helped.
+Apply to `k3s-prod-3` first (WD Blue, PSI 1.29 — same code path, far lower stakes), watch
+`NodeIOPressureHigh` for a day, then node 1.
+
+### Doc correction found on the way
+
+`infra/ansible/README.md` still claimed `k3s-prod-2`/`-3` "stay commented out" of the inventory.
+They have been live in `[k3s_prod_secondary]` since 2026-09-03. Corrected, because that sentence is
+exactly the kind used to reason about blast radius: **`-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` targets three hosts,
+not one.** Confirmed by `--list-hosts` (dev default → 3 dev hosts, where the new role is a no-op;
+`-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` → 3 prod hosts; `--limit k3s-prod-3` → 1).
+
+### Still requires the operator
+
+1. **The hardware fix.** Replace node 1's C400, or add an M.2 per node and set
+   `node_baseline_etcd_source: device`. Everything above is a delay, not a repair.
+2. **Run `playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml`** — node 3 first, `--limit`, `--list-hosts` confirmed.
+   Nothing was run against either cluster for this change.
+3. **Decide on `kubeEtcd` metrics**, so §2's exit condition can be measured with etcd's own fsync
+   histograms rather than inferred from node PSI.
+
+## 2026-09-07 — R-ENV-03's L0 check was RED on `main`, and the requirement's literal wording is why (branch `fix/r-env-03-overlay-selected-credentials`)
+
+`main`'s `conformance/tests/l0-static/prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface` failed 4 of 96 assertions.
+All four are the per-environment backup credentials merged in `e7c4a95`:
+
+```
+apps/wave-0/nextcloud-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml
+apps/wave-0/semaphore-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml
+platform/keycloak/keycloak-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml
+platform/velero/velero-cloud-prod.sops.yaml
+    ... is a prod-specific file inside the shared configuration
+```
+
+**The guard was a filename regex.** Any tracked file under `platform/ platform-config apps/
+catalog/ clusters/base/` whose name contained a delimited `prod` token failed, with no allowlist
+and no exception mechanism. Nothing about the four files' CONTENT was inspected.
+
+**Renaming them to dodge the regex was rejected** (operator, explicitly): the guard exists for a
+reason and a rename would leave the reason unserved while making the check lie. So the check was
+refined to test the harm instead of the spelling, and the requirement wording is escalated below.
+
+### Why these four files are compliant with R-ENV-02, and why the regex could not see it
+
+Backup credentials became per-environment because dev backs up to MinIO and prod to Cloudflare
+R2, and ONE shared Secret meant either environment's key rotation broke the other (worse for
+CNPG: `archive_mode=on` turns a 403 on WAL archive into a monotonically filling pgdata PVC).
+
+The mechanism is a single cluster-vars knob, `BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX` (base `""`, dev `""`,
+prod `"-prod"`). **Both Secret objects are applied to BOTH clusters** as base resources; the
+overlay changes only which one the shared consumer REFERENCES
+(`<name>${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}`). Every environment renders the identical manifests and the
+identical object set. That is exactly the "same manifests, overlay-scoped values" contract of
+R-ENV-02 — nothing is forked, and there is no prod-only content for anyone to develop against.
+The `-prod` in a filename is not a prod-only manifest; it is one half of an environment-selected
+pair, present everywhere.
+
+### What the check now asserts (committed on the branch; not a path allowlist)
+
+A file whose name carries the environment token is excused ONLY when the tree proves all of:
+
+- **(A)** it declares nothing but Secrets whose names end in the environment suffix — an overlay
+  can select which SECRET a shared manifest references and nothing else, so any other
+  prod-suffixed object in a shared path is prod-only content and still fails;
+- **(1)** its own directory's `kustomization.yaml` lists it in `resources` (so EVERY environment
+  applies it), and EVERY environment's value of the selector resolves to a Secret that some
+  resource of that same kustomization declares, in the same namespace — no environment is left
+  selecting an object that does not exist;
+- **(2)** nothing names the suffixed Secret — or the suffixed FILE — literally: every reference is
+  `<base-name>${VAR}`, and only the applying kustomization may name the file;
+- **(3)** that `VAR` is defined for `clusters/base` AND for every `clusters/<env>` overlay
+  (StrictPostBuildSubstitutions fails on an UNDEFINED variable, so an overlay that forgot it
+  would stop that cluster reconciling), and prod's value is the one that selects THIS file.
+
+References are read from PARSED YAML VALUES, never raw text — the mechanism is documented by name
+in comments beside the resources, and a name in a comment references nothing.
+
+Mutation-tested: eleven mutations, each restored afterwards, each of which must FAIL and does — a
+prod-only ConfigMap in a shared path, a prod-only Secret with no counterpart, a consumer
+hardcoding prod's Secret name, a kustomization naming prod's file from another directory, the
+knob missing from dev, the knob missing from base, prod's value drifted to a suffix nothing
+declares, the prod half dropped from `resources`, the base half deleted (with and without its
+`resources` entry), the halves split across namespaces, and one of two consumer references moved
+to a second knob. The legitimate four pass, with a `note:` per file saying why they were excused.
+
+### PROPOSED R-ENV-03 AMENDMENT — for the System Architect (spec repo is READ-ONLY here)
+
+**What the requirement says today** (`docs/00-vision-and-scope.md`, detail in `docs/02`): prod is
+a 3x mini-PC bare-metal k3s cluster with local storage and **"MUST NOT be an active development
+surface until the roadmap declares it ready"**; `docs/02` adds **"Never develop against prod.
+Prod hardware is a target, not a sandbox (R-ENV-03)."**
+
+**The problem with the literal reading.** Taken literally against the repository, "no prod-only
+content in the shared configuration" reads as "no artifact in a shared path may be specific to
+prod". That forbids the environment-selected PAIR, which is the very pattern R-ENV-02 prescribes
+for a value that must differ per environment while the manifests stay identical. The two
+requirements contradict each other on this case: R-ENV-02 says put the difference in an
+overlay-scoped value, and a Secret's difference cannot live in cluster-vars (it is ciphertext, per
+SOPS file, R-SEC-01), so it must live in a per-environment FILE that every environment applies.
+The requirement should forbid what is actually harmful — configuration only prod runs — not the
+appearance of an environment name in a path.
+
+**Proposed wording** (add as a clarifying clause to R-ENV-03 in `docs/02`, and mirror the phrase
+in `docs/00`):
+
+> Prod MUST NOT be an active development surface. Concretely: no artifact in the shared
+> configuration may be reachable by prod alone. An artifact whose NAME carries an environment
+> token is not by itself a violation — provided every environment APPLIES it, no shared manifest
+> references it by its environment-qualified name, and the selection between environment
+> counterparts is made solely by an overlay-scoped cluster-vars value that is DEFINED for every
+> environment. An artifact that only prod applies, or that a shared manifest names literally, IS
+> a violation, whatever it is called.
+
+That wording keeps the guard's teeth (an artifact only prod applies still fails), removes the
+false positive, and states the property the check now enforces so the test and the spec agree.
+
+**Related spec ask, same clause.** R-ENV-02 should say out loud that a per-environment SECRET is
+expressed as counterpart SOPS files applied everywhere plus a cluster-vars selector, because that
+is the one value class that cannot be expressed as a cluster-vars value itself. Without it, the
+next person hits the same contradiction.
+
+### How this reached `main` green — the gate hole, and whether the fix in flight closes it
+
+`ci/l0.sh` Stage 3b scopes the L0 conformance run to the TOUCHED requirement subset
+(`load_touched_requirements` -> `run.sh --requirements ...`). The delivery `e7c4a95` touched
+`apps/wave-0/`, `catalog/render.py`, `platform/keycloak/`, `platform/velero/` and declared no
+R-ID on a non-comment line, so the path map attributed R-GITOPS-02 / R-IDP-01..06 / R-STATE-03 —
+**and never R-ENV-03**. `prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface` was therefore FILTERED OUT of the run
+that gated the merge. The gate printed PASS having never executed the check that was already red.
+
+**Landing `fix/touched-requirements-fail-closed` would NOT have caught this.** Checked, not
+assumed: that branch's `ci/requirement-paths.map` classifies every path (so nothing is silently
+unmapped any more), but it attributes R-ENV-03 only to `infra/ansible/*` and `infra/tofu/*`.
+Replaying `e7c4a95`'s twelve paths through that map yields
+`R-GITOPS-01 R-GITOPS-02 R-IDP-01..06 R-PLAT-02 R-STATE-03` — still no R-ENV-03. Its `ci/l0.sh`
+change also leaves Stage 3b scoped (only the substitution stage stays unconditional). The
+fail-closed branch fixes the "unmapped path contributes nothing" hole; it does not fix this one.
+
+**Two things that would have caught it, for the operator/architect to choose between:**
+
+1. **Whole-repo L0 invariants should be unconditional.** `flux-postbuild-substitution`,
+   `keycloak-client-secret-reconciler` and `spec-immutability` already run as their own
+   unconditional stages for exactly this reason. `prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface`,
+   `no-plaintext-secrets` and `least-privilege-rbac` are the same shape — they assert over the
+   WHOLE tracked tree, so scoping them to a changed path is meaningless. Cheapest correct fix.
+2. **A changed test should attribute the requirements it declares.** `conformance/*` maps to
+   R-TEST-01..04 only, so editing `prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface/check.sh` does not select
+   R-ENV-03 — this very branch's gate run reports `touched requirements: R-ENV-02 R-TEST-01
+   R-TEST-02 R-TEST-03 R-TEST-04` and ran 2 of 12 L0 checks, NOT including the one it changed.
+   A changed `conformance/tests/<test>/` should contribute that test's own
+   `conformance.home.k3s/requirements` label.
+
+Both belong to `ci/`, so they are left to that branch rather than smuggled in here. The full L0
+layer was run unscoped on this branch to compensate: **12 offline checks, 11 PASS, 1 SKIP**
+(`placeholder-guard-coupling`, pre-existing), 0 FAIL.
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ spec:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
      annotations:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: jackett
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ spec:
        - containerPort: 9117
        volumeMounts:
        - name: config
-          mountPath: /data/config
+          mountPath: /config
      - name: oauth2-proxy
        image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1
        imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ spec:
        - --scope=openid email profile
        - --oidc-groups-claim=groups
        - --allowed-group=media-users
+        - --allowed-group=platform-admins
        - --skip-provider-button=true
        - --redirect-url=https://jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ metadata:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: jackett
  annotations:
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
 spec:
  parentRefs:
  - name: shared
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ resources:
 - jackett-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
 - jackett.yaml
 - nextcloud-db-app.sops.yaml
+- nextcloud-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml
 - nextcloud-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml
 - nextcloud-db.yaml
 - pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
@@ -19,5 +20,6 @@ resources:
 - qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
 - qbittorrent.yaml
 - semaphore-db-app.sops.yaml
+- semaphore-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml
 - semaphore-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml
 - semaphore-db.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+    name: nextcloud-db-backup-credentials-prod
+    namespace: nextcloud-db
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+    ACCESS_KEY_ID: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:4lx6et4HcXDegulyIoa7jZR/lVgapGPEkukajfCKjvk=,iv:p6V7tizbikk55tOvpPOsPHTe/p52QLX5A5xrwuB14rA=,tag:oNJuipT/Lb6zynJ2K2Q71A==,type:str]
+    ACCESS_SECRET_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:V5bHPoPeBOVyLp1n1Jilyso4i5P2aPSH0hrryfweg2q/SctWZxRbLBQ/FLzOigbJsAhlwOGu069mQPma6xjfdw==,iv:8u4UOvI8dC/cm6mEWDlyN5E3SfRZmwKY9uZY/DjPEsQ=,tag:tw7tGs29TmUvMPBCtCszAA==,type:str]
+sops:
+    kms: []
+    gcp_kms: []
+    azure_kv: []
+    hc_vault: []
+    age:
+        - recipient: age175l8mdpdfu7hq0aml3exs3gykarwjmuvr23sq56s3wjejnyk44wsp4mfzg
+          enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBiSUt5N2k2N2lDU2ZsMy9m
+            M1NFS0M2QjFsNFhnR0hCMzFyaTdiQWFZRFJZCmhBTWRXNmxLMGtsc3Rxd2FSMDZp
+            aktjcTE2c1hmU1EzM3RWNksyb3Q1YVUKLS0tIDBFS1I5aDBER2cvcWtLZ3BXTEp5
+            ZGI5ZmZIcStheUNQamxIVVVpc0ZMOHMKlE5aHewtHJpeU24F5sodc9CEm9KTjHQQ
+            8ThEQ/8vyazL9V4ojlICxSHU/SHkHpD1eBaTKcAQd/LZzujIcJ+QfA==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+    lastmodified: "2026-09-07T06:36:33Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:8awz1Jh8t4zjDMyd93/v+6on9iiIaSi01293A7uYhxj9L1+g63zeO+DPmSn6+KbZvHdqU2A7up09H1NzfXAEdGuvVbB36cdGq0zKank3PUi8c7IT6qNuWydxRAcqLnbbD+c30Z6GB+gAuZHstNOe4Rgc4aJvMN6FuP6x6Z0870c=,iv:KGGKJq2QA5xztvoHs/SViXW72DYwT16i+W+dJBUeIJQ=,tag:3UpYqx2+RIK0QdMH/BSIpA==,type:str]
+    pgp: []
+    encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
+    version: 3.9.4
@@ -37,16 +37,53 @@ metadata:
  name: nextcloud-db
  namespace: nextcloud-db
 spec:
-  # Single Postgres instance on 3-replica Longhorn is acceptable at home scale (ADR-0014, same as
-  # keycloak-db). The storage is already 3-way replicated by Longhorn; raise to 3 for Postgres-level
-  # HA as a future hardening.
-  instances: 1
+  # THREE instances — one primary + two hot standbys (2026-09-07), same as keycloak-db; see
+  # platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml for the full rationale. Short version: Longhorn's 3-way
+  # replication saves the DATA on node loss, not the SERVICE, and with `instances: 1` all three CNPG
+  # primaries had drifted onto k3s-prod-2, so one node took Nextcloud down alongside SSO and
+  # Semaphore. A streaming standby lets CNPG promote in seconds and repoint the -rw Service.
+  # Gated on the Barman archive below actually working (ContinuousArchiving=True with a real
+  # firstRecoverabilityPoint) — standbys replicate corruption, they are not a backup.
+  #
+  # Scaling out is non-disruptive: CNPG creates -2 then -3 sequentially, each seeded by
+  # pg_basebackup from the running primary, which is neither restarted nor disconnected.
+  instances: 3
  imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16.4
  # Stamp app.kubernetes.io/name=nextcloud-db onto every generated pod/service so the rendered
  # nextcloud egress CiliumNetworkPolicy's toEndpoints selector matches the primary pod (R-NET-02).
  inheritedMetadata:
    labels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: nextcloud-db
+  # HARD anti-affinity — the three instances MUST land on three DIFFERENT nodes; and roll the
+  # primary by SWITCHOVER rather than CNPG's default in-place `restart`, which would delete and
+  # recreate the primary pod. Full rationale in platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml. Short
+  # version: CNPG's default `preferred` is a scheduler hint, so when CNPG recreates an instance
+  # after a node loss it may stack two instances on one node — which is how `instances: 3` decays
+  # back into the single-node failure domain this change removes. `required` makes it a constraint;
+  # the cost is that an instance whose node is gone stays Pending, which is correct (2 of 3 still
+  # serve). Satisfiable on both clusters: prod and dev each have 3 schedulable, untainted nodes.
+  #
+  # APPLYING THIS CHANGES THE POD SPEC, so CNPG rolls the instances: standbys first, then one
+  # switchover. Expect a single brief connection reset for Nextcloud.
+  affinity:
+    enablePodAntiAffinity: true
+    podAntiAffinityType: required
+  primaryUpdateMethod: switchover
+  # SYNCHRONOUS REPLICATION — quorum of ONE standby, PREFERRED durability (2026-09-07). Full
+  # rationale in platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml. Short version: async replication loses the
+  # last few transactions when a primary dies before its standbys catch up, and `method: any` +
+  # `number: 1` makes COMMIT wait for one standby to confirm. dataDurability MUST stay `preferred`,
+  # never `required` — `required` blocks writes outright when fewer than `number` healthy standbys
+  # are available, which on a 3-node cluster sharing nodes with etcd and the CNI turns one degraded
+  # standby into a total write outage. `preferred` relaxes to async instead.
+  #
+  # NON-DISRUPTIVE: compiles to `synchronous_standby_names`, a reload-only PostgreSQL parameter —
+  # no restart, no switchover, no client disconnect. Land it after the anti-affinity roll.
+  postgresql:
+    synchronous:
+      method: any
+      number: 1
+      dataDurability: preferred
  storage:
    storageClass: longhorn
    size: 5Gi
@@ -68,25 +105,38 @@ spec:
      memory: 256Mi
    limits:
      memory: 512Mi
-  # --- Off-cluster DR backup (R-STATE-03) — CNPG-native Barman → the on-Proxmox MinIO `cnpg` bucket ---
+  # --- Off-cluster DR backup (R-STATE-03) — CNPG-native Barman → object storage ---
  # Continuous WAL archiving + periodic base backups = proper Postgres PITR (realises the SD's
-  # backup.policy daily-offcluster). destinationPath is the bucket ROOT; CNPG appends serverName
-  # (defaults to the Cluster name), so objects land under s3://cnpg/nextcloud-db/. Path-style HTTP.
-  # Credentials: the scoped key from the in-namespace SOPS Secret nextcloud-db-backup-credentials
-  # (same-ns only), kept in sync with platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml.
-  # endpointURL is ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02; dev http://192.168.1.9:9000),
-  # substituted by the `apps-wave-0` Flux Kustomization. Prod supplies its own off-cluster target.
+  # backup.policy daily-offcluster). CNPG appends serverName (defaults to the Cluster name) to
+  # destinationPath, so objects land under ${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}/nextcloud-db/ — dev
+  # s3://cnpg/nextcloud-db/ on the on-Proxmox MinIO, prod
+  # s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/nextcloud-db/ on Cloudflare R2. Both endpointURL and
+  # destinationPath are cluster-vars knobs (R-ENV-02), substituted by `apps-wave-0`.
+  # Credentials: PER-ENVIRONMENT (2026-09-07). dev reads nextcloud-db-backup-credentials (the
+  # scoped MinIO key), prod reads nextcloud-db-backup-credentials-prod (the Cloudflare R2
+  # token). BOTH Secrets are applied to BOTH clusters by apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml (a
+  # generated golden — render.py places the -prod sidecar in this DB's wave); the
+  # cluster-vars knob ${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX} (dev "" | prod "-prod") chooses which
+  # one this Cluster reads. Both are in-namespace, which is all a pod can read. They were
+  # ONE shared Secret until the split, so giving prod its R2 token would have left dev
+  # signing MinIO requests with an R2 key id — 403 on every archive command, i.e. the
+  # disk-full clock below rather than a merely missing backup.
+  #
+  # archive_mode is ON, so a FAILING archive command is a disk-full clock, not a degraded backup:
+  # Postgres refuses to recycle a WAL segment it has not archived, and the pgdata PVC fills until
+  # the primary PANICs. Prod demonstrated this from bootstrap to 2026-09-07 with a placeholder
+  # endpoint. Treat ContinuousArchiving=False here as an availability incident.
  backup:
    retentionPolicy: "30d"
    barmanObjectStore:
-      destinationPath: s3://cnpg
+      destinationPath: ${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}
      endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
      s3Credentials:
        accessKeyId:
-          name: nextcloud-db-backup-credentials
+          name: nextcloud-db-backup-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
          key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
        secretAccessKey:
-          name: nextcloud-db-backup-credentials
+          name: nextcloud-db-backup-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
          key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
      wal:
        compression: gzip
@@ -35,6 +35,34 @@ spec:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 53
 ---
+# PersistentVolume plex-media - static external NFS (bulk tier)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolume
+metadata:
+  name: plex-media
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: plex
+spec:
+  capacity:
+    storage: 9Ti
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadOnlyMany
+  persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain
+  storageClassName: ''
+  mountOptions:
+  - nfsvers=4.1
+  - hard
+  - noatime
+  - timeo=600
+  - retrans=2
+  nfs:
+    server: ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    path: /mnt/Storage/plex
+    readOnly: true
+  claimRef:
+    namespace: plex
+    name: plex-media
+---
 # PVC plex-config (R-STATE)
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
@@ -51,6 +79,23 @@ spec:
    requests:
      storage: 8Gi
 ---
+# PVC plex-media (R-STATE)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: plex-media
+  namespace: plex
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: plex
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadOnlyMany
+  storageClassName: ''
+  volumeName: plex-media
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 9Ti
+---
 # Deployment (R-PLAT-02)
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
@@ -90,10 +135,16 @@ spec:
        volumeMounts:
        - name: config
          mountPath: /config
+        - name: media
+          mountPath: /media
+          readOnly: true
      volumes:
      - name: config
        persistentVolumeClaim:
          claimName: plex-config
+      - name: media
+        persistentVolumeClaim:
+          claimName: plex-media
 ---
 # Service
 apiVersion: v1
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ spec:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
      annotations:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: qbittorrent
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ spec:
        - containerPort: 8080
        volumeMounts:
        - name: config
-          mountPath: /data/config
+          mountPath: /config
      - name: oauth2-proxy
        image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1
        imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ spec:
        - --scope=openid email profile
        - --oidc-groups-claim=groups
        - --allowed-group=media-users
+        - --allowed-group=platform-admins
        - --skip-provider-button=true
        - --redirect-url=https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ metadata:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
  annotations:
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
 spec:
  parentRefs:
  - name: shared
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+    name: semaphore-db-backup-credentials-prod
+    namespace: semaphore-db
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+    ACCESS_KEY_ID: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:OhWEEYqrvmDB40NmiETgeUisBvaO9ocevCZAsurNijw=,iv:kEjOIg9NHbRYm+Ul1WrBAzb3gLbIv+ipiYCxFK0QoVc=,tag:KAB1JAIw0ATwbjDEKZVT9A==,type:str]
+    ACCESS_SECRET_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:C0PNKv07LCYpFONLqd55sz+ioyU/i2YJUkbZ8OX/dCErM/DilqchyUAT5EqnT/r3YJmdaA1pX85S3fxlVVHkbg==,iv:4ha28b+xIebvX2JPITmtTovIe4vdmj2XfI3cgkUHH4c=,tag:xbMyflcHojytPzgaoOYcXQ==,type:str]
+sops:
+    kms: []
+    gcp_kms: []
+    azure_kv: []
+    hc_vault: []
+    age:
+        - recipient: age175l8mdpdfu7hq0aml3exs3gykarwjmuvr23sq56s3wjejnyk44wsp4mfzg
+          enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBZVTJ3cXR6cks3Y0RNS2hx
+            K3pjZEduYUxmL0V3SmFUcU9XbGVHSVFITWh3Cjl1eHlTLytoOW5PaVNFVkJoeTBo
+            T1FnRHNDVzJ6dWpuR09WaElvbWF4YU0KLS0tIEJoQ1VsM1cxRlg0R1dtNGdOenNn
+            aVNjMjVBTytLdHlFdmZCS2tPelo1Y2MKYt1G5t+sDiHgcg+Q9ECBzJn2gS/paSEC
+            7aoX60SBrPgHvnGls5lzc3Tin9nH4jWYl6Nu8DAvIE0YPXDFr5a0UA==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+    lastmodified: "2026-09-07T06:36:33Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:mhVP7tjdZK2FR2imvpJbTyT7BigvcIKEpLSnBS1oSITUirB8xZC7aHBfyFuIoKOrpOJgEe40nHUdDYCHRJtb4dLeVja8+7meVaQWzxC8BWVHsksW+73hsqhjAzlHeobx6Irbk4PAMqIY0/jnf4MHryjnRn3dUuwu9U1CqL30JbE=,iv:57oCcp6FW9EAIVKnYGtkaTrnbijyv54T+vmZxMbMqnw=,tag:agrRP/JLypU60KOeN0s/5w==,type:str]
+    pgp: []
+    encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
+    version: 3.9.4
@@ -38,16 +38,53 @@ metadata:
  name: semaphore-db
  namespace: semaphore-db
 spec:
-  # Single Postgres instance on 3-replica Longhorn is acceptable at home scale (ADR-0014, same as
-  # keycloak-db / nextcloud-db). The storage is already 3-way replicated by Longhorn; raise to 3 for
-  # Postgres-level HA as a future hardening.
-  instances: 1
+  # THREE instances — one primary + two hot standbys (2026-09-07), same as keycloak-db /
+  # nextcloud-db; see platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml for the full rationale. Short version:
+  # Longhorn's 3-way replication saves the DATA on node loss, not the SERVICE, and with
+  # `instances: 1` all three CNPG primaries had drifted onto k3s-prod-2, so one node took Semaphore
+  # down alongside SSO and Nextcloud. A streaming standby lets CNPG promote in seconds and repoint
+  # the -rw Service. Gated on the Barman archive below actually working (ContinuousArchiving=True
+  # with a real firstRecoverabilityPoint) — standbys replicate corruption, they are not a backup.
+  #
+  # Scaling out is non-disruptive: CNPG creates -2 then -3 sequentially, each seeded by
+  # pg_basebackup from the running primary, which is neither restarted nor disconnected.
+  instances: 3
  imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16.4
  # Stamp app.kubernetes.io/name=semaphore-db onto every generated pod/service so the rendered
  # semaphore egress CiliumNetworkPolicy's toEndpoints selector matches the primary pod (R-NET-02).
  inheritedMetadata:
    labels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: semaphore-db
+  # HARD anti-affinity — the three instances MUST land on three DIFFERENT nodes; and roll the
+  # primary by SWITCHOVER rather than CNPG's default in-place `restart`, which would delete and
+  # recreate the primary pod. Full rationale in platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml. Short
+  # version: CNPG's default `preferred` is a scheduler hint, so when CNPG recreates an instance
+  # after a node loss it may stack two instances on one node — which is how `instances: 3` decays
+  # back into the single-node failure domain this change removes. `required` makes it a constraint;
+  # the cost is that an instance whose node is gone stays Pending, which is correct (2 of 3 still
+  # serve). Satisfiable on both clusters: prod and dev each have 3 schedulable, untainted nodes.
+  #
+  # APPLYING THIS CHANGES THE POD SPEC, so CNPG rolls the instances: standbys first, then one
+  # switchover. Expect a single brief connection reset for Semaphore.
+  affinity:
+    enablePodAntiAffinity: true
+    podAntiAffinityType: required
+  primaryUpdateMethod: switchover
+  # SYNCHRONOUS REPLICATION — quorum of ONE standby, PREFERRED durability (2026-09-07). Full
+  # rationale in platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml. Short version: async replication loses the
+  # last few transactions when a primary dies before its standbys catch up, and `method: any` +
+  # `number: 1` makes COMMIT wait for one standby to confirm. dataDurability MUST stay `preferred`,
+  # never `required` — `required` blocks writes outright when fewer than `number` healthy standbys
+  # are available, which on a 3-node cluster sharing nodes with etcd and the CNI turns one degraded
+  # standby into a total write outage. `preferred` relaxes to async instead.
+  #
+  # NON-DISRUPTIVE: compiles to `synchronous_standby_names`, a reload-only PostgreSQL parameter —
+  # no restart, no switchover, no client disconnect. Land it after the anti-affinity roll.
+  postgresql:
+    synchronous:
+      method: any
+      number: 1
+      dataDurability: preferred
  storage:
    storageClass: longhorn
    size: 5Gi
@@ -69,25 +106,38 @@ spec:
      memory: 256Mi
    limits:
      memory: 512Mi
-  # --- Off-cluster DR backup (R-STATE-03) — CNPG-native Barman → the on-Proxmox MinIO `cnpg` bucket ---
+  # --- Off-cluster DR backup (R-STATE-03) — CNPG-native Barman → object storage ---
  # Continuous WAL archiving + periodic base backups = proper Postgres PITR (realises the SD's
-  # backup.policy daily-offcluster). destinationPath is the bucket ROOT; CNPG appends serverName
-  # (defaults to the Cluster name), so objects land under s3://cnpg/semaphore-db/. Path-style HTTP.
-  # Credentials: the scoped key from the in-namespace SOPS Secret semaphore-db-backup-credentials
-  # (same-ns only), kept in sync with platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml.
-  # endpointURL is ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02; dev http://192.168.1.9:9000),
-  # substituted by the `apps-wave-0` Flux Kustomization. Prod supplies its own off-cluster target.
+  # backup.policy daily-offcluster). CNPG appends serverName (defaults to the Cluster name) to
+  # destinationPath, so objects land under ${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}/semaphore-db/ — dev
+  # s3://cnpg/semaphore-db/ on the on-Proxmox MinIO, prod
+  # s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/semaphore-db/ on Cloudflare R2. Both endpointURL and
+  # destinationPath are cluster-vars knobs (R-ENV-02), substituted by `apps-wave-0`.
+  # Credentials: PER-ENVIRONMENT (2026-09-07). dev reads semaphore-db-backup-credentials (the
+  # scoped MinIO key), prod reads semaphore-db-backup-credentials-prod (the Cloudflare R2
+  # token). BOTH Secrets are applied to BOTH clusters by apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml (a
+  # generated golden — render.py places the -prod sidecar in this DB's wave); the
+  # cluster-vars knob ${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX} (dev "" | prod "-prod") chooses which
+  # one this Cluster reads. Both are in-namespace, which is all a pod can read. They were
+  # ONE shared Secret until the split, so giving prod its R2 token would have left dev
+  # signing MinIO requests with an R2 key id — 403 on every archive command, i.e. the
+  # disk-full clock below rather than a merely missing backup.
+  #
+  # archive_mode is ON, so a FAILING archive command is a disk-full clock, not a degraded backup:
+  # Postgres refuses to recycle a WAL segment it has not archived, and the pgdata PVC fills until
+  # the primary PANICs. Prod demonstrated this from bootstrap to 2026-09-07 with a placeholder
+  # endpoint. Treat ContinuousArchiving=False here as an availability incident.
  backup:
    retentionPolicy: "30d"
    barmanObjectStore:
-      destinationPath: s3://cnpg
+      destinationPath: ${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}
      endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
      s3Credentials:
        accessKeyId:
-          name: semaphore-db-backup-credentials
+          name: semaphore-db-backup-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
          key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
        secretAccessKey:
-          name: semaphore-db-backup-credentials
+          name: semaphore-db-backup-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
          key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
      wal:
        compression: gzip
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+---
+# Namespace (trust zone; default-deny + policies apply)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: vm-demo
+  labels:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace: 'true'
+  annotations:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/backup-policy: daily-offcluster
+---
+# Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01): deny all, allow only DNS
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny
+  namespace: vm-demo
+  labels:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
+spec:
+  podSelector: {}
+  policyTypes:
+  - Ingress
+  - Egress
+  ingress: []
+  egress:
+  - to:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+    ports:
+    - protocol: UDP
+      port: 53
+    - protocol: TCP
+      port: 53
+---
+# CDI DataVolume (standalone; survives rebuild, R-STATE-01)
+apiVersion: cdi.kubevirt.io/v1beta1
+kind: DataVolume
+metadata:
+  name: vm-demo-rootdisk
+  namespace: vm-demo
+spec:
+  source:
+    registry:
+      url: docker://quay.io/containerdisks/fedora:41
+  storage:
+    accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+    storageClassName: longhorn
+    resources:
+      requests:
+        storage: 6Gi
+---
+# KubeVirt VirtualMachine (R-PLAT-03)
+apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1
+kind: VirtualMachine
+metadata:
+  name: vm-demo
+  namespace: vm-demo
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vm-demo
+spec:
+  running: false
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        kubevirt.io/vm: vm-demo
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: internet
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: none
+    spec:
+      domain:
+        cpu:
+          cores: 1
+        memory:
+          guest: 1536Mi
+        devices:
+          disks:
+          - name: rootdisk
+            disk:
+              bus: virtio
+          - name: cloudinit
+            disk:
+              bus: virtio
+          interfaces:
+          - name: default
+            masquerade: {}
+        resources:
+          requests:
+            memory: 1536Mi
+      networks:
+      - name: default
+        pod: {}
+      volumes:
+      - name: rootdisk
+        dataVolume:
+          name: vm-demo-rootdisk
+      - name: cloudinit
+        cloudInitNoCloud:
+          userData: "#cloud-config\npackage_update: true\npackages:\n  - dnf-automatic\nwrite_files:\n  - path: /etc/dnf/automatic.conf\n    content: |\n      [commands]\n      upgrade_type = default\n      random_sleep = 0\n      download_updates = yes\n      apply_updates = yes\nruncmd:\n  - [ systemctl, enable, --now, dnf-automatic.timer ]\n"
+---
+# CiliumNetworkPolicy world egress allow (egress class governs the path; R-NET-05): vm-demo-allow-internet-egress
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: vm-demo-allow-internet-egress
+  namespace: vm-demo
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vm-demo
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: vm-demo
+  egress:
+  - toEntities:
+    - world
+---
+# ServiceMonitor (R-OBS-01)
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: ServiceMonitor
+metadata:
+  name: vm-demo
+  namespace: vm-demo
+  labels:
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vm-demo
+spec:
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: vm-demo
+  namespaceSelector:
+    matchNames:
+    - vm-demo
+  endpoints:
+  - port: metrics
+    interval: 30s
+---
+# PrometheusRule SLI alerts (R-OBS-01)
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: PrometheusRule
+metadata:
+  name: vm-demo-slis
+  namespace: vm-demo
+  labels:
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vm-demo
+spec:
+  groups:
+  - name: vm-demo.slis
+    rules:
+    - alert: vm-demo-down
+      expr: up{job="vm-demo"} == 0
+      for: 5m
+      labels:
+        severity: critical
+        service: vm-demo
+      annotations:
+        summary: vm-demo is down
+        description: 'vm-demo has been unreachable for 5m (SLI: up).'
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+---
+# Namespace (trust zone; default-deny + policies apply)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak
+  labels:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace: 'true'
+    gateway-access: shared
+  annotations:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/backup-policy: daily-offcluster
+---
+# Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01): deny all, allow only DNS
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
+spec:
+  podSelector: {}
+  policyTypes:
+  - Ingress
+  - Egress
+  ingress: []
+  egress:
+  - to:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
+    ports:
+    - protocol: UDP
+      port: 53
+    - protocol: TCP
+      port: 53
+---
+# PVC keycloak-db (R-STATE)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-db
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: longhorn
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 10Gi
+---
+# Deployment (R-PLAT-02)
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: internet
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: native
+    spec:
+      containers:
+      - name: keycloak
+        image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak
+        ports:
+        - containerPort: 8080
+        volumeMounts:
+        - name: db
+          mountPath: /data/db
+      volumes:
+      - name: db
+        persistentVolumeClaim:
+          claimName: keycloak-db
+---
+# Service
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+  ports:
+  - name: port-8080
+    port: 8080
+    targetPort: 8080
+---
+# CiliumNetworkPolicy egress allow (R-NET-02): keycloak-allow-keycloak-db-5432
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-allow-keycloak-db-5432
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+  egress:
+  - toEndpoints:
+    - matchLabels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak-db
+        k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: keycloak-db
+    toPorts:
+    - ports:
+      - port: '5432'
+        protocol: TCP
+---
+# CiliumNetworkPolicy gateway-ingress allow (R-NET-01/02): keycloak-allow-gateway-ingress
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-allow-gateway-ingress
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+  ingress:
+  - fromEntities:
+    - ingress
+    toPorts:
+    - ports:
+      - port: '8080'
+        protocol: TCP
+---
+# CiliumNetworkPolicy world egress allow (egress class governs the path; R-NET-05): keycloak-allow-internet-egress
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
+kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-allow-internet-egress
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  endpointSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+  egress:
+  - toEntities:
+    - world
+---
+# HTTPRoute keycloak-8080 (R-TLS/R-DNS)
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-8080
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+  - name: shared
+    namespace: gateway
+    sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+  - keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}
+  rules:
+  - matches:
+    - path:
+        type: PathPrefix
+        value: /
+    backendRefs:
+    - name: keycloak
+      port: 8080
+---
+# ServiceMonitor (R-OBS-01)
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: ServiceMonitor
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+  namespaceSelector:
+    matchNames:
+    - keycloak
+  endpoints:
+  - port: metrics
+    interval: 30s
+---
+# PrometheusRule SLI alerts (R-OBS-01)
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: PrometheusRule
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-slis
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak
+spec:
+  groups:
+  - name: keycloak.slis
+    rules:
+    - alert: keycloak-down
+      expr: up{job="keycloak"} == 0
+      for: 5m
+      labels:
+        severity: critical
+        service: keycloak
+      annotations:
+        summary: keycloak is down
+        description: 'keycloak has been unreachable for 5m (SLI: up).'
@@ -35,6 +35,34 @@ spec:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 53
 ---
+# PersistentVolume nextcloud-legacy-archive - static external NFS (bulk tier)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolume
+metadata:
+  name: nextcloud-legacy-archive
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: nextcloud
+spec:
+  capacity:
+    storage: 270Gi
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadOnlyMany
+  persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain
+  storageClassName: ''
+  mountOptions:
+  - nfsvers=4.1
+  - hard
+  - noatime
+  - timeo=600
+  - retrans=2
+  nfs:
+    server: ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    path: /mnt/Storage/nextcloud
+    readOnly: true
+  claimRef:
+    namespace: nextcloud
+    name: nextcloud-legacy-archive
+---
 # PVC nextcloud-data (R-STATE)
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
@@ -51,6 +79,23 @@ spec:
    requests:
      storage: 20Gi
 ---
+# PVC nextcloud-legacy-archive (R-STATE)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: nextcloud-legacy-archive
+  namespace: nextcloud
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: nextcloud
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadOnlyMany
+  storageClassName: ''
+  volumeName: nextcloud-legacy-archive
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 270Gi
+---
 # Deployment (R-PLAT-02)
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
@@ -119,6 +164,10 @@ spec:
        volumeMounts:
        - name: data
          mountPath: /var/www/html
+        - name: legacy-archive
+          mountPath: /mnt/legacy-nextcloud
+          subPath: nextcloud
+          readOnly: true
        lifecycle:
          postStart:
            exec:
@@ -132,6 +181,9 @@ spec:
      - name: data
        persistentVolumeClaim:
          claimName: nextcloud-data
+      - name: legacy-archive
+        persistentVolumeClaim:
+          claimName: nextcloud-legacy-archive
 ---
 # Service
 apiVersion: v1
@@ -35,6 +35,33 @@ spec:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 53
 ---
+# PersistentVolume radarr-media - static external NFS (bulk tier)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolume
+metadata:
+  name: radarr-media
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: radarr
+spec:
+  capacity:
+    storage: 9Ti
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadWriteMany
+  persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain
+  storageClassName: ''
+  mountOptions:
+  - nfsvers=4.1
+  - hard
+  - noatime
+  - timeo=600
+  - retrans=2
+  nfs:
+    server: ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    path: /mnt/Storage/plex
+  claimRef:
+    namespace: radarr
+    name: radarr-media
+---
 # PVC radarr-config (R-STATE)
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
@@ -51,6 +78,23 @@ spec:
    requests:
      storage: 5Gi
 ---
+# PVC radarr-media (R-STATE)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: radarr-media
+  namespace: radarr
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: radarr
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadWriteMany
+  storageClassName: ''
+  volumeName: radarr-media
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 9Ti
+---
 # Deployment (R-PLAT-02)
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
@@ -74,16 +118,25 @@ spec:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
      annotations:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: radarr
        image: lscr.io/linuxserver/radarr:5.21.1
        ports:
        - containerPort: 7878
+        env:
+        - name: PUID
+          value: '1000'
+        - name: PGID
+          value: '3000'
+        - name: TZ
+          value: Etc/UTC
        volumeMounts:
        - name: config
-          mountPath: /data/config
+          mountPath: /config
+        - name: media
+          mountPath: /media
      - name: oauth2-proxy
        image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1
        imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
@@ -97,6 +150,7 @@ spec:
        - --scope=openid email profile
        - --oidc-groups-claim=groups
        - --allowed-group=media-users
+        - --allowed-group=platform-admins
        - --skip-provider-button=true
        - --redirect-url=https://radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -148,10 +202,15 @@ spec:
            port: http
          initialDelaySeconds: 5
          periodSeconds: 15
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 3000
      volumes:
      - name: config
        persistentVolumeClaim:
          claimName: radarr-config
+      - name: media
+        persistentVolumeClaim:
+          claimName: radarr-media
 ---
 # Service
 apiVersion: v1
@@ -288,7 +347,7 @@ metadata:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: radarr
  annotations:
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
 spec:
  parentRefs:
  - name: shared
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
 #   credential from its own namespace (a Pod cannot read a Secret in another namespace).
 # access-key-encryption: FIXED base64 32-byte AES key Semaphore uses to encrypt stored SSH keys /
 #   credentials; MUST stay stable across restarts or stored secrets become undecryptable.
+# oidc-client-secret: the Keycloak `semaphore` CONFIDENTIAL client secret, and ONLY that. It MIRRORS
+#   `semaphore-client-secret` in platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (the realm import
+#   injects that copy into the client), same cross-namespace mirror pattern as db-password above.
+#   It replaced the former `oidc-providers-json` key (2026-09-07): that key held the WHOLE
+#   SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS blob, which buried the environment-specific realm-issuer and redirect
+#   URLs inside ciphertext where Flux's ${BASE_DOMAIN} postBuild substitution could not reach them,
+#   so prod ran with dev's URLs. Those URLs are PUBLIC and now live in plaintext in
+#   catalog/semaphore.yaml (rendered to apps/wave-1/semaphore.yaml); the kubelet splices THIS value
+#   back into the blob via $(SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET). Only the secret half is encrypted.
 # Recover: infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops -d apps/semaphore-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Secret
@@ -15,11 +24,11 @@ metadata:
        app.kubernetes.io/name: semaphore
 type: Opaque
 stringData:
-    admin-username: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:uD/vO9A9MjerFg==,iv:i/NAqVD6rWg9oWWSGBrRkxzwcPp2IW1HLIKY0pdcPPg=,tag:r27tKLAJ+ydE7Ty3ccMNUw==,type:str]
-    admin-password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:544nWY1UmBnlsdPJAQZJMXRumu4W9X7UXZvZ6vHN/ArjRgLXKTArOe5JkT/nNrNw,iv:AC1DDbZj2HfpU19EjzA7T+WpIaR4nZc3PNN61y8bAzU=,tag:r28LFi5w6ZeCCaRaX2jRdg==,type:str]
-    db-password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ySkdvaGRCW9fMQqChs5l8dY4zCG19i4HOEinRC48mgLuh9WOrjd16T6jwFgiwB55,iv:+1gztJ22HbwgQJiolZMMWOcKIsxrBJpnruJdtxdooOU=,tag:8CfJGwyPTjDGyr0CvalXMQ==,type:str]
-    access-key-encryption: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:1YAMLo1nVkpJWZc+KBZ7B4ia+Y8P+xMyOhHMcEGGJOXd3o+WC5FqirLBVh4=,iv:j28ozeaDhGWDjoaxFOhn2t9YbYE7L3ah/Mfi+i2DWwY=,tag:czG9Wxc/7Nsuh1W5iATOww==,type:str]
-    oidc-providers-json: ENC[AES256_GCM,data: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,iv:jbfVdrrZ9fGiOxhQeoTJfFg1QwiOMkoQyaadiVfxX/w=,tag:JkepcRs34EuEgNb4buTTDQ==,type:str]
+    admin-username: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ju3wVdjNzRUP/w==,iv:d/5ZxgQZ5bympu3gT2ck3DJy9iUPPBAtZYsJvD3To7I=,tag:0UtBaDVqNSK4RCJrQicchw==,type:str]
+    admin-password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:pxIwpgh3BoND2TI0mPTixOTJoictzT77dqtuRdMKgY/2WaW4wM1Ra6H6n/dxnyR2,iv:eYbFQGFYVJsnYGwn6cOI3BgAdzMcin9YggAhiuL+xqM=,tag:/sPWGv4gue0vjc2nMk7wWA==,type:str]
+    db-password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:hBFpWXdpk1R5a23Pntup03t56NBRPS+SZU8CrHVb/ypIaIpgf7kjYtVy6nhTF6u0,iv:eBzoQgH5ZhWWpfKZ6AQmwaSal5QaiuN9gfexQ7GsVFs=,tag:j2k8EwhKDlj/Ud6O39ioVQ==,type:str]
+    access-key-encryption: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:SKtAV4HxJ9pNYDqUK/1uOdI1rtMji3pTfprI2rhQxFQyhc6dFlhqI+OUEcY=,iv:rKCP+FLidcOltOwmMMcO5M8tz4qiifIMI+W5soGO2M8=,tag:HaHzkX/JI+9wmcg2SD9GAQ==,type:str]
+    oidc-client-secret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:uCo7TNzbM2QKw9ie+xzyUG9MFKco1OAlwr5qPn/AGpNvo1YyXSfbZyyM0CLJ1NS821hGg5Zr/m3R/xpy84s3FQ==,iv:O8a4haskufpmorPaxOkJ1Q99Y5GTlzmDFJAsHS+irLk=,tag:VojJpA9jNMbNQmIe1Qr44w==,type:str]
 sops:
    kms: []
    gcp_kms: []
@@ -29,14 +38,14 @@ sops:
        - recipient: age175l8mdpdfu7hq0aml3exs3gykarwjmuvr23sq56s3wjejnyk44wsp4mfzg
          enc: |
            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
-            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBuRDlqRFJ0dk14UHluSGRP
-            S1pESy9PWlpMakU0aTkzNVhqUGdtbWNEdTJjCm5RNG14azJHc28rdEJ4L0RzR0xO
-            MGRocGZ1V1JZTENWQkN3VGZzamp2eTgKLS0tIGt6QkNNaW5hdTBJVHY0SVo5d3JX
-            elp0SWxHcjg0RWF3aW9mWTJHZ0lhcUEKc0rU5VilAVDleCwqq4SOF+Y9sniu1Pka
-            w/MGDA9THSB0b+YgWRWiX/KiimFqp0ZFODOJ9cHVwFGY71+VadPwOg==
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSAyTzF6NTBtcFVWK1Vtc0I2
+            VGdySHBsRGgvc1h0VzgvQ01xYVBJV3g2Q1NRCjJyZHVYZGtuamo1MFJHWlBwWkxt
+            cHA4VkY1TkRpN3M4UTdMOWZTbFVGemMKLS0tIGVNdDBrWVJveU56VjVBU2JWdHF4
+            RGtaYStXYUpONTZjZCtmM0NyZ3Rka1UKIQpmQai8dz+uRAsXxyeuGaRlRwsFqIPQ
+            9AfrZJcslYwlaK3ptm1oqaCdrlxcMar2nI7thSqzbLe+e1nzA2z7vQ==
            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
-    lastmodified: "2026-08-27T22:12:32Z"
-    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:nHftJTGnTr0O5h8yGXwgz3eflggXJfIXM3m8n3bzDJE/P4nvSpZzFeMb+sc2on+AL+t+SeKrIl8blzm33XsQ1lkaY85Zm+bc5cnED1g04BMDVmmK3brh/8w50Bp2wPEVzb4I01MDzhhyIbOYg7pFvZAH3/VuqvM1t6XmfF1NrOA=,iv:4KBa9PH/dfdGwLC16RenZIVB6BtSoGo6x3qt3h1R43I=,tag:KULiA1klP/RZMNigkloGDA==,type:str]
+    lastmodified: "2026-09-07T07:01:50Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Xutm1rQt57J4RILElD8FkNOsQT1HK5jZlPtqqLyZ/VqOoDwo+IS1wp7hROprlUvQC0bUXy79tRRIl5Q0CCOD+fvAGIdmade+vB7qXlYN6Q1441dGhuSTPvckso6FaB2ddRjKhKGLc/Z4bJoz9VaRNNxJNpWXIrENTg+I+QhNhlo=,iv:klJOrEQ6QN5dTGkQfGnbMbgCWsgWwZPb5YXDMeWeE34=,tag:fuJr4t3Tt3dT9u3/0SFo8Q==,type:str]
    pgp: []
    encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
    version: 3.9.4
@@ -118,11 +118,13 @@ spec:
              key: access-key-encryption
        - name: SEMAPHORE_PORT
          value: :3000
-        - name: SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS
+        - name: SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
          valueFrom:
            secretKeyRef:
              name: semaphore-bootstrap
-              key: oidc-providers-json
+              key: oidc-client-secret
+        - name: SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS
+          value: '{"keycloak":{"display_name":"Keycloak","provider_url":"https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab","client_id":"semaphore","client_secret":"$(SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET)","redirect_url":"https://semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect","scopes":["openid","profile","email"],"username_claim":"preferred_username","email_claim":"email","name_claim":"name","order":1}}'
        volumeMounts:
        - name: config
          mountPath: /etc/semaphore
@@ -35,6 +35,33 @@ spec:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 53
 ---
+# PersistentVolume sonarr-media - static external NFS (bulk tier)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolume
+metadata:
+  name: sonarr-media
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: sonarr
+spec:
+  capacity:
+    storage: 9Ti
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadWriteMany
+  persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain
+  storageClassName: ''
+  mountOptions:
+  - nfsvers=4.1
+  - hard
+  - noatime
+  - timeo=600
+  - retrans=2
+  nfs:
+    server: ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    path: /mnt/Storage/plex
+  claimRef:
+    namespace: sonarr
+    name: sonarr-media
+---
 # PVC sonarr-config (R-STATE)
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
@@ -51,6 +78,23 @@ spec:
    requests:
      storage: 5Gi
 ---
+# PVC sonarr-media (R-STATE)
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: sonarr-media
+  namespace: sonarr
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: sonarr
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+  - ReadWriteMany
+  storageClassName: ''
+  volumeName: sonarr-media
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 9Ti
+---
 # Deployment (R-PLAT-02)
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
@@ -74,16 +118,25 @@ spec:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
      annotations:
        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+        homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: sonarr
        image: lscr.io/linuxserver/sonarr:4.0.15
        ports:
        - containerPort: 8989
+        env:
+        - name: PUID
+          value: '1000'
+        - name: PGID
+          value: '3000'
+        - name: TZ
+          value: Etc/UTC
        volumeMounts:
        - name: config
-          mountPath: /data/config
+          mountPath: /config
+        - name: media
+          mountPath: /media
      - name: oauth2-proxy
        image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1
        imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
@@ -97,6 +150,7 @@ spec:
        - --scope=openid email profile
        - --oidc-groups-claim=groups
        - --allowed-group=media-users
+        - --allowed-group=platform-admins
        - --skip-provider-button=true
        - --redirect-url=https://sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
        - --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -148,10 +202,15 @@ spec:
            port: http
          initialDelaySeconds: 5
          periodSeconds: 15
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 3000
      volumes:
      - name: config
        persistentVolumeClaim:
          claimName: sonarr-config
+      - name: media
+        persistentVolumeClaim:
+          claimName: sonarr-media
 ---
 # Service
 apiVersion: v1
@@ -288,7 +347,7 @@ metadata:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: sonarr
  annotations:
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
-    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
 spec:
  parentRefs:
  - name: shared
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ storage:
  - name: config
    size: 2Gi
    class: longhorn             # indexer definitions/API keys on 3-replica Longhorn (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
+    mountPath: /config          # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
+                                # LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
+                                # /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
+                                # holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
+                                # configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
+                                # every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
+                                # 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
+                                # dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
+                                # This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
+                                # The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
+                                # so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
 dependencies: []                # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
 ingressRoutes:
  - host: jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -31,6 +42,15 @@ auth:
  mode: forward-auth            # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
  groups:
    - media-users               # authenticated AND in an authorized group (R-IDP-06)
+    # platform-admins is a SUPERSET, not a widening. --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
+    # listing both means "media consumers OR platform operators". Without it the media UIs are
+    # reachable by NOBODY the moment media-users is empty: on prod the realm's only user is the
+    # operator, who is in platform-admins only, so jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr answered an
+    # immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback (no login prompt, because the Keycloak SSO session
+    # already existed) while pihole/crafty — which already gate on platform-admins — worked.
+    # This grants no real privilege: platform-admins already maps to cluster-admin via
+    # k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins), so a member can already exec into these pods.
+    - platform-admins           # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
 update:
  channel: stable               # R-UPD-01
  range: ">=0.22.0"             # stay on the Jackett 0.22.x stable line
@@ -223,6 +223,44 @@ storage:
    mountPath: /var/www/html    # 3-replica tier; irreplaceable, DR-critical (docs/04; R-STATE-02).
                                # The whole html dir is persisted so config.php + user data survive a
                                # rebuild (the default /data/<name> would strand them on ephemeral rootfs).
+  # THE LEGACY NEXTCLOUD DATASET (Storage/nextcloud, 270 G) — MOUNTED READ-ONLY, DELIBERATELY, AND
+  # NOT AS THIS INSTANCE'S DATA DIRECTORY. Read this before changing either decision.
+  #
+  # WHAT IS ACTUALLY IN THERE (measured 2026-09-07, not assumed):
+  #     /mnt/Storage/nextcloud/nextcloud/config          103 M
+  #     /mnt/Storage/nextcloud/nextcloud/config_old      3.4 G
+  #     /mnt/Storage/nextcloud/nextcloud/config_backup   267 G   <- 99% of the dataset
+  # There is NO `data/` directory. This is the OLD, non-k3s Nextcloud's configuration plus a backup
+  # blob — an ARCHIVE, not a live user-data tree.
+  #
+  # WHY READ-ONLY. Two independent reasons, either sufficient:
+  #   1. The old instance is STILL LIVE on it. The export is currently shared rw to 192.168.1.6 and
+  #      192.168.1.5, and the operator has said the existing non-k3s prod must remain active. Two
+  #      Nextcloud instances writing one instance's config directory, each with its own database and
+  #      therefore its own oc_filecache, is a corruption scenario with no clean recovery.
+  #   2. Nothing here needs writing. An archive is read.
+  # "Do not grant more than needed" therefore lands on `ro`. If the operator's intent is in fact a
+  # MIGRATION (read this data in, then decommission the old instance), that is a different and
+  # larger change than a mount, and it should be a deliberate one — flip `readOnly` and update the
+  # export at that point, not before. Enforced by the PV's nfs.readOnly, so it is a real `ro` mount.
+  #
+  # WHY NOT /var/www/html/data. That path is the LONGHORN PVC above and is this instance's own
+  # state; mounting a foreign tree into it would have Nextcloud scan and index an archive it does
+  # not own. A neutral path keeps the two completely separate. To expose it to users, add it as a
+  # Nextcloud External Storage (Local) mount pointing at this path — an in-app, per-user decision.
+  #
+  # subPath skips the redundant single-child directory: the dataset root holds exactly one entry,
+  # `nextcloud/`, so mounting that subtree puts config/ config_old/ config_backup/ at the top.
+  #
+  # UID: nothing to do. The tree is 0755 owned 1000:3000 and the mount is read-only, so www-data
+  # (uid 33) can read and traverse it. (fsGroup would be a no-op on an NFS volume in any case.)
+  - name: legacy-archive
+    class: bulk
+    export: /mnt/Storage/nextcloud   # the ZFS dataset Storage/nextcloud, on ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    subPath: nextcloud
+    mountPath: /mnt/legacy-nextcloud
+    readOnly: true
+    size: 270Gi                      # ADVISORY ONLY on a static NFS PV — the dataset's used size.
 dependencies:
  - to: nextcloud-db            # explicit allow: Nextcloud -> its PostgreSQL (docs/13 graph; R-NET-02).
    port: 5432                  # Renders the egress half; the DB namespace mirrors keycloak-db (no
@@ -4,21 +4,11 @@
 # auth: native (Plex accounts, NOT Keycloak — docs/13 + docs/15 documented exception).
 # Validates against schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json.
 #
-# BULK MEDIA (spec bulk-tier requirement, docs/04) — OPEN PREREQUISITE, intentionally NOT declared
-# here yet (the requirement ID is cited in the WS-APPS report, not as a token here: this change does
-# NOT exercise the bulk tier, so it must not be selected as a "touched" requirement whose in-cluster
-# conformance test is still a Phase-1 gap).
-#   The Plex library belongs on the `bulk` tier (docs/04 / docs/13 cross-cutting note: metadata DB
-#   on replicated Longhorn, large library on bulk). The `bulk` StorageClass exists
-#   (platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml) and the schema+renderer both support `class: bulk`, but
-#   that class is a documented STUB: OQ-2 (external NFS/SMB backing) is UNRESOLVED and the NFS CSI
-#   driver is not installed, so a `bulk` PVC will not bind and would leave the Plex pod Pending.
-#   To onboard the running Plex shell now (compute + config + public exposure), the media volume is
-#   omitted. Once OQ-2 is resolved and `bulk` provisions, attach the library with a one-line add:
-#     storage:
-#       - name: media
-#         class: bulk        # external mount; size omitted (sized outside the cluster)
-#   then re-render. See the WS-APPS report for the full bulk-media finding.
+# BULK MEDIA — NOW ATTACHED (docs/04 bulk tier; the long-standing OQ-2 prerequisite, resolved for
+# the STATIC case). The library is 8.33 T of ZFS on the Proxmox host at /mnt/Storage/plex, and it
+# already exists: nothing is provisioned, an existing dataset is mounted. See
+# docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md for the layout, the export change and the uid analysis. (The bulk-tier
+# requirement ID is deliberately still not typed here — see that document's "gate" note.)
 name: plex
 kind: container
 source:
@@ -70,6 +60,31 @@ storage:
                              # UI sign-in, the operator adds a PLEX_CLAIM env from a fresh https://plex.tv/claim token
                              # (4-min TTL) — deliberately NOT wired here: the env secretKeyRef pattern has no `optional`,
                              # so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would crashloop the pod. See operator hand-off.
+  # THE LIBRARY (docs/04 bulk tier). One READ-ONLY mount of the export ROOT, giving /media/movies,
+  # /media/tv and /media/photos — the whole tree the layout actually has (`ls /mnt/Storage/plex`:
+  # downloads/ movies/ photos/ tv/).
+  #
+  # WHY THE ROOT AND NOT THREE subPath MOUNTS. Nothing is gained by narrowing: the mount is `ro`,
+  # so no subPath could remove a privilege that matters, while three mounts would triple the NFS
+  # mounts per pod and mean a manifest change every time a top-level library is added.
+  #
+  # WHY READ-ONLY, when the export is `rw` and the other consumers write. Plex is a SERVER: it
+  # indexes and streams. Every write on that tree belongs to Sonarr and Radarr. Marking it here
+  # costs nothing and removes Plex from the set of things that can damage 8.33 T. Enforced by the
+  # PV's nfs.readOnly (a real `ro` mount), not only by the volumeMount flag.
+  #
+  # UID: no change needed. The tree is 0755 owned 1000:3000 throughout, so it is world-readable and
+  # world-traversable, and PLEX_UID/PLEX_GID above already make the process uid 1000 in any case.
+  # (fsGroup would have been a no-op here regardless — the in-tree NFS plugin does no ownership
+  # management. That is the trap the arrs' PUID/PGID exists to avoid; Plex never hits it.)
+  - name: media
+    class: bulk
+    export: /mnt/Storage/plex   # the ZFS dataset Storage/plex, on ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    mountPath: /media
+    readOnly: true
+    size: 9Ti                   # ADVISORY ONLY (nothing enforces a static NFS PV's capacity): the
+                                # dataset's 8.33 T used, rounded up, so `kubectl get pv` reports
+                                # something true. The real limit is the ZFS pool.
 dependencies: []              # default-deny: reaches only DNS; clients/Seerr reach IT (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
 ingressRoutes:
  - host: plex.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -38,6 +38,17 @@ storage:
  - name: config
    size: 5Gi
    class: longhorn             # settings/categories/session on 3-replica Longhorn; DR-critical (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
+    mountPath: /config          # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
+                                # LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
+                                # /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
+                                # holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
+                                # configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
+                                # every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
+                                # 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
+                                # dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
+                                # This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
+                                # The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
+                                # so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
 dependencies: []                # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
 ingressRoutes:
  - host: qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
@@ -46,6 +57,11 @@ auth:
  mode: forward-auth            # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
  groups:
    - media-users               # authenticated AND in an authorized group (R-IDP-06)
+    # See catalog/jackett.yaml for the full rationale: --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
+    # platform-admins here is a superset, not a widening (that group already carries cluster-admin
+    # via k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml). Without it, an empty media-users locks every operator out with an
+    # immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback — observed on prod 2026-09-12.
+    - platform-admins           # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
 update:
  channel: stable               # R-UPD-01
  range: ">=5.0.0 <6.0.0"       # stay on the qBittorrent 5.x stable line
@@ -9,6 +9,23 @@ name: radarr
 kind: container
 source:
  image: lscr.io/linuxserver/radarr:5.21.1   # pinned stable v5 tag (R-UPD-01); update.range governs advancement
+# LinuxServer images run their service as the user `abc`, whose uid/gid these two set. They are
+# LOAD-BEARING for the bulk mount, not cosmetic: see the storage note below. The default is 911,
+# which cannot write a 1000:3000-owned 0755 tree.
+env:
+  - name: PUID
+    value: "1000"               # owner uid of every directory under /mnt/Storage/plex
+  - name: PGID
+    value: "3000"               # dominant group there; keeps files this writes readable to the
+                                # EXISTING non-k3s consumers of the same export, which stay live
+  - name: TZ
+    value: Etc/UTC              # same safe default plex uses; the arrs schedule by local time
+podSecurityContext:
+  # For the LONGHORN config PVC only. fsGroup does nothing on the NFS volume (the in-tree plugin
+  # does no ownership management), but on a Longhorn filesystem the kubelet applies it, which is
+  # what makes /config writable by the now-uid-1000 process WITHOUT relying on the image chowning
+  # /config for itself when PUID changes. Matches PGID so the primary group owns the config too.
+  fsGroup: 3000
 exposure: internal              # LAN-only web UI at radarr.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 3; R-DNS/R-NET)
 egress: vpn                     # indexer scrape + downloader handoff steered via the shared VPN egress gateway,
                                # kill-switch enforced OUTSIDE the workload (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
@@ -16,11 +33,66 @@ storage:
  - name: config
    size: 5Gi
    class: longhorn             # app DB / config on the 3-replica tier; DR-critical (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
-  # NOTE (bulk-media PREREQUISITE): docs/13 row 3 places the media library / downloads volume on the
-  # `bulk` tier (docs/04 bulk storage). The `bulk` StorageClass exists (platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml)
-  # but is a NON-provisioning STUB pending OQ-2 (NFS/SMB backing = REPLACE-ME). Adding a `class: bulk`
-  # volume now would leave the PVC (and therefore the pod) Pending. The media/downloads volume is
-  # therefore DEFERRED until OQ-2 is resolved; config-only on longhorn keeps Radarr deployable today.
+    mountPath: /config          # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
+                                # LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
+                                # /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
+                                # holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
+                                # configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
+                                # every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
+                                # 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
+                                # dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
+                                # This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
+                                # The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
+                                # so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
+  # THE MEDIA TREE (docs/04 bulk tier) — ONE read-WRITE mount of the export ROOT at /media, giving
+  # /media/movies (the library) and /media/downloads (the import source) UNDER THE SAME MOUNT.
+  #
+  # *** THE ROOT MOUNT IS THE POINT, NOT A CONVENIENCE. *** Radarr imports by HARDLINKING or
+  # atomically renaming a finished download into the library. Both are same-FILESYSTEM operations,
+  # and to the kernel "same filesystem" means SAME MOUNT. The layout on the host is:
+  #     /mnt/Storage/plex/movies/                      the library
+  #     /mnt/Storage/plex/downloads/complete/radarr/  where finished releases land
+  # — siblings under one dataset, so a hardlink between them is legal on the server. But mounting
+  # them as two subPath volumes (subPath: movies at /media/movies, subPath: downloads elsewhere) creates
+  # TWO mounts, and link() across mounts fails EXDEV no matter what the server thinks. Radarr then
+  # silently degrades to copy-then-delete: every import rewrites the whole file over NFS and the
+  # seeding copy is destroyed. Their smallest common ancestor IS the export root, so the root mount
+  # is the MINIMAL mount that preserves hardlinks — least privilege bounded below by a hard
+  # requirement, not a shortcut. (The cost is stated plainly: Radarr can also write /media/tv,
+  # which is sonarr's. Narrowing that would cost hardlinks, which is a worse trade.)
+  #
+  # *** /media, NOT /data — AND THAT IS NOT A STYLE CHOICE. *** The config PVC above renders at the
+  # renderer default /data/config. A media mount at /data would be mounted OVER it and MASK the
+  # config volume entirely; the pod would come up with its app database shadowed by an 8 T media
+  # tree. /media collides with nothing in a LinuxServer image and matches the path plex uses for
+  # the same export, so when qbittorrent is eventually given this mount too, the arrs and the
+  # download client will already agree on absolute paths — which is the other precondition for
+  # hardlinked imports (otherwise every import needs a Remote Path Mapping).
+  #
+  # SEPARATE LATENT BUG, NOT FIXED HERE (deliberately — it changes live on-disk state): /data/config
+  # is almost certainly the wrong place for this PVC in the first place. LinuxServer's arr images run
+  # with `-data=/config`, so the app writes /config — the container's EPHEMERAL layer — while the
+  # Longhorn PVC at /data/config sits unused. That is the EXACT failure plex's own mountPath comment
+  # documents having already been bitten by. Fixing it means starting from an empty config volume, so
+  # it belongs in its own change with the operator present.
+  #
+  # UID/GID — THE FAILURE THIS AVOIDS IS "MOUNTS FINE, CANNOT WRITE". The export is no_root_squash
+  # + sec=sys, so the client's numeric uid is passed through verbatim and the server's ownership is
+  # the whole story. The tree is 0755 owned 1000:3000 (some dirs 1000:1000), so ONLY uid 1000 can
+  # write it. LinuxServer images default to PUID/PGID 911 — which would mount cleanly and then fail
+  # every import with EACCES. The PUID/PGID set above make the process uid 1000, matching the owner.
+  #
+  # AND NOTE fsGroup CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT. The in-tree NFS volume plugin performs no
+  # ownership management, so podSecurityContext.fsGroup is a NO-OP on this volume — it is not the
+  # lever here, and reaching for it is how this failure normally gets misdiagnosed. The fsGroup
+  # that IS set above exists for the LONGHORN config PVC, so that changing PUID does not depend on
+  # the image re-chowning /config for itself.
+  - name: media
+    class: bulk
+    export: /mnt/Storage/plex   # the ZFS dataset Storage/plex, on ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    mountPath: /media           # => /media/movies (Root Folder) and /media/downloads (import source)
+    size: 9Ti                   # ADVISORY ONLY on a static NFS PV: the dataset's 8.33 T used,
+                                # rounded up, so `kubectl get pv` reports something true.
 dependencies:
  - to: qbittorrent             # arr → download client (docs/13 dependency graph; R-NET-02 explicit allow)
    port: 8080
@@ -35,6 +107,11 @@ auth:
  mode: forward-auth            # bare UI, no usable OIDC: oauth2-proxy → Keycloak at the Gateway (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
  groups:
    - media-users               # authenticated AND in the media group (R-IDP-06)
+    # See catalog/jackett.yaml for the full rationale: --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
+    # platform-admins here is a superset, not a widening (that group already carries cluster-admin
+    # via k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml). Without it, an empty media-users locks every operator out with an
+    # immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback — observed on prod 2026-09-12.
+    - platform-admins           # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
 update:
  channel: stable               # R-UPD-01
  range: ">=5.0.0 <6.0.0"       # stay on the Radarr v5 stable line
@@ -53,6 +53,30 @@ LBL = "homelab.keithjackson.dev"
 # Hardcoding the literal here is what let prod be authored to serve dev's public hostnames,
 # and prod's external-dns then deleted dev's records (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10).
 ZONE = "${BASE_DOMAIN}"
+# The bulk (external NFS) tier's SERVER, emitted as a Flux post-build TOKEN for exactly the same
+# reason as ZONE: dev and prod reach the same Proxmox ZFS host by DIFFERENT addresses (dev's nodes
+# are on the host's own LAN and dial it directly; prod's nodes are on the far side of pfSense and
+# must be given whichever address the still-pending routing decision produces). Hardcoding either
+# one authors a manifest that is silently wrong in the other environment. Declared in
+# clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml and patched by BOTH overlays; written BARE (it is a real knob,
+# not a shell expansion), so StrictPostBuildSubstitutions fails the tier if an overlay forgets it.
+BULK_NFS_SERVER = "${BULK_NFS_SERVER}"
+# Mount options for every bulk NFS volume. These are a PLATFORM decision, not a per-service one,
+# so they live here rather than on the ServiceDefinition surface:
+#   nfsvers=4.1  NFSv4 carries mount+lock IN the protocol, so it needs ONE port (tcp/2049) and no
+#                rpcbind/111, mountd or statd. That is what makes the prod path a single pfSense
+#                rule instead of four, and it is why v4 is chosen over v3. The server advertises
+#                +3 +4 +4.1 +4.2; 4.1 is the conservative floor every node kernel already speaks.
+#   hard         A `soft` mount turns a server hiccup into a short read / EIO handed to the
+#                application, which for a media library and an archive is silent corruption.
+#                `hard` blocks instead. The cost is explicit: an NFS outage HANGS I/O rather than
+#                failing it, so an outage shows up as stuck pods, not as damaged files. Chosen
+#                deliberately -- hung is recoverable, truncated is not.
+#   noatime      The datasets are relatime, so every read would otherwise generate a metadata
+#                WRITE back to the pool. Plex walking an 8 T library must not do that.
+#   timeo=600/retrans=2  the TCP defaults, stated explicitly so a future reader knows the retry
+#                budget was considered rather than inherited.
+BULK_NFS_MOUNT_OPTIONS = ["nfsvers=4.1", "hard", "noatime", "timeo=600", "retrans=2"]
 GATEWAY_NAME = "shared"
 GATEWAY_NS = "gateway"
 KP_RELEASE = "kube-prometheus-stack"  # ServiceMonitor/PrometheusRule discovery label
@@ -111,8 +135,10 @@ def apply_defaults(sd: dict) -> dict:
    obs.setdefault("slis", [])
    s["observability"] = obs

-    # storage entry class default is longhorn (replicated tier).
-    s["storage"] = [{**{"class": "longhorn"}, **v} for v in s["storage"]]
+    # storage entry class default is longhorn (replicated tier); readOnly default is False
+    # (grant-nothing-extra is expressed by SETTING it, so the default stays back-compatible and
+    # every pre-existing golden renders byte-identical).
+    s["storage"] = [{**{"class": "longhorn", "readOnly": False}, **v} for v in s["storage"]]
    # dependency protocol default is tcp.
    s["dependencies"] = [{**{"protocol": "tcp"}, **d} for d in s["dependencies"]]
    return s
@@ -200,18 +226,139 @@ def _service_ports(s: dict) -> list:
    return [{"name": f"port-{p}", "port": p, "targetPort": p} for p in ports]


+def _bulk_access_mode(vol: dict) -> str:
+    """A bulk volume's access mode follows its read/write posture.
+
+    Every bulk volume is `...Many`: the SAME export is consumed by several namespaces at once
+    (plex, sonarr and radarr all sit on /mnt/Storage/plex) and by several nodes at once, which is
+    precisely what ReadWriteOnce cannot express. WHICH `Many` it is says whether this consumer
+    writes -- so `kubectl get pv` reports the intent, not merely the topology.
+    """
+    return "ReadOnlyMany" if vol.get("readOnly") else "ReadWriteMany"
+
+
+def r_bulk_pvs(s: dict) -> list:
+    """One STATIC PersistentVolume per `class: bulk` storage entry (docs/04 bulk tier).
+
+    WHY A PV AT ALL, RATHER THAN AN INLINE `nfs:` POD VOLUME
+    -------------------------------------------------------
+    An inline volume is fewer objects and it would work. It is rejected for four reasons, in
+    descending order of what they would cost to discover later:
+
+      1. RECLAIM POLICY. `persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain` is a declared, reviewable
+         property of a PV. There is no equivalent for an inline volume -- and the data behind
+         these mounts is 8.33 TiB of media and a 267 GiB archive that ALSO has live non-k3s
+         consumers. A statement in git that nothing in this cluster may reclaim it is worth an
+         object.
+      2. READ-ONLY LIVES IN ONE PLACE. `spec.nfs.readOnly: true` becomes a real `ro` mount option
+         for every pod that ever binds this volume. The same intent expressed on an inline volume
+         is one Deployment edit away from being dropped silently, with no diff anywhere near the
+         storage. (It is still a CLIENT-side guarantee -- the export cannot distinguish plex from
+         sonarr, since both may run on any node -- but it is one that lives in one reviewable
+         place.)
+      3. VISIBILITY. `kubectl get pv,pvc` is where an operator looks for "what external storage is
+         attached, and who holds it". An inline volume is invisible there, and invisible to
+         anything that reasons over PVCs.
+      4. IT IS THE CONTRACT THE REPO ALREADY HAS. Every other storage entry is a PVC; the
+         renderer, the Kyverno ServiceDefinition policy and the backup wiring all key on that. An
+         inline volume would be a second, parallel storage model inside the same renderer.
+
+    CROSS-NAMESPACE. A PV binds 1:1 to a PVC, so "plex, sonarr and radarr share one export" is NOT
+    one shared PV -- it is three PVs, one per namespace, each naming the same server+path. That is
+    the correct model rather than a workaround: the sharing happens on the NFS server, which is
+    built for concurrent clients, and each namespace keeps its own independently reviewable access
+    mode (plex ReadOnlyMany, the arrs ReadWriteMany). One shared PV would have forced a single
+    posture on all three.
+
+    BINDING IS PINNED FROM BOTH ENDS -- `claimRef` here and `volumeName` on the PVC. Either alone
+    leaves a race in which some other PVC of matching size and mode grabs the volume first;
+    together the binding is deterministic. `storageClassName: ""` (explicitly empty, NOT the `bulk`
+    StorageClass) is what tells the binder this volume is statically provisioned: it suppresses the
+    default-StorageClass annotation and guarantees no provisioner is ever asked to create anything.
+    It also sidesteps a trap -- a StorageClass's `provisioner` is IMMUTABLE, so re-pointing the
+    existing `bulk` class (whose stub names an NFS CSI driver that is not installed) at this data
+    would make Flux fail forever on that one object.
+    """
+    out = []
+    for vol in s["storage"]:
+        if vol.get("class") != "bulk":
+            continue
+        name = f"{s['name']}-{vol['name']}"
+        # `export` and `size` are both structurally required of a bulk entry, and the JSON
+        # Schema only enforces the first. A PersistentVolume with no `capacity` is rejected by
+        # the API server, so a missing size must fail HERE with a sentence a human can act on
+        # rather than as a bare KeyError three frames down.
+        for field, why in (
+            ("export", "the absolute NFS export path this volume attaches"),
+            ("size", "the PV capacity (advisory, but the API requires the field)"),
+        ):
+            if not vol.get(field):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"{s['name']}: storage entry {vol['name']!r} has class 'bulk' but no "
+                    f"'{field}' — {why}. A bulk volume attaches storage that already exists "
+                    f"outside the cluster, so it cannot be rendered without it."
+                )
+        nfs = {"server": BULK_NFS_SERVER, "path": vol["export"]}
+        if vol.get("readOnly"):
+            nfs["readOnly"] = True
+        spec = {
+            "capacity": {"storage": vol["size"]},
+            "accessModes": [_bulk_access_mode(vol)],
+            # Retain: deleting the PVC must NEVER be able to reach the data. There is nothing to
+            # "reclaim" here in any case -- the volume was not provisioned by the cluster.
+            "persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy": "Retain",
+            "storageClassName": "",
+            "mountOptions": list(BULK_NFS_MOUNT_OPTIONS),
+            "nfs": nfs,
+            "claimRef": {"namespace": s["name"], "name": name},
+        }
+        out.append(
+            {
+                "apiVersion": "v1",
+                "kind": "PersistentVolume",
+                "metadata": {
+                    "name": name,
+                    "labels": {"app.kubernetes.io/name": s["name"]},
+                },
+                "spec": spec,
+            }
+        )
+    return out
+
+
 def r_pvcs(s: dict) -> list:
    """One PVC per storage entry (R-STATE-01/02/04).

-    longhorn -> 3-replica replicated tier; bulk -> external media tier (not 3x replicated).
+    longhorn -> 3-replica replicated tier, dynamically provisioned, ReadWriteOnce.
+    bulk     -> the STATIC external NFS PV rendered by r_bulk_pvs, pre-bound by volumeName.
    """
    out = []
    for vol in s["storage"]:
        cls = vol.get("class", "longhorn")
-        storage_class = "longhorn" if cls == "longhorn" else "bulk"
+        if cls == "bulk":
+            # Mirror image of the PV: the same explicitly-empty class (so nothing dynamically
+            # provisions), the same access mode, and volumeName completing the two-sided binding.
+            out.append(
+                {
+                    "apiVersion": "v1",
+                    "kind": "PersistentVolumeClaim",
+                    "metadata": {
+                        "name": f"{s['name']}-{vol['name']}",
+                        "namespace": s["name"],
+                        "labels": {"app.kubernetes.io/name": s["name"]},
+                    },
+                    "spec": {
+                        "accessModes": [_bulk_access_mode(vol)],
+                        "storageClassName": "",
+                        "volumeName": f"{s['name']}-{vol['name']}",
+                        "resources": {"requests": {"storage": vol["size"]}},
+                    },
+                }
+            )
+            continue
        spec = {
            "accessModes": ["ReadWriteOnce"],
-            "storageClassName": storage_class,
+            "storageClassName": "longhorn",
        }
        if vol.get("size"):
            spec["resources"] = {"requests": {"storage": vol["size"]}}
@@ -257,7 +404,17 @@ def r_deployment(s: dict) -> dict:
        # it verbatim for apps that need a fixed on-disk layout (e.g. Gitea keeps all state
        # directly under /data). Omitting it preserves the /data/<name> default (back-compat).
        mount_path = vol.get("mountPath", f"/data/{vol['name']}")
-        volume_mounts.append({"name": vol["name"], "mountPath": mount_path})
+        mount = {"name": vol["name"], "mountPath": mount_path}
+        # subPath mounts a subtree of the volume instead of its root. Emitted only when declared,
+        # so every pre-existing golden stays byte-identical.
+        if vol.get("subPath"):
+            mount["subPath"] = vol["subPath"]
+        # readOnly on the mount as well as on the PV's nfs source. Belt and braces on purpose: the
+        # PV field is what makes the kernel mount `ro`; this one is what a reviewer reading the
+        # Deployment sees. An edit that drops one still leaves the other.
+        if vol.get("readOnly"):
+            mount["readOnly"] = True
+        volume_mounts.append(mount)
        volumes.append(
            {
                "name": vol["name"],
@@ -1095,6 +1252,14 @@ def render(sd: dict, image_automation: bool = True, inbound: list | None = None)
    if s["kind"] == "container":
        # Container PVCs. (For a vm, the CDI DataVolume owns/creates the disk PVC, so we
        # never render a plain PVC for the VM root disk — it would collide with CDI.)
+        # The static bulk PV is rendered BEFORE the PVC that names it. Document order inside one
+        # kustomize build is not an apply-ordering guarantee, but a PVC whose PV does not exist
+        # yet merely stays Pending and binds on the next reconcile, so this is a readability
+        # convention rather than a correctness requirement.
+        for pv in r_bulk_pvs(s):
+            docs.append(
+                (f"PersistentVolume {pv['metadata']['name']} - static external NFS (bulk tier)", pv)
+            )
        for pvc in r_pvcs(s):
            docs.append((f"PVC {pvc['metadata']['name']} (R-STATE)", pvc))
        docs.append(("Deployment (R-PLAT-02)", r_deployment(s)))
@@ -1321,6 +1486,11 @@ def plan_apps_waves(sds: list, present_files: set) -> dict:
      - `<svc>-db.yaml`                     -> wave(svc-db) (a strictly-lower wave; CNPG DB)
      - `<svc>-db-app.sops.yaml`            -> wave(svc-db) (CNPG initdb owner secret)
      - `<svc>-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc-db) (CNPG Barman S3 backup secret)
+      - `<svc>-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc-db) (the PROD half of that
+        secret: the two environments carry DIFFERENT object-store credentials, selected in
+        the Cluster CR by `${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}`. Both objects ship to both clusters,
+        so both must be placed in the DB wave — the Secret has to exist before the Cluster
+        that names it.)
    Non-catalog units (EXTRA_UNITS, e.g. gitea-actions) place by their declared anchor+offset.
    Only files that actually exist in `present_files` are placed, so the plan is robust to a
    service having no bootstrap secret or no DB. Deterministic (sorted).
@@ -1348,6 +1518,9 @@ def plan_apps_waves(sds: list, present_files: set) -> dict:
            add(wdb, f"{db}.yaml")
            add(wdb, f"{db}-app.sops.yaml")
            add(wdb, f"{db}-backup-credentials.sops.yaml")   # CNPG Barman S3 creds (R-STATE-03)
+            # PROD half of the same credential (2026-09-07 per-env split). Placed only when
+            # the file exists, so a DB that has not been split is unaffected.
+            add(wdb, f"{db}-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml")

    for unit, cfg in EXTRA_UNITS.items():
        anchor = cfg["anchor"]
@@ -1830,6 +2003,7 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
    present = {
        "a.yaml", "svc.yaml", "svc-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml",
        "svc-db.yaml", "svc-db-app.sops.yaml", "svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml",
+        "svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml",
        "gitea.yaml",
        "gitea-actions.yaml", "gitea-actions-runner-secret.sops.yaml",
    }
@@ -1839,8 +2013,10 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
    flat = {f: wv for wv, fs in plan.items() for f in fs}
    check(flat.get("a.yaml") == 0, "leaf app must land in wave 0")
    check(flat.get("svc-db.yaml") == 0 and flat.get("svc-db-app.sops.yaml") == 0
-          and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml") == 0,
-          "CNPG DB manifest + its owner secret + its Barman backup secret must be in the DB's (lower) wave")
+          and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml") == 0
+          and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml") == 0,
+          "CNPG DB manifest + its owner secret + BOTH halves of its per-env Barman backup secret "
+          "must be in the DB's (lower) wave")
    check(flat.get("svc.yaml") == 1 and flat.get("svc-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml") == 1,
          "a DB-backed app + its bootstrap secret must be in the consumer wave, above the DB")
    check(flat.get("gitea.yaml") == 0, "gitea (leaf) must be wave 0")
@@ -78,16 +78,34 @@ env:
  #     (util ConfigType `oidc_providers`, env-tagged SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS). The value is a single
  #     JSON blob for the `keycloak` provider — provider_url is the homelab realm issuer (auto-discovery),
  #     client_id=semaphore, redirect_url=/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect, claims map to the realm's
-  #     token. It CONTAINS the confidential client secret, so the whole blob is held SOPS-encrypted in the
-  #     semaphore-bootstrap Secret (key oidc-providers-json; same secret value SOPS-held in
-  #     keycloak-realm-clients) and injected here by reference — never in cleartext. The name is NOT a
-  #     kubelet service-link var (those are SEMAPHORE_SERVICE_HOST / SEMAPHORE_PORT_*), so no collision.
-  #     The LOCAL SEMAPHORE_ADMIN above stays as the break-glass path (docs/15). ---
-  - name: SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS
+  #     token. The name is NOT a kubelet service-link var (those are SEMAPHORE_SERVICE_HOST /
+  #     SEMAPHORE_PORT_*), so no collision. The LOCAL SEMAPHORE_ADMIN above stays break-glass (docs/15).
+  #
+  #     PER-ENVIRONMENT URLS (2026-09-07 fix). The blob USED to live whole inside the SOPS-encrypted
+  #     semaphore-bootstrap Secret (key `oidc-providers-json`) because it CONTAINS the confidential
+  #     client secret. That hid two environment-specific, NON-SECRET URLs — the realm issuer and the
+  #     redirect URI — inside ciphertext, where Flux's ${BASE_DOMAIN} postBuild substitution CANNOT
+  #     reach them. Both were frozen at the apex `home.keithjackson.dev`, so PROD (BASE_DOMAIN =
+  #     prod.home.keithjackson.dev) pointed its OIDC at DEV's Keycloak — unroutable from prod's
+  #     192.168.2.0/24 (the identical root cause as the Headlamp login timeout; see
+  #     platform/headlamp/README.md). Dev was only ever "right" because dev IS the apex.
+  #
+  #     THE SPLIT: the URLs are public, so the blob is now a PLAINTEXT literal here and gets
+  #     ${BASE_DOMAIN}-substituted per environment like every other hostname. Only the confidential
+  #     client secret stays SOPS-encrypted, in its own key (`oidc-client-secret`), and is spliced back
+  #     in by the KUBELET's dependent-env-var expansion: an env `value` may reference an EARLIER env
+  #     var of the same container as $(NAME), and secretKeyRef-sourced vars are eligible. So
+  #     SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET MUST STAY IMMEDIATELY ABOVE — the kubelet resolves env in list
+  #     order, and a reference to a not-yet-defined name is left as the LITERAL text $(...). It is
+  #     fail-loud in the way that matters: if the Secret key is missing the Pod never starts
+  #     (CreateContainerConfigError), rather than silently authenticating against nothing. ---
+  - name: SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
    valueFrom:
      secretKeyRef:
        name: semaphore-bootstrap
-        key: oidc-providers-json
+        key: oidc-client-secret
+  - name: SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS
+    value: '{"keycloak":{"display_name":"Keycloak","provider_url":"https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab","client_id":"semaphore","client_secret":"$(SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET)","redirect_url":"https://semaphore.${BASE_DOMAIN}/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect","scopes":["openid","profile","email"],"username_claim":"preferred_username","email_claim":"email","name_claim":"name","order":1}}'
 # The semaphoreui/semaphore image runs as the non-root user UID 1001 / GID 0 (tini -> server-wrapper),
 # and on boot the wrapper writes its generated config.json into the config dir. A mounted Longhorn PVC
 # is root:root, so UID 1001 cannot write it -> the pod panics ("permission denied"). fsGroup=1001 makes
@@ -117,10 +135,12 @@ auth:
  groups:
    - platform-admins           # access scoped to an authorized group (R-IDP-06)
  # WIRED (native OIDC): the Keycloak `semaphore` confidential client (platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-
-  # import.yaml + live kcadm) is consumed via the SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env (JSON blob held encrypted
-  # in the semaphore-bootstrap Secret, oidc-providers-json). The `groups` claim is exposed for
-  # authorization (R-IDP-06). Semaphore KEEPS its LOCAL admin as the break-glass path so an IdP outage
-  # never locks the operator out (docs/15 "Availability caveat"). No secret is embedded here.
+  # import.yaml + live kcadm) is consumed via the SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env — a PLAINTEXT JSON blob
+  # (see `env` above) whose per-environment URLs are ${BASE_DOMAIN}-substituted, with the confidential
+  # client secret spliced in at runtime from the semaphore-bootstrap Secret key `oidc-client-secret`.
+  # The `groups` claim is exposed for authorization (R-IDP-06). Semaphore KEEPS its LOCAL admin as the
+  # break-glass path so an IdP outage never locks the operator out (docs/15 "Availability caveat").
+  # No secret is embedded here.
 update:
  channel: stable               # R-UPD-01
  range: ">=2.19.0 <3.0.0"      # stay on the 2.x stable line
@@ -9,6 +9,23 @@ name: sonarr
 kind: container
 source:
  image: lscr.io/linuxserver/sonarr:4.0.15   # pinned stable v4 tag (R-UPD-01); update.range governs advancement
+# LinuxServer images run their service as the user `abc`, whose uid/gid these two set. They are
+# LOAD-BEARING for the bulk mount, not cosmetic: see the storage note below. The default is 911,
+# which cannot write a 1000:3000-owned 0755 tree.
+env:
+  - name: PUID
+    value: "1000"               # owner uid of every directory under /mnt/Storage/plex
+  - name: PGID
+    value: "3000"               # dominant group there; keeps files this writes readable to the
+                                # EXISTING non-k3s consumers of the same export, which stay live
+  - name: TZ
+    value: Etc/UTC              # same safe default plex uses; the arrs schedule by local time
+podSecurityContext:
+  # For the LONGHORN config PVC only. fsGroup does nothing on the NFS volume (the in-tree plugin
+  # does no ownership management), but on a Longhorn filesystem the kubelet applies it, which is
+  # what makes /config writable by the now-uid-1000 process WITHOUT relying on the image chowning
+  # /config for itself when PUID changes. Matches PGID so the primary group owns the config too.
+  fsGroup: 3000
 exposure: internal              # LAN-only web UI at sonarr.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 2; R-DNS/R-NET)
 egress: vpn                     # indexer scrape + downloader handoff steered via the shared VPN egress gateway,
                                # kill-switch enforced OUTSIDE the workload (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
@@ -16,11 +33,66 @@ storage:
  - name: config
    size: 5Gi
    class: longhorn             # app DB / config on the 3-replica tier; DR-critical (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
-  # NOTE (bulk-media PREREQUISITE): docs/13 row 2 places the media library / downloads volume on the
-  # `bulk` tier (docs/04 bulk storage). The `bulk` StorageClass exists (platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml)
-  # but is a NON-provisioning STUB pending OQ-2 (NFS/SMB backing = REPLACE-ME). Adding a `class: bulk`
-  # volume now would leave the PVC (and therefore the pod) Pending. The media/downloads volume is
-  # therefore DEFERRED until OQ-2 is resolved; config-only on longhorn keeps Sonarr deployable today.
+    mountPath: /config          # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
+                                # LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
+                                # /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
+                                # holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
+                                # configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
+                                # every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
+                                # 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
+                                # dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
+                                # This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
+                                # The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
+                                # so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
+  # THE MEDIA TREE (docs/04 bulk tier) — ONE read-WRITE mount of the export ROOT at /media, giving
+  # /media/tv (the library) and /media/downloads (the import source) UNDER THE SAME MOUNT.
+  #
+  # *** THE ROOT MOUNT IS THE POINT, NOT A CONVENIENCE. *** Sonarr imports by HARDLINKING or
+  # atomically renaming a finished download into the library. Both are same-FILESYSTEM operations,
+  # and to the kernel "same filesystem" means SAME MOUNT. The layout on the host is:
+  #     /mnt/Storage/plex/tv/                      the library
+  #     /mnt/Storage/plex/downloads/complete/tv-sonarr/  where finished releases land
+  # — siblings under one dataset, so a hardlink between them is legal on the server. But mounting
+  # them as two subPath volumes (subPath: tv at /media/tv, subPath: downloads elsewhere) creates
+  # TWO mounts, and link() across mounts fails EXDEV no matter what the server thinks. Sonarr then
+  # silently degrades to copy-then-delete: every import rewrites the whole file over NFS and the
+  # seeding copy is destroyed. Their smallest common ancestor IS the export root, so the root mount
+  # is the MINIMAL mount that preserves hardlinks — least privilege bounded below by a hard
+  # requirement, not a shortcut. (The cost is stated plainly: Sonarr can also write /media/movies,
+  # which is radarr's. Narrowing that would cost hardlinks, which is a worse trade.)
+  #
+  # *** /media, NOT /data — AND THAT IS NOT A STYLE CHOICE. *** The config PVC above renders at the
+  # renderer default /data/config. A media mount at /data would be mounted OVER it and MASK the
+  # config volume entirely; the pod would come up with its app database shadowed by an 8 T media
+  # tree. /media collides with nothing in a LinuxServer image and matches the path plex uses for
+  # the same export, so when qbittorrent is eventually given this mount too, the arrs and the
+  # download client will already agree on absolute paths — which is the other precondition for
+  # hardlinked imports (otherwise every import needs a Remote Path Mapping).
+  #
+  # SEPARATE LATENT BUG, NOT FIXED HERE (deliberately — it changes live on-disk state): /data/config
+  # is almost certainly the wrong place for this PVC in the first place. LinuxServer's arr images run
+  # with `-data=/config`, so the app writes /config — the container's EPHEMERAL layer — while the
+  # Longhorn PVC at /data/config sits unused. That is the EXACT failure plex's own mountPath comment
+  # documents having already been bitten by. Fixing it means starting from an empty config volume, so
+  # it belongs in its own change with the operator present.
+  #
+  # UID/GID — THE FAILURE THIS AVOIDS IS "MOUNTS FINE, CANNOT WRITE". The export is no_root_squash
+  # + sec=sys, so the client's numeric uid is passed through verbatim and the server's ownership is
+  # the whole story. The tree is 0755 owned 1000:3000 (some dirs 1000:1000), so ONLY uid 1000 can
+  # write it. LinuxServer images default to PUID/PGID 911 — which would mount cleanly and then fail
+  # every import with EACCES. The PUID/PGID set above make the process uid 1000, matching the owner.
+  #
+  # AND NOTE fsGroup CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT. The in-tree NFS volume plugin performs no
+  # ownership management, so podSecurityContext.fsGroup is a NO-OP on this volume — it is not the
+  # lever here, and reaching for it is how this failure normally gets misdiagnosed. The fsGroup
+  # that IS set above exists for the LONGHORN config PVC, so that changing PUID does not depend on
+  # the image re-chowning /config for itself.
+  - name: media
+    class: bulk
+    export: /mnt/Storage/plex   # the ZFS dataset Storage/plex, on ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
+    mountPath: /media           # => /media/tv (Root Folder) and /media/downloads (import source)
+    size: 9Ti                   # ADVISORY ONLY on a static NFS PV: the dataset's 8.33 T used,
+                                # rounded up, so `kubectl get pv` reports something true.
 dependencies:
  - to: qbittorrent             # arr → download client (docs/13 dependency graph; R-NET-02 explicit allow)
    port: 8080
@@ -35,6 +107,11 @@ auth:
  mode: forward-auth            # bare UI, no usable OIDC: oauth2-proxy → Keycloak at the Gateway (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
  groups:
    - media-users               # authenticated AND in the media group (R-IDP-06)
+    # See catalog/jackett.yaml for the full rationale: --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
+    # platform-admins here is a superset, not a widening (that group already carries cluster-admin
+    # via k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml). Without it, an empty media-users locks every operator out with an
+    # immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback — observed on prod 2026-09-12.
+    - platform-admins           # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
 update:
  channel: stable               # R-UPD-01
  range: ">=4.0.0 <5.0.0"       # stay on the Sonarr v4 stable line
@@ -137,6 +137,82 @@ else
  esac
 fi

+# ---- Stage 3d: Keycloak client-secret declaration + reconciler (UNCONDITIONAL) ----
+# The Keycloak realm import resolves each OIDC client's secret from an `(env:NAME)`
+# placeholder. When the operator cannot resolve one it stores the LITERAL placeholder as
+# the client secret AND THE IMPORT JOB STILL REPORTS SUCCESS, then rests at Done=True and
+# never re-runs. On 2026-09-06 that had all 12 prod clients unusable ("Invalid client or
+# Invalid client credentials") behind an entirely green cluster; dev had one. The check
+# asserts the declaration is self-consistent (every placeholder defined, every Secret key
+# present, names matching the reconciler's contract), that the Flux ordering is a REAL
+# dependsOn edge rather than a comment, and — by extracting the shipped script from its
+# ConfigMap and running its --selftest — that the reconciler is compare-then-write,
+# idempotent, non-logging and blast-radius-bounded.
+#
+# WHY ITS OWN UNCONDITIONAL STAGE, same reasoning as 3c: Stage 3b scopes the conformance
+# run to the TOUCHED requirements (R-TEST-03). This check's invariant spans platform/,
+# platform-config/ and clusters/, so a change that breaks it need not attribute R-IDP-03/04
+# and the requirement-scoped selection would filter it out of exactly the change that
+# introduces the bug. It is a sub-second offline scan plus a loopback selftest, with no
+# side effects, so running it twice when 3b also selects it is not worth avoiding.
+KEYCLOAK_SECRET_CHECK="${KEYCLOAK_SECRET_CHECK:-${REPO_ROOT}/conformance/tests/l0-static/keycloak-client-secret-reconciler/check.sh}"
+log "Stage: Keycloak client-secret reconciler safety (${KEYCLOAK_SECRET_CHECK})"
+if [ ! -f "$KEYCLOAK_SECRET_CHECK" ]; then
+  skip "keycloak client-secret check not present at '${KEYCLOAK_SECRET_CHECK}' — UNWIRED, not green"
+  summary "- keycloak-client-secrets: **SKIPPED** (check missing)"
+  if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then rc=3; fi
+else
+  kc_rc=0
+  bash "$KEYCLOAK_SECRET_CHECK" || kc_rc=$?
+  case "$kc_rc" in
+    0) ok "Keycloak client-secret declaration + reconciler passed"
+       summary "- keycloak-client-secrets: **passed**" ;;
+    3) skip "keycloak client-secret check SKIPPED (platform/keycloak absent) — not a pass"
+       summary "- keycloak-client-secrets: **SKIPPED** (nothing to audit)"
+       if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then rc=3; fi ;;
+    *) err "Keycloak client-secret declaration + reconciler FAILED"
+       summary "- keycloak-client-secrets: **FAILED**"; rc=1 ;;
+  esac
+fi
+
+# ---- Stage 3e: bulk tier distinct from the replicated tier (UNCONDITIONAL) ----
+# The `bulk` StorageClass sat as a REPLACE-ME stub for six roadmap phases, and the only
+# thing keeping a multi-terabyte media library off the 3-replica `longhorn` class was four
+# hand-written comments in ServiceDefinitions. A bulk volume that lands on the replicated
+# tier does not fail loudly — Longhorn accepts the PVC and starts replicating 3x of data
+# three mini-PCs cannot hold. The check asserts the tier separation, that a bulk volume is
+# statically pre-bound from BOTH ends (so nothing can dynamically provision an EMPTY
+# stand-in that mounts and Binds perfectly while the real data is never attached), Retain,
+# hard/NFSv4 mount options, the read-only coupling between PV and volumeMount, that no
+# workload mounts one export twice (which breaks Sonarr/Radarr hardlinks with EXDEV), and
+# that the server is a per-environment knob every overlay supplies.
+#
+# WHY ITS OWN UNCONDITIONAL STAGE, same reasoning as 3c/3d: Stage 3b scopes the conformance
+# run to the TOUCHED requirements (R-TEST-03), and ci/touched-requirements.sh's path map
+# keys NEITHER apps/* nor platform/longhorn/* to the bulk requirement. So the change most
+# likely to break this — moving a bulk volume onto the replicated tier, or narrowing one
+# export into two mounts — could attribute no requirement at all and be gated by nothing.
+# The invariant spans catalog/, apps/ and clusters/, so it runs on EVERY gate invocation.
+BULK_TIER_CHECK="${BULK_TIER_CHECK:-${REPO_ROOT}/conformance/tests/l0-static/bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated/check.sh}"
+log "Stage: bulk tier distinct from replicated tier (${BULK_TIER_CHECK})"
+if [ ! -f "$BULK_TIER_CHECK" ]; then
+  skip "bulk tier check not present at '${BULK_TIER_CHECK}' — UNWIRED, not green"
+  summary "- bulk-tier: **SKIPPED** (check missing)"
+  if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then rc=3; fi
+else
+  bulk_rc=0
+  bash "$BULK_TIER_CHECK" || bulk_rc=$?
+  case "$bulk_rc" in
+    0) ok "Bulk tier distinctness + static binding passed"
+       summary "- bulk-tier: **passed**" ;;
+    3) skip "bulk tier check SKIPPED (catalog/ or apps/ absent) — not a pass"
+       summary "- bulk-tier: **SKIPPED** (nothing to audit)"
+       if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then rc=3; fi ;;
+    *) err "Bulk tier distinctness + static binding FAILED"
+       summary "- bulk-tier: **FAILED**"; rc=1 ;;
+  esac
+fi
+
 case "$rc" in
  0) ok "L0 stage complete" ;;
  3) skip "L0 stage incomplete (unwired seam / missing tool) — not a pass" ;;
@@ -180,9 +180,41 @@ path_requirements() {
    platform/externaldns/*)    echo "R-DNS-02" ;;
    platform/velero/*)         echo "R-STATE-03" ;;
    platform/monitoring/*)     echo "R-OBS-01 R-OBS-02" ;;
+    # platform/cnpg was UNMAPPED until 2026-09-06. It is the PostgreSQL DR path for keycloak-db /
+    # nextcloud-db / semaphore-db (barmanObjectStore WAL archiving + ScheduledBackup), so a change
+    # there is an R-IDP-05 / R-STATE-03 change; it now also carries the platform-health alert rules
+    # for that path (R-OBS-04). Without this line an edit under platform/cnpg/ contributed ZERO
+    # requirements unless it happened to retype an R-ID on a non-comment line, and escaped the gate.
+    platform/cnpg/*)           echo "R-IDP-05 R-STATE-03 R-OBS-04" ;;
+    # vpn-egress was UNMAPPED until 2026-09-06. platform/vpn-egress/egress-steering.yaml IS the
+    # R-NET-04 datapath (the rule that selects between the two egress paths) and the R-NET-05/06/07
+    # steering policy — it even self-declares those IDs in its `homelab.keithjackson.dev/requirements`
+    # annotation. But the content scan only reads ADDED/REMOVED lines, so any edit that does not
+    # happen to retype an R-ID (a selector change, an excludedCIDRs change, a comment) contributed
+    # ZERO requirements and escaped the gate entirely. Mapped explicitly; the annotation still wins
+    # when a diff does carry the tags.
+    platform/vpn-egress/*)     echo "R-NET-04 R-NET-05 R-NET-06 R-NET-07" ;;
+    # Keycloak is the whole SSO surface: the realm import (declarative identity config),
+    # the SOPS client secrets, and the reconciler that heals them. Added 2026-09-06 after
+    # the client-secret incident, in which editing platform/keycloak/ attributed NO
+    # requirement, so the L2 keycloak tests were filtered out of the merge gate's touched
+    # subset — the change that could break every OIDC login was gated by nothing.
+    # R-IDP-05 is in scope because platform/keycloak/ also carries the CNPG DB Cluster and
+    # its off-cluster backup credential, not only the realm.
+    platform/keycloak/*)       echo "R-IDP-01 R-IDP-02 R-IDP-03 R-IDP-04 R-IDP-05 R-IDP-06" ;;
+    platform/oauth2-proxy/*)   echo "R-IDP-02 R-IDP-06" ;;
    platform/image-automation/*) echo "R-UPD-01 R-UPD-02" ;;
    conformance/*)             echo "R-TEST-01 R-TEST-02 R-TEST-03 R-TEST-04" ;;
    clusters/*)                echo "R-GITOPS-01 R-ENV-02" ;;
+    # bootstrap/ was UNMAPPED until 2026-09-06, and the omission was load-bearing:
+    # bootstrap/standup.sh carries the placeholder guards that decide whether `velero` may be
+    # enabled against a real backup endpoint. A change touching standup.sh ALONGSIDE any
+    # already-mapped path scoped the L0 run to that other path's requirements and silently
+    # excluded conformance/tests/l0-static/placeholder-guard-coupling — the check that exists
+    # precisely to catch a guard/value mismatch. The 2026-09-05 guard bug (a prefix glob that
+    # stopped matching when the value it guards changed, in a different file) is exactly the
+    # class that omission would hide.
+    bootstrap/*)               echo "R-STATE-03 R-GITOPS-01" ;;
    .gitea/*|ci/*)             echo "R-GITOPS-01 R-TEST-02 R-TEST-03" ;;
    *) : ;;
  esac
@@ -97,6 +97,27 @@ Kustomization: apps-wave-1  (./apps/wave-1, dependsOn apps-wave-0)
 Kustomization: apps-wave-N  (./apps/wave-N, dependsOn apps-wave-N-1)
 ```

+### Second-order CRDs need a THIRD pass (`platform-config-cdi`, added 2026-09-05)
+
+The controllers/configs split (`platform` → `platform-config`) assumes a CRD is registered by the
+controller **install**. CDI breaks that: `cdi-operator.yaml` registers only `cdis.cdi.kubevirt.io`,
+and cdi-operator creates `storageprofiles` / `datavolumes` / `datasources` **only after it has
+reconciled the `CDI` CR**. Since kustomize-controller server-side **dry-runs every object in a pass
+before applying any of them**, having the `CDI` CR and the CDI `StorageProfile`s in one pass was a
+**deadlock, not a race**: unknown kind → pass aborts → CR never applied → CRD never created →
+`platform-config` can never converge → every tier below it blocked. Invisible on dev (its CDI CRDs
+have existed for months); it cost 12h on prod's cold start.
+
+So there is a third tier, `platform-config-cdi` (`./platform-config-cdi`, `dependsOn:
+platform-config`), and a rule:
+
+> A CR belongs in `platform-config-cdi`, not `platform-config`, when the CRD it needs is created by a
+> **controller at runtime** rather than by a manifest in git.
+
+`apps-vms` `dependsOn` it as well as `platform-config`, because CDI reads
+`StorageProfile/longhorn-vm` at DataVolume **provisioning** time — a VM disk provisioned before that
+profile exists is stamped RWO/Filesystem and is permanently not live-migratable.
+
 Wave 0 `dependsOn` `platform-config` (transitively `platform`) so CNI/storage/TLS/DNS/gateway
 exist before any workload reconciles. The app tier is split into dependency-ordered WAVES
 (`catalog/render.py --emit-waves`): each `apps-wave-<N>` health-gates (wait:true) ONLY its own
@@ -4,8 +4,11 @@
 # NON-GATING (wait:false): unlike the app waves, this does NOT health-wait. A VM's first-boot image
 # import (CDI, minutes) + in-guest software install mean a VM can be intentionally long-not-Ready, so
 # health-gating it would wedge reconciliation for no benefit. VMs have no in-cluster dependents.
-# dependsOn platform-config so KubeVirt/CDI + the longhorn-vm StorageClass + CDI StorageProfiles
-# exist first. prune:true — this Kustomization solely owns the VM manifests (no adoption concern).
+# dependsOn platform-config so KubeVirt/CDI + the longhorn-vm StorageClass exist first, AND
+# platform-config-cdi so the CDI StorageProfiles do (2026-09-05: the StorageProfiles MOVED OUT of
+# platform-config into their own tier, so `dependsOn: platform-config` alone NO LONGER guarantees
+# them — see the dependsOn block). prune:true — this Kustomization solely owns the VM manifests (no
+# adoption concern).
 apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
 kind: Kustomization
 metadata:
@@ -19,6 +22,28 @@ spec:
  wait: false
  dependsOn:
    - name: platform-config
+    # LOAD-BEARING, not decoration. apps/vms/unifi/20-datavolume.yaml provisions a DataVolume on
+    # storageClassName `longhorn-vm`, and CDI reads StorageProfile/longhorn-vm AT PROVISIONING TIME to
+    # decide the claim's accessModes/volumeMode. Without that profile's `claimPropertySets`
+    # (ReadWriteMany + Block) the PVC is stamped RWO/Filesystem and the VM disk is PERMANENTLY not
+    # live-migratable — a silent, unrecoverable-without-recreate loss. The profiles used to arrive
+    # with platform-config; since 2026-09-05 they arrive with `platform-config-cdi`, so the edge has
+    # to move with them. platform-config-cdi runs wait:true and StorageProfile has no status
+    # conditions (kstatus -> Current on apply), so this edge cannot stall this tier.
+    #
+    # HONEST LIMIT: CDI provisions from the profile's STATUS, which its storageprofile-controller
+    # derives from our spec. This edge proves the spec is applied, not that CDI has folded it into
+    # status — that is a watch-triggered round-trip of seconds against a ~30s dependency requeue, so
+    # it is a timing argument rather than a guarantee. See clusters/base/platform-config-cdi.yaml.
+    #
+    # This edge also makes the StorageProfile prune/recreate transition safe: platform-config's prune
+    # deletes the two profiles for the ~30-60s before platform-config-cdi re-applies them, and this
+    # dependsOn is what guarantees Flux cannot create a DataVolume inside that window.
+    #
+    # The platform-config edge above is kept although platform-config-cdi already dependsOn it: the
+    # edges are a set, there is no cycle, and stating both means a future edit to platform-config-cdi
+    # cannot silently drop this tier's KubeVirt/StorageClass gate.
+    - name: platform-config-cdi
  sourceRef:
    kind: GitRepository
    name: flux-system
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ spec:
    substituteFrom:
      - kind: ConfigMap
        name: cluster-vars
-  # SOPS decryption for velero-cloud.sops.yaml (the scoped MinIO `cloud` credential) is layered per
-  # environment by the overlay (clusters/dev patches THIS Kustomization by name), identical to how
-  # headlamp/oauth2-proxy/crafty decrypt their own SOPS secrets. See clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml.
+  # SOPS decryption for the `cloud` INI credentials — velero-cloud.sops.yaml (dev's scoped MinIO key)
+  # and velero-cloud-prod.sops.yaml (prod's Cloudflare R2 token) — is layered per environment by the
+  # overlay (clusters/dev and clusters/prod patch THIS Kustomization by name), identical to how
+  # headlamp/oauth2-proxy/crafty decrypt their own SOPS secrets. Both Secrets are applied on both
+  # clusters; ${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX} (substituted from cluster-vars above) decides which one the
+  # velero Deployment actually mounts. See clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml.
@@ -96,15 +96,55 @@ data:
  #
  # Substitution coverage (verify before adding a knob here): every path that consumes these declares
  # postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars — platform (K3S_API_HOST), platform-config
-  # (CILIUM_LB_POOL_*, S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT), crafty (CRAFTY_L4_VIP), apps-wave-0 (S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT),
-  # velero (S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT), apps-vms (UNIFI_L4_VIP). A ${TOKEN} in an UNSUBSTITUTED path would
-  # ship the literal string into the cluster.
+  # (CILIUM_LB_POOL_*, and keycloak-db's S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT + CNPG_BACKUP_PATH: the Cluster lives at
+  # platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml but is rendered by platform-config, which is the ONLY
+  # tier that lists it), crafty (CRAFTY_L4_VIP), apps-wave-0 (nextcloud-db + semaphore-db:
+  # S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT, CNPG_BACKUP_PATH), velero (S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT, S3_BACKUP_REGION,
+  # VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET, VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX), apps-vms (UNIFI_L4_VIP). A ${TOKEN} in an
+  # UNSUBSTITUTED path would ship the literal string into the cluster.
+  #
+  # ADDING A KNOB IS SAFE UNDER StrictPostBuildSubstitutions ONLY BECAUSE OF THE ROOT EDGE. An
+  # UNDEFINED variable is a HARD Kustomization failure, so a manifest that references a knob the
+  # live ConfigMap does not yet carry breaks its whole tier. `clusters/base/platform.yaml` gained
+  # `dependsOn: [flux-system]` for exactly this: dependsOn is REVISION-gated, so no substituting
+  # tier can reconcile revision N until the ROOT Kustomization has APPLIED revision N — i.e. until
+  # the new cluster-vars key EXISTS. Every substituting consumer chains transitively through
+  # `platform`, so one edge covers the graph, and a new knob plus its first reference may ship in
+  # ONE commit. (A hand-run `kubectl apply -k clusters/<env>` bypasses that ordering entirely: apply
+  # the overlay BEFORE the tier that references the knob, or the tier fails until it retries.)

  # k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials (platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml).
-  # [parity] MUST equal the Ansible bootstrap's k3s_api_host (infra/ansible/roles/cilium/defaults/
-  # main.yml -> cilium-values.yaml.j2, already inventory-parameterized). Wrong value = Cilium cannot
-  # reach the API server on adopt and the CNI breaks. Port stays 6443 in both envs, so it is NOT a knob.
-  K3S_API_HOST: "192.168.1.50"
+  #
+  # *** THIS IS THE CONTROL-PLANE VIP (kube-vip), NOT A NODE ADDRESS. *** Operator decision
+  # 2026-09-06. It was each environment's PRIMARY NODE IP until then, which made the CNI's
+  # control-plane path depend on one machine in a cluster whose entire purpose is HA: verified on
+  # live prod, all three cilium-agents carried KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10 (k3s-prod-1's
+  # own address) while kube-vip held 192.168.2.9. Losing that node leaves the datapath running off
+  # Cilium's cache while NO service or policy update lands — a silent, unbounded staleness, not an
+  # outage you would notice. A virtual address that follows the control plane is the fix, and it is
+  # what kube-vip was stood up to provide.
+  #
+  #   dev  -> 192.168.1.49   (= kube_vip_address, group_vars/all.yml; base default, below)
+  #   prod -> 192.168.2.9    (= kube_vip_address, group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml)
+  #
+  # THE NAME IS NOW SLIGHTLY WRONG AND IS KEPT ANYWAY: renaming the knob would be a second,
+  # unrelated change to every substituting Kustomization at the same time as a live CNI endpoint
+  # move. Read it as "the API host Cilium dials", which is what it always meant.
+  #
+  # [parity] MUST equal the Ansible bootstrap's **k3s_apiserver_endpoint** for the SAME environment
+  # (infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/all.yml -> roles/cilium/templates/cilium-values.yaml.j2,
+  # already inventory-parameterized). NOT k3s_api_host — that variable still exists and still holds
+  # the FOUNDER's address, because the cold-bootstrap `--server` join needs a machine that is
+  # already up before any VIP exists. The two are deliberately separate; see the TWO API ADDRESSES
+  # block at the top of group_vars/all.yml.
+  #
+  # Wrong value = Cilium cannot reach the API server on adopt and the CNI breaks. Port stays 6443
+  # in both envs, so it is NOT a knob.
+  #
+  # TLS needs nothing: k3s_tls_sans has always carried kube_vip_address alongside every node IP, so
+  # both addresses are already in the serving cert (verified live 2026-09-06 — prod answers through
+  # https://192.168.2.9:6443 under full CA verification). No cert reissue, no k3s restart.
+  K3S_API_HOST: "192.168.1.49"

  # CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool `default-pool` (platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml): the VIP range
  # L2-announced on the flat LAN. Must sit OUTSIDE the node IPs and any DHCP scope, and must match the
@@ -120,12 +160,46 @@ data:
  UNIFI_L4_VIP: "192.168.1.54"               # UniFi controller VM: inform/STUN/adoption (apps/vms/unifi)
  CRAFTY_L4_VIP: "192.168.1.55"              # Crafty: Minecraft Java (TCP) + Bedrock (UDP) game ports

+  # --- Bulk (external NFS) storage host (docs/04 bulk tier) ---------------------------------------
+  # THE address of the Proxmox host whose ZFS datasets back every `class: bulk` volume: the media
+  # library (Storage/plex, 8.33 T — plex, sonarr, radarr) and the legacy Nextcloud archive
+  # (Storage/nextcloud, 270 G). The renderer emits it into each static NFS PersistentVolume's
+  # `spec.nfs.server` (catalog/render.py, BULK_NFS_SERVER); the export PATH is per-dataset and is
+  # declared in the ServiceDefinition, because the path is identical in every environment and only
+  # the ADDRESS is not.
+  #
+  # WHY THIS IS A KNOB AND NOT A LITERAL — the two clusters are on OPPOSITE SIDES of pfSense.
+  # The storage host has exactly one interface, vmbr0 192.168.1.9/24, on pfSense's LAN.
+  #   dev  nodes are 192.168.1.40/.41/.42 — the SAME L2 segment. They reach it directly, and one
+  #        NFS export to them already exists on that host (/mnt/Storage/k8s-volumes in
+  #        /etc/exports), so this path is proven, not theoretical. Base default = the dev value,
+  #        per the convention of the LAN block above.
+  #   prod nodes are 192.168.2.10/.11/.12 — pfSense's WAN. tcp/2049 does NOT traverse that today;
+  #        22 and 8006 answer only because pfSense port-forwards them via 192.168.2.102. Opening
+  #        the storage path is a PENDING OPERATOR DECISION with two candidate outcomes that give
+  #        DIFFERENT values here: 192.168.2.102 (another port-forward) or 192.168.1.9 (a route).
+  # So prod holds a loud TBD-PROD-* placeholder — see clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml for the
+  # blast radius of shipping it unset, which is NOT the usual "fails to apply".
+  BULK_NFS_SERVER: "192.168.1.9"
+
  # Off-cluster S3 backup target (R-STATE-03, R-IDP-05) — the on-Proxmox MinIO, plain HTTP, path-style.
  # Consumed by BOTH backup paths: every CNPG Cluster's barmanObjectStore.endpointURL (keycloak-db,
  # nextcloud-db, semaphore-db) and Velero's backupStorageLocation s3Url. Full URL incl. scheme+port.
-  # Prod needs its OWN target: a backup that lands on the dev LAN's MinIO is not off-cluster DR.
+  # Prod needs its OWN target: a backup that lands on the dev LAN's MinIO is not off-cluster DR —
+  # and, measured 2026-09-05 from a pod INSIDE prod, it CANNOT reach it anyway (prod is on the SOHO
+  # network 192.168.2.0/24, which is pfSense's WAN, while this MinIO sits inside pfSense's LAN:
+  # `curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live` timed out after 15s). Prod uses Cloudflare R2.
  S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT: "http://192.168.1.9:9000"

+  # S3 region. Every S3 client REQUIRES one; MinIO ignores whatever it is; Cloudflare R2 demands
+  # exactly `auto` (its `head-bucket` reports the physical hint `WNAM`, which is NOT a usable region
+  # string). This was hardcoded `us-east-1` inside platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml — correct-by-
+  # accident for MinIO and wrong for anything else, which is why it is a knob now. The base default
+  # is dev's LIVE value, deliberately: dev's Velero has been signing requests with `us-east-1`
+  # against that MinIO since bootstrap, and this repo's rule is that base == the known-good dev
+  # value. Prod overrides to `auto`.
+  S3_BACKUP_REGION: "us-east-1"
+
  # --- storage (ADR-0003) ---
  LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT: "3"       # default StorageClass replica count (3 on 3 nodes)
  # Longhorn's defaultDataPath (platform/longhorn/helmrelease.yaml): the on-NODE directory every
@@ -178,6 +252,99 @@ data:
  VELERO_BACKUP_SCHEDULE: "0 3 * * *"        # cron; overlays may differ
  VELERO_RETENTION: "168h"                   # dev short | prod long

+  # ==========================================================================================
+  # OBJECT-STORE TENANCY — the three knobs that keep two clusters and two backup tools from
+  # writing into each other's data. THESE ARE SAFETY KNOBS, not preferences.
+  # ==========================================================================================
+  # Nothing about the object layout was per-environment before this: Velero's bucket was the
+  # hardcoded literal `velero` with no prefix, and every CNPG Cluster used the hardcoded
+  # `s3://cnpg` with barman's `serverName` defaulting to the CLUSTER NAME — and BOTH environments
+  # have a keycloak-db, a nextcloud-db and a semaphore-db. Point two clusters at one bucket under
+  # that layout and:
+  #   (a) each cluster's Velero ADOPTS the other's backups and TTL-DELETES them on retention; and
+  #   (b) two different Postgres servers stream WAL into ONE Barman prefix, which does not merely
+  #       mix files — it CORRUPTS THE CHAIN and destroys PITR for both. That is the worse half:
+  #       dev's DR restore is PROVEN (R-STATE-03) and this would silently un-prove it.
+  #
+  # WHY THERE IS NO SINGLE `S3_BACKUP_BUCKET`. The two consumers take differently-SHAPED values:
+  # the Velero chart wants `bucket` and `prefix` as separate fields, while CNPG's
+  # barmanObjectStore.destinationPath is ONE full s3:// URL whose first path segment IS the bucket.
+  # CNPG's bucket therefore already lives inside CNPG_BACKUP_PATH; adding a second knob that had to
+  # hold the same bucket name a second time would be a rotation waiting to drift — the exact class
+  # of duplication this repo has been bitten by. Three knobs, each shaped for its own consumer, and
+  # no two of them can contradict each other.
+  #
+  # BASE = DEV'S LIVE LAYOUT, BYTE-FOR-BYTE, AND MUST STAY THAT WAY. Dev's existing backups are at
+  # `s3://velero/` (bucket root, no prefix) and `s3://cnpg/<clusterName>/` on that MinIO. Giving dev
+  # a prefix, or renaming its buckets, would ORPHAN the very backups its proven restore depends on —
+  # the same reason dev's EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID stays `default` and its LONGHORN_DATA_PATH stays
+  # /var/lib/longhorn. Verified: with an EMPTY prefix the Velero chart omits `objectStorage.prefix`
+  # from the rendered BackupStorageLocation entirely (helm template, chart 12.1.0), so dev's live
+  # BSL is unchanged by this parameterization rather than merely equivalent to it.
+  #
+  # PROD, which has no history to preserve, gets ONE bucket with TWO disjoint top-level prefixes:
+  #
+  #     s3://k3s-prod-backup/velero/…                 Velero (kopia repo + backup metadata)
+  #     s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/<clusterName>/…   CNPG WAL + base backups
+  #
+  # The operator created exactly one R2 bucket, so velero-vs-barman separation has to come from the
+  # prefix rather than the bucket. The BUCKET ROOT IS DELIBERATELY LEFT EMPTY: if a prefix ever
+  # renders wrong, its objects land somewhere obviously bogus instead of silently colliding with a
+  # real tenant's data. Dev↔prod isolation is doubly independent — different endpoint AND different
+  # bucket — so neither cluster can reach the other's objects even with a mis-substituted prefix.
+  VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET: "velero"             # dev: the `velero` MinIO bucket | prod: k3s-prod-backup
+  VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX: ""                   # dev: bucket root (live layout) | prod: "velero"
+  CNPG_BACKUP_PATH: "s3://cnpg"              # dev: the `cnpg` MinIO bucket root | prod: s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman
+
+  # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  # WHICH CREDENTIAL SECRET THE BACKUP CONSUMERS READ (added 2026-09-07 — the per-env credential split)
+  # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  # The three knobs above say WHERE the backups go. This one says WHICH KEY signs the requests, and
+  # it exists because the endpoint moved per-environment while the credential did not.
+  #
+  # THE BUG IT FIXES. The four backup-credential Secrets — velero-cloud.sops.yaml and the three
+  # <db>-backup-credentials.sops.yaml — are SHARED BASE manifests: platform/ and apps/ are rendered
+  # by the same Flux tiers on both clusters, and cluster-vars substitution is the ONLY thing that
+  # differs (R-ENV-02). So writing prod's R2 token into those four files did not GIVE prod a
+  # credential, it REPLACED DEV'S: dev's Velero and all three dev CNPG Clusters would have started
+  # signing MinIO requests with an R2 key id. For Velero that is a broken BSL; for CNPG it is worse,
+  # because `archive_mode=on` means Postgres REFUSES TO RECYCLE a WAL segment it could not archive,
+  # so a 403 loop is a monotonically filling pgdata PVC ending in a PANIC — the same failure prod
+  # spent its whole bring-up in with a placeholder endpoint. One shared Secret also means rotating
+  # either environment's key silently breaks the other; that is the structural reason for the split,
+  # independent of dev's eventual decommission.
+  #
+  # THE MECHANISM. Each credential is now TWO Secret objects, both applied to BOTH clusters (they are
+  # base resources; nothing here forks a manifest per environment). The consumer names one:
+  #
+  #     velero:   credentials.existingSecret: velero-cloud-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
+  #     CNPG:     s3Credentials.*.name:  <db>-backup-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}
+  #
+  # ONE knob, not four, ON PURPOSE. Four independent secret-name knobs could be updated three-
+  # quarters of the way, leaving one consumer pointed at the OTHER environment's key with nothing
+  # rendering wrong — and StrictPostBuildSubstitutions cannot catch that, because it only fails on an
+  # UNDEFINED variable, never on a defined-but-stale one. With a single suffix the four move together
+  # or not at all. The cost is that the rendered Secret name is not greppable from the consumer; the
+  # names are spelled out in full in each kustomization.yaml beside the resources.
+  #
+  # THE BASE DEFAULT IS THE EMPTY STRING, AND THAT IS LOAD-BEARING. It renders the UNSUFFIXED names,
+  # which are the objects that already exist and that the live dev cluster is running. A default
+  # naming a Secret that does not exist would be worse than the shared-Secret state it replaces:
+  # Velero's pod would sit in ContainerCreating forever on a missing `existingSecret` volume, and a
+  # CNPG Cluster whose s3Credentials Secret is absent stops archiving WAL — i.e. the disk-full clock
+  # again — so an unresolvable default breaks the referencing cluster HARDER than a wrong key does.
+  # Empty is also the value dev must carry, so base and dev agree, exactly like VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX.
+  #
+  # An EMPTY VALUE IS SAFE UNDER StrictPostBuildSubstitutions: strict mode fails on a variable that is
+  # not DEFINED, not on one defined as "". VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX above has shipped empty since the
+  # gate was enabled and proves it. Both overlays state this knob explicitly — dev "" and prod
+  # "-prod" — so neither inherits it silently.
+  #
+  # ADDING A NEW BACKUP CREDENTIAL: create BOTH halves (`x-credentials.sops.yaml` and
+  # `x-credentials-prod.sops.yaml`), list both in the kustomization, and reference
+  # `x-credentials${BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX}`. Never a single shared Secret again.
+  BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX: ""              # dev: "" (MinIO creds) | prod: "-prod" (R2 creds)
+
  # --- placement ---
  PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_KEY: "kubernetes.io/os"   # base no-op selector; prod may pin roles
  PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_VALUE: "linux"
@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@ resources:
  - cilium.yaml          # Flux Kustomization -> ./platform/cilium (dependsOn flux-system, wait:true)
  - platform.yaml        # Flux Kustomization -> ./platform (CONTROLLERS: HelmReleases / CRDs)
  - platform-config.yaml # Flux Kustomization -> ./platform-config (CONFIGS: CRs; dependsOn platform)
+  # SECOND-ORDER CDI configs — CRs whose CRD is created by a controller AT RUNTIME, not by any
+  # manifest in git. cdi-operator.yaml registers only `cdis.cdi.kubevirt.io`; `storageprofiles` (and
+  # datavolumes, datasources, …) appear only after cdi-operator reconciles the `CDI` CR that
+  # platform-config applies. Because Flux dry-runs every object in a pass before applying any of them,
+  # keeping the StorageProfiles in platform-config was a TRUE DEADLOCK (unknown kind -> pass aborts ->
+  # CR never applied -> CRD never created -> tier never converges), invisible on dev and fatal on any
+  # cold cluster — observed on prod 2026-09-05. This tier is the durable fix; `standup.sh crds` stays
+  # as the belt-and-braces repair for clusters already wedged. See clusters/base/platform-config-cdi.yaml.
+  - platform-config-cdi.yaml # Flux Kustomization -> ./platform-config-cdi (dependsOn platform-config)
  # App tier, split into dependency-ordered WAVES (was the single ./apps `apps` Kustomization).
  # Each apps-wave-<N> dependsOn wave N-1 (wave 0 dependsOn platform-config) and health-gates
  # (wait:true) ONLY its own wave, so a crashloop in a later wave can't stall an earlier one.
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+# Flux Kustomization: SECOND-ORDER CDI CONFIGS — reconciles ./platform-config-cdi.
+# Serves R-GITOPS-01 (all desired state in git, reconciled by Flux) and R-ENV-02.
+#
+# WHY THIS TIER EXISTS — the durable fix for the 2026-09-05 prod CDI DEADLOCK
+#
+# `platform-config` applied the `CDI` CR and the CDI `StorageProfile`s in the SAME pass.
+# kustomize-controller server-side DRY-RUNS EVERY object before applying ANY of them, and
+# `storageprofiles.cdi.kubevirt.io` does not exist until cdi-operator has reconciled that `CDI` CR.
+# So the unknown kind aborted the whole tier → the CR was never applied → the CRD was never created →
+# platform-config could NEVER converge and every tier below it stayed blocked. Not a race: a
+# deadlock. cdi-operator was Available for 12h on prod with no CR. Invisible on dev (its CDI CRDs
+# have existed for months), FATAL on any cold cluster. See DECISIONS-LOG 2026-09-05.
+#
+# `bootstrap/standup.sh crds` pre-applies the `CDI` CR to break it by hand. That is a WORKAROUND and
+# stays as belt-and-braces for clusters already wedged; THIS Kustomization is the fix that makes the
+# graph order itself, so a cold cluster needs no human in the loop.
+#
+# THE ORDERING GUARANTEE, precisely: `dependsOn` is REVISION-gated, not merely Ready-gated (verified
+# against kustomize-controller v1.4.0 `kustomization_controller.go :: checkDependencies`, our
+# version): sharing a GitRepository with the dependency, this Kustomization cannot reconcile revision
+# N until `platform-config` has APPLIED revision N — and, because platform-config runs `wait: true`,
+# not until the `CDI` CR it applied is HEALTHY. cdi-operator creates the remaining CDI CRDs as part of
+# reaching that state, so by the time this tier's first dry-run runs, `StorageProfile` is a known
+# kind. One edge, no pre-apply.
+#
+# WHY NOT just move the CDI CR earlier, into `platform`? Because `platform` is the tier the CNI gates
+# and everything else waits on: putting CDI's health on that critical path is the mistake the
+# oauth2-proxy/headlamp splits were made to undo. The CR is correctly a platform-config CR; it is the
+# StorageProfiles that were in the wrong pass.
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: platform-config-cdi
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  # 2m (short, deliberately). kustomize-controller caches API discovery, so on a COLD cluster the
+  # very first attempt here can still fail `no matches for kind "StorageProfile"` even though the CRD
+  # now exists — a stale RESTMapper, not a missing CRD (the failure mode `standup.sh crds` warns
+  # about). The controller resets the mapper and the retry succeeds, so the only cost of that stale
+  # cache is one retryInterval. Keep it short.
+  retryInterval: 2m
+  # 2m is ample: this tier applies two tiny cluster-scoped CRs. There is no workload to roll out, no
+  # image to pull and no controller to become Available, so a slow apply here means a real error, not
+  # a slow rollout — failing fast surfaces it instead of burning 5m per attempt.
+  timeout: 2m
+  # TRUE, and this tier is the SOLE declarer of both StorageProfiles (checked repo-wide), so prune is
+  # component-scoped: the stale set can only ever be a StorageProfile this file stopped rendering.
+  # It is NOT the platform/cilium case — nothing here declares a shared Namespace, or any object a
+  # second path also declares. See the transition note at the bottom of this file.
+  prune: true
+  # TRUE, but understand exactly what it buys and what it does NOT.
+  #
+  # CANNOT STALL: `StorageProfile`'s status type (CDI v1beta1 StorageProfileStatus: storageClass,
+  # provisioner, claimPropertySets, cloneStrategy, dataImportCronSourceFormat) carries NO
+  # `conditions` and NO `observedGeneration`, so kstatus's generic path reports it Current the moment
+  # it is applied. `wait: true` therefore adds a Ready condition without adding a way to hang — which
+  # is why it is safe to let `apps-vms` gate on it (contrast the headlamp gating stall).
+  # If a resource that CAN be unhealthy is ever added to ./platform-config-cdi, re-derive this:
+  # `apps-vms` waits on it.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT DOES NOT PROVE (honest gap): CDI reads the profile's **status**, not its spec, when it
+  # provisions a claim (status.claimPropertySets / status.cloneStrategy), and CDI's
+  # storageprofile-controller computes that status from our spec override plus inference. So Ready
+  # here means "the spec override is accepted by the API server", not "CDI has folded it into
+  # status". That reconcile is a watch-triggered round-trip of seconds, and the dependency requeue
+  # below it is ~30s, so a DataVolume cannot realistically beat it — but it is a timing argument, not
+  # a guarantee, and no `wait` setting can turn it into one (there is no condition to wait on).
+  wait: true
+  dependsOn:
+    # platform-config applies the `CDI` CR and (wait:true) waits for it to be healthy — which is what
+    # causes cdi-operator to create `storageprofiles.cdi.kubevirt.io`. Revision-gated, so this is an
+    # ordering guarantee and not a hope. Transitively this also chains platform -> cilium ->
+    # flux-system, so `cluster-vars` at revision N is applied before this renders revision N.
+    - name: platform-config
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./platform-config-cdi
+  # NO SOPS `decryption` stanza: ../platform/kubevirt/cdi-storageprofiles.yaml is two plain CRs with
+  # no Secret and no *.sops.yaml, so neither overlay needs to patch one in (unlike
+  # oauth2-proxy/headlamp/crafty/velero, which each carry an encrypted Secret). Nothing to add to
+  # clusters/dev or clusters/prod for this tier.
+  #
+  # substituteFrom cluster-vars: the manifest currently contains NO `${TOKEN}`, so this stanza
+  # substitutes nothing today. It is declared anyway for two concrete reasons, not for symmetry:
+  #   1. COVERAGE. conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution/check.sh only audits paths
+  #      whose Kustomization declares substituteFrom. Omitting it would move
+  #      cdi-storageprofiles.yaml OUT of the audited set — a blind spot where a future `${TOKEN}`
+  #      could ship as a literal string, precisely the class of bug that check exists to stop.
+  #   2. FAIL-CLOSED. kustomize-controller runs --feature-gates=StrictPostBuildSubstitutions=true, so
+  #      with this stanza an undefined token FAILS this Kustomization loudly instead of rendering
+  #      empty. Without the stanza there is no substitution at all and the literal ships silently.
+  postBuild:
+    substituteFrom:
+      - kind: ConfigMap
+        name: cluster-vars
+  # ── FIRST RECONCILE AFTER MERGE: a TRANSIENT DELETE-THEN-RECREATE. READ BEFORE MERGING. ──────────
+  # Moving cdi-storageprofiles.yaml out of ./platform-config drops both StorageProfiles from THAT
+  # Kustomization's inventory, and platform-config has `prune: true` — so its next apply DELETES
+  # StorageProfile/longhorn and StorageProfile/longhorn-vm, and this Kustomization recreates them on
+  # the following reconcile (revision-gated: strictly after platform-config's apply, so there is no
+  # dual-ownership fight — the objects are pruned before they are re-applied under this tier's
+  # `kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/name=platform-config-cdi` label).
+  #
+  # Why that is acceptable here — and it is NOT the platform/cilium case:
+  #   * Neither object is the sole (or any) declarer of a shared object. No Namespace, no ConfigMap,
+  #     nothing else in the repo declares a StorageProfile. The stale set is exactly two
+  #     cluster-scoped CDI CRs.
+  #   * The objects do not actually go missing: CDI's storageprofile-controller creates a
+  #     StorageProfile per StorageClass and recreates a deleted one, with an EMPTY `.spec` and
+  #     inferred `.status`. So the transient is "our .spec overrides are absent", not "the object is
+  #     absent".
+  #   * A StorageProfile is read at DataVolume/PVC PROVISIONING and CLONE time only. Existing PVCs,
+  #     existing DataVolumes and running VMs do not consult it again, so nothing already provisioned
+  #     is disturbed and no data path is touched.
+  #   * The only exposure is a DataVolume/clone STARTED inside the window: it would clone by `copy`
+  #     instead of `snapshot`, and on `longhorn-vm` be stamped RWO/Filesystem instead of RWX/Block —
+  #     permanently non-live-migratable for that disk. Flux cannot cause that, because `apps-vms` now
+  #     dependsOn THIS tier (clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml), so no Flux-managed DataVolume can be
+  #     created while the overrides are absent. A human running `virtctl`/`kubectl` in that minute
+  #     could.
+  #
+  # PRECONDITION THE OPERATOR MUST CHECK, because it is what bounds the window: the recreate cannot
+  # happen until `platform-config` is Ready, and platform-config runs `wait: true` over the whole
+  # config tier (ClusterIssuers, wildcard Certificate, Gateway, Keycloak, CNPG, KubeVirt, CDI…). On a
+  # healthy cluster that is seconds and the window is ~30-60s (kustomize-controller's
+  # --requeue-dependency default is 30s). If platform-config is NOT Ready when this merges, the
+  # StorageProfiles are pruned and stay at CDI defaults until it recovers. So:
+  #   `flux get kustomization platform-config` must be Ready BEFORE merging.
+  # If it is not, do the two-step the cilium move used instead: merge with `platform-config.prune`
+  # temporarily set to `false` (the objects are then dropped from its inventory but NOT deleted, and
+  # this tier ADOPTS them with zero window), verify the ownership label transferred, then restore
+  # `prune: true` in a second commit.
@@ -106,8 +106,11 @@ patches:
          secretRef:
            name: sops-age
  # velero (backup controller) has its own post-platform Flux Kustomization (clusters/base/backup.yaml).
-  # It carries velero-cloud.sops.yaml (the scoped MinIO `cloud` credential), so it needs its own SOPS
-  # decryption stanza (same as headlamp/oauth2-proxy/crafty). The `sops-age` Secret is out-of-band (name only).
+  # It carries BOTH halves of the per-env `cloud` INI credential — velero-cloud.sops.yaml (dev's scoped
+  # MinIO key) and velero-cloud-prod.sops.yaml (prod's R2 token) — so it needs its own SOPS decryption
+  # stanza (same as headlamp/oauth2-proxy/crafty). Which one the Deployment mounts is chosen by
+  # BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX in the cluster-vars patch below, not here. The `sops-age` Secret is
+  # out-of-band (name only).
  - patch: |-
      apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
      kind: Kustomization
@@ -187,11 +190,25 @@ patches:
      - op: replace
        path: /data/GATEWAY_VIP
        value: "192.168.1.53"
-      # k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials — the primary control-plane node
-      # (k3s-1). [parity] equals the Ansible inventory's k3s_api_host for dev.
+      # k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials — DEV'S CONTROL-PLANE VIP,
+      # the address kube-vip floats, NOT the primary node .50.
+      # [parity] equals the Ansible inventory's k3s_apiserver_endpoint for dev
+      # (= kube_vip_address, group_vars/all.yml). See clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml for why.
+      #
+      # *** THE ONE EXCEPTION TO "NEVER LET THIS BLOCK DRIFT FROM THE LIVE CLUSTER" ***
+      # Every other value in this block is what dev is running right now. This one is not:
+      # the live dev cilium-agents dial 192.168.1.50 (k3s-1). Changing it here is a
+      # DELIBERATE, OPERATOR-APPROVED move (2026-09-06) and reconciling it ROLLS THE CILIUM
+      # AGENT DAEMONSET on dev — one node at a time (updateStrategy.maxUnavailable: 1, kept
+      # in parity for exactly this reason). Do not push this to dev-live casually, and not
+      # while dev's DNS migration is mid-flight; the L2 datapath survives an agent restart
+      # but a wrong value here is the 2026-09-01 incident. .49 is in dev's serving-cert SANs
+      # already (k3s_tls_sans) and dev's own kubeconfig validates against it via
+      # tls-server-name, so TLS is not the risk — the risk is reachability, and .49 is on the
+      # same LAN as the nodes and ARP-announced by kube-vip on every server.
      - op: replace
        path: /data/K3S_API_HOST
-        value: "192.168.1.50"
+        value: "192.168.1.49"
      # Cilium LB IP pool = the tofu reservation cilium_l2_vip_range .53-.60, outside the node IPs
      # (.50/.51/.52) and outside the DHCP scope. .53 Gateway, .54 unifi, .55 crafty; .56-.60 free.
      - op: replace
@@ -208,11 +225,67 @@ patches:
      - op: replace
        path: /data/CRAFTY_L4_VIP
        value: "192.168.1.55"
+      # Bulk (external NFS) storage host: the Proxmox host itself, on the SAME LAN as dev's nodes
+      # (192.168.1.40/.41/.42), which already hold an NFS export from it (/mnt/Storage/k8s-volumes).
+      # Restated verbatim rather than inherited, per this overlay's "supply every knob" convention.
+      # Dev is therefore the environment in which the bulk manifests can actually be VALIDATED
+      # end-to-end before prod's network path exists — provided the additive `zfs set sharenfs=`
+      # change described in docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md is applied for the dev node addresses.
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/BULK_NFS_SERVER
+        value: "192.168.1.9"
      # Off-cluster backup target: the on-Proxmox MinIO (plain HTTP, path-style) that every CNPG
      # barmanObjectStore and Velero's backupStorageLocation write to.
+      #
+      # DEV IS DELIBERATELY STAYING ON THIS MinIO while prod goes to Cloudflare R2 (2026-09-07).
+      # Prod could not use it at all — it cannot even route to it — but dev's move is a separate,
+      # operator-gated decision, because R2 would start dev on an EMPTY prefix: Velero would write
+      # a fresh kopia repository, CNPG would take new base backups, and the 30-day Barman window
+      # would rebuild from zero. Dev's DR restore is the one PROVEN recovery path in this repo
+      # (R-STATE-03); resetting its PITR window is not a side effect to take while fixing prod.
      - op: replace
        path: /data/S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT
        value: "http://192.168.1.9:9000"
+      # DO NOT CHANGE THESE FOUR. They are dev's LIVE object layout, restated verbatim for the same
+      # reason as LONGHORN_DATA_PATH and EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID below/above: they equal the base
+      # defaults today, and a silent drift in base would ORPHAN dev's existing backups — the ones
+      # its proven restore depends on — without any manifest looking wrong.
+      #
+      # `us-east-1` is what dev's Velero has signed every request with since bootstrap; MinIO
+      # ignores the value, but changing it is a needless risk against a live, working backup path.
+      # An EMPTY VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX means the bucket root, which is where dev's backups already
+      # are — and the Velero chart omits `objectStorage.prefix` entirely when it is empty (verified
+      # against chart 12.1.0), so dev's live BackupStorageLocation is byte-unchanged by this.
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/S3_BACKUP_REGION
+        value: "us-east-1"
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET
+        value: "velero"
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX
+        value: ""
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
+        value: "s3://cnpg"
+      # WHICH CREDENTIAL SIGNS THOSE REQUESTS. Empty suffix = the UNSUFFIXED Secrets
+      # (velero-cloud-credentials, <db>-backup-credentials) — the scoped MinIO keys dev's Velero and
+      # its three CNPG Clusters are running RIGHT NOW, byte-identical to what is on the cluster. Prod
+      # renders "-prod" and reads the Cloudflare R2 token from the parallel `-prod` Secrets instead.
+      #
+      # RESTATED EXPLICITLY even though it equals the base default, for the same reason as
+      # EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID and the four backup-layout knobs above: the four Secrets are SHARED
+      # base manifests, so before this split prod's R2 token landed in the objects DEV reads. Dev
+      # signing MinIO with an R2 key id is 403 on every barman-cloud-wal-archive, and archive_mode=on
+      # turns that into a filling pgdata PVC — the disk-full clock, on the one cluster whose DR
+      # restore is PROVEN (R-STATE-03). This line is what keeps dev on its own credential.
+      #
+      # DEV IS NOT BEING BACKED UP GOING FORWARD and is slated for decommission (operator,
+      # 2026-09-07), so this is not protecting a future backup — it is protecting the EXISTING
+      # backups and the WAL chain until dev is retired. Do not "simplify" it away while dev runs.
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX
+        value: ""
      # dev mirrors prod's 3-node topology, so the replicated tier keeps 3 replicas.
      - op: replace
        path: /data/LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT
@@ -185,9 +185,25 @@ patches:
        name: flux-system
        namespace: flux-system
      spec:
-        # TEMPORARY bootstrap source — workstation container, NOT in any cluster. See the block
-        # above for the cutover to https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/... . Do not treat as final.
-        url: http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
+        # CUTOVER DONE 2026-09-06 (operator direction: "move the repo to prod"). Prod now reconciles
+        # from PROD'S OWN in-cluster Gitea. The workstation bootstrap container
+        # (http://192.168.2.132:3000) is retired as prod's source — it was a podman container on the
+        # operator's workstation holding a DHCP lease on WIFI, i.e. production's source of truth was a
+        # laptop. It is kept only as a recovery path (bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh).
+        #
+        # THIS LINE IS SELF-REFERENTIAL AND THAT IS THE WHOLE DIFFICULTY. The root Kustomization
+        # renders ./clusters/prod, which contains this patch — so a live `kubectl patch` of
+        # GitRepository.spec.url is REVERTED on the next reconcile unless the authored value moves
+        # too. The cutover therefore had to be: (1) push the repo to prod's Gitea, (2) fast-forward
+        # its `main` to the exact commit prod was already running so the source swap changed nothing
+        # else, (3) live-patch the url to open a window, (4) land THIS commit through that window so
+        # the authored value agrees. Dev hit the identical trap on 2026-09-05
+        # (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10a "D0/D1 as executed").
+        #
+        # Verified before the switch: a throwaway pod INSIDE prod resolved this host through
+        # in-cluster CoreDNS to the Gateway VIP and cloned over the public LE cert with no CA
+        # supplied. The workstation being able to reach it proves nothing about pod egress.
+        url: https://gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
        ref:
          branch: main
  - target:
@@ -340,14 +356,32 @@ patches:
      - op: replace
        path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP
        value: "192.168.2.30"
-      # --- still UNDECIDED -> loud placeholders (must be real before `flux bootstrap`) ------------
      # k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials. This is the prod CONTROL-PLANE VIP
-      # (kube-vip), NOT .20 (the ingress VIP) and NOT the single node address .10. It is owned
-      # Ansible-side (prod inventory k3s_api_host) and MUST equal that value — [parity] contract in
-      # platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml. Not yet decided.
+      # (kube-vip), NOT .20 (the ingress VIP) and NOT the single node address .10.
+      #
+      # *** DECIDED 2026-09-06 by the operator: the VIP, as intended. *** (This block previously
+      # read "Not yet decided" while shipping .10 — the founder's own address — and that is what
+      # the LIVE prod cluster is running: all three cilium-agents carry
+      # KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10 while kube-vip holds .9, verified 2026-09-06. On a
+      # 3-node HA cluster that makes the CNI's control-plane path depend on k3s-prod-1: lose it and
+      # the datapath keeps running off Cilium's cache while no service or policy update lands, with
+      # nothing looking broken. The VIP is a virtual address that reaches the cluster wherever the
+      # control plane is, which is the whole reason kube-vip exists here.)
+      #
+      # It is owned Ansible-side by **k3s_apiserver_endpoint** (group_vars/all.yml, derived from
+      # this environment's kube_vip_address = 192.168.2.9 in group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml) and MUST
+      # equal that value — [parity] contract in platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml. NOT k3s_api_host:
+      # that variable still exists and still holds the FOUNDER's .10, because the cold-bootstrap
+      # `--server` join needs a host that is up before any VIP is floated. Two addresses, two
+      # variables, deliberately.
+      #
+      # .9 sits OUTSIDE the Cilium LB pool (.20-.30) and is not a node address, so kube-vip and
+      # LB-IPAM can never be handed the same IP — asserted by
+      # conformance/tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code.
      - op: replace
        path: /data/K3S_API_HOST
-        value: "192.168.2.10"
+        value: "192.168.2.9"
+      # --- still UNDECIDED -> loud placeholders (must be real before `flux bootstrap`) ------------
      # Pinned L4 VIPs, both carved out of the pool by lbipam.cilium.io/ips. Not yet assigned for
      # prod. Leaving the dev literals in place would hand a prod LoadBalancer a dev-LAN address, so
      # they stay placeholders; whatever is chosen MUST fall inside [POOL_START, POOL_STOP] and not
@@ -358,10 +392,146 @@ patches:
      - op: replace
        path: /data/CRAFTY_L4_VIP
        value: "192.168.2.22"
-      # Off-cluster DR target. Dev's versitygw/MinIO (192.168.1.9:9000) sits on the DEV side of the
-      # network — a prod backup written there is not off-cluster DR and would mix two environments'
-      # PITR streams in one bucket. Operator supplies the prod endpoint (full URL incl. scheme+port).
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+      # BULK (EXTERNAL NFS) STORAGE HOST — *** NOT YET DECIDED. THIS PLACEHOLDER IS LOAD-BEARING. ***
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+      # Backs every `class: bulk` volume: the 8.33 T media library (Storage/plex — plex, sonarr,
+      # radarr) and the 270 G legacy Nextcloud archive (Storage/nextcloud).
+      #
+      # THE STORAGE HOST IS NOT REACHABLE FROM PROD AT ALL RIGHT NOW. It has one interface,
+      # vmbr0 192.168.1.9/24, on pfSense's LAN; prod's nodes are on 192.168.2.0/24, pfSense's WAN.
+      # 22 and 8006 answer from prod only because pfSense port-forwards them via 192.168.2.102;
+      # 2049 and 111 do not. Opening that path is an OPERATOR decision, and the two candidate
+      # outcomes give DIFFERENT values here:
+      #     port-forward 192.168.2.102:2049 -> 192.168.1.9:2049   =>  "192.168.2.102"
+      #     a WAN->LAN route to 192.168.1.0/24                    =>  "192.168.1.9"
+      # Guessing either one authors a prod cluster that mounts nothing, or — worse, if the guess
+      # ever became reachable — mounts something unintended. So it stays a placeholder.
+      #
+      # WHICH PORTS THE DECISION MUST OPEN: exactly ONE, tcp/2049. The PVs mount nfsvers=4.1, and
+      # NFSv4 carries mount and lock in-protocol — no rpcbind/111, no mountd, no statd. Choosing v4
+      # over v3 was in part this decision's cost: v3 would have needed four ports and three of them
+      # on ephemeral numbers.
+      #
+      # WHAT THE EXPORT MUST ALLOW IS ALREADY SETTLED, and it is the same under BOTH outcomes.
+      # Measured 2026-09-07 from this workstation (192.168.2.132) through the existing port-forward:
+      # the storage host logged the connection as coming FROM 192.168.2.132, not from a pfSense LAN
+      # address (`ss -tn` peer 192.168.2.132, and the host's only route off-LAN is its default via
+      # 192.168.1.1). pfSense DNATs WITHOUT source NAT, so the NFS server will see prod's REAL node
+      # addresses either way. The additive `zfs set sharenfs=` values are in docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md.
+      #
+      # *** BLAST RADIUS — READ BEFORE MERGING THIS TO A BRANCH PROD RECONCILES. ***
+      # A PersistentVolume's spec.nfs.server is an unvalidated string: the API server ACCEPTS this
+      # placeholder, the PV is created and the PVC BINDS to it (binding is pure control-plane). The
+      # failure surfaces only when a pod mounts — MountVolume.SetUp "Failed to resolve server
+      # TBD-PROD-BULK-NFS-SERVER" — so plex, sonarr, radarr and nextcloud would sit in
+      # ContainerCreating on prod. Unlike the LAN knobs above, this placeholder does NOT fail at
+      # apply time and there is no CRD validation to lean on. Set this value BEFORE prod reconciles
+      # a revision containing the bulk volumes; the dev overlay renders a working value, which is
+      # where these manifests are meant to be proven first.
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/BULK_NFS_SERVER
+        # 192.168.2.102 is pfSense's WAN address, which DNATs tcp/2049 through to the Proxmox
+        # host's REAL address 192.168.1.9 on pfSense's LAN. Prod sits on the WAN side and cannot
+        # reach 192.168.1.9 directly, so the cluster mounts the NAT address. Dev is on the LAN and
+        # keeps the base value 192.168.1.9.
+        #
+        # PROVEN from k3s-prod-1 on 2026-09-12, not inferred:
+        #   - mount of 192.168.2.102:/mnt/Storage/plex negotiated nfs4 vers=4.1 proto=tcp
+        #   - a write as uid 1000 succeeded. Tested as 1000 and NOT root deliberately: the export
+        #     carries no_root_squash, so a root write would have passed and proved nothing, while
+        #     LSIO images default to PUID 911 and would have gone Ready then failed every import
+        #     with EACCES. The tree is 0755 1000:3000, so uid 1000 is the only writer.
+        #   - ln() across downloads/ -> tv/ returned link count 2 (same inode), so the arrs get
+        #     real atomic moves instead of silently degrading to copy-then-delete on EXDEV.
+        # pfSense DNATs WITHOUT source NAT (the host logs prod's own node addresses as the peer),
+        # so the ZFS export ACL names 192.168.2.10/.11/.12 directly rather than one translated IP.
+        value: "192.168.2.102"
+      # ==========================================================================================
+      # OFF-CLUSTER DR TARGET — Cloudflare R2 (operator, 2026-09-05; bucket + token 2026-09-07).
+      # ==========================================================================================
+      # Dev's versitygw/MinIO (192.168.1.9:9000) sits on the DEV side of the network and is NOT an
+      # option for prod, for two independent reasons:
+      #   1. UNREACHABLE. Prod is on the SOHO network 192.168.2.0/24 — pfSense's WAN — while that
+      #      MinIO is inside pfSense's LAN. Measured from a pod INSIDE prod (the workstation proves
+      #      nothing about pod egress): `curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live` → connection
+      #      timed out after 15s. Reaching it would need a WAN→LAN rule that does not exist.
+      #   2. NOT OFF-CLUSTER DR. It runs on the same Proxmox host as dev's VMs, so it already shares
+      #      a physical failure domain with dev. R2 is genuinely off-site, and its free egress means
+      #      restore REHEARSALS cost nothing — R-STATE-03 has no financial disincentive to stay proven.
+      #
+      # THIS UNBLOCKS AN ACTIVE INCIDENT, not just a roadmap item. All three prod CNPG Clusters ship
+      # `archive_mode=on` with `endpointURL: TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT`, so barman-cloud-wal-archive
+      # exits 4 on every segment and Postgres — correctly — REFUSES TO RECYCLE WAL. Verified live
+      # 2026-09-07: keycloak-db / nextcloud-db / semaphore-db all report
+      # ContinuousArchiving=False/ContinuousArchivingFailing, and keycloak-db's 5 GiB PVC is at
+      # 579 MiB used / 4360 MiB free and climbing monotonically. A disk-full PANIC there takes the
+      # cluster's SSO database down, and with it kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and
+      # forward-auth. Fixing the endpoint lets Postgres drain the whole backlog.
+      #
+      # ENDPOINT IS ACCOUNT-SCOPED, so it stays a prod-overlay value even though it is not a LAN
+      # address: this is the operator's Cloudflare account id, confirmed from inside a prod pod
+      # (`head-bucket` on k3s-prod-backup → BucketRegion WNAM; PUT and DELETE both succeed).
+      # It is NOT put in base, because base is dev's live MinIO and dev is deliberately STAYING
+      # there — moving dev to R2 would reset its PITR window and orphan the backups its PROVEN
+      # restore depends on. Two environments, two targets, isolated by URL *and* by bucket.
      - op: replace
        path: /data/S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT
-        value: "TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT"
+        value: "https://7ce452a1b3d6c86daf2c020edcb82d37.r2.cloudflarestorage.com"
+      # R2 requires the region string to be exactly `auto`. (`head-bucket` answers
+      # `{"BucketRegion":"WNAM"}` — that is a PHYSICAL LOCATION HINT, not a signing region; using it
+      # here produces AuthorizationHeaderMalformed.) Dev keeps the base `us-east-1` its live MinIO
+      # has always been signed with.
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/S3_BACKUP_REGION
+        value: "auto"
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+      # OBJECT TENANCY INSIDE THE ONE BUCKET. The operator created a SINGLE R2 bucket, so velero and
+      # barman cannot be separated by bucket the way they are on dev's MinIO (`velero` and `cnpg`).
+      # They are separated by disjoint TOP-LEVEL PREFIXES instead:
+      #
+      #     s3://k3s-prod-backup/velero/…                 Velero: kopia repo + backup metadata
+      #     s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/<clusterName>/…   CNPG: WAL + base backups
+      #
+      # The bucket ROOT is left empty on purpose — a misrendered prefix then lands somewhere
+      # obviously wrong instead of silently colliding with a live tenant. Velero's retention TTL
+      # deletes objects under its own prefix only, so it can never reap a WAL segment; and barman's
+      # per-cluster serverName subdirectory keeps the three Postgres servers' chains apart, which
+      # matters because interleaving two servers' WAL into one prefix corrupts the chain outright.
+      # Dev cannot be reached from any of these: different endpoint AND different bucket names.
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET
+        value: "k3s-prod-backup"
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX
+        value: "velero"
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
+        value: "s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman"
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+      # WHICH CREDENTIAL SIGNS THE REQUESTS TO THAT BUCKET (per-env credential split, 2026-09-07).
+      # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+      # The knobs above moved the ENDPOINT and the OBJECT LAYOUT per environment. The credential did
+      # not move with them, and it could not: the four backup-credential Secrets are SHARED BASE
+      # manifests, applied to both clusters by the same Flux tiers. Writing the R2 token into them
+      # gave prod a working key by TAKING DEV'S AWAY — dev would have signed MinIO requests with an
+      # R2 key id, and under archive_mode=on that is a filling pgdata PVC, not a missing backup.
+      #
+      # So each credential is now two objects, and this suffix selects prod's:
+      #     velero-cloud-credentials-prod           the R2 token in the AWS INI `cloud` shape
+      #     <db>-backup-credentials-prod            the same token as ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
+      # for keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db. Both halves ship to both clusters (they are
+      # base resources); ONLY this value decides which one each consumer reads. It is a SUFFIX rather
+      # than four secret-name knobs deliberately — four could be updated three-quarters of the way,
+      # leaving one consumer on dev's MinIO key with nothing rendering wrong, and strict-mode
+      # substitution cannot catch a defined-but-stale variable.
+      #
+      # THE R2 TOKEN IS THE ONE PROVEN FROM INSIDE PROD (chore/r2-credentials 0a6a862): head-bucket on
+      # k3s-prod-backup returns BucketRegion WNAM, and PUT and DELETE both succeed. Rotating it now
+      # touches ONLY the four `-prod` files; dev's MinIO keys are untouched objects. That isolation is
+      # the structural reason for the split, independent of dev's eventual decommission.
+      - op: replace
+        path: /data/BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX
+        value: "-prod"
      # TODO(WS-INFRA, Phase 7): pin prod node placement once the bare-metal role labels exist.
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ rules:
    verbs: [create, delete, get, list, watch, patch]
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: [pods, services, configmaps, secrets, persistentvolumeclaims]
+    # LOAD-BEARING `get` ON CONFIGMAPS, BEYOND FIXTURE CREATION (R-ENV-02): the environment-
+    # agnostic L2 tests (dns-exposure, dns-internal-resolution, gateway-ingress-reachable,
+    # oidc-sso-grafana, trusted-tls) resolve the cluster's own BASE_DOMAIN / GATEWAY_VIP at run
+    # time from `flux-system/cluster-vars` — the same ConfigMap Flux substitutes from — via
+    # chainsaw `x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars')` bindings.
+    # If this rule is ever narrowed to the test's own namespace, those bindings fail and the
+    # tests error out. Narrow it only alongside a namespace-scoped read of that ConfigMap.
    verbs: [create, delete, get, list, watch, patch]
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: [pods/exec]
@@ -297,6 +297,109 @@ _EXECUTABLE_RE = re.compile(
 _BLOCKED_RE = re.compile(
    r"^\s*" + re.escape(LABEL_PREFIX) + r"/blocked-by:\s*(.+)$", re.M)

+# ---------------------------------------------------------- scaffold-marker detection
+# WHY THIS IS NOT A WHOLE-FILE `"TODO" in text`
+# ---------------------------------------------------
+# It used to be, and that mis-reported a SAFETY-CRITICAL requirement. A test whose SUBJECT
+# is placeholder detection has to name the idioms it hunts for:
+# `l0-static/placeholder-guard-coupling/check.sh` carries
+# `SEED = ["TBD", "TODO", "FIXME", "PLACEHOLDER", ...]` — its detection vocabulary, as data.
+# A whole-file substring test read that as the test declaring itself unfinished, classified
+# a 32-assertion executable check as a scaffold, raised a permanent `--strict` annotation
+# conflict, and (because the same file is tagged R-STATE-03) reported R-STATE-03 as
+# `exec=1 scaffold=1`. A previous engineer worked around it by rewording prose.
+#
+# The rule below is derived from the corpus (43 tests), not invented. Every genuine
+# scaffold in this tree — `l2-behavioral/onboarding-completeness`, `l3-fault-injection/
+# alerting`, `l3-fault-injection/gitops-drift`, and no others — declares itself in BOTH of
+# two structural positions, and no executable test does either:
+#
+#   1. a `# STATUS: ... scaffold` line in the file's documentation header. This is the
+#      repo's DEDICATED declaration slot (tests/README.md): 3 of 43 tests say
+#      `STATUS: scaffold` and they are exactly the three scaffolds; 19 others declare
+#      `STATUS: EXECUTABLE` / `IMPLEMENTED` / `RUNNABLE`; the rest declare nothing.
+#   2. a TODO/FIXME marker in the BODY that CARRIES A MESSAGE — `echo "TODO: assert PVC
+#      bound ..."`, `TODO(T-4.1): hermetic SMTP capture sink`. A marker that carries a
+#      message is a note about work that is missing. A marker that is the ENTIRE content of
+#      a quoted literal (`"TODO",` in a vocabulary list) carries no message: it is the
+#      marker as a *datum*, which is what a placeholder DETECTOR necessarily contains.
+#
+# Both are still evaluated over the body of `chainsaw-test.yaml` AND of any
+# `render-check.sh` / `check.sh`, and either one still OUTRANKS an
+# `executable: "true"` annotation (see classify_test) — the invariant that an annotation
+# must never outrank the body is unchanged. Ambiguity still only ever DOWNGRADES: an
+# unrecognised marker shape, a marker in body code outside a quoted literal, or a marker
+# carrying any trailing text all classify as scaffold.
+#
+# KNOWN, ACCEPTED IMPRECISION (stated rather than hidden): a test that embeds a marker with
+# text attached but as data — e.g. `re.compile(r"TODO|FIXME")`, or a single string holding
+# several idioms — is still called a scaffold. That is the conservative direction, and the
+# author's remedy is the same structural discipline the corpus already uses: keep each
+# idiom a standalone literal in a list.
+
+# Vocabulary: only the idioms that DECLARE unfinished work. Deliberately excludes `TBD`,
+# `PLACEHOLDER`, `XXX`, `REPLACE-ME` — tests in this tree legitimately carry those in
+# executable code as data (`l0-static/egress-paths-selected-by-rules/check.sh` compares
+# authored values against `"TBD"`; `l0-static/no-plaintext-secrets/check.sh` matches
+# `placeholder.*`), and none of them is used here to mark a placeholder body.
+# Case-insensitive: no English word contains either token, and the corpus carries no
+# lower-case occurrence, so folding case only ever ADDS detection (`echo "todo: ..."`).
+_MARKER_RE = re.compile(r"\b(?:TODO|FIXME)\b", re.I)
+
+# The dedicated declaration slot, on a comment line, case-insensitive. The declared state
+# must be the FIRST token after `STATUS:` — a `STATUS:` line declares exactly one state,
+# and all three real scaffolds read `# STATUS: scaffold — <what is missing>`. Anchoring it
+# there is what keeps `# STATUS: EXECUTABLE ... this is not a scaffold` from matching; a
+# loose `.*scaffold` would turn any prose that merely uses the word into a declaration.
+_STATUS_SCAFFOLD_RE = re.compile(
+    r"^[ \t]*#[ \t]*STATUS:[ \t]*(?:scaffold|placeholder)\b", re.M | re.I)
+
+# A quoted literal whose entire content is one marker word: the marker as data.
+_MARKER_AS_DATUM_RE = re.compile(r"(['\"])[ \t]*(?:TODO|FIXME)[ \t]*\1", re.I)
+
+
+def _split_doc_header(text: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Split a test file into (documentation header, body).
+
+    Both file kinds in this tree open with a banner comment block that is PROSE about the
+    test: the Given/When/Then, the incident being closed, the mandatory "what this does NOT
+    prove" list (tests/README.md, L0 authoring rule 1). Prose necessarily discusses
+    placeholder idioms when the test hunts them, so an incidental mention there is
+    documentation, not a placeholder body.
+
+    The body starts at the first line that is neither blank nor a `#` comment:
+      *.sh    -> `set -euo pipefail` (the shebang is a comment)
+      *.yaml  -> `apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1`
+    Comments BELOW that point are body, deliberately: a scaffold marks a missing fixture
+    with an inline comment (`l3-fault-injection/alerting`: `file: fixtures/smtp-sink.yaml
+    # TODO(T-4.1): hermetic SMTP capture sink`), and that must keep counting.
+    """
+    lines = text.splitlines(keepends=True)
+    for i, ln in enumerate(lines):
+        s = ln.strip()
+        if s and not s.startswith("#"):
+            return "".join(lines[:i]), "".join(lines[i:])
+    return text, ""          # no executable line at all: it is all header, body is empty
+
+
+def scaffold_marker(text: str) -> str:
+    """Why `text` declares itself a placeholder body, or "" if it does not.
+
+    Returns a short human-readable reason (used verbatim in the hygiene report) so the
+    defect is actionable rather than a bare path.
+    """
+    head, body = _split_doc_header(text)
+    m = _STATUS_SCAFFOLD_RE.search(head) or _STATUS_SCAFFOLD_RE.search(body)
+    if m:
+        return m.group(0).strip().lstrip("#").strip()[:80]
+    # Blank out markers held as pure data before looking for a marker that has a message.
+    m2 = _MARKER_RE.search(_MARKER_AS_DATUM_RE.sub('""', body))
+    if m2:
+        line = body[:m2.start()].count("\n")
+        snippet = body.splitlines()[line].strip()
+        return f"placeholder marker in body: {snippet[:80]}"
+    return ""
+

 def classify_test(t: dict) -> dict:
    """Decide EXECUTABLE vs SCAFFOLD for one discovered test, conservatively.
@@ -304,14 +407,18 @@ def classify_test(t: dict) -> dict:
    A tagged test is only worth counting if it can actually assert something. Rules, in
    order, chosen so ambiguity NEVER upgrades a test:

-      scaffold             the body contains TODO markers (a placeholder), *even if* it
-                           is annotated executable — an annotation must never outrank the
-                           body. That mismatch is also reported as a hygiene defect.
-      executable           annotated `conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"` and no TODOs.
-      executable-untagged  no TODOs and a real runnable body, but the annotation is
-                           missing (true of the L1 render tests, which execute a
-                           render-check.sh + golden diff, of the L0 static checks, and
-                           of the META self-check).
+      scaffold             the test DECLARES itself a placeholder — a `# STATUS: scaffold`
+                           header line, or a TODO/FIXME marker carrying a message in the
+                           body (see `scaffold_marker` for the rule and the corpus it was
+                           derived from) — *even if* it is annotated executable. An
+                           annotation must never outrank the body. That mismatch is also
+                           reported as a hygiene defect.
+      executable           annotated `conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"` and no
+                           scaffold declaration.
+      executable-untagged  no scaffold declaration and a real runnable body, but the
+                           annotation is missing (true of the L1 render tests, which
+                           execute a render-check.sh + golden diff, of the L0 static
+                           checks, and of the META self-check).
                           Counted as executable, and flagged as an annotation gap.
      scaffold             anything else.
    """
@@ -322,16 +429,26 @@ def classify_test(t: dict) -> dict:
    # downgrades the test to a scaffold — an annotation must never outrank the body,
    # whichever file the body lives in.
    extra = ""
+    scripts: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
    for script in ("render-check.sh", "check.sh"):
        sp = p.parent / script
        if sp.is_file():
-            extra += sp.read_text()
+            body = sp.read_text()
+            extra += body
+            scripts.append((script, body))
    declared = bool(_EXECUTABLE_RE.search(text))
-    has_todo = "TODO" in text or "TODO" in extra
+    # Each file is classified on ITS OWN structure — the yaml and the script have different
+    # header blocks, so they must not be concatenated before the header/body split.
+    reason = scaffold_marker(text)
+    for script, body in scripts:
+        if reason:
+            break
+        r = scaffold_marker(body)
+        reason = f"{script}: {r}" if r else ""
    bm = _BLOCKED_RE.search(text)
    has_body = bool(extra) or bool(re.search(r"^\s+- (script|assert|apply):", text, re.M))

-    if has_todo:
+    if reason:
        state = "scaffold"
    elif declared:
        state = "executable"
@@ -348,7 +465,8 @@ def classify_test(t: dict) -> dict:
        "name": t["name"], "path": rel, "layer": t["layer"],
        "state": state,
        "declared_executable": declared,
-        "annotation_conflict": bool(declared and has_todo),
+        "annotation_conflict": bool(declared and reason),
+        "scaffold_reason": reason,
        "blocked_by": bm.group(1).strip().strip('"') if bm else "",
    }

@@ -640,6 +758,10 @@ def build(repo: Path, registry: list[dict], tests: list[dict], impl: dict[str, l
    # --- hygiene defects this tool owns -------------------------------------------
    hygiene = {
        "annotation_conflicts": [t["path"] for t in classified if t["annotation_conflict"]],
+        # Same set, with WHY each one was called a placeholder body, so the fix is obvious
+        # from the report instead of requiring the reader to re-derive the rule.
+        "annotation_conflict_reasons": {t["path"]: t["scaffold_reason"]
+                                       for t in classified if t["annotation_conflict"]},
        "executable_untagged": [t["path"] for t in classified
                                if t["state"] == "executable-untagged"],
        "registry_not_in_spec": [],
@@ -910,8 +1032,10 @@ def render_md(rep: dict, nodes: list[dict], advisory: dict | None) -> str:
    else:
        o.append("- registry ↔ spec parity: **NOT CHECKED** (spec tree not available; "
                 "this is a skip, not a pass)")
-    o.append(f"- tests annotated executable but containing TODO bodies: "
-             f"{h['annotation_conflicts'] or 'none'}")
+    o.append("- tests annotated executable but declaring a placeholder body: "
+             + (", ".join(f"`{k}` ({v})"
+                          for k, v in sorted(h["annotation_conflict_reasons"].items()))
+                if h["annotation_conflicts"] else "none"))
    o.append(f"- executable tests missing the `{LABEL_PREFIX}/executable` annotation: "
             f"{h['executable_untagged'] or 'none'}")

@@ -930,9 +1054,12 @@ def render_md(rep: dict, nodes: list[dict], advisory: dict | None) -> str:
             "reconciled |")
    o.append("| verifying test | `conformance.home.k3s/R-*` label on a Chainsaw test "
             "(the authoritative tag, same source as `coverage.md`) | exact |")
-    o.append("| executable vs scaffold | TODO markers in the test body outrank the "
-             "`executable` annotation; a real body without the annotation still counts "
-             "and is flagged | conservative — ambiguity never upgrades |")
+    o.append("| executable vs scaffold | a `# STATUS: scaffold` header line, or a "
+             "TODO/FIXME marker CARRYING A MESSAGE in the body (a marker held as a bare "
+             "quoted datum — a placeholder detector's own vocabulary — is not one); "
+             "either outranks the `executable` annotation, and a real body without the "
+             "annotation still counts and is flagged | conservative — ambiguity never "
+             "upgrades |")
    o.append("| **test actually passed** | the committed `runs/ledger.jsonl` row for "
             "every verifying test: JUnit result **plus** that test's own pass sentinel "
             "token grepped from the run log | exact where a run was recorded, refused "
@@ -1127,6 +1254,70 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
              classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L2"})["state"]
              == "scaffold")

+        # === THE BUG THIS DETECTOR WAS REWRITTEN FOR ==============================
+        # A whole-file `"TODO" in text` mis-classified `l0-static/placeholder-guard-
+        # coupling` — a 32-assertion executable check whose SUBJECT is placeholder
+        # detection, so it must name the idioms it hunts — as a scaffold, and through it
+        # reported the SAFETY-CRITICAL R-STATE-03 as `exec=1 scaffold=1`. These
+        # assertions pin BOTH directions: a marker held as DATA must not downgrade, and a
+        # real placeholder body must still be caught. Both halves are load-bearing; the
+        # second is what stops this fix from degrading into "always executable".
+        yml = ("metadata:\n  annotations:\n"
+               "    conformance.home.k3s/executable: \"true\"\n"
+               "spec:\n  steps:\n    - script:\n"
+               "        content: bash ./check.sh\n")
+        f.write_text(yml)
+        detector = td2 / "check.sh"
+        # Shaped exactly like the real check: a prose header that discusses the idioms,
+        # then executable code holding them as a vocabulary list.
+        detector.write_text(
+            "#!/usr/bin/env bash\n"
+            "# L0 static check — placeholder vocabulary\n"
+            "#   * SEED — loud-placeholder idioms (TBD, TODO, FIXME, PLACEHOLDER)\n"
+            "# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. A pure offline assertion script.\n"
+            "set -euo pipefail\n"
+            "python3 - <<'EOF'\n"
+            "SEED = [\"TBD\", \"TODO\", \"FIXME\", \"PLACEHOLDER\"]\n"
+            "assert any(w in open('/etc/hostname').read().upper() for w in SEED) is False\n"
+            "EOF\n")
+        c = classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L0"})
+        check("a marker in HEADER PROSE does not downgrade an executable check",
+              c["state"] == "executable" and not c["annotation_conflict"])
+        check("a marker held as a bare quoted DATUM does not downgrade (the R-STATE-03 bug)",
+              c["scaffold_reason"] == "")
+
+        # ... and the protection is intact: a real placeholder body is still caught, in
+        # each of the three shapes the corpus actually uses.
+        detector.write_text("#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n"
+                            "echo \"TODO: assert the PVC is bound\"\n")
+        c = classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L0"})
+        check("a TODO carrying a message in check.sh IS still a scaffold",
+              c["state"] == "scaffold" and c["annotation_conflict"])
+        check("the scaffold reason names the file and the offending line",
+              c["scaffold_reason"].startswith("check.sh:")
+              and "TODO: assert the PVC is bound" in c["scaffold_reason"])
+        detector.write_text("#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n"
+                            "# TODO(T-4.1) write the hermetic sink fixture\ntrue\n")
+        check("a TODO(T-x.y) roadmap marker in an inline body comment IS still a scaffold",
+              classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L0"})["state"]
+              == "scaffold")
+        detector.write_text("#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n"
+                            "echo \"FIXME the extraction before trusting this\"\n")
+        check("an unpunctuated FIXME carrying trailing prose IS still a scaffold",
+              classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L0"})["state"]
+              == "scaffold")
+        # The dedicated declaration slot outranks a body that would otherwise look real —
+        # this is how all three genuine scaffolds in the tree declare themselves.
+        detector.unlink()
+        f.write_text("# L3 FAULT-INJECTION SCAFFOLD — x\n"
+                     "# STATUS: scaffold — needs T-1.4 (Flux bootstrapped).\n" + yml)
+        c = classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L3"})
+        check("a `# STATUS: scaffold` header declaration IS a scaffold, body notwithstanding",
+              c["state"] == "scaffold" and c["annotation_conflict"])
+        check("`# STATUS: EXECUTABLE` is not read as a scaffold declaration",
+              scaffold_marker("# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline "
+                              "assertion script; covers no scaffold.\nset -e\n") == "")
+
    # ---------------------------------------------------------------- PROOF / ledger
    # These are the assertions that stand between this report and a fake green.
    check("empty ledger parses to no rows (pre-ledger behaviour is preserved)",
@@ -1341,8 +1532,11 @@ def main() -> int:
                             f"{h['registry_not_in_spec']} {h['spec_not_in_registry']}\n")
            rc = 1
        if h["annotation_conflicts"]:
-            sys.stderr.write(f"[status] STRICT: tests annotated executable with TODO "
-                             f"bodies: {h['annotation_conflicts']}\n")
+            sys.stderr.write(
+                "[status] STRICT: tests annotated executable that declare a placeholder "
+                "body: " + "; ".join(f"{k} ({v})" for k, v in
+                                     sorted(h["annotation_conflict_reasons"].items()))
+                + "\n")
            rc = 1
        if rep["safety_critical_without_executable_l3"]:
            sys.stderr.write(f"[status] STRICT: safety-critical requirement(s) whose L3 "
@@ -93,9 +93,52 @@ and coverage extraction exact and robust.
  break the thing and assert fail-closed / no-data-loss, with `finally` restoring state.
 - **Never weaken a test to go green (R-TEST-06).** If the spec can't be met, escalate to
  the PM — do not relax the assertion or the requirement.
+- **Never write a per-environment value into a test (R-ENV-02).** No hostname suffix, no
+  Gateway VIP, no LB-pool range. One authored suite must run green against dev *and* prod,
+  so a test **asks the cluster it is pointed at** what it is. The mechanism is a chainsaw
+  binding over the same ConfigMap Flux substitutes from:
+
+  ```yaml
+  spec:
+    bindings:
+      - name: baseDomain
+        value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
+  ```
+
+  Declare it at **test level** (step `outputs`/`bindings` are step-scoped), then consume it:
+  `($baseDomain)` for a pod `env:` value, `(join('.', ['myhost', $baseDomain]))` where a
+  full hostname is needed — including inside a `fixtures/*.yaml` applied with `apply: file:`,
+  which chainsaw templates with the same bindings. Prefer reading the *actual* observed value
+  over restating a range (e.g. assert the DNS answer equals `GATEWAY_VIP`, or equals the LB IP
+  the Service was assigned) — it is both stricter and environment-independent. Never take the
+  environment from a CLI flag or an exported variable: a flag someone forgets is how a suite
+  ends up silently asserting the other cluster's expectations. L1 goldens are the one
+  exception: they are rendering fixtures and carry the literal `${BASE_DOMAIN}` token.
+
+### How a scaffold declares itself (and how `status.py` tells one from a verifier)

 Scaffolds in this tree carry `TODO(T-x.y)` markers where a fixture/assertion lands as a
-later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test. `lib/status.py` treats such a
-marker — in the `chainsaw-test.yaml`, in `render-check.sh`, or in `check.sh` — as
-outranking any `conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"` annotation, so a placeholder body
-can never be reported as an executable test.
+later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test. `lib/status.py` classifies each
+test EXECUTABLE or SCAFFOLD from the test's own files — `chainsaw-test.yaml`,
+`render-check.sh`, `check.sh` — and either signal below **outranks**
+`conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"`, so a placeholder body can never be reported as
+an executable test. Declare a scaffold in **both** positions:
+
+1. **`# STATUS: scaffold — <what is missing>`** in the file's header comment block. The
+   declared state must be the first token after `STATUS:` (executable tests say
+   `# STATUS: EXECUTABLE` / `IMPLEMENTED` / `RUNNABLE`).
+2. **A `TODO`/`FIXME` marker carrying a message, in the body** — the file from its first
+   non-comment line onward. `echo "TODO(T-4.2): inject a fault to fire a rule"`,
+   or an inline comment on a missing fixture:
+   `file: fixtures/smtp-sink.yaml   # TODO(T-4.1): hermetic SMTP capture sink`.
+
+What is **not** a scaffold marker, and why the distinction is load-bearing: a marker
+mentioned in the **header prose** (the Given/When/Then and the mandatory "what this does
+NOT prove" list), and a marker that is the **entire content of a quoted literal** — a
+placeholder *detector*'s own vocabulary, e.g. `SEED = ["TBD", "TODO", "FIXME", ...]` in
+`l0-static/placeholder-guard-coupling/check.sh`. A whole-file `"TODO" in text` test used to
+classify that 32-assertion check as a scaffold and, through it, report the safety-critical
+R-STATE-03 as `exec=1 scaffold=1`. If your check must hold a marker as data, keep each
+idiom a **standalone quoted literal in a list**; a marker with text attached (a regex
+alternation, several idioms in one string) still classifies as a scaffold, because
+ambiguity here only ever downgrades.
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — the five auditability proofs can be produced on demand  (R-SEC-03)  [EXECUTABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-SEC-03 ("All the above properties MUST be demonstrable/auditable (an
+#          operator can prove isolation, egress path, cert validity, and backup integrity)"),
+#          made concrete by docs/07 §"Auditability requirements (R-SEC-03) — what an operator
+#          must be able to prove": Isolation (denied-probe test), Egress path (egress IP
+#          check), Kill-switch (fault-injection test), TLS (cert status + external check),
+#          Backups (DR drill) — "These proofs are part of the platform acceptance suite, not
+#          one-time checks", with the acceptance gate "The five auditability proofs above can
+#          be produced on demand."
+#
+# HOW THIS AVOIDS BEING A TAUTOLOGY (the whole design question for a meta-requirement)
+# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# "A test exists for R-NET-01, therefore isolation is auditable" would pass in any suite that
+# compiles and would keep passing while every proof rotted into a scaffold. Four distinct
+# failure modes are asserted instead, each by DRIVING the real machinery:
+#   (a) each of the five proofs has an EXECUTABLE test — not a placeholder scaffold — at the layer
+#       the spec's own words require (fault injection / a DR drill => L3), taken from
+#       lib/status.py's own verdict so this check cannot disagree with the status report;
+#   (b) the proofs are PRODUCIBLE by the documented command: `run.sh --requirements <the five>`
+#       must resolve to real test dirs AND pass the merge gate's coverage assertion;
+#   (c) each Chainsaw-layer proof declares a PASS SENTINEL that lib/record_run.py can
+#       attribute — a proof that passes but records nothing leaves the operator with a green
+#       terminal and no evidence;
+#   (d) the evidence chain REFUSES FORGERIES: this check mounts two of its own against the
+#       real tools — a green JUnit for a real proof test whose log holds only that test's SKIP
+#       token, and a ledger row claiming `proven` at the repository's ROOT commit — and
+#       requires record_run.py to report not-proven and status.py to report `stale-proof`. It
+#       also drives `record_run.py --selftest` and `status.py --selftest`, which NOTHING in
+#       ci/ or run.sh ran before this test existed.
+# The five proofs are not hand-listed where the spec can be read: when the read-only spec repo
+# is mounted, docs/07's bullet labels are parsed and must match this check's mapping exactly,
+# so a sixth proof added to the spec fails here instead of being silently unverified.
+#
+# WHY L0: every clause is a property of the repository and its own tooling, needs no cluster,
+# and belongs in the merge gate — an audit chain is worth having only if it is intact BEFORE
+# anyone needs it.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it (plus the read-only spec repo when mounted),
+# WHEN  lib/status.py, lib/common.sh's requirement resolver, run.sh's coverage gate,
+#       lib/record_run.py's sentinel parser and both evidence tools' self-tests are DRIVEN,
+#       and two synthetic forgeries are presented to them,
+# THEN  each of docs/07's five proofs maps to an executable test at the required layer, the
+#       documented one-command invocation selects and asserts them, each is capturable as a
+#       ledger row, and neither a self-skip nor a stale row can be recorded as proof.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git tree + the harness's
+# own stdlib tooling; no cluster, no network); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run
+# it directly, and this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# WHAT THIS TEST FIXED WHILE BEING WRITTEN (recorded, not hidden): three of the tests that ARE
+# the automated half of docs/07's isolation and TLS proofs — l2-behavioral/default-deny,
+# l2-behavioral/trusted-tls and l2-behavioral/gateway-ingress-reachable — declared NO pass
+# sentinel, so lib/record_run.py could never record them as proven and those two audit proofs
+# were structurally unrecordable. Each now ends with a proof-of-pass sentinel step. The
+# assertion here was NOT relaxed to accommodate them (R-TEST-06).
+#
+# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (enumerated in check.sh's header; this test claims none of them):
+#   * That the five proofs PASS. This asserts they are present, strong, runnable by one
+#     command, capturable, and that the chain refuses forgeries — not that isolation holds
+#     today (R-NET-01's test) or that the restore works (R-STATE-03's).
+#   * HUBBLE. docs/07 names Hubble flow logs as part of the isolation proof; no test in this
+#     suite queries Hubble. Only the denied-probe half is automated — a real, named gap.
+#   * LEDGER COMPLETENESS OVER TIME. Nothing offline can prove a row was never removed; that
+#     would need signed history.
+#   * R-SEC-03's wording is broader than docs/07's five bullets. Suite-wide coverage of every
+#     requirement is R-TEST-01/04's claim (tests/meta/harness-selfcheck) and is deliberately
+#     not re-asserted here.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: auditability-proofs-producible
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-03: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-SEC-03"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given the tracked tree and the harness's own tooling, when status.py, the requirement
+      resolver, run.sh's coverage gate, record_run.py's sentinel parser and both evidence
+      tools' self-tests are driven and two synthetic forgeries are presented to them, then each
+      of docs/07's five auditability proofs has an executable test at the layer the spec
+      requires, is selectable and asserted by the documented one-command invocation, is
+      capturable as a ledger row, and neither a self-skip nor a stale proof can be recorded as
+      evidence.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: then-each-of-the-five-proofs-is-producible-and-the-evidence-chain-refuses-forgeries
+      description: >-
+        Run the offline assertion script over the tracked tree (same script ci/l0.sh and
+        conformance/run.sh --layer l0 execute).
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NOTE ON WORDING (deliberate, do not "improve"): this file and check.sh say "placeholder
+# scaffold" rather than the four-letter marker lib/status.py looks for, because that detector is
+# a bare substring test over the whole file. Writing the marker in PROSE — even to say a proof
+# must NOT be one — makes status.py classify THIS test as a scaffold, so the R-SEC-03 test would
+# report itself as unexecutable. Observed and worked around here; the detector's crudeness is
+# reported to the PM rather than loosened, since loosening a fake-green guard to suit one file is
+# the wrong trade (R-TEST-06).
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — auditability-proofs-producible
+# Serves: R-SEC-03 ("All the above properties MUST be demonstrable/auditable (an operator can
+#         prove isolation, egress path, cert validity, and backup integrity)."
+#         — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md).
+#
+# The spec makes this meta-requirement concrete. docs/07-security-and-secrets.md
+# §"Auditability requirements (R-SEC-03) — what an operator must be able to prove":
+#   - **Isolation**: "service X cannot reach service Y" — via Hubble flow logs + a
+#     denied-probe test.
+#   - **Egress path**: "service X's public IP is the VPN's" — via an egress IP check.
+#   - **Kill-switch**: "with VPN down, X leaks nothing" — via a fault-injection test.
+#   - **TLS**: "every endpoint serves a valid, non-self-signed, unexpired cert" — via cert
+#     status + external check.
+#   - **Backups**: "irreplaceable data is restorable" — via a DR drill.
+#   "These proofs are part of the platform acceptance suite, not one-time checks."
+# and its acceptance gate: "The five auditability proofs above can be produced on demand."
+#
+# HOW A META-REQUIREMENT IS TESTED WITHOUT BECOMING A TAUTOLOGY
+# ------------------------------------------------------------
+# The trap is obvious and this check is built to avoid it: "a test exists for R-NET-01,
+# therefore isolation is auditable" is true of any suite that compiles, proves nothing, and
+# would keep passing while every proof rotted into a scaffold. Four separate failure modes
+# have to be caught for "an operator can PROVE it" to mean anything, and each one is asserted
+# by DRIVING the real machinery rather than by reading files:
+#
+#   (a) THE PROOF EXISTS, AT THE RIGHT STRENGTH. Each of the five named proofs maps to a
+#       requirement that must have an EXECUTABLE verifying test — not a placeholder scaffold — and,
+#       where the spec's own words name fault injection ("with VPN down"; "a DR drill"), an
+#       executable L3 test specifically. Executable-vs-scaffold is not re-derived here: this
+#       check RUNS lib/status.py and reads its verdict, so it cannot disagree with the
+#       repository's own status report.
+#   (b) THE PROOF IS PRODUCIBLE ON DEMAND, BY THE DOCUMENTED COMMAND. `run.sh
+#       --requirements <the five IDs>` must resolve to a non-empty test set and must ASSERT
+#       their coverage (that flag is the merge gate's own path: it passes --require to
+#       coverage.py). This check drives run.sh itself, so if the resolver, the labels or the
+#       gate wiring break, R-SEC-03 fails.
+#   (c) THE PROOF IS CAPTURABLE. A test that passes but records nothing leaves an operator
+#       with a green terminal and no evidence. For each Chainsaw-layer proof, the test must
+#       declare a PASS SENTINEL that lib/record_run.py can actually attribute — computed with
+#       record_run.py's OWN parser, so deleting a test's sentinel makes this check fail
+#       instead of silently making the requirement unprovable.
+#   (d) THE EVIDENCE CANNOT BE FORGED, AND IS NOT HONOURED WHEN STALE. This is the clause
+#       that makes the check bite. Two INDEPENDENT forgery attempts are mounted against the
+#       real tools, in a throwaway directory:
+#         * a Chainsaw run in which the JUnit says a real proof test PASSED while the run log
+#           carries only that test's SKIP token — the exact shape of a self-skipping L2/L3
+#           test. record_run.py must refuse to call it `proven`.
+#         * a ledger row claiming `proven` at a commit that PREDATES the requirement's
+#           implementing code — status.py must degrade it to `stale-proof`, never green.
+#       Both tools' own built-in self-tests (`--selftest`) are also driven, because nothing
+#       in ci/ or run.sh runs them today: the guards that keep a skip from becoming a proof
+#       were themselves unexercised in the merge gate until this check.
+#
+#   The FIVE PROOFS ARE NOT HAND-LISTED where the spec can be read: when the read-only spec
+#   repo is mounted, the bullet labels are parsed out of docs/07 and must match this check's
+#   mapping EXACTLY. Add a sixth proof to the spec and this check fails as unmapped rather
+#   than quietly ignoring it.
+#
+# WHY L0: every clause above is a property of the repository and its own tooling, provable
+# offline, and it belongs in the merge gate — the point of an audit chain is that it is intact
+# BEFORE anyone needs it. Nothing here needs a cluster, and nothing here would be more true
+# with one.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this check as claiming them):
+#   - THAT THE FIVE PROOFS PASS. This asserts the proofs are present, strong, runnable by one
+#     documented command, capturable as evidence, and that the evidence chain refuses
+#     forgeries. Whether isolation actually holds today is R-NET-01's test; whether the DR
+#     restore works is R-STATE-03's. R-SEC-03 is about the operator's ABILITY to produce the
+#     proof, which is what is asserted.
+#   - HUBBLE. docs/07 names "Hubble flow logs" as part of the isolation proof. No test in this
+#     suite queries Hubble, and this check does not pretend otherwise: it asserts the
+#     denied-probe half, which is the half that is automated. The Hubble half remains an
+#     operator-interactive capability — a real, named gap in R-SEC-03's coverage.
+#   - THE OPERATOR-FACING NARRATIVE. That a human can find and read the evidence (the status
+#     report's prose, the ledger's provenance fields) is a usability property, not a testable
+#     one.
+#   - LEDGER COMPLETENESS OVER TIME. The ledger is append-only by convention and by review;
+#     nothing here can prove a row was never removed from it (that would need signed history).
+#   - THAT THE PROOFS COVER "ALL THE ABOVE PROPERTIES". R-SEC-03's own wording is broader than
+#     the five bullets docs/07 enumerates. The five are what the spec made concrete and are
+#     what is asserted; suite-wide coverage of every requirement is R-TEST-01/04's claim,
+#     tested by tests/meta/harness-selfcheck, and is deliberately NOT re-asserted here.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+: "${SPEC_REPO:=${ROOT}/../home-network-k3s}"
+export SPEC_REPO
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+CONF = ROOT / "conformance"
+LIB = CONF / "lib"
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+NOTES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def note(msg):
+    NOTES.append(msg)
+
+
+def die():
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (auditability-proofs-producible): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} "
+          "assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+
+def run(cmd, **kw) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+    return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=kw.pop("cwd", CONF), **kw)
+
+
+# ================================================= THE FIVE PROOFS docs/07 ENUMERATES
+# key  = the bullet label docs/07 uses (verified against the spec below when it is mounted)
+# reqs = the requirement(s) whose verifying test IS that proof
+# layer= the WEAKEST layer the spec's own words allow. Where docs/07 says "a fault-injection
+#        test" / "a DR drill", an L2 happy-path test does not discharge the proof.
+PROOFS = {
+    "Isolation":   {"reqs": ["R-NET-01"], "layers": {"L2", "L3"},
+                    "why": '"service X cannot reach service Y" — via Hubble flow logs + a '
+                           "denied-probe test"},
+    "Egress path": {"reqs": ["R-NET-05"], "layers": {"L2", "L3"},
+                    "why": '"service X\'s public IP is the VPN\'s" — via an egress IP check'},
+    "Kill-switch": {"reqs": ["R-NET-06"], "layers": {"L3"},
+                    "why": '"with VPN down, X leaks nothing" — via a fault-injection test'},
+    "TLS":         {"reqs": ["R-TLS-01"], "layers": {"L2", "L3"},
+                    "why": '"every endpoint serves a valid, non-self-signed, unexpired cert" '
+                           "— via cert status + external check"},
+    "Backups":     {"reqs": ["R-STATE-03"], "layers": {"L3"},
+                    "why": '"irreplaceable data is restorable" — via a DR drill'},
+}
+PROOF_REQS = sorted({r for p in PROOFS.values() for r in p["reqs"]})
+
+# ---- SELF-POLICING: the proof list must still be the SPEC's proof list ---------------
+spec = Path(os.environ.get("SPEC_REPO", ""))
+sec_doc = spec / "docs" / "07-security-and-secrets.md"
+if sec_doc.is_file():
+    text = sec_doc.read_text()
+    m = re.search(r"^##\s+Auditability requirements \(R-SEC-03\).*?$(.*?)^##\s", text,
+                  re.M | re.S)
+    check(m is not None,
+          "docs/07 no longer carries an '## Auditability requirements (R-SEC-03)' section — "
+          "the proof list this check is coupled to has moved or been removed, so the mapping "
+          "below can no longer be trusted (R-TEST-06: follow the spec, never the other way)")
+    if m:
+        labels = re.findall(r"^\s*-\s+\*\*([^*]+)\*\*:", m.group(1), re.M)
+        check(set(labels) == set(PROOFS),
+              f"docs/07 enumerates the auditability proofs {sorted(labels)} but this check "
+              f"maps {sorted(PROOFS)} — every proof the spec names must map to a verifying "
+              "test, and a proof this check does not know about would be silently unverified")
+        check(len(labels) == 5,
+              f"docs/07 enumerates {len(labels)} auditability proof(s); its own acceptance "
+              "gate says 'The five auditability proofs above can be produced on demand' — the "
+              "prose and the list have drifted apart")
+else:
+    note(f"the read-only spec repo is not mounted at {spec} — the proof list could not be "
+         "re-derived from docs/07, so the mapping below was used as written. Every other "
+         "assertion still ran. (ci/l0.sh mounts the spec; a bare local run may not.)")
+
+# ============================================ (a) EACH PROOF EXISTS, AT THE RIGHT STRENGTH
+# Driven through lib/status.py so this check and the repository's own status report cannot
+# disagree about what is executable and what is a scaffold.
+tmp = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="r-sec-03-"))
+try:
+    out = tmp / "status"
+    st = run([sys.executable, str(LIB / "status.py"), "--repo", str(ROOT),
+              "--registry", str(CONF / "requirements" / "registry.yaml"),
+              "--tests", str(CONF / "tests"), "--out", str(out)])
+    check(st.returncode == 0,
+          f"lib/status.py exited {st.returncode} — the report an operator would use to find "
+          f"the audit evidence does not generate: {(st.stderr or st.stdout).strip()[:400]}")
+    status = {}
+    sj = out / "status.json"
+    if sj.is_file():
+        status = json.loads(sj.read_text())
+    check(bool(status.get("by_requirement")),
+          "lib/status.py produced no per-requirement report — the audit posture of each "
+          "requirement is not derivable, so R-SEC-03 cannot be assessed at all")
+    by_req = status.get("by_requirement", {})
+
+    for label, spec_proof in sorted(PROOFS.items()):
+        for rid in spec_proof["reqs"]:
+            rec = by_req.get(rid)
+            check(rec is not None,
+                  f"proof '{label}' maps to {rid}, which the status report does not know — "
+                  "either the registry lost the requirement or this mapping is stale")
+            if not rec:
+                continue
+            tests = (rec.get("verification") or {}).get("tests") or []
+            executable = [t for t in tests if t.get("state", "").startswith("executable")]
+            check(bool(executable),
+                  f"proof '{label}' ({rid}) has no EXECUTABLE verifying test — its tests are "
+                  f"{[t.get('name') + ':' + t.get('state', '?') for t in tests]}. docs/07: "
+                  f"{spec_proof['why']}. A placeholder scaffold cannot be produced on demand, so the "
+                  "operator cannot prove this property")
+            at_layer = [t for t in executable if t.get("layer") in spec_proof["layers"]]
+            check(bool(at_layer),
+                  f"proof '{label}' ({rid}) has no executable test at layer(s) "
+                  f"{sorted(spec_proof['layers'])} — it has "
+                  f"{[t.get('name') + '@' + str(t.get('layer')) for t in executable]}. "
+                  f"docs/07 requires this proof to be produced {spec_proof['why']}, and a "
+                  "weaker layer does not discharge it (a rendering check is not a drill)")
+
+    # ==================================== (b) PRODUCIBLE ON DEMAND, BY THE DOCUMENTED COMMAND
+    # The resolver: --requirements must translate the five R-IDs into real test dirs.
+    resolver = run(["bash", "-c",
+                    f'export CONF_ROOT="{CONF}"; . "{LIB}/common.sh"; '
+                    f'conf_dirs_for_requirements "{" ".join(PROOF_REQS)}"'])
+    dirs = [l for l in resolver.stdout.splitlines() if l.strip()]
+    check(resolver.returncode == 0 and len(dirs) >= len(PROOF_REQS),
+          f"`run.sh --requirements {','.join(PROOF_REQS)}` resolves to {len(dirs)} test dir(s) "
+          f"for {len(PROOF_REQS)} proof requirement(s) — the single command docs/07's "
+          "acceptance gate depends on ('produced on demand') cannot select the proofs")
+
+    # The gate: the same flag ASSERTS coverage (run.sh passes --require to coverage.py), so a
+    # zero exit here is the repository's own statement that all five proofs are covered.
+    gate = run(["./run.sh", "--coverage-only", "--requirements", ",".join(PROOF_REQS)])
+    check(gate.returncode == 0,
+          f"`./run.sh --coverage-only --requirements {','.join(PROOF_REQS)}` exited "
+          f"{gate.returncode} — the merge gate's own coverage assertion rejects the audit "
+          f"proof set: {(gate.stderr or gate.stdout).strip()[:400]}")
+
+    # ================================================ (c) THE PROOF IS CAPTURABLE AS EVIDENCE
+    # Use record_run.py's OWN sentinel parser: a Chainsaw-layer proof with no declared pass
+    # token can pass forever and never be recorded as proof of anything.
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(LIB))
+    os.environ.setdefault("PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE", "1")
+    sys.dont_write_bytecode = True
+    import record_run as rr                                   # noqa: E402
+
+    smap = rr.sentinel_map(CONF / "tests")
+    check(len(smap) >= 10,
+          f"record_run.py's sentinel map contains {len(smap)} test(s) — the parser lost its "
+          "grip on the test tree, so the assertions below would assert nothing")
+    for label, spec_proof in sorted(PROOFS.items()):
+        for rid in spec_proof["reqs"]:
+            rec = by_req.get(rid) or {}
+            tests = (rec.get("verification") or {}).get("tests") or []
+            names = [t.get("name") for t in tests
+                     if t.get("state", "").startswith("executable")
+                     and t.get("layer") in spec_proof["layers"]]
+            for name in names:
+                ent = smap.get(name)
+                check(ent is not None,
+                      f"proof '{label}': record_run.py does not know the test {name!r} — its "
+                      "result could never be attributed to a ledger row")
+                if not ent:
+                    continue
+                if ent.get("layer") in rr.SENTINEL_EXEMPT_LAYERS:
+                    continue          # offline layers are truthful by JUnit alone
+                check(bool(ent.get("pass")),
+                      f"proof '{label}': the Chainsaw test {name!r} declares NO pass sentinel, "
+                      "so lib/record_run.py can never record it as proven. It would go green "
+                      "in the terminal and leave the operator with no evidence — exactly the "
+                      "gap the ledger exists to close (docs/07: the proofs are 'part of the "
+                      "platform acceptance suite, not one-time checks')")
+                check(bool(ent.get("terminal_pass")),
+                      f"proof '{label}': the test {name!r} has no TERMINAL pass token, so "
+                      "record_run.py cannot decide its verdict")
+
+    # =============================== (d) THE EVIDENCE CANNOT BE FORGED, NOR HONOURED WHEN STALE
+    # Both tools' own guards, which NOTHING in ci/ or run.sh drives today.
+    for tool in ("record_run.py", "status.py"):
+        r = run([sys.executable, str(LIB / tool), "--selftest"])
+        check(r.returncode == 0,
+              f"`lib/{tool} --selftest` exited {r.returncode} — the guards that keep a "
+              "self-skipped or stale run from being recorded as proof are broken, so nothing "
+              f"in the evidence chain can be trusted: {(r.stderr or r.stdout).strip()[:500]}")
+
+    # ---- FORGERY 1: a green JUnit for a REAL proof test whose log holds only a SKIP token.
+    # This is the precise shape of a self-skipping L2/L3 test, and it must NOT become proof.
+    forge_target, forge_skip = None, None
+    for label, spec_proof in sorted(PROOFS.items()):
+        for rid in spec_proof["reqs"]:
+            for name, ent in smap.items():
+                if rid in (ent.get("requirements") or []) and ent.get("skip") \
+                        and ent.get("layer") not in rr.SENTINEL_EXEMPT_LAYERS:
+                    forge_target, forge_skip = name, ent["skip"][0]
+                    break
+            if forge_target:
+                break
+        if forge_target:
+            break
+    check(forge_target is not None,
+          "no Chainsaw-layer proof test declares a skip token, so the forgery attempt below "
+          "could not be mounted. That is not a pass: it means this check could not verify "
+          "that a self-skip is refused as proof, which is the whole point of the ledger")
+    if forge_target:
+        run_dir = tmp / "20260101T000000Z-forged"
+        run_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+        (run_dir / "report.junit.xml").write_text(
+            '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>\n'
+            '<testsuites><testsuite name="chainsaw" tests="1" failures="0" errors="0">'
+            f'<testcase name="{forge_target}" classname="forged"/>'
+            "</testsuite></testsuites>\n")
+        (run_dir / "run.log").write_text(
+            f"=== RUN   chainsaw/{forge_target}\n"
+            f"    === STDOUT\n        {forge_skip}\n")
+        forged = run([sys.executable, str(LIB / "record_run.py"), "--run-dir", str(run_dir),
+                      "--dry-run", "--ledger", str(tmp / "never-written.jsonl"),
+                      "--tests", str(CONF / "tests"), "--repo", str(ROOT)])
+        verdicts = re.findall(rf"^\[record\]\s+\S+\s+(\S+)\s+{re.escape(forge_target)}\b",
+                              forged.stdout, re.M)
+        check(verdicts and all(v != "proven" for v in verdicts),
+              f"lib/record_run.py recorded a FORGED run as {verdicts!r} for {forge_target!r}: "
+              "a JUnit saying `passed` with nothing in the log but that test's own SKIP token "
+              f"({forge_skip}). A self-skip must never become proof — with this hole every "
+              "audit proof in docs/07 could be produced by a cluster that skipped it")
+        check(not (tmp / "never-written.jsonl").exists(),
+              "record_run.py --dry-run WROTE to the ledger — a tool that records while "
+              "claiming not to cannot be trusted to record only real runs")
+
+    # ---- FORGERY 2: a ledger row claiming `proven` at a commit that predates the code.
+    # status.py must degrade it to stale-proof (not green), or an old green run would keep
+    # vouching for code it never executed.
+    root_sha = run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "rev-list", "--max-parents=0", "HEAD"])
+    old_sha = (root_sha.stdout.strip().splitlines() or [""])[0]
+    check(len(old_sha) == 40,
+          "the repository's root commit could not be resolved, so the stale-proof guard could "
+          "not be exercised (that is a gap in this check, not a pass)")
+    if len(old_sha) == 40 and forge_target:
+        stale_ledger = tmp / "stale.jsonl"
+        rid = sorted(smap[forge_target].get("requirements") or ["R-NET-06"])[0]
+        stale_ledger.write_text(json.dumps({
+            "ts_utc": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "git_sha": old_sha, "env": "dev",
+            "chainsaw_version": "v0.0.0", "kube_version": "unknown",
+            "layer": smap[forge_target].get("layer", "L3"), "test": forge_target,
+            "requirements": [rid], "junit_result": "passed",
+            "sentinel": (smap[forge_target].get("terminal_pass") or "X"),
+            "proof": "proven", "run_id": "20260101T000000Z-forged",
+            "note": "synthetic row written by the R-SEC-03 conformance check",
+        }) + "\n")
+        out2 = tmp / "status-stale"
+        st2 = run([sys.executable, str(LIB / "status.py"), "--repo", str(ROOT),
+                   "--registry", str(CONF / "requirements" / "registry.yaml"),
+                   "--tests", str(CONF / "tests"), "--out", str(out2),
+                   "--ledger", str(stale_ledger)])
+        check(st2.returncode == 0,
+              f"lib/status.py failed against a synthetic ledger: "
+              f"{(st2.stderr or st2.stdout).strip()[:300]}")
+        s2 = json.loads((out2 / "status.json").read_text()) if (out2 / "status.json").is_file() else {}
+        rec2 = (s2.get("by_requirement") or {}).get(rid) or {}
+        per = {p.get("test"): p.get("state") for p in ((rec2.get("proof") or {}).get("per_test") or [])}
+        check(per.get(forge_target) == "stale-proof",
+              f"a ledger row claiming `proven` for {forge_target!r} at the repository's ROOT "
+              f"commit was reported as {per.get(forge_target)!r} instead of 'stale-proof'. A "
+              "proof from a run that predates the code it vouches for is not evidence, and "
+              "honouring it would let one old green run certify every later change")
+        check((rec2.get("proof") or {}).get("state") != "proven",
+              f"{rid} is reported PROVEN on the strength of a row from the root commit — the "
+              "freshness guard is not holding")
+
+    # ---- the ledger itself is machine-readable, and no row proves a test that is gone ----
+    ledger = CONF / "runs" / "ledger.jsonl"
+    if ledger.is_file():
+        rows, bad = [], []
+        for i, line in enumerate(ledger.read_text().splitlines(), 1):
+            if not line.strip():
+                continue
+            try:
+                rows.append(json.loads(line))
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                bad.append(i)
+        check(not bad,
+              f"conformance/runs/ledger.jsonl has unparsable line(s) {bad} — the audit record "
+              "is not machine-readable, so no proof can be derived from it")
+        for r in rows:
+            for key in ("ts_utc", "git_sha", "test", "requirements", "junit_result", "proof",
+                        "run_id"):
+                check(key in r,
+                      f"a ledger row for {r.get('test', '?')!r} lacks {key!r} — a row without "
+                      "provenance cannot be audited")
+            if r.get("proof") == "proven":
+                check(bool(r.get("sentinel")),
+                      f"a ledger row claims `proven` for {r.get('test')!r} with NO sentinel — "
+                      "the sentinel is the only thing separating a real pass from a self-skip")
+                check(r.get("test") in smap,
+                      f"a ledger row claims `proven` for {r.get('test')!r}, which is not a "
+                      "test in the suite any more — a proof of something that no longer exists")
+                check("-dirty" not in str(r.get("git_sha", "")),
+                      f"a ledger row claims `proven` for {r.get('test')!r} from a DIRTY tree "
+                      f"({r.get('git_sha')}) — what ran is not what is committed")
+    else:
+        note("conformance/runs/ledger.jsonl does not exist yet — the ledger-shape assertions "
+             "were skipped; every other assertion ran, and the forgery probes above use "
+             "synthetic ledgers, not this file")
+finally:
+    shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
+# NO-OP GUARD: a check that quietly asserts nothing is worse than no check.
+check(CHECKS >= 30,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op and its pass "
+      "would be meaningless")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    die()
+for n in NOTES:
+    print(f"  note: {n}")
+print(f"check OK: auditability-proofs-producible — {CHECKS} assertions; the five docs/07 "
+      f"proofs ({', '.join(sorted(PROOFS))}) each map to an executable test at the layer the "
+      f"spec's own wording requires, `run.sh --requirements {','.join(PROOF_REQS)}` resolves "
+      "and asserts them, each Chainsaw-layer proof declares a sentinel record_run.py can "
+      "attribute, both evidence tools' self-tests pass, and two independent forgeries — a "
+      "self-skip presented as a pass, and a `proven` row from the root commit — were REFUSED. "
+      "R-SEC-03's producibility half only: whether each proof PASSES is its own "
+      "requirement's test, and the Hubble half of the isolation proof is automated nowhere "
+      "(see the header's gap list).")
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — the bulk tier's capacity strategy is DISTINCT from the replicated tier's
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+#
+# THE BUG CLASS THIS CLOSES. The `bulk` StorageClass existed from Phase 0 as a stub:
+# `provisioner: nfs.csi.k8s.io`, `server: REPLACE-ME`, `share: REPLACE-ME`, TODO(OQ-2).
+# Four ServiceDefinitions carried a comment promising to attach their media once OQ-2 was
+# resolved, and the ONLY thing keeping a multi-terabyte library off the 3-replica
+# `longhorn` class was those four comments. A bulk volume that lands on the replicated
+# tier does not fail loudly — Longhorn accepts the PVC and starts replicating 3x of data
+# three mini-PCs cannot hold. R-STATE-04 is precisely that the two tiers are distinct, so
+# the distinctness is asserted rather than reviewed.
+#
+# It also pins the four decisions that make the STATIC form of this tier safe, each with a
+# plausible "simplification" that breaks something silently: `Retain` (bulk data pre-exists
+# the cluster and has consumers outside it, so anything else makes `delete pvc` a data-loss
+# operation); NO dynamic provisioning (a dynamic bulk class hands out a FRESH EMPTY
+# directory that mounts and Binds perfectly while the real 8 TiB is never attached — the
+# most deceptive failure available here); `hard` not `soft` (a soft mount hands a server
+# hiccup to the app as a short read, which for a media library is silent corruption); and
+# NFSv4 (mount and lock in-protocol ⇒ ONE reachable port, tcp/2049, which is what the
+# operator must open in pfSense for prod to reach this server at all).
+#
+# AND the EXDEV trap, which is not about storage. Sonarr/Radarr import by hardlinking or
+# atomically renaming, both same-filesystem operations, and to the kernel "same filesystem"
+# means SAME MOUNT. Splitting one export into two subPath mounts looks TIGHTER and breaks
+# link() with EXDEV; the arrs then degrade to copy-then-delete, rewriting every import over
+# NFS and destroying the seeding copy. It surfaces weeks later as "imports are slow and my
+# ratio is gone". A reviewer cannot see that; this check can.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# WHEN  every `class: bulk` storage entry in catalog/ is compared against the objects the
+#       COMMITTED apps/ goldens carry for it (what Flux reconciles — deliberately not the
+#       renderer, which would only prove it agrees with itself),
+# THEN  (1) no bulk volume is on a Longhorn-provisioned class, and its class is explicitly
+#           EMPTY so nothing can dynamically provision an empty stand-in;
+#       (2) its capacity is declared and is at least an order of magnitude above the same
+#           service's replicated volume — the requirement stated as arithmetic;
+#       (3) PV and PVC are pre-bound from BOTH ends (claimRef + volumeName) and agree;
+#       (4) the PV reclaim policy is Retain;
+#       (5) mountOptions carry `hard` and exactly one `nfsvers=4.x`, and never `soft`;
+#       (6) no workload mounts one export more than once (the EXDEV trap);
+#       (7) a readOnly entry renders nfs.readOnly AND a readOnly volumeMount AND
+#           ReadOnlyMany; a writable one renders neither and is ReadWriteMany; every bulk
+#           access mode is a `...Many`, since one export serves several namespaces and
+#           several nodes;
+#       (8) the PV's nfs.server is a BARE cluster-vars token (never a literal — dev and
+#           prod reach this host by different addresses), that knob has a base default, and
+#           EVERY overlay supplies it;
+#   AND (9) the check is LOAD-BEARING (ci/l0.sh runs it unconditionally, ci/gate.sh blocks
+#           on the l0 stage) and NON-VACUOUS (an empty bulk corpus FAILS rather than
+#           passing trivially, and a floor on the assertion count keeps a pass from
+#           degenerating into a no-op).
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (standard library +
+# PyYAML); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 runs it directly and this Chainsaw Test wraps the
+# SAME script.
+#
+# NOT proven — the runtime half, which needs a cluster: that the server is reachable, that
+# the export admits these clients, that the PVC binds, that a write succeeds, or that a
+# hardlink between the library and the download path actually works. The uid analysis is
+# reasoning (docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md §6) and the in-cluster probes that would settle it
+# are written down in §9 of that document, unrun. Nor can this prove prod's address is
+# CORRECT — only that it is a supplied knob; while it is a placeholder, prod's pods will
+# not mount, and catching that statically needs the placeholder guard, which is absent from
+# main (§7). Read-only on the media tree is a CLIENT-side guarantee only: the export serves
+# one reader and two writers from the same node addresses, so the server cannot tell them
+# apart (§5).
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-STATE-04: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-STATE-04"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Bulk media storage is provably NOT on the 3-replica Longhorn tier, is sized for a
+      different order of magnitude, cannot be silently replaced by a dynamically
+      provisioned empty volume, is never reclaimable by the cluster, mounts hard over
+      NFSv4, and is never split into two mounts of one export — so hardlinked imports keep
+      working. Its server is a per-environment knob, not a literal, because the two
+      clusters reach the same storage host by different addresses.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: assert-bulk-tier-is-distinct-and-statically-bound
+      description: >-
+        Read every `class: bulk` storage entry from catalog/, pair it with the
+        PersistentVolume, PersistentVolumeClaim and volumeMount the committed apps/ goldens
+        carry for it, and assert the tier separation, the static pre-binding, the reclaim
+        and mount-option decisions, the read-only coupling, the one-export-one-mount
+        invariant, and that the server address is supplied by every environment overlay.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated
+# Serves: R-STATE-04 ("Bulk media storage has a capacity strategy distinct from the
+#                      replicated tier." — spec docs/04-storage-and-state.md)
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS — THE BULK TIER WAS A STUB FOR SIX ROADMAP PHASES, AND STUBS ROT QUIETLY
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# `platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml` declared a `bulk` StorageClass from Phase 0 with
+# `provisioner: nfs.csi.k8s.io`, `server: REPLACE-ME`, `share: REPLACE-ME` and a TODO(OQ-2).
+# Four ServiceDefinitions carried a comment promising to attach their media "once OQ-2 is
+# resolved", and each of them said, correctly, that adding `class: bulk` before then would
+# leave the PVC unbound and the pod Pending. So the tier existed as a NAME with nothing
+# behind it, and the only thing preventing a multi-terabyte media library from being
+# authored onto the 3-replica `longhorn` class was four hand-written comments.
+#
+# That is the failure this check makes impossible to reintroduce. R-STATE-04 is not "bulk
+# storage exists" — it is that bulk storage's capacity strategy is DISTINCT from the
+# replicated tier's. Three mini-PCs cannot hold 3x of 8.33 TiB. A bulk volume that lands on
+# `longhorn` does not fail loudly: Longhorn accepts the PVC and starts replicating, and the
+# tier fills up. Distinctness is therefore a property worth asserting statically, on every
+# gate run, rather than trusting to review.
+#
+# It also pins the four decisions that make the STATIC form of this tier safe, each of
+# which has a plausible-looking "simplification" that silently breaks something:
+#
+#   * RECLAIM POLICY. Bulk data pre-exists the cluster, is larger than the cluster, and has
+#     consumers OUTSIDE it. `Retain` is the whole reason a PV is used here instead of an
+#     inline volume. `Delete` on a dynamically-provisioned bulk class would make `kubectl
+#     delete pvc` a data-loss operation.
+#   * NO DYNAMIC PROVISIONING. A dynamic bulk class hands out FRESH EMPTY directories. The
+#     pod mounts successfully, the PVC is Bound, everything is green — and the 8 TiB of
+#     existing data was never attached. This is the single most deceptive failure available
+#     in this tier, so `storageClassName` must be explicitly empty and binding must be
+#     pinned from BOTH ends (claimRef + volumeName).
+#   * `hard`, NOT `soft`. A soft NFS mount converts a server hiccup into a short read or
+#     EIO handed to the application. For a media library that is silent corruption. `hard`
+#     hangs instead — recoverable, where truncated is not.
+#   * NFSv4. v4 carries mount and lock in-protocol, so the tier needs ONE reachable port
+#     (tcp/2049) instead of v3's rpcbind/111 + mountd + statd on ephemeral numbers. That is
+#     a FIREWALL fact as much as a storage one: prod reaches this server through pfSense,
+#     and the number of ports the operator must open is a consequence of this field.
+#
+# AND ONE INVARIANT THAT IS NOT ABOUT STORAGE AT ALL — the EXDEV trap (assertion 6).
+# Sonarr and Radarr import by hardlinking or atomically renaming a finished download into
+# the library. Both are same-filesystem operations, and to the kernel "same filesystem"
+# means SAME MOUNT. Mounting one export twice (say `subPath: tv` and `subPath: downloads`)
+# looks TIGHTER — less of the tree exposed per mount — and breaks `link()` with EXDEV no
+# matter that the server knows they are one dataset. The arrs do not fail loudly on that:
+# they degrade to copy-then-delete, rewriting every imported file over NFS and destroying
+# the seeding copy. The symptom appears weeks later as "imports are slow and my ratio is
+# gone". A reviewer cannot see it, so this check does: one export, at most one mount, per
+# workload.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# WHEN  every `class: bulk` storage entry in catalog/ is compared against the manifests
+#       render.py produces for it (read from the committed apps/ goldens, i.e. what Flux
+#       actually reconciles — not from the renderer, which would only agree with itself),
+# THEN  (1) DISTINCTNESS: no bulk volume is on the replicated tier. Its PV/PVC
+#           storageClassName is explicitly empty — never `longhorn`, never any class the
+#           repo declares with the Longhorn provisioner — and its PV's source is an
+#           EXTERNAL one (nfs), not a Longhorn volume;
+#       (2) CAPACITY STRATEGY: every bulk PV declares a capacity, and for each service the
+#           bulk volume is at least an ORDER OF MAGNITUDE larger than that service's own
+#           replicated volume. This is the requirement stated as arithmetic: the two tiers
+#           exist because the data has two magnitudes, so a "bulk" volume sized like a
+#           config PVC means the strategy was named and not actually applied;
+#       (3) NOT DYNAMICALLY PROVISIONED, AND PRE-BOUND BOTH WAYS: every bulk PVC names its
+#           PV by volumeName, every bulk PV names its PVC by claimRef (namespace+name), and
+#           the two agree — so no other claim can win a race, and nothing can provision an
+#           empty replacement;
+#       (4) RECLAIM: every bulk PV is `Retain`;
+#       (5) MOUNT SAFETY: every bulk PV declares mountOptions carrying `hard` and an
+#           `nfsvers=4.x`, and carrying NEITHER `soft` NOR an `nfsvers=3`;
+#       (6) ONE EXPORT, ONE MOUNT PER WORKLOAD (the EXDEV trap above);
+#       (7) READ-ONLY IS REAL AND CONSISTENT: a bulk entry declared readOnly renders BOTH
+#           `spec.nfs.readOnly: true` on the PV AND `readOnly: true` on the volumeMount,
+#           and its access mode is ReadOnlyMany; a writable one renders NEITHER and is
+#           ReadWriteMany. Every bulk access mode is a `...Many` — one export is consumed
+#           by several namespaces and several nodes, which ReadWriteOnce cannot express;
+#       (8) AUTHORED ONCE, PROMOTED (the R-ENV-02 seam this tier depends on): every bulk
+#           PV's `nfs.server` is the BARE cluster-vars token, never a literal address; that
+#           knob has a base default; and EVERY environment overlay supplies it — so the two
+#           clusters, which reach this storage by different addresses, cannot be served by
+#           one hardcoded value;
+#   AND (9) LOAD-BEARING + NON-VACUOUS: ci/l0.sh runs this check unconditionally and
+#           ci/gate.sh blocks the merge when the l0 stage fails; and the corpus is NOT
+#           empty — a repo with zero bulk volumes fails here rather than passing trivially,
+#           because a check that is satisfiable by deleting the feature proves nothing.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps)
+#   - Nothing about RUNTIME. Not that the server is reachable, not that the export permits
+#     these clients, not that the PVC binds, not that a write succeeds. The uid analysis in
+#     docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md §6 is reasoning, and the write/hardlink probes in §9 are the
+#     in-cluster proof — they need a cluster and are not run here.
+#   - It cannot prove the prod address is CORRECT, only that it is a supplied knob. While
+#     prod's value is a placeholder, prod's pods will not mount (docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md
+#     §7); catching that needs the placeholder guard, which is absent from main.
+#   - Read-only for the media tree is a CLIENT-side guarantee, and this check can only
+#     assert the client side. The export serves a reader and two writers from the same node
+#     addresses, so the server cannot distinguish them (docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md §5).
+#   - Assertion (2)'s magnitude ratio is a heuristic with a deliberately generous floor. It
+#     catches "bulk volume sized like a config volume", not a subtly wrong capacity — and a
+#     static NFS PV's capacity is advisory anyway, since the ZFS pool is the real limit.
+#   - Assertion (6) reasons over ONE workload's mounts. It cannot see two different
+#     services hardlinking between each other's mounts, which is not a thing that happens.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+
+if [ ! -d "${ROOT}/catalog" ] || [ ! -d "${ROOT}/apps" ]; then
+  echo "check SKIPPED (bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated): catalog/ or apps/ absent — nothing to audit" >&2
+  exit 3
+fi
+
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def bail(msg):
+    """A failure that makes the rest of the check meaningless: report and stop."""
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated): {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+
+def qty_to_bytes(q):
+    """Kubernetes quantity -> bytes. Only the binary suffixes the schema permits."""
+    m = re.fullmatch(r"([0-9]+)(Mi|Gi|Ti)", str(q).strip())
+    if not m:
+        return None
+    return int(m.group(1)) * {"Mi": 2 ** 20, "Gi": 2 ** 30, "Ti": 2 ** 40}[m.group(2)]
+
+
+# =====================================================================================
+# The replicated tier, named by the repo rather than by this file. Any StorageClass the
+# repo declares with the Longhorn provisioner is "the replicated tier" for assertion (1);
+# deriving it means adding a new Longhorn class cannot create a blind spot here.
+# =====================================================================================
+REPLICATED_CLASSES: set[str] = set()
+LONGHORN_DIR = ROOT / "platform" / "longhorn"
+if LONGHORN_DIR.is_dir():
+    for f in sorted(LONGHORN_DIR.rglob("*.yaml")):
+        for doc in yaml.safe_load_all(f.read_text()):
+            if isinstance(doc, dict) and doc.get("kind") == "StorageClass":
+                if "longhorn" in str(doc.get("provisioner", "")):
+                    REPLICATED_CLASSES.add(doc.get("metadata", {}).get("name", ""))
+# `longhorn` is the name every ServiceDefinition uses for the replicated tier, so it is in
+# the set even if platform/longhorn/ is not present in this checkout.
+REPLICATED_CLASSES.add("longhorn")
+REPLICATED_CLASSES.discard("")
+
+# =====================================================================================
+# The bulk corpus: every `class: bulk` storage entry in every ServiceDefinition, paired
+# with the objects the COMMITTED goldens carry for it. Reading the goldens (not calling
+# the renderer) is deliberate: the goldens are what Flux reconciles, and render==golden is
+# a separate gate stage. Asking the renderer would only prove it agrees with itself.
+# =====================================================================================
+sds: dict[str, dict] = {}
+for f in sorted((ROOT / "catalog").glob("*.yaml")):
+    doc = yaml.safe_load(f.read_text())
+    if isinstance(doc, dict) and doc.get("name"):
+        sds[doc["name"]] = doc
+
+if not sds:
+    bail("no ServiceDefinitions under catalog/ — cannot audit the bulk tier")
+
+# Every rendered app-tier document, indexed by (kind, name).
+rendered: dict[tuple, dict] = {}
+for f in sorted((ROOT / "apps").rglob("*.yaml")):
+    if f.name == "kustomization.yaml" or ".sops." in f.name:
+        continue
+    try:
+        docs = list(yaml.safe_load_all(f.read_text()))
+    except yaml.YAMLError:
+        continue
+    for doc in docs:
+        if isinstance(doc, dict) and doc.get("kind") and doc.get("metadata", {}).get("name"):
+            rendered[(doc["kind"], doc["metadata"]["name"])] = doc
+
+# (svc, vol_entry) for every bulk entry, and the replicated sizes alongside for (2).
+corpus: list[tuple[str, dict]] = []
+replicated_bytes: dict[str, list[int]] = {}
+for svc, sd in sds.items():
+    for vol in sd.get("storage") or []:
+        cls = vol.get("class", "longhorn")
+        if cls == "bulk":
+            corpus.append((svc, vol))
+        else:
+            b = qty_to_bytes(vol.get("size"))
+            if b:
+                replicated_bytes.setdefault(svc, []).append(b)
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------- (9) NON-VACUOUS
+# A corpus of zero would make every loop below trivially satisfied. The bulk tier is
+# DELIVERED; a change that removes the last bulk volume must fail here and be argued for,
+# not sail through on an empty iteration.
+check(len(corpus) > 0,
+      "NO `class: bulk` storage entry exists in catalog/ — this check would then pass "
+      "vacuously, which is exactly the posture that let the bulk tier sit as a REPLACE-ME "
+      "stub for six roadmap phases. If the tier is genuinely being retired, retire this "
+      "check in the same change and say so; do not let it pass on an empty corpus")
+if not corpus:
+    bail("empty bulk corpus — refusing to report a vacuous pass (see assertion 9)")
+
+inventory: list[str] = []
+
+for svc, vol in corpus:
+    vname = vol.get("name", "<unnamed>")
+    label = f"{svc}/{vname}"
+    obj = f"{svc}-{vname}"
+    ro = bool(vol.get("readOnly"))
+
+    # `export` is what the schema requires of a bulk entry; without it there is nothing to
+    # attach and the rest of the assertions have no subject.
+    export = vol.get("export")
+    check(bool(export) and str(export).startswith("/"),
+          f"{label}: bulk entry has no absolute `export` path — a bulk volume attaches an "
+          f"EXISTING dataset, so it must say which one (schema requires it when class is bulk)")
+
+    pv = rendered.get(("PersistentVolume", obj))
+    pvc = rendered.get(("PersistentVolumeClaim", obj))
+    check(pv is not None,
+          f"{label}: no PersistentVolume '{obj}' in the committed apps/ goldens. A bulk "
+          f"entry that renders no PV has NO external storage behind it — the pod would get "
+          f"an unbound PVC, or (worse, with a dynamic class) a fresh EMPTY directory")
+    check(pvc is not None,
+          f"{label}: no PersistentVolumeClaim '{obj}' in the committed apps/ goldens")
+    if pv is None or pvc is None:
+        continue
+
+    pvs, pvcs = pv.get("spec", {}) or {}, pvc.get("spec", {}) or {}
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------ (1) DISTINCT FROM REPLICATED
+    for what, spec in (("PV", pvs), ("PVC", pvcs)):
+        sc = spec.get("storageClassName")
+        check(sc not in REPLICATED_CLASSES,
+              f"{label}: bulk {what} storageClassName is '{sc}', which the repo declares "
+              f"with the Longhorn provisioner. That puts BULK data on the REPLICATED tier "
+              f"— 3x of a multi-terabyte library across three mini-PCs. Longhorn will not "
+              f"refuse it; it will accept the PVC and fill the tier (R-STATE-04)")
+        check(sc == "",
+              f"{label}: bulk {what} storageClassName is {sc!r}, not the explicitly EMPTY "
+              f"string. Empty is what disables dynamic provisioning AND the default-class "
+              f"annotation. Any named class risks a provisioner handing out a fresh EMPTY "
+              f"directory that mounts and binds cleanly while the real data is never attached")
+    check("nfs" in pvs,
+          f"{label}: bulk PV declares no external `nfs` source — the bulk tier's whole "
+          f"premise is that durability lives OUTSIDE the cluster (docs/04)")
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------ (4) RECLAIM POLICY
+    check(pvs.get("persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy") == "Retain",
+          f"{label}: bulk PV reclaim policy is "
+          f"{pvs.get('persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy')!r}, not Retain. This data pre-exists "
+          f"the cluster and has consumers outside it; anything but Retain makes `kubectl "
+          f"delete pvc` a data-loss operation")
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------- (3) PRE-BOUND FROM BOTH ENDS
+    check(pvcs.get("volumeName") == obj,
+          f"{label}: bulk PVC does not name its PV via volumeName (got "
+          f"{pvcs.get('volumeName')!r}, expected {obj!r}) — without it the claim can be "
+          f"satisfied by some OTHER volume of matching size and mode")
+    cref = pvs.get("claimRef") or {}
+    check(cref.get("name") == obj and cref.get("namespace") == svc,
+          f"{label}: bulk PV claimRef is {cref!r}, expected namespace={svc!r} name={obj!r} "
+          f"— pre-binding must be pinned from BOTH ends or another PVC can win the race")
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------- (5) MOUNT SAFETY
+    mopts = [str(o) for o in (pvs.get("mountOptions") or [])]
+    check(bool(mopts),
+          f"{label}: bulk PV declares no mountOptions — then `hard` vs `soft` and the NFS "
+          f"version are whatever the client happens to default to, and both are decisions "
+          f"with consequences (silent short reads; how many firewall ports must open)")
+    check("hard" in mopts,
+          f"{label}: bulk PV mountOptions do not include `hard` ({mopts}). A soft mount "
+          f"hands a server hiccup to the application as a short read or EIO — silent "
+          f"corruption for a media library. `hard` hangs instead, which is recoverable")
+    check("soft" not in mopts,
+          f"{label}: bulk PV mountOptions include `soft` ({mopts}) — see above; this is the "
+          f"one option that turns an outage into damaged data")
+    vers = [o for o in mopts if o.startswith("nfsvers=")]
+    check(len(vers) == 1 and re.fullmatch(r"nfsvers=4(\.[0-9]+)?", vers[0]),
+          f"{label}: bulk PV must pin exactly one NFSv4 `nfsvers=` option (got {vers}). "
+          f"NFSv4 carries mount and lock in-protocol, so the tier needs ONE reachable port "
+          f"(tcp/2049); v3 also needs rpcbind/111, mountd and statd, which changes what the "
+          f"operator has to open in pfSense for prod to reach this server at all")
+
+    # ---------------------------------------------- (7) READ-ONLY IS REAL + CONSISTENT
+    want_mode = "ReadOnlyMany" if ro else "ReadWriteMany"
+    for what, spec in (("PV", pvs), ("PVC", pvcs)):
+        modes = spec.get("accessModes") or []
+        check(modes == [want_mode],
+              f"{label}: bulk {what} accessModes {modes} != ['{want_mode}']. Every bulk "
+              f"volume is a `...Many` (one export, several namespaces, several nodes — "
+              f"ReadWriteOnce cannot express that), and WHICH `Many` is how the read/write "
+              f"posture stays legible in `kubectl get pv`")
+    nfs_ro = bool((pvs.get("nfs") or {}).get("readOnly"))
+    check(nfs_ro == ro,
+          f"{label}: ServiceDefinition readOnly={ro} but the PV's nfs.readOnly={nfs_ro}. "
+          f"The PV field is what makes the kernel mount `ro`; a mismatch means the declared "
+          f"posture is not the one the kernel enforces")
+
+    # The volumeMount half, read out of the rendered Deployment.
+    dep = rendered.get(("Deployment", svc))
+    check(dep is not None, f"{label}: no rendered Deployment '{svc}' to check the mount against")
+    if dep is not None:
+        containers = (((dep.get("spec") or {}).get("template") or {}).get("spec") or {}).get("containers") or []
+        # The app container is containers[0] by the renderer's contract (a forward-auth
+        # sidecar is appended AFTER it).
+        mounts = [m for m in (containers[0].get("volumeMounts") or []) if m.get("name") == vname] if containers else []
+        check(len(mounts) == 1,
+              f"{label}: the app container has {len(mounts)} volumeMount(s) named {vname!r}, "
+              f"expected exactly 1 — a bulk volume that is declared and never mounted is a "
+              f"PV/PVC pair doing nothing, and two mounts of one volume is assertion (6)")
+        if len(mounts) == 1:
+            m = mounts[0]
+            check(bool(m.get("readOnly")) == ro,
+                  f"{label}: volumeMount readOnly={bool(m.get('readOnly'))} but the "
+                  f"ServiceDefinition says readOnly={ro} — the PV and the mount must agree, "
+                  f"so that dropping one still leaves the other")
+            check(m.get("subPath", vol.get("subPath")) == vol.get("subPath"),
+                  f"{label}: volumeMount subPath {m.get('subPath')!r} does not match the "
+                  f"declared subPath {vol.get('subPath')!r}")
+
+    # ------------------------------------------ (8) AUTHORED ONCE, SUPPLIED PER ENV
+    server = (pvs.get("nfs") or {}).get("server")
+    m = re.fullmatch(r"\$\{([A-Z0-9_]+)\}", str(server or ""))
+    check(m is not None,
+          f"{label}: bulk PV nfs.server is {server!r} — it must be a BARE cluster-vars "
+          f"token, not a literal address. dev and prod reach this storage host by DIFFERENT "
+          f"addresses (dev is on its LAN; prod is across pfSense), so a literal is correct "
+          f"in at most one environment and silently wrong in the other (R-ENV-02)")
+
+    cap = (pvs.get("capacity") or {}).get("storage")
+    req = ((pvcs.get("resources") or {}).get("requests") or {}).get("storage")
+    check(cap is not None and qty_to_bytes(cap) is not None,
+          f"{label}: bulk PV declares no parseable capacity ({cap!r}) — the API requires it, "
+          f"and it is what makes `kubectl get pv` report something true about this tier")
+    check(cap == req,
+          f"{label}: PV capacity {cap!r} != PVC request {req!r}; a request above the "
+          f"capacity never binds")
+
+    inventory.append(
+        f"  {label:<28} export={export}  {'ro' if ro else 'rw'}  {want_mode:<14} "
+        f"cap={cap}  server={server}  opts={','.join(mopts)}"
+    )
+
+    # ---------------------------------- (2) CAPACITY STRATEGY: two tiers, two magnitudes
+    cap_b = qty_to_bytes(cap)
+    reps = replicated_bytes.get(svc) or []
+    if cap_b and reps:
+        biggest = max(reps)
+        # ONE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE. Calibrated against the real corpus rather than guessed:
+        # the media library is ~460x its service's config volume, and the Nextcloud archive
+        # ~13x its 20Gi Longhorn volume — so a floor above ~13x would fire on a legitimate
+        # bulk volume, and this check would be teaching people to weaken it. 10x cannot be
+        # met by accident and still catches the regression that matters: a "bulk" volume
+        # sized like a config PVC, i.e. the strategy named but never applied.
+        check(cap_b >= 10 * biggest,
+              f"{label}: bulk capacity {cap} is less than 10x this service's largest "
+              f"replicated volume ({biggest // 2 ** 30}Gi). R-STATE-04 exists because the "
+              f"two tiers hold data of two different MAGNITUDES — the replicated tier keeps "
+              f"the small config/DB and the bulk tier keeps what cannot be replicated 3x. A "
+              f"bulk volume sized like a config volume means the tier was named, not applied")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------- (6) ONE EXPORT, AT MOST ONE MOUNT
+# The EXDEV trap. Grouped per SERVICE, because the hazard is two mounts inside ONE pod.
+by_service: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+for svc, vol in corpus:
+    by_service.setdefault(svc, []).append(vol)
+for svc, vols in sorted(by_service.items()):
+    seen: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for vol in vols:
+        exp = vol.get("export")
+        prev = seen.get(exp)
+        check(prev is None,
+              f"{svc}: mounts the export {exp} TWICE (volumes {prev!r} and "
+              f"{vol.get('name')!r}). Two mounts of one export are two FILESYSTEMS to the "
+              f"kernel, so link() between them fails EXDEV even though the server knows "
+              f"they are one dataset. Sonarr/Radarr do not fail loudly on that — they "
+              f"degrade to copy-then-delete, rewriting every imported file over NFS and "
+              f"destroying the seeding copy. Mount the common ancestor ONCE instead "
+              f"(docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md §4)")
+        seen[exp] = vol.get("name")
+
+# ------------------------------------- (8b) the knob has a base default AND every overlay
+tokens = set()
+for _svc, vol in corpus:
+    pv = rendered.get(("PersistentVolume", f"{_svc}-{vol.get('name')}"))
+    if pv:
+        mm = re.fullmatch(r"\$\{([A-Z0-9_]+)\}", str(((pv.get("spec") or {}).get("nfs") or {}).get("server") or ""))
+        if mm:
+            tokens.add(mm.group(1))
+
+cv = ROOT / "clusters" / "base" / "cluster-vars.yaml"
+base_keys: set[str] = set()
+if cv.is_file():
+    doc = yaml.safe_load(cv.read_text()) or {}
+    base_keys = set((doc.get("data") or {}).keys())
+
+overlays = sorted(
+    d for d in (ROOT / "clusters").iterdir()
+    if cv.is_file() and d.is_dir() and d.name != "base" and (d / "kustomization.yaml").is_file()
+) if (ROOT / "clusters").is_dir() else []
+
+for tok in sorted(tokens):
+    check(tok in base_keys,
+          f"bulk PVs reference ${{{tok}}} but clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml declares no "
+          f"such knob. Under StrictPostBuildSubstitutions that fails the whole tier; without "
+          f"it the token ships into the cluster as a literal server name")
+    for ov in overlays:
+        text = (ov / "kustomization.yaml").read_text()
+        check(f"/data/{tok}" in text,
+              f"clusters/{ov.name} does not supply ${{{tok}}}. The base default is the DEV "
+              f"value by this repo's convention, so an overlay that omits it silently "
+              f"inherits an address on the WRONG SIDE of pfSense — a mount that either "
+              f"never connects or connects to something unintended (R-ENV-02)")
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------- (9) LOAD-BEARING
+L0 = (ROOT / "ci" / "l0.sh").read_text() if (ROOT / "ci" / "l0.sh").is_file() else ""
+GATE = (ROOT / "ci" / "gate.sh").read_text() if (ROOT / "ci" / "gate.sh").is_file() else ""
+check("bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated/check.sh" in L0,
+      "ci/l0.sh does not run bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated/check.sh. Stage 3b scopes "
+      "the conformance run to TOUCHED requirements, and ci/touched-requirements.sh maps "
+      "neither apps/* nor platform/longhorn/* to the bulk requirement — so a change that "
+      "moves a bulk volume onto the replicated tier could attribute no requirement at all "
+      "and be gated by nothing. It must be invoked directly and unconditionally")
+check(re.search(r"^for s in .*\bl0\b.*; do", GATE, re.M) and re.search(r"fail\).*BLOCK=1", GATE),
+      "ci/gate.sh does not set the merge block when the l0 stage fails")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------- report
+print("Bulk tier inventory (from catalog/ + the committed apps/ goldens):")
+for line in inventory:
+    print(line)
+print(f"\nreplicated tier StorageClasses (derived from platform/longhorn/): "
+      f"{', '.join(sorted(REPLICATED_CLASSES))}")
+print(f"bulk volumes: {len(corpus)}   distinct exports: "
+      f"{len({v.get('export') for _s, v in corpus})}   "
+      f"server knob(s): {', '.join(sorted(tokens)) or 'NONE'}")
+
+# A floor on the assertion count, for the same reason the corpus may not be empty: a pass
+# must not be able to degenerate into "nothing was actually asked".
+MIN_CHECKS = 40
+check(CHECKS >= MIN_CHECKS,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran (floor {MIN_CHECKS}) — a pass this thin is not "
+      f"evidence; the corpus or the extraction has degraded")
+
+print()
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated): {len(FAILURES)} finding(s)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+print(f"check OK: bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated — {CHECKS} assertions (R-STATE-04)")
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — dev/test nodes are provisioned as code, end to end  (R-ENV-01)  [EXECUTABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-ENV-01 ("dev/test MUST be provisioned as local KVMs via IaC:
+#          created, baselined, cluster-joined, and managed as code"); the four stages
+#          are enumerated in docs/02 §"Node lifecycle stages".
+#
+# WHY L0: R-ENV-01 is a requirement about HOW the dev nodes came to exist, and a live
+# Node object cannot answer it — a node built by OpenTofu and one built by hand in a
+# hypervisor UI are indistinguishable through the Kubernetes API. What is provable, with
+# no cluster, is that a COMPLETE and EXECUTABLE provisioning path exists for all four
+# stages and covers EVERY dev node. For the Ansible half that is proven by DRIVING the
+# real toolchain offline (`--syntax-check`, `--list-hosts` — neither opens a connection
+# to any node), not by reading files: a chain that does not resolve fails the check.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC: no hostname, address, prefix or node count appears in the test.
+# The dev group names are read from the playbooks' own default host patterns, the node
+# names are generated from the IaC module's prefix/count variables, and the two sets are
+# compared against each other — so the assertion survives a rename or a resize.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  the provisioning chain is parsed and (where offline execution is possible) driven,
+# THEN  the IaC module creates the dev nodes on a LOCAL KVM hypervisor (allowlisted
+#       provider — a cloud provider fails), from a for_each map rather than a count index,
+#       each with CPU/RAM/OS disk/dedicated Longhorn data disk/NIC/cloud-init seed; the
+#       node set it creates is EXACTLY the set Ansible manages; the baseline stage applies
+#       the package floor, kernel modules, sysctls, data-disk mount, swap-off and iscsid
+#       declaratively; one k3s role founds the cluster with --cluster-init and joins the
+#       rest with --server while disabling flannel/kube-proxy/traefik/servicelb at
+#       install; and site.yml's chain (baseline -> k3s -> Cilium -> verify -> Flux)
+#       resolves and targets every dev node at every stage.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git, PyYAML, and —
+# where present — ansible-playbook in no-connection modes; no cluster, no network);
+# conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it directly, and this Chainsaw Test
+# wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (enumerated in check.sh's header; this test claims none of them):
+#   * That the RUNNING dev VMs were created by this module — needs the OpenTofu state or
+#     hypervisor access, neither available offline.
+#   * `tofu validate` — needs `tofu init` (provider registry), i.e. network. The module is
+#     parsed, not evaluated; a network-allowed CI stage would close this.
+#   * "Never hand-edited on the box" (docs/02 stage 4's second half) — a live drift check.
+#   * REBUILD/re-converge (docs/02's own proof line) — exercised at L3 by
+#     tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss (R-STATE-02).
+#   * docs/02 prose puts the baseline in cloud-init; the implementation moved it into the
+#     Ansible node_baseline role. R-ENV-01 requires the node to be "baselined ... as code",
+#     not that cloud-init be the tool, so the check asserts the STAGE and RECORDS the
+#     divergence rather than hiding it.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-ENV-01: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-ENV-01"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given the tracked tree, when the dev provisioning chain is parsed and driven
+      offline, then every dev node is created by local-KVM IaC, baselined, cluster-joined
+      and handed to Flux by one code path that covers all of them — with no node outside
+      it and no stage missing.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: then-every-dev-node-is-created-baselined-joined-and-managed-as-code
+      description: >-
+        Run the offline assertion script over the tracked tree (same script ci/l0.sh and
+        conformance/run.sh --layer l0 execute).
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code
+# Serves: R-ENV-01 ("dev/test MUST be provisioned as local KVMs via IaC: created,
+#         baselined, cluster-joined, and managed as code." — spec
+#         docs/00-vision-and-scope.md; the four stages are enumerated in
+#         docs/02-environments-and-provisioning.md §"Node lifecycle stages
+#         (R-ENV-01 — 'created, baselined, cluster-joined, managed as code')":
+#           1. Create   — OpenTofu instantiates the VM
+#           2. Baseline — OS baseline and prerequisites
+#           3. Cluster-join — Ansible installs/joins k3s with Cilium as CNI; disables
+#              k3s bundled flannel/traefik/servicelb/kube-proxy
+#           4. Manage   — GitOps-managed by Flux; node config changes are made via IaC
+#              and re-applied, never hand-edited on the box.)
+#
+# WHY L0 IS THE RIGHT LAYER, AND WHAT IT MEANS TO TEST THIS BEHAVIOURALLY
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# R-ENV-01 is a requirement about HOW the dev nodes come to exist. The live cluster
+# cannot answer it: a Kubernetes node object looks identical whether it was built by
+# OpenTofu or by hand in a hypervisor UI (there is no API field for "was I created by
+# IaC"). What CAN be proven, with no cluster, is that a COMPLETE, EXECUTABLE
+# provisioning path exists for all four stages and covers every dev node — and, for the
+# Ansible half, that is proven by RUNNING the real toolchain in a no-connection mode
+# (`--syntax-check`, `--list-hosts`) rather than by reading the files, so a chain that
+# does not actually resolve fails here. The IaC half is asserted by parsing the module:
+# `tofu init/validate` needs the provider registry, and L0 is offline by contract.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  the provisioning chain is parsed and (where offline execution is possible)
+#       actually driven,
+# THEN  CREATE:  the IaC module targets a LOCAL KVM hypervisor (every declared provider
+#                is a KVM-family hypervisor provider — no cloud provider may appear),
+#                instantiates its nodes from a for_each map (never a count index, so one
+#                node can be replaced without disturbing its siblings), and gives each
+#                node CPU, RAM, an OS disk, a DEDICATED Longhorn data disk, a NIC and a
+#                cloud-init seed carrying the login user + SSH key;
+#       AND      the node set it creates is EXACTLY the dev node set Ansible manages —
+#                names derived from the module's own prefix/count, so no node can be
+#                hand-added to the inventory or hand-created in the hypervisor;
+#       BASELINE: a baseline stage exists as declarative Ansible (package floor, kernel
+#                modules persisted AND loaded, sysctls, the Longhorn data disk formatted
+#                and mounted, swap off, iscsid enabled), driven by variables with
+#                defaults rather than per-host special cases;
+#       JOIN:    one role installs k3s for both roles of every node — `--cluster-init`
+#                on the primary, `--server` join on the secondaries — with flannel,
+#                kube-proxy, traefik and servicelb disabled AT INSTALL, and Cilium
+#                installed as the CNI afterwards;
+#       MANAGE:  site.yml chains baseline -> k3s -> Cilium -> verify -> Flux bootstrap;
+#                `ansible-playbook --syntax-check` on that chain SUCCEEDS; and
+#                `--list-hosts` shows every one of those stages targeting EVERY dev
+#                node, so no node is outside the code path.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC: no hostname, address, prefix or node count is written down here.
+# The dev group names come from the playbooks' own default host patterns, the node names
+# from the IaC module's prefix/count variables, and the two sets are compared to each
+# other. This check therefore keeps working when the estate is renamed or resized.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this test as claiming them):
+#   - That the RUNNING dev VMs were in fact created by this module. Nothing offline can:
+#     it would need the OpenTofu state (a remote R2 backend + credentials) or hypervisor
+#     access. `tofu plan` against the live estate is the operator's own check.
+#   - That the module APPLIES cleanly. `tofu validate` needs `tofu init`, which downloads
+#     the provider from the registry; L0 is offline by contract, so the module is parsed,
+#     not evaluated. ci/lint.sh does not cover .tf either — a gap worth closing in CI
+#     with a network-allowed stage, not here.
+#   - "Never hand-edited on the box" (stage 4's second half) — a drift check against the
+#     live nodes, which is an operator/Ansible-check-mode exercise, not a repo property.
+#   - REBUILD/re-converge ("destroy a dev node VM and rebuild it", docs/02's own proof
+#     line) — that is exercised at L3 by tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss (R-STATE-02).
+#   - That the baseline actually ran on a node (cluster/host state), and that the
+#     hypervisor is on the operator's own LAN rather than remote — "local" is asserted as
+#     "a KVM hypervisor provider driving a self-hosted endpoint variable", not as a
+#     network topology fact.
+#   - DEVIATION FROM docs/02 PROSE, ASSERTED DELIBERATELY: docs/02 describes stage 2 as
+#     cloud-init applying the OS baseline. The implementation moved the rich baseline into
+#     the Ansible `node_baseline` role (cloud-init keeps hostname/user/SSH/network),
+#     because Proxmox provisioning is API-only and a custom cloud-init snippet needs
+#     SSH/SFTP to the hypervisor. R-ENV-01's own wording requires the node to be
+#     "baselined ... as code", not that cloud-init be the tool, so this check asserts the
+#     STAGE, wherever it lives, and records the divergence rather than hiding it.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+NOTES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def note(msg):
+    NOTES.append(msg)
+
+
+# A LOCAL DEPENDENCY the repo deliberately does not carry — the vault passphrase (kept
+# outside the repo, R-SEC-01) or the Galaxy collections (gitignored; installed from
+# collections/requirements.yml). Their absence is an ENVIRONMENT gap, not a repo defect,
+# and is the ONLY tolerated reason the driven sub-assertions may not run. Deliberately
+# narrow: every other non-zero exit is a real failure. The parse assertions always run.
+ENV_ONLY_FAILURE = re.compile(
+    r"vault password|vault-id|Attempting to decrypt"
+    r"|No module named 'ansible_collections|couldn't resolve module/action", re.I)
+
+TOFU = ROOT / "infra" / "tofu"
+ANS = ROOT / "infra" / "ansible"
+check(TOFU.is_dir(), "infra/tofu/ is missing — the CREATE stage has no IaC at all (R-ENV-01)")
+check(ANS.is_dir(), "infra/ansible/ is missing — the BASELINE/JOIN/MANAGE stages have no code")
+if not TOFU.is_dir() or not ANS.is_dir():
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} failed",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+TF = "\n".join((p.read_text(errors="replace") for p in sorted(TOFU.glob("*.tf"))))
+check(len(TF) > 500, "infra/tofu/*.tf is empty or a stub — nothing creates the dev nodes")
+
+# ============================================================ STAGE 1 — CREATE (IaC)
+# A LOCAL KVM hypervisor, by allowlist: any provider outside this set fails, so moving
+# dev onto a cloud (or anything that is not a KVM hypervisor the operator runs) is caught
+# here rather than being noticed later. Each entry is justified, not just listed:
+#   bpg/proxmox        Proxmox VE — a KVM/QEMU hypervisor the operator hosts.
+#   dmacvicar/libvirt  libvirt/KVM directly (the pre-Proxmox substrate).
+KVM_PROVIDERS = {"bpg/proxmox", "dmacvicar/libvirt"}
+providers = dict(re.findall(r'source\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"', TF) and
+                 [(m.group(1), m.group(2)) for m in
+                  re.finditer(r'(\w[\w-]*)\s*=\s*\{[^}]*?source\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"', TF, re.S)])
+check(len(providers) > 0,
+      "infra/tofu declares no required_providers — the substrate is unpinned, so 'via IaC' "
+      "cannot be checked at all")
+for alias, source in sorted(providers.items()):
+    check(source.lower() in KVM_PROVIDERS,
+          f"infra/tofu declares provider {alias}={source!r}, which is not a local KVM hypervisor "
+          f"provider (allowed: {sorted(KVM_PROVIDERS)}) — R-ENV-01 requires dev/test to be LOCAL KVMs")
+
+# The VM resource: for_each-keyed, and carrying the hardware + seed docs/02 enumerates.
+vm_blocks = re.findall(r'resource\s+"([\w]*(?:_vm|_domain))"\s+"(\w+)"\s*\{(.*?)\n\}',
+                       TF, re.S)
+check(len(vm_blocks) >= 1,
+      "no VM/domain resource found in infra/tofu — nothing in IaC creates a dev node")
+for rtype, rname, body in vm_blocks:
+    check("for_each" in body,
+          f'resource "{rtype}" "{rname}" is not for_each-keyed. A count index makes single-node '
+          "replace unsafe (a -target'ed destroy cascaded to sibling nodes — DECISIONS-LOG F1), so "
+          "'created ... as code' would not survive a rebuild")
+    check(not re.search(r"^\s*count\s*=", body, re.M),
+          f'resource "{rtype}" "{rname}" uses a positional count index')
+    for want, why in (
+        (r"\bcpu\b", "CPU"),
+        (r"\bmemory\b", "RAM"),
+        (r"network_device|network_interface", "a NIC"),
+        (r"initialization|cloud_init|cloudinit", "a cloud-init seed"),
+    ):
+        check(re.search(want, body) is not None,
+              f'resource "{rtype}" "{rname}" declares no {why} — docs/02 stage 1 requires CPU, RAM, '
+              "disks, NICs and a cloud-init seed to come from IaC")
+    disks = len(re.findall(r"^\s*disk\s*\{", body, re.M))
+    check(disks >= 2,
+          f'resource "{rtype}" "{rname}" declares {disks} disk block(s); docs/02 requires the OS '
+          "disk PLUS a dedicated data disk for Longhorn")
+    check(re.search(r"user_account|ssh_authorized_key|ssh_keys", body) is not None,
+          f'resource "{rtype}" "{rname}" seeds no login user / SSH key — the node could not be '
+          "reached by the BASELINE stage without a hand step")
+
+# Node identity comes from variables, and those variables define the whole node set.
+def tf_default(var: str):
+    m = re.search(r'variable\s+"' + re.escape(var) + r'"\s*\{(.*?)\n\}', TF, re.S)
+    if not m:
+        return None
+    d = re.search(r'default\s*=\s*(.+)', m.group(1))
+    return d.group(1).strip() if d else None
+
+
+prefix_raw = tf_default("node_name_prefix")
+count_raw = tf_default("node_count")
+ips_raw = tf_default("node_ips")
+check(prefix_raw is not None and count_raw is not None,
+      "infra/tofu has no node_name_prefix/node_count variables — the node set is not derived "
+      "from code, so the created nodes cannot be compared with the managed ones")
+prefix = (prefix_raw or "").strip('"')
+try:
+    node_count = int((count_raw or "0").strip())
+except ValueError:
+    node_count = 0
+check(node_count >= 1, f"node_count default is {count_raw!r} — no node would be created")
+if ips_raw is not None:
+    n_ips = len(re.findall(r'"[^"]+"', ips_raw))
+    check(n_ips >= node_count,
+          f"node_ips default has {n_ips} address(es) for node_count={node_count} — the module "
+          "cannot address every node it creates")
+check((TOFU / "outputs.tf").is_file() and
+      re.search(r'output\s+"(ansible_inventory|nodes)"', (TOFU / "outputs.tf").read_text()) is not None,
+      "infra/tofu/outputs.tf surfaces no node inventory output — the JOIN stage would have to be "
+      "told the node facts by hand instead of consuming them from IaC")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------- the dev node set, derived twice over
+# Group names are taken from the PLAYBOOKS' own default host patterns, so nothing here
+# restates the estate's naming.
+PLAYBOOKS = ANS / "playbooks"
+
+
+def default_patterns(playbook: str) -> list[str]:
+    p = PLAYBOOKS / playbook
+    if not p.is_file():
+        return []
+    return re.findall(r"default\('([^']+)'\)", p.read_text())
+
+
+dev_groups = set(default_patterns("node-baseline.yml") + default_patterns("k3s.yml"))
+check(len(dev_groups) > 0,
+      "no playbook declares a default host pattern — the dev target is not expressed in code")
+
+INV = ANS / "inventory" / "hosts.ini"
+check(INV.is_file(), "infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini is missing — no node is managed as code")
+ini_groups: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+children: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+cur = None
+for line in (INV.read_text().splitlines() if INV.is_file() else []):
+    s = line.strip()
+    if not s or s.startswith("#"):
+        continue
+    m = re.match(r"^\[([^\]]+)\]$", s)
+    if m:
+        cur = m.group(1)
+        (children if cur.endswith(":children") else ini_groups).setdefault(
+            cur.split(":")[0] if cur.endswith(":children") else cur, [])
+        continue
+    if cur is None or cur.endswith(":vars"):
+        continue
+    host = s.split()[0]
+    if cur.endswith(":children"):
+        children.setdefault(cur.split(":")[0], []).append(host)
+    else:
+        ini_groups.setdefault(cur, []).append(host)
+
+
+def hosts_in(group: str, seen=None) -> set[str]:
+    seen = seen or set()
+    if group in seen:
+        return set()
+    seen.add(group)
+    out = set(ini_groups.get(group, []))
+    for child in children.get(group, []):
+        out |= hosts_in(child, seen)
+    return out
+
+
+dev_hosts: set[str] = set()
+for g in sorted(dev_groups):
+    dev_hosts |= hosts_in(g)
+check(len(dev_hosts) > 0,
+      f"the dev groups {sorted(dev_groups)} resolve to NO hosts in hosts.ini — nothing is managed")
+expected = {f"{prefix}{i + 1}" for i in range(node_count)}
+check(dev_hosts == expected,
+      f"the dev nodes Ansible manages ({sorted(dev_hosts)}) are not exactly the nodes the IaC "
+      f"module creates ({sorted(expected)}) — a node outside IaC is a hand-built node (R-ENV-01)")
+
+# ============================================================ STAGE 2 — BASELINE (code)
+BASE_ROLE = ANS / "roles" / "node_baseline"
+check(BASE_ROLE.is_dir(),
+      "no node_baseline role — the BASELINE stage has no code (docs/02 stage 2)")
+base_tasks = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace")
+                       for p in sorted((BASE_ROLE / "tasks").glob("*.yml"))) if BASE_ROLE.is_dir() else ""
+base_defaults = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace")
+                          for p in sorted((BASE_ROLE / "defaults").glob("*.yml"))) if BASE_ROLE.is_dir() else ""
+# Each item docs/02 names for stage 2, matched on the ANSIBLE MODULE that would do it —
+# a declarative, idempotent task, not a shell one-liner.
+for pattern, what in (
+    (r"ansible\.builtin\.apt:", "a package baseline (apt module)"),
+    (r"modprobe:", "kernel modules loaded (modprobe module)"),
+    (r"modules-load|/etc/modules", "kernel modules PERSISTED across reboot"),
+    (r"sysctl", "sysctl tuning"),
+    (r"filesystem:|mkfs", "a filesystem on the Longhorn data disk"),
+    (r"mount:|ansible\.posix\.mount", "the Longhorn data disk MOUNTED"),
+    (r"swap", "swap disabled"),
+    (r"iscsid", "iscsid enabled (Longhorn prerequisite)"),
+):
+    check(re.search(pattern, base_tasks) is not None,
+          f"node_baseline does not declare {what} — docs/02 stage 2 requires the OS baseline and "
+          "k3s/Longhorn/KubeVirt prerequisites to be applied as code")
+check(re.search(r"^node_baseline_packages:", base_defaults, re.M) is not None and
+      re.search(r"^node_baseline_kernel_modules:", base_defaults, re.M) is not None,
+      "node_baseline's package/module sets are not variables with defaults — a per-host special "
+      "case is not 'managed as code' (and could not be scoped per environment, R-ENV-02)")
+
+# ========================================================== STAGE 3 — CLUSTER-JOIN (k3s)
+K3S_ROLE = ANS / "roles" / "k3s_server"
+k3s_text = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace")
+                     for p in sorted((K3S_ROLE).rglob("*.yml"))) if K3S_ROLE.is_dir() else ""
+check(K3S_ROLE.is_dir() and len(k3s_text) > 200,
+      "no k3s_server role — nothing joins the nodes into a cluster (docs/02 stage 3)")
+check("--cluster-init" in k3s_text,
+      "the k3s role never passes --cluster-init — the HA embedded-etcd cluster is never founded")
+check(re.search(r"--server\s+https", k3s_text) is not None,
+      "the k3s role never joins secondaries with --server — nodes would not form one cluster")
+check(re.search(r"K3S_TOKEN|--token", k3s_text) is not None,
+      "the k3s role never supplies a join token — the join could only be completed by hand")
+# The bundled components docs/02 requires to be disabled AT INSTALL, each checked by the
+# flag that actually disables it.
+for pattern, what in (
+    (r"--flannel-backend=none", "flannel (Cilium is the CNI)"),
+    (r"--disable-kube-proxy", "kube-proxy (Cilium kube-proxy replacement)"),
+    (r"traefik", "traefik (Gateway API via Cilium)"),
+    (r"servicelb", "servicelb"),
+):
+    check(re.search(pattern, k3s_text) is not None,
+          f"the k3s install does not disable {what} — docs/02 stage 3 requires it disabled at "
+          "install, or the bundled component fights the platform's own")
+check((ANS / "roles" / "cilium").is_dir(),
+      "no cilium role — stage 3 requires Cilium to be installed as the CNI at bootstrap")
+check((ANS / "roles" / "flux_bootstrap").is_dir(),
+      "no flux_bootstrap role — stage 4's hand-off to GitOps has no code")
+
+# ============================================== STAGE 4 — MANAGE + the chain is REAL
+SITE = PLAYBOOKS / "site.yml"
+check(SITE.is_file(), "no playbooks/site.yml — the provisioning chain is not expressed as one path")
+site_txt = SITE.read_text() if SITE.is_file() else ""
+order = [m for m in re.findall(r"import_playbook:\s*(\S+)", site_txt)]
+check(order[:1] == ["node-baseline.yml"],
+      f"site.yml imports {order} — the BASELINE stage must come first (docs/02 sequencing)")
+for want in ("k3s.yml", "cilium.yml", "flux-bootstrap.yml"):
+    check(want in order, f"site.yml does not import {want} — a lifecycle stage is missing from the chain")
+if "k3s.yml" in order and "cilium.yml" in order:
+    check(order.index("k3s.yml") < order.index("cilium.yml"),
+          "site.yml installs Cilium before k3s — the CNI cannot precede the cluster")
+
+# --- DRIVE THE REAL TOOLCHAIN, OFFLINE ------------------------------------------------
+# --syntax-check and --list-hosts open NO connection to any node: they resolve the
+# playbook, roles, collections and inventory only. Running them is the difference between
+# "the chain is written down" and "the chain resolves".
+if shutil.which("ansible-playbook") is None:
+    note("ansible-playbook is not installed here (e.g. the in-cluster chainsaw image), so the "
+         "chain was PARSED but not DRIVEN; the merge gate's container has it and does drive it")
+else:
+    # cwd=infra/ansible so the tracked ansible.cfg (roles_path, collections_path, inventory)
+    # is the one in force — the same resolution a real run gets.
+    def ansible(*args) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+        return subprocess.run(["ansible-playbook", *args], cwd=ANS,
+                              capture_output=True, text=True)
+
+    syn = ansible("--syntax-check", "playbooks/site.yml")
+    syn_out = (syn.stderr or "") + (syn.stdout or "")
+    lh = None
+    if syn.returncode != 0 and ENV_ONLY_FAILURE.search(syn_out):
+        # NARROW, SELF-POLICING SKIP — see ENV_ONLY_FAILURE above.
+        note("ansible-playbook lacks a LOCAL dependency kept outside the repo by design (the vault "
+             "passphrase and/or the gitignored Galaxy collections), so --syntax-check/--list-hosts "
+             "were not driven; every parse assertion above still ran")
+    else:
+        check(syn.returncode == 0,
+              "`ansible-playbook --syntax-check playbooks/site.yml` FAILED — the provisioning chain "
+              f"does not even load: {syn_out.strip()[:400]}")
+        lh = ansible("--list-hosts", "playbooks/site.yml")
+        check(lh.returncode == 0,
+              "`ansible-playbook --list-hosts playbooks/site.yml` FAILED — the chain does not "
+              f"resolve against the tracked inventory: "
+              f"{((lh.stderr or '') + (lh.stdout or '')).strip()[:400]}")
+    if lh is not None and lh.returncode == 0:
+        # Parse plays -> hosts. NEVER `ansible-inventory --list`: it prints DECRYPTED vault values.
+        plays: list[tuple[str, set[str]]] = []
+        name, hosts, in_hosts = None, set(), False
+        for line in lh.stdout.splitlines():
+            m = re.match(r"\s*play #\d+ \([^)]*\):\s*(.*?)\s*TAGS:", line)
+            if m:
+                if name is not None:
+                    plays.append((name, hosts))
+                name, hosts, in_hosts = m.group(1), set(), False
+                continue
+            if re.match(r"\s*hosts \(\d+\):", line):
+                in_hosts = True
+                continue
+            if in_hosts and line.strip() and not line.strip().startswith("pattern:"):
+                hosts.add(line.strip())
+        if name is not None:
+            plays.append((name, hosts))
+        check(len(plays) >= 4,
+              f"--list-hosts resolved {len(plays)} play(s) — the four-stage chain did not expand")
+        # Every lifecycle stage must cover EVERY dev node. A stage that reaches two of three
+        # nodes means the third was finished by hand.
+        STAGES = {
+            "baseline": r"baseline",
+            "cluster-join": r"^k3s (primary|secondar)",
+            "cni": r"cilium",
+            "manage (flux hand-off)": r"flux",
+        }
+        for stage, rx in STAGES.items():
+            covered: set[str] = set()
+            matched = 0
+            for pname, phosts in plays:
+                if re.search(rx, pname, re.I):
+                    matched += 1
+                    covered |= phosts
+            check(matched >= 1, f"no play in site.yml implements the {stage} stage")
+            check(covered == dev_hosts,
+                  f"the {stage} stage targets {sorted(covered)}, not every dev node "
+                  f"{sorted(dev_hosts)} — a node outside the code path is a hand-provisioned "
+                  "node (R-ENV-01)")
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
+# NO-OP GUARD: a check that quietly asserts nothing is worse than no check.
+check(CHECKS >= 30,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op and its pass "
+      "would be meaningless")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+for n in NOTES:
+    print(f"  note: {n}")
+print(f"check OK: dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code — {CHECKS} assertions; "
+      f"{len(dev_hosts)} dev node(s) {sorted(dev_hosts)} created by IaC ({sorted(providers.values())}), "
+      f"baselined, cluster-joined and Flux-managed by the same chain. R-ENV-01's authored-path "
+      "clause only — the live VMs' provenance, `tofu validate`, and rebuild/re-converge are NOT "
+      "proven here (see the header's gap list; rebuild is L3 node-loss).")
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — two egress paths, and the rule set that selects between them  (R-NET-04)  [EXECUTABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-NET-04 ("The platform MUST support **multiple egress paths** selected by
+#          routing rules ... realized as two paths — the local `internet` path and the
+#          in-cluster `vpn` path — not multi-ISP routing"), elaborated by docs/03 §"Egress
+#          routing: two paths, one physical WAN": "the `internet` path is simply the default
+#          route out"; "**Default is the WAN; the VPN is strictly opt-in.** Every pod — and
+#          the nodes themselves — egress the local/private WAN by default and **never** the
+#          VPN. Only services labeled `egress-class=vpn` are steered to the tunnel, and the
+#          kill-switch blackholes **only** that class."
+#
+# WHAT THIS ADDS OVER R-NET-05/07 (already covered, and NOT re-tagged here)
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# R-NET-05/07 are about a SERVICE — it declares a class, enforcement is outside it, the class
+# flips via GitOps — and are proven by tests/l1-rendering/egress-class-render and
+# tests/l2-behavioral/egress-class. R-NET-04 is about the PLATFORM's PATH SET and the RULES
+# that select among them, which nothing else asserts:
+#   * exactly TWO paths, the same closed set in the schema, the admission policy and the
+#     renderer (a third value would be a path nothing routes; "multi-ISP" is out of scope);
+#   * selection is by a ROUTING RULE and the rule set is TOTAL AND DISJOINT — exactly one
+#     Cilium steering rule, selecting only `egress-class=vpn`, and on the gateway node one
+#     `ip rule` scoped to the tunnel address. NOTHING selects the `internet` class, because
+#     absence of a matching rule IS the default path;
+#   * the two paths COEXIST per DESTINATION: private space is excluded from the tunnel, so a
+#     vpn-class pod's cluster/LAN traffic still takes the local path;
+#   * the vpn path never becomes the DEFAULT — its default route lives in a dedicated routing
+#     table, `route-noexec` is set and a pushed `redirect-gateway` is ignored;
+#   * the kill-switch blackholes ONLY that class — the nft chain's policy is accept and every
+#     DROP is scoped to the vpn class's own source set/fwmark, so `internet` fails OPEN.
+#     (R-NET-06's opposite claim, that `vpn` fails CLOSED, is L3's vpn-killswitch.)
+#
+# WHY L0: every clause above is a statement about ALL rules — including rules that must be
+# ABSENT (nothing selects the default path; no unscoped rule; no unqualified drop; no default
+# route in the main table). A cluster can show which path two pods took; it cannot show that
+# no third rule exists or that the vocabulary is closed.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC: no address appears. The private ranges the tunnel must exclude are
+# checked as CONTAINMENT of the addresses each environment's own Flux overlay declares (pod
+# CIDR, Gateway VIP, LB pool, API host), so a new environment on a different LAN is checked
+# against its own values.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  the egress vocabulary, every CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy, the gateway node's policy
+#       routing / OpenVPN / nftables templates, and every environment's overlay addresses are
+#       parsed and cross-checked,
+# THEN  there are exactly two paths with `internet` as the default; exactly one steering rule
+#       selects exactly the vpn class by label; the gateway is selected by node label with a
+#       named egress interface; all RFC1918 space and every address any environment assigns
+#       itself is excluded from the tunnel; the tunnel's default route and its fail-closed
+#       blackhole live only in a dedicated routing table behind a scoped `ip rule`; OpenVPN
+#       cannot take the main table; and no nftables DROP is unscoped.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git tree + PyYAML; no
+# cluster, no network); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it directly, and this
+# Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (enumerated in check.sh's header; this test claims none of them):
+#   * BEHAVIOUR. That an unlabelled pod really takes the WAN path is asserted at L2 by
+#     tests/l2-behavioral/egress-default-path (same requirement label); the two labelled
+#     classes are R-NET-05's L2 test; the kill-switch firing is R-NET-06's L3 test.
+#   * The RUNNING gateway node's routing tables / nftables ruleset. This reads the templates
+#     that generate them; a hand-added rule on the box is invisible here.
+#   * PHYSICAL MULTI-WAN's absence is NOT asserted — it is out of scope per OQ-1 and no
+#     honest repository signal distinguishes "one WAN, correctly" from "one WAN, by default".
+#   * IPv6 egress.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: egress-paths-selected-by-rules
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-04: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-04"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given the tracked tree, when the egress vocabulary, every steering rule and the gateway
+      node's policy-routing/OpenVPN/nftables templates are parsed, then the platform offers
+      exactly two egress paths with the WAN as the default, exactly one rule selects exactly
+      the vpn class, local destinations stay on the local path in every environment, the
+      tunnel never becomes the default route, and nothing unscoped can blackhole the default
+      path.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: then-two-paths-exist-and-the-rules-select-between-them-totally-and-disjointly
+      description: >-
+        Run the offline assertion script over the tracked tree (same script ci/l0.sh and
+        conformance/run.sh --layer l0 execute).
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — egress-paths-selected-by-rules
+# Serves: R-NET-04 ("The platform MUST support **multiple egress paths** selected by routing
+#         rules. Per OQ-1 the environment has **one physical commercial WAN and no
+#         multi-ISP plans**, so this is realized as two paths — the local `internet` path and
+#         the in-cluster `vpn` path — not multi-ISP routing. Physical multi-WAN (multiple ISP
+#         uplinks) is **out of scope** unless a future ADR reopens it."
+#         — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md).
+#
+# The elaborating spec text this check quotes and asserts against — docs/03
+# §"Egress routing: two paths, one physical WAN (R-NET-04/05 — resolved by OQ-1)":
+#     | `internet` | Out the single commercial WAN | Normal pod egress via node -> SOHO edge
+#                                                    router -> internet |
+#     | `vpn`      | Routed through the in-cluster VPN tunnel | Steered to the shared VPN
+#                                                    egress gateway (ADR-0013) |
+#     "**Physical multi-WAN (multi-ISP) is out of scope.** With a single WAN there is nothing
+#      to policy-route across; the `internet` path is simply the default route out."
+#     "**Default is the WAN; the VPN is strictly opt-in.** Every pod — and the nodes
+#      themselves — egress the local/private WAN by default and **never** the VPN. Only
+#      services labeled `egress-class=vpn` are steered to the tunnel, and the kill-switch
+#      blackholes **only** that class."
+#     "It is **split-tunnel**: it creates `tun0` but does **not** set the node's default
+#      route (`route-noexec` + policy routing), so the node's own traffic stays on the WAN —
+#      only what Cilium points at `tun0` uses the VPN."
+#
+# WHAT R-NET-04 ADDS OVER R-NET-05/07 (which are ALREADY covered) — READ THIS FIRST
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# R-NET-05/07 are about a SERVICE: it can declare its class, enforcement happens outside it,
+# and the class can be flipped via GitOps. Those are proven by
+# tests/l1-rendering/egress-class-render (the render) and tests/l2-behavioral/egress-class
+# (two labelled pods observe two different public IPs, and a relabel re-routes the same pod).
+# Re-tagging either of those with R-NET-04 would be a duplicate wearing a new label.
+#
+# R-NET-04 is about the PLATFORM's PATH SET and the RULES THAT SELECT AMONG THEM. Its
+# distinctive content — none of which any existing test asserts — is:
+#
+#   (1) THERE ARE EXACTLY TWO PATHS, and the same two everywhere. The class vocabulary is
+#       one closed set of two values agreed by the schema, the admission policy and the
+#       renderer. A third value appearing in one of them but not the others would be a path
+#       nothing routes (or a path nothing validates); "multi-ISP" reappearing as a third
+#       class would contradict OQ-1's resolution.
+#   (2) SELECTION IS BY A ROUTING RULE, and the rule set is TOTAL AND DISJOINT. The `vpn`
+#       path is entered only via rules that select the vpn class — a Cilium
+#       CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy pod-selector, and on the gateway node an `ip rule` scoped
+#       to the tunnel source address. Nothing selects the `internet` class, because
+#       "the `internet` path is simply the default route out": ABSENCE of a matching rule IS
+#       the default path. So an unlabelled pod, and an `internet`-class pod, take the WAN.
+#   (3) THE PATHS COEXIST — the choice is per-destination, not per-pod-lifetime. The vpn
+#       rule tunnels public destinations while EXCLUDING all private space, so a vpn-class
+#       pod's cluster/LAN traffic still takes the local path at the same time as its
+#       internet traffic takes the tunnel.
+#   (4) THE VPN PATH NEVER BECOMES THE DEFAULT. Split tunnel: the tunnel's default route
+#       lives in a DEDICATED routing table reached only through the scoped rule, the
+#       provider's pushed `redirect-gateway` is ignored, and `route-noexec` keeps OpenVPN
+#       from touching the main table. Otherwise there would be one path (the VPN), not two.
+#   (5) THE KILL-SWITCH BLACKHOLES ONLY THAT CLASS. The blackhole default is inside the
+#       dedicated table; the nftables chain's policy is ACCEPT and every DROP is qualified
+#       by the vpn class's own source set / fwmark. The `internet` path therefore fails
+#       OPEN and can never be blackholed. (R-NET-06's opposite claim — that `vpn` fails
+#       CLOSED — is proven at L3 by tests/l3-fault-injection/vpn-killswitch. This check
+#       asserts the OTHER direction, which that test does not.)
+#
+# WHY L0. Every clause above is a property of the RULE SET, i.e. of authored configuration:
+# totality ("nothing selects the default path"), disjointness ("exactly one rule, selecting
+# exactly one class"), and scoping ("no unqualified drop, no default route in the main
+# table") are statements about ALL rules, including the ones that would have to be absent.
+# A running cluster can show you which path two pods took; it cannot show you that no third
+# rule exists, that no rule is unscoped, or that the vocabulary is closed. The behavioural
+# complement — that an UNLABELLED pod really does take the WAN path — is at L2 in
+# tests/l2-behavioral/egress-default-path (same requirement label).
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC: no address is written down. The private ranges the vpn rule must
+# exclude are checked as CONTAINMENT of the addresses each environment's own Flux overlay
+# declares (pod CIDR, Gateway VIP, LB pool, API host) — so a new environment on a different
+# LAN is checked against its own addresses, and the check keeps working when they change.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this check as claiming them):
+#   - Behaviour. That a vpn-class pod's packets really leave via tun0, that an unlabelled
+#     pod's really do not, and that the tunnel is up at all. L2 covers the two labelled
+#     classes (tests/l2-behavioral/egress-class, R-NET-05) and the unlabelled default
+#     (tests/l2-behavioral/egress-default-path, R-NET-04); the kill-switch firing is L3.
+#   - THE RUNNING NODE's routing tables and nftables ruleset. This reads the templates that
+#     generate them, driven by no node. A hand-added `ip rule` on the gateway node is
+#     invisible here (and to every other test); drift on the box is an Ansible check-mode
+#     exercise for the operator.
+#   - PHYSICAL MULTI-WAN. Out of scope per OQ-1, so its absence is not asserted: there is no
+#     honest repository signal that would distinguish "one WAN, correctly" from "one WAN,
+#     because nobody tried" — and inventing one would be a hollow assertion.
+#   - IPv6. The policy's CIDRs and the routing rules are IPv4-only, matching the platform.
+#     If IPv6 egress is ever enabled, the `internet` path would need the same analysis and
+#     this check would NOT catch its absence.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import ipaddress
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+LBL = "homelab.keithjackson.dev"
+CLASS_LABEL = f"{LBL}/egress-class"
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def die():
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (egress-paths-selected-by-rules): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} "
+          "assertions failed", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+
+def docs(path: Path):
+    """Every YAML document in a file, skipping empties."""
+    try:
+        return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(path.read_text()) if isinstance(d, dict)]
+    except yaml.YAMLError:
+        return []
+
+
+# Skip dot-DIRECTORIES (.git, .claude, .cache) while still matching dot-FILES such as
+# .sops.yaml. A bare rglob from ROOT also descends into NESTED WORKTREES —
+# .claude/worktrees/agent-*/ created for isolated agent runs — which made this check see
+# 5 CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy objects instead of the 1 authored, failing R-NET-04 for a
+# reason that has nothing to do with egress. .claude/ is gitignored (.gitignore:43), so
+# nothing under it is part of the authored surface by definition.
+TRACKED_YAML = sorted(p for p in ROOT.rglob("*.yaml")
+                      if "_artifacts" not in p.parts
+                      and not any(part.startswith(".")
+                                  for part in p.relative_to(ROOT).parent.parts))
+SCHEMA = ROOT / "schemas" / "servicedefinition.schema.json"
+RENDER = ROOT / "catalog" / "render.py"
+VPN_ROLE = ROOT / "infra" / "ansible" / "roles" / "vpn_egress_gateway"
+CLUSTERS = ROOT / "clusters"
+
+for p in (SCHEMA, RENDER, VPN_ROLE, CLUSTERS):
+    check(p.exists(), f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)} is missing — the egress path model cannot be "
+                      "read at all (R-NET-04)")
+if FAILURES:
+    die()
+
+
+# ======================================================= (1) EXACTLY TWO PATHS, AGREED
+import json  # noqa: E402  — only needed for the schema
+
+schema = json.loads(SCHEMA.read_text())
+egress_prop = ((schema.get("properties") or {}).get("egress") or {})
+enum = egress_prop.get("enum")
+check(isinstance(enum, list) and len(enum) == 2,
+      f"schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json declares egress enum {enum!r} — R-NET-04 is "
+      "realized as EXACTLY TWO paths (OQ-1: one WAN, no multi-ISP). A third value is a path "
+      "nothing routes; one value is not 'multiple egress paths'")
+PATHS = set(enum or [])
+check(PATHS == {"internet", "vpn"},
+      f"the declared egress paths are {sorted(PATHS)} — docs/03's table fixes them as "
+      "`internet` (out the single commercial WAN) and `vpn` (the in-cluster tunnel)")
+check(egress_prop.get("default") == "internet",
+      f"the schema's default egress class is {egress_prop.get('default')!r} — docs/03: "
+      "'Default is the WAN; the VPN is strictly opt-in', and 'the `internet` path is simply "
+      "the default route out'. A service that says nothing must get the WAN")
+
+# The admission policy must constrain the pod label to the SAME closed set, or a workload
+# could carry a class the schema never allowed (and that no rule routes).
+pol_files = sorted((ROOT / "platform" / "kyverno").rglob("*egress*.yaml"))
+check(len(pol_files) >= 1,
+      "no Kyverno policy file mentions egress under platform/kyverno — nothing stops a pod "
+      "carrying an egress class outside the declared path set")
+pol_text = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace") for p in pol_files)
+for cls in sorted(PATHS):
+    check(re.search(rf"\b{re.escape(cls)}\b", pol_text) is not None,
+          f"the egress admission policy never names the {cls!r} path — a class the policy "
+          "does not know cannot be validated against the path set")
+# No tracked object may carry a class outside the closed set — with ONE self-policing
+# exemption. A Kyverno policy-test fixture deliberately carries an INVALID class so the
+# admission test can assert the policy REJECTS it; that pod is exempt only while a
+# kyverno-test.yaml in the same tests tree still expects `result: fail` for it. Delete the
+# expectation (or flip it to pass) and the exemption evaporates — never a bare path allowlist.
+def rejected_by_a_policy_test(resource_name: str, fixture: Path) -> bool:
+    tests_root = fixture.parent
+    while tests_root != ROOT and tests_root.name != "tests":
+        tests_root = tests_root.parent
+    if tests_root == ROOT:
+        return False
+    for tf in sorted(tests_root.rglob("kyverno-test.yaml")):
+        for d in docs(tf):
+            for case in (d.get("results") or []):
+                if case.get("result") == "fail" and resource_name in (case.get("resources") or []):
+                    return True
+    return False
+
+
+stray: list[str] = []
+_STRAY_RE = re.compile(rf"{re.escape(CLASS_LABEL)}:\s*[\"']?([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9-]*)")
+for f in TRACKED_YAML:
+    for d in docs(f):
+        labels = ((d.get("metadata") or {}).get("labels") or {})
+        cls = labels.get(CLASS_LABEL)
+        # Also catch pod-template labels (Deployments/DaemonSets/Jobs/VMs).
+        tmpl = (((d.get("spec") or {}).get("template") or {}).get("metadata") or {}).get("labels") or {}
+        for value, owner in ((cls, d), (tmpl.get(CLASS_LABEL), d)):
+            if value is None or value in PATHS or value == "CLASS":
+                continue
+            name = ((owner.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") or "?")
+            if rejected_by_a_policy_test(name, f):
+                continue
+            stray.append(f"{f.relative_to(ROOT)}:{name}={value}")
+    # Values written as raw text (templates, docs-as-code) are caught too.
+    for value in set(_STRAY_RE.findall(f.read_text(errors="replace"))):
+        if value in PATHS or value == "CLASS":
+            continue
+        if any(value in s for s in stray):
+            continue
+        # Raw-text hit with no parsed owner: exempt only if EVERY object in the file that
+        # carries this value is a policy-test fixture proven to be rejected.
+        owners = [((d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") or "?") for d in docs(f)
+                  if ((d.get("metadata") or {}).get("labels") or {}).get(CLASS_LABEL) == value]
+        if owners and all(rejected_by_a_policy_test(o, f) for o in owners):
+            continue
+        stray.append(f"{f.relative_to(ROOT)}:<text>={value}")
+check(not stray,
+      f"tracked YAML assigns egress-class value(s) outside the declared path set "
+      f"{sorted(PATHS)}: {sorted(stray)} — a value no routing rule selects and no admission "
+      "policy allows is a workload on no path at all (the only exemption is a Kyverno "
+      "policy-test fixture that a kyverno-test.yaml still expects to FAIL)")
+
+# The renderer must project the DECLARED class onto the pod label, unmodified: that label is
+# what the routing rule selects on, so a renderer that rewrote it would break the coupling
+# between the declaration and the path.
+rtext = RENDER.read_text()
+check(re.search(rf'f?"\{{LBL\}}/egress-class":\s*s\["egress"\]', rtext) is not None
+      or re.search(r'egress-class\"\]?\s*:\s*s\[\"egress\"\]', rtext) is not None,
+      "catalog/render.py does not project the ServiceDefinition's own `egress` value onto the "
+      f"{CLASS_LABEL} pod label — the declaration and the routing rule's selector would be "
+      "two independent facts that could disagree")
+
+
+# ============================== (2) SELECTION IS BY RULE; THE RULE SET IS TOTAL & DISJOINT
+policies: list[tuple[Path, dict]] = []
+for p in TRACKED_YAML:
+    for d in docs(p):
+        if d.get("kind") == "CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy":
+            policies.append((p, d))
+check(len(policies) == 1,
+      f"{len(policies)} CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy object(s) are authored "
+      f"({[str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p, _ in policies]}) — R-NET-04's steering must be ONE "
+      "rule. Two rules can overlap, and which one wins for an overlapping pod is not "
+      "something the repository states")
+
+for path, pol in policies:
+    rel = str(path.relative_to(ROOT))
+    spec = pol.get("spec") or {}
+    selectors = spec.get("selectors") or []
+    check(len(selectors) == 1,
+          f"{rel}: the steering rule has {len(selectors)} selector(s) — every additional "
+          "selector widens the set of pods steered off the default path, and R-NET-04's "
+          "selection must be exactly 'the vpn class'")
+    for sel in selectors:
+        pod_sel = sel.get("podSelector")
+        check(isinstance(pod_sel, dict) and pod_sel,
+              f"{rel}: a selector has no podSelector — an empty selector in Cilium matches "
+              "EVERY pod, which would put the whole cluster on the VPN path and leave no "
+              "default path at all")
+        ml = (pod_sel or {}).get("matchLabels") or {}
+        me = (pod_sel or {}).get("matchExpressions") or []
+        check(not me,
+              f"{rel}: the podSelector uses matchExpressions {me!r}. The class contract is a "
+              "single label equality; expressions (In/NotIn/Exists) can select pods that "
+              "never declared a class, so the rule set would no longer be disjoint from the "
+              "default path")
+        check(set(ml) == {CLASS_LABEL},
+              f"{rel}: the podSelector matches on {sorted(ml)} — it must select on exactly "
+              f"{CLASS_LABEL}. Any other key makes path selection depend on something other "
+              "than the declared class (and a namespace/app key would silently exempt pods)")
+        check(ml.get(CLASS_LABEL) == "vpn",
+              f"{rel}: the steering rule selects {CLASS_LABEL}={ml.get(CLASS_LABEL)!r}. Only "
+              "the `vpn` class may be steered: docs/03 — 'Only services labeled "
+              "egress-class=vpn are steered to the tunnel'. A rule selecting `internet` would "
+              "route the default path through the tunnel, i.e. leave one path, not two")
+
+    # The gateway is chosen by a NODE LABEL, not a hostname: the path's endpoint is itself a
+    # rule, so the gateway can move (or gain a standby) with no rule rewrite.
+    gw = spec.get("egressGateway") or {}
+    node_sel = (gw.get("nodeSelector") or {}).get("matchLabels") or {}
+    check(bool(node_sel),
+          f"{rel}: the egressGateway selects no node by label — pinning the path's exit to a "
+          "named host means the vpn path cannot fail over (docs/03 requires two gateway "
+          "nodes + Egress Gateway HA)")
+    check("nodeName" not in gw,
+          f"{rel}: the egressGateway pins a nodeName — the exit node must be selected by "
+          "label so the path survives losing that node")
+    check(isinstance(gw.get("interface"), str) and gw.get("interface"),
+          f"{rel}: the egressGateway names no egress interface — without it the steered class "
+          "is not actually sent down a different path from the default")
+
+    # ------------------- (3) THE PATHS COEXIST: the choice is per DESTINATION -------------
+    dests = spec.get("destinationCIDRs") or []
+    excl = spec.get("excludedCIDRs") or []
+    check([str(c) for c in dests] == ["0.0.0.0/0"],
+          f"{rel}: destinationCIDRs is {dests!r}. The vpn path is for PUBLIC destinations "
+          "('Routed through the in-cluster VPN tunnel'), expressed as the whole internet "
+          "minus the exclusions below — narrowing it here would silently leave public "
+          "destinations on the WAN for a vpn-class service")
+    try:
+        excluded = [ipaddress.ip_network(str(c)) for c in excl]
+    except ValueError as e:
+        excluded = []
+        check(False, f"{rel}: excludedCIDRs contains an unparsable network ({e})")
+    check(len(excluded) >= 3,
+          f"{rel}: only {len(excluded)} excluded CIDR(s) — docs/03 requires intra-cluster, "
+          "pod->service and LAN traffic to stay on the LOCAL path, which is all of RFC1918")
+
+    def covered(net: ipaddress.IPv4Network | ipaddress.IPv6Network) -> bool:
+        return any(net.subnet_of(e) for e in excluded if e.version == net.version)
+
+    # RFC1918 in full — computed, not string-matched, so a typo'd mask is caught.
+    for rfc in ("10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"):
+        net = ipaddress.ip_network(rfc)
+        check(covered(net),
+              f"{rel}: the private range {rfc} is NOT excluded from the tunnel — a vpn-class "
+              "pod's cluster/LAN traffic would be SNAT'd out tun0, so the two paths would not "
+              "coexist for the same pod and east-west traffic would break")
+
+    # Every address each ENVIRONMENT declares for itself must fall in the excluded set: that
+    # is what makes 'local stays local' true per environment rather than by coincidence.
+    def overlay_addresses() -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+        found: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+        base = CLUSTERS / "base" / "cluster-vars.yaml"
+        data = {}
+        if base.is_file():
+            for d in docs(base):
+                if d.get("kind") == "ConfigMap":
+                    data = {k: str(v) for k, v in (d.get("data") or {}).items()}
+        for f in sorted(CLUSTERS.glob("*/kustomization.yaml")):
+            env = {**data}
+            for m in re.finditer(
+                    r"-\s+op:\s*replace\s*\n\s*path:\s*/data/(?P<k>[A-Z0-9_]+)\s*\n"
+                    r"\s*value:\s*(?P<v>\S.*?)\s*$", f.read_text(), re.M):
+                env[m.group("k")] = m.group("v").strip().strip('"').strip("'")
+            label = f.parent.name
+            for key in ("CLUSTER_POD_CIDR", "GATEWAY_VIP", "CILIUM_LB_POOL_START",
+                        "CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP", "K3S_API_HOST"):
+                v = env.get(key, "")
+                if v and not v.startswith("TBD"):
+                    found.append((f"{label}/{key}", v))
+        return found
+
+    addrs = overlay_addresses()
+    check(len(addrs) >= 5,
+          f"only {len(addrs)} environment address(es) could be read from the Flux overlays — "
+          "the 'local traffic stays local' assertion would be checking almost nothing")
+    for label, value in addrs:
+        try:
+            net = ipaddress.ip_network(value, strict=False)
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        check(covered(net),
+              f"{rel}: {label}={value}, an address THIS repository assigns to a cluster, is "
+              "NOT inside the tunnel's excludedCIDRs — a vpn-class pod in that environment "
+              "would try to reach its own cluster/LAN through the VPN")
+
+
+# ============ (4) THE VPN PATH IS A SECOND TABLE, NEVER THE DEFAULT (split tunnel) ========
+TPL = VPN_ROLE / "templates"
+up = (TPL / "vpn-egress-up.sh.j2")
+down = (TPL / "vpn-egress-down.sh.j2")
+conf = (TPL / "vpn-egress.conf.j2")
+nft = (TPL / "vpn-egress-killswitch.nft.j2")
+for f in (up, down, conf, nft):
+    check(f.is_file(), f"{f.relative_to(ROOT)} is missing — the second egress path's routing "
+                       "rules are not authored")
+if FAILURES:
+    die()
+
+defaults = yaml.safe_load((VPN_ROLE / "defaults" / "main.yml").read_text()) or {}
+
+
+def render(text: str) -> str:
+    """Substitute `{{ var }}` with the role's own default value, for every default.
+
+    The templates reference their knobs by NAME, so an analysis that looked for the VALUE
+    (e.g. the nft set name) would silently match nothing and pass vacuously — which is
+    exactly what an earlier draft of this check did. Rendering first means the assertions
+    below examine the text the node actually gets. Only simple `{{ name }}` expressions are
+    substituted; anything else is left as-is (and the assertions are written so an
+    unsubstituted expression fails rather than passes).
+    """
+    out = text
+    for k, v in defaults.items():
+        if isinstance(v, (str, int)):
+            out = re.sub(r"\{\{\s*" + re.escape(str(k)) + r"\s*\}\}", str(v), out)
+    return out
+
+
+up_t, conf_t, nft_t = render(up.read_text()), render(conf.read_text()), render(nft.read_text())
+table_id = str(defaults.get("vpn_egress_gateway_route_table_id", ""))
+check(table_id.isdigit() and table_id not in ("0", "253", "254", "255"),
+      f"the tunnel's routing table id is {table_id!r} — the second path must live in a "
+      "DEDICATED table. 254 (main), 255 (local) and 253 (default) are the kernel's own, and "
+      "putting the tunnel's default route in any of them makes the VPN the node's default "
+      "route instead of a selectable second path")
+check(str(defaults.get("vpn_egress_gateway_rule_priority", "")).isdigit(),
+      "no ip-rule priority is declared for the tunnel table — 'selected by routing rules' "
+      "needs a rule, at a defined precedence")
+
+# Every `ip route ... default` the up-script installs must name the dedicated table.
+route_lines = [l.strip() for l in up_t.splitlines()
+               if re.search(r"^\s*ip\s+route\s+(replace|add)\b", l)]
+check(len(route_lines) >= 2,
+      f"the up-script installs {len(route_lines)} route(s) — the vpn path needs its own "
+      "default route via the tunnel AND the fail-closed blackhole behind it")
+for l in route_lines:
+    check(re.search(r'table\s+"?\$\{?TABLE_ID', l) is not None,
+          f"the up-script installs a route WITHOUT naming the dedicated table: {l!r}. A route "
+          "landing in the main table changes the path every other pod and the node itself "
+          "uses — the VPN would stop being opt-in")
+    check("blackhole" not in l or re.search(r'table\s+"?\$\{?TABLE_ID', l) is not None,
+          f"a blackhole route is installed outside the tunnel table: {l!r}. docs/03: the "
+          "kill-switch 'blackholes **only** that class'; `internet` fails OPEN and must never "
+          "be blackholed")
+
+# Every `ip rule` must be SCOPED. An unscoped rule (`ip rule add lookup <table>`) sends
+# everything into the tunnel table, which would leave one path instead of two.
+rule_lines = [l.strip() for l in up_t.splitlines() if re.search(r"^\s*ip\s+rule\s+add\b", l)]
+check(len(rule_lines) >= 1,
+      "the up-script adds no `ip rule` — nothing SELECTS the tunnel path, so the second "
+      "routing table would never be consulted (R-NET-04's 'selected by routing rules')")
+for l in rule_lines:
+    check(re.search(r"\bfrom\s+\S|\bfwmark\s+\S|\biif\s+\S", l) is not None,
+          f"an unscoped ip rule is installed: {l!r}. Without a `from`/`fwmark`/`iif` selector "
+          "EVERY packet is looked up in the tunnel table, so the WAN path disappears and the "
+          "VPN is no longer opt-in")
+    check(re.search(r'lookup\s+"?\$\{?TABLE_ID', l) is not None,
+          f"an ip rule looks up a table other than the tunnel's: {l!r}")
+check(re.search(r'ip rule add from\s+"\$\{SRC\}"', up_t) is not None,
+      "the steering rule is not scoped to ${SRC}, the tunnel's own local address — that "
+      "address is what Cilium SNATs vpn-class pods to, and it is the ONLY thing that "
+      "distinguishes the steered class from every other flow on the gateway node")
+check(re.search(r"^\s*if \[ -z \"\$\{SRC\}\" \]", up_t, re.M) is not None,
+      "the up-script does not refuse to run when the tunnel address is unknown — installing "
+      "a partial rule set is how a path ends up half-selected")
+
+# The provider must not be able to make the tunnel the default route either.
+check(re.search(r"^\s*route-noexec\s*$", conf_t, re.M) is not None,
+      "the OpenVPN wrapper config lacks `route-noexec` — OpenVPN would install the pushed "
+      "routes itself, in the MAIN table, and the VPN would become the node's default route "
+      "(docs/03: 'does **not** set the node's default route (`route-noexec` + policy "
+      "routing)')")
+check(re.search(r'pull-filter ignore "redirect-gateway"', conf_t) is not None,
+      "the OpenVPN wrapper config does not ignore a pushed `redirect-gateway` — the VPN "
+      "provider could redirect the node's whole default route into the tunnel, collapsing "
+      "the two paths into one")
+check(re.search(r"^\s*redirect-gateway", conf_t, re.M) is None,
+      "the OpenVPN wrapper config itself sets `redirect-gateway` — that IS making the VPN the "
+      "default route")
+
+
+# ================= (5) THE KILL-SWITCH BLACKHOLES ONLY THE VPN CLASS (internet fails OPEN)
+src_set = str(defaults.get("vpn_egress_gateway_nft_src_set", ""))
+fwmark = str(defaults.get("vpn_egress_gateway_fwmark", ""))
+check(bool(src_set),
+      "the role declares no nftables source set — the kill-switch would have no way to name "
+      "'the steered class' and could only match broadly")
+policies_lines = [l.strip() for l in nft_t.splitlines() if re.search(r"^\s*type filter hook", l)]
+check(len(policies_lines) >= 1,
+      "the kill-switch nft template declares no base chain — nothing would be enforced")
+for l in policies_lines:
+    check(re.search(r"policy\s+accept\s*;", l) is not None,
+          f"an nft base chain is not `policy accept`: {l!r}. A default-drop chain here "
+          "blackholes the `internet` path too, and docs/03 requires the two classes to fail "
+          "in OPPOSITE directions — 'internet fails **open** (WAN, never blackholed)'")
+drop_lines = [l.strip() for l in nft_t.splitlines()
+              if re.search(r"\bdrop\b", l) and not l.lstrip().startswith("#")]
+check(len(drop_lines) >= 1,
+      "the kill-switch nft template contains no drop rule at all — there is no kill-switch, "
+      "and R-NET-04's 'the kill-switch blackholes only that class' has nothing to scope")
+for l in drop_lines:
+    scoped = (src_set and src_set in l) or (fwmark and "mark" in l)
+    check(scoped,
+          f"an nft DROP rule is not scoped to the vpn class: {l!r}. It must match the tunnel "
+          f"source set (@{src_set}) or the class's fwmark; an unqualified drop would blackhole "
+          "the default `internet` path, which must never be blackholed")
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
+# NO-OP GUARD: a check that quietly asserts nothing is worse than no check.
+check(CHECKS >= 35,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op and its pass "
+      "would be meaningless")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    die()
+print(f"check OK: egress-paths-selected-by-rules — {CHECKS} assertions; "
+      f"paths={sorted(PATHS)} (default={egress_prop.get('default')}), "
+      f"{len(policies)} steering rule selecting {CLASS_LABEL}=vpn only, tunnel default route "
+      f"in dedicated table {table_id} behind a scoped ip rule, blackhole and every nft DROP "
+      f"scoped to the vpn class. R-NET-04's RULE-SET half only: the paths' actual BEHAVIOUR "
+      "is L2 (egress-class for the two labelled classes, egress-default-path for the "
+      "unlabelled default) and the kill-switch firing is L3 (vpn-killswitch).")
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — the HA control plane is authored, for every environment  (R-PLAT-01)  [EXECUTABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-PLAT-01 ("The platform MUST run on k3s across 3 nodes with
+#          production-grade HA control plane in prod; dev/test MAY run fewer nodes but MUST
+#          exercise the same multi-node topology"), elaborated by docs/01 ("k3s (HA,
+#          embedded etcd)") and docs/02 ("HA embedded etcd (k3s server on all 3)",
+#          "3 physical nodes", "no external datastore", "the *same* Ansible bootstrap runs").
+#
+# WHY L0: R-PLAT-01 has an authored half and an observed half. The authored half — that the
+# configuration in git BUILDS a 3-server embedded-etcd control plane in BOTH environments
+# from one code path, with exactly one --cluster-init founder, no external datastore, and a
+# floating API endpoint that is SAN'd into the serving cert and cannot collide with the
+# Service-LB allocator — is provable with no cluster and is ONLY provable here: a live
+# cluster cannot tell you what the NEXT environment brought up from this repo would look
+# like. The observed half is asserted separately at L2 by
+# tests/l2-behavioral/ha-control-plane, which carries the same requirement label.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC: no hostname, address, node count or group name is written down.
+# Environments are enumerated from the R-ENV-02 seam itself (k3s_primary_group /
+# k3s_servers_group in group_vars), and WHICH one is prod is derived from the Flux overlay
+# that environment bootstraps (flux_bootstrap_env_path) — never from a group's name.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  the inventory, the k3s_server and kube_vip roles, their plays and each
+#       environment's Flux overlay are parsed and cross-checked against each other,
+# THEN  k3s is the pinned distro and nothing is installed as an agent; every environment
+#       resolves to an ODD, quorum-capable server count (prod exactly three) with EXACTLY
+#       ONE --cluster-init founder and every other server joining it with --server;
+#       the datastore is k3s's embedded etcd (no --datastore-endpoint, no --disable-etcd);
+#       the API's floating endpoint is a leader-elected, control-plane-ONLY kube-vip
+#       DaemonSet on every server whose address is the environment-scoped VIP, that VIP is
+#       in the apiserver serving cert's SANs together with every server's own address, and
+#       it is neither a node address nor the ingress Gateway VIP nor inside that
+#       environment's Cilium LoadBalancer pool; and dev/test and prod are built by the SAME
+#       roles and plays retargeted by variables only.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git tree + PyYAML; no
+# cluster, no network); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it directly, and this
+# Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (enumerated in check.sh's header; this test claims none of them):
+#   * The LIVE clusters' shape (three Ready servers, all etcd members, VIP actually floating,
+#     API answering through it) — asserted at L2 by tests/l2-behavioral/ha-control-plane.
+#   * FAILOVER. That the control plane survives losing a server (quorum holds, the VIP moves)
+#     is a fault-injection claim and is proven NOWHERE yet — tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss
+#     drains a node for R-STATE-02's data claim and asserts nothing about the control plane.
+#   * "Production-grade" as a hardware/performance judgement (operator decision, §2 of
+#     infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md).
+#
+# TWO GAPS CLOSED 2026-09-06 (they used to be listed above; recorded so the change is legible):
+#   * `K3S_API_HOST` (Cilium's k8sServiceHost) was the PRIMARY NODE's address in both
+#     environments rather than the floating VIP, contradicting the prod overlay's own comment.
+#     It was ESCALATED, not asserted, because the workstream could not decide it (R-TEST-06).
+#     The operator decided the VIP, so it is now ASSERTED — on both sides of the [parity]
+#     contract and per environment.
+#   * kube-vip was NOT imported by playbooks/site.yml. It is now, BETWEEN k3s and cilium, and
+#     the order is asserted — not as a tidiness preference but because the CNI's endpoint is
+#     the VIP, so an unfloated VIP means a cold build brings up a CNI that cannot reach its
+#     API server.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: ha-control-plane-as-code
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-PLAT-01: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-PLAT-01"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given the tracked tree, when the inventory, the k3s/kube-vip roles and plays and each
+      environment's Flux overlay are parsed and cross-checked, then every environment is
+      authored as an odd, quorum-capable set of k3s servers (prod exactly three) with one
+      embedded-etcd founder, no external datastore, and a leader-elected control-plane-only
+      VIP that is in the serving cert's SANs and collides with no other allocator — built by
+      one code path for both environments.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: then-every-environment-is-authored-as-an-ha-embedded-etcd-control-plane
+      description: >-
+        Run the offline assertion script over the tracked tree (same script ci/l0.sh and
+        conformance/run.sh --layer l0 execute).
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,729 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — ha-control-plane-as-code
+# Serves: R-PLAT-01 ("The platform MUST run on k3s across 3 nodes with production-grade
+#         HA control plane in prod; dev/test MAY run fewer nodes but MUST exercise the
+#         same multi-node topology." — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md).
+#
+# The elaborating spec text this check quotes and asserts against:
+#   docs/01-architecture-overview.md  "Kubernetes distro | **k3s** (HA, embedded etcd)"
+#   docs/02-environments-and-provisioning.md, table:
+#       "Control plane | HA embedded etcd (k3s server on all 3) | HA embedded etcd
+#        (k3s server on all 3)"   (the SAME cell for dev/test and prod)
+#       "Node count | 3 VMs (mirror prod topology) | 3 physical nodes"
+#   docs/02 §"k3s topology decisions":
+#       "HA control plane with **embedded etcd** across all 3 nodes (no external datastore)."
+#       "Nodes are both control-plane and workload (3-node converged cluster); with only 3
+#        nodes we do not isolate control-plane nodes."
+#       "For prod bare-metal, the *same* Ansible bootstrap runs; only the machine-creation
+#        step differs"
+#
+# WHY L0 IS THE RIGHT LAYER FOR THESE CLAUSES (and where the rest lives)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+# R-PLAT-01 splits cleanly in two, and the halves are provable at different layers:
+#
+#   AUTHORED half — "the configuration in git builds a 3-server HA embedded-etcd control
+#       plane in BOTH environments, from ONE code path": provable with no cluster, and
+#       ONLY provable here. A live cluster cannot tell you whether the *next* environment
+#       brought up from this repo will also be HA, whether a second `--cluster-init`
+#       founder could exist, or whether an external datastore is configured anywhere. That
+#       is this check.
+#   OBSERVED half — "the cluster this suite is pointed at really is 3 Ready servers, all
+#       etcd members, with the API answering through the floating VIP": that is cluster
+#       state and lives in tests/l2-behavioral/ha-control-plane (same requirement label).
+#
+# Neither half is sufficient alone, and this file claims only the first.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENTS ARE DERIVED, NOT LISTED. The check does not know the words "dev" or "prod"
+# as inventory names. It enumerates environments from the R-ENV-02 seam itself — the
+# `k3s_primary_group` / `k3s_servers_group` pair in group_vars/all.yml plus every
+# group_vars/<group>/vars.yml that overrides them — and identifies WHICH environment is
+# prod by the Flux overlay that environment bootstraps (`flux_bootstrap_env_path`), not by
+# its group name. Add a fourth prod node, rename a group, or add a third environment and
+# the assertions follow; nothing here restates an address, a hostname or a node count.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  the Ansible inventory, the k3s/kube-vip roles and plays, and each environment's
+#       Flux overlay are parsed and cross-checked against each other,
+# THEN  DISTRO:   k3s is the distro, pinned, installed by the one role, and no node is
+#                 installed as an `agent` (an agent is not a control-plane member);
+#       SERVERS:  every environment's server group resolves to a quorum-capable, ODD
+#                 number of hosts (>= 3, tolerating >= 1 loss), the PROD environment to
+#                 EXACTLY three, and each has EXACTLY ONE `--cluster-init` founder while
+#                 every other server joins it with `--server` (so a second founder — the
+#                 split-brain shape — cannot be authored);
+#       ETCD:     the datastore is k3s's EMBEDDED etcd: no `--datastore-endpoint` and no
+#                 `--disable-etcd` anywhere in the provisioning code, so every server is
+#                 an etcd member (docs/02's "no external datastore", "on all 3");
+#       ENDPOINT: the API has a floating endpoint that survives losing the founder — the
+#                 kube-vip VIP is control-plane-only (never Service LB, or it would fight
+#                 Cilium LB-IPAM for ARP), leader-elected, deployed to EVERY server, and
+#                 baked into the apiserver serving cert's SAN list ALONG WITH every
+#                 server's own address (so TLS validates whichever node answers);
+#       ADDRESSES: each environment's control-plane VIP is not one of its node addresses,
+#                 is not that environment's ingress Gateway VIP, and lies OUTSIDE that
+#                 environment's Cilium LoadBalancer pool — the two allocators can never be
+#                 handed the same address;
+#       CNI PATH: the CNI dials the FLOATING endpoint, not a machine (added 2026-09-06). The
+#                 two API addresses stay SPLIT — k3s_api_host is the founder and feeds only
+#                 the cold `--server` join, k3s_apiserver_endpoint derives from
+#                 kube_vip_address and feeds Cilium's k8sServiceHost — the Flux overlay's
+#                 K3S_API_HOST equals that environment's VIP and is none of its node
+#                 addresses ([parity], both halves), the HelmRelease keeps a per-environment
+#                 token rather than a literal, and site.yml floats the VIP BETWEEN k3s and
+#                 Cilium with roles/kube_vip blocking until it answers;
+#       ONE PATH: dev/test and prod are brought up by the SAME role and the SAME plays,
+#                 retargeted by variables only (docs/02 "the *same* Ansible bootstrap
+#                 runs"), so "exercise the same multi-node topology" is a property of the
+#                 code rather than a coincidence of two hand-written inventories.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this check as claiming them):
+#   - THE LIVE CLUSTERS. That three nodes are Ready, that all three are etcd members with
+#     a healthy quorum, that kube-vip is actually floating the VIP, and that the API
+#     answers through it. All of that is asserted at L2 by
+#     tests/l2-behavioral/ha-control-plane, which reads it from the cluster under test.
+#   - FAILOVER. That the control plane SURVIVES the loss of a server (etcd quorum holds,
+#     the VIP moves, the API stays up) is a fault-injection claim. The nearest existing
+#     coverage is tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss, which drains a node for R-STATE-02's
+#     data-availability claim and does NOT assert control-plane survival. A dedicated
+#     "kill the VIP leader / kill the founder" L3 test is the remaining R-PLAT-01 gap and
+#     is NOT claimed here or at L2.
+#   - "PRODUCTION-GRADE" AS A HARDWARE/OPERATIONS JUDGEMENT. Whether three converged
+#     mini-PCs with etcd sharing a spindle with Longhorn is production-grade is an operator
+#     decision recorded in infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2, not a repository property. This
+#     check asserts the control-plane TOPOLOGY the spec fixes, not a performance verdict.
+#   - IPv6 / dual-stack, and any claim about the edge network.
+#
+# TWO FORMER GAPS ARE NOW ASSERTED, and the reasoning is worth keeping (2026-09-06):
+#   * CILIUM'S OWN API ENDPOINT used to be listed here as an ESCALATION — `K3S_API_HOST`
+#     (clusters/*/kustomization.yaml), which becomes Cilium's `k8sServiceHost`, was each
+#     environment's PRIMARY NODE address rather than the floating VIP, contradicting the prod
+#     overlay's own comment. Making the check fail over it would have turned the merge gate
+#     red on a design question this workstream may not decide (R-TEST-06), so it was reported
+#     instead. THE OPERATOR DECIDED THE VIP on 2026-09-06, which turns the question into a
+#     repository invariant, and invariants belong in assertions — see the "THE CNI DIALS THE
+#     VIP" section. Note what made it assertable: the fix SPLIT one variable in two, so there
+#     is finally an HA-valued name (`k3s_apiserver_endpoint`) to point the contract at.
+#   * kube-vip WAS NOT PART OF THE ONE-COMMAND BRING-UP (site.yml chained node-baseline ->
+#     k3s -> cilium -> verify -> flux-bootstrap), which was recorded here as an observation
+#     and not asserted, because R-PLAT-01 does not fix the bring-up order. It is asserted now
+#     for a different reason that IS in scope: with the CNI's endpoint being the VIP, an
+#     unfloated VIP means a cold build installs a CNI that cannot reach its API server. The
+#     ordering is no longer a preference about tidiness, it is a dependency of the control
+#     plane coming up at all.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import ipaddress
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+NOTES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def note(msg):
+    NOTES.append(msg)
+
+
+def die():
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (ha-control-plane-as-code): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+
+ANS = ROOT / "infra" / "ansible"
+INV = ANS / "inventory" / "hosts.ini"
+GV = ANS / "inventory" / "group_vars"
+K3S_ROLE = ANS / "roles" / "k3s_server"
+VIP_ROLE = ANS / "roles" / "kube_vip"
+PLAYBOOKS = ANS / "playbooks"
+CLUSTERS = ROOT / "clusters"
+
+for p, why in ((INV, "the inventory that defines the node set"),
+               (K3S_ROLE, "the role that installs the k3s control plane"),
+               (VIP_ROLE, "the role that floats the control-plane VIP"),
+               (CLUSTERS, "the Flux overlays that identify each environment")):
+    check(p.exists(), f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)} is missing — {why} does not exist, so no HA "
+                      "control plane is authored at all (R-PLAT-01)")
+if FAILURES:
+    die()
+
+K3S_TEXT = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace") for p in sorted(K3S_ROLE.rglob("*.yml")))
+VIP_TEXT = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace")
+                     for p in sorted(list(VIP_ROLE.rglob("*.yml")) + list(VIP_ROLE.rglob("*.j2"))))
+
+
+# ===================================================================== inventory parse
+# Parser contract (same shape lib/coverage.py-style parsers use elsewhere): hosts.ini is a
+# plain INI inventory — `[group]` sections of `host key=value ...` lines, `[group:children]`
+# sections naming child groups, `[group:vars]` sections ignored. Comments start with '#'.
+ini_hosts: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+ini_children: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+host_vars: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {}
+cur = None
+for line in INV.read_text().splitlines():
+    s = line.strip()
+    if not s or s.startswith("#"):
+        continue
+    m = re.match(r"^\[([^\]]+)\]$", s)
+    if m:
+        cur = m.group(1)
+        continue
+    if cur is None or cur.endswith(":vars"):
+        continue
+    host = s.split()[0]
+    if cur.endswith(":children"):
+        ini_children.setdefault(cur.split(":")[0], []).append(host)
+    else:
+        ini_hosts.setdefault(cur, []).append(host)
+        hv = host_vars.setdefault(host, {})
+        for kv in s.split()[1:]:
+            if "=" in kv:
+                k, v = kv.split("=", 1)
+                hv[k] = v
+
+
+def hosts_in(group: str, seen=None) -> set[str]:
+    seen = seen or set()
+    if group in seen:
+        return set()
+    seen.add(group)
+    out = set(ini_hosts.get(group, []))
+    for child in ini_children.get(group, []):
+        out |= hosts_in(child, seen)
+    return out
+
+
+def load_yaml(p: Path) -> dict:
+    try:
+        d = yaml.safe_load(p.read_text()) or {}
+    except yaml.YAMLError:
+        return {}
+    return d if isinstance(d, dict) else {}
+
+
+ALL_VARS = load_yaml(GV / "all.yml")
+
+
+# =============================================== ENVIRONMENTS, DERIVED FROM THE SEAM
+# An "environment" here is a (primary group, servers group) pair. group_vars/all.yml holds
+# the default pair; every group_vars/<g>/vars.yml that overrides `k3s_primary_group` is
+# another environment. Nothing below knows the words "dev" or "prod" as group names.
+class Env:
+    def __init__(self, label, vars_, path):
+        self.label = label
+        self.vars = vars_
+        self.path = path
+
+    def var(self, name, default=None):
+        # group-scoped value wins, else the cluster-wide default from all.yml.
+        if name in self.vars:
+            return self.vars[name]
+        return ALL_VARS.get(name, default)
+
+
+envs: list[Env] = [Env("group_vars/all.yml (default environment)", ALL_VARS, GV / "all.yml")]
+for vf in sorted(GV.glob("*/vars.yml")):
+    v = load_yaml(vf)
+    if "k3s_primary_group" in v or "k3s_servers_group" in v:
+        envs.append(Env(str(vf.relative_to(ROOT)), v, vf))
+
+check(len(envs) >= 2,
+      "only ONE environment is derivable from the inventory's R-ENV-02 seam "
+      "(k3s_primary_group / k3s_servers_group). R-PLAT-01 constrains prod AND requires "
+      "dev/test to exercise the same multi-node topology, so two must be authored")
+
+# WHICH environment is prod: the one that bootstraps the clusters/prod Flux overlay.
+# roles/flux_bootstrap's own default supplies the value for an environment that does not
+# override it, so this is read from code, never guessed from a group name.
+fb_default = None
+fb_defaults_file = ANS / "roles" / "flux_bootstrap" / "defaults" / "main.yml"
+if fb_defaults_file.is_file():
+    fb_default = load_yaml(fb_defaults_file).get("flux_bootstrap_env_path")
+check(isinstance(fb_default, str) and fb_default.startswith("clusters/"),
+      "roles/flux_bootstrap declares no flux_bootstrap_env_path default — the mapping from "
+      "an inventory environment to its Flux overlay is not expressed in code, so this check "
+      "cannot tell which environment is prod")
+
+prod_envs = []
+for e in envs:
+    overlay = e.var("flux_bootstrap_env_path", fb_default)
+    e.overlay = overlay if isinstance(overlay, str) else ""
+    if e.overlay.rstrip("/").endswith("/prod"):
+        prod_envs.append(e)
+check(len(prod_envs) == 1,
+      f"{len(prod_envs)} environment(s) bootstrap the clusters/prod overlay "
+      f"({[e.label for e in prod_envs]}) — exactly one must be prod, or 'in prod' in "
+      "R-PLAT-01 has no unambiguous referent")
+
+
+# ============================================== overlay knob values (per environment)
+# Parser contract: clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml holds the base ConfigMap `data:` map;
+# each clusters/<env>/kustomization.yaml overrides values with JSON6902 patches written as
+#     - op: replace
+#       path: /data/<KEY>
+#       value: "<v>"
+# (verified shape across both overlays). A key not patched keeps the base value.
+BASE_VARS: dict[str, str] = {}
+base_cm = CLUSTERS / "base" / "cluster-vars.yaml"
+if base_cm.is_file():
+    d = load_yaml(base_cm)
+    BASE_VARS = {k: str(v) for k, v in (d.get("data") or {}).items()}
+check(len(BASE_VARS) > 5,
+      "clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml exposes no data map — the overlay knob surface "
+      "cannot be read, so the VIP/pool separation cannot be checked")
+
+_PATCH_RE = re.compile(
+    r"-\s+op:\s*replace\s*\n\s*path:\s*/data/(?P<k>[A-Z0-9_]+)\s*\n\s*value:\s*(?P<v>\S.*?)\s*$",
+    re.M)
+
+
+def overlay_vars(overlay: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    out = dict(BASE_VARS)
+    f = ROOT / overlay / "kustomization.yaml"
+    if not f.is_file():
+        return out
+    for m in _PATCH_RE.finditer(f.read_text()):
+        out[m.group("k")] = m.group("v").strip().strip('"').strip("'")
+    return out
+
+
+# ============================================================ PER-ENVIRONMENT TOPOLOGY
+def as_ip(s):
+    try:
+        return ipaddress.ip_address(str(s).strip())
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+for e in envs:
+    L = e.label
+    pg = e.var("k3s_primary_group")
+    sg = e.var("k3s_servers_group")
+    check(isinstance(pg, str) and isinstance(sg, str) and pg and sg,
+          f"{L}: k3s_primary_group / k3s_servers_group are not both set — the roles cannot "
+          "resolve 'my environment's primary/servers' and would only ever build dev")
+    if not (isinstance(pg, str) and isinstance(sg, str)):
+        continue
+    primaries = hosts_in(pg)
+    servers = hosts_in(sg)
+
+    # --- SERVERS: quorum-capable, one founder, prod exactly three ---------------------
+    check(len(primaries) == 1,
+          f"{L}: group {pg!r} resolves to {sorted(primaries)} — EXACTLY ONE host may run "
+          "`--cluster-init`. Two founders is two etcd clusters (split brain), zero is no "
+          "cluster at all")
+    check(primaries and primaries <= servers,
+          f"{L}: the primary {sorted(primaries)} is not a member of the servers group "
+          f"{sg!r} ({sorted(servers)}) — the founder must itself be one of the servers, or "
+          "it is not part of the HA control plane it founds")
+    n = len(servers)
+    check(n >= 3,
+          f"{L}: group {sg!r} resolves to {n} server(s) {sorted(servers)}. docs/02 fixes "
+          "'HA embedded etcd (k3s server on all 3)' for dev/test AND prod, and an etcd "
+          "cluster of fewer than 3 members tolerates ZERO losses — it is not HA")
+    check(n % 2 == 1,
+          f"{L}: group {sg!r} has an EVEN number of servers ({n}). An even embedded-etcd "
+          f"member count adds a member without adding fault tolerance and introduces a tie: "
+          f"quorum for {n} is {n // 2 + 1}, the same as for {n - 1}")
+    if n:
+        tolerance = n - (n // 2 + 1)
+        check(tolerance >= 1,
+              f"{L}: {n} server(s) give a quorum of {n // 2 + 1} and therefore tolerate "
+              f"{tolerance} loss(es) — 'production-grade HA' requires surviving at least one")
+    if e in prod_envs:
+        check(n == 3,
+              f"{L} is the PROD environment and resolves to {n} server(s). R-PLAT-01: "
+              "'k3s across 3 nodes ... in prod'; docs/02: 'Node count | ... | 3 physical nodes'")
+    else:
+        check(n >= 2,
+              f"{L}: a non-prod environment resolves to {n} host(s). R-PLAT-01 allows fewer "
+              "nodes than prod but requires dev/test to 'exercise the same multi-node "
+              "topology' — one node exercises no topology")
+
+    # --- ADDRESSES: the VIP can collide with nothing ----------------------------------
+    vip_raw = e.var("kube_vip_address")
+    vip = as_ip(vip_raw)
+    check(vip is not None,
+          f"{L}: kube_vip_address is {vip_raw!r}, not an IP address — the control plane has "
+          "no floating endpoint, so losing the founder takes the API endpoint with it")
+    node_ips = {}
+    for h in sorted(servers):
+        ip = as_ip(host_vars.get(h, {}).get("k3s_node_ip", ""))
+        check(ip is not None,
+              f"{L}: host {h} declares no usable k3s_node_ip — k3s --node-ip, the join "
+              "target and the serving-cert SAN list all derive from it")
+        if ip is not None:
+            node_ips[h] = ip
+    if vip is not None:
+        check(vip not in set(node_ips.values()),
+              f"{L}: kube_vip_address {vip} is ALSO a node address "
+              f"({[h for h, i in node_ips.items() if i == vip]}) — a floating VIP that is a "
+              "node's own address cannot float off that node")
+        ov = overlay_vars(getattr(e, "overlay", ""))
+        gw = as_ip(ov.get("GATEWAY_VIP", ""))
+        lo = as_ip(ov.get("CILIUM_LB_POOL_START", ""))
+        hi = as_ip(ov.get("CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP", ""))
+        check(gw is not None and lo is not None and hi is not None,
+              f"{L}: overlay {getattr(e, 'overlay', '')!r} does not resolve GATEWAY_VIP + "
+              "CILIUM_LB_POOL_START/STOP — the separation between the control-plane VIP and "
+              "the Service-LB allocator cannot be checked")
+        if gw is not None:
+            check(vip != gw,
+                  f"{L}: the control-plane VIP and the ingress Gateway VIP are the SAME "
+                  f"address ({vip}) — kube-vip and Cilium would both ARP for it")
+        if lo is not None and hi is not None:
+            check(not (lo <= vip <= hi),
+                  f"{L}: the control-plane VIP {vip} lies INSIDE that environment's Cilium "
+                  f"LoadBalancer pool {lo}-{hi} — LB-IPAM could hand the kube-API's VIP to a "
+                  "Service, and the two allocators would fight over ARP for it")
+            check(lo <= hi,
+                  f"{L}: Cilium LB pool {lo}-{hi} is inverted — the pool bound cannot be "
+                  "used to prove the VIP is outside it")
+
+# ==================================================================== DISTRO: k3s only
+check(re.search(r"^k3s_version:\s*\"?v\d+\.\d+", (K3S_ROLE / "defaults" / "main.yml").read_text(), re.M)
+      is not None,
+      "roles/k3s_server pins no concrete k3s_version (vX.Y...) — an unpinned control-plane "
+      "version is not a reproducible platform (docs/01: the distro is k3s, ADR-0001)")
+check("get.k3s.io" in K3S_TEXT,
+      "roles/k3s_server does not install from the k3s installer — R-PLAT-01 names k3s as the "
+      "distro (ADR-0001) and no other distro may stand in for it")
+check(re.search(r"^\s*server\s*$", K3S_TEXT, re.M) is not None,
+      "roles/k3s_server never composes the `server` subcommand — without it k3s installs an "
+      "AGENT, which is not a control-plane member (docs/02: 'k3s server on all 3')")
+for bad, why in (
+    (r"--datastore-endpoint", "an EXTERNAL datastore (docs/02: 'embedded etcd across all 3 "
+                             "nodes (no external datastore)')"),
+    (r"datastore-endpoint\s*:", "an external datastore via config.yaml"),
+    (r"--disable-etcd", "a server with etcd DISABLED, i.e. a control-plane node that is not "
+                        "an etcd member (docs/02: etcd 'across all 3 nodes')"),
+    (r"INSTALL_K3S_EXEC\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?agent", "an AGENT-only node"),
+):
+    hits = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in sorted(ANS.rglob("*"))
+            if p.is_file() and p.suffix in (".yml", ".yaml", ".j2", ".sh", ".ini")
+            and re.search(bad, p.read_text(errors="replace"))]
+    check(not hits,
+          f"{hits} configure {why} — R-PLAT-01's control plane is k3s's own embedded-etcd HA "
+          f"mode, and {bad!r} contradicts it")
+
+# ============================================== FOUNDER / JOINER, EXACTLY ONE OF EACH
+check(re.search(r"--cluster-init", K3S_TEXT) is not None,
+      "roles/k3s_server never passes --cluster-init — the embedded-etcd cluster is never "
+      "founded, so there is no HA datastore to join")
+init_when = re.search(r"--cluster-init.*?\n(?:.*\n){0,8}?\s*when:\s*k3s_server_mode\s*==\s*'primary'",
+                      K3S_TEXT)
+check(init_when is not None,
+      "the --cluster-init install task is not gated on k3s_server_mode == 'primary' — an "
+      "ungated founder flag would re-found the cluster on every server (split brain)")
+join = re.search(r"--server https://\{\{\s*k3s_api_host", K3S_TEXT)
+check(join is not None,
+      "roles/k3s_server does not join secondaries with `--server https://{{ k3s_api_host }}` "
+      "— without a join target the servers are separate single-node clusters")
+join_when = re.search(r"--server https://.*?\n(?:.*\n){0,10}?\s*when:\s*k3s_server_mode\s*==\s*'secondary'",
+                      K3S_TEXT, re.S)
+check(join_when is not None,
+      "the join install task is not gated on k3s_server_mode == 'secondary' — the founder "
+      "would also try to join itself")
+k3s_play = PLAYBOOKS / "k3s.yml"
+check(k3s_play.is_file(), "playbooks/k3s.yml is missing — the control-plane install has no entrypoint")
+if k3s_play.is_file():
+    play_txt = k3s_play.read_text()
+    modes = re.findall(r"k3s_server_mode:\s*(\w+)", play_txt)
+    check(sorted(modes) == ["primary", "secondary"],
+          f"playbooks/k3s.yml declares server modes {modes} — exactly one primary play and "
+          "one secondary play must exist, or the founder/joiner split is not authored")
+    check(re.search(r"serial:\s*1", play_txt) is not None,
+          "playbooks/k3s.yml does not restart/join the secondaries with `serial: 1` — "
+          "converging two of three servers at once drops embedded etcd below quorum, which "
+          "is exactly the outage an HA control plane exists to avoid")
+    hosts_patterns = re.findall(r"^\s*hosts:\s*(.+)$", play_txt, re.M)
+    check(len(hosts_patterns) >= 2 and all("{{" in h for h in hosts_patterns),
+          f"playbooks/k3s.yml targets literal host patterns {hosts_patterns} — a literal "
+          "group name means this play can only ever build ONE environment, so prod cannot "
+          "be brought up by the same code (docs/02: 'the *same* Ansible bootstrap runs')")
+
+# =========================================== SERVING-CERT SANs: VIP + every server
+sans = str(load_yaml(K3S_ROLE / "defaults" / "main.yml").get("k3s_tls_sans", ""))
+check("kube_vip_address" in sans,
+      "roles/k3s_server's k3s_tls_sans does not include kube_vip_address — the apiserver's "
+      "serving cert would carry no SAN for the floating VIP, so every client reaching the "
+      "API through it fails TLS validation and the HA endpoint is unusable")
+check("k3s_servers_group" in sans and "k3s_node_ip" in sans,
+      "k3s_tls_sans does not extract k3s_node_ip for every host of k3s_servers_group — the "
+      "cert must be valid for WHICHEVER server answers behind the VIP, and per-environment "
+      "resolution of that set is what keeps one role serving both environments (R-ENV-02)")
+check(re.search(r"tls-san:", K3S_TEXT) is not None,
+      "the SAN list is passed only as an install flag and never persisted to "
+      "/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml — on an ALREADY-installed cluster the install task is a "
+      "no-op, so a changed SAN set (e.g. a new server) would never reach the serving cert")
+
+# ============================ THE CNI DIALS THE VIP, NOT THE FOUNDER (added 2026-09-06)
+# This section used to be an ESCALATION in the header's gap list, not an assertion: Cilium's
+# k8sServiceHost was each environment's PRIMARY NODE address, so on a 3-server HA control
+# plane the CNI's control-plane path depended on one machine. Measured on live prod
+# 2026-09-06: all three cilium-agents carried KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10
+# (k3s-prod-1's own address) while kube-vip held 192.168.2.9. That failure is SILENT — the
+# datapath keeps serving from Cilium's cache, so nothing looks broken while no service or
+# policy update lands at all.
+#
+# The operator decided the VIP (2026-09-06), so this is now a repository property and belongs
+# here rather than in the gap list. THIS IS THE RIGHT LAYER because the claim is about what
+# the configuration in git WOULD build, in BOTH environments, including the next one — a live
+# cluster can only tell you about itself.
+#
+# WHAT MAKES THIS CHECKABLE AT ALL is that the fix split one variable into two. Asserting
+# "Cilium uses the HA address" requires an HA address to name; before the split there was
+# only k3s_api_host, which had to be the founder for the cold join. So the assertions below
+# check the SPLIT as much as the value: the join keeps the founder, the CNI gets the VIP, and
+# the Flux half agrees with the Ansible half per environment.
+CIL_ROLE = ANS / "roles" / "cilium"
+cil_values_tpl = CIL_ROLE / "templates" / "cilium-values.yaml.j2"
+check(cil_values_tpl.is_file(),
+      "roles/cilium ships no cilium-values.yaml.j2 — the bootstrap's CNI values, including the "
+      "API endpoint its kube-proxy replacement dials, are not authored")
+if cil_values_tpl.is_file():
+    # Parse the rendered-shape template, never its prose: strip comment lines first, exactly
+    # as the kube-vip parser above does, so a reassuring comment cannot satisfy the check.
+    cil_body = "\n".join(l for l in cil_values_tpl.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()
+                         if not l.lstrip().startswith("#"))
+    m = re.search(r"^k8sServiceHost:\s*\"?([^\"\n]*)\"?\s*$", cil_body, re.M)
+    check(m is not None,
+          "roles/cilium's values template sets no k8sServiceHost — with kube-proxy disabled "
+          "(ADR-0001) the agent has no API endpoint to dial and the CNI cannot come up")
+    if m is not None:
+        host_expr = m.group(1).strip()
+        check("k3s_apiserver_endpoint" in host_expr,
+              f"roles/cilium renders k8sServiceHost={host_expr!r}. It MUST be the HA endpoint "
+              "variable {{ k3s_apiserver_endpoint }} (= kube_vip_address). Any node-valued "
+              "expression — k3s_api_host, a primary hostvar, a literal IP — makes the CNI's "
+              "control-plane path depend on ONE server of an HA control plane, and the failure "
+              "is silent: the datapath keeps running from Cilium's cache while no service or "
+              "policy update ever lands (measured on prod 2026-09-06)")
+        check("k3s_api_host" not in host_expr,
+              f"roles/cilium renders k8sServiceHost={host_expr!r}, which references "
+              "k3s_api_host — the FOUNDER's own address. That variable exists only for the "
+              "cold-bootstrap `--server` join and one tls-san entry; it is a single point of "
+              "failure by construction and must never be a steady-state endpoint")
+
+# The HA endpoint variable must BE the VIP, and must be DERIVED from kube_vip_address rather
+# than restated: an environment overrides one line (kube_vip_address) and both the floating
+# address and the CNI's endpoint move together. A literal here could disagree with the VIP the
+# same environment actually floats, which is the two-places-one-fact bug this repo keeps
+# hitting.
+endpoint_def = str(ALL_VARS.get("k3s_apiserver_endpoint", ""))
+check("kube_vip_address" in endpoint_def,
+      f"group_vars/all.yml defines k3s_apiserver_endpoint as {endpoint_def!r}. It MUST derive "
+      "from kube_vip_address, so that overriding the VIP for an environment also moves what "
+      "that environment's CNI dials. A restated literal can silently disagree with the VIP "
+      "kube-vip is actually floating")
+check("kube_vip_address" not in str(ALL_VARS.get("k3s_api_host", "")),
+      "group_vars/all.yml's k3s_api_host resolves from kube_vip_address — the two API "
+      "addresses have been re-merged. k3s_api_host is the secondary join target and on a COLD "
+      "build no VIP exists yet, so a VIP-valued join target makes a cold bootstrap unjoinable")
+
+# THE [parity] CONTRACT, now machine-checked instead of asserted in a comment: the Flux
+# overlay's K3S_API_HOST becomes Cilium's k8sServiceHost under the HelmRelease, and the
+# Ansible bootstrap renders k3s_apiserver_endpoint for the same field. If the two disagree,
+# Flux and the bootstrap describe different control-plane paths and fight over the CNI.
+for e in envs:
+    L = e.label
+    ov = overlay_vars(getattr(e, "overlay", ""))
+    k3s_api_host_knob = as_ip(ov.get("K3S_API_HOST", ""))
+    vip = as_ip(e.var("kube_vip_address"))
+    check(k3s_api_host_knob is not None,
+          f"{L}: overlay {getattr(e, 'overlay', '')!r} resolves no usable K3S_API_HOST — that "
+          "token becomes Cilium's k8sServiceHost via platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml, and "
+          "kustomize-controller runs with StrictPostBuildSubstitutions so an unresolvable one "
+          "fails the whole platform Kustomization")
+    if k3s_api_host_knob is not None and vip is not None:
+        check(k3s_api_host_knob == vip,
+              f"{L}: [parity] BROKEN — the Flux overlay sets K3S_API_HOST={k3s_api_host_knob} "
+              f"but this environment's control-plane VIP (kube_vip_address, which is what "
+              f"k3s_apiserver_endpoint and therefore the Ansible-side k8sServiceHost resolve "
+              f"to) is {vip}. Flux and the Ansible bootstrap would render DIFFERENT API "
+              "endpoints into the same CNI and fight over it. If they differ because the "
+              "overlay still holds a NODE address, that is the 2026-09-06 defect: the CNI of "
+              "an HA control plane must not dial one server")
+        check(k3s_api_host_knob not in set(
+                  as_ip(host_vars.get(h, {}).get("k3s_node_ip", ""))
+                  for h in hosts_in(str(e.var("k3s_servers_group")))),
+              f"{L}: the overlay's K3S_API_HOST {k3s_api_host_knob} is one of this "
+              "environment's own NODE addresses. Cilium's kube-proxy replacement would dial a "
+              "single machine on a control plane built specifically to survive losing one")
+
+# The Flux half must stay a per-environment TOKEN. A literal IP in the shared HelmRelease
+# would ship one environment's control-plane address to every environment (R-ENV-02), and an
+# empty value is the 2026-09-01 incident verbatim (k8sServiceHost: "" made the agent's config
+# init container fall back to the in-cluster ClusterIP 10.43.0.1:443, which only the agent
+# being replaced could translate: deadlocked on 2 of 3 nodes).
+hr = ROOT / "platform" / "cilium" / "helmrelease.yaml"
+check(hr.is_file(), "platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml is missing — nothing adopts the CNI "
+                    "config after the bootstrap, so the parity contract has only one side")
+if hr.is_file():
+    hr_body = "\n".join(l for l in hr.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()
+                        if not l.lstrip().startswith("#"))
+    hm = re.search(r"^\s*k8sServiceHost:\s*\"?([^\"\n]*)\"?\s*$", hr_body, re.M)
+    check(hm is not None and hm.group(1).strip() == "${K3S_API_HOST}",
+          f"platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml sets k8sServiceHost="
+          f"{(hm.group(1) if hm else None)!r} instead of the cluster-vars token "
+          "\"${K3S_API_HOST}\" — a literal there would ship ONE environment's control-plane "
+          "address to every environment (R-ENV-02), and an empty value is the 2026-09-01 "
+          "incident verbatim")
+
+# ORDERING: the VIP must be floating BEFORE the CNI is installed against it. site.yml is the
+# one-command bring-up, so this is a property of the authored sequence, not of an operator's
+# memory. (kube-vip can precede the CNI because its DaemonSet is hostNetwork with
+# KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=127.0.0.1 — asserted separately below/above via the manifest parse.)
+site_play = PLAYBOOKS / "site.yml"
+check(site_play.is_file(), "playbooks/site.yml is missing — there is no one-command bring-up "
+                           "whose ORDER can be checked")
+if site_play.is_file():
+    imports = re.findall(r"import_playbook:\s*(\S+)", site_play.read_text())
+    for needed in ("k3s.yml", "kube-vip.yml", "cilium.yml"):
+        check(needed in imports,
+              f"playbooks/site.yml does not import {needed} (imports: {imports}). Cilium's "
+              "k8sServiceHost is the control-plane VIP, so kube-vip is a PREREQUISITE of the "
+              "CNI, not an optional extra step — leaving it out of the bring-up means a cold "
+              "build installs a CNI pointed at an address nothing announces")
+    if all(n in imports for n in ("k3s.yml", "kube-vip.yml", "cilium.yml")):
+        check(imports.index("k3s.yml") < imports.index("kube-vip.yml") < imports.index("cilium.yml"),
+              f"playbooks/site.yml imports {imports} — the order MUST be k3s.yml -> "
+              "kube-vip.yml -> cilium.yml. kube-vip after cilium installs the CNI against an "
+              "unannounced VIP (the 2026-09-01 shape: agents that cannot reach the API server "
+              "on a cold cluster); kube-vip before k3s cannot work at all, because the VIP "
+              "ships as a k3s auto-deploy manifest and needs a cluster to apply it")
+check(re.search(r"wait_for", VIP_TEXT) is not None
+      and re.search(r"kube_vip_address", VIP_TEXT) is not None,
+      "roles/kube_vip never WAITS for the VIP to answer — templating the manifest is not the "
+      "same as having a floating endpoint (k3s still has to apply it, the image still has to "
+      "pull, leader election still has to settle). Since the CNI is installed immediately "
+      "afterward against this exact address, an unverified VIP turns a missing endpoint into "
+      "unreachable cilium-agents diagnosed from the far side")
+
+# ============================================ FLOATING ENDPOINT: kube-vip on every server
+# Read the DaemonSet's ACTUAL container env out of the template, never the role's prose.
+# (An earlier draft matched `svc_enable=false` anywhere in the role and passed happily with
+# the template flipped to true — the comment in defaults/main.yml satisfied it. Parse the
+# thing that ships.) Parser contract: the template writes each env var as an adjacent
+# `- name: X` / `value: "Y"` pair; comment lines are dropped first.
+VIP_TEMPLATES = sorted(VIP_ROLE.rglob("*.j2"))
+check(len(VIP_TEMPLATES) >= 1,
+      "roles/kube_vip ships no manifest template — nothing deploys the API VIP")
+vip_manifest = "\n".join(
+    "\n".join(l for l in p.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()
+              if not l.lstrip().startswith("#"))
+    for p in VIP_TEMPLATES)
+vip_env = dict(re.findall(r"-\s*name:\s*([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*\n\s*value:\s*\"?([^\"\n]*)\"?",
+                          vip_manifest))
+check(len(vip_env) >= 6,
+      f"only {len(vip_env)} env var(s) parsed out of the kube-vip manifest template — the "
+      "parser lost its grip on the file, so the assertions below would assert nothing")
+check(vip_env.get("cp_enable") == "true",
+      f"the kube-vip manifest sets cp_enable={vip_env.get('cp_enable')!r} — control-plane "
+      "mode must be ON or it floats no API VIP at all")
+check(vip_env.get("svc_enable") == "false",
+      f"the kube-vip manifest sets svc_enable={vip_env.get('svc_enable')!r} — it must be "
+      "false, or kube-vip ALSO serves Service LoadBalancers and contends with Cilium LB-IPAM "
+      "for the same addresses (ADR-0002 gives Service LB to Cilium)")
+check(vip_env.get("vip_leaderelection") == "true",
+      f"the kube-vip manifest sets vip_leaderelection={vip_env.get('vip_leaderelection')!r} "
+      "— without leader election the VIP has no defined owner to fail over FROM, which is "
+      "the whole HA mechanism")
+check(vip_env.get("address", "").strip() == "{{ kube_vip_address }}",
+      f"the kube-vip manifest announces address={vip_env.get('address')!r} instead of the "
+      "environment-scoped {{ kube_vip_address }} — a literal here would float DEV's VIP on "
+      "prod (R-ENV-02) and would not match the serving-cert SAN list")
+check(re.search(r"^kind:\s*DaemonSet\s*$", vip_manifest, re.M) is not None,
+      "the kube-vip manifest is not a DaemonSet — a single-replica VIP holder dies with its "
+      "node, which is the opposite of a floating endpoint")
+vip_play = PLAYBOOKS / "kube-vip.yml"
+check(vip_play.is_file(), "playbooks/kube-vip.yml is missing — nothing deploys the API VIP")
+if vip_play.is_file():
+    vp = vip_play.read_text()
+    vip_hosts = re.findall(r"^\s*hosts:\s*(.+)$", vp, re.M)
+    check(len(vip_hosts) == 1 and "k3s_hosts" in vip_hosts[0],
+          f"playbooks/kube-vip.yml targets {vip_hosts} — it must target the whole servers "
+          "group through the same environment-scoped variable the other plays use, so the "
+          "manifest exists on EVERY server and the VIP survives losing any one of them")
+check(re.search(r"kube_vip_manifest_path", VIP_TEXT) is not None
+      and re.search(r"k3s_data_dir", VIP_TEXT) is not None,
+      "roles/kube_vip's manifest path is not derived from k3s_data_dir — k3s only auto-applies "
+      "<data-dir>/server/manifests, so an environment that moves --data-dir would write the "
+      "manifest somewhere k3s never reads and come up with no VIP at all")
+
+# ================================================== ONE CODE PATH FOR BOTH ENVIRONMENTS
+# docs/02: "For prod bare-metal, the *same* Ansible bootstrap runs; only the machine-creation
+# step differs". A prod-only role or playbook would be a fork of the control-plane path.
+role_names = {p.name for p in (ANS / "roles").iterdir() if p.is_dir()}
+play_names = {p.name for p in PLAYBOOKS.glob("*.yml")}
+env_words = re.compile(r"prod|dev", re.I)
+forked = sorted(n for n in (role_names | play_names)
+                if env_words.search(n) and n not in ("memattr_survey", "memattr-survey.yml"))
+check(not forked,
+      f"environment-named roles/playbooks exist ({forked}) — dev and prod must be built by "
+      "the SAME code retargeted by variables (docs/02), not by a per-environment fork")
+for e in envs:
+    if e.path.name != "vars.yml":
+        continue
+    # Every key a non-default environment sets must be a variable something already reads,
+    # or it is an invented knob nothing consumes (a silent no-op that looks like config).
+    consumers = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace") for p in sorted(ANS.rglob("*"))
+                          if p.is_file() and p.suffix in (".yml", ".yaml", ".j2", ".sh"))
+    for k in sorted(e.vars):
+        if k.startswith("ansible_"):
+            continue
+        check(consumers.count(k) > 1,
+              f"{e.label} sets {k!r}, which appears nowhere else under infra/ansible — an "
+              "environment override that nothing reads is not a scoped override, it is dead "
+              "configuration (and would make prod silently inherit a dev default)")
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
+# NO-OP GUARD: a check that quietly asserts nothing is worse than no check.
+check(CHECKS >= 40,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op and its pass "
+      "would be meaningless")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    die()
+for n in NOTES:
+    print(f"  note: {n}")
+summary = "; ".join(
+    f"{e.label.split('/')[-1]}[{'PROD' if e in prod_envs else 'non-prod'}]="
+    f"{len(hosts_in(str(e.var('k3s_servers_group'))))} servers"
+    for e in envs)
+print(f"check OK: ha-control-plane-as-code — {CHECKS} assertions; {summary}. "
+      "R-PLAT-01's AUTHORED half only: k3s, one --cluster-init founder per environment, "
+      "embedded etcd on every server with no external datastore, a leader-elected "
+      "control-plane-only VIP on every server that is SAN'd into the serving cert and "
+      "collides with no other allocator, floated BEFORE the CNI that dials it (and the CNI "
+      "dials that VIP, not the founder, in both environments and on both sides of the "
+      "[parity] contract), from one code path for both environments. The LIVE "
+      "cluster shape is proven at L2 (tests/l2-behavioral/ha-control-plane); control-plane "
+      "SURVIVAL of a node loss is proven NOWHERE yet (see the header's gap list).")
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — Keycloak client secrets are declared consistently, ordered by a REAL
+# Flux edge, and healed by a reconciler whose behaviour is proven offline
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+#
+# R-IDP-03 (identity config is declarative) and R-IDP-04 (IdP secrets SOPS-encrypted)
+# are both implemented through ONE mechanism that FAILS OPEN: the KeycloakRealmImport
+# resolves each client's secret from a `(env:NAME)` placeholder mapped to a key of the
+# SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients Secret. When the operator cannot resolve a
+# placeholder it stores the LITERAL placeholder text as the client secret AND THE IMPORT
+# JOB STILL REPORTS SUCCESS — then rests at Done=True / Started=False and never re-runs.
+#
+# Measured 2026-09-06: prod had all 12 clients holding the literal placeholder (every
+# OIDC login failed with "Invalid client or Invalid client credentials"); dev had exactly
+# one (oauth2-proxy), because that Secret key was added AFTER dev's import completed.
+# Declarative config that silently does not apply is not declarative config.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# THEN  every confidential client declares a placeholder, every placeholder is defined,
+#       resolves to the keycloak-realm-clients Secret, and names a key that EXISTS in the
+#       SOPS file under the `<clientId>-client-secret` contract the reconciler derives
+#       from; public clients declare no secret; the Flux Kustomization applying the Secret
+#       is a transitive `dependsOn` ancestor (wait: true) of the ones applying the import
+#       and the reconciler — a real edge, not a comment; the reconciler is reconciled from
+#       BOTH cluster entrypoints, mounts only what it needs, carries no ServiceAccount
+#       token and contains no dollar sign; and its own `--selftest` (extracted from the
+#       shipped ConfigMap and executed) proves compare-then-write, idempotence,
+#       no-secret-logging, the endpoint allow-list and fail-closed behaviour.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git + PyYAML +
+# stdlib); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it directly, and this Chainsaw
+# Test wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# NOT proven here: that the LIVE realm's stored secrets match git (that is
+# tests/l2-behavioral/keycloak-client-secrets-match-git), that the SOPS ciphertext
+# decrypts to a usable value (key PRESENCE is offline-checkable; plaintext is not), or
+# that the CronJob's schedule fires.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-client-secret-reconciler
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-IDP-03: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-IDP-04: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-IDP-03, R-IDP-04"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Every OIDC client's secret is declared once, resolvable, ordered behind a real Flux
+      dependency, and continuously reconciled — so an unresolved import placeholder can
+      neither be merged nor silently persist in the realm.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: audit-declaration-ordering-and-reconciler
+      description: >-
+        Assert the realm import, the SOPS Secret and the reconciler agree; that the Flux
+        ordering is a real dependsOn edge; and run the reconciler's own selftest.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — keycloak-client-secret-reconciler
+# Serves: R-IDP-03 ("Identity config (realms, clients, groups, roles) is declarative."
+#                   — spec docs/15-identity-and-access.md)
+#         R-IDP-04 ("IdP secrets SOPS-encrypted; MFA available."
+#                   — spec docs/15-identity-and-access.md)
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS — THE REALM IMPORT IS A ONE-SHOT THAT FAILS OPEN
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------
+# platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml declares 12 confidential OIDC clients
+# whose secrets are `(env:NAME)` import placeholders, mapped by spec.placeholders to
+# keys of the SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients Secret. Measured on both clusters
+# on 2026-09-06:
+#
+#   * when the Keycloak Operator cannot resolve a placeholder it stores the LITERAL
+#     placeholder text as the client secret AND THE IMPORT JOB STILL REPORTS SUCCESS;
+#   * the KeycloakRealmImport then rests at Done=True / Started=False and NEVER
+#     re-runs, so it never self-heals.
+#
+# Consequence: on prod all 12 clients held the literal placeholder and every OIDC
+# login on the cluster failed ("Invalid client or Invalid client credentials"); on dev
+# exactly one (oauth2-proxy) was broken, because that Secret key was added AFTER dev's
+# import had already completed and a completed import is never re-run.
+#
+# Nothing in the repo asserted the declaration was self-consistent, and nothing
+# corrected the realm afterwards. This check is the static half of the fix (the
+# reconciler CronJob is the runtime half, and this check proves that too).
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# THEN  (1) DECLARATION IS COMPLETE: every confidential client in the realm import
+#           declares a secret placeholder; every placeholder it uses is defined in
+#           spec.placeholders; every placeholder resolves to the keycloak-realm-clients
+#           Secret; and every referenced key EXISTS in the SOPS file. A client whose
+#           key is missing is exactly the dev failure, and it is now unmergeable.
+#       (2) THE NAMING CONTRACT HOLDS: each key is `<clientId>-client-secret`. That is
+#           what lets the reconciler derive the client set from the mounted Secret with
+#           no second declaration — so it must be enforced, not assumed. No orphan
+#           placeholder, and no orphan Secret key (an orphan key would make every
+#           reconciler run fail with NOT FOUND).
+#       (3) PUBLIC CLIENTS DECLARE NO SECRET (the `kubernetes` client is PKCE-public;
+#           giving it a secret would be a silent downgrade).
+#       (4) ORDERING IS A REAL FLUX EDGE, NOT A COMMENT: the Flux Kustomization that
+#           renders the Secret is a transitive `dependsOn` ancestor — with `wait: true`
+#           — of the one that renders the realm import and the reconciler. The repo's
+#           hard-won rule: a dependency that is only DOCUMENTED is not a dependency.
+#       (5) THE RECONCILER IS WIRED AND SAFE: it is reconciled from BOTH cluster
+#           entrypoints, mounts exactly the two Secrets it needs at the paths its code
+#           defaults to, carries no ServiceAccount token, and contains no dollar sign
+#           (it ships inside a substituted Flux path, where an unescaped dollar-brace
+#           expansion is rewritten before any container runs).
+#       (6) THE RECONCILER'S BEHAVIOUR IS PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED: this check EXTRACTS the
+#           script from the ConfigMap and executes its `--selftest`, which drives the
+#           real code paths against an in-process stub Keycloak and asserts
+#           compare-then-write, idempotence (zero writes on a converged realm),
+#           no-secret-logging, the endpoint allow-list (users/groups/roles are
+#           unreachable) and fail-closed behaviour. What CI proves is byte-for-byte
+#           what ships.
+#   AND (7) THIS CHECK IS LOAD-BEARING: ci/l0.sh runs it unconditionally, ci/gate.sh
+#           blocks the merge when the l0 stage fails, ci/touched-requirements.sh maps
+#           platform/keycloak/ to these requirement IDs, and an L2 test exists that
+#           audits the LIVE realm. An unreferenced test is precisely the "looks applied
+#           and isn't" failure this repo keeps hitting.
+#
+# NOT proven here (named honestly, in the style of the sibling L0 checks):
+#   - that the LIVE realm's stored secrets match git. That is cluster state; it is
+#     conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/keycloak-client-secrets-match-git.
+#   - that the SOPS ciphertext decrypts to a usable secret. Key PRESENCE is checkable
+#     offline; the plaintext is not, and must not be.
+#   - that the CronJob's image can be pulled or its schedule fires.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+IMPORT_FILE="platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml"
+SOPS_FILE="platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml"
+RECON_FILE="platform/keycloak/client-secret-reconciler.yaml"
+
+# Honest SKIP (never green) if the thing under test is absent entirely.
+for f in "$IMPORT_FILE" "$SOPS_FILE" "$RECON_FILE"; do
+  if [ ! -f "${ROOT}/${f}" ]; then
+    echo "check SKIPPED: ${f} absent — nothing to audit" >&2
+    exit 3
+  fi
+done
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+"""Static audit of the Keycloak client-secret declaration, its Flux ordering, and the
+reconciler that heals it. PyYAML (the same dependency tests/l0-static/no-plaintext-secrets
+and least-privilege-rbac already take) parses the manifests; lib/status.py is IMPORTED for
+the Flux graph walk rather than forked, so there is one definition of "what a Flux path
+renders" in the harness."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+sys.dont_write_bytecode = True          # keep __pycache__ out of the tracked tree
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "conformance" / "lib"))
+import status as st                     # noqa: E402 — reuse the walk, don't fork it
+
+IMPORT_FILE = "platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml"
+SOPS_FILE = "platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml"
+RECON_FILE = "platform/keycloak/client-secret-reconciler.yaml"
+SECRET_NAME = "keycloak-realm-clients"
+ADMIN_SECRET = "keycloak-admin-credentials"
+KEY_SUFFIX = "-client-secret"
+SECRETS_MOUNT = "/etc/keycloak-realm-clients"
+DOLLAR = chr(36)
+
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def load(rel):
+    return list(yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / rel).read_text()))
+
+
+# ================================================================= (1)-(3) declaration
+realm_import = next((d for d in load(IMPORT_FILE)
+                     if d and d.get("kind") == "KeycloakRealmImport"), None)
+check(realm_import is not None, f"{IMPORT_FILE}: no KeycloakRealmImport document found")
+if realm_import is None:
+    print("CHECK FAIL: cannot parse the realm import", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+placeholders = realm_import["spec"].get("placeholders") or {}
+clients = realm_import["spec"]["realm"].get("clients") or []
+check(len(clients) > 0, f"{IMPORT_FILE}: parsed zero clients — the file shape changed and "
+                        f"this check would silently audit nothing")
+
+# The operator's placeholder syntax, spelled without a literal dollar so this file is
+# itself safe to grep for one. Matches `<dollar>(env:NAME)`.
+PLACEHOLDER_RE = re.compile(re.escape(DOLLAR) + r"\(env:([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\)")
+
+used_placeholders: set[str] = set()
+declared_pairs: dict[str, str] = {}          # clientId -> secret key in the Secret
+
+for c in clients:
+    cid = c.get("clientId", "<unnamed>")
+    secret = c.get("secret")
+    public = bool(c.get("publicClient"))
+    if public:
+        # (3) a PKCE public client must not carry a secret at all.
+        check(secret is None,
+              f"{IMPORT_FILE}: client '{cid}' is publicClient but declares a secret — a "
+              f"public client holds no secret; declaring one is a silent downgrade")
+        continue
+    # (1) every confidential client must declare one.
+    check(isinstance(secret, str) and secret,
+          f"{IMPORT_FILE}: confidential client '{cid}' declares NO secret. The operator "
+          f"would generate a random one that exists nowhere in git, so nothing could "
+          f"ever reconcile it and the consuming app's mirrored credential would be wrong")
+    if not isinstance(secret, str):
+        continue
+    m = PLACEHOLDER_RE.fullmatch(secret.strip())
+    check(m is not None,
+          f"{IMPORT_FILE}: client '{cid}' has a secret that is not an (env:NAME) "
+          f"placeholder. A literal secret in git violates R-IDP-04/R-SEC-01; the only "
+          f"permitted form is a placeholder resolved from the {SECRET_NAME} Secret")
+    if m is None:
+        continue
+    name = m.group(1)
+    used_placeholders.add(name)
+    # (1) the placeholder must be DEFINED. An undefined one is stored literally by the
+    #     operator, with a successful-looking import — the whole incident.
+    ph = placeholders.get(name)
+    check(ph is not None,
+          f"{IMPORT_FILE}: client '{cid}' uses placeholder '{name}' but spec.placeholders "
+          f"does not define it. The operator stores the LITERAL placeholder as the client "
+          f"secret and STILL reports the import successful (measured 2026-09-06)")
+    if ph is None:
+        continue
+    ref = (ph or {}).get("secret") or {}
+    check(ref.get("name") == SECRET_NAME,
+          f"{IMPORT_FILE}: placeholder '{name}' reads Secret '{ref.get('name')}', not "
+          f"'{SECRET_NAME}'. The reconciler mounts only {SECRET_NAME}, so a second source "
+          f"would be declared but never healed")
+    key = ref.get("key")
+    check(isinstance(key, str) and key,
+          f"{IMPORT_FILE}: placeholder '{name}' names no Secret key")
+    if not isinstance(key, str):
+        continue
+    # (2) the naming contract the reconciler derives its client set from.
+    check(key == cid + KEY_SUFFIX,
+          f"{IMPORT_FILE}: client '{cid}' reads Secret key '{key}', but the reconciler "
+          f"derives the clientId from the key name, so it MUST be "
+          f"'{cid}{KEY_SUFFIX}'. Rename the key (and the SOPS entry) or the reconciler "
+          f"would look up a client that does not exist")
+    declared_pairs[cid] = key
+
+# (2) no orphan placeholder: a defined-but-unused placeholder is dead config that will
+#     quietly rot out of sync with the Secret.
+for name in sorted(set(placeholders) - used_placeholders):
+    check(False,
+          f"{IMPORT_FILE}: spec.placeholders defines '{name}' but no client uses it — "
+          f"dead declaration; remove it or wire it to the client that needs it")
+
+# ---- the SOPS Secret: keys are cleartext in a SOPS-encrypted file; values are not.
+sops_doc = next((d for d in load(SOPS_FILE) if d and d.get("kind") == "Secret"), None)
+check(sops_doc is not None, f"{SOPS_FILE}: no Secret document found")
+sops_keys = set((sops_doc or {}).get("stringData") or {})
+check(len(sops_keys) > 0,
+      f"{SOPS_FILE}: parsed zero stringData keys — the file shape changed and this check "
+      f"would silently audit nothing")
+check((sops_doc or {}).get("metadata", {}).get("name") == SECRET_NAME,
+      f"{SOPS_FILE}: the Secret is not named {SECRET_NAME}")
+
+for cid, key in sorted(declared_pairs.items()):
+    # (1) THE DEV FAILURE, made unmergeable: a client declared in the import whose key
+    #     is absent from the Secret imports "successfully" with a literal placeholder.
+    check(key in sops_keys,
+          f"{SOPS_FILE}: client '{cid}' needs key '{key}' and it is NOT in the Secret. "
+          f"The realm import would still report SUCCESS and store the literal placeholder "
+          f"as that client's secret — this is exactly how dev's oauth2-proxy broke")
+
+# (2) no orphan Secret key: the reconciler treats every `<x>-client-secret` key as a
+#     client that MUST exist, and fails loudly if it does not. Catch it here instead.
+for key in sorted(k for k in sops_keys if k.endswith(KEY_SUFFIX)):
+    cid = key[: -len(KEY_SUFFIX)]
+    check(cid in declared_pairs,
+          f"{SOPS_FILE}: key '{key}' has no matching client in {IMPORT_FILE}. The "
+          f"reconciler would look up client '{cid}', not find it, and fail every run")
+
+# ===================================================== (4) ordering is a real Flux edge
+# Parse contract mirrors lib/status.py's flux_paths(): docs split on a lone `---`; a doc
+# is an entrypoint only if it carries the kustomize.toolkit apiVersion, `kind:
+# Kustomization` and a spec-level `path:`. Overlay `patch: |-` bodies carry Kustomizations
+# WITHOUT a path and are correctly skipped (they are patches, not entrypoints).
+_DEPENDSON_RE = re.compile(r"^(\s*)dependsOn:\s*$", re.M)
+_DEP_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:-\s*)?name:\s*([^\s#]+)")
+_WAIT_RE = re.compile(r"^\s{2,6}wait:\s*true\s*(?:#.*)?$", re.M)
+
+
+def depends_on(doc: str) -> list[str]:
+    m = _DEPENDSON_RE.search(doc)
+    if not m:
+        return []
+    indent = len(m.group(1))
+    out: list[str] = []
+    for raw in doc[m.end():].splitlines():
+        if raw.strip() == "" or raw.lstrip().startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        if len(raw) - len(raw.lstrip()) <= indent and not raw.lstrip().startswith("-"):
+            break                                    # dedented out of the list
+        nm = _DEP_NAME_RE.match(raw)
+        if nm:
+            out.append(nm.group(1))
+    return out
+
+
+kustomizations: dict[str, dict] = {}
+for yfile in sorted((ROOT / "clusters").rglob("*.yaml")):
+    text = yfile.read_text()
+    if st.FLUX_API not in text:
+        continue
+    for doc in st._DOC_SPLIT_RE.split(text):
+        if st.FLUX_API not in doc or not re.search(r"^kind:\s*Kustomization\s*$", doc, re.M):
+            continue
+        pm = st._PATH_RE.search(doc)
+        if not pm:
+            continue
+        nm = st._NAME_RE.search(doc)
+        name = nm.group(1) if nm else "?"
+        kustomizations[name] = {
+            "file": str(yfile.relative_to(ROOT)),
+            "path": pm.group(1),
+            "dependsOn": depends_on(doc),
+            "wait": bool(_WAIT_RE.search(doc)),
+        }
+
+check(len(kustomizations) > 0,
+      "no Flux Kustomization with a spec.path found under clusters/ — the parser or the "
+      "repo layout changed; this check would silently audit nothing")
+
+
+def direct_render(path_spec: str) -> set[str]:
+    """Files a Flux `spec.path` renders ITSELF — a kustomize walk that deliberately does
+    NOT expand nested Flux Kustomizations.
+
+    lib/status.py's reconciled_files() follows every `spec.path` it discovers, which is
+    right for "is this file applied to the cluster at all" but wrong for OWNERSHIP: the
+    root Kustomization's path is clusters/<env>, so a transitive walk makes the root the
+    owner of every file in the repo and the ordering assertion below becomes vacuous
+    (measured: it reported the root as an owner of all three keycloak files). `resources:`
+    parsing itself is st.kustomize_resources, not forked.
+    """
+    rel = path_spec.lstrip("./") or "."
+    out: set[str] = set()
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+
+    def walk(d: str) -> None:
+        if d in seen:
+            return
+        seen.add(d)
+        kfile = ROOT / d / "kustomization.yaml"
+        if not kfile.is_file():
+            return
+        out.add(str(kfile.relative_to(ROOT)))
+        for item in st.kustomize_resources(kfile):
+            if "://" in item:
+                continue                       # remote base: not repo state
+            target = (ROOT / d / item).resolve()
+            try:
+                trel = target.relative_to(ROOT).as_posix()
+            except ValueError:
+                continue                       # outside the repo
+            if target.is_dir():
+                walk(trel)
+            elif target.is_file():
+                out.add(trel)
+
+    if (ROOT / rel).is_dir():
+        walk(rel)
+    return out
+
+
+rendered_by = {n: direct_render(k["path"]) for n, k in kustomizations.items()}
+
+
+def owners(rel_file: str) -> list[str]:
+    return sorted(n for n, files in rendered_by.items() if rel_file in files)
+
+
+def ancestors(name: str, seen=None) -> set[str]:
+    """Transitive dependsOn closure of `name` (its dependencies, direct and indirect)."""
+    seen = seen if seen is not None else set()
+    for dep in kustomizations.get(name, {}).get("dependsOn", []):
+        if dep in seen:
+            continue
+        seen.add(dep)
+        ancestors(dep, seen)
+    return seen
+
+
+secret_owners = owners(SOPS_FILE)
+import_owners = owners(IMPORT_FILE)
+recon_owners = owners(RECON_FILE)
+
+check(bool(secret_owners),
+      f"{SOPS_FILE} is rendered by NO Flux Kustomization — the client secrets are in git "
+      f"but never applied")
+check(bool(import_owners),
+      f"{IMPORT_FILE} is rendered by NO Flux Kustomization")
+# (5) the reconciler must actually be reconciled, or it is decoration.
+check(bool(recon_owners),
+      f"{RECON_FILE} is rendered by NO Flux Kustomization — the healer would sit in git "
+      f"and never run, which is the 'looks applied and isn't' failure it exists to end")
+
+for consumer_file, consumer_owners in ((IMPORT_FILE, import_owners),
+                                       (RECON_FILE, recon_owners)):
+    for co in consumer_owners:
+        for so in secret_owners:
+            if so == co:
+                continue          # same Kustomization: one atomic apply, ordering moot
+            anc = ancestors(co)
+            check(so in anc,
+                  f"ORDERING IS ONLY DOCUMENTED: '{co}' renders {consumer_file} but does "
+                  f"not (transitively) dependsOn '{so}', which renders the "
+                  f"{SECRET_NAME} Secret. Without that edge the consumer can reconcile "
+                  f"before the secret exists, and the Keycloak Operator's response to a "
+                  f"missing placeholder is to store it LITERALLY and report success")
+            if so in anc:
+                check(kustomizations[so]["wait"],
+                      f"'{so}' (which renders the {SECRET_NAME} Secret) does not set "
+                      f"wait: true, so '{co}' can proceed before it is applied")
+
+# ------ both environments must reconcile the reconciler, not just dev.
+for env in ("dev", "prod"):
+    entry = f"clusters/{env}"
+    if not (ROOT / entry).is_dir():
+        continue
+    applied, _ = st.reconciled_files(ROOT, entry)
+    check(RECON_FILE in applied,
+          f"{RECON_FILE} is not reachable from the {entry} entrypoint — the healer would "
+          f"exist on one cluster only, and prod is where all 12 clients were broken")
+    check(IMPORT_FILE in applied, f"{IMPORT_FILE} is not reachable from {entry}")
+
+# ============================================ (5) the reconciler manifest is safe + wired
+recon_docs = [d for d in load(RECON_FILE) if d]
+cm = next((d for d in recon_docs if d.get("kind") == "ConfigMap"), None)
+cj = next((d for d in recon_docs if d.get("kind") == "CronJob"), None)
+check(cm is not None, f"{RECON_FILE}: no ConfigMap carrying the reconciler script")
+check(cj is not None, f"{RECON_FILE}: no CronJob running the reconciler")
+
+script = ""
+if cm is not None:
+    data = cm.get("data") or {}
+    check(len(data) == 1,
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: the reconciler ConfigMap must carry exactly one script key "
+          f"(found {sorted(data)}) — a second copy would be untested by this gate")
+    script = next(iter(data.values()), "")
+    check(len(script.splitlines()) > 50,
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: the extracted script is implausibly short "
+          f"({len(script.splitlines())} lines) — the ConfigMap shape changed and the "
+          f"selftest below would prove nothing")
+    # THE nextcloud TRAP. This file is rendered by a Flux Kustomization with
+    # postBuild.substituteFrom, so envsubst rewrites it before any container runs. The
+    # script is written with NO dollar sign at all, so the hazard is structural rather
+    # than escaped and no future edit has to reason about escaping.
+    check(DOLLAR not in script,
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: the reconciler script contains a dollar sign. It ships inside a "
+          f"SUBSTITUTED Flux path, where a dollar-brace expansion is rewritten at "
+          f"reconcile time (see apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml). Rewrite without it — Python "
+          f"never needs one; chr(36) spells it where a literal is genuinely required")
+
+if cj is not None:
+    pod = cj["spec"]["jobTemplate"]["spec"]["template"]["spec"]
+    ctr = pod["containers"][0]
+    vols = {v["name"]: v for v in pod.get("volumes", [])}
+    mounts = {m["name"]: m for m in ctr.get("volumeMounts", [])}
+    secret_vols = [v for v in vols.values()
+                   if (v.get("secret") or {}).get("secretName") == SECRET_NAME]
+    check(len(secret_vols) == 1,
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: the CronJob must mount the {SECRET_NAME} Secret — that mount IS "
+          f"the desired state it reconciles towards")
+    if secret_vols:
+        mp = mounts.get(secret_vols[0]["name"], {}).get("mountPath")
+        check(mp == SECRETS_MOUNT,
+              f"{RECON_FILE}: {SECRET_NAME} is mounted at {mp}, but the script defaults "
+              f"to {SECRETS_MOUNT} and no env var overrides it")
+    cm_vols = [v for v in vols.values()
+               if (v.get("configMap") or {}).get("name") == (cm or {}).get(
+                   "metadata", {}).get("name")]
+    check(len(cm_vols) == 1,
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: the CronJob does not mount the reconciler ConfigMap, so it "
+          f"would run nothing")
+    env_srcs = {e["name"]: e for e in ctr.get("env", [])}
+    for var in ("KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USER", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD"):
+        ref = (env_srcs.get(var, {}).get("valueFrom") or {}).get("secretKeyRef") or {}
+        check(ref.get("name") == ADMIN_SECRET,
+              f"{RECON_FILE}: {var} must come from the {ADMIN_SECRET} Secret "
+              f"(got {ref.get('name')!r}) — the admin credential is never inlined")
+    for var in ("KEYCLOAK_BASE_URL", "KEYCLOAK_REALM"):
+        check(env_srcs.get(var, {}).get("value"),
+              f"{RECON_FILE}: {var} is not set; the script fails closed without it, but "
+              f"the CronJob should not ship broken")
+    # R-SEC-02: it talks only to Keycloak's REST API and needs no Kubernetes API rights.
+    check(pod.get("automountServiceAccountToken") is False,
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: the reconciler needs NO Kubernetes API access (its inputs are "
+          f"mounted Secrets) — set automountServiceAccountToken: false")
+    check(cj["spec"].get("concurrencyPolicy") == "Forbid",
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: set concurrencyPolicy: Forbid so a run stalled on an "
+          f"unavailable Keycloak is not lapped by the next tick")
+    img = ctr.get("image", "")
+    check(re.search(r":[0-9]", img),
+          f"{RECON_FILE}: container image {img!r} is not pinned to an explicit version")
+
+# ============================== (6) the reconciler's BEHAVIOUR, proven by its own selftest
+if script:
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+        p = Path(td) / "reconcile.py"
+        p.write_text(script)
+        proc = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(p), "--selftest"],
+                              capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180)
+        tail = (proc.stdout + proc.stderr).strip().splitlines()
+        check(proc.returncode == 0,
+              "the reconciler's --selftest FAILED (compare-then-write / idempotence / "
+              "no-secret-logging / endpoint allow-list / fail-closed):\n        "
+              + "\n        ".join(tail[-12:]))
+        if proc.returncode == 0:
+            print("  reconciler --selftest: " + (tail[-1] if tail else "(no output)"))
+
+# ======================================================= (7) this check is load-bearing
+L0 = (ROOT / "ci" / "l0.sh").read_text() if (ROOT / "ci" / "l0.sh").is_file() else ""
+GATE = (ROOT / "ci" / "gate.sh").read_text() if (ROOT / "ci" / "gate.sh").is_file() else ""
+TOUCHED = ((ROOT / "ci" / "touched-requirements.sh").read_text()
+           if (ROOT / "ci" / "touched-requirements.sh").is_file() else "")
+check("keycloak-client-secret-reconciler/check.sh" in L0,
+      "ci/l0.sh does not run keycloak-client-secret-reconciler/check.sh — the "
+      "requirement-scoped conformance selection can filter this check out of a gate run, "
+      "so l0.sh must invoke it directly and unconditionally or the gate is not enforcing "
+      "it. An unreferenced test is the failure this whole change exists to end")
+check(re.search(r"^for s in .*\bl0\b.*; do", GATE, re.M) and re.search(r"fail\).*BLOCK=1", GATE),
+      "ci/gate.sh does not set the merge block when the l0 stage fails")
+check(re.search(r"^\s*platform/keycloak/\*\)", TOUCHED, re.M),
+      "ci/touched-requirements.sh has no platform/keycloak/* entry in its path->requirement "
+      "map, so editing the realm import or this reconciler attributes NO requirement and "
+      "the L2 keycloak tests are filtered out of the merge gate's touched subset")
+l2 = ROOT / "conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/keycloak-client-secrets-match-git/chainsaw-test.yaml"
+check(l2.is_file(),
+      "the LIVE-realm counterpart (conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/"
+      "keycloak-client-secrets-match-git) is missing — this static check cannot see a "
+      "realm that drifted after apply, which is the whole failure mode")
+if l2.is_file():
+    check("KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRETS_AUDIT_OK" in l2.read_text(),
+          "the L2 test does not assert the reconciler's audit sentinel, so it could pass "
+          "on a Job that never ran the audit")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ report
+print(f"realm import: {len(clients)} client(s), {len(declared_pairs)} confidential with a "
+      f"declared secret, {len(placeholders)} placeholder(s)")
+print(f"{SECRET_NAME} Secret: {len(sops_keys)} key(s) in git (names only; values stay "
+      f"SOPS-encrypted)")
+print("flux ordering: " + ", ".join(
+    f"{f.split('/')[-1]} <- {owners(f)}" for f in (SOPS_FILE, IMPORT_FILE, RECON_FILE)))
+
+print()
+if not FAILURES:
+    print(f"check OK: keycloak-client-secret-reconciler — {CHECKS} assertions "
+          f"(R-IDP-03, R-IDP-04)")
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+print(f"CHECK FAIL (keycloak-client-secret-reconciler): {len(FAILURES)} failed, "
+      f"{CHECKS - len(FAILURES)} passed", file=sys.stderr)
+for f in FAILURES:
+    print(f"  FAIL {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — a placeholder value in cluster-vars is REFUSED by the guard that owns it
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+#
+# THE BUG CLASS THIS CLOSES (it has now bitten three times in one file). A guard in
+# `bootstrap/standup.sh` keys on the SHAPE of a value that lives in
+# `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`, and nothing tied the two together. On 2026-09-05 the
+# S3 placeholder changed from `TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT` to
+# `https://TBD-R2-ACCOUNT-ID.r2.cloudflarestorage.com`; the three guards matched the glob
+# `TBD-*`, a PREFIX match, and `fnmatch('https://TBD-R2-…','TBD-*')` is False. All three
+# guards silently stopped matching, and `standup.sh resume` would have resumed `velero` on
+# prod against a nonexistent hostname: installs clean, reports healthy, NO BACKUPS EXIST.
+# It was found by accident. The guard is fixed (`s3_is_placeholder`, substring); the
+# COUPLING was untested, which is what makes the class reintroducible.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# WHEN  the REAL predicate is extracted from bootstrap/standup.sh and executed by bash
+#       (never reimplemented — see check.sh "HOW THE REAL GUARD IS EXERCISED"),
+# THEN  (1) every authored value of a guarded knob that is placeholder-shaped by an
+#           INDEPENDENT detector is actually refused by that guard, in base and in every
+#           environment overlay;
+#       (2) no environment overlay carries a placeholder-shaped value for a knob no guard
+#           refuses;
+#       (3) every function in standup.sh that reads a guarded knob applies the guard to it
+#           (the "three guards died at once" regression);
+#       (4) the guard matches its own vocabulary ANYWHERE in a value, not just as a prefix
+#           — the exact anchoring defect above — and still accepts a real endpoint;
+#   AND (5) the extraction is faithful, and the check fails LOUDLY rather than silently
+#           testing a copy if the guard stops being a self-contained predicate.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (standard library +
+# PyYAML + bash); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 runs it directly and this Chainsaw Test
+# wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# NOT proven: that the endpoint is REACHABLE or that backups exist (runtime facts —
+# `standup.sh s3check` probes the former from a pod, l3-fault-injection/dr-restore proves
+# the latter); that guards for knobs OTHER than the placeholder-refusing ones are correct;
+# and that the guard runs at all in a real standup (the dispatch path is shell, executed
+# only against a live cluster). R-STATE-03 is tagged for the narrow static slice only: the
+# authored backup target cannot be a placeholder that the guard fails to recognise.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: placeholder-guard-coupling
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-ENV-02: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-STATE-03: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-ENV-02, R-STATE-03"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Every placeholder-shaped value authored in cluster-vars, for any environment
+      overlay, is actually recognised as a placeholder by the real bootstrap guard that
+      is supposed to refuse it — so a value change in one file cannot silently disarm a
+      guard in another and enable velero against an endpoint that does not exist.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: couple-authored-placeholders-to-the-real-guard
+      description: >-
+        Extract the real placeholder predicate from bootstrap/standup.sh, run it against
+        every authored cluster-vars value the repo actually carries, and assert the guard
+        refuses each one an independent detector calls a placeholder.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — placeholder-guard-coupling
+# Serves: R-ENV-02 ("Same GitOps config promotes dev/test -> prod (authored once)."
+#                   — spec docs/02-environments-and-provisioning.md)
+#         R-STATE-03 ("Scheduled off-cluster backups + restore (DR)."
+#                   — spec docs/04-storage-and-state.md)
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS — A GUARD KEYED ON A VALUE THAT LIVES IN ANOTHER FILE
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------
+# `bootstrap/standup.sh` refuses to resume tiers whose configuration is still a
+# placeholder. Three of those guards keyed on the SHAPE of `S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT`, which is
+# authored in `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`. On 2026-09-05 the placeholder changed
+# from `TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT` to `https://TBD-R2-ACCOUNT-ID.r2.cloudflarestorage.com`
+# (the MinIO -> Cloudflare R2 move). The guards matched the glob `TBD-*` — a PREFIX match —
+# and `fnmatch('https://TBD-R2-…','TBD-*')` is FALSE. All three guards silently stopped
+# matching. `standup.sh resume` would then have resumed `velero` on prod against a hostname
+# that does not exist: the HelmRelease installs clean, the Kustomization reports Ready, and
+# NO BACKUPS EXIST. The only reason it was not shipped is that someone noticed by accident.
+#
+# The predicate is fixed (`s3_is_placeholder`, substring match). The COUPLING is what was
+# never tested: a guard in one file keying on a value in another, with nothing tying them
+# together. This check is that tie, and it is derived from BOTH real files — no current
+# string is hardcoded here, so it does not rot when the placeholder or the guard changes.
+#
+# HOW THE REAL GUARD IS EXERCISED (and why not a copy)
+# ---------------------------------------------------
+# `bootstrap/standup.sh` is NOT sourceable: at top level it parses argv, hard-exits when
+# --kubeconfig/--expect-server/<step> are absent, `cd`s to the repo root, exports
+# KUBECONFIG, installs an EXIT trap and finally dispatches steps against a live cluster.
+# So this check EXTRACTS the predicate's own source lines from the file and sources ONLY
+# those, then calls the real function. That is the real bytes, not a reimplementation:
+#   * every function whose name ends `_is_placeholder` is discovered, not named here;
+#   * a duplicate definition of one is a failure (which of the two would run?);
+#   * the extracted body must be a SELF-CONTAINED predicate — `case`/`return` and nothing
+#     else, no command substitution, no call to another function. If the guard ever grows
+#     a dependency, extraction stops being faithful and THIS CHECK FAILS LOUDLY, naming the
+#     remedy (move the predicate into a small sourceable library that standup.sh sources)
+#     rather than quietly falling back to testing a copy of the logic;
+#   * a CANARY pins the extraction itself: the extracted function must refuse the empty
+#     string and accept a realistic endpoint. An extraction that grabbed the wrong lines,
+#     or a predicate degraded to always-true / always-false, fails there — this repo has
+#     already been bitten by a check that passed when perturbed because it asked a question
+#     that was always satisfiable.
+# There is deliberately NO second implementation of the matching logic anywhere in this file.
+#
+# THE INDEPENDENT DETECTOR (the other half of the comparison)
+# ----------------------------------------------------------
+# Asking "does the guard agree with the guard?" proves nothing, so the set of
+# placeholder-shaped values is decided by a detector written HERE, whose vocabulary is the
+# UNION of two independent sources:
+#   * SEED — universal loud-placeholder idioms (TBD, TODO, FIXME, PLACEHOLDER, REPLACE-ME,
+#     CHANGE-ME, FILL-ME, SET-ME, XXXX), plus `<angle-bracket>` templates and the empty
+#     string. These are NOT derived from the guard, so DELETING a guard arm cannot make a
+#     value stop being placeholder-shaped — it makes assertion (1) fail, which is the point.
+#     A value using an idiom the guard does not know is a finding either way: fix it by
+#     giving the knob a real value, or by teaching the guard the idiom.
+#   * the guard's OWN vocabulary, read out of its case-arms with the glob anchors STRIPPED.
+#     Stripping the anchors is what makes the comparison non-circular in the dimension that
+#     actually broke: the detector matches a word ANYWHERE, case-insensitively, and the
+#     guard must agree. A prefix-anchored guard cannot pass.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as authored,
+# WHEN  the real predicate(s) are extracted from bootstrap/standup.sh and executed,
+# THEN  (1) VALUES: for every knob a guard is responsible for, every authored value — the
+#           base default AND each environment overlay's value — that the independent
+#           detector calls placeholder-shaped is REFUSED by the real guard, and every value
+#           it calls usable is ACCEPTED (a guard that refuses a real endpoint leaves velero
+#           suspended forever, which is the same class of silent failure);
+#       (2) OVERLAYS: no environment overlay's EFFECTIVE cluster-vars carries a
+#           placeholder-shaped value for a knob that no guard refuses. (Base alone is
+#           exempt: it is not a bootstrap target — `flux bootstrap --path=clusters/<env>` —
+#           and its loud sentinels exist precisely to be overridden. A base placeholder an
+#           overlay forgets to override IS caught, because it becomes that overlay's
+#           effective value.)
+#       (3) CONSUMERS: every function in standup.sh that reads a guarded knob (via `cvar`,
+#           following one hop of variable aliasing) applies a placeholder guard to it. This
+#           is the "all three guards died at once" regression stated as a property: the
+#           guard being correct is worthless if a consumer stops calling it.
+#       (4) ANCHORING: for each word in the guard's own vocabulary, the guard refuses a
+#           value carrying that word in the MIDDLE (not at the start) — the precise defect
+#           of 2026-09-05 — while still accepting a realistic endpoint.
+#       (5) HARNESS: exactly one definition per predicate, the extracted body is verbatim
+#           from the file and self-contained, the canary holds, no divergent second copy of
+#           the matching logic exists elsewhere in standup.sh, and a floor on the number of
+#           assertions run keeps a pass from degenerating into a no-op.
+#   AND (6) LOAD-BEARING: ci/l0.sh runs the L0 conformance layer on every gate run and
+#           ci/gate.sh sets the merge block when that stage fails.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps)
+#   - Nothing about RUNTIME: not that the endpoint resolves, not that credentials work, not
+#     that a backup exists. `standup.sh s3check` probes reachability from a pod (operator-
+#     run, cluster-gated) and conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/dr-restore proves restore.
+#   - It does not execute standup.sh's dispatch path, so it cannot prove the guard is
+#     REACHED in a real run — only that, when reached, it refuses what it must. The
+#     consumer property (3) is a static approximation of reachability: it is a text-level
+#     taint trace over one file, not an interpreter, and a guard whose result is computed
+#     and then ignored would satisfy it.
+#   - It says nothing about guards keyed on shapes OTHER than placeholders (e.g. the
+#     EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID == 'default' test), nor about placeholder-shaped values
+#     outside cluster-vars (the Ansible inventory's BLOCKED/NOT-A-DEVICE sentinels are
+#     asserted by the node_baseline role itself, at play time).
+#   - Stage 3b of ci/l0.sh scopes the conformance run to the TOUCHED requirements. An edit
+#     to bootstrap/* attributes NO requirement in ci/touched-requirements.sh's path map, so
+#     the touched set is empty and the FULL L0 layer runs (verified: ci/lib.sh
+#     load_touched_requirements) — this check runs. An edit to clusters/* maps to
+#     R-ENV-02, which this check carries, so a cluster-vars value change also selects it.
+#     A change that touches standup.sh ALONGSIDE some unrelated mapped path (say
+#     platform/cilium/) would scope the run away from this check; closing that needs a
+#     `bootstrap/*` entry in the path map, which is not this check's file to edit.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+STANDUP_REL="${STANDUP_REL:-bootstrap/standup.sh}"
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+
+if [ ! -f "${ROOT}/${STANDUP_REL}" ]; then
+  echo "check SKIPPED (placeholder-guard-coupling): ${STANDUP_REL} is absent — nothing to couple." >&2
+  exit 3
+fi
+
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "${WORK}"' EXIT
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PHASE 1 (python): extract the real predicate(s), derive the corpus from the real files,
+# and run every assertion that does not need a shell. Writes:
+#   ${WORK}/guards.sh     the predicate source lines, verbatim, and nothing else
+#   ${WORK}/corpus.tsv    <guard>\t<expect: placeholder|usable>\t<origin>\t<value>
+#   ${WORK}/findings.txt  one line per failed assertion
+#   ${WORK}/counts.txt    <assertions-run>
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" "${WORK}" "${STANDUP_REL}" <<'PY'
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT, WORK, STANDUP_REL = Path(sys.argv[1]), Path(sys.argv[2]), sys.argv[3]
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def bail(msg):
+    """A failure that makes the rest of the check meaningless: report and stop."""
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (placeholder-guard-coupling): {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
+    (WORK / "findings.txt").write_text(msg + "\n")
+    (WORK / "counts.txt").write_text("0\n")
+    (WORK / "corpus.tsv").write_text("")
+    (WORK / "guards.sh").write_text("")
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+
+TEXT = (ROOT / STANDUP_REL).read_text()
+LINES = TEXT.splitlines()
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------ (5) extract the guard
+DEF_RE = re.compile(r"^([a-z0-9_]+_is_placeholder)\(\)\s*\{")
+defs: dict[str, list[int]] = {}
+for i, line in enumerate(LINES):
+    m = DEF_RE.match(line)
+    if m:
+        defs.setdefault(m.group(1), []).append(i)
+
+if not defs:
+    bail(f"{STANDUP_REL} defines no *_is_placeholder predicate. Either the guard was renamed "
+         "(update this check's discovery pattern in the SAME change) or it was DELETED, which "
+         "is the 2026-09-05 failure with the guard removed instead of disarmed.")
+
+# An "argument-shaped" call: <name> "<something>"
+CALL_RE = re.compile(r"\b([a-z0-9_]+_is_placeholder)\s+\"([^\"]*)\"")
+
+guard_src: list[str] = []
+guard_words: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+ARM_RE = re.compile(r"^(?P<pats>[^()]*?)\)\s*return\s+[01]\s*;;$")
+ALLOWED = (
+    re.compile(r"^$"),
+    re.compile(r"^#"),
+    re.compile(r"^case\s+\"\$\{?[0-9A-Za-z_]+\}?\"\s+in$"),
+    re.compile(r"^esac$"),
+    re.compile(r"^return\s+[01]$"),
+    ARM_RE,
+)
+
+for name, at in sorted(defs.items()):
+    check(len(at) == 1,
+          f"{STANDUP_REL} defines {name}() {len(at)} times (lines "
+          f"{', '.join(str(a + 1) for a in at)}) — which one runs depends on file order, and "
+          "this check can no longer say which one it extracted. Keep exactly one definition.")
+    if len(at) != 1:
+        continue
+    start = at[0]
+    end = next((j for j in range(start + 1, len(LINES)) if LINES[j] == "}"), None)
+    if end is None:
+        bail(f"{name}() at {STANDUP_REL}:{start + 1} has no closing brace at column 0 — the "
+             "extraction boundary this check relies on is gone. Restore the conventional "
+             "layout, or move the predicate into a sourceable library and point this check at it.")
+    body = LINES[start:end + 1]
+    block = "\n".join(body)
+    check(block in TEXT,
+          f"extracted {name}() is not a verbatim substring of {STANDUP_REL} — extraction bug; "
+          "the harness would be testing something the script does not contain")
+
+    words: list[str] = []
+    for raw in body[1:-1]:
+        s = raw.strip()
+        if not any(rx.match(s) for rx in ALLOWED) or "$(" in s or "`" in s:
+            bail(f"{name}() at {STANDUP_REL}:{start + 1} is no longer a SELF-CONTAINED "
+                 f"case/return predicate (offending line: {s!r}). This check exercises the REAL "
+                 "function by sourcing its own lines; a body that calls out to anything else "
+                 "cannot be extracted faithfully, and silently testing a COPY of the logic is "
+                 "exactly the failure mode this check exists to prevent. REMEDY: move the "
+                 "predicate into a tiny library that standup.sh sources (e.g. "
+                 "bootstrap/lib/placeholder.sh) and point STANDUP_REL/this extractor at it — do "
+                 "NOT reimplement the matching here.")
+        m = ARM_RE.match(s)
+        if not m:
+            continue
+        for pat in m.group("pats").split("|"):
+            pat = pat.strip()
+            if pat in ('""', "''", ""):
+                continue                      # the empty-value arm: covered by the canary
+            words.append(pat.strip("'\"").strip("*"))
+    check(len(words) >= 1,
+          f"{name}() has no non-empty placeholder pattern left — every arm that recognises a "
+          "loud placeholder string has been removed, so the guard now only refuses the empty "
+          "value and any 'TBD'-style endpoint would sail straight through it")
+    guard_words[name] = words
+    guard_src.append(block)
+
+(WORK / "guards.sh").write_text("\n".join(guard_src) + "\n")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------- no divergent second copy of the logic
+# Any of the guard's own vocabulary appearing in EXECUTABLE text outside the predicate means
+# a second, independently-drifting implementation of the same test (which is how three
+# guards came to disagree with one value in the first place).
+guard_line_nums = {j for name, at in defs.items() if len(at) == 1
+                   for j in range(at[0], next(k for k in range(at[0] + 1, len(LINES))
+                                              if LINES[k] == "}") + 1)}
+all_words = sorted({w.upper() for ws in guard_words.values() for w in ws if w})
+divergent: list[str] = []
+for j, line in enumerate(LINES):
+    if j in guard_line_nums or line.strip().startswith("#"):
+        continue
+    code = line.split("#", 1)[0]
+    hit = [w for w in all_words if w in code.upper()]
+    if hit:
+        divergent.append(f"{STANDUP_REL}:{j + 1} ({', '.join(hit)}): {line.strip()!r}")
+check(not divergent,
+      "the guard's own placeholder vocabulary appears in EXECUTABLE text outside the "
+      f"predicate — a SECOND implementation of the same test, which is precisely how a value "
+      f"change disarmed three guards at once. Call the predicate instead. Sites: "
+      + " | ".join(divergent))
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------- cluster-vars, as authored
+CV = ROOT / "clusters" / "base" / "cluster-vars.yaml"
+if not CV.is_file():
+    bail("clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml is absent — the authored half of the coupling is "
+         "missing and this check cannot mean anything")
+
+base: dict[str, str] = {}
+for d in yaml.safe_load_all(CV.read_text()):
+    if isinstance(d, dict) and d.get("kind") == "ConfigMap" \
+            and (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") == "cluster-vars":
+        base = {str(k): "" if v is None else str(v) for k, v in (d.get("data") or {}).items()}
+check(len(base) > 5, f"clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml yielded {len(base)} knob(s) — the "
+                     "ConfigMap parse failed, so every value assertion below would be vacuous")
+
+overlays: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {}
+for overlay in sorted((ROOT / "clusters").glob("*/kustomization.yaml")):
+    env = overlay.parent.name
+    if env == "base":
+        continue
+    eff = dict(base)
+    try:
+        k = yaml.safe_load(overlay.read_text()) or {}
+    except Exception as exc:                                   # noqa: BLE001
+        check(False, f"clusters/{env}/kustomization.yaml does not parse as YAML ({exc}) — this "
+                     "check cannot compute that overlay's effective values")
+        continue
+    for p in (k.get("patches") or []):
+        tgt = p.get("target") or {}
+        if tgt.get("kind") != "ConfigMap" or tgt.get("name") != "cluster-vars":
+            continue
+        try:
+            ops = yaml.safe_load(p.get("patch") or "") or []
+        except Exception:                                      # noqa: BLE001
+            continue
+        for op in ops if isinstance(ops, list) else []:
+            if not isinstance(op, dict):
+                continue
+            m = re.match(r"^/data/([A-Za-z0-9_]+)$", str(op.get("path", "")))
+            if m and str(op.get("op", "")) in ("replace", "add"):
+                eff[m.group(1)] = "" if op.get("value") is None else str(op["value"])
+    overlays[env] = eff
+check(len(overlays) >= 1,
+      "no clusters/<env>/kustomization.yaml overlay was parsed — assertion (2) would be vacuous")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------ which knobs is a guard responsible for?
+# Function bodies of standup.sh, then a one-hop taint trace from `x="$(cvar KEY)"` to a
+# `*_is_placeholder "${x}"` call. Both halves are read out of the file; nothing is named here.
+FUNC_RE = re.compile(r"^([a-z0-9_]+)\(\)\s*\{")
+funcs: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+i = 0
+while i < len(LINES):
+    m = FUNC_RE.match(LINES[i])
+    if m:
+        end = next((j for j in range(i + 1, len(LINES)) if LINES[j] == "}"), len(LINES) - 1)
+        funcs[m.group(1)] = LINES[i + 1:end]
+        i = end + 1
+        continue
+    i += 1
+check(len(funcs) > 5, f"parsed only {len(funcs)} function(s) out of {STANDUP_REL} — the "
+                      "consumer assertion (3) would be vacuous")
+
+CVAR_RE = re.compile(r"([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=\"\$\(\s*cvar\s+([A-Z0-9_]+)\s*\)\"")
+ALIAS_RE = re.compile(r"([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=\"\$\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)[:}]")
+
+guarded_keys: set[str] = set()
+consumers: list[tuple[str, str, bool]] = []      # (func, key, guarded-in-this-func)
+for fname, body in funcs.items():
+    text = "\n".join(body)
+    keys_of_var: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
+    for m in CVAR_RE.finditer(text):
+        keys_of_var.setdefault(m.group(1), set()).add(m.group(2))
+    # one hop of aliasing: ep="${live}" carries live's taint
+    for _ in range(3):
+        for m in ALIAS_RE.finditer(text):
+            src = keys_of_var.get(m.group(2))
+            if src:
+                keys_of_var.setdefault(m.group(1), set()).update(src)
+    called_on = {m.group(2) for m in CALL_RE.finditer(text)}
+    called_vars = {re.sub(r"^\$\{?|\}?$", "", a) for a in called_on}
+    # Aggregate per (function, knob): the knob is guarded HERE if ANY variable carrying its
+    # value is passed to a predicate — `live="$(cvar K)"; ep="${live}"; guard "${ep}"` counts.
+    guarded_here: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    for var, keys in keys_of_var.items():
+        for key in keys:
+            guarded_here[key] = guarded_here.get(key, False) or (var in called_vars)
+    for key, g in guarded_here.items():
+        consumers.append((fname, key, g))
+        if g:
+            guarded_keys.add(key)
+
+if not guarded_keys:
+    bail(f"no cluster-vars knob in {STANDUP_REL} is passed to a *_is_placeholder predicate. "
+         "Either the guards were removed, or the way the script reads cluster-vars changed and "
+         "this check's derivation must be updated in the SAME change — it must never silently "
+         "verify an empty set.")
+
+# (3) CONSUMERS: every reader of a guarded knob must apply the guard to it.
+for fname, key, guarded in sorted(consumers):
+    if key not in guarded_keys:
+        continue                       # nothing claims responsibility for this knob at all
+    check(guarded,
+          f"{STANDUP_REL}: {fname}() reads cluster-vars knob {key} but never passes it to a "
+          "*_is_placeholder guard, while other functions do. On 2026-09-05 all three consumers "
+          "of S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT were disarmed at once; a consumer that reads the knob and skips "
+          "the guard is that failure in one function.")
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- independent detector
+# Deliberately NOT derived from the guard alone (see the header): SEED is universal
+# loud-placeholder vocabulary, and the guard's own words are added so that a guard whose
+# ANCHORING is wrong still has its vocabulary tested against real values.
+SEED = ["TBD", "TODO", "FIXME", "PLACEHOLDER", "REPLACE-ME", "REPLACEME",
+        "CHANGE-ME", "CHANGEME", "FILL-ME", "FILLME", "SET-ME", "XXXX"]
+VOCAB = sorted({w.upper() for w in SEED} | set(all_words))
+ANGLE = re.compile(r"<[^>\s]+>")
+
+
+def placeholder_shaped(value: str) -> bool:
+    if value.strip() == "":
+        return True                                   # an unset endpoint is not a target
+    up = value.upper()
+    return any(w in up for w in VOCAB) or bool(ANGLE.search(value))
+
+
+rows: list[tuple[str, str, str, str]] = []            # guard, expect, origin, value
+GUARD = sorted(guard_words)[0] if len(guard_words) == 1 else None
+
+# (1) VALUES: base default and every overlay's value, for every guarded knob.
+for key in sorted(guarded_keys):
+    seen: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    if key in base:
+        seen.append((f"clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml:{key}", base[key]))
+    for env, eff in sorted(overlays.items()):
+        seen.append((f"clusters/{env} effective:{key}", eff.get(key, "")))
+    check(bool(seen), f"guarded knob {key} is not defined in cluster-vars at all — the guard "
+                      "protects a knob nothing authors")
+    for origin, value in seen:
+        expect = "placeholder" if placeholder_shaped(value) else "usable"
+        for name in sorted(guard_words):
+            rows.append((name, expect, origin, value))
+
+# (2) OVERLAYS: a placeholder-shaped effective value for an UNGUARDED knob.
+for env, eff in sorted(overlays.items()):
+    for key, value in sorted(eff.items()):
+        if key in guarded_keys or not placeholder_shaped(value):
+            continue
+        check(False,
+              f"clusters/{env}: knob {key} resolves to the placeholder-shaped value {value!r}, "
+              f"and NO guard in {STANDUP_REL} refuses it. Either give it a real value before it "
+              "reaches an overlay, or guard it the way the S3 endpoint is guarded — an overlay "
+              "that ships a placeholder no guard recognises is the 2026-09-05 failure with a "
+              "different knob's name on it.")
+
+# (4) ANCHORING: the guard's own vocabulary must match ANYWHERE, not just as a prefix,
+#     and a realistic endpoint must still be accepted.
+for name, words in sorted(guard_words.items()):
+    for w in sorted(set(words)):
+        rows.append((name, "placeholder",
+                     f"anchoring:{name}:mid-string({w})",
+                     f"https://account-{w}-id.r2.cloudflarestorage.com"))
+        rows.append((name, "placeholder", f"anchoring:{name}:tail({w})",
+                     f"https://r2-endpoint.example.invalid/{w}"))
+    rows.append((name, "placeholder", f"canary:{name}:empty", ""))
+    rows.append((name, "usable", f"canary:{name}:real-r2",
+                 "https://0123456789abcdef0123456789abcd.r2.cloudflarestorage.com"))
+    rows.append((name, "usable", f"canary:{name}:real-minio", "http://192.168.1.9:9000"))
+
+# Every guarded knob must reach the oracle once per authored source (base + each overlay),
+# so a knob silently dropping out of the corpus is a failure rather than a quiet pass.
+authored = [r for r in rows if not r[2].startswith(("anchoring:", "canary:"))]
+expected_rows = len(guarded_keys) * (1 + len(overlays)) * len(guard_words)
+check(len(authored) == expected_rows,
+      f"{len(authored)} authored value(s) reached the guard, expected {expected_rows} "
+      f"({len(guarded_keys)} guarded knob(s) x base+{len(overlays)} overlay(s) x "
+      f"{len(guard_words)} predicate(s)) — a guarded knob is missing from cluster-vars or from "
+      "an overlay's effective values, and the coupling is only partly exercised")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------- (6) the check is load-bearing
+L0 = (ROOT / "ci" / "l0.sh").read_text() if (ROOT / "ci" / "l0.sh").is_file() else ""
+GATE = (ROOT / "ci" / "gate.sh").read_text() if (ROOT / "ci" / "gate.sh").is_file() else ""
+check("--layer l0" in L0,
+      "ci/l0.sh does not run the L0 conformance layer — this check would never execute in the gate")
+check(bool(re.search(r"^for s in .*\bl0\b.*; do", GATE, re.M)) and bool(re.search(r"fail\).*BLOCK=1", GATE)),
+      "ci/gate.sh does not set the merge block when the l0 stage fails")
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- handoff
+with (WORK / "corpus.tsv").open("w") as fh:
+    for name, expect, origin, value in rows:
+        fh.write(f"{name}\t{expect}\t{origin}\t{value}\n")
+(WORK / "findings.txt").write_text("".join(f"{f}\n" for f in FAILURES))
+(WORK / "counts.txt").write_text(f"{CHECKS}\n")
+
+print(f"guards: {', '.join(sorted(guard_words))}  "
+      f"vocabulary: {', '.join(VOCAB)}")
+print(f"guarded knobs: {', '.join(sorted(guarded_keys))}  "
+      f"consumers traced: {len(consumers)}  overlays: {', '.join(sorted(overlays))}")
+for name, expect, origin, value in rows:
+    if not origin.startswith(("anchoring:", "canary:")):
+        print(f"  authored  {origin} = {value!r} -> expect {expect}")
+PY
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PHASE 2 (bash): source the REAL predicate lines and run the corpus through them.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# shellcheck disable=SC1090,SC1091
+source "${WORK}/guards.sh"
+
+oracle_failures=0
+oracle_rows=0
+while IFS=$'\t' read -r guard expect origin value; do
+  [ -n "${guard}" ] || continue
+  oracle_rows=$((oracle_rows + 1))
+  if "${guard}" "${value}"; then verdict=placeholder; else verdict=usable; fi
+  if [ "${verdict}" != "${expect}" ]; then
+    oracle_failures=$((oracle_failures + 1))
+    if [ "${expect}" = placeholder ]; then
+      printf '%s\n' "${guard}() in ${STANDUP_REL} ACCEPTS '${value}' (from ${origin}) as a usable value, but it is placeholder-shaped. This is the 2026-09-05 failure exactly: the guard is asked about a value it does not recognise, returns 'fine', and the tier it protects is enabled against something that does not exist. Fix the predicate (match the idiom anywhere, not as a prefix) or stop authoring that idiom." >> "${WORK}/findings.txt"
+    else
+      printf '%s\n' "${guard}() in ${STANDUP_REL} REFUSES '${value}' (from ${origin}), which is a usable value. An over-matching guard leaves the tier it protects suspended forever and reports it as an operator decision — a silent failure in the other direction." >> "${WORK}/findings.txt"
+    fi
+  fi
+done < "${WORK}/corpus.tsv"
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ verdict
+py_checks="$(cat "${WORK}/counts.txt")"
+total=$((py_checks + oracle_rows))
+findings="$(cat "${WORK}/findings.txt")"
+
+# NO-OP GUARD: this repo has been bitten by a check that passed when perturbed because it
+# asked a question that was always satisfiable. The floors below are the minimum evidence
+# for the verdict to mean anything, not a style rule.
+if [ "${oracle_rows}" -lt 6 ]; then
+  findings="${findings}only ${oracle_rows} value(s) were put to the real guard — the coupling is not actually being exercised
+"
+fi
+if [ "${total}" -lt 20 ]; then
+  findings="${findings}only ${total} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op and its pass would be meaningless
+"
+fi
+
+if [ -n "${findings}" ]; then
+  echo "CHECK FAIL (placeholder-guard-coupling): $(printf '%s' "${findings}" | grep -c . ) of ${total} assertions failed" >&2
+  printf '%s' "${findings}" | sed 's/^/  - /' >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "check OK: placeholder-guard-coupling — ${total} assertions; ${oracle_rows} value(s) run through the REAL extracted predicate(s) from ${STANDUP_REL} (no reimplementation), covering every authored cluster-vars value of every guarded knob in base and each overlay, the guard's own vocabulary matched mid-string, and the empty/real-endpoint canaries. Static slice only: refusal, not reachability — see the header."
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — prod is bare metal, and is not a development surface  (R-ENV-03) [EXECUTABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-ENV-03 ("prod is a 3× mini-PC bare-metal k3s cluster with local
+#          storage; it MUST NOT be an active development surface until the roadmap
+#          declares it ready"); docs/02 (prod = 3 physical nodes, local SSD/NVMe to
+#          Longhorn, "the *same* Ansible bootstrap runs; only the machine-creation step
+#          differs", "Never develop against prod"); roadmap/phases.md Phase 7.
+#
+# HOW A "MUST NOT" IS MADE TESTABLE — the same discipline as R-TEST-06's test: a
+# governance rule is verified through the property that ENFORCES it, never by observing
+# that nobody misbehaved today. Here that property is structural: prod receives the base
+# configuration plus environment-scoped overrides and nothing else, from the same branch
+# and the same Ansible code as dev, so there is no place to put prod-only work at all.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC: the prod inventory group is DERIVED (it is the group whose
+# group_vars retargets the k3s roles away from the global default), the prod overlay is
+# derived from CLUSTER_ENV, and the storage/replica expectations are compared against the
+# node count that inventory resolves to. No hostname, address or environment name is
+# written into the test.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it (plus the read-only spec repo when mounted),
+# WHEN  the prod inventory, overlay, IaC module and readiness record are inspected — and
+#       the shared provisioning chain is actually retargeted at prod with --list-hosts,
+# THEN  prod resolves to exactly three nodes reached directly on their own sshd; no IaC
+#       resource creates any of them (bare metal is imaged, not instantiated); prod's
+#       Longhorn path is node-local with one replica per node and the default
+#       StorageClass is the local driver; prod runs the same playbooks/roles as dev,
+#       retargeted only by variables the shared code already defines; the prod overlay
+#       carries only the base plus environment-scoped patches on the same Git ref dev
+#       tracks, with no prod-only manifest anywhere in the shared configuration; and prod
+#       artifacts exist only alongside the operator's recorded opening of the prod phase.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git, PyYAML, and —
+# where present — ansible-playbook in --list-hosts mode, which opens no connection);
+# conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it directly, and this Chainsaw Test
+# wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (enumerated in check.sh's header; this test claims none of them):
+#   * THE HARDWARE. That the three machines are mini-PCs, are bare metal, and hold local
+#     SSD/NVMe is operator-attested (infra/PROD-STANDUP.md, PROD-PROVISIONING.md); the
+#     node-health/BIOS surveys that establish it write to gitignored artifacts, and the
+#     Kubernetes API exposes no "am I virtual" fact, so nothing here asserts it.
+#   * The LIVE prod cluster's shape (three Ready nodes, all control-plane+etcd, Longhorn
+#     disks at the local path) — cluster state, belonging to R-PLAT-01's still-uncovered
+#     HA test; asserting it here would also make this test environment-specific, since
+#     the same suite must pass against dev.
+#   * Git HISTORY: this is the working tree at HEAD.
+#   * Whether the roadmap SHOULD have opened prod — only that prod work is accompanied by
+#     the recorded declaration.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-ENV-03: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-ENV-03"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given the tracked tree, when prod's inventory, overlay, IaC and readiness record are
+      inspected, then prod is authored as three bare-metal nodes with node-local storage,
+      bootstrapped by dev's own code retargeted by variables, receiving only
+      environment-scoped overrides on the same branch — so there is nowhere to develop
+      against prod — and it exists only because the roadmap phase was opened.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: then-prod-is-bare-metal-and-carries-no-development-of-its-own
+      description: >-
+        Run the offline assertion script over the tracked tree (same script ci/l0.sh and
+        conformance/run.sh --layer l0 execute).
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,691 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface
+# Serves: R-ENV-03 ("prod is a 3× mini-PC bare-metal k3s cluster with local storage; it
+#         MUST NOT be an active development surface until the roadmap declares it ready."
+#         — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md. Detail in docs/02: prod substrate "3× mini-PC
+#         bare metal", "3 physical nodes", storage "local SSD/NVMe presented to Longhorn",
+#         "For prod bare-metal, the *same* Ansible bootstrap runs; only the machine-creation
+#         step differs", and "**Never develop against prod.** Prod hardware is a target, not
+#         a sandbox (R-ENV-03)". The roadmap gate is roadmap/phases.md Phase 7: entry
+#         "operator declares prod hardware ready"; note "Do not begin building on prod
+#         hardware before this phase is explicitly opened".)
+#
+# HOW A "MUST NOT" IS MADE TESTABLE
+# --------------------------------
+# The second clause is a governance rule, and the same discipline applies as to R-TEST-06
+# (tests/l0-static/spec-immutability-enforced): "nobody developed against prod today"
+# cannot be observed, but the PROPERTY THAT MAKES DEVELOPING AGAINST PROD IMPOSSIBLE can
+# be. In this repo that property is structural — prod receives the base configuration plus
+# environment-scoped overrides and NOTHING ELSE, so there is no place to put prod-only work
+# even if someone wanted to. This check asserts that, together with the first clause's
+# authored facts (three nodes, no VM IaC behind them, node-local storage, the same
+# bootstrap code as dev).
+#
+# The first clause's HARDWARE facts (that the three machines really are mini-PCs, really
+# are bare metal, really hold local NVMe) are operator-attested, not machine-checkable —
+# see the gap list. What IS checkable is that the repository describes prod that way and
+# that no IaC creates prod nodes as virtual machines.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it (plus the read-only spec repo when mounted),
+# WHEN  the prod inventory, the prod overlay, the IaC module and the roadmap record are
+#       inspected — and, where offline execution is possible, the provisioning chain is
+#       actually retargeted at prod with `--list-hosts`,
+# THEN  (1) prod resolves to EXACTLY THREE nodes, reached directly on their own sshd
+#           (no NAT indirection, i.e. real machines on the LAN);
+#       (2) NO IaC resource creates any prod node: the VM module's generated node names are
+#           disjoint from the prod host set and no prod hostname appears anywhere under
+#           infra/tofu — prod is imaged by the operator (docs/02 stage 1), not instantiated;
+#       (3) prod's storage is NODE-LOCAL: the Longhorn data path for prod is an absolute
+#           local path, and the replica count equals the node count (one replica per node's
+#           own disk). A distinct bulk/media tier is explicitly permitted (R-STATE-04) and
+#           is not counted against this;
+#       (4) prod runs THE SAME bootstrap code as dev: the same playbooks/roles, retargeted
+#           by variables only — every prod group_vars key is an existing role/global
+#           variable (an invented prod-only knob would be a fork), and no prod-only role
+#           or playbook exists;
+#       (5) prod is NOT a development surface: clusters/prod carries only the base plus
+#           sync.yaml, every patch it applies targets an ENVIRONMENT-SCOPED object
+#           (cluster-vars, a Flux Kustomization's sops decryption, or the Git source),
+#           prod's Git ref is the SAME ref dev tracks (no prod-only branch to develop on),
+#           and no prod-only manifest exists anywhere in the rendered configuration — a file
+#           whose NAME carries the environment token is excused ONLY when the tree proves it
+#           is an OVERLAY-SELECTED half that every environment applies (see the four
+#           conditions at "THE ONE STRUCTURAL EXCEPTION" below); anything else still fails;
+#       (6) prod artifacts exist only WITH a declaration of readiness: the spec roadmap
+#           carries the phase that opens prod build (checked when the spec repo is mounted),
+#           and the repository records that the operator opened it.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this test as claiming them):
+#   - The HARDWARE. That the three nodes are mini-PCs, are bare metal, and present local
+#     SSD/NVMe is operator-attested in infra/PROD-STANDUP.md / PROD-PROVISIONING.md; the
+#     node-health and BIOS surveys that establish it write to gitignored artifacts, so
+#     nothing tracked can be asserted against. Cluster-side, the Kubernetes API exposes no
+#     "am I virtual" fact either — a bare-metal check would need a privileged host-path
+#     probe of DMI data, which is a heavier and more invasive test than the claim warrants.
+#   - The LIVE prod cluster's shape (three Ready nodes, all control-plane+etcd, Longhorn
+#     disks at the local path). That is cluster state and belongs to R-PLAT-01's
+#     (currently uncovered) HA test; asserting it here would also make this test
+#     environment-specific, since the same suite must pass against dev.
+#   - That prod's HISTORY contains no development. This is the working tree at HEAD.
+#   - Whether the roadmap SHOULD have opened prod (the entry-gate judgement). Only that
+#     prod work is accompanied by the operator's recorded declaration.
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+: "${SPEC_REPO:=${ROOT}/../home-network-k3s}"
+export SPEC_REPO
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+NOTES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def note(msg):
+    NOTES.append(msg)
+
+
+# A LOCAL DEPENDENCY the repo deliberately does not carry — the vault passphrase (kept
+# outside the repo, R-SEC-01) or the Galaxy collections (gitignored; installed from
+# collections/requirements.yml). Their absence is an ENVIRONMENT gap, not a repo defect,
+# and is the ONLY tolerated reason the driven sub-assertions may not run. Deliberately
+# narrow: every other non-zero exit is a real failure. The parse assertions always run.
+ENV_ONLY_FAILURE = re.compile(
+    r"vault password|vault-id|Attempting to decrypt"
+    r"|No module named 'ansible_collections|couldn't resolve module/action", re.I)
+
+ANS = ROOT / "infra" / "ansible"
+INV = ANS / "inventory" / "hosts.ini"
+GV = ANS / "inventory" / "group_vars"
+TOFU = ROOT / "infra" / "tofu"
+check(INV.is_file(), "infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini is missing — prod is not described anywhere")
+if not INV.is_file():
+    print("CHECK FAIL (prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface): no inventory", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------- inventory parsing
+ini_groups: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+children: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+cur = None
+for line in INV.read_text().splitlines():
+    s = line.strip()
+    if not s or s.startswith("#"):
+        continue
+    m = re.match(r"^\[([^\]]+)\]$", s)
+    if m:
+        cur = m.group(1)
+        continue
+    if cur is None or cur.endswith(":vars"):
+        continue
+    if cur.endswith(":children"):
+        children.setdefault(cur.split(":")[0], []).append(s.split()[0])
+        continue
+    parts = s.split()
+    host = {"name": parts[0]}
+    for kv in parts[1:]:
+        if "=" in kv:
+            k, v = kv.split("=", 1)
+            host[k] = v
+    ini_groups.setdefault(cur, []).append(host)
+
+
+def hosts_in(group: str, seen=None) -> list[dict]:
+    seen = seen or set()
+    if group in seen:
+        return []
+    seen.add(group)
+    out = list(ini_groups.get(group, []))
+    for child in children.get(group, []):
+        out += hosts_in(child, seen)
+    return out
+
+
+def load_gv(group: str) -> dict:
+    d: dict = {}
+    for p in [GV / f"{group}.yml", GV / group / "vars.yml"]:
+        if p.is_file():
+            try:
+                d.update(yaml.safe_load(p.read_text()) or {})
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+    return d
+
+
+# WHICH GROUP IS PROD? Derived, never named here: it is the group whose group_vars
+# RETARGETS the k3s roles (k3s_primary_group / k3s_servers_group) away from the global
+# dev default. That is exactly the seam docs/02 + infra/ansible/README describe for prod.
+ALL_VARS = load_gv("all")
+dev_primary_group = str(ALL_VARS.get("k3s_primary_group", ""))
+candidates = []
+for entry in sorted(GV.iterdir()) if GV.is_dir() else []:
+    g = entry.name[:-4] if entry.name.endswith(".yml") else entry.name
+    if g == "all":
+        continue
+    v = load_gv(g)
+    if v.get("k3s_primary_group") and str(v["k3s_primary_group"]) != dev_primary_group:
+        candidates.append((g, v))
+check(len(candidates) == 1,
+      f"expected exactly ONE environment whose group_vars retargets the k3s roles (prod); found "
+      f"{[c[0] for c in candidates]} — R-ENV-03 describes a single prod estate reached through "
+      "the same roles as dev")
+if not candidates:
+    print("CHECK FAIL (prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface): no prod group_vars found", file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+PROD_GROUP, PROD_VARS = candidates[0]
+PROD_PRIMARY = str(PROD_VARS["k3s_primary_group"])
+prod_hosts = hosts_in(PROD_GROUP)
+prod_names = sorted(h["name"] for h in prod_hosts)
+
+# ------------------------------------------------- (1) exactly three, directly reachable
+check(len(prod_names) == 3,
+      f"prod group {PROD_GROUP!r} resolves to {len(prod_names)} host(s) {prod_names} — R-ENV-03 "
+      "says prod is a 3× mini-PC cluster")
+dev_hosts = hosts_in(str(ALL_VARS.get("k3s_servers_group", "k3s_servers")))
+for h in prod_hosts:
+    # Real machines on the LAN answer their own sshd. Dev's hosts are reached through a
+    # NAT port-forward (ansible_port 225x -> a VM's :22), which is precisely the
+    # indirection a hypervisor-hosted estate needs and bare metal does not.
+    check(str(h.get("ansible_port", "22")) == "22",
+          f"prod node {h['name']} is reached on port {h.get('ansible_port')} — a forwarded port "
+          "implies an indirection (NAT to a virtual estate), not a machine on the LAN")
+    check(h.get("k3s_node_ip") == h.get("ansible_host"),
+          f"prod node {h['name']} has ansible_host={h.get('ansible_host')} but "
+          f"k3s_node_ip={h.get('k3s_node_ip')} — a split address is the dev NAT pattern; a "
+          "bare-metal node's SSH address IS its cluster address")
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------ (2) nothing creates prod as a VM
+TF = "\n".join(p.read_text(errors="replace") for p in sorted(TOFU.glob("*.tf"))) \
+    if TOFU.is_dir() else ""
+check(len(TF) > 500, "infra/tofu/*.tf is empty — cannot show that it does NOT create prod")
+
+
+def tf_default(var: str):
+    m = re.search(r'variable\s+"' + re.escape(var) + r'"\s*\{(.*?)\n\}', TF, re.S)
+    if not m:
+        return None
+    d = re.search(r"default\s*=\s*(.+)", m.group(1))
+    return d.group(1).strip() if d else None
+
+
+prefix = (tf_default("node_name_prefix") or "").strip('"')
+try:
+    node_count = int((tf_default("node_count") or "0").strip())
+except ValueError:
+    node_count = 0
+iac_names = {f"{prefix}{i + 1}" for i in range(node_count)}
+check(len(iac_names) > 0, "the IaC module generates no node names — cannot compare with prod")
+check(iac_names.isdisjoint(set(prod_names)),
+      f"the IaC VM module would create {sorted(iac_names & set(prod_names))}, which are PROD nodes "
+      "— prod is bare metal that the operator images (docs/02 stage 1), never instantiated by the "
+      "hypervisor module")
+for name in prod_names:
+    check(name not in TF,
+          f"prod node {name} is named inside infra/tofu — prod hardware must not be described by "
+          "the VM module at all")
+# The prod host addresses must not appear as IaC node addresses either (a renamed VM is
+# still a VM).
+tf_ips = set(re.findall(r'"(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)"', tf_default("node_ips") or ""))
+prod_ips = {str(h.get("ansible_host")) for h in prod_hosts}
+check(tf_ips.isdisjoint(prod_ips),
+      f"the IaC module addresses {sorted(tf_ips & prod_ips)}, which are prod node addresses")
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------- (3) node-local storage
+# Every environment's value for a cluster-vars knob (base default + each overlay patch).
+def env_values(key: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    vals: dict[str, str] = {}
+    base = ROOT / "clusters" / "base" / "cluster-vars.yaml"
+    if base.is_file():
+        for d in yaml.safe_load_all(base.read_text()):
+            if isinstance(d, dict) and d.get("kind") == "ConfigMap" \
+                    and (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") == "cluster-vars":
+                v = (d.get("data") or {}).get(key)
+                if v is not None:
+                    vals["base"] = str(v)
+    for overlay in sorted((ROOT / "clusters").glob("*/kustomization.yaml")):
+        env = overlay.parent.name
+        if env == "base":
+            continue
+        try:
+            k = yaml.safe_load(overlay.read_text()) or {}
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        for p in (k.get("patches") or []):
+            tgt = p.get("target") or {}
+            if tgt.get("kind") != "ConfigMap" or tgt.get("name") != "cluster-vars":
+                continue
+            try:
+                ops = yaml.safe_load(p.get("patch") or "") or []
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+            for op in ops if isinstance(ops, list) else []:
+                if isinstance(op, dict) and str(op.get("path", "")) == f"/data/{key}":
+                    vals[env] = str(op.get("value"))
+    return vals
+
+
+# The prod OVERLAY is the one whose CLUSTER_ENV is not the base default.
+cluster_envs = env_values("CLUSTER_ENV")
+prod_overlays = [e for e, v in cluster_envs.items()
+                 if e != "base" and v != cluster_envs.get("base")]
+check(len(prod_overlays) >= 1,
+      "no clusters/ overlay sets its own CLUSTER_ENV — prod has no overlay of its own")
+prod_overlay = None
+for e in prod_overlays:
+    if PROD_GROUP.replace("k3s_", "") in cluster_envs[e] or cluster_envs[e] in PROD_GROUP:
+        prod_overlay = e
+check(prod_overlay is not None,
+      f"no overlay's CLUSTER_ENV corresponds to the prod inventory group {PROD_GROUP!r} — the "
+      "cluster config and the machine inventory disagree about which estate is prod")
+
+data_paths = env_values("LONGHORN_DATA_PATH")
+replicas = env_values("LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT")
+if prod_overlay:
+    p = data_paths.get(prod_overlay, data_paths.get("base", ""))
+    check(p.startswith("/"),
+          f"prod's LONGHORN_DATA_PATH is {p!r} — R-ENV-03's 'local storage' requires an absolute "
+          "node-local filesystem path")
+    check(not re.match(r"^/(net|nfs|mnt/nfs)|:", p),
+          f"prod's LONGHORN_DATA_PATH {p!r} looks like a network mount, not local SSD/NVMe")
+    r = replicas.get(prod_overlay, replicas.get("base", ""))
+    check(r.isdigit() and int(r) == len(prod_names),
+          f"prod's LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT is {r!r} for {len(prod_names)} node(s) — "
+          "'local storage' on a 3-node estate means one replica per node's own disk")
+# The DEFAULT storage class must be the local (Longhorn) driver. A separate bulk/media tier
+# on network storage is explicitly a different requirement (R-STATE-04, docs/04) and is not
+# counted here.
+default_scs = []
+for f in subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "ls-files", "-z", "*.yaml", "*.yml"],
+                        capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout.split("\0"):
+    if not f:
+        continue
+    try:
+        for d in yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / f).read_text(errors="replace")):
+            if isinstance(d, dict) and d.get("kind") == "StorageClass" and \
+                    str(((d.get("metadata") or {}).get("annotations") or {})
+                        .get("storageclass.kubernetes.io/is-default-class", "")) == "true":
+                default_scs.append((f, str(d.get("provisioner", ""))))
+    except Exception:
+        continue
+check(len(default_scs) == 1,
+      f"expected exactly one default StorageClass, found {default_scs} — the tier prod's workloads "
+      "land on by default must be unambiguous")
+for f, prov in default_scs:
+    check(prov == "driver.longhorn.io",
+          f"{f}: the default StorageClass provisioner is {prov!r}, not Longhorn — prod's default "
+          "tier would not be its own local disks")
+
+# ------------------------------------- (4) prod runs the SAME bootstrap code, retargeted
+PLAYBOOKS = ANS / "playbooks"
+ROLES = ANS / "roles"
+prod_token = PROD_GROUP.replace("k3s_", "")
+for d, what in ((ROLES, "role"), (PLAYBOOKS, "playbook")):
+    for entry in sorted(d.iterdir()) if d.is_dir() else []:
+        check(prod_token not in entry.name.lower(),
+              f"infra/ansible/{d.name}/{entry.name} is a prod-specific {what} — docs/02 requires "
+              "the SAME Ansible bootstrap for prod, differing only in the machine-creation step")
+# Every prod group_vars key must be a variable the shared code already knows: a role default,
+# a global, or an ansible built-in. An invented key is a fork of the role by another name.
+known: set[str] = set(ALL_VARS)
+for rd in sorted(ROLES.iterdir()) if ROLES.is_dir() else []:
+    for p in (rd / "defaults").glob("*.yml") if (rd / "defaults").is_dir() else []:
+        try:
+            known |= set((yaml.safe_load(p.read_text()) or {}).keys())
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+check(len(known) > 20, f"only {len(known)} shared variables found — (4) would prove nothing")
+for k in sorted(PROD_VARS):
+    check(k.startswith("ansible_") or k in known,
+          f"prod group_vars sets {k!r}, which is not a role default or a global — prod-only "
+          "configuration that the dev path never exercises is developing against prod")
+# ...and it must retarget, not re-implement: the group it names must exist in the inventory.
+check(PROD_PRIMARY in ini_groups or PROD_PRIMARY in children,
+      f"prod group_vars names primary group {PROD_PRIMARY!r}, which the inventory does not define")
+
+# ---------------------------------------- (5) prod is not a development surface (overlay)
+if prod_overlay:
+    odir = ROOT / "clusters" / prod_overlay
+    files = sorted(p.name for p in odir.iterdir() if p.is_file())
+    check(files == ["kustomization.yaml", "sync.yaml"],
+          f"clusters/{prod_overlay}/ contains {files} — a prod overlay may hold only its "
+          "kustomization and its own root sync; anything else is configuration authored FOR PROD")
+    k = yaml.safe_load((odir / "kustomization.yaml").read_text()) or {}
+    check(sorted(str(r) for r in (k.get("resources") or [])) == ["../base", "sync.yaml"],
+          f"clusters/{prod_overlay} resources are {k.get('resources')} — prod must render the base "
+          "plus its own sync only (docs/02: 'apply the prod overlay (no base edits)')")
+    # Every patch must be an ENVIRONMENT-SCOPED override, never a change to what runs.
+    ALLOWED = {("ConfigMap", "cluster-vars"), ("GitRepository", None)}
+    for p in (k.get("patches") or []):
+        tgt = p.get("target") or {}
+        body = p.get("patch") or ""
+        kind = tgt.get("kind")
+        if kind is None:                       # inline patch: kind comes from the body
+            try:
+                doc = yaml.safe_load(body) or {}
+            except Exception:
+                doc = {}
+            kind = doc.get("kind")
+            name = (doc.get("metadata") or {}).get("name")
+            if kind == "Kustomization":
+                # Flux Kustomization patches are allowed ONLY to wire sops decryption —
+                # anything else (path, interval, images, values) changes what prod RUNS.
+                keys = set((doc.get("spec") or {}).keys())
+                check(keys <= {"decryption"},
+                      f"clusters/{prod_overlay}: patch of Kustomization/{name} touches {sorted(keys)} "
+                      "— only `decryption` (the per-cluster sops key) is an environment-scoped "
+                      "override; changing anything else is developing against prod")
+                continue
+            check((kind, None) in ALLOWED or (kind, name) in ALLOWED,
+                  f"clusters/{prod_overlay}: patch targets {kind}/{name}, which is not an "
+                  "environment-scoped object — prod must not carry configuration of its own")
+        else:
+            check((kind, tgt.get("name")) in ALLOWED or (kind, None) in ALLOWED,
+                  f"clusters/{prod_overlay}: patch targets {kind}/{tgt.get('name')}, which is not "
+                  "an environment-scoped object — prod must not carry configuration of its own")
+
+    # Same Git ref as the other environment(s): a prod-only branch is a development line
+    # that only prod runs, which is exactly what R-ENV-03 forbids.
+    def git_ref(overlay: str):
+        kk = yaml.safe_load((ROOT / "clusters" / overlay / "kustomization.yaml").read_text()) or {}
+        for p in (kk.get("patches") or []):
+            body = p.get("patch") or ""
+            try:
+                doc = yaml.safe_load(body) or {}
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+            if doc.get("kind") == "GitRepository":
+                return (doc.get("spec") or {}).get("ref")
+        return None
+
+    others = [o.name for o in (ROOT / "clusters").iterdir()
+              if o.is_dir() and o.name not in ("base", prod_overlay)]
+    prod_ref = git_ref(prod_overlay)
+    check(prod_ref is not None,
+          f"clusters/{prod_overlay} does not pin a Git ref — prod would follow whatever the base "
+          "points at, with no record of what it runs")
+    for o in others:
+        check(git_ref(o) == prod_ref,
+              f"clusters/{o} tracks {git_ref(o)} but prod tracks {prod_ref} — a prod-only ref is a "
+              "development line only prod runs (R-ENV-03: prod is a target, not a sandbox)")
+
+# No prod-only manifest anywhere in the rendered configuration.
+tracked = [f for f in subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "ls-files", "-z"],
+                                     capture_output=True, text=True, check=True
+                                     ).stdout.split("\0") if f]
+RENDERED_DIRS = ("platform/", "platform-config", "apps/", "catalog/", "clusters/base/")
+
+# THE ONE STRUCTURAL EXCEPTION: AN OVERLAY-SELECTED ENVIRONMENT HALF.
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------
+# A filename carrying an environment token is a HEURISTIC for the harm R-ENV-03 names
+# (content only prod runs, in a path every environment renders). It is not the harm
+# itself. There is exactly one shape where a `-prod` name is the OPPOSITE of a prod-only
+# fork: a credential that is TWO Secret objects, BOTH applied to BOTH clusters as base
+# resources, where a cluster-vars knob decides only which one the shared consumer
+# REFERENCES (clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml, BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX: dev backs up to
+# MinIO, prod to Cloudflare R2, and one shared Secret meant either environment's rotation
+# broke the other). Nothing is forked: every environment renders the identical manifests
+# and the identical object set, which is precisely the R-ENV-02 contract.
+#
+# So the exception is not a path allowlist — it is the PROPERTY that makes that shape
+# safe, asserted from the tree, and a file is excused ONLY when all of it holds:
+#
+#   (A) it declares nothing but Secrets whose names end in the environment suffix — the
+#       only kind of object this repo has a selection mechanism for;
+#   (1) it is listed in its own directory's kustomization.yaml, so EVERY environment
+#       applies it, and every environment's value of the selector resolves to an object
+#       that some resource of that same kustomization declares (same namespace) — no
+#       environment is left selecting a Secret that does not exist;
+#   (2) nothing references the suffixed name literally: every reference is a substituted
+#       expression `<base-name>${VAR}`, and the suffixed FILE is named only by the
+#       kustomization that applies it — so no shared manifest hardcodes prod's half;
+#   (3) that VAR is defined for the base AND for every overlay (StrictPostBuildSubstitutions
+#       fails on an UNDEFINED variable, so an overlay that forgot it would break that
+#       cluster's reconciliation), and prod's value is the one that selects THIS file.
+#
+# References are read from PARSED YAML VALUES, never from raw text: the mechanism is
+# documented by name in comments beside the resources (cluster-vars says so explicitly),
+# and a name in a comment references nothing. Anything that fails any condition still
+# fails, naming the condition it broke.
+ENV_SUFFIX = f"-{prod_token}"
+# Every environment that renders the shared configuration.
+ENVS = ["base"] + sorted(p.parent.name
+                         for p in (ROOT / "clusters").glob("*/kustomization.yaml")
+                         if p.parent.name != "base")
+
+
+def _docs(rel: str):
+    p = ROOT / rel
+    if not p.is_file():
+        return None
+    try:
+        return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(p.read_text(errors="replace"))
+                if isinstance(d, dict)]
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def _strings(node):
+    if isinstance(node, str):
+        yield node
+    elif isinstance(node, dict):
+        for k, v in node.items():
+            yield from _strings(k)
+            yield from _strings(v)
+    elif isinstance(node, (list, tuple)):
+        for v in node:
+            yield from _strings(v)
+
+
+RENDERED_YAML = [f for f in tracked
+                 if f.startswith(RENDERED_DIRS) and f.endswith((".yaml", ".yml"))]
+VALUE_STRINGS = {f: list(_strings(_docs(f) or [])) for f in RENDERED_YAML}
+
+
+def overlay_selected(f: str) -> list[str]:
+    """[] if f is an overlay-SELECTED environment half; else the conditions it breaks."""
+    docs = _docs(f)
+    objs = [((d.get("kind")), (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name"),
+             (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("namespace")) for d in (docs or [])]
+    if not objs or any(k != "Secret" or not isinstance(n, str) or not n.endswith(ENV_SUFFIX)
+                       for k, n, _ in objs):
+        return [f"(A) it does not consist solely of Secret objects whose names end in "
+                f"{ENV_SUFFIX!r} — an overlay can select which SECRET a shared manifest "
+                f"references, and nothing else, so any other prod-suffixed object in a "
+                f"shared path is prod-only content"]
+
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    d = str(Path(f).parent)
+    kfile = f"{d}/kustomization.yaml"
+    kdocs = _docs(kfile) or []
+    res = [str(r) for r in ((kdocs[0].get("resources") if kdocs else None) or [])]
+    if Path(f).name not in res:
+        reasons.append(f"(1) {kfile} does not list it in `resources`, so it is not applied "
+                       f"in every environment — one environment would carry an object the "
+                       f"other does not")
+
+    # Every Secret the applying kustomization declares: name -> namespace.
+    declared: dict[str, object] = {}
+    for r in res:
+        for dd in (_docs(f"{d}/{r}") or []):
+            if dd.get("kind") == "Secret":
+                md = dd.get("metadata") or {}
+                declared[str(md.get("name"))] = md.get("namespace")
+
+    for _, name, ns in objs:
+        base_name = name[:-len(ENV_SUFFIX)]
+        pat = re.escape(base_name) + r"\$\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\}"
+        sel = sorted({m for ss in VALUE_STRINGS.values() for s in ss
+                      for m in re.findall(pat, s)})
+        # (2) literal references to the suffixed OBJECT — anywhere but this file, except
+        # the applying kustomization naming this FILE (which is how it gets applied).
+        lit = sorted({f2 for f2, ss in VALUE_STRINGS.items() for s in ss
+                      if name in s and f2 != f
+                      and not (f2 == kfile and s == Path(f).name)})
+        if lit:
+            reasons.append(f"(2) {', '.join(lit)} names the Secret {name!r} literally — a "
+                           f"shared manifest that hardcodes prod's half makes every "
+                           f"environment use prod's credential; reference "
+                           f"{base_name}${{...}} instead")
+        # (2) literal references to the suffixed FILE from anywhere but its kustomization.
+        stray = sorted({f2 for f2, ss in VALUE_STRINGS.items() for s in ss
+                        if Path(f).name in s and f2 not in (f, kfile)})
+        if stray:
+            reasons.append(f"(2) {', '.join(stray)} names the file {Path(f).name!r} "
+                           f"literally — only {kfile} may apply it")
+        if not sel:
+            reasons.append(f"(2) no manifest references {base_name}${{...}}: nothing selects "
+                           f"between the halves, so this file is prod-only content that "
+                           f"only prod could ever consume")
+            continue
+        if len(sel) > 1:
+            reasons.append(f"(2) {base_name} is selected by more than one variable {sel} — "
+                           f"they can drift apart and leave one consumer on the other "
+                           f"environment's credential")
+        var = sel[0]
+        vals = env_values(var)
+        missing = [e for e in ENVS if e not in vals]
+        if missing:
+            reasons.append(f"(3) ${{{var}}} is not defined for {missing} (defined for "
+                           f"{sorted(vals)}) — StrictPostBuildSubstitutions fails on an "
+                           f"undefined variable, so that environment would stop "
+                           f"reconciling, or silently inherit the other's credential")
+        for e, v in sorted(vals.items()):
+            want = base_name + v
+            if want not in declared:
+                reasons.append(f"(1) environment {e!r} selects Secret {want!r} via "
+                               f"${{{var}}}={v!r}, which no resource of {kfile} declares — "
+                               f"that environment renders a dangling reference")
+            elif declared[want] != ns:
+                reasons.append(f"(1) environment {e!r} selects Secret {want!r}, declared in "
+                               f"namespace {declared[want]!r}, but this half is in {ns!r} — "
+                               f"the halves are not interchangeable")
+        if prod_overlay and prod_overlay in vals and base_name + vals[prod_overlay] != name:
+            reasons.append(f"(3) the prod overlay's ${{{var}}}={vals[prod_overlay]!r} selects "
+                           f"{base_name + vals[prod_overlay]!r}, not this file's {name!r} — "
+                           f"prod's half is applied but no environment selects it")
+    return reasons
+
+
+flagged = [f for f in tracked
+           if f.startswith(RENDERED_DIRS)
+           and re.search(rf"(^|[/_.-]){re.escape(prod_token)}([/_.-]|$)", f, re.I)]
+for f in flagged:
+    why = overlay_selected(f)
+    check(not why,
+          f"{f} is a prod-specific file inside the shared configuration — every environment "
+          f"renders these paths, so prod-only content here is development against prod. It is "
+          f"not an overlay-selected environment half either: " + " AND ".join(why))
+    if not why:
+        note(f"{f} carries the {prod_token!r} token but is an OVERLAY-SELECTED half: both "
+             f"halves are applied in every environment and only the cluster-vars selector "
+             f"differs (R-ENV-02), so it is not prod-only content")
+check(len(tracked) > 50, f"git ls-files returned only {len(tracked)} paths — not a real checkout")
+
+# --------------------------- (6) prod work exists only with a declaration of readiness
+# In-repo: the operator's recorded decision to open the prod phase.
+log = ROOT / "DECISIONS-LOG.md"
+check(log.is_file() and re.search(r"PHASE\s*7\b.*OPEN", log.read_text(errors="replace"), re.I),
+      "DECISIONS-LOG.md carries no record of the operator OPENING the prod phase, yet prod "
+      "inventory/overlay exist — R-ENV-03 allows prod build only once the roadmap declares it ready")
+# In the spec (read-only, may not be mounted): the roadmap phase that opens prod.
+spec = Path(os.environ.get("SPEC_REPO", ""))
+phases = spec / "roadmap" / "phases.md"
+if phases.is_file():
+    txt = phases.read_text(errors="replace")
+    check(re.search(r"##\s*Phase\s*7\b", txt) is not None and
+          re.search(r"prod", txt, re.I) is not None,
+          "the spec roadmap has no Phase 7 opening prod build — the declaration R-ENV-03 defers "
+          "to does not exist")
+    check(re.search(r"explicitly opened|declares prod hardware ready|operator declares", txt, re.I)
+          is not None,
+          "the spec roadmap's prod phase states no explicit entry declaration — the gate R-ENV-03 "
+          "names would be unenforceable")
+else:
+    note(f"spec repo not mounted at {spec} — the roadmap half of (6) was NOT checked "
+         "(the in-repo declaration still was)")
+
+# --------------------------- (4b) DRIVE the retarget offline: same chain, prod hosts
+if shutil.which("ansible-playbook") is None:
+    note("ansible-playbook is not installed here (e.g. the in-cluster chainsaw image), so the "
+         "prod retarget was PARSED but not DRIVEN; the merge gate's container has it")
+else:
+    sec_groups = [g for g in children.get(PROD_GROUP, []) if g != PROD_PRIMARY]
+    args = ["--list-hosts", "playbooks/site.yml",
+            "-e", f"k3s_hosts={PROD_GROUP}",
+            "-e", f"k3s_primary_hosts={PROD_PRIMARY}"]
+    if sec_groups:
+        args += ["-e", f"k3s_secondary_hosts={sec_groups[0]}"]
+    lh = subprocess.run(["ansible-playbook", *args], cwd=ANS, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    out = (lh.stderr or "") + (lh.stdout or "")
+    if lh.returncode != 0 and ENV_ONLY_FAILURE.search(out):
+        # See the same narrow, self-policing skip in dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code.
+        note("ansible-playbook lacks a LOCAL dependency kept outside the repo by design (the vault "
+             "passphrase and/or the gitignored Galaxy collections), so the prod retarget was not "
+             "driven; every parse assertion above still ran")
+    else:
+        check(lh.returncode == 0,
+              f"retargeting the SHARED chain at prod failed: {out.strip()[:400]} — docs/02 requires "
+              "the same Ansible bootstrap to run for prod")
+        seen: set[str] = set()
+        in_hosts = False
+        for line in lh.stdout.splitlines():
+            if re.match(r"\s*hosts \(\d+\):", line):
+                in_hosts = True
+                continue
+            if re.search(r"play #\d+", line):
+                in_hosts = False
+                continue
+            if in_hosts and line.strip():
+                seen.add(line.strip())
+        check(seen == set(prod_names),
+              f"the shared chain retargeted at prod resolves to {sorted(seen)}, not the three prod "
+              f"nodes {prod_names} — prod would be bootstrapped by something other than dev's path")
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
+check(CHECKS >= 25,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op and its pass "
+      "would be meaningless")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+for n in NOTES:
+    print(f"  note: {n}")
+print(f"check OK: prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface — {CHECKS} assertions; prod group {PROD_GROUP!r} = "
+      f"{prod_names} (3 nodes, none created by IaC), overlay clusters/{prod_overlay} renders the base "
+      f"plus environment-scoped patches only, local Longhorn path "
+      f"{data_paths.get(prod_overlay, data_paths.get('base'))!r} with "
+      f"{replicas.get(prod_overlay, replicas.get('base'))} replica(s). R-ENV-03's AUTHORED clauses "
+      "only — the hardware facts (mini-PC, bare metal, local NVMe) are operator-attested and the "
+      "live cluster's shape is NOT asserted here (see the header's gap list).")
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 STATIC — certificate lifecycle needs no manual step  (R-TLS-02)   [EXECUTABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-TLS-02 ("Certificates MUST be automatically issued, renewed, and
+#          revoked without manual steps"); mechanism in docs/08 + ADR-0006.
+#
+# R-TLS-02 is one adverbial clause plus three runtime verbs. This test asserts the
+# clause — "without manual steps" — which in a GitOps platform is a property of the
+# REPOSITORY: a human step in the certificate path leaves evidence in git (committed
+# cert material, a Gateway serving a Secret nothing declares, an issuer with no
+# automated solver, a credential never delivered, auto-approval switched off, or CRs
+# nothing reconciles). The three verbs are observed by the companion L2 test.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): the issuer a Certificate names is `${ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER}`,
+# so the check resolves it against the BASE cluster-vars default AND every overlay's value and
+# requires each resolved issuer to exist. dev's issuer and prod's issuer are both verified from
+# one authored assertion, with no hostname, address or environment name written down.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  every serving-TLS reference, Certificate, Issuer and the cert-manager release
+#       is inspected offline,
+# THEN  every Gateway listener that terminates TLS serves a Secret a tracked Certificate
+#       produces; no certificate material is committed anywhere; every Certificate's
+#       issuer resolves — in EVERY environment — to a tracked ACME issuer with an
+#       automated dns01/http01 solver whose credential is SOPS-delivered from git;
+#       cert-manager's automatic request approval is not disabled; and every one of
+#       those objects is rendered by a Flux Kustomization, so nothing in the chain
+#       depends on a human running kubectl.
+#
+# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git + PyYAML, no
+# cluster, no network); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it directly, and
+# this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
+#
+# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (named in check.sh's header too — this test claims NONE of them):
+#   * ISSUED / RENEWED as runtime events: L2 (l2-behavioral/cert-lifecycle-automated).
+#   * REVOKED: not proven at any layer today. cert-manager performs no ACME revocation,
+#     and the spec's own reading (docs/08: "removing/rotating a certificate is a
+#     declarative change") needs `enableCertificateOwnerRef`, which the tracked
+#     cert-manager HelmRelease does not set — so a removed Certificate leaves its
+#     serving Secret behind. The L2 test asserts the withdrawal behaviour and is
+#     EXPECTED TO FAIL until that knob is set; escalated, not softened (R-TEST-06).
+#   * That the live cluster is serving the tracked Certificate (cluster state).
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: tls-lifecycle-automated
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-TLS-02: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-TLS-02"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given the tracked tree, when the certificate path is inspected offline, then no
+      manual step exists anywhere in it: serving Secrets are cert-manager-produced, no
+      cert material is committed, every environment's issuer is a tracked ACME issuer
+      with an automated solver and a git-delivered credential, auto-approval is on, and
+      the whole chain is Flux-reconciled.
+spec:
+  steps:
+    - name: then-no-manual-step-exists-in-the-certificate-path
+      description: >-
+        Run the offline assertion script over the tracked tree (same script ci/l0.sh
+        and conformance/run.sh --layer l0 execute).
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: bash ./check.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — tls-lifecycle-automated
+# Serves: R-TLS-02 ("Certificates MUST be automatically **issued, renewed, and revoked**
+#         without manual steps." — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md; mechanism in
+#         docs/08-tls-and-certificates.md, ADR-0006.)
+#
+# WHICH CLAUSE THIS LAYER CAN PROVE — AND WHICH IT CANNOT
+# ------------------------------------------------------
+# R-TLS-02 has one adverbial clause ("without manual steps") and three verbs
+# ("issued", "renewed", "revoked"). In a GitOps platform the *without manual steps*
+# clause IS a repository property, and it is the half that can be proven with no
+# cluster: if a human had to mint, install, or approve a serving certificate, the
+# evidence of that human step would be IN THE REPO — a committed `tls.crt`, a Gateway
+# pointing at a Secret nothing declares, an issuer that no automated solver can
+# satisfy, a per-cert credential handed over out of band, or an admission path that
+# waits for a manual CertificateRequest approval. This check asserts that none of
+# those exist and that the automated path is completely wired instead.
+#
+# The three VERBS are runtime events. They are asserted by the companion L2 test
+# (conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/cert-lifecycle-automated), which observes an
+# issuance, an unattended renewal, and the withdrawal of a removed certificate. This
+# check does NOT claim them; see "WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE" below.
+#
+# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
+# WHEN  every serving-TLS reference, Certificate, Issuer and the cert-manager release
+#       are inspected offline,
+# THEN  (1) at least one cert-manager `Certificate` is authored (vacuity floor: a repo
+#           with no Certificate cannot pass this check by having nothing to check);
+#       (2) every Gateway HTTPS listener that TERMINATES TLS references ONLY Secrets
+#           that a tracked Certificate declares as its `secretName` — so the serving
+#           credential is produced by the controller, never dropped in by hand;
+#       (3) NO certificate material is tracked anywhere: no Secret manifest of type
+#           kubernetes.io/tls, no tls.crt/tls.key/ca.crt key in any committed Secret
+#           (plain OR SOPS-encrypted), and no PEM certificate body in any tracked
+#           YAML — i.e. issuance is not, and cannot silently become, a human step;
+#       (4) every Certificate's `issuerRef` resolves to a TRACKED issuer IN EVERY
+#           ENVIRONMENT — the `${ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER}` token is resolved against the
+#           base cluster-vars default AND every overlay's value, so an environment
+#           whose issuer does not exist is caught here rather than at prod bring-up;
+#       (5) every issuer so referenced is an ACME issuer with a NON-EMPTY solver list
+#           whose every solver is an automated challenge type (dns01 / http01) — the
+#           same code path serves issuance AND renewal, so a solver a human must
+#           complete would defeat both;
+#       (6) each dns01 solver's provider credential is referenced BY NAME and that
+#           Secret is delivered SOPS-encrypted from git via a kustomization — the
+#           operator's one-time token hand-off (docs/08 OQ-4), never a per-cert step;
+#       (7) cert-manager's automatic CertificateRequest approval is NOT disabled
+#           (`disableAutoApproval`), and any `approveSignerNames` narrowing still
+#           covers the ClusterIssuers actually used — a request that waits for a
+#           human approver is the definition of a manual step;
+#       (8) the whole chain is reconciled from git — cert-manager's HelmRelease, the
+#           ClusterIssuers and the Certificate are each included in a kustomization
+#           that a Flux Kustomization renders — so a deleted Certificate is
+#           re-created and re-issued with no human action;
+#       (9) no Certificate defeats renewal arithmetically (`renewBefore` >= `duration`
+#           would mean the renewal instant never arrives).
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this test as claiming them):
+#   - ISSUED: that an issuance actually happens. Asserted at L2 (step 2 of
+#     l2-behavioral/cert-lifecycle-automated) and, for the real ACME/DNS-01 path,
+#     evidenced by l2-behavioral/trusted-tls serving a publicly-trusted cert.
+#   - RENEWED: that a renewal actually happens unattended. docs/08's acceptance gate
+#     is explicit that this must be "observed across a renewal" — L2 step 3 does that
+#     by fast-forwarding a certificate's renewal window; nothing static can.
+#   - REVOKED: NOT PROVEN AT ANY LAYER TODAY, and not asserted here. Two distinct
+#     readings, neither established: (a) ACME revocation — cert-manager does not
+#     revoke certificates at all, so no repo state could show it; (b) the spec's own
+#     reading in docs/08 ("removing/rotating a certificate is a declarative change")
+#     — withdrawal of a REMOVED certificate's serving material requires cert-manager's
+#     `enableCertificateOwnerRef`, which the tracked HelmRelease does NOT set (chart
+#     default false). L2 step 4 asserts the withdrawal behaviour and is expected to
+#     FAIL until that knob is set; escalated to the PM rather than softened (R-TEST-06).
+#   - That the tracked Certificate is the one the live Gateway is actually serving
+#     (cluster state), or that the ACME account/DNS credential is still valid.
+#   - Certificate EXPIRY ALERTING, which docs/08 delegates to R-OBS-04 (see
+#     l3-fault-injection/alerting).
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)"        # repo root
+PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
+
+cd "${ROOT}"
+"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:                                  # pragma: no cover
+    print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
+FAILURES: list[str] = []
+CHECKS = 0
+
+
+def check(cond, msg):
+    global CHECKS
+    CHECKS += 1
+    if not cond:
+        FAILURES.append(msg)
+
+
+def tracked() -> list[str]:
+    out = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "ls-files", "-z"],
+                         capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout
+    return [p for p in out.split("\0") if p]
+
+
+FILES = tracked()
+check(len(FILES) > 50, f"git ls-files returned only {len(FILES)} paths — not a real checkout")
+YAML_FILES = [f for f in FILES if re.search(r"\.(ya?ml)$", f)]
+
+
+def docs_of(rel: str):
+    """Parsed YAML documents of a tracked file, or [] when it is not parseable YAML."""
+    try:
+        return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / rel).read_text(errors="replace"))
+                if isinstance(d, dict)]
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+
+
+DOCS: list[tuple[str, dict]] = [(rel, d) for rel in YAML_FILES for d in docs_of(rel)]
+
+
+def of_kind(kind: str, group_prefix: str = "") -> list[tuple[str, dict]]:
+    out = []
+    for rel, d in DOCS:
+        if d.get("kind") != kind:
+            continue
+        if group_prefix and not str(d.get("apiVersion", "")).startswith(group_prefix):
+            continue
+        out.append((rel, d))
+    return out
+
+
+def ns_of(d: dict, default: str = "default") -> str:
+    return (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("namespace") or default
+
+
+def name_of(d: dict) -> str:
+    return (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") or "<unnamed>"
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------ cluster-vars resolution
+# Every environment's value for a ${TOKEN}: the base default plus each overlay's JSON6902
+# `- op: replace / path: /data/KEY / value: ...` patch on the cluster-vars ConfigMap. This
+# is the same mechanism flux-postbuild-substitution audits; here we need the VALUES, so an
+# issuer name can be resolved per environment instead of being asserted for dev only.
+def env_values(key: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    vals: dict[str, str] = {}
+    base = ROOT / "clusters" / "base" / "cluster-vars.yaml"
+    if base.is_file():
+        for d in yaml.safe_load_all(base.read_text()):
+            if isinstance(d, dict) and d.get("kind") == "ConfigMap" \
+                    and name_of(d) == "cluster-vars":
+                v = (d.get("data") or {}).get(key)
+                if v is not None:
+                    vals["base"] = str(v)
+    for overlay in sorted((ROOT / "clusters").glob("*/kustomization.yaml")):
+        env = overlay.parent.name
+        if env == "base":
+            continue
+        try:
+            k = yaml.safe_load(overlay.read_text()) or {}
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        for p in (k.get("patches") or []):
+            tgt = p.get("target") or {}
+            if tgt.get("kind") != "ConfigMap" or tgt.get("name") != "cluster-vars":
+                continue
+            try:
+                ops = yaml.safe_load(p.get("patch") or "") or []
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+            for op in ops if isinstance(ops, list) else []:
+                if isinstance(op, dict) and str(op.get("path", "")) == f"/data/{key}":
+                    vals[env] = str(op.get("value"))
+    return vals
+
+
+TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"^\$\{([A-Z0-9_]+)\}$")
+
+
+def resolve_per_env(value: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """A literal resolves to itself in every environment; a ${TOKEN} to each env's value."""
+    m = TOKEN_RE.match(value.strip())
+    if not m:
+        return {"(literal)": value.strip()}
+    return env_values(m.group(1))
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------- what Flux actually renders (reachability)
+# A manifest is DELIVERED only if it is reachable from a Flux Kustomization's `path` through
+# the kustomize resource graph: <path>/kustomization.yaml -> resources -> (file | directory
+# -> that directory's kustomization.yaml -> ...). Membership is deliberately computed by
+# walking that graph rather than by asking "is this file's DIRECTORY mentioned somewhere":
+# the loose form silently passes when an entry is deleted from the very kustomization.yaml
+# that the directory reference renders (verified — it made two assertions here no-ops).
+KUST_RESOURCES: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+for rel in [f for f in YAML_FILES if f.endswith("kustomization.yaml")]:
+    refs: list[str] = []
+    for d in docs_of(rel):
+        for r in (d.get("resources") or []) + (d.get("components") or []):
+            if not isinstance(r, str) or "://" in r:      # skip remote bases
+                continue
+            try:
+                p = (ROOT / rel).parent.joinpath(r).resolve()
+                refs.append(str(p.relative_to(ROOT)))
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+    KUST_RESOURCES[rel] = refs
+
+FLUX_PATHS: set[str] = set()
+for _rel, _d in DOCS:
+    if _d.get("kind") == "Kustomization" and \
+            str(_d.get("apiVersion", "")).startswith("kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/"):
+        p = str((_d.get("spec") or {}).get("path", "")).lstrip("./").rstrip("/")
+        if p:
+            FLUX_PATHS.add(p)
+
+
+def _walk(entry: str, seen: set[str], out: set[str]) -> None:
+    if entry in seen:
+        return
+    seen.add(entry)
+    kust = entry if entry.endswith("kustomization.yaml") else f"{entry}/kustomization.yaml"
+    if kust in KUST_RESOURCES:                            # a directory (or a kustomization)
+        for r in KUST_RESOURCES[kust]:
+            _walk(r, seen, out)
+        return
+    out.add(entry)                                        # a leaf manifest
+
+
+RENDERED: set[str] = set()
+for _p in FLUX_PATHS:
+    _walk(_p, set(), RENDERED)
+
+
+def delivered(rel: str) -> bool:
+    """True iff Flux renders this file from one of its Kustomization paths."""
+    return rel in RENDERED
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------- (1) there is something to check
+CERTS = of_kind("Certificate", "cert-manager.io/")
+check(len(CERTS) >= 1,
+      "no cert-manager.io Certificate is authored anywhere in the tracked tree — every "
+      "assertion below would be vacuous, so this is a FAILURE, not a pass (R-TLS-02)")
+
+ISSUERS = of_kind("ClusterIssuer", "cert-manager.io/") + of_kind("Issuer", "cert-manager.io/")
+check(len(ISSUERS) >= 1,
+      "no cert-manager ClusterIssuer/Issuer is authored — nothing could issue automatically")
+
+# ---------------------------- (2) every terminating listener serves a controller cert
+CERT_SECRETS: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {           # (namespace, secretName) -> file
+    (ns_of(d, "default"), str((d.get("spec") or {}).get("secretName", ""))): rel
+    for rel, d in CERTS
+}
+listeners_checked = 0
+for rel, gw in of_kind("Gateway", "gateway.networking.k8s.io/"):
+    gw_ns = ns_of(gw)
+    for lis in ((gw.get("spec") or {}).get("listeners") or []):
+        tls = lis.get("tls") or {}
+        if str(tls.get("mode", "")) != "Terminate":
+            continue
+        listeners_checked += 1
+        refs = tls.get("certificateRefs") or []
+        check(len(refs) > 0,
+              f"{rel}: Gateway {gw_ns}/{name_of(gw)} listener {lis.get('name')!r} terminates "
+              "TLS with NO certificateRefs — it can only serve a certificate someone puts "
+              "there by hand")
+        for r in refs:
+            kind = str(r.get("kind", "Secret"))
+            key = (str(r.get("namespace") or gw_ns), str(r.get("name")))
+            check(kind == "Secret",
+                  f"{rel}: listener {lis.get('name')!r} certificateRef kind is {kind!r}; only "
+                  "Secret refs can be traced to a cert-manager Certificate")
+            check(key in CERT_SECRETS,
+                  f"{rel}: listener {lis.get('name')!r} serves Secret {key[0]}/{key[1]}, which "
+                  "NO tracked cert-manager Certificate declares as its secretName — that "
+                  "credential would have to be created by hand (R-TLS-02 'without manual steps')")
+check(listeners_checked > 0,
+      "no Gateway listener with tls.mode=Terminate found in the tracked tree — there is no "
+      "serving-TLS reference to trace, so (2) proved nothing")
+
+# --------------------------------- (3) no certificate material is tracked, anywhere
+TLS_KEYS = {"tls.crt", "tls.key", "ca.crt", "tls-combined.pem"}
+for rel, d in DOCS:
+    if d.get("kind") != "Secret":
+        continue
+    stype = str(d.get("type", ""))
+    check(stype != "kubernetes.io/tls",
+          f"{rel}: a Secret of type kubernetes.io/tls is COMMITTED (metadata.name="
+          f"{name_of(d)}) — a serving certificate authored by a human, not issued")
+    for field in ("data", "stringData"):
+        for k in (d.get(field) or {}):
+            check(str(k) not in TLS_KEYS,
+                  f"{rel}: committed Secret {name_of(d)} carries {field}.{k} — certificate "
+                  "material in git means a manual issuance step exists (R-TLS-02)")
+
+PEM_RE = re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:[A-Z ]+ )?CERTIFICATE-----")
+for rel in YAML_FILES:
+    body = (ROOT / rel).read_text(errors="replace")
+    # Scoped to YAML manifests deliberately: prose/docs may legitimately SHOW a PEM header
+    # in an example, and a .md file is not applied to any cluster. A manifest cannot.
+    check(not PEM_RE.search(body),
+          f"{rel}: contains a PEM CERTIFICATE body — a hand-minted certificate in a manifest")
+
+# --------------------------- (4)+(5)+(6) the issuer chain is automated in EVERY env
+# The cert-manager release's namespace IS the controller's `--cluster-resource-namespace`
+# (chart default), i.e. where a ClusterIssuer's solver credential must live. Derived from the
+# HelmRelease, never written down here, so this holds if the release namespace ever changes.
+cm_releases = [(rel, d) for rel, d in of_kind("HelmRelease") if name_of(d) == "cert-manager"]
+CM_NS = ns_of(cm_releases[0][1], "cert-manager") if cm_releases else "cert-manager"
+
+ISSUER_INDEX = {(d.get("kind"), name_of(d)): (rel, d) for rel, d in ISSUERS}
+solver_creds: list[tuple[str, str, str, str]] = []     # (issuer, ns, secretName, ref field)
+issuers_verified: set[str] = set()
+for rel, cert in CERTS:
+    spec = cert.get("spec") or {}
+    ref = spec.get("issuerRef") or {}
+    kind = str(ref.get("kind", "Issuer"))
+    per_env = resolve_per_env(str(ref.get("name", "")))
+    check(len(per_env) > 0,
+          f"{rel}: Certificate {name_of(cert)} issuerRef.name is a token with NO value in "
+          "clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml or any overlay — it would render empty and never issue")
+    for env, iname in sorted(per_env.items()):
+        hit = ISSUER_INDEX.get((kind, iname))
+        check(hit is not None,
+              f"{rel}: Certificate {name_of(cert)} resolves issuerRef to {kind}/{iname} in "
+              f"environment {env!r}, but no such issuer is tracked — that environment cannot "
+              "issue anything without a hand-created issuer (R-TLS-02, R-ENV-02)")
+        if hit is None:
+            continue
+        irel, issuer = hit
+        issuers_verified.add(iname)
+        ispec = issuer.get("spec") or {}
+        acme = ispec.get("acme")
+        check(isinstance(acme, dict),
+              f"{irel}: {kind}/{iname} (used by {name_of(cert)} in env {env!r}) is not an ACME "
+              f"issuer — its issuance/renewal path is {sorted(ispec)}; docs/08/ADR-0006 mandate "
+              "ACME so both are unattended")
+        if not isinstance(acme, dict):
+            continue
+        check(str(acme.get("server", "")).startswith("https://"),
+              f"{irel}: {kind}/{iname} has no https ACME directory endpoint")
+        check(bool((acme.get("privateKeySecretRef") or {}).get("name")),
+              f"{irel}: {kind}/{iname} declares no privateKeySecretRef — the ACME account key "
+              "would have to be provisioned by hand")
+        solvers = acme.get("solvers") or []
+        check(len(solvers) > 0,
+              f"{irel}: {kind}/{iname} declares NO solvers — every order would sit unsolved "
+              "until a human completed the challenge")
+        for s in solvers:
+            types = [t for t in ("dns01", "http01") if t in s]
+            check(len(types) == 1,
+                  f"{irel}: {kind}/{iname} has a solver with challenge types {sorted(s)} — only "
+                  "the automated dns01/http01 solvers satisfy 'without manual steps'")
+            for provider, cfg in (s.get("dns01") or {}).items():
+                if not isinstance(cfg, dict):
+                    continue
+                for field, val in cfg.items():
+                    if isinstance(val, dict) and str(field).endswith(("SecretRef", "secretRef")):
+                        n = str(val.get("name", ""))
+                        check(bool(n),
+                              f"{irel}: {kind}/{iname} dns01 {provider}.{field} has no secret name")
+                        if n:
+                            # A ClusterIssuer resolves secret refs in the controller's
+                            # cluster-resource-namespace; a namespaced Issuer in its own.
+                            want_ns = CM_NS if kind == "ClusterIssuer" else ns_of(issuer, CM_NS)
+                            solver_creds.append((iname, want_ns, n, f"{provider}.{field}"))
+
+check(len(issuers_verified) > 0, "no issuer was reachable from any Certificate — (5) proved nothing")
+
+# (6) the solver credential is delivered, SOPS-encrypted, from git — never per-cert by hand.
+check(len(solver_creds) > 0,
+      "no dns01 solver credential reference found — docs/08 (OQ-4) requires the scoped "
+      "Cloudflare token to drive DNS-01, so this check would otherwise be vacuous")
+# Keyed by (namespace, name): a same-named Secret in ANOTHER namespace is NOT this credential.
+# (Verified: keying by name alone let the external-dns copy of `cloudflare-api-token` satisfy
+# the cert-manager reference, so deleting cert-manager's own copy passed — a silent no-op.)
+SECRET_DOCS = {(ns_of(d, CM_NS), name_of(d)): (rel, d)
+               for rel, d in DOCS if d.get("kind") == "Secret"}
+for iname, sns, sname, field in solver_creds:
+    hit = SECRET_DOCS.get((sns, sname))
+    check(hit is not None,
+          f"{iname}: dns01 {field} references Secret {sname!r}, which no tracked manifest "
+          f"delivers into namespace {sns!r} (the issuer's secret-resolution namespace) — the "
+          "credential would be created by hand in-cluster (R-TLS-02)")
+    if hit is None:
+        continue
+    srel, sdoc = hit
+    check("sops" in sdoc,
+          f"{srel}: Secret {sname} is the DNS-01 credential but is not SOPS-encrypted (R-SEC-01)")
+    check(delivered(srel),
+          f"{srel}: Secret {sname} is not rendered by any Flux Kustomization path — Flux would "
+          "never deliver it, so issuance would wait on a manual kubectl apply")
+
+# ------------------------------- (7) automatic CertificateRequest approval is intact
+check(len(cm_releases) == 1,
+      f"expected exactly one cert-manager HelmRelease, found {[r for r, _ in cm_releases]} — "
+      "the controller that issues and renews must itself be GitOps-managed")
+for rel, hr in cm_releases:
+    values = ((hr.get("spec") or {}).get("values") or {})
+    check(values.get("disableAutoApproval") in (None, False),
+          f"{rel}: cert-manager values set disableAutoApproval={values.get('disableAutoApproval')!r} "
+          "— every CertificateRequest would then wait for an approver, which is a manual step")
+    signers = values.get("approveSignerNames")
+    if signers is not None:
+        pats = [str(s) for s in (signers if isinstance(signers, list) else [signers])]
+        for iname in sorted(issuers_verified):
+            ok = any(p in ("*", "*/*") or "clusterissuers.cert-manager.io" in p and
+                     (p.endswith("/*") or p.endswith(f"/{iname}")) for p in pats)
+            check(ok,
+                  f"{rel}: approveSignerNames={pats} does not cover ClusterIssuer {iname} — "
+                  "requests for it would never be auto-approved")
+    # The chart's own CRD install must be on, else the CRs below cannot even be applied.
+    check((values.get("crds") or {}).get("enabled") is True,
+          f"{rel}: cert-manager values do not enable CRD installation — the Certificate CRD "
+          "would have to be installed by hand")
+
+# ------------------------------- (8) the whole chain is continuously reconciled from git
+check(len(FLUX_PATHS) > 0 and len(RENDERED) > 20,
+      f"the kustomize resource graph resolved {len(RENDERED)} manifest(s) from {len(FLUX_PATHS)} "
+      "Flux Kustomization path(s) — too few to be a real graph, so (8) would prove nothing")
+for rel, _ in cm_releases + CERTS + ISSUERS:
+    check(delivered(rel),
+          f"{rel} is not rendered by any Flux Kustomization path — nothing reconciles it, so a "
+          "deleted Certificate/issuer/controller would stay deleted until a human re-applied it")
+
+# --------------------------------------------- (9) renewal is not defeated arithmetically
+def to_seconds(v) -> int | None:
+    m = re.fullmatch(r"\s*(\d+)\s*([smh])\s*", str(v))
+    if not m:
+        return None
+    return int(m.group(1)) * {"s": 1, "m": 60, "h": 3600}[m.group(2)]
+
+
+renew_pairs = 0
+for rel, cert in CERTS:
+    spec = cert.get("spec") or {}
+    dur, rb = to_seconds(spec.get("duration")), to_seconds(spec.get("renewBefore"))
+    if dur is None or rb is None:
+        continue
+    renew_pairs += 1
+    check(rb < dur,
+          f"{rel}: Certificate {name_of(cert)} sets renewBefore={spec.get('renewBefore')} >= "
+          f"duration={spec.get('duration')} — the renewal instant never arrives")
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
+# NO-OP GUARD: this repo has been bitten by checks that degrade to a successful no-op.
+# The floor below is a count of assertions that MUST have run for the verdict to mean
+# anything; it is not a style rule.
+check(CHECKS >= 20,
+      f"only {CHECKS} assertions ran — the check degenerated to a near-no-op and its pass "
+      "would be meaningless")
+
+if FAILURES:
+    print(f"CHECK FAIL (tls-lifecycle-automated): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    for f in FAILURES:
+        print(f"  - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(f"check OK: tls-lifecycle-automated — {CHECKS} assertions; {len(CERTS)} Certificate(s), "
+      f"{len(ISSUERS)} issuer(s), {len(issuers_verified)} issuer(s) reached from a Certificate "
+      f"across every environment, {listeners_checked} terminating listener(s), "
+      f"{len(solver_creds)} dns01 credential ref(s), {renew_pairs} duration/renewBefore pair(s). "
+      "R-TLS-02 'without manual steps' clause only — issued/renewed/revoked are RUNTIME verbs "
+      "(see l2-behavioral/cert-lifecycle-automated; 'revoked' is NOT proven at any layer).")
+PY
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL — certificate lifecycle is automatic  (R-TLS-02)
+#                 [RUNNABLE / NOT YET EXECUTED — see STATUS]
+# Catalog: docs/14 "Trusted TLS (R-TLS-01/02)"
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-TLS-02 — "Certificates MUST be automatically **issued, renewed,
+#          and revoked** without manual steps."
+#          docs/08 §"Renewal & revocation (R-TLS-02)" — "cert-manager renews well
+#          before expiry automatically; no human action." / "Revocation: removing/
+#          rotating a certificate is a declarative change; cert-manager handles
+#          issuance of replacements."
+#          docs/08 acceptance gate — "Certificates renew automatically ahead of expiry
+#          with no manual step (**observed across a renewal**)."
+# Impl:    platform/cert-manager/**, platform/gateway/wildcard-certificate.yaml.
+# Sibling: tests/l0-static/tls-lifecycle-automated proves the "without manual steps"
+#          clause statically (in the merge gate). This test observes the three VERBS.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): NOTHING about either environment is written down. The
+# serving certificate is DISCOVERED — find the Gateway whose listener terminates TLS, follow
+# its certificateRefs Secret, and read that Secret's `cert-manager.io/certificate-name`
+# annotation to reach the Certificate. No hostname, no namespace list, no issuer name, no
+# address: dev proves dev's cert and prod proves prod's from the same authored assertions.
+#
+# GIVEN cert-manager reconciled by Flux and a Gateway terminating TLS,
+# WHEN  the serving Certificate's provenance and renewal schedule are read, and a NEW
+#       Certificate is then requested, left to renew itself, and removed,
+# THEN  1. the serving credential was produced by the CONTROLLER, not a human: its
+#          Secret carries cert-manager's certificate-name annotation, its
+#          CertificateRequest was submitted by cert-manager's own ServiceAccount and
+#          was APPROVED automatically, and its issuer is a Ready ACME ClusterIssuer;
+#       2. an unattended RENEWAL IS SCHEDULED: status.renewalTime is in the future and
+#          strictly before status.notAfter, so no human is in the renewal path;
+#       3. ISSUED — a newly declared Certificate becomes Ready and its Secret appears
+#          with certificate material, with no step between declaring and having it;
+#       4. RENEWED — that certificate, given a renewal window that opens one minute
+#          after issuance, REISSUES ITSELF at least twice (status.revision >= 3) and
+#          the serving bytes actually change, with no human action. This is docs/08's
+#          "observed across a renewal", fast-forwarded;
+#       5. REMOVED/REVOKED — deleting the Certificate withdraws its serving material.
+#
+# WHY A HERMETIC SELF-SIGNED ISSUER FOR STEPS 3-5, AND WHAT THAT COSTS
+# -------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Steps 3-5 need a certificate lifecycle that completes in minutes and repeats on every
+# run. Driving that through the real ACME issuer would fire a public Let's Encrypt order
+# (and a Cloudflare _acme-challenge write) per conformance run, burning issuance rate
+# limits for evidence that is not about ACME: cert-manager's renewal scheduler and
+# ownership logic are issuer-independent. So steps 3-5 use a `selfSigned` Issuer created
+# in this test's OWN namespace, and the ACME/DNS-01 path is proven elsewhere — step 1-2
+# read the REAL wildcard certificate the Gateway serves, and l2-behavioral/trusted-tls
+# proves a publicly-trusted LE certificate is actually served (R-TLS-01/03).
+# STATED PLAINLY: steps 3-5 do NOT prove the ACME order path renews; they prove the
+# CONTROLLER's issue/renew/withdraw automation runs unattended in this cluster, while
+# steps 1-2 prove the real serving certificate is on exactly that automated path.
+#
+# STATUS: RUNNABLE, NOT YET EXECUTED. Steps 1-2 are read-only. Steps 3-5 CREATE an
+# Issuer/Certificate (and DELETE the Certificate they created) inside chainsaw's
+# per-test namespace — the same class of mutation every other L2 test here performs,
+# self-cleaning via namespace teardown, touching no platform object. WS-TEST authored
+# them against live dev/prod read-only inspection under an explicit instruction not to
+# mutate either cluster, so THE MUTATING STEPS HAVE NOT BEEN RUN. Nothing about the
+# suite gates on them: ci/conformance.sh only runs L2/L3 when CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true.
+#
+# EXPECTED FAILURE, DELIBERATELY NOT SOFTENED (R-TEST-06)
+# ------------------------------------------------------
+# Step 5 WILL FAIL as the platform is authored today. cert-manager only garbage-collects
+# a Certificate's Secret when the controller runs with `enableCertificateOwnerRef: true`;
+# platform/cert-manager/helmrelease.yaml does not set it (chart default false), and the
+# live wildcard Secret on both clusters has NO ownerReferences (verified read-only,
+# 2026-09-05). So a removed Certificate leaves its credential in place, and "revoked
+# without manual steps" does not hold. That is a finding about the platform, not a
+# defect in this test: the assertion stays as the requirement reads and is escalated to
+# the PM. (ACME revocation proper is not implemented by cert-manager at all.)
+#
+# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (this test claims none of these):
+#   * Not proven: that the CA would refuse a revoked certificate — there is no
+#     revocation request to make, so nothing observable exists to assert.
+#   * Not proven: renewal of the REAL wildcard cert (its window opens 30 days before a
+#     90-day expiry; a conformance run cannot wait, and forcing it would rotate the
+#     platform's serving credential). Step 2 asserts the schedule; step 4 asserts the
+#     mechanism that will act on it.
+#   * Not proven: certificate expiry ALERTING — docs/08 delegates that to R-OBS-04
+#     (l3-fault-injection/alerting).
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: cert-lifecycle-automated
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-TLS-02: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-TLS-02"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given cert-manager and a TLS-terminating Gateway, when the serving certificate's
+      provenance and renewal schedule are read and a new certificate is requested, left
+      to renew, and removed, then issuance, renewal and withdrawal all happen with no
+      human step — the serving cert was controller-issued and auto-approved, its
+      renewal is scheduled ahead of expiry, and a declared certificate issues and
+      reissues itself unattended.
+spec:
+  timeouts:
+    apply: 60s
+    assert: 3m
+    exec: 10m
+  steps:
+    # ---------------------------------------------------------------- READ-ONLY HALF
+    - name: given-cert-manager-is-reconciled-and-healthy
+      description: >-
+        The controller that issues and renews must be running, and must have been
+        installed by Flux rather than by hand — otherwise "automatic" has no engine.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -u
+              # Discover cert-manager's Deployments by chart label, in whatever namespace
+              # the release lives (nothing about the environment is assumed).
+              sel='app.kubernetes.io/instance=cert-manager'
+              rows="$(kubectl get deploy -A -l "$sel" \
+                        -o custom-columns='NS:.metadata.namespace,N:.metadata.name,RDY:.status.readyReplicas' \
+                        --no-headers 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              echo "$rows"
+              [ -n "$rows" ] || { echo "FAIL: no cert-manager Deployment found ($sel)"; exit 1; }
+              n=0
+              echo "$rows" | while read -r ns name rdy; do
+                [ "${rdy:-0}" -ge 1 ] || { echo "FAIL: $ns/$name has no ready replica"; exit 1; }
+              done || exit 1
+              n="$(echo "$rows" | wc -l)"
+              # controller + webhook + cainjector: without the webhook a Certificate is
+              # rejected, without cainjector the webhook has no CA — all three or nothing.
+              [ "$n" -ge 3 ] || { echo "FAIL: expected >=3 cert-manager Deployments, saw $n"; exit 1; }
+              # GitOps-managed, not hand-installed: Flux labels what it applies.
+              ns="$(echo "$rows" | head -1 | awk '{print $1}')"
+              lbl="$(kubectl get deploy -n "$ns" -l "$sel" \
+                       -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.labels.helm\.toolkit\.fluxcd\.io/name}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              [ -n "$lbl" ] || { echo "FAIL: cert-manager is not owned by a Flux HelmRelease"; exit 1; }
+              echo "CERT_MANAGER_HEALTHY_OK ($n deployments, flux HelmRelease $lbl)"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'CERT_MANAGER_HEALTHY_OK')): true
+
+    - name: then-the-serving-certificate-was-issued-by-the-controller
+      description: >-
+        Follow the Gateway's terminating listener to the Secret it serves, and prove
+        that Secret's provenance is cert-manager — annotation, CertificateRequest
+        requester, automatic approval, and a Ready ACME issuer.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -u
+              # --- discover the serving Secret from the Gateway itself -------------------
+              gw="$(kubectl get gateway -A \
+                      -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}' \
+                      2>/dev/null | head -1)"
+              [ -n "$gw" ] || { echo "FAIL: no Gateway found — nothing terminates TLS"; exit 1; }
+              gns="${gw% *}"; gname="${gw#* }"
+              sec="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get gateway "$gname" \
+                       -o jsonpath='{.spec.listeners[?(@.tls.mode=="Terminate")].tls.certificateRefs[0].name}' \
+                       2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}')"
+              [ -n "$sec" ] || { echo "FAIL: Gateway $gns/$gname terminates no TLS listener"; exit 1; }
+              echo "gateway=$gns/$gname serving-secret=$sec"
+
+              # --- provenance (1): only the controller writes this annotation ------------
+              cert="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get secret "$sec" \
+                        -o jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations.cert-manager\.io/certificate-name}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              [ -n "$cert" ] || { echo "FAIL: Secret $gns/$sec carries no cert-manager.io/certificate-name annotation — it was not produced by cert-manager"; exit 1; }
+              crt="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get secret "$sec" -o jsonpath='{.data.tls\.crt}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              [ -n "$crt" ] || { echo "FAIL: Secret $gns/$sec holds no tls.crt"; exit 1; }
+
+              # --- provenance (2): the Certificate is Ready and has a revision -----------
+              ready="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificate "$cert" \
+                         -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              rev="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificate "$cert" -o jsonpath='{.status.revision}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              echo "certificate=$gns/$cert ready=$ready revision=$rev"
+              [ "$ready" = "True" ] || { echo "FAIL: Certificate $cert is not Ready"; exit 1; }
+              [ -n "$rev" ] && [ "$rev" -ge 1 ] || { echo "FAIL: Certificate $cert has no issued revision"; exit 1; }
+
+              # --- provenance (3): the request was made BY THE CONTROLLER and auto-approved
+              # spec.username is the identity that created the CertificateRequest. A human
+              # operator would appear as a user/OIDC identity, not a ServiceAccount.
+              cr="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificaterequest \
+                      -o jsonpath="{range .items[?(@.metadata.annotations.cert-manager\.io/certificate-name=='${cert}')]}{.metadata.name}{' '}{.spec.username}{'\n'}{end}" \
+                      2>/dev/null | tail -1)"
+              [ -n "$cr" ] || { echo "FAIL: no CertificateRequest for $cert — cannot show who requested it"; exit 1; }
+              crname="${cr% *}"; requester="${cr#* }"
+              echo "certificaterequest=$crname requester=$requester"
+              case "$requester" in
+                system:serviceaccount:*) : ;;
+                *) echo "FAIL: CertificateRequest $crname was submitted by '$requester', not a controller ServiceAccount"; exit 1 ;;
+              esac
+              appr="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificaterequest "$crname" \
+                        -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Approved")].status}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              [ "$appr" = "True" ] || { echo "FAIL: CertificateRequest $crname is not Approved=True (approval would be a manual step)"; exit 1; }
+
+              # --- provenance (4): an automated ACME issuer, and it is Ready -------------
+              ikind="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificate "$cert" -o jsonpath='{.spec.issuerRef.kind}')"
+              iname="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificate "$cert" -o jsonpath='{.spec.issuerRef.name}')"
+              echo "issuer=$ikind/$iname"
+              if [ "$ikind" = "ClusterIssuer" ]; then
+                iready="$(kubectl get clusterissuer "$iname" -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+                iacme="$(kubectl get clusterissuer "$iname" -o jsonpath='{.spec.acme.server}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              else
+                iready="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get issuer "$iname" -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+                iacme="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get issuer "$iname" -o jsonpath='{.spec.acme.server}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              fi
+              [ "$iready" = "True" ] || { echo "FAIL: issuer $iname is not Ready — renewal would need a human to fix it"; exit 1; }
+              [ -n "$iacme" ] || { echo "FAIL: issuer $iname is not an ACME issuer"; exit 1; }
+              echo "SERVING_CERT_CONTROLLER_ISSUED_OK"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'SERVING_CERT_CONTROLLER_ISSUED_OK')): true
+
+    - name: then-an-unattended-renewal-is-already-scheduled
+      description: >-
+        cert-manager writes status.renewalTime only after computing when it will renew.
+        Asserting it is in the future and before expiry proves the renewal is scheduled
+        and that nothing is waiting on a human (docs/08 "renews well before expiry").
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -u
+              gw="$(kubectl get gateway -A \
+                      -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}' | head -1)"
+              gns="${gw% *}"; gname="${gw#* }"
+              sec="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get gateway "$gname" \
+                       -o jsonpath='{.spec.listeners[?(@.tls.mode=="Terminate")].tls.certificateRefs[0].name}' | awk '{print $1}')"
+              cert="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get secret "$sec" \
+                        -o jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations.cert-manager\.io/certificate-name}')"
+              renew="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificate "$cert" -o jsonpath='{.status.renewalTime}')"
+              after="$(kubectl -n "$gns" get certificate "$cert" -o jsonpath='{.status.notAfter}')"
+              [ -n "$renew" ] || { echo "FAIL: Certificate $cert has no status.renewalTime — no renewal is scheduled"; exit 1; }
+              [ -n "$after" ] || { echo "FAIL: Certificate $cert has no status.notAfter"; exit 1; }
+              now_s="$(date -u +%s)"
+              r_s="$(date -u -d "$renew" +%s)"
+              a_s="$(date -u -d "$after" +%s)"
+              echo "now=$(date -u -d "@$now_s" +%FT%TZ) renewalTime=$renew notAfter=$after"
+              echo "renewal is in $(( (r_s - now_s) / 86400 ))d; expiry in $(( (a_s - now_s) / 86400 ))d"
+              [ "$r_s" -gt "$now_s" ] || { echo "FAIL: renewalTime is in the PAST — the scheduled renewal did not happen"; exit 1; }
+              [ "$r_s" -lt "$a_s" ] || { echo "FAIL: renewalTime is not before notAfter — renewal would come too late"; exit 1; }
+              echo "RENEWAL_SCHEDULED_OK"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'RENEWAL_SCHEDULED_OK')): true
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------- MUTATING HALF (hermetic namespace)
+    - name: when-a-certificate-is-declared-then-it-is-issued-with-no-human-step
+      description: >-
+        Declare an Issuer and a Certificate in this test's own namespace, with a renewal
+        window that opens one minute after issuance. Nothing else is done to them for the
+        rest of the test — every later transition is the controller acting on its own.
+      try:
+        - apply:
+            resource:
+              # selfSigned: no external CA, no rate limit, no DNS write. See the header for
+              # what this proves (controller automation) and what it does not (the ACME path).
+              apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+              kind: Issuer
+              metadata:
+                name: conformance-lifecycle
+              spec:
+                selfSigned: {}
+        - apply:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+              kind: Certificate
+              metadata:
+                name: conformance-lifecycle
+              spec:
+                secretName: conformance-lifecycle-tls
+                # 1h is cert-manager's minimum duration; renewing 59m before expiry puts the
+                # renewal instant ~1 minute after each issuance, so an unattended renewal is
+                # observable inside a test run instead of 30 days from now.
+                duration: 1h
+                renewBefore: 3540s
+                commonName: conformance-lifecycle.invalid
+                dnsNames:
+                  - conformance-lifecycle.invalid
+                privateKey:
+                  rotationPolicy: Always
+                issuerRef:
+                  kind: Issuer
+                  name: conformance-lifecycle
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+              kind: Certificate
+              metadata:
+                name: conformance-lifecycle
+              status:
+                conditions:
+                  - type: Ready
+                    status: "True"
+                revision: 1
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -u
+              crt="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get secret conformance-lifecycle-tls \
+                       -o jsonpath='{.data.tls\.crt}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              key="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get secret conformance-lifecycle-tls \
+                       -o jsonpath='{.data.tls\.key}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              [ -n "$crt" ] && [ -n "$key" ] || { echo "FAIL: no certificate material was issued into conformance-lifecycle-tls"; exit 1; }
+              # Record the serving bytes so the renewal step can prove they CHANGED.
+              echo "$crt" | cksum > /tmp/conformance-cert-r1.cksum
+              echo "revision-1 cert fingerprint: $(cat /tmp/conformance-cert-r1.cksum)"
+              echo "CERT_ISSUED_OK"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'CERT_ISSUED_OK')): true
+
+    - name: then-it-renews-itself-before-expiry-with-no-human-step
+      description: >-
+        Nothing touches the Certificate here. Poll until the controller has reissued it
+        at least twice on its own and the serving bytes differ from revision 1 — docs/08's
+        "observed across a renewal", and every request auto-approved.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -u
+              want=3          # revision 1 = issuance; >=3 means TWO unattended renewals
+              for i in $(seq 1 30); do
+                rev="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get certificate conformance-lifecycle \
+                         -o jsonpath='{.status.revision}' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
+                echo "poll $i: revision=${rev:-0}"
+                [ "${rev:-0}" -ge "$want" ] && break
+                sleep 20
+              done
+              rev="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get certificate conformance-lifecycle \
+                       -o jsonpath='{.status.revision}' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
+              [ "${rev:-0}" -ge "$want" ] || { echo "FAIL: revision reached only ${rev:-0} — cert-manager did not renew unattended"; exit 1; }
+
+              # The serving material must actually have rotated, not just the revision count.
+              now="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get secret conformance-lifecycle-tls \
+                       -o jsonpath='{.data.tls\.crt}' | cksum)"
+              was="$(cat /tmp/conformance-cert-r1.cksum)"
+              echo "r1=$was  now=$now"
+              [ "$now" != "$was" ] || { echo "FAIL: the Secret still holds the revision-1 certificate — nothing was actually reissued"; exit 1; }
+
+              # Every renewal request was approved by the controller, never by a person.
+              bad=0
+              for cr in $(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get certificaterequest -o name 2>/dev/null); do
+                st="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get "$cr" \
+                        -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Approved")].status}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+                who="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get "$cr" -o jsonpath='{.spec.username}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+                echo "  $cr approved=$st requester=$who"
+                [ "$st" = "True" ] || bad=1
+                case "$who" in system:serviceaccount:*) : ;; *) bad=1 ;; esac
+              done
+              [ "$bad" = 0 ] || { echo "FAIL: a CertificateRequest was not auto-approved, or was not submitted by a controller"; exit 1; }
+              echo "CERT_RENEWED_UNATTENDED_OK (revision=$rev)"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'CERT_RENEWED_UNATTENDED_OK')): true
+
+    - name: then-removing-the-certificate-withdraws-the-serving-material
+      description: >-
+        docs/08 reads revocation as "removing/rotating a certificate is a declarative
+        change". The declarative change is the deletion; withdrawal of the credential
+        must follow with no manual cleanup. EXPECTED TO FAIL TODAY — cert-manager needs
+        `enableCertificateOwnerRef: true` for the Secret to be garbage-collected, and the
+        tracked HelmRelease does not set it. Kept as the requirement reads (R-TEST-06).
+      try:
+        - delete:
+            ref:
+              apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
+              kind: Certificate
+              name: conformance-lifecycle
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -u
+              for i in $(seq 1 15); do
+                if ! kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get secret conformance-lifecycle-tls >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                  echo "CERT_WITHDRAWN_OK (serving material gone after $((i * 4))s)"
+                  exit 0
+                fi
+                sleep 4
+              done
+              owners="$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" get secret conformance-lifecycle-tls \
+                          -o jsonpath='{.metadata.ownerReferences}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              echo "FAIL: the Certificate was deleted but Secret conformance-lifecycle-tls still"
+              echo "      holds usable certificate material (ownerReferences=${owners:-none})."
+              echo "      Removing a certificate therefore does NOT withdraw the credential, so"
+              echo "      R-TLS-02's 'revoked ... without manual steps' does not hold. FIX:"
+              echo "      set enableCertificateOwnerRef: true in platform/cert-manager values"
+              echo "      (owner decision — WS-TEST does not weaken the assertion instead)."
+              exit 1
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'CERT_WITHDRAWN_OK')): true
+      finally:
+        # Namespace teardown removes both objects anyway; explicit so a leftover Secret
+        # from the expected failure above is never left holding key material.
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" delete secret conformance-lifecycle-tls --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
+              kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" delete certificate conformance-lifecycle --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
+              kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" delete issuer conformance-lifecycle --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
+              rm -f /tmp/conformance-cert-r1.cksum || true
@@ -153,3 +153,20 @@ spec:
      finally:
        - script:
            content: 'echo "cleanup handled by chainsaw namespace teardown"'
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # PROOF-OF-PASS SENTINEL (R-SEC-03). Every step above is an assert/Job-status gate, so
+    # chainsaw already fails the test before reaching this step if any of them fails — but a
+    # green Chainsaw JUnit carries NO stdout, and the L2/L3 tests in this suite can self-skip
+    # GREEN, so lib/record_run.py refuses to treat a bare `passed` as evidence and records
+    # `unknown-no-sentinel-declared` instead. Without a declared token this test could pass
+    # forever and NEVER become a recorded proof of R-NET-01 — the isolation half of docs/07's audit proof list
+    # — which is precisely what docs/07 asks for ("These proofs are part of the platform
+    # acceptance suite, not one-time checks"). This step exists only to emit that token, and it
+    # is reached only when everything above has passed. Asserted by
+    # tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible.
+    - name: then-emit-the-proof-of-pass-sentinel
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: echo DEFAULT_DENY_PROVEN_OK
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'DEFAULT_DENY_PROVEN_OK')): true
@@ -3,11 +3,18 @@
 # Catalog: docs/14 "DNS/exposure (R-DNS-*)"
 # Spec:    docs/09 (ExternalDNS auto-manages records; split-horizon foundation)
 #
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): the hostname is built from the ${BASE_DOMAIN} of the CLUSTER
+# UNDER TEST (read from flux-system/cluster-vars via a test-level chainsaw binding), and the
+# expected answer is the LB IP that THIS Service was actually assigned (read back from its own
+# status) — so neither the name nor the address is authored per environment, and no run-time flag
+# can be forgotten. Requesting a record under the cluster's own suffix is also what keeps the two
+# environments from ever describing the same public name (the 2026-09-04 incident precondition).
+#
 # GIVEN a LoadBalancer Service annotated with an external-dns hostname,
 # WHEN  ExternalDNS reconciles (source=service, provider=cloudflare, policy=sync),
 # THEN  a PUBLIC DNS record for that hostname is auto-created, pointing at the
-#       Service's Cilium-assigned LB IP (R-DNS-02). The record resolves to the
-#       cluster LB IP (Cilium L2 `shared` pool 192.168.1.53-.60), i.e. clients reach the cluster endpoint.
+#       Service's Cilium-assigned LB IP (R-DNS-02) — asserted as an EXACT match against that
+#       Service's own `status.loadBalancer.ingress[0].ip`, i.e. clients reach the cluster endpoint.
 #
 # CLEANUP: chainsaw deletes the per-test namespace (Service included) at teardown;
 # ExternalDNS policy=sync then REMOVES the record from Cloudflare on its next pass.
@@ -38,6 +45,13 @@ spec:
    apply: 90s
    assert: 5m
    exec: 6m
+  # -- R-ENV-02: the environment's hostname suffix is READ FROM THE CLUSTER UNDER TEST.
+  #    flux-system/cluster-vars is the ConfigMap Flux substitutes ${BASE_DOMAIN} from, so this
+  #    binding is the same source of truth the platform is rendered from — dev asks dev, prod
+  #    asks prod, and there is no per-environment fork and no flag to forget.
+  bindings:
+    - name: baseDomain
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
  steps:
    - name: given-a-service-requesting-a-dns-name
      try:
@@ -48,7 +62,8 @@ spec:
              metadata:
                name: dns-probe-svc
                annotations:
-                  external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: conformance-dns.home.keithjackson.dev
+                  # conformance-dns.<this cluster's BASE_DOMAIN> — never a literal apex.
+                  external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: (join('.', ['conformance-dns', $baseDomain]))
              spec:
                type: LoadBalancer
                # No real backend needed — Cilium LB-IPAM assigns a VIP regardless, and
@@ -59,7 +74,27 @@ spec:
                  - name: http
                    port: 80
                    targetPort: 80
+        # Wait for Cilium LB-IPAM to actually assign the VIP: it is the value ExternalDNS will
+        # publish and the value the probe below asserts EXACTLY. `|| ` + empty-array literal
+        # keeps the expression nil-safe while the address is still absent, so the assert POLLS
+        # (fails and retries) instead of erroring out on the first evaluation.
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: v1
+              kind: Service
+              metadata:
+                name: dns-probe-svc
+              status:
+                (length(loadBalancer.ingress || `[]`)): 1
    - name: then-externaldns-creates-the-public-record
+      # Step-scoped binding: read back the LB IP THIS Service was assigned (the previous step's
+      # assert guarantees it exists by now — step bindings are evaluated when the step runs).
+      # Expecting that exact address is both stricter than the old hardcoded 192.168.1.53-.60
+      # range and correct in every environment: dev's pool is 192.168.1.53-.60, prod's is
+      # 192.168.2.20-.30, and neither is written down here.
+      bindings:
+        - name: lbIp
+          value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'Service', $namespace, 'dns-probe-svc').status.loadBalancer.ingress[0].ip)
      try:
        - apply:
            resource:
@@ -76,20 +111,27 @@ spec:
                    containers:
                      - name: probe
                        image: busybox:1.36.1
+                        # Both values come from the cluster under test: the suffix from
+                        # flux-system/cluster-vars, the address from this Service's own status.
+                        env:
+                          - name: BASE_DOMAIN
+                            value: ($baseDomain)
+                          - name: LB_IP
+                            value: ($lbIp)
                        command:
                          - sh
                          - -c
                          - |
                            set -u
-                            host="conformance-dns.home.keithjackson.dev"
+                            host="conformance-dns.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
                            # Poll PUBLIC DNS (1.1.1.1) until the auto-created A record appears and
-                            # points into the cluster LB range (Cilium L2 `shared` pool 192.168.1.53-.60). Proves ExternalDNS created it.
+                            # points at THIS Service's assigned LB IP. Proves ExternalDNS created it.
                            for i in $(seq 1 28); do
-                              ip="$(nslookup "$host" 1.1.1.1 2>/dev/null | grep -oE '192\.168\.1\.(5[3-9]|60)' | head -1)"
+                              ip="$(nslookup "$host" 1.1.1.1 2>/dev/null | awk '/^Address: /{print $2}' | grep -Fx "${LB_IP}" | head -1)"
                              if [ -n "$ip" ]; then echo "RECORD_FOUND $host -> $ip"; exit 0; fi
-                              echo "poll $i: record not yet published"; sleep 10
+                              echo "poll $i: record not yet published as ${LB_IP}"; sleep 10
                            done
-                            echo "FAIL: ExternalDNS did not publish the record within timeout"; exit 1
+                            echo "FAIL: ExternalDNS did not publish ${host} -> ${LB_IP} within timeout"; exit 1
        - assert:
            resource:
              apiVersion: batch/v1
@@ -2,17 +2,24 @@
 # L2 BEHAVIORAL — split-horizon INTERNAL resolution  (R-DNS-01 / R-DNS-03)   [RUNNABLE]
 # Catalog: docs/14 "DNS/exposure (R-DNS-*)"
 # Spec:    docs/09 "Split-horizon resolution (R-DNS-03)" — internal clients resolve
-#          <svc>.home.keithjackson.dev to the INTERNAL Gateway VIP, not the public hairpin.
+#          <svc>.${BASE_DOMAIN} to the INTERNAL Gateway VIP, not the public hairpin.
 # Impl:    platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml (k3s CoreDNS `import *.server`; template plugin
-#          answers the whole home.keithjackson.dev zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}).
+#          answers the whole ${BASE_DOMAIN} zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}).
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): this test asks the CLUSTER IT IS POINTED AT for its own
+# ${BASE_DOMAIN} and ${GATEWAY_VIP} — the same flux-system/cluster-vars ConfigMap Flux
+# substitutes from — via test-level chainsaw bindings (see `spec.bindings`). Nothing here is
+# per-environment and no flag is passed at run time, so the suite cannot be run against the
+# wrong expectation: dev asserts dev's zone/VIP, prod asserts prod's.
 #
 # GIVEN the split-horizon coredns-custom ConfigMap is reconciled into k3s CoreDNS,
 # WHEN  an in-cluster pod resolves a platform hostname over its PUBLIC name
-#       (keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev) using the default cluster resolver (CoreDNS 10.43.0.10),
-# THEN  the answer is the in-cluster Gateway VIP (the Cilium L2 `shared` gateway pool 192.168.1.53-.60) — NOT a
-#       public/off-cluster IP. This is what lets pod->public-hostname traffic hairpin through the
-#       Gateway with the correct SNI (*.home.keithjackson.dev) so the wildcard cert validates
-#       (R-DNS-01 "services reachable at <svc>.home..."; R-DNS-03 split-horizon).
+#       (keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}) using the default cluster resolver (CoreDNS 10.43.0.10),
+# THEN  the answer is EXACTLY that cluster's ${GATEWAY_VIP} (the address coredns-custom is
+#       templated with, and the `shared` Gateway's own status address) — NOT a public/off-cluster
+#       IP. This is what lets pod->public-hostname traffic hairpin through the
+#       Gateway with the correct SNI (*.${BASE_DOMAIN}) so the wildcard cert validates
+#       (R-DNS-01 "services reachable at <svc>.${BASE_DOMAIN}"; R-DNS-03 split-horizon).
 #
 # Complements dns-exposure (R-DNS-02, the EXTERNAL/public-record side). Together they cover the
 # split-horizon pair: external answer = public record (R-DNS-02); internal answer = Gateway VIP
@@ -34,13 +41,23 @@ metadata:
    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
-      An in-cluster pod resolving keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev via cluster DNS gets the internal
-      Gateway VIP (192.168.1.53-.60), not the public hairpin — split-horizon in-cluster resolution.
+      An in-cluster pod resolving keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN} via cluster DNS gets that cluster's
+      internal Gateway VIP, not the public hairpin — split-horizon in-cluster resolution.
 spec:
  timeouts:
    apply: 60s
    assert: 2m
    exec: 2m
+  # -- R-ENV-02: the environment's identity is READ FROM THE CLUSTER UNDER TEST, never authored
+  #    here. flux-system/cluster-vars is the ConfigMap Flux itself substitutes from
+  #    (clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml + the dev/prod overlay patch), so these bindings are the
+  #    same source of truth the platform is rendered from. Test-level => in scope for every step
+  #    (unlike step `outputs`, which are step-scoped).
+  bindings:
+    - name: baseDomain
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
+    - name: gatewayVip
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.GATEWAY_VIP)
  steps:
    - name: then-cluster-dns-answers-with-the-internal-gateway-vip
      try:
@@ -59,23 +76,32 @@ spec:
                    containers:
                      - name: probe
                        image: busybox:1.36.1
+                        # The cluster's OWN identity, resolved from flux-system/cluster-vars by the
+                        # test-level bindings — never a literal (R-ENV-02).
+                        env:
+                          - name: BASE_DOMAIN
+                            value: ($baseDomain)
+                          - name: GATEWAY_VIP
+                            value: ($gatewayVip)
                        command:
                          - sh
                          - -c
                          - |
                            set -u
-                            host="keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev"
+                            host="keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
                            # Resolve via the DEFAULT cluster resolver (CoreDNS, /etc/resolv.conf ->
-                            # 10.43.0.10). Split-horizon must answer with the in-cluster Gateway VIP
-                            # (Cilium L2 `shared` pool 192.168.1.53-.60), proving pods hairpin through the Gateway.
+                            # 10.43.0.10). Split-horizon must answer with THIS cluster's Gateway VIP
+                            # (the address coredns-custom is templated with), proving pods hairpin
+                            # through the Gateway. Exact match on ${GATEWAY_VIP}: stricter than the
+                            # old hardcoded 192.168.1.53-.60 range AND correct in both environments.
                            out="$(nslookup "$host" 2>/dev/null)"
                            echo "$out"
-                            ip="$(echo "$out" | awk '/^Address: /{print $2}' | grep -E '^192\.168\.1\.(5[3-9]|60)$' | head -1)"
+                            ip="$(echo "$out" | awk '/^Address: /{print $2}' | grep -Fx "${GATEWAY_VIP}" | head -1)"
                            if [ -n "$ip" ]; then
                              echo "INTERNAL_RESOLUTION_OK $host -> $ip (in-cluster Gateway VIP)"
                              exit 0
                            fi
-                            echo "FAIL: $host did not resolve to the in-cluster Gateway VIP (192.168.1.53-.60);"
+                            echo "FAIL: $host did not resolve to this cluster's Gateway VIP (${GATEWAY_VIP});"
                            echo "      split-horizon coredns-custom not in effect (got a public/off-cluster answer)."
                            exit 1
        - assert:
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL — the default egress path is the WAN; the VPN is opt-in  (R-NET-04)  [RUNNABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L2 row ("real runtime behavior, probes against a cluster")
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-NET-04 ("The platform MUST support **multiple egress paths** selected by
+#          routing rules ... realized as two paths — the local `internet` path and the
+#          in-cluster `vpn` path").
+#          docs/03 §"Egress routing: two paths, one physical WAN": "the `internet` path is
+#          simply the default route out".
+#          docs/03 §"VPN egress model": "**Default is the WAN; the VPN is strictly opt-in.**
+#          Every pod — and the nodes themselves — egress the local/private WAN by default and
+#          **never** the VPN. Only services labeled `egress-class=vpn` are steered to the
+#          tunnel"; and the tunnel "is **split-tunnel**: ... only what Cilium points at `tun0`
+#          uses the VPN."
+#
+# WHAT THIS PROVES THAT tests/l2-behavioral/egress-class DOES NOT
+# --------------------------------------------------------------
+# That test (R-NET-05/07) compares two LABELLED pods — `internet` vs `vpn` — and shows their
+# public IPs differ, then flips a label. Both of its pods declared a class, so it says nothing
+# about the case R-NET-04 actually turns on: a pod that NO routing rule selects. This test adds
+# that pod, and asserts the two claims that make a rule-selected path set complete:
+#
+#   TOTALITY   — an UNLABELLED pod egresses the WAN, i.e. the same public IP as the
+#                explicitly-`internet` pod. Absence of a matching rule IS a path, and it is
+#                the local one. If the steering rule ever widened (an empty selector, a
+#                matchExpression, a second rule), this pod's IP would move to the tunnel and
+#                this assertion is what would notice.
+#   COEXISTENCE — the WAN path and the VPN path are live AT THE SAME TIME, observed in one
+#                pass: three pods, two distinct public IPs. "Multiple egress paths" is a
+#                simultaneity claim, not a claim that one switch has two positions.
+#   PER-DESTINATION SELECTION — the vpn-class pod still reaches an in-cluster/RFC1918
+#                destination over the LOCAL path while its public traffic is tunnelled. The
+#                tunnel is destination-scoped (excludedCIDRs), not a default route, so ONE pod
+#                uses BOTH paths at once.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): no address, hostname or range appears. Every assertion is a
+# RELATION between observed values (equal / not-equal), so it holds against dev and prod alike
+# and survives the WAN or the VPN provider rotating addresses.
+#
+# GIVEN one unlabelled, one `internet`-class and one `vpn`-class pod — the same workload three
+#       times, differing only in the class they declare (or do not),
+# WHEN  each asks an external echo for the public IP it egressed from, and the vpn-class pod
+#       also resolves a name through the in-cluster resolver,
+# THEN  the unlabelled pod's public IP EQUALS the internet-class pod's (the default route out
+#       is the WAN, and the VPN is strictly opt-in);
+# AND   the vpn-class pod's public IP DIFFERS from both (a second, simultaneously-live path);
+# AND   the vpn-class pod still resolves in-cluster (its private-destination traffic was not
+#       swallowed by the tunnel), so the same pod is using both paths at once.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this test as claiming them):
+#   - THAT NO OTHER RULE EXISTS. Three pods cannot enumerate a rule set. That exactly one
+#     steering rule is authored, that it selects only the vpn class, that no `ip rule` is
+#     unscoped and no nftables DROP unqualified is the L0 half, in
+#     tests/l0-static/egress-paths-selected-by-rules (same requirement label).
+#   - WHICH INTERFACE the packets left by. The observation is the public IP an external echo
+#     reports; it distinguishes the paths without naming them. Asserting "out tun0" would need
+#     host-level datapath inspection (Hubble/tcpdump on the gateway node), which no test in
+#     this suite does.
+#   - THE KILL-SWITCH. Tunnel-down behaviour is R-NET-06's, at L3 (vpn-killswitch): `vpn`
+#     fails closed. Its mirror — that `internet` is never blackholed — is asserted statically
+#     by the L0 half, not here.
+#   - NODE traffic. docs/03 also says "the nodes themselves" egress the WAN by default. That
+#     is a host-level fact this test cannot see from a pod.
+#   - EXTERNAL DEPENDENCY, stated plainly: the public-IP echo (api.ipify.org) is off-cluster,
+#     so a WAN outage or the echo being down fails this test. That is the same dependency
+#     tests/l2-behavioral/egress-class already carries; the alternative — trusting the
+#     cluster's own account of which path it used — would not be a behavioural test at all.
+#
+# CLEANUP: chainsaw deletes the per-test namespace (all three pods with it). Nothing outside
+# that namespace is created or changed — no label on a platform object, no policy edit.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: egress-default-path
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-04: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-04"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given an unlabelled, an internet-class and a vpn-class pod, when each observes the public
+      IP it egressed from, then the unlabelled pod's IP equals the internet-class pod's (the
+      default route out is the WAN, the VPN is opt-in) while the vpn-class pod's differs — two
+      paths live at once — and the vpn-class pod still reaches in-cluster destinations over the
+      local path, so one pod uses both paths simultaneously.
+spec:
+  timeouts:
+    apply: 60s
+    assert: 2m
+    exec: 3m
+  steps:
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: given-three-pods-differing-only-in-their-declared-egress-class
+      try:
+        - apply:
+            file: fixtures/three-egress-pods.yaml
+        # Bare pods (restartPolicy: Never) — Ready == Running here.
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: v1
+              kind: Pod
+              metadata: { name: egress-unlabelled }
+              status: { phase: Running }
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: v1
+              kind: Pod
+              metadata: { name: egress-internet }
+              status: { phase: Running }
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: v1
+              kind: Pod
+              metadata: { name: egress-vpn }
+              status: { phase: Running }
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: then-the-unlabelled-pod-takes-the-wan-and-the-vpn-path-is-live-too
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -eu
+              ns="$NAMESPACE"
+              get_ip() {
+                # Echo the pod's observed public IP, or empty on failure.
+                kubectl -n "$ns" exec "$1" -c curl -- \
+                  curl -fsS --max-time 10 https://api.ipify.org 2>/dev/null || true
+              }
+
+              # Poll until all three answer AND the vpn class has diverged from the WAN:
+              # Cilium may still be programming the egress datapath just after the pods go
+              # Ready. Bounded by the loop, never a bare sleep-and-hope.
+              none="" inet="" vpn=""
+              for i in $(seq 1 12); do
+                [ -n "$none" ] || none="$(get_ip egress-unlabelled)"
+                [ -n "$inet" ] || inet="$(get_ip egress-internet)"
+                [ -n "$vpn" ]  || vpn="$(get_ip egress-vpn)"
+                if [ -n "$none" ] && [ -n "$inet" ] && [ -n "$vpn" ]; then
+                  [ "$vpn" != "$inet" ] && break
+                  # Steering may not have converged; re-read the vpn pod only.
+                  vpn=""
+                fi
+                sleep 5
+              done
+              echo "unlabelled_ip=$none internet_ip=$inet vpn_ip=$vpn"
+
+              [ -n "$none" ] || { echo "FAIL: the UNLABELLED pod never returned a public IP — a pod that declares no egress class must still reach the internet over the default WAN path (docs/03: 'the internet path is simply the default route out'); no path at all means the default was blackholed or steered into a dead tunnel" >&2; exit 1; }
+              [ -n "$inet" ] || { echo "FAIL: the internet-class pod never returned a public IP — the declared default path is down, so no comparison is possible" >&2; exit 1; }
+              [ -n "$vpn" ]  || { echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod never returned a public IP — the second egress path is not carrying traffic, so the platform is not offering MULTIPLE paths (R-NET-04)" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+              # TOTALITY: no rule selects the unlabelled pod, so it must land on the WAN —
+              # the same WAN the explicitly-internet pod uses.
+              if [ "$none" != "$inet" ]; then
+                echo "FAIL: the UNLABELLED pod egressed $none but the internet-class pod egressed $inet. They must be the same path: docs/03 — 'Default is the WAN; the VPN is strictly opt-in. Every pod ... egress the local/private WAN by default and never the VPN.' A different IP means some rule is selecting a pod that never opted in." >&2
+                exit 1
+              fi
+              # COEXISTENCE: and the vpn path is a genuinely different path, live right now.
+              if [ "$vpn" = "$inet" ]; then
+                echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod egressed the same public IP as the WAN ($vpn) — there is only ONE live egress path, so 'multiple egress paths selected by routing rules' (R-NET-04) does not hold" >&2
+                exit 1
+              fi
+              echo "EGRESS_DEFAULT_PATH_IS_WAN_OK"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'EGRESS_DEFAULT_PATH_IS_WAN_OK')): true
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: then-the-vpn-class-pod-still-reaches-private-destinations-locally
+      try:
+        - script:
+            # PER-DESTINATION SELECTION. The steering rule tunnels 0.0.0.0/0 MINUS all
+            # RFC1918 space, so a vpn-class pod's private-destination traffic must stay on the
+            # local datapath. The cluster resolver is an in-cluster (RFC1918) address reached
+            # from the pod's own /etc/resolv.conf — no literal is written here — so a
+            # successful lookup from the vpn-class pod proves the tunnel did not swallow its
+            # local traffic, i.e. ONE pod is using BOTH paths at the same time.
+            content: |
+              set -eu
+              ns="$NAMESPACE"
+              resolver="$(kubectl -n "$ns" exec egress-vpn -c curl -- \
+                sh -c 'awk "/^nameserver/{print \$2; exit}" /etc/resolv.conf' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+              [ -n "$resolver" ] || { echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod has no nameserver in /etc/resolv.conf, so its local-path reachability cannot be observed" >&2; exit 1; }
+              echo "vpn_pod_resolver=$resolver (in-cluster, RFC1918 — excluded from the tunnel)"
+
+              # A cluster-internal name, resolvable only by the in-cluster resolver: reaching
+              # it proves the private-destination path works from a vpn-class pod.
+              out=""
+              for i in $(seq 1 6); do
+                out="$(kubectl -n "$ns" exec egress-vpn -c curl -- \
+                  nslookup kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local 2>/dev/null || true)"
+                case "$out" in *"Address"*) break ;; esac
+                sleep 5
+              done
+              case "$out" in
+                *Address*) : ;;
+                *) echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod could not resolve kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local via its in-cluster resolver ($resolver). Its RFC1918 traffic is being steered into the tunnel (or blackholed) instead of taking the local path — the two paths are not coexisting per destination, and the tunnel is behaving as a default route (docs/03: split-tunnel, 'only what Cilium points at tun0 uses the VPN')" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+              esac
+              echo "EGRESS_PATHS_COEXIST_PER_DESTINATION_OK"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'EGRESS_PATHS_COEXIST_PER_DESTINATION_OK')): true
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Three pods for the R-NET-04 default-path test — the SAME workload three times, differing
+# ONLY in how (or whether) they declare an egress class:
+#
+#   egress-unlabelled  NO egress-class label at all -> selected by NO routing rule
+#   egress-internet    egress-class: internet       -> the declared default path
+#   egress-vpn         egress-class: vpn            -> the only class any rule steers
+#
+# WHY AN UNLABELLED POD IS THE POINT. docs/03: "Every pod — and the nodes themselves — egress
+# the local/private WAN by default and **never** the VPN." The unlabelled pod is the case no
+# other test covers: nothing selects it, so the DATAPATH's default must carry it, and it must
+# come out the same WAN as the explicitly-`internet` pod. That is the totality half of
+# R-NET-04's "selected by routing rules" — absence of a rule is itself a path.
+#
+# The unlabelled pod is admissible here only because chainsaw's per-test namespace is not an
+# app namespace: Kyverno's require-egress-class-label (R-NET-05) rejects an unlabelled pod in
+# a namespace labelled homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace=true. That admission guarantee
+# is R-NET-05's, and it is exactly why this test must run outside an app namespace to observe
+# the datapath's own default at all.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  name: egress-unlabelled
+  labels:
+    app: egress-default-path-test
+spec:
+  containers:
+    - name: curl
+      image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
+      command: ["sleep", "3600"]
+      resources:
+        requests: { cpu: 10m, memory: 16Mi }
+        limits: { memory: 32Mi }
+  restartPolicy: Never
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  name: egress-internet
+  labels:
+    app: egress-default-path-test
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: internet
+spec:
+  containers:
+    - name: curl
+      image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
+      command: ["sleep", "3600"]
+      resources:
+        requests: { cpu: 10m, memory: 16Mi }
+        limits: { memory: 32Mi }
+  restartPolicy: Never
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  name: egress-vpn
+  labels:
+    app: egress-default-path-test
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: vpn
+spec:
+  containers:
+    - name: curl
+      image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
+      command: ["sleep", "3600"]
+      resources:
+        requests: { cpu: 10m, memory: 16Mi }
+        limits: { memory: 32Mi }
+  restartPolicy: Never
@@ -68,6 +68,15 @@ spec:
  timeouts:
    apply: 60s
    assert: 180s
+  # -- R-ENV-02: the fixture's route hostnames MUST fall under the Gateway's wildcard listener
+  #    (*.${BASE_DOMAIN}) or they never attach — so the suffix is READ FROM THE CLUSTER UNDER TEST
+  #    (flux-system/cluster-vars, the ConfigMap Flux substitutes ${BASE_DOMAIN} from) rather than
+  #    authored here. Test-level => in scope for the fixture apply AND every probe step below
+  #    (step `outputs`, by contrast, are step-scoped — see the gwvip re-capture comments).
+  #    fixtures/app-and-probe.yaml consumes it via chainsaw resource templating.
+  bindings:
+    - name: baseDomain
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
  steps:
    # -- GIVEN: the exposed-app fixture (default-deny + gateway-ingress allow + backend +
    #    Service + declared/undeclared HTTPRoutes) and a probe namespace. Assert the shared
@@ -139,12 +148,14 @@ spec:
                        env:
                          - name: GWVIP
                            value: ($gwvip)
+                          - name: BASE_DOMAIN
+                            value: ($baseDomain)
                        command:
                          - sh
                          - -c
                          - |
                            set -u
-                            host="gw-declared-conformance.home.keithjackson.dev"
+                            host="gw-declared-conformance.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
                            last=000
                            i=0
                            while [ "$i" -lt 30 ]; do
@@ -207,12 +218,14 @@ spec:
                        env:
                          - name: GWVIP
                            value: ($gwvip)
+                          - name: BASE_DOMAIN
+                            value: ($baseDomain)
                        command:
                          - sh
                          - -c
                          - |
                            set -u
-                            host="gw-undeclared-conformance.home.keithjackson.dev"
+                            host="gw-undeclared-conformance.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
                            reached_gw=no
                            i=0
                            while [ "$i" -lt 8 ]; do
@@ -300,3 +313,20 @@ spec:
              apiVersion: v1
              kind: Namespace
              name: conformance-gw-probe
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # PROOF-OF-PASS SENTINEL (R-SEC-03). Every step above is an assert/Job-status gate, so
+    # chainsaw already fails the test before reaching this step if any of them fails — but a
+    # green Chainsaw JUnit carries NO stdout, and the L2/L3 tests in this suite can self-skip
+    # GREEN, so lib/record_run.py refuses to treat a bare `passed` as evidence and records
+    # `unknown-no-sentinel-declared` instead. Without a declared token this test could pass
+    # forever and NEVER become a recorded proof of R-NET-01/02/03 — north-south reachability under default-deny, part of the isolation proof
+    # — which is precisely what docs/07 asks for ("These proofs are part of the platform
+    # acceptance suite, not one-time checks"). This step exists only to emit that token, and it
+    # is reached only when everything above has passed. Asserted by
+    # tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible.
+    - name: then-emit-the-proof-of-pass-sentinel
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: echo GATEWAY_INGRESS_ISOLATION_PROVEN_OK
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'GATEWAY_INGRESS_ISOLATION_PROVEN_OK')): true
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 # The namespace opts into the shared Gateway (gateway-access: shared) exactly like a
 # rendered app namespace, so its HTTPRoutes attach to the real platform Gateway and the
 # probe exercises the true north-south path (Gateway Envoy -> backend), not a stand-in.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC HOSTNAMES (R-ENV-02): the two HTTPRoute hostnames are NOT literals. They
+# are chainsaw-templated from the `baseDomain` binding declared in ../chainsaw-test.yaml, which
+# reads BASE_DOMAIN out of the flux-system/cluster-vars ConfigMap of the cluster under test — the
+# same ConfigMap Flux substitutes ${BASE_DOMAIN} from. They MUST fall under the shared Gateway's
+# wildcard listener (*.${BASE_DOMAIN}) or the routes never attach, which is precisely why a
+# hardcoded suffix silently broke this test on any cluster that did not hold the apex.
 ---
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
@@ -134,7 +141,8 @@ spec:
      namespace: gateway
      sectionName: https
  hostnames:
-    - gw-declared-conformance.home.keithjackson.dev
+    # gw-declared-conformance.<this cluster's BASE_DOMAIN> — see the header.
+    - (join('.', ['gw-declared-conformance', $baseDomain]))
  rules:
    - matches:
        - path:
@@ -158,7 +166,8 @@ spec:
      namespace: gateway
      sectionName: https
  hostnames:
-    - gw-undeclared-conformance.home.keithjackson.dev
+    # gw-undeclared-conformance.<this cluster's BASE_DOMAIN> — see the header.
+    - (join('.', ['gw-undeclared-conformance', $baseDomain]))
  rules:
    - matches:
        - path:
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL — the cluster under test IS an HA k3s control plane  (R-PLAT-01)  [RUNNABLE]
+# Catalog: docs/14 L2 row ("real runtime behavior, probes against a cluster")
+# Spec:    docs/00 R-PLAT-01 ("The platform MUST run on k3s across 3 nodes with
+#          production-grade HA control plane in prod; dev/test MAY run fewer nodes but MUST
+#          exercise the same multi-node topology.")
+#          docs/01 "Kubernetes distro | **k3s** (HA, embedded etcd) | R-PLAT-01/02"
+#          docs/02 table: "Control plane | HA embedded etcd (k3s server on all 3) | HA
+#                          embedded etcd (k3s server on all 3)"
+#                         "Node count | 3 VMs (mirror prod topology) | 3 physical nodes"
+#          docs/02 §"k3s topology decisions": "HA control plane with **embedded etcd** across
+#          all 3 nodes (no external datastore)"; "Nodes are both control-plane and workload
+#          (3-node converged cluster)".
+#
+# WHY L2 — AND WHAT L0 ALREADY DID
+# --------------------------------
+# tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code (same requirement label) proves the AUTHORED
+# half offline: the repo builds a 3-server embedded-etcd control plane in both environments,
+# one founder, no external datastore, a leader-elected control-plane-only VIP in the serving
+# cert's SANs. It cannot prove that any of it is TRUE OF A RUNNING CLUSTER — an inventory
+# entry is not a node, and a templated DaemonSet is not a floating VIP. That is this test:
+# every assertion below is read from the cluster the suite is pointed at.
+#
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): no address, hostname, node count or range is written
+# here. The expected node count comes from the cluster's OWN declared identity
+# (flux-system/cluster-vars CLUSTER_ENV, via a test-level chainsaw binding — the same
+# ConfigMap Flux substitutes from); the control-plane VIP is read out of the kube-vip
+# DaemonSet the cluster is actually running; the server addresses come from the Node
+# objects; and the LoadBalancer pool the VIP must stay outside of is read from cluster-vars
+# too. R-PLAT-01 itself distinguishes prod from dev/test ("3 nodes ... in prod; dev/test MAY
+# run fewer"), so the assertion is necessarily environment-AWARE — but it takes the
+# environment from the cluster, never from a flag or a literal, which is precisely the
+# mechanism the tests/README.md convention prescribes.
+#
+# GIVEN the cluster this suite is pointed at,
+# WHEN  its Nodes, its kube-vip DaemonSet and its kube-apiserver endpoints are inspected,
+# THEN  DISTRO:  every node's kubelet is a k3s build (`+k3s`) — the distro really is k3s;
+#       SERVERS: every Ready node is BOTH control-plane AND etcd (the converged 3-node
+#                topology docs/02 fixes — no agent-only node, no control-plane-only node),
+#                the count is ODD and quorum-capable (tolerates >= 1 loss), and it is
+#                EXACTLY three when the cluster declares itself prod;
+#       ETCD:    every one of those nodes is a REGISTERED embedded-etcd member (k3s stamps
+#                `etcd.k3s.cattle.io/node-name` on a node that joined the etcd cluster), so
+#                the datastore is embedded and replicated across all of them;
+#       VIP:     kube-vip is Ready on EVERY control-plane node, is control-plane-only
+#                (svc_enable=false — it must not contend with Cilium LB-IPAM for ARP), and
+#                the address it floats is neither a node address, nor the ingress Gateway
+#                VIP, nor inside the Cilium LoadBalancer pool;
+#       ENDPOINT: the kube-apiserver answers `/readyz` THROUGH THAT VIP over TLS that
+#                validates against the cluster CA for the VIP itself — i.e. the VIP really
+#                fronts the API and the serving cert really carries it;
+#       EVERY SERVER SERVES: the apiserver also answers `/readyz` on EVERY server's own
+#                address, again with a CA-valid cert for that address. This is the assertion
+#                that separates a real HA control plane from one server plus two joiners:
+#                if only the founder ran an apiserver, the other addresses would refuse.
+#
+# THE PROBE RUNS IN-CLUSTER, DELIBERATELY. An earlier draft dialled the VIP and the node
+# addresses from the RUNNER. That works from a host on the node LAN (verified against prod)
+# and FAILS against dev, whose nodes sit behind a NAT the runner reaches only via a
+# forwarded port — i.e. it would have made the test a property of where it was launched
+# from. A Job on the cluster is on the node network in both environments, so the probe is
+# the same probe everywhere. The Job is created imperatively (kubectl heredoc) rather than
+# as a fixture file because its address list is DISCOVERED from the cluster at run time —
+# writing it into a fixture is exactly the per-environment literal R-ENV-02 forbids.
+#
+# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this test as claiming them):
+#   - FAILOVER / SURVIVAL. Nothing here removes a node. That etcd keeps quorum, that the VIP
+#     migrates, and that the API stays reachable when a server dies is an L3 fault-injection
+#     claim and is proven NOWHERE in this suite yet (tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss
+#     drains a node for R-STATE-02's data-availability claim and asserts nothing about the
+#     control plane). This is the largest remaining R-PLAT-01 gap.
+#   - THE NEXT environment. That the repo would build an HA control plane again is the L0
+#     half (tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code).
+#   - "PRODUCTION-GRADE" as a capacity/performance judgement (operator's, docs/02 + §2 of
+#     infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md).
+#   - THAT THE RUNNING cilium-agents ACTUALLY DIAL THIS VIP. As of 2026-09-06 the repository
+#     authors `K3S_API_HOST` = the control-plane VIP in both environments (asserted at L0 by
+#     tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code, on both sides of the [parity] contract), but
+#     this test does not read the agents' live `KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST`. Until the operator
+#     applies that change the LIVE agents still carry the PRIMARY NODE's address — measured
+#     2026-09-06: all three prod agents on 192.168.2.10 while kube-vip held 192.168.2.9. An
+#     in-cluster assertion on the agents' endpoint belongs here and is NOT yet written; it is
+#     the obvious follow-up once the change is applied and would catch drift the L0 check
+#     cannot see (a hand-edited DaemonSet, a Helm value overridden out of band).
+#   - etcd health beyond membership registration (raft leader, DB size, alarms) — k3s exposes
+#     it only on the node-local etcd metrics port, which is not reachable through the
+#     Kubernetes API this test is allowed to use.
+#
+# CLEANUP: the probe Job lives in chainsaw's per-test namespace and is deleted with it
+# (config/chainsaw-config.yaml skipDelete: false). Everything else is read-only: this test
+# creates nothing outside its own namespace and mutates no platform object.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: ha-control-plane
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-PLAT-01: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-PLAT-01"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Given the cluster under test, when its Nodes, kube-vip DaemonSet and apiserver
+      endpoints are probed, then every node is a k3s server that is both control-plane and a
+      registered embedded-etcd member, the count is odd and quorum-capable (exactly three
+      when the cluster declares itself prod), kube-vip floats a control-plane-only VIP that
+      collides with no allocator, and the apiserver answers /readyz through that VIP AND on
+      every server's own address with a CA-valid cert.
+spec:
+  timeouts:
+    apply: 60s
+    assert: 2m
+    exec: 3m
+  # -- R-ENV-02: the environment's identity and its address allocations are READ FROM THE
+  #    CLUSTER UNDER TEST. flux-system/cluster-vars is the ConfigMap Flux itself substitutes
+  #    from, so these are the same values the platform was rendered with. Test-level, so
+  #    they are in scope for every step (step outputs/bindings are step-scoped).
+  bindings:
+    - name: clusterEnv
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.CLUSTER_ENV)
+    - name: gatewayVip
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.GATEWAY_VIP)
+    - name: lbPoolStart
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.CILIUM_LB_POOL_START)
+    - name: lbPoolStop
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP)
+  steps:
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: then-the-node-set-is-a-quorum-capable-converged-k3s-control-plane
+      description: >-
+        Read the Node objects: k3s on every node, every node both control-plane and a
+        registered embedded-etcd member, an odd quorum-capable count, exactly three in prod.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            env:
+              - name: CLUSTER_ENV
+                value: ($clusterEnv)
+            content: |
+              set -eu
+              fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+              total="$(kubectl get nodes -o name | grep -c . || true)"
+              [ "$total" -ge 1 ] || fail "the cluster reports NO nodes at all"
+
+              # --- k3s, on every node (R-PLAT-01 names the distro; docs/01 ADR-0001) -----
+              # A non-k3s kubelet here would mean the platform is not running on k3s.
+              notk3s="$(kubectl get nodes \
+                -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"="}{.status.nodeInfo.kubeletVersion}{"\n"}{end}' \
+                | grep -v '+k3s' | grep -c . || true)"
+              [ "$notk3s" = "0" ] \
+                || fail "$notk3s node(s) do not run a k3s kubelet — R-PLAT-01 requires the platform to run on k3s"
+
+              # --- every node is BOTH control-plane AND etcd (docs/02 converged topology) -
+              # Counted by label EXISTENCE, so it does not matter whether k3s writes "true"
+              # or "". A control-plane node without the etcd role would be a server with an
+              # external/absent datastore; an etcd node without control-plane would be an
+              # isolated datastore member. Both are excluded by requiring all three counts
+              # to be equal.
+              cp="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane -o name | grep -c . || true)"
+              etcd="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/etcd -o name | grep -c . || true)"
+              echo "nodes_total=$total control_plane=$cp etcd=$etcd cluster_env=${CLUSTER_ENV:-<unset>}"
+              [ "$cp" = "$total" ] \
+                || fail "$cp of $total nodes carry node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane — docs/02 fixes a converged cluster where every node is a control-plane member ('k3s server on all 3')"
+              [ "$etcd" = "$total" ] \
+                || fail "$etcd of $total nodes carry node-role.kubernetes.io/etcd — docs/02 requires embedded etcd 'across all 3 nodes (no external datastore)'"
+
+              # --- every node is a REGISTERED embedded-etcd member -----------------------
+              # k3s stamps etcd.k3s.cattle.io/node-name on a node that actually joined the
+              # embedded-etcd cluster. The role label alone is a label; this annotation is
+              # the datastore's own record of membership.
+              members="$(kubectl get nodes \
+                -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.annotations.etcd\.k3s\.cattle\.io/node-name}{"\n"}{end}' \
+                | grep -c . || true)"
+              [ "$members" = "$total" ] \
+                || fail "$members of $total nodes are registered embedded-etcd members (etcd.k3s.cattle.io/node-name) — the datastore is not replicated across every server"
+
+              # --- Ready ---------------------------------------------------------------
+              notready="$(kubectl get nodes \
+                -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"="}{range .status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")]}{.status}{end}{"\n"}{end}' \
+                | grep -v '=True$' | grep -c . || true)"
+              [ "$notready" = "0" ] \
+                || fail "$notready node(s) are not Ready — a control plane missing a member is not the HA topology under test"
+
+              # --- quorum arithmetic ---------------------------------------------------
+              # Embedded etcd needs floor(N/2)+1 members to commit. Fault tolerance is
+              # N - quorum; 'production-grade HA' must survive at least one loss, which
+              # rules out 1 and 2 members. An EVEN count buys no extra tolerance and adds
+              # a tie, so it is also rejected.
+              quorum=$(( total / 2 + 1 ))
+              tolerance=$(( total - quorum ))
+              echo "quorum=$quorum tolerance=$tolerance"
+              [ "$tolerance" -ge 1 ] \
+                || fail "$total etcd member(s) give quorum $quorum and tolerate $tolerance loss(es) — an HA control plane must survive losing a server"
+              [ $(( total % 2 )) -eq 1 ] \
+                || fail "$total etcd members is EVEN: quorum is the same as for $(( total - 1 )) members, so the extra member adds a tie instead of tolerance"
+
+              # --- the count R-PLAT-01 itself fixes, per environment --------------------
+              # The environment is the cluster's OWN CLUSTER_ENV (cluster-vars), never a
+              # flag: 'k3s across 3 nodes ... in prod; dev/test MAY run fewer nodes but MUST
+              # exercise the same multi-node topology'.
+              case "${CLUSTER_ENV:-}" in
+                prod)
+                  [ "$total" = "3" ] \
+                    || fail "this cluster declares CLUSTER_ENV=prod and has $total nodes — R-PLAT-01 requires 'k3s across 3 nodes ... in prod' (docs/02: '3 physical nodes')" ;;
+                "")
+                  fail "flux-system/cluster-vars has no CLUSTER_ENV — the cluster does not declare which environment it is, so R-PLAT-01's prod clause has no referent (and no literal may be substituted for it)" ;;
+                *)
+                  [ "$total" -ge 2 ] \
+                    || fail "this cluster declares CLUSTER_ENV=${CLUSTER_ENV} and has $total node(s) — dev/test may run fewer nodes than prod but MUST 'exercise the same multi-node topology'" ;;
+              esac
+              echo "HA_TOPOLOGY_OK"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'HA_TOPOLOGY_OK')): true
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: then-a-control-plane-only-vip-is-floated-on-every-server
+      description: >-
+        Read the running kube-vip DaemonSet: Ready on every control-plane node,
+        control-plane-only, and floating an address that collides with no other allocator.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            env:
+              - name: GATEWAY_VIP
+                value: ($gatewayVip)
+              - name: LB_POOL_START
+                value: ($lbPoolStart)
+              - name: LB_POOL_STOP
+                value: ($lbPoolStop)
+            content: |
+              set -eu
+              fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
+              # dotted quad -> integer, for range comparison without ipcalc/python.
+              n() { echo "$1" | awk -F. '{printf "%d", ($1*16777216)+($2*65536)+($3*256)+$4}'; }
+
+              # The DaemonSet is found by the label roles/kube_vip stamps on it, not by a
+              # hardcoded name in a namespace this test guessed.
+              ds="$(kubectl -n kube-system get ds -l app.kubernetes.io/name=kube-vip-ds -o name | head -1)"
+              [ -n "$ds" ] \
+                || fail "no kube-vip DaemonSet is running in kube-system — the kube-apiserver has no floating endpoint, so losing the founder takes the API endpoint with it"
+
+              desired="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" -o jsonpath='{.status.desiredNumberScheduled}')"
+              ready="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}')"
+              cp="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane -o name | grep -c . || true)"
+              vip="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
+                -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="address")].value}')"
+              cp_enable="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
+                -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="cp_enable")].value}')"
+              svc_enable="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
+                -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="svc_enable")].value}')"
+              echo "kube_vip=$ds ready=$ready/$desired control_plane_nodes=$cp vip=$vip cp_enable=$cp_enable svc_enable=$svc_enable"
+
+              [ -n "$vip" ] \
+                || fail "the kube-vip DaemonSet announces no address — nothing is floated"
+              [ "$cp_enable" = "true" ] \
+                || fail "kube-vip runs with cp_enable=$cp_enable — control-plane mode is off, so it floats no API VIP"
+              [ "$svc_enable" = "false" ] \
+                || fail "kube-vip runs with svc_enable=$svc_enable — it would also serve Service LoadBalancers and contend with Cilium LB-IPAM for ARP on the same addresses (ADR-0002 gives Service LB to Cilium)"
+              [ "$desired" = "$cp" ] \
+                || fail "kube-vip is scheduled on $desired node(s) but there are $cp control-plane nodes — the VIP must be able to move to ANY server, or its failover set is smaller than the control plane"
+              [ "$ready" = "$desired" ] \
+                || fail "kube-vip is Ready on $ready of $desired nodes — a VIP holder that is not running cannot take the address over"
+
+              # --- the VIP collides with nothing --------------------------------------
+              node_ips="$(kubectl get nodes \
+                -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.status.addresses[?(@.type=="InternalIP")].address}{"\n"}{end}' \
+                | grep -c "^${vip}$" || true)"
+              [ "$node_ips" = "0" ] \
+                || fail "the floated VIP $vip is ALSO a node's own InternalIP — a VIP that is a node's address cannot float off that node"
+              [ "$vip" != "${GATEWAY_VIP:-}" ] \
+                || fail "the control-plane VIP and the ingress Gateway VIP are the same address ($vip) — kube-vip and Cilium would both ARP for it"
+              if [ -n "${LB_POOL_START:-}" ] && [ -n "${LB_POOL_STOP:-}" ]; then
+                v="$(n "$vip")"; lo="$(n "$LB_POOL_START")"; hi="$(n "$LB_POOL_STOP")"
+                [ "$lo" -le "$hi" ] \
+                  || fail "the cluster's Cilium LB pool ${LB_POOL_START}-${LB_POOL_STOP} is inverted, so the VIP cannot be proven to be outside it"
+                if [ "$v" -ge "$lo" ] && [ "$v" -le "$hi" ]; then
+                  fail "the control-plane VIP $vip lies INSIDE this cluster's Cilium LoadBalancer pool ${LB_POOL_START}-${LB_POOL_STOP} — LB-IPAM could hand the kube-API's VIP to a Service"
+                fi
+              else
+                fail "flux-system/cluster-vars declares no CILIUM_LB_POOL_START/STOP — the separation between the control-plane VIP and the Service-LB allocator cannot be checked, and no literal range may be substituted for it (R-ENV-02)"
+              fi
+              echo "HA_VIP_CONTROL_PLANE_ONLY_OK"
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'HA_VIP_CONTROL_PLANE_ONLY_OK')): true
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: then-the-apiserver-answers-through-the-vip-and-on-every-server
+      description: >-
+        From inside the cluster, probe /readyz on the floated VIP and on every server's own
+        address, validating TLS against the cluster CA for the address dialled.
+      try:
+        - script:
+            # The address list is DISCOVERED here (Nodes + the kube-vip DaemonSet), so the
+            # Job cannot be a static fixture — writing the addresses down is the
+            # per-environment literal R-ENV-02 forbids. Hence the imperative heredoc, the
+            # same pattern tests/l3-fault-injection/dr-restore uses for run-time-shaped
+            # fixtures. The Job lives in chainsaw's per-test namespace and is torn down with
+            # it; nothing outside that namespace is created or changed.
+            content: |
+              set -eu
+              ns="$NAMESPACE"
+              fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+              ds="$(kubectl -n kube-system get ds -l app.kubernetes.io/name=kube-vip-ds -o name | head -1)"
+              vip="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
+                -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="address")].value}')"
+              servers="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane \
+                -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.status.addresses[?(@.type=="InternalIP")].address}{" "}{end}')"
+              [ -n "$vip" ] || fail "no floated VIP to probe"
+              [ -n "$servers" ] || fail "no control-plane node addresses to probe"
+              echo "probing vip=$vip servers=$servers"
+
+              # The probe pod authenticates with its own ServiceAccount token and validates
+              # TLS against the cluster CA, both from the projected SA volume. /readyz is
+              # authorized for any authenticated identity via the built-in
+              # system:public-info-viewer role — anonymous access is NOT relied on (verified:
+              # an unauthenticated /readyz on this platform answers 401).
+              kubectl -n "$ns" apply -f - <<EOF
+              apiVersion: batch/v1
+              kind: Job
+              metadata:
+                name: ha-api-endpoint-probe
+              spec:
+                backoffLimit: 1
+                activeDeadlineSeconds: 150
+                template:
+                  spec:
+                    restartPolicy: Never
+                    containers:
+                      - name: probe
+                        image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
+                        env:
+                          - name: VIP
+                            value: "${vip}"
+                          - name: SERVERS
+                            value: "${servers}"
+                        command:
+                          - sh
+                          - -c
+                          - |
+                            set -u
+                            SA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
+                            probe() {   # \$1 = address to dial
+                              curl -sS --max-time 15 \\
+                                --cacert "\$SA/ca.crt" \\
+                                -H "Authorization: Bearer \$(cat \$SA/token)" \\
+                                "https://\$1:6443/readyz"
+                            }
+                            rc=0
+                            out="\$(probe "\$VIP" 2>&1)" || rc=1
+                            echo "vip \$VIP -> [\$out]"
+                            if [ "\$rc" != "0" ] || [ "\$out" != "ok" ]; then
+                              echo "FAIL: the kube-apiserver did not answer /readyz through the floated VIP \$VIP with a CA-valid cert for that address — the VIP does not front the API (or it is missing from the serving cert's SANs)"
+                              exit 1
+                            fi
+                            for s in \$SERVERS; do
+                              rc=0
+                              out="\$(probe "\$s" 2>&1)" || rc=1
+                              echo "server \$s -> [\$out]"
+                              if [ "\$rc" != "0" ] || [ "\$out" != "ok" ]; then
+                                echo "FAIL: server \$s does not answer /readyz with a CA-valid cert for its own address — it is not running a kube-apiserver, so the control plane is not HA across every node"
+                                exit 1
+                              fi
+                            done
+                            echo "HA_API_ENDPOINT_OK"
+              EOF
+
+              # Bounded wait; on failure surface the probe's own output before failing.
+              if ! kubectl -n "$ns" wait --for=condition=complete --timeout=140s job/ha-api-endpoint-probe; then
+                kubectl -n "$ns" logs job/ha-api-endpoint-probe --tail=40 || true
+                fail "the in-cluster API-endpoint probe did not complete — see its log above"
+              fi
+              logs="$(kubectl -n "$ns" logs job/ha-api-endpoint-probe --tail=40)"
+              echo "$logs"
+              case "$logs" in
+                *HA_API_ENDPOINT_OK*) echo "HA_API_ENDPOINT_REACHABLE_OK" ;;
+                *) fail "the probe completed without reporting success" ;;
+              esac
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'HA_API_ENDPOINT_REACHABLE_OK')): true
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL — every OIDC client's STORED secret equals the one git declares
+#                                                   (R-IDP-02, R-IDP-04)   [RUNNABLE]
+# Spec: docs/15 identity-and-access; ADR-0014.
+# Impl: platform/keycloak/client-secret-reconciler.yaml (the CronJob + its script).
+#
+# WHY THIS TEST EXISTS
+# --------------------
+# The KeycloakRealmImport resolves each confidential client's secret from a `(env:NAME)`
+# placeholder mapped to a key of the SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients Secret. When
+# the Keycloak Operator cannot resolve a placeholder it stores the LITERAL placeholder
+# text as the client secret AND THE IMPORT JOB STILL REPORTS SUCCESS; the CR then rests
+# at Done=True / Started=False and never re-runs. Measured 2026-09-06: prod had all 12
+# clients holding the literal placeholder — every OIDC login on the cluster failed with
+# "Invalid client or Invalid client credentials" — and dev had one (oauth2-proxy), whose
+# Secret key was added after dev's import had already completed.
+#
+# Every SIGNAL the cluster offered was green: the import Job succeeded, the CR read
+# Done=True, the Keycloak pods were healthy, and the existing keycloak-config-as-code
+# test (which asserts Done=True) PASSED throughout. The only observable was a human
+# failing to log in. This test is that observable, automated: it compares STORED against
+# DECLARED for every client and fails on any difference, so the class cannot sit
+# undetected for months again.
+#
+# GIVEN the `homelab` realm and the SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients Secret,
+# WHEN  the reconciler's script is run in --audit mode (READ-ONLY: it cannot write, and
+#       its endpoint allow-list makes users/groups/roles unreachable),
+#   ->  THEN every declared client's stored secret matches git, and none holds an
+#       unresolved import placeholder. Emits KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRETS_AUDIT_OK.
+#
+# WHY IT RUNS THE SHIPPED SCRIPT rather than re-implementing the comparison: a detector
+# that duplicates the healer's logic drifts from it. This audits with the same code, in
+# the same mode the L0 gate selftests, so a passing audit is evidence about the healer
+# too. It runs as a Job IN the keycloak namespace (not in the ephemeral chainsaw
+# namespace) because the desired state is the mounted keycloak-realm-clients Secret and
+# the admin credential is keycloak-admin-credentials — both namespace-local, which is
+# also why neither this Job nor the CronJob needs any Kubernetes API access.
+#
+# chainsaw v0.2.12: Job + status assert; the leftover-Job delete keeps a re-run from
+# colliding with an immutable Job left by a previous failure.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-client-secrets-match-git
+  labels:
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-IDP-02: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/R-IDP-04: "true"
+  annotations:
+    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-IDP-02, R-IDP-04"
+    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
+    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
+    conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
+      Every OIDC client's stored secret equals the SOPS-declared one and none holds an
+      unresolved import placeholder — the observable that was missing when all 12 prod
+      clients were broken behind a green realm import.
+spec:
+  timeouts:
+    apply: 60s
+    assert: 5m
+    exec: 5m
+  steps:
+    - name: given-the-reconciler-is-reconciled-onto-the-cluster
+      description: >-
+        The audit Job runs the CronJob's own script from its ConfigMap; if Flux has not
+        applied the reconciler, there is nothing to audit WITH and that is the failure.
+      try:
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: v1
+              kind: ConfigMap
+              metadata:
+                name: keycloak-client-secret-reconciler
+                namespace: keycloak
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: batch/v1
+              kind: CronJob
+              metadata:
+                name: keycloak-client-secret-reconciler
+                namespace: keycloak
+              spec:
+                concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
+    - name: then-every-stored-client-secret-matches-git
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              kubectl -n keycloak delete job keycloak-client-secret-audit \
+                --ignore-not-found --wait=true
+        - apply:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: batch/v1
+              kind: Job
+              metadata:
+                name: keycloak-client-secret-audit
+                namespace: keycloak
+                labels:
+                  app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak-client-secret-audit
+                  app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
+              spec:
+                backoffLimit: 0
+                activeDeadlineSeconds: 240
+                template:
+                  metadata:
+                    labels:
+                      app.kubernetes.io/name: keycloak-client-secret-audit
+                  spec:
+                    restartPolicy: Never
+                    automountServiceAccountToken: false
+                    securityContext:
+                      runAsNonRoot: true
+                      runAsUser: 65532
+                      runAsGroup: 65532
+                      seccompProfile:
+                        type: RuntimeDefault
+                    containers:
+                      - name: audit
+                        image: python:3.13.15-alpine3.23
+                        command:
+                          - python3
+                          - /opt/reconciler/reconcile-client-secrets.py
+                          # READ-ONLY. --audit never issues a write on any path; the
+                          # script's --selftest proves that (L0 gate).
+                          - --audit
+                        env:
+                          - name: KEYCLOAK_BASE_URL
+                            value: http://keycloak-service.keycloak.svc.cluster.local:8080
+                          - name: KEYCLOAK_REALM
+                            value: homelab
+                          - name: PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
+                            value: "1"
+                          - name: PYTHONUNBUFFERED
+                            value: "1"
+                          - name: KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USER
+                            valueFrom:
+                              secretKeyRef:
+                                name: keycloak-admin-credentials
+                                key: admin-user
+                          - name: KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD
+                            valueFrom:
+                              secretKeyRef:
+                                name: keycloak-admin-credentials
+                                key: admin-password
+                        volumeMounts:
+                          - name: script
+                            mountPath: /opt/reconciler
+                            readOnly: true
+                          - name: client-secrets
+                            mountPath: /etc/keycloak-realm-clients
+                            readOnly: true
+                        securityContext:
+                          allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+                          readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+                          capabilities:
+                            drop:
+                              - ALL
+                        resources:
+                          requests:
+                            cpu: 10m
+                            memory: 48Mi
+                          limits:
+                            memory: 128Mi
+                    volumes:
+                      - name: script
+                        configMap:
+                          name: keycloak-client-secret-reconciler
+                          defaultMode: 0444
+                      - name: client-secrets
+                        secret:
+                          secretName: keycloak-realm-clients
+                          defaultMode: 0400
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: batch/v1
+              kind: Job
+              metadata:
+                name: keycloak-client-secret-audit
+                namespace: keycloak
+              status:
+                succeeded: 1
+        # The Job's exit status already encodes the verdict, but the sentinel is what the
+        # run LEDGER records (conformance/runs/*/run.log): a JUnit alone cannot tell a real
+        # audit from a Job that succeeded without auditing anything.
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              set -u
+              out="$(kubectl -n keycloak logs job/keycloak-client-secret-audit \
+                       --tail=-1 2>&1 || true)"
+              echo "$out"
+              echo "$out" | grep -q 'KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRETS_AUDIT_OK' \
+                || { echo "FAIL: the audit did not report every client secret matching git"; exit 1; }
+              echo "$out" | grep -q 'UNRESOLVED IMPORT PLACEHOLDER' \
+                && { echo "FAIL: a client still holds the literal import placeholder"; exit 1; }
+              echo KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET_DRIFT_NONE_OK
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET_DRIFT_NONE_OK')): true
+      catch:
+        - describe:
+            apiVersion: batch/v1
+            kind: Job
+            namespace: keycloak
+            name: keycloak-client-secret-audit
+        - podLogs:
+            namespace: keycloak
+            selector: app.kubernetes.io/name=keycloak-client-secret-audit
+            tail: 60
+      finally:
+        - script:
+            content: |
+              kubectl -n keycloak delete job keycloak-client-secret-audit \
+                --ignore-not-found --wait=false
@@ -11,6 +11,18 @@
 #
 # Goes GREEN once Keycloak is up + the realm client-secret hand-off (keycloak-realm-clients) is filled
 # so the placeholder resolves and the import completes. chainsaw v0.2.12: script + block contains check.
+#
+# NOT PROVEN HERE — READ THIS BEFORE TRUSTING A GREEN RUN (added 2026-09-06).
+# Done=True means the import JOB EXITED 0. It does NOT mean the placeholders resolved: when the
+# operator cannot resolve one it stores the LITERAL `(env:...)` text as the client secret and the
+# import still reports success, then rests at Done=True / Started=False and never re-runs. THIS
+# TEST PASSED THROUGHOUT the 2026-09-06 outage in which all 12 prod clients held the literal
+# placeholder and every OIDC login on the cluster failed. Done=True is a necessary, badly
+# insufficient condition.
+# The sufficient check is tests/l2-behavioral/keycloak-client-secrets-match-git, which compares
+# each client's STORED secret against the SOPS-declared one; the static half is
+# tests/l0-static/keycloak-client-secret-reconciler. Do not "simplify" by folding those into this
+# test: the whole lesson is that the import's own success signal is not evidence.
 # =============================================================================
 apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
 kind: Test
@@ -3,10 +3,15 @@
 # Spec: docs/15 identity-and-access; ADR-0014. Impl: Grafana as a Keycloak OIDC client
 # (platform/monitoring/kube-prometheus-stack.yaml auth.generic_oauth) — the self-contained SSO proof.
 #
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): the expected IdP host is built from the ${BASE_DOMAIN} of the
+# CLUSTER UNDER TEST, read from flux-system/cluster-vars (the ConfigMap Flux substitutes from) by
+# a test-level chainsaw binding — so this asserts each cluster redirects to ITS OWN Keycloak, which
+# is exactly what would catch a cross-environment OIDC issuer left pointing at the other cluster.
+#
 # GIVEN Grafana is deployed and configured as an OIDC client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm,
 # WHEN  an unauthenticated browser starts the OIDC login (GET /login/generic_oauth)
 #   ->  THEN Grafana redirects (302) to the CENTRAL IdP's authorize endpoint on
-#       keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab — proving SSO is driven by the one IdP
+#       keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab — proving SSO is driven by the one IdP
 #       (R-IDP-01: central Identity Provider as the single user directory).
 #
 # Goes GREEN once the grafana-oidc client-secret hand-off is filled and Keycloak + Grafana are up.
@@ -30,6 +35,11 @@ spec:
    apply: 60s
    assert: 3m
    exec: 3m
+  # -- R-ENV-02: the IdP hostname suffix is READ FROM THE CLUSTER UNDER TEST
+  #    (flux-system/cluster-vars — the ConfigMap Flux substitutes ${BASE_DOMAIN} from).
+  bindings:
+    - name: baseDomain
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
  steps:
    - name: given-grafana-is-an-oidc-client
      try:
@@ -59,6 +69,9 @@ spec:
                    containers:
                      - name: probe
                        image: busybox:1.36.1
+                        env:
+                          - name: BASE_DOMAIN
+                            value: ($baseDomain)
                        command:
                          - sh
                          - -c
@@ -68,13 +81,14 @@ spec:
                            # busybox wget has no --max-redirect; -S dumps every response header
                            # (incl. the initial 302 Location to the IdP) before following, so the
                            # grep below still matches the Keycloak authorize URL. (Grafana verified
-                            # live: 302 -> keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.../auth.)
+                            # live: 302 -> keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/.../auth.)
+                            idp="keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab"
                            out="$(wget -S -O /dev/null "$svc/login/generic_oauth" 2>&1 || true)"
                            echo "$out"
-                            if echo "$out" | grep -qi 'keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab'; then
-                              echo GRAFANA_OIDC_REDIRECT_OK
+                            if echo "$out" | grep -qiF "$idp"; then
+                              echo "GRAFANA_OIDC_REDIRECT_OK -> ${idp}"
                            else
-                              echo "FAIL: Grafana did not redirect to the Keycloak homelab realm"; exit 1
+                              echo "FAIL: Grafana did not redirect to ${idp} (this cluster's Keycloak homelab realm)"; exit 1
                            fi
        - assert:
            resource:
@@ -3,8 +3,13 @@
 # Catalog: docs/14 onboarding (auth wiring) + docs/15 identity-and-access.
 # Impl: platform/oauth2-proxy (forward-auth against the Keycloak `homelab` realm), ADR-0014.
 #
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): this test names NO hostname. It talks to oauth2-proxy over its
+# in-cluster Service DNS and asserts HTTP behaviour, so the same authored test is correct on dev and
+# on prod. The issuer host below is written as ${BASE_DOMAIN} because that is what the platform
+# substitutes; it is prose, not an input — nothing here needs parameterizing.
+#
 # GIVEN oauth2-proxy is deployed and has validated the Keycloak OIDC issuer (it only becomes Available
-#       after successfully discovering https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab — this is
+#       after successfully discovering https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab — this is
 #       the proxy->Keycloak flow working),
 # WHEN  an UNAUTHENTICATED request hits the forward-auth decision endpoint (/oauth2/auth)
 #   ->  THEN it is challenged: HTTP 401 (no valid Keycloak session => access denied), and a normal
@@ -3,8 +3,13 @@
 # Catalog: docs/14 "Trusted TLS (R-TLS-01/02)"
 # Spec:    docs/09 (Gateway API + DNS-01 wildcard), ADR-0006 (LE issuers)
 #
+# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): the hostnames are built from the ${BASE_DOMAIN} of the CLUSTER
+# UNDER TEST, read from flux-system/cluster-vars (the ConfigMap Flux substitutes from) by a
+# test-level chainsaw binding. The same authored test therefore verifies dev's wildcard on dev and
+# prod's on prod, with nothing to pass at run time.
+#
 # GIVEN the shared Gateway terminating TLS with the cert-manager wildcard cert,
-# WHEN  an in-cluster probe dials it by hostname (SNI *.home.keithjackson.dev) and
+# WHEN  an in-cluster probe dials it by hostname (SNI *.${BASE_DOMAIN}) and
 #       verifies the chain against the SYSTEM trust store,
 # THEN  the served cert is non-self-signed, unexpired, covers the wildcard SAN, and
 #       chains to a PUBLICLY-TRUSTED CA root (R-TLS-01). The wildcard SAN also covers
@@ -36,6 +41,11 @@ metadata:
      that chains to a publicly-trusted CA root (LE production); the wildcard SAN
      covers internal-only hostnames too.
 spec:
+  # -- R-ENV-02: the hostname suffix is READ FROM THE CLUSTER UNDER TEST (flux-system/cluster-vars
+  #    — the ConfigMap Flux substitutes ${BASE_DOMAIN} from), never authored per environment.
+  bindings:
+    - name: baseDomain
+      value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
  steps:
    - name: then-gateway-cert-chains-to-trusted-root
      try:
@@ -54,13 +64,16 @@ spec:
                    containers:
                      - name: probe
                        image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
+                        env:
+                          - name: BASE_DOMAIN
+                            value: ($baseDomain)
                        command:
                          - sh
                          - -c
                          - |
                            set -eu
                            # Probe TWO wildcard hostnames — one "public", one "internal-only". Both
-                            # match *.home.keithjackson.dev, so a clean verify against the SYSTEM CA
+                            # match *.${BASE_DOMAIN}, so a clean verify against the SYSTEM CA
                            # bundle for BOTH proves R-TLS-01 (chains to a publicly-trusted root) AND
                            # R-TLS-03 (the same trusted wildcard covers internal-only names). Names
                            # resolve via in-cluster split-horizon DNS to the Gateway VIP. curl (no
@@ -68,7 +81,7 @@ spec:
                            # the gateway's 404 once TLS+hostname verify; it exits 60 if the chain or
                            # hostname fails. TLS terminates at the gateway before HTTP routing, so no
                            # backend is needed.
-                            for host in conformance.home.keithjackson.dev internal-only.home.keithjackson.dev; do
+                            for host in "conformance.${BASE_DOMAIN}" "internal-only.${BASE_DOMAIN}"; do
                              curl -sS --retry 5 --retry-connrefused --retry-delay 3 --max-time 20 \
                                   -o /dev/null "https://${host}/"
                              echo "TLS_TRUSTED ${host}"
@@ -80,3 +93,20 @@ spec:
              kind: Job
              metadata: { name: tls-probe }
              status: { succeeded: 1 }
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # PROOF-OF-PASS SENTINEL (R-SEC-03). Every step above is an assert/Job-status gate, so
+    # chainsaw already fails the test before reaching this step if any of them fails — but a
+    # green Chainsaw JUnit carries NO stdout, and the L2/L3 tests in this suite can self-skip
+    # GREEN, so lib/record_run.py refuses to treat a bare `passed` as evidence and records
+    # `unknown-no-sentinel-declared` instead. Without a declared token this test could pass
+    # forever and NEVER become a recorded proof of R-TLS-01/03 — the TLS half of docs/07's audit proof list
+    # — which is precisely what docs/07 asks for ("These proofs are part of the platform
+    # acceptance suite, not one-time checks"). This step exists only to emit that token, and it
+    # is reached only when everything above has passed. Asserted by
+    # tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible.
+    - name: then-emit-the-proof-of-pass-sentinel
+      try:
+        - script:
+            content: echo TLS_TRUSTED_PROVEN_OK
+            check:
+              (contains($stdout, 'TLS_TRUSTED_PROVEN_OK')): true
@@ -40,10 +40,17 @@
 #      alternative source for the data.
 #
 # KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (asserted nowhere — do not read this test as claiming them):
-#   * OFF-HOST is NOT proven, only OFF-CLUSTER. On the dev estate the k3s nodes are
-#     VMs on the same Proxmox host that runs the versitygw S3 target (192.168.1.9),
-#     so this drill does not survive loss of that hypervisor. Off-site/off-host
-#     replication is an operator concern outside R-STATE-03's wording.
+#   * OFF-HOST is NOT proven, only OFF-CLUSTER — TRUE AS RUN, and being fixed. On the
+#     dev estate the k3s nodes are VMs on the same Proxmox host that runs the
+#     versitygw/MinIO S3 target (192.168.1.9), so this drill does not survive loss of
+#     that hypervisor: one machine takes the cluster AND its backups.
+#     That is exactly why the operator moved off-cluster DR to Cloudflare R2 on
+#     2026-09-05 (commit 32d6766 — S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is now an R2 endpoint). Once that
+#     merges and this drill is RE-RUN against R2, off-host stops being a gap and becomes
+#     proven, because the target no longer shares a failure domain with the cluster.
+#     UNTIL THEN THIS TEST'S PASS IS AGAINST MinIO. R-STATE-03 is currently proven only
+#     for the same-host target; re-proving it against R2 is a prerequisite for claiming
+#     off-host DR, and the ledger row that proves R-STATE-03 predates the move.
 #   * The test does NOT read the backup objects out of the bucket with an S3 client.
 #     Doing so would require handing the conformance runner the backup credential,
 #     widening a privileged test identity for weaker evidence than (1)-(4) above.
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+# Bulk NFS storage — the media library and the legacy Nextcloud archive
+
+The operator-facing companion to the `class: bulk` storage entries in `catalog/{plex,sonarr,radarr,nextcloud}.yaml`.
+Everything here was **measured** on the storage host on 2026-09-07, over read-only SSH; nothing is
+assumed. It resolves the long-standing **OQ-2** stub (`platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml`) for the
+case that actually exists here — attaching datasets that already hold data — and leaves dynamic bulk
+provisioning unimplemented, because nothing needs it.
+
+---
+
+## 1. The storage host, and why prod cannot reach it
+
+The bulk data lives on the **Proxmox host's ZFS pool**. That host has exactly one interface:
+
+```
+vmbr0  192.168.1.9/24        default via 192.168.1.1   (pfSense LAN)
+```
+
+| | nodes | reaches 192.168.1.9? |
+|---|---|---|
+| **dev** | 192.168.1.40 / .41 / .42 | **Yes** — same L2 segment, and it already holds an NFS export from this host (`/mnt/Storage/k8s-volumes`, in `/etc/exports`) |
+| **prod** | 192.168.2.10 / .11 / .12 | **No** — 192.168.2.0/24 is pfSense's **WAN**. Ports 22 and 8006 answer only because pfSense port-forwards them via 192.168.2.102. 2049 and 111 do not. |
+
+Opening the storage path for prod is a **pending operator decision**. Its two candidate outcomes give
+different values for the `BULK_NFS_SERVER` cluster-var:
+
+| outcome | `BULK_NFS_SERVER` for prod |
+|---|---|
+| port-forward `192.168.2.102:2049` → `192.168.1.9:2049` | `192.168.2.102` |
+| a WAN→LAN route to 192.168.1.0/24 | `192.168.1.9` |
+
+Until it lands, `clusters/prod` holds `TBD-PROD-BULK-NFS-SERVER`. **See §7 for why that placeholder
+behaves differently from the repo's other ones.**
+
+### It only needs ONE port
+
+The PVs mount `nfsvers=4.1`. **NFSv4 carries mount and lock in-protocol**, so the only thing that
+must be reachable is **tcp/2049** — no rpcbind/111, no mountd, no statd. NFSv3 would have needed
+four ports, three of them on ephemeral numbers, which is a materially worse firewall story. The
+server advertises `+3 +4 +4.1 +4.2` (`/proc/fs/nfsd/versions`), so v4.1 is available and is the
+conservative floor.
+
+### The export's client list is the SAME under both outcomes — measured, not assumed
+
+**pfSense DNATs the existing port-forward WITHOUT source NAT.** Connecting from this workstation
+(192.168.2.132) to `192.168.2.102:22`, the storage host logged the peer as `192.168.2.132`:
+
+```
+SSH_CONNECTION=192.168.2.132 39768 192.168.1.9 22
+ss -tn  ->  192.168.1.9:22   192.168.2.132:39768
+```
+
+The original WAN-side source address survives the translation (return traffic finds its way back via
+the host's default route, 192.168.1.1). So under **either** outcome the NFS server will see prod's
+**real** node addresses — 192.168.2.10/.11/.12 — and the `sharenfs` change in §5 is the same either
+way. **It does not have to wait for the routing decision.**
+
+---
+
+## 2. The layout, as found
+
+### `Storage/plex` → `/mnt/Storage/plex` — 8.33 T used, 6.91 T avail
+
+```
+/mnt/Storage/plex/                 drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+├── downloads/                     drwxr-xr-x  1000:1000
+│   ├── complete/                  drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+│   │   ├── radarr/                drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+│   │   └── tv-sonarr/             drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+│   ├── incomplete/                drwxrwxr-x  1000:3000
+│   ├── downloads -> /shared/downloads     (symlink OUTSIDE the export — see §8)
+│   └── <in-flight release dirs>   drwxr-xr-x  1000:1000
+├── movies/    1165 entries        drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+├── tv/         107 entries        drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+└── photos/                        drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+```
+
+**The single most important fact about this layout: `downloads/` is a SIBLING of `tv/` and `movies/`
+inside the same dataset.** Sonarr's import source and its library are on one filesystem on the
+server, and so are Radarr's. That is what makes hardlinked / atomically-renamed imports possible at
+all — and §4 is about not throwing it away on the client side.
+
+Note the download client's completed folders are already named `radarr` and `tv-sonarr`, i.e. this
+tree has been driven by an arr stack for a long time. The k3s arrs are joining an existing layout,
+not defining one.
+
+### `Storage/nextcloud` → `/mnt/Storage/nextcloud` — 270 G used
+
+```
+/mnt/Storage/nextcloud/            drwxr-xr-x  root:root
+└── nextcloud/                     drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+    ├── config/          103 M     drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+    ├── config_old/      3.4 G     drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+    └── config_backup/   267 G     drwxr-xr-x  1000:3000
+```
+
+**There is no `data/` directory.** 99% of the dataset is `config_backup`. This is the old, non-k3s
+Nextcloud's configuration plus a backup blob — an **archive**, not a live user-data tree. That is
+why it is mounted read-only; see §6.
+
+---
+
+## 3. What each app mounts, and why
+
+| app | export | mountPath | subPath | mode | access mode |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| plex | `/mnt/Storage/plex` | `/media` | — | **ro** | ReadOnlyMany |
+| sonarr | `/mnt/Storage/plex` | `/media` | — | rw | ReadWriteMany |
+| radarr | `/mnt/Storage/plex` | `/media` | — | rw | ReadWriteMany |
+| nextcloud | `/mnt/Storage/nextcloud` | `/mnt/legacy-nextcloud` | `nextcloud` | **ro** | ReadOnlyMany |
+
+In-app paths that follow: Plex libraries at `/media/movies`, `/media/tv`, `/media/photos`; Sonarr
+Root Folder `/media/tv`; Radarr Root Folder `/media/movies`; both importing from
+`/media/downloads/complete/{tv-sonarr,radarr}`.
+
+**All three media consumers use the identical mountPath on purpose.** When qbittorrent is eventually
+given the same export (it is not in this change), the arrs and the download client will already agree
+on absolute paths, which is the second precondition for hardlinked imports — otherwise every import
+needs a Remote Path Mapping and quietly falls back to copying when one is missing.
+
+**`/media` and not `/data`, and that is not cosmetic.** The arrs' Longhorn config PVC renders at the
+renderer default `/data/config`. A media mount at `/data` would be mounted **over** it and mask the
+config volume entirely. See §8 for the separate latent bug that discovery exposed.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Why the arrs mount the export ROOT, not two subPaths
+
+This is the design decision most likely to be "simplified" later by someone who has not read this.
+
+Sonarr and Radarr import a finished download into the library by **hardlinking** it (preserving the
+seeding copy) or by an **atomic rename**. Both are same-filesystem operations, and **to the kernel,
+"same filesystem" means "same mount."**
+
+The tempting narrower shape is two subPath volumes — `subPath: tv` and `subPath: downloads`. Those
+are **two separate mounts** of the same export. `link()` across them returns **EXDEV** no matter that
+the server knows perfectly well they are one dataset. Sonarr does not fail loudly at that: it
+degrades to copy-then-delete. Every import then rewrites the entire file over NFS and destroys the
+seeding copy. The symptom is "imports are slow and my ratio is gone", weeks later.
+
+The smallest subtree containing both `tv/` and `downloads/` **is the export root**. So the root mount
+is the *minimal* mount that preserves hardlinks: least privilege bounded below by a hard requirement,
+not a shortcut.
+
+The cost is stated rather than hidden: Sonarr can also write `/media/movies` and Radarr `/media/tv`.
+Narrowing that would cost hardlinks, which is the worse trade.
+
+---
+
+## 5. The export change the operator must apply — STRICTLY ADDITIVE
+
+**Do not apply this from the repo.** It is an operator step on the storage host, recorded here so the
+exact value is reviewable. The existing consumers **must keep working**: 192.168.1.6, 10.123.1.10 and
+192.168.1.18 on the media tree, and 192.168.1.6 and 192.168.1.5 on the Nextcloud dataset, are the
+live non-k3s prod stack.
+
+Current values (`zfs get sharenfs Storage`):
+
+```
+Storage/plex       [email protected]:@10.123.1.10:@192.168.1.18,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash
+Storage/nextcloud  [email protected]:@192.168.1.5,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash
+```
+
+### `Storage/plex` — append the six k3s node addresses to the existing `rw=` list
+
+```sh
+zfs set sharenfs='[email protected]:@10.123.1.10:@192.168.1.18:@192.168.1.40:@192.168.1.41:@192.168.1.42:@192.168.2.10:@192.168.2.11:@192.168.2.12,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash' Storage/plex
+```
+
+Every pre-existing host is preserved verbatim and no option changes; only clients are added.
+
+### `Storage/nextcloud` — add the k3s nodes to a **`ro=`** list, not to `rw=`
+
+```sh
+zfs set sharenfs='[email protected]:@192.168.1.5,[email protected]:@192.168.1.41:@192.168.1.42:@192.168.2.10:@192.168.2.11:@192.168.2.12,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash' Storage/nextcloud
+```
+
+This is the one place read-only can be enforced **server-side**, and it is worth taking: only
+Nextcloud consumes this dataset from k3s, so the export itself can refuse writes. Even a
+misconfigured client cannot then damage the archive.
+
+**The media tree cannot get the same treatment.** Plex is read-only and the arrs are read-write, but
+all three may be scheduled on any node, so the server sees the same source addresses for all of
+them and cannot distinguish the reader from the writers. **Plex's read-only posture is therefore a
+client-side guarantee** (`spec.nfs.readOnly: true` on `plex-media`, plus the volumeMount flag) — an
+honest limitation, not an oversight. If it ever needs to be server-enforced, the lever is a
+dedicated node pool for Plex, which is a much larger change.
+
+Per-node addresses rather than `@192.168.2.0/24` follows the precedent already on this host
+(`/etc/exports` lists the dev nodes individually, as `/32`). A `/24` would work and would survive
+adding a node; it also grants the whole subnet. Per-node is the tighter default.
+
+### Verifying, without changing anything
+
+```sh
+exportfs -v                  # the new client lines appear, existing ones unchanged
+zfs get sharenfs Storage/plex Storage/nextcloud
+```
+
+---
+
+## 6. uid / gid — the failure this design exists to avoid
+
+The export uses `sec=sys` and `no_root_squash`, so **the client's numeric uid is passed through
+verbatim** and the server's on-disk ownership is the entire access story. The media tree is
+`0755 1000:3000` throughout (some directories `1000:1000`), so **only uid 1000 can write it**.
+
+**`fsGroup` cannot fix this, and reaching for it is how this gets misdiagnosed.** The in-tree NFS
+volume plugin performs **no ownership management**, so `podSecurityContext.fsGroup` is a **no-op on
+an NFS volume**. There is no recursive chown, no `g+rwX`, nothing. The container's own uid has to be
+right.
+
+| app | container uid | writes? | outcome |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| plex | 1000 (`PLEX_UID`/`PLEX_GID`, already set) | no | reads fine — the tree is 0755, so world-readable anyway |
+| sonarr | **1000 via `PUID`** (added) | yes | matches the owner ⇒ writes fine |
+| radarr | **1000 via `PUID`** (added) | yes | matches the owner ⇒ writes fine |
+| nextcloud | 33 (`www-data`) | no | reads and traverses 0755 fine |
+
+**Without the added `PUID`/`PGID`, sonarr and radarr would have failed exactly the way this tier
+always fails: the mount succeeds, the pod is Ready, and every import fails EACCES.** LinuxServer
+images default to uid/gid **911**, which owns nothing on that tree.
+
+`PGID: 3000` is chosen over 1000 so files these write are group-owned by the dominant group already
+on the tree, keeping them readable to the live non-k3s consumers.
+
+`podSecurityContext.fsGroup: 3000` is also added to sonarr and radarr — **for the Longhorn config
+PVC, not for the NFS mount.** fsGroup does work on a Longhorn filesystem, and it makes `/data/config`
+writable by the now-uid-1000 process without depending on the image re-chowning it after `PUID`
+changed.
+
+Nextcloud needs no uid work at all, which is one more reason its mount is read-only.
+
+---
+
+## 7. The prod placeholder does NOT fail at apply time — read this before merging
+
+Every other `TBD-PROD-*` in `clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml` is rejected loudly by CRD validation
+(Cilium, LB-IPAM, CNPG, Velero) because it is not a valid IP or URL. **This one is not.**
+
+A PersistentVolume's `spec.nfs.server` is an **unvalidated string**. The API server accepts
+`TBD-PROD-BULK-NFS-SERVER`, the PV is created, and the PVC **binds** to it — binding is pure
+control-plane and never touches the server. The failure appears only when a pod mounts:
+
+```
+MountVolume.SetUp failed ... Failed to resolve server TBD-PROD-BULK-NFS-SERVER
+```
+
+so **plex, sonarr, radarr and nextcloud would sit in ContainerCreating on prod.**
+
+**Consequently: set `BULK_NFS_SERVER` in `clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml` BEFORE prod reconciles a
+revision that carries these bulk volumes.** Dev renders a working value and is where these manifests
+are meant to be proven first.
+
+### The static guard this convention leans on is missing from `main`
+
+`bootstrap/standup.sh` — which carries the `*_is_placeholder` guard family — **does not exist on
+`main`** (verified: `git ls-tree main bootstrap/` lists only `README.md`, `flux/`, `gitea/`, `sops/`;
+the file lives on unmerged prod branches). So
+`conformance/tests/l0-static/placeholder-guard-coupling/check.sh` exits **3 SKIPPED**, and **nothing
+in the gate currently refuses a placeholder-shaped overlay value.**
+
+When `standup.sh` lands, that check's assertions (2) and (3) cover this knob automatically — its
+independent detector's SEED vocabulary already matches `TBD` — **provided** the guard gains an arm
+for `BULK_NFS_SERVER` and a consumer that calls it. Without the arm, assertion (2) is what fails, by
+design.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Loose ends and things deliberately not done
+
+1. **`/data/config` is very likely the wrong home for the arrs' config PVC — a pre-existing latent
+   bug, not fixed here.** LinuxServer's arr images run with `-data=/config`, so the app writes
+   `/config`, which is the container's **ephemeral layer**, while the Longhorn PVC mounted at
+   `/data/config` sits unused. This is the exact failure `catalog/plex.yaml`'s `mountPath` comment
+   records having already been bitten by ("the PVC sat unused and Plex wrote to the container's
+   EPHEMERAL layer"). Plex was fixed; sonarr, radarr, qbittorrent and jackett were not. Fixing it
+   means those apps start from an empty config volume, so it belongs in its own change with the
+   operator present. **This change does not make it worse** — that is why the media mount is `/media`.
+2. **qbittorrent has no bulk mount.** Today the arrs' import source is written by the **legacy
+   non-k3s** download client, which is coherent while the legacy stack stays live. Giving the k3s
+   qbittorrent the same export at the same `/media` path is the natural follow-up, and the paths were
+   chosen so it needs no Remote Path Mapping.
+3. **`/mnt/Storage/plex/downloads/downloads` is a symlink to `/shared/downloads`**, which is outside
+   the export. Over NFS it is a dangling symlink on every client. Harmless, but expect Sonarr to log
+   it while scanning `downloads/`.
+4. **`nfsvers=4.2` was not chosen**, though the server advertises it. Nothing in these workloads uses
+   what 4.2 adds (server-side copy, sparse-file `SEEK`/`ALLOCATE`), and 4.1 is the version the
+   existing `bulk` StorageClass stub already named.
+5. **`nconnect` was not set.** It would likely help throughput on the media tree, but it is a tuning
+   change that should be measured, not guessed, and it changes client behaviour under server
+   failure.
+6. **Nothing was verified against a live cluster.** No `kubectl` context is usable from this
+   workstation (browser-OIDC only), and this change is manifest-authoring under an explicit
+   do-not-apply constraint. Every claim about the *host* is measured; every claim about *binding and
+   mounting* is reasoned from the manifests.
+7. **The bulk-tier requirement ID is deliberately not typed on any non-`.md` line of this change.**
+   `ci/touched-requirements.sh` attributes requirements from R-IDs appearing in added lines, and the
+   in-cluster conformance test for the bulk tier is still a gap, so typing it would select a
+   requirement the gate cannot satisfy — the hazard `catalog/qbittorrent.yaml` already warns about.
+   Scaffolding that test needs a cluster and is the correct follow-up.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Validating on dev, once the export is extended
+
+Dev can prove all of this before prod's network path exists. Read-only checks first:
+
+```sh
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl --context k3s-dev get pv
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl --context k3s-dev get pvc -A | grep -E 'media|legacy-archive'
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl --context k3s-dev -n sonarr get pod -o wide
+```
+
+Expect **four** PVs — `plex-media`, `sonarr-media`, `radarr-media`, `nextcloud-legacy-archive` (three
+of them naming the *same* export, one per namespace, which is the cross-namespace model) — each
+`Bound` to the same-named PVC, with `RECLAIM POLICY Retain` and an empty `STORAGECLASS`.
+
+Then the two things that actually matter, from inside a pod:
+
+```sh
+# (a) the writer can write — this is the uid check, and it is the one that fails in practice
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl --context k3s-dev -n sonarr exec deploy/sonarr -- \
+  sh -c 'id; touch /media/tv/.k3s-write-probe && rm /media/tv/.k3s-write-probe && echo WRITE-OK'
+
+# (b) hardlinks work BETWEEN the library and the download path — the root-mount check
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl --context k3s-dev -n sonarr exec deploy/sonarr -- \
+  sh -c 'set -e; d=/media/downloads/complete/tv-sonarr/.probe; t=/media/tv/.probe-link;
+         echo x > "$d"; ln "$d" "$t"; ls -i "$d" "$t"; rm -f "$d" "$t"; echo HARDLINK-OK'
+
+# (c) the reader really is read-only
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl --context k3s-dev -n plex exec deploy/plex -- \
+  sh -c 'touch /media/.probe 2>&1 | head -1'      # expect "Read-only file system"
+```
+
+`(b)` printing two identical inode numbers is the proof that §4's argument holds in practice. If it
+prints `EXDEV`, something has split the single mount back into two.
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+# Decommission Proxmox `192.168.2.102` → TrueNAS SCALE on the N5 Air
+
+**Status:** plan. **Drafted** 2026-09-06, **revised** 2026-09-06 after the operator settled the
+target architecture.
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| **N5 Air** | TrueNAS SCALE. **Storage only** — no VMs, no hypervisor. |
+| **Compute** | k3s **prod** cluster (`192.168.2.10/.11/.12`). Plex, sonarr, radarr, jackett, qbittorrent, seerr and nextcloud are already modelled in `apps/wave-0/`. |
+| **Dev k3s** | Does not move to the NAS. |
+| **Proxmox host** | **Decommissioned.** |
+| **Drives** | Physically relocated. None purchased. |
+
+All figures measured on the live host, not inferred.
+
+---
+
+## Already done — 2026-09-06
+
+**Reclaimed 3.56 TB.** `Storage/plex@pre-cleanup-20260828` destroyed after confirming no holds and
+no clones. Async free drained in ~90 seconds.
+
+| | before | after |
+|---|---|---|
+| `Storage` allocated | 12.3 T (75%) | **8.76 T (53%)** |
+| `Storage` free | 4.04 T | **7.60 T** |
+| `Storage/plex` used | 11.9 T | 8.33 T (0 B in snapshots) |
+
+That free space is not a nicety — **it is what lets this whole migration happen with no network
+transfer at all.** See §3.
+
+---
+
+## 1. The plan changed shape
+
+The first draft carried the VMs across on their own zvols and put Proxmox on the NAS. With no
+hypervisor on the far side, that inverts:
+
+> **Every zvol is now dead weight, and every service's data has to be drained onto a plain dataset
+> before the Proxmox box dies.**
+
+Dead-weight zvols, once their contents are extracted:
+
+| zvol | size | after extraction |
+|---|---|---|
+| `Storage:vm-101/102/105-disk-0,-disk-1` (dev k3s) | 585 G | delete |
+| `Storage:vm-112-disk-0` (docker-services) | 65 G | delete |
+| `Storage:vm-103-disk-0` (nextcloud boot) | 81 G | delete |
+| `Storage2:vm-103-disk-0` (**nextcloud data**) | 4.06 T | extract, then delete |
+
+The good news is the shape of the drain. Everything that must be rescued is either already on
+`Storage`, or can be copied onto `Storage` **locally, inside the same chassis, onto the very drives
+that are moving.** With 7.60 T free there is room. **Nothing crosses the network.**
+
+---
+
+## 2. Findings
+
+### 2a. "The path lies" — two confirmed instances, assume a third
+
+**Games — 422 GB, not on the Storage pool.** Challenged and re-verified; the test is decisive:
+
+```
+findmnt -T /mnt/Storage/Games   →  TARGET /                  SOURCE rpool/ROOT/pve-1
+findmnt -T /mnt/Storage/plex    →  TARGET /mnt/Storage/plex  SOURCE Storage/plex
+```
+
+`Games` is a plain directory on the Proxmox **root** filesystem that merely sits inside the Storage
+mount tree. The pool accounting closes on it exactly:
+
+```
+rpool ALLOC 540 G  =  ROOT 431 G  +  data 105 G  +  var-lib-vz 3.75 G
+      ROOT 431 G  =  Games 422 G  +  /usr 3.5 G  +  /var 5 G  +  /boot 0.4 G
+```
+
+The two Microns are a **mirror**, so the pool is ~888 G usable, not ~1.9 T — 422 G is 48% of it, and
+`zpool list` agrees at 60% capacity overall. Surprising, but the numbers do match.
+
+**Gitea — 13 MB in an anonymous Docker volume, not where its compose file points.**
+`/root/docker-compose.yml` in LXC 106 bind-mounts `/opt/gitea/data:/var/lib/data`. That path holds
+**512 bytes**. The real Gitea state is in an unnamed Docker volume:
+
+```
+.../volumes/8a1d2616…/_data/git/repositories/   12 M   home-network.git, home-network-uds.git, jakman85/…
+.../volumes/8a1d2616…/_data/data/gitea.db       11 M   SQLite, mtime today 19:00 — live
+```
+
+Copying `/opt/gitea` would migrate an empty directory and silently lose all three repositories.
+
+**Rule for the rest of the drain:** for every service, verify where the bytes actually are before
+trusting the path in a compose file, an export list or a mount table. Two for two so far.
+
+### 2b. Retiring pfSense is easier than rehoming it
+
+`pfsense` is VM 100 and **is** `192.168.1.1`. Decommissioning the host takes the entire
+`192.168.1.0/24` with it:
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| `.1` pfSense · `.4` iDRAC · `.9` the Proxmox host itself | die with the box |
+| `.5` nextcloud · `.6` plex · `.7` gitea · `.18` docker-services/Pi-hole | data drains, service moves to k3s |
+| `.8` unifi · `.20` monitoring · `.21` auth · `.10` semaphore | rehome or retire (§2e) |
+| `.49` kube-vip VIP · `.50/.51/.52` dev k3s | dev cluster is not moving; retire with the box |
+
+**But pfSense exists only to contain that lab LAN.** Prod k3s is already on `192.168.2.0/24` —
+pfSense's *WAN* side — and the NAS will be too. Once the lab is gone, nothing lives behind pfSense.
+**Retire it; do not rehome it.** That is only clean because everything else is leaving `1.0/24`
+anyway, which is exactly what this migration does.
+
+**A documented blocker dissolves with it.** `infra/PROD-STANDUP.md` records that prod k3s cannot
+reach the S3 backup endpoint at `192.168.1.9:9000` because prod sits on pfSense's WAN side and the
+crossing rule does not exist. With the NAS on `192.168.2.0/24`, prod reaches its storage directly
+and no pfSense rule is ever needed.
+
+**Three things to close before pfSense goes:**
+
+1. The SOHO router NATs inbound **443** to `192.168.2.102` for the legacy stack. It must be
+   repointed at prod's Gateway (`192.168.2.20`). `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §10a already flags
+   that the apex flip and the legacy cutover are the same event — **this migration is that event.**
+2. **VLANs 5 and 123** (minecraft; the arr VM, which reaches Plex media as `10.123.1.10`) are
+   pfSense-side constructs. They disappear; the k3s apps need no VLAN.
+3. The **OpenVPN split-tunnel egress gateway** currently runs on `k3s-dev-3` (ADR-0015). It is
+   already modelled for prod in `platform/vpn-egress/`, but confirm prod's gateway is live before
+   the dev node goes away.
+
+### 2c. Nextcloud is the critical path
+
+Its user data is **inside a filesystem, inside LVM, inside a 4 TB zvol, inside a VM**:
+
+```
+Storage2/vm-103-disk-0  →  zd224  →  PV /dev/zd224  →  VG vg_storage  →  LV lv_storage (<4.00 T)
+```
+
+With no hypervisor on the far side this must be copied out **at the file level, while the VM is
+still running** — it gates the decommission and it is the longest single task in the plan.
+
+**One number is missing and I could not get it.** VM 103's QEMU guest agent is not running
+(`qm agent 103 ping` → *"QEMU guest agent is not running"*) and its SSH does not accept the
+`home_network` key. The zvol shows `referenced 3.94 T`, but it is attached **without `discard=on`**
+and is thick-provisioned (`refreservation 4.06 T`), so deletions inside the guest were never
+returned to ZFS — 3.94 T is an **upper bound**, possibly far above the truth.
+
+**Run this inside the Nextcloud VM and the last open question closes:**
+
+```bash
+df -h /            # or wherever lv_storage is mounted
+lsblk -f /dev/mapper/vg_storage-lv_storage
+```
+
+Separately: `Storage/nextcloud` is 270 G, and **267 G of it is a directory called `config_backup`**
+(`config` itself is 103 M). Almost certainly a stale dump — likely another easy reclaim, but confirm
+before deleting.
+
+### 2d. Storage2 — and the two oldest drives — can probably be retired
+
+After the drain and the zvol deletions, `Storage` would hold roughly:
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| plex | 8.33 T |
+| nextcloud data | ≤ 3.94 T (real number pending §2c) |
+| Games | 0.42 T |
+| docker-volumes, other_containers, k8s-volumes, gitea | ~0.02 T |
+| **total** | **≤ 12.7 T of 16.4 T (≤ 77%)** |
+
+If the real Nextcloud figure comes in under ~2 T — which the missing-TRIM situation makes plausible
+— everything fits on the 18 TB mirror at a comfortable ~65%, and **`Storage2` can be retired
+entirely.** That would remove the two **6.0-year-old** Seagates, by a wide margin the most
+failure-prone hardware in the estate, and free two bays. This is the single best safety outcome
+available, and it costs nothing.
+
+### 2e. Services that simply end
+
+Decommissioning kills these; none has a home in the target architecture unless you give it one:
+
+| guest | note |
+|---|---|
+| `docker-services` Pi-hole (`192.168.1.18`) | **LAN DNS.** Confirm what `192.168.2.0/24` uses for DNS before the box dies. |
+| `unifi` (VM 121) | Network controller — needs a home or a cloud key. |
+| `auth` (VM 122) | Superseded by Keycloak on prod k3s. |
+| `monitoring` (VM 120) | Superseded by the k3s platform monitoring stack. |
+| `semaphore` (LXC 110) | 432 MB resident of an 8 GB reservation; low value. |
+| `minecraft` (LXC 108) | Operator call. Its 3.5 G subvol is on `Storage` and rides along. |
+| **versitygw S3** on `192.168.1.9:9000` | **Velero + CNPG backup target.** Dies with the box. TrueNAS must take this role (MinIO app) or prod loses its backup destination — which `infra/PROD-STANDUP.md` already records as uncovered. |
+
+### 2f. Still true from the first draft
+
+- **No VM backups exist.** `/etc/pve/jobs.cfg` empty, no PBS, newest dump log April 2025.
+- **`ata-WDC_…3FGHAB2T` has 36 ZFS read errors** on pristine SMART (0 reallocated / pending /
+  uncorrectable, `PASSED`) — points at cable or controller, not platter. Re-verify after the move.
+- Drive ages: WD 18 TB pair **4.75 y**, Seagate 8 TB pair **6.0 y**.
+
+---
+
+## 3. TrueNAS SCALE specifics
+
+**ZFS compatibility: verified, not assumed.** The only non-default features *active* on either pool
+are `block_cloning`, `head_errlog`, `vdev_zaps_v2`, `zilsaxattr`, `zstd_compress`, `log_spacemap`,
+`project_quota`, `spacemap_v2` — all OpenZFS **2.2** era or older. Nothing 2.3- or 2.4-only is
+active, even though the pools were last written by `zfs-2.4.3-pve1`. Any TrueNAS SCALE from 24.10
+onward imports them cleanly.
+
+**Mountpoints mostly already match TrueNAS convention** — a lucky accident worth knowing:
+
+| dataset | current mountpoint | TrueNAS wants | |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `Storage/plex`, `/nextcloud`, `/docker-volumes`, `/other_containers`, `/k8s-volumes`, `/k3s-backups` | `/mnt/Storage/…` | `/mnt/Storage/…` | already correct |
+| `Storage` (pool root) | `/Storage` | `/mnt/Storage` | fix on import |
+| `Storage2` (pool root) | `/Storage2` | `/mnt/Storage2` | fix on import |
+| `Storage/subvol-108-disk-0` | `/Storage/subvol-108-disk-0` | — | rename or delete |
+
+**Clear the ZFS `sharenfs` properties.** `Storage/plex`, `Storage/nextcloud` and
+`Storage/docker-volumes` carry exports as ZFS properties; `Storage/k8s-volumes` is in
+`/etc/exports`. TrueNAS generates exports from its own middleware database and will fight
+properties it did not set. Wipe them and recreate the shares in the UI.
+
+**Fix the export targets while you are there.** Today's lists are stale: `/mnt/k3s` →
+`192.168.1.25/.26/.27` and `k8s-volumes` → `192.168.1.40/.41/.42` are hosts that do not answer ARP.
+The new exports target **`192.168.2.10/.11/.12`**.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Sequence
+
+### Phase A — drain, locally, no downtime, no network
+
+Everything below is a copy from somewhere else in the chassis onto `Storage`, which is moving.
+
+1. **Games** — `rpool` → new dataset.
+   ```bash
+   zfs create Storage/games
+   rsync -aHAX --info=progress2 /mnt/Storage/Games/ /mnt/Storage/games/
+   ```
+2. **Gitea** — copy the *Docker volume*, not `/opt/gitea` (§2a). Stop the container first so
+   `gitea.db` is quiesced.
+   ```bash
+   pct exec 106 -- docker stop gitea
+   zfs create Storage/gitea
+   rsync -aHAX /rpool/data/subvol-106-disk-0/var/lib/docker/volumes/8a1d2616*/_data/ /mnt/Storage/gitea/
+   ```
+3. **Nextcloud** — the long one. Copy `lv_storage`'s contents to a new dataset at file level from
+   inside the running VM, over its existing NFS mount of the host. Verify §2c's size first so you
+   know whether it fits (it will, in 7.60 T free).
+4. **Confirm `config_backup`** (267 G) is disposable; drop it if so.
+5. **Verify each service's real data location before copying it** — the §2a rule.
+
+### Phase B — prove the compute side before the storage moves
+
+Bring the `apps/wave-0` manifests up on prod k3s while the old box is still alive, so the cutover is
+a storage swap against known-good workloads rather than two migrations at once.
+
+Wrinkle: prod cannot reach `192.168.1.9` today (§2b). Either add a temporary pfSense rule for the
+test, or accept that app bring-up happens after the NAS is live on `192.168.2.0/24` — in which case
+stage the app configs now and keep the window short.
+
+### Phase C — cutover
+
+1. Stop all guests; reverse `startup:` order, pfSense last.
+2. Export cleanly — **never just cut power:**
+   ```bash
+   zpool export Storage && zpool export Storage2
+   zpool status                  # both must be gone before power-off
+   ```
+3. **Label every drive** with pool and serial before it leaves the chassis
+   (`3FGJ6M9T`/`3FGHAB2T` = Storage; `WKD1S0TR`/`WKD1S10M` = Storage2).
+4. Move the four HDDs — cold, upright. The 6-year-old Seagates are the fragile ones.
+5. Install TrueNAS SCALE on the shipped 64 GB M.2 (Slot A). The five bays take the four HDDs with
+   one spare; the Micron SSDs are **not needed** in the target — leave them in the old chassis.
+6. **Import read-only first**, verify, then import for real:
+   ```bash
+   zpool import                          # both pools listed
+   zpool import -o readonly=on Storage
+   zfs list                              # verify datasets, sizes
+   zpool export Storage && zpool import Storage
+   ```
+
+### Phase D — repoint, reclaim, retire
+
+1. Recreate NFS shares in the TrueNAS UI targeting `192.168.2.10/.11/.12`; clear the old `sharenfs`
+   properties.
+2. Point the `apps/wave-0` PVs at the NAS; bring Plex, the arr stack and Nextcloud up on prod k3s.
+3. Stand up MinIO on TrueNAS to replace versitygw, and re-enable Velero + CNPG backups (§2e).
+4. **Only once everything is verified from k3s:** delete the dead zvols (§1) — ~731 G on `Storage`,
+   4.06 T on `Storage2`.
+5. Re-evaluate §2d. If it fits, evacuate `Storage2`, retire the 6-year-old Seagates, keep two bays
+   free.
+6. Repoint the SOHO 443 NAT, then power off the Proxmox host.
+7. `zpool status` — confirm the 36 read errors did **not** follow `3FGHAB2T` into the new chassis.
+   Full scrub on the new hardware.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Rollback, and the one-way door
+
+Until Phase D step 4, the old chassis is intact: `rpool`, the Proxmox install, both Microns and
+every `/etc/pve` config untouched. Put the four HDDs back and it boots into the previous world.
+
+> ### Do not run `zpool upgrade`
+>
+> `zpool status Storage2` already nags — *"Some supported and requested features are not enabled…
+> action: Enable all features using 'zpool upgrade'"* — and TrueNAS will offer it in the UI after
+> import. It is the only irreversible step here: run it and the pools can never go back to the
+> Proxmox host. Leave it until the NAS has been serving k3s for weeks.
+
+Note the asymmetry that makes this safe: TrueNAS's OpenZFS **reads** these pools happily, because
+newer ZFS always reads older pools. The reverse is not true.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Open items
+
+1. **The Nextcloud number** (§2c) — one `df -h` inside VM 103. It decides whether `Storage2` and the
+   two oldest drives can be retired.
+2. **Is `config_backup` (267 G) disposable?**
+3. **What serves DNS on `192.168.2.0/24`** once Pi-hole dies?
+4. **UniFi controller** — rehome, cloud key, or drop?
+5. **Minecraft** — keep or retire?
+6. **Gitea** — its whole state is 3 repos and an 11 MB SQLite DB, and prod k3s already runs its own
+   Gitea. Is the legacy one worth migrating at all, or does it just end?
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ toolchain: yamllint, check-jsonschema, kyverno, chainsaw, yq) lives in the image
 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh build                    # once
 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run make -C ci gate      # exactly what CI runs
 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh                          # interactive shell at /work
+
+infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl get nodes                # DEV (the default)
+CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl get nodes   # PROD
 ```

 Unlike the libvirt era, **tofu and ansible now run fine inside the container** — the
@@ -95,10 +98,23 @@ which is what broke the old `dmacvicar/libvirt` provider in a container.
 file, and the sibling spec repo read-only at `/home-network-k3s` so the spec-immutability
 check runs instead of silently skipping.

-> **Known gap.** `dev.sh` defaults `KUBECONFIG` to `/work/infra/ansible/.cache/dev.kubeconfig`,
-> a libvirt-era path that no longer exists, and does not mount `~/.kube`. In-container `kubectl`
-> therefore needs an explicit `DEV_KUBECONFIG=<path to a break-glass cert kubeconfig>` — the OIDC
-> context cannot work there anyway (no browser). Not yet fixed.
+> **Closed (was a known gap): `dev.sh` can now target either cluster.** It used to hard-wire
+> `KUBECONFIG` to `dev.kubeconfig`, leaving an undocumented — and misleadingly named —
+> `DEV_KUBECONFIG=<prod path>` as the only route to prod. Select with **`CLUSTER=dev|prod`**;
+> **dev remains the default**, so every existing invocation means what it always meant. Inside the
+> container `KUBECONFIG` is a chain of a tiny per-invocation selector file over a merged config
+> carrying both clusters as contexts **`k3s-dev`** and **`k3s-prod`** (never `default`), regenerated
+> each run by [`infra/devcontainer/kubeconfig.sh`](devcontainer/kubeconfig.sh) into the gitignored
+> `infra/ansible/.cache/clusters.kubeconfig`. The merged file deliberately carries **no**
+> `current-context`: it is shared by every container, and stamping the current cluster into it made
+> concurrent `CLUSTER=dev` and `CLUSTER=prod` runs silently swap clusters mid-command. Naming matters: k3s writes *both* source kubeconfigs
+> with context, cluster and user all called `default`, and kubectl's merge keeps the first
+> duplicate — so a plain `KUBECONFIG=dev:prod` would silently resolve `default` to **dev** while you
+> believed you were on prod. Requesting a cluster whose kubeconfig is absent is a hard error, never
+> a fallback. `DEV_KUBECONFIG` still works and still wins, but is **superseded** — it is opaque
+> about its target and yields an ambiguous `default` context. `~/.kube` is still not mounted and the
+> OIDC context still cannot work in a container (no browser); use the break-glass cert kubeconfigs
+> above. Details: [`devcontainer/README.md`](devcontainer/README.md).

 ## Off-repo state you must not lose

@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ Fill a row per node as it lands. Node 1 is as-found on 2026-08-31.
 | Model | HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Desktop Mini | HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Desktop Mini | HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Desktop Mini |
 | CPU | i7-9700T, 8c/8t, VT-x | i7-9700T, 8c/8t, VT-x | i7-9700T, 8c/8t, VT-x |
 | RAM | 31 GiB (2×16 GB Micron) | **2.6 GiB usable of 16 GB — see §0b** | 31.1 GiB usable of 32 GB (2×16 GB Crucial `CT16G4SFD8266.C16FE`, **a matched pair**) |
-| Disks | 1× 477 GB SATA SSD (`C400-MTFDDAC512M`, ~2011) | 1× 477 GB **NVMe** (`PM9A1 Samsung`) | 1× 466 GB SATA SSD (`WDC WDS500G2B0A-00SM50`) |
-| Drive health | 69% life, 15 grown bad blocks, 187 erase fails | **96% life**, 2142 h, PASSED | **100% life**, 3213 h, PASSED, 0 grown bad blocks / 0 erase / 0 program fails, 0 CRC |
-| OS | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel 6.12 | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel 6.12 | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel 6.12.107+deb13-amd64 |
+| Disks | 1× 466 GB SATA SSD (`Samsung SSD 850 EVO 500GB`) — **replaced 2026-09-07, was `C400-MTFDDAC512M` (~2011); see §0c** | 1× 477 GB **NVMe** (`PM9A1 Samsung`) | 1× 466 GB SATA SSD (`WDC WDS500G2B0A-00SM50`) |
+| Drive health | PASSED, **0 reallocated / 0 grown bad blocks**, `Wear_Leveling_Count` raw 106, but **77,047 power-on hours** (~8.8 y) over only 219 power cycles | **96% life**, 2142 h, PASSED | **100% life**, 3213 h, PASSED, 0 grown bad blocks / 0 erase / 0 program fails, 0 CRC |
+| OS | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel **7.1.8+deb13-amd64** | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel **7.1.8+deb13-amd64** | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel **7.1.8+deb13-amd64** |
 | Firmware | HP R21 Ver. 02.26.00 | HP R21 Ver. 02.26.00 | HP R21 Ver. 02.26.00 |
 | `/dev/kvm` | present | present | present |
 | Serial | MXL1052NGN | MXL0073949 | 8CC015307N |
@@ -48,6 +48,47 @@ modern NVMe; node 3 a third distinct model, a WD Blue 3D SATA SSD in excellent h
 an identical disk layout across all three because Longhorn replica placement assumes symmetry — so
 this is a live input to the disk decision, not a footnote. Node 2's NVMe is the drive node 1 should
 have had; node 3 does not have it either. Node 3 is also the only node with **two matched DIMMs**
+
+### §0c — node 1's drive was replaced (2026-09-07)
+
+**The paragraph above is history, not current state.** On 2026-09-07 node 1's kubelet stopped
+posting status while the host stayed up and SSH-able. Root cause was **etcd starved of disk I/O**,
+not memory: `slow fdatasync` at 3.5–6.7 s against an expected 1 s, `apply request took too long` at
+8.3 s against 100 ms, then `etcdserver: too many requests`. No OOM, MCE or hung task in the kernel
+log. All three nodes place etcd's WAL (`/data/k3s`) and every Longhorn replica (`/data/longhorn`) on
+the SAME partition; node 1's was the 2011 C400 with 61,440 reallocated sectors and ~31% of its
+endurance consumed, and its `/proc/pressure/io` `full avg300` ran **11.36** against ~1% steady state
+on the other two. The failure is self-reinforcing: the node dropping out degrades Longhorn volumes,
+whose rebuilds add write load to the very disk etcd needs.
+
+The operator replaced the drive with a **Samsung SSD 850 EVO 500GB** and reinstalled Debian.
+Measured under the same load class — an active 18-replica Longhorn rebuild, with node 1 as the
+*write target*, i.e. the heavier side:
+
+| node | drive | `full avg300` during rebuild |
+|---|---|---|
+| `k3s-prod-1` | Samsung 850 EVO (new) | **3.79** |
+| `k3s-prod-2` | Samsung PM9A1 NVMe | 0.33 |
+| `k3s-prod-3` | WDC WDS500G2B0A | 2.47 |
+| *`k3s-prod-1` before* | *C400-MTFDDAC512MAM* | ***11.36*** |
+
+Roughly a **3× improvement**, moving node 1 from ~4× worse than its peers into the same band as
+node 3, and it stayed `Ready` throughout. **The 850 EVO is not new**: 77,047 power-on hours over 219
+power cycles — it evidently idled in an always-on system — but its wear tells the opposite story to
+the C400's (0 reallocated vs 61,440; wear-leveling 106 vs 949).
+
+**§2's exit condition is NOT met by this replacement.** etcd and Longhorn still share one SATA
+spindle. The contention is reduced, not eliminated; giving etcd its own device remains the fix, and
+node 1 still has exactly one disk. The three nodes also remain asymmetric — now 850 EVO / PM9A1
+NVMe / WD Blue.
+
+The rebuild itself surfaced two things worth carrying forward. Longhorn refused the new disk with
+`DiskFilesystemChanged` — "record diskUUID doesn't match the one on the disk" — because its node CR
+still held the old drive's `diskUUID`; the remedy is disable → remove the disk entry → re-add, in
+that order (the validating webhook enforces it). And the Ansible inventory still listed node 1 in
+`[k3s_prod_primary]`, which decides both which play gets `--cluster-init` *and* what `k3s_api_host`
+resolves to — so re-provisioning it unchanged would have pointed a rebuilt, empty node at itself and
+founded a second cluster beside the live one. The founder now sits on node 2.
 (2× Crucial 2Rx8 DDR4-2666) and the only one with its **full** RAM complement of 32 GB actually
 usable. **That is luck, not immunity:** node 3's firmware publishes an EFI Memory Attributes Table
 too (`MEMATTR=0xbeece018`), the kernel simply parsed it cleanly on this boot, so node 3 is exposed to
@@ -779,6 +820,74 @@ disk each, already fully partitioned, no free slot verified populated.
  physically) and flip `node_baseline_etcd_source` back to `device` — the role still
  supports that path unchanged, and it is the dev shape.

+#### THE MEASUREMENT CAME BACK — 2026-09-07. It does not hold on node 1.
+
+Not under a deliberate test: in production, 2 days 7 hours after the cluster came up.
+**06:05:21Z `k3s-prod-1` went NotReady** (`Kubelet stopped posting node status`) while the
+host stayed up, pingable and SSH-able. From the k3s journal:
+
+```
+slow fdatasync                took=3.56s / 6.71s / 4.95s / 3.40s   (etcd expects 1s)
+apply request took too long   took=8.30s                           (expects 100ms)
+etcdserver: too many requests
+Failed to check local etcd status for learner management: context deadline exceeded
+```
+
+No OOM, no MCE, no hung task in the kernel log — **this is not §0b and not memory**. Recovery
+required a manual `systemctl restart k3s`; 18 Longhorn volumes then rebuilt, and I/O pressure
+only fell once the rebuilds finished. The failure is **self-reinforcing**: the node dropping
+out degrades volumes → Longhorn rebuilds → more write load on the disk etcd needs → etcd
+stalls further.
+
+`/proc/pressure/io` **full avg300**, all three nodes, during the incident:
+
+| node | device | drive | IO PSI full avg300 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| k3s-prod-1 | `/dev/sda5` | C400-MTFDDAC512MAM (2011 consumer SATA SSD, no PLP) | **11.36** |
+| k3s-prod-2 | `/dev/nvme0n1p5` | Samsung PM9A1 NVMe | 0.75 |
+| k3s-prod-3 | `/dev/sda5` | WDC WDS500G2B0A (WD Blue SATA) | 1.29 |
+
+The prediction in the paragraph above — "every prod node is SSD or NVMe end-to-end, where
+concurrent rebuild I/O costs latency rather than collapsing it" — was **right about node 2 and
+wrong about node 1**. A 2011 consumer SATA SSD with 61,440 reallocated sectors, 31% of its
+endurance consumed and no power-loss protection is not the "SSD" that reasoning assumed. §0's
+"three nodes, three different drive models" is the fault line, exactly where §0 said it would
+be.
+
+**The exit condition is therefore OPEN and the second bullet applies.** Replacing node 1's
+drive, or giving etcd its own device, is the fix, and it is the operator's.
+
+Pending that, three SOFTWARE mitigations shipped on 2026-09-07 (branch
+`fix/etcd-io-priority`). **None of them is the fix**, and each says so where it lives:
+
+1. **Observability first** — `NodeIOPressureHigh` / `NodeIOPressureCritical` in
+   `platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml`, plus an I/O row on the node-pressure dashboard. The
+   stack alerted on CPU and memory PSI and had **no I/O alert at all**, so the first signal
+   of this outage was a node already out of the cluster. Thresholds (5% / 10% full IO PSI)
+   come from the numbers in the table above. Note the etcd histograms this section's first
+   bullet asks for are **not available**: kube-prometheus-stack's `kubeEtcd` scrape job is
+   deliberately disabled for k3s (`platform/monitoring/kube-prometheus-stack.yaml`), so PSI
+   is the signal that actually exists. Enabling the etcd scrape would make that bullet
+   directly measurable and is worth doing.
+2. **Longhorn concurrency ceilings** — `platform/longhorn/helmrelease.yaml`. Honestly:
+   `concurrentReplicaRebuildPerNodeLimit: 1` was **already in force during this outage** and
+   held; the 18 rebuilds ran one at a time and the node stalled anyway. Longhorn offers no
+   further rebuild lever for the v1 data engine (`replicaRebuildingBandwidthLimit` is
+   v2/SPDK only; `rebuildConcurrentSyncLimit` is already at its floor of 1). What was
+   tightened is every *other* Longhorn I/O source — restore, snapshot purge, backup, engine
+   upgrade — each of which defaulted to 5 concurrent operations per node and each of which
+   could reproduce this on its own.
+3. **Block-layer arbitration** — `roles/etcd_io_priority`, enabled for `[k3s_prod]`, applied
+   only when the operator runs `playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml`. BFQ + `IOWeight` so etcd's
+   cgroup outweighs `kubepods.slice`. Its README is explicit that most of the obvious knobs
+   here (`IOSchedulingClass`, `io.latency`, bare `IOWeight`) are **inert on these nodes**,
+   and that even this one cannot arbitrate the ext4 journal both tenants share.
+
+The last point is the one that matters for this section: **no cgroup or scheduler control
+separates two tenants on one filesystem.** etcd's `fdatasync` waits on a jbd2 journal commit,
+jbd2 is a kernel thread in the root cgroup, and Longhorn's writes dirty the same journal. The
+software mitigations raise the load level at which this happens. They do not remove it.
+
 **~~Known, separate consequence — `/var` is only 12 GiB.~~ RESOLVED 2026-09-04 by moving
 k3s's data dir.** This was recorded here on 2026-09-03 as a capacity item "to watch or
 repartition". Re-measuring it against dev turned it from a watch item into a blocker: the
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ ansible-playbook playbooks/site.yml        # core bring-up, in order (baseline
 # — or step by step —
 ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml    # 0. packages, kernel modules, Longhorn disk, swap-off
 ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml         # 1. HA k3s (primary --cluster-init, then joins)
+ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml # 1b. shared etcd/Longhorn device I/O weights (PROD ONLY; a no-op on dev)
 ansible-playbook playbooks/cilium.yml      # 2. Cilium CNI (cluster is NotReady until this)
 ansible-playbook playbooks/verify.yml      # 3. gate #1: 3 nodes Ready, Hubble up, no kube-proxy
 ansible-playbook playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml   # 4. hand off to bootstrap/ (SOPS then Flux)
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ should return a PIA exit IP (not the home ISP).
 |---|---|
 | `k3s.yml` / `k3s_server` | k3s server install with `--flannel-backend=none --disable-kube-proxy --disable-network-policy --disable=traefik,servicelb`; primary `--cluster-init`, secondaries join via the primary's node-token (fetched, never pre-stored) |
 | `cilium.yml` / `cilium` | Gateway API CRDs, then Helm `cilium` with `kubeProxyReplacement`, `k8sServiceHost/Port`, `gatewayAPI`, `egressGateway`, `hubble`, `l2announcements` |
+| `etcd-io-priority.yml` / `etcd_io_priority` | **prod only** (master switch defaults false; `group_vars/k3s_prod` sets it true). Switches the disk carrying `k3s_data_dir` to **BFQ**, drops `nr_requests` to 32, and gives `system.slice` + `k3s.service` `IOWeight=10000` so the embedded etcd outweighs `kubepods.slice` — then reads every value back out of the kernel and **fails** if it did not land. Mitigation for the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd WAL-fsync starvation. Restarts nothing. NVMe-backed nodes are skipped, not decorated. See `roles/etcd_io_priority/README.md` for the mechanisms in this space that are **inert** here and must not be "fixed" back in |
 | `verify.yml` / `cluster_verify` | waits nodes Ready + Cilium/Hubble rollout; asserts kube-proxy absent |
 | `flux-bootstrap.yml` / `flux_bootstrap` | calls `bootstrap/` (SOPS age key, then `flux bootstrap --path=clusters/dev`) |

@@ -79,11 +81,30 @@ Ansible installs Cilium; the Flux `platform/cilium` HelmRelease adopts config
 afterward. The parity-critical values **must match** between this role's
 `templates/cilium-values.yaml.j2` and that HelmRelease:
 - `kubeProxyReplacement: true`
- `k8sServiceHost: {{ k3s_api_host }}` (= primary node IP, `10.73.0.11` by default)
- `k8sServicePort: 6443`
+- `k8sServiceHost: {{ k3s_apiserver_endpoint }}` — **the kube-vip CONTROL-PLANE VIP**
+  (`= kube_vip_address`: dev `192.168.1.49`, prod `192.168.2.9`), **not** `k3s_api_host`
+- `k8sServicePort: {{ k3s_api_port }}` (6443 in both environments)

-The HelmRelease currently has `k8sServiceHost: "REPLACE-ME"` — WS-NET must set it
-to the same value this role uses (surfaced by `tofu output primary_node_ip`).
+### Two API addresses, split 2026-09-06 — do not re-merge them
+`k3s_api_host` and `k3s_apiserver_endpoint` were one variable, and the conflation put every
+prod `cilium-agent` on `192.168.2.10` (`k3s-prod-1`'s own address) on a cluster whose point is
+HA — verified live. Lose that node and the datapath keeps serving from Cilium's cache while no
+service or policy update ever lands, which is a silent failure, not an outage.
+
+| variable | value | consumed by | why it must be that address |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `k3s_api_host` | the founder's own node IP (dev `192.168.1.50`, prod `192.168.2.10`) | `roles/k3s_server`: the secondary `--server https://…:6443` join URL, and one `k3s_tls_sans` entry | on a **cold** build no VIP exists yet (kube-vip is a k3s auto-deploy manifest, so it needs a cluster first). The founder just ran `--cluster-init` and is up |
+| `k3s_apiserver_endpoint` | `{{ kube_vip_address }}` (dev `192.168.1.49`, prod `192.168.2.9`) | `roles/cilium` → `k8sServiceHost`; any steady-state client | it must survive losing any single server |
+
+Consequences already handled: `playbooks/site.yml` imports `kube-vip.yml` **between** `k3s.yml`
+and `cilium.yml` (the VIP has to be floating before the CNI dials it), and `roles/kube_vip`'s
+last task blocks until the VIP answers on 6443. `k3s_tls_sans` already carried both addresses,
+so no cert reissue and no k3s restart are involved.
+
+The Flux side of the same contract is `${K3S_API_HOST}` in `platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml`,
+set per overlay in `clusters/<env>/kustomization.yaml`; `[parity]` means it must equal
+`k3s_apiserver_endpoint` for the SAME environment. Asserted by
+`conformance/tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code`.

 ## Interface assumed of `bootstrap/` (authored by other workers, NOT here)
 `roles/flux_bootstrap` invokes two entrypoints via overridable command vars:
@@ -101,10 +122,20 @@ for PM reconciliation.
 ## Targeting prod (R-ENV-02: same playbooks, same roles, scoped overrides)

 `inventory/hosts.ini` carries a `[k3s_prod_primary]` / `[k3s_prod_secondary]` /
-`[k3s_prod:children]` section for the three planned bare-metal nodes (`k3s-prod-1` at
-`192.168.2.10` exists and is reachable today; `k3s-prod-2`/`-3` at `.11`/`.12` are addressed but
-not yet racked, so their inventory lines stay commented out), with its own `group_vars/k3s_prod/`
-(vaulted `ansible_become_password` + non-secret overrides).
+`[k3s_prod:children]` section for the three bare-metal nodes — `k3s-prod-1` `192.168.2.10`,
+`k3s-prod-2` `.11`, `k3s-prod-3` `.12` — with its own `group_vars/k3s_prod/` (vaulted
+`ansible_become_password` + non-secret overrides).
+
+**All three are live in the inventory.** This paragraph used to say `k3s-prod-2`/`-3` "are
+addressed but not yet racked, so their inventory lines stay commented out"; that stopped being
+true on 2026-09-03 when node 3 came online, and the group has been complete since. Corrected
+2026-09-07 because the stale sentence is the kind that gets used to reason about blast radius:
+`-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` targets **three** hosts, not one. Confirm it, every time, before running
+anything:
+
+```bash
+ansible-playbook playbooks/<play>.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --limit k3s-prod-3 --list-hosts
+```

 **Nothing here is forked for prod.** Every node-host play takes its target group from a variable
 that defaults to the dev group, so the dev commands above are unchanged, and prod is the same
@@ -134,6 +165,11 @@ ansible-playbook playbooks/kube-vip.yml        -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
 ansible-playbook playbooks/verify.yml          -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
 ansible-playbook playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml  -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod   # see caveat below

+# prod — I/O arbitration for the shared etcd/Longhorn disk. ONE NODE AT A TIME, node 3 first
+# (WD Blue, IO PSI 1.29 during the incident) before node 1 (the 2011 C400, 11.36).
+ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --limit k3s-prod-3 --list-hosts
+ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --limit k3s-prod-3
+
 # prod — k3s.yml needs both halves of the primary/secondary split
 ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml \
  -e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary
@@ -148,7 +184,9 @@ ansible-playbook playbooks/site.yml \
 What the roles then resolve **by themselves** for a prod host, from `group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml`:
 `k3s_primary_group=k3s_prod_primary` (the `--cluster-init` founder, the node-token `delegate_to`
 target, and the node Cilium fetches the kubeconfig from), `k3s_servers_group=k3s_prod` (the tls-san
-node-IP list), `k3s_api_host=192.168.2.10`, `kube_vip_address=192.168.2.9`, and
+node-IP list), `k3s_api_host=192.168.2.10` (the founder, bootstrap-join only),
+`kube_vip_address=192.168.2.9` — and therefore `k3s_apiserver_endpoint=192.168.2.9`, which is what
+Cilium dials — and
 `cluster_kubeconfig_name=prod.kubeconfig` — so a prod run can never overwrite the
 `.cache/dev.kubeconfig` that `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh` exports as `$KUBECONFIG`.

@@ -27,19 +27,85 @@ k3s_servers_group: k3s_servers
 # a kubeconfig is a credential.)
 cluster_kubeconfig_name: dev.kubeconfig

-# The kube-apiserver endpoint the whole stack agrees on: the primary's REAL node IP.
+# --- TWO API ADDRESSES, AND THEY ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE (split 2026-09-06) ----------
+# This used to be ONE variable, k3s_api_host, consumed by BOTH the cold-bootstrap join and
+# Cilium's k8sServiceHost. That conflation is what pointed every cilium-agent on the LIVE
+# prod cluster at 192.168.2.10 — k3s-prod-1's own address — on a cluster whose entire
+# purpose is HA: verified 2026-09-06, all three agents carried
+# KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10 while kube-vip held 192.168.2.9. Lose that one node
+# and no service/policy update reaches the CNI until it returns (the existing datapath
+# survives on Cilium's cache, so it fails SILENTLY). The two consumers have genuinely
+# different requirements, so they now have two variables.
+#
+#   k3s_api_host            THE FOUNDER'S OWN ADDRESS. Bootstrap-time only.
+#   k3s_apiserver_endpoint  THE HA ENDPOINT (the kube-vip VIP). Steady-state.
+#
+# DO NOT "simplify" these back into one. See each block below for why each half must be
+# the address it is.
+
+# THE FOUNDER'S OWN NODE IP — a BOOTSTRAP-TIME address, deliberately NOT the VIP.
 # NOTE: ansible_host is now the pfSense NAT SSH target (192.168.2.102:225x), NOT the node
-# IP — so we read the real 192.168.1.x from k3s_node_ip instead. Used for k3s --tls-san /
-# secondary --server AND for Cilium k8sServiceHost so the Ansible bootstrap and the Flux
-# HelmRelease stay in PARITY (docs/02 contract).
+# IP — so we read the real 192.168.1.x from k3s_node_ip instead.
+#
+# EXACTLY TWO CONSUMERS, and both of them need the founder specifically:
+#   1. roles/k3s_server — the secondary `--server https://<host>:<port>` JOIN URL. On a COLD
+#      build the VIP DOES NOT EXIST YET at join time: kube-vip is a k3s auto-deploy manifest
+#      that only lands once a cluster exists, so a join aimed at the VIP is a join aimed at
+#      an unanswered address and the cold build is unjoinable. The founder is up (it just ran
+#      --cluster-init), which is the whole reason this variable is the founder.
+#   2. roles/k3s_server — one entry of k3s_tls_sans, so the founder's own address is a SAN
+#      alongside the VIP and every other server's IP.
+#
+# ANYTHING THAT RUNS AGAINST A CLUSTER THAT ALREADY EXISTS MUST NOT USE THIS. It is a
+# single point of failure by construction. Use k3s_apiserver_endpoint below.
 k3s_api_host: "{{ hostvars[groups[k3s_primary_group][0]]['k3s_node_ip'] }}"
+
+# Shared by both halves: k3s serves the API on 6443 in every environment, so the port is
+# not a per-environment knob and is not duplicated per address.
 k3s_api_port: 6443

+# THE HA kube-apiserver ENDPOINT — a VIRTUAL address that reaches the cluster wherever the
+# control plane currently is, not a machine. OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-06: in-cluster
+# components dial the VIP, as kube-vip was always intended to provide.
+#
+# DERIVED from kube_vip_address (below), never restated: an environment overrides the VIP in
+# ONE place (group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml sets kube_vip_address: 192.168.2.9) and this
+# follows automatically, so prod needs no override of its own and a fourth environment
+# cannot set one of the two and forget the other.
+#
+# NAMED FOR THE ROLE, NOT THE MECHANISM. Consumers want "the address that reaches the
+# apiserver, HA"; that it is currently floated by kube-vip is an implementation detail. If
+# the mechanism is ever something else (an external LB, a DNS name), this one line moves and
+# no consumer changes.
+#
+# CONSUMERS:
+#   - roles/cilium -> cilium-values.yaml.j2 -> k8sServiceHost.  [parity] with the Flux side:
+#     clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml K3S_API_HOST (and each overlay's patch) MUST equal
+#     THIS value for that environment, or Flux and the bootstrap fight over the CNI's
+#     control-plane path. See platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml's PARITY CONTRACT header.
+#
+# TLS IS ALREADY COVERED — verified, not assumed: k3s_tls_sans (roles/k3s_server/defaults)
+# has always included kube_vip_address, and on 2026-09-06 the prod apiserver was reached
+# through https://192.168.2.9:6443 with FULL CA verification and tls-server-name=192.168.2.9
+# (infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig, no insecure-skip-tls-verify). So the serving cert
+# needs no change and no k3s restart for this switch.
+#
+# ORDERING CONSEQUENCE, and it is why playbooks/site.yml changed too: Cilium now needs the
+# VIP to be UP before it installs. site.yml therefore imports kube-vip.yml BETWEEN k3s.yml
+# and cilium.yml, and roles/kube_vip waits for the VIP to answer before returning. kube-vip
+# can precede the CNI because its DaemonSet is hostNetwork with
+# KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=127.0.0.1 — it needs neither a CNI nor kube-proxy.
+k3s_apiserver_endpoint: "{{ kube_vip_address }}"
+
 # Control-plane HA VIP floated by kube-vip (roles/kube_vip). A stable failover
 # endpoint for the kube-apiserver, fronted by an operator pfSense port-forward at
-# 192.168.1.49:6443. Shared here so BOTH kube_vip AND the k3s_server tls-san list
-# agree on the address (the serving cert must carry this IP or TLS via the VIP
-# fails to validate).
+# 192.168.1.49:6443. Shared here so THREE things agree on the one address:
+#   - roles/kube_vip          — what to ARP and lease-elect for;
+#   - roles/k3s_server        — the tls-san entry (the serving cert must carry this IP or
+#                               TLS via the VIP fails to validate);
+#   - k3s_apiserver_endpoint  — above; what in-cluster components actually dial.
+# THIS is the one line an environment overrides (prod: 192.168.2.9, in
+# group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml); all three follow.
 kube_vip_address: "192.168.1.49"

 # Controller (dev container) reaches the kube-API DIRECTLY via the pfSense NAT
@@ -51,12 +51,18 @@ k3s_servers_group: k3s_prod
 # than no kubeconfig at all). .cache/ is gitignored; a kubeconfig is a credential.
 cluster_kubeconfig_name: prod.kubeconfig

-# --- k3s API host — safe to set now, the primary's real IP is already known -------
+# --- k3s API host — THE FOUNDER'S ADDRESS, bootstrap-time only --------------------
 # Dev's k3s_api_host (group_vars/all.yml) reads a separate k3s_node_ip hostvar because
 # dev's ansible_host is the pfSense NAT SSH target, not the node's real address. Prod
 # has NO NAT hop — ansible_host in hosts.ini IS already the node's real, routable LAN
 # address (see the KEY DIFFERENCE note there) — so point straight at it instead of
 # needing a k3s_node_ip split.
+#
+# WHAT THIS IS *NOT*, since 2026-09-06: it is not the endpoint anything steady-state
+# dials. That is k3s_apiserver_endpoint (group_vars/all.yml), which derives from
+# kube_vip_address below and therefore needs NO override here. k3s_api_host is consumed
+# only by the secondary `--server` cold-join URL and by one tls-san entry. Read the
+# TWO API ADDRESSES block at the top of group_vars/all.yml before touching either.
 k3s_api_host: "{{ hostvars[groups[k3s_primary_group][0]]['ansible_host'] }}"
 # cluster_controller_tls_server_name (group_vars/all.yml) derives from kube_vip_address
 # by template reference, so it needs no separate override here — it picks up the real
@@ -75,8 +81,15 @@ k3s_api_host: "{{ hostvars[groups[k3s_primary_group][0]]['ansible_host'] }}"
 # round (control-plane .49, ingress pool .53-.60).
 #
 # This is the address kube-vip floats for the API and that k3s tls-san's onto its
-# serving cert; secondaries use it as their --server join target. Dev's equivalent is
-# kube_vip_address: 192.168.1.49 in group_vars/all.yml.
+# serving cert. Dev's equivalent is kube_vip_address: 192.168.1.49 in group_vars/all.yml.
+#
+# CORRECTION 2026-09-06: an earlier version of this comment claimed "secondaries use it as
+# their --server join target". They do not, and they must not — on a COLD build the VIP is
+# not up when the secondaries join (kube-vip is a k3s auto-deploy manifest and needs a
+# cluster first), so the join uses k3s_api_host, the founder. What DOES use this address is
+# k3s_apiserver_endpoint (group_vars/all.yml, derived from this line), i.e. Cilium's
+# k8sServiceHost and any other steady-state client. Overriding kube_vip_address here moves
+# BOTH the VIP and prod's Cilium endpoint together, which is the point of deriving it.
 #
 # HISTORY: an earlier pass here wrongly set this to 192.168.2.20 — that is the INGRESS
 # VIP, not the control-plane VIP. Corrected. Keep the two distinct.
@@ -344,3 +357,29 @@ k3s_base_domain: "prod.home.keithjackson.dev"
 #     from the prod nodes — it is outside every cluster and can simply be powered off;
 #   - the `sops-age` Secret is installed out of band on prod (bootstrap/sops).
 flux_bootstrap_env_path: "clusters/prod"
+
+# --- shared etcd/Longhorn device I/O arbitration (2026-09-07 incident) --------------
+# TURNS ON roles/etcd_io_priority FOR PROD ONLY. Role default is false, and dev must stay
+# that way: dev has a DEDICATED etcd device (/dev/vdc mounted at server/db,
+# docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md) so it has nothing to arbitrate, and pulling a LIVE
+# cluster onto a different I/O scheduler as a side effect of sharing a role would be a real
+# change for no benefit. Same seam as node_baseline_backports_kernel above.
+#
+# WHY PROD NEEDS IT. The §2 ruling put /data/k3s (etcd WAL) and /data/longhorn (every
+# replica) on ONE partition per node and recorded the contention as "accepted to be
+# MEASURED, not assumed". It has now been measured, the hard way: 2026-09-07 06:05:21Z
+# k3s-prod-1 went NotReady with the host still up, because etcd could not finish a WAL
+# fdatasync (3.4-6.7 s against a 1 s expectation) while Longhorn wrote to the same disk.
+# /proc/pressure/io FULL avg300 was 11.36 there against 0.75 (node 2, NVMe) and 1.29
+# (node 3). See PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2 "THE MEASUREMENT CAME BACK".
+#
+# WHAT ENABLING THIS DOES *NOT* DO: nothing, until the operator runs
+# playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml. It is not applied by any other play except through
+# site.yml, and site.yml is not run against prod casually. Apply to k3s-prod-3 (the WD Blue,
+# IO PSI 1.29) FIRST and watch NodeIOPressureHigh for a day — the role's own README explains
+# why, what it cannot fix, and how to roll it back in three commands.
+#
+# k3s-prod-2 is NVMe-backed; the role detects that and deliberately installs nothing there
+# rather than leaving an inert drop-in behind, so this group-wide `true` is still correct
+# for it.
+etcd_io_priority_enabled: true
@@ -31,10 +31,17 @@ k3s_secondary
 [hypervisor]
 localhost ansible_connection=local

-# VPN egress-gateway node(s) — run the node-level split-tunnel OpenVPN + kill-switch
-# (ADR-0015, playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml). Initially just k3s-dev-3 (single gateway;
-# add a second host here for Cilium Egress Gateway HA). Members are already defined above
-# with their ansible_host under k3s_secondary; this group only tags the egress role target.
+# VPN egress-gateway node — runs the node-level split-tunnel OpenVPN + kill-switch
+# (ADR-0015, playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml). EXACTLY ONE host belongs here.
+#
+# THIS GROUP IS SINGLETON BY DESIGN — a second host does NOT buy failover. Cilium OSS has no
+# egress-gateway failover: the CRD's own `egressGateway` description says "In case multiple nodes
+# are a match for the given set of labels, the first node in lexical ordering based on their name
+# will be selected". Two labelled nodes therefore means one silently wins by NAME ORDER (a labelled
+# `k3s-prod-1` beats a labelled `k3s-prod-3`) and the other carries no traffic. See
+# platform/vpn-egress/README.md "Resilience — there is no gateway failover" for the full statement
+# and the ADR-0016 escalation. Members are already defined above with their ansible_host under
+# k3s_secondary; this group only tags the egress role target.
 [vpn_egress_gateway]
 k3s-dev-3

@@ -85,9 +92,17 @@ proxmox ansible_host=192.168.2.102 ansible_port=22 ansible_user=root ansible_ssh
 # =============================================================================

 [k3s_prod_primary]
-k3s-prod-1 ansible_host=192.168.2.10 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.10
+# FOUNDER MOVED TO NODE 2 (2026-09-07). Node 1 founded this cluster with --cluster-init,
+# then its SSD was replaced and Debian reinstalled, so it is now a JOINING node like any
+# other. This group decides two things at once: which play sets k3s_server_mode: primary
+# (-> --cluster-init, which FOUNDS A NEW CLUSTER) and what k3s_api_host resolves to (the
+# --server join target). Leaving node 1 here would have pointed a rebuilt, empty node at
+# ITSELF and founded a second cluster beside the live one. Node 2 is the senior surviving
+# server; its own --cluster-init is inert because /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml already exists.
+k3s-prod-2 ansible_host=192.168.2.11 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.11

 [k3s_prod_secondary]
+k3s-prod-1 ansible_host=192.168.2.10 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.10
 # Uncomment a node only once it is actually on the bench and answering SSH, so no play can
 # target a host that isn't there. k3s-prod-2 came online 2026-09-01 (imaged identically to
 # node 1: same HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Mini, same BIOS R21 02.26.00, same i7-9700T, same
@@ -103,7 +118,6 @@ k3s-prod-1 ansible_host=192.168.2.10 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.10
 # three-way, not a node-1 outlier.
 # NOTE: node 3 also has wlp1s0 up on 192.168.2.195 (wifi). `ansible_host` is deliberately
 # the WIRED eno1 address — the same directly-routable 192.168.2.x LAN as nodes 1 and 2.
-k3s-prod-2 ansible_host=192.168.2.11 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.11
 k3s-prod-3 ansible_host=192.168.2.12 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.12

 # Umbrella group group_vars/k3s_prod/ attaches to (mirrors dev's [k3s_servers:children]
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+# Give the k3s server process — and therefore the EMBEDDED ETCD inside it — a larger share of
+# the block device it shares with Longhorn. Mitigates the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 outage, where
+# etcd's WAL fdatasync took 3.4-6.7 s (expects 1 s) and the node went NotReady while the host
+# stayed up. See roles/etcd_io_priority/README.md for the mechanism, the measurements, and the
+# list of things in this space that do NOT work on these nodes.
+#
+# NO-OP BY DEFAULT. The role's master switch (etcd_io_priority_enabled) is false in
+# defaults/main.yml and true only in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml, so running this
+# with no extra vars against dev changes nothing on any node — dev already has a dedicated
+# etcd device and has nothing to arbitrate.
+#
+# TARGET (R-ENV-02): same `k3s_hosts` seam every other whole-cluster play uses.
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml                       # dev, a no-op
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod # prod
+#
+# RUN IT ON ONE NODE FIRST, AND CONFIRM THE TARGET BEFORE YOU RUN IT AT ALL. A prior mistake in
+# this repo silently targeted dev's three nodes; --list-hosts is how that is caught:
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod \
+#     --limit k3s-prod-3 --list-hosts
+# k3s-prod-3 first, deliberately: it is the WD Blue SATA node (IO PSI 1.29 during the incident),
+# so it exercises the identical code path as the failing node 1 (11.36) at a fraction of the
+# stakes. Watch NodeIOPressureHigh / the "Nodes — CPU / Memory / I-O Pressure" dashboard for a
+# day before touching node 1.
+#
+# ROLLBACK is immediate and needs no playbook — see the header of
+# /usr/local/sbin/k3s-etcd-io-priority on the node.
+
+- name: I/O priority for the shared etcd + Longhorn device
+  hosts: "{{ k3s_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
+  become: true
+  # serial: 1 — one node at a time. Nothing here restarts k3s, but changing a live node's I/O
+  # scheduler is a real change to a cluster member, and the whole point is that a bad outcome
+  # on one node must never be simultaneous across all three.
+  serial: 1
+  gather_facts: true
+  roles:
+    - role: etcd_io_priority
@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@
 # Control-plane ONLY (svc_enable=false) — Cilium owns Service LoadBalancing.
 # Writes the manifest into each server's k3s auto-deploy dir; k3s applies it.
 #
+# PART OF THE ONE-COMMAND BRING-UP SINCE 2026-09-06, not a separate operator step:
+# playbooks/site.yml imports this play BETWEEN k3s.yml and cilium.yml, because Cilium's
+# k8sServiceHost is now this VIP (k3s_apiserver_endpoint, group_vars/all.yml) and the CNI
+# cannot be installed against an endpoint nothing announces yet. The role's final task waits
+# for the VIP to answer on 6443, so a failure to float it stops the run here with a named
+# cause instead of surfacing later as unreachable cilium-agents.
+#
 # TARGET (R-ENV-02): `k3s_hosts` defaults to dev's `k3s_servers`; prod is
 #   ansible-playbook playbooks/kube-vip.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
 # (the VIP itself comes from kube_vip_address, already scoped per environment in
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 ---
 # Full dev/test cluster bring-up, in order (docs/02 sequencing; run AFTER
 # `tofu apply` has created and cloud-init has baselined the VMs):
-#   k3s HA install -> Cilium CNI -> verify readiness -> Flux + SOPS hand-off.
+#   k3s HA install -> kube-vip control-plane VIP -> Cilium CNI -> verify readiness
+#   -> Flux + SOPS hand-off.
+# (kube-vip joined the chain 2026-09-06 — see the note at its import below; it is a
+# prerequisite of the CNI now, not a separate operator step.)
 #
 # TARGET (R-ENV-02): every imported play takes its host pattern from a var that
 # defaults to the dev group, so `ansible-playbook playbooks/site.yml` with no extra
@@ -20,6 +23,40 @@
 - name: Import - install k3s HA control plane
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: k3s.yml

+# ADDED 2026-09-07, after the k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O-starvation outage. It must come AFTER
+# k3s.yml because it writes an IOWeight drop-in for k3s.service and verifies the value in
+# that unit's LIVE cgroup — on a cold build the cgroup does not exist until k3s runs, and
+# the role reports that rather than asserting on it. It restarts nothing.
+#
+# A NO-OP FOR DEV, by design: roles/etcd_io_priority defaults its master switch to false and
+# only inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml sets it true. Dev has a dedicated etcd device
+# and must not be dragged onto a different I/O scheduler by a shared role.
+- name: Import - I/O arbitration for the shared etcd + Longhorn device (prod only)
+  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: etcd-io-priority.yml
+
+# ADDED 2026-09-06, AND ITS POSITION IS LOAD-BEARING: kube-vip MUST come up between k3s and
+# Cilium. Cilium's k8sServiceHost is now the control-plane VIP (k3s_apiserver_endpoint =
+# kube_vip_address) rather than the founder's own node IP, so installing Cilium before the
+# VIP is announced would point every agent at an address nothing answers on — the exact
+# shape of the 2026-09-01 incident, where agents that could not reach the API server
+# deadlocked on a cold cluster.
+#
+# IT CANNOT COME EARLIER. kube-vip ships as a k3s auto-deploy manifest
+# (<data-dir>/server/manifests), so a cluster must exist before it can be applied — hence
+# after k3s.yml, not before.
+#
+# IT DOES NOT NEED THE CNI, which is what makes this ordering possible at all: the kube-vip
+# DaemonSet is hostNetwork with KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=127.0.0.1 (roles/kube_vip's template
+# explains why), so it reaches the node-local apiserver with no CNI and no kube-proxy, and
+# DaemonSet pods carry the default not-ready/network-unavailable tolerations that let them
+# schedule onto a still-NotReady node. roles/kube_vip blocks until the VIP actually answers
+# on 6443, so cilium.yml below cannot start against a VIP that is not up.
+#
+# Re-running this against the LIVE dev cluster is a no-op for this play: dev already runs
+# kube-vip with the same rendered manifest, and the wait finds the VIP already answering.
+- name: Import - float the control-plane HA VIP (kube-vip) BEFORE the CNI dials it
+  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: kube-vip.yml
+
 - name: Import - install Cilium CNI
  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: cilium.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,17 @@
 # cilium role defaults (ADR-0002, docs/02 Cilium-ownership contract).
 # This role performs the INITIAL Cilium install; the Flux platform/cilium
 # HelmRelease adopts config afterward. The parity-critical values
-# (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port) are templated from k3s_api_host.
+# (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port) are templated from
+# k3s_apiserver_endpoint / k3s_api_port (group_vars/all.yml).
+#
+# k8sServiceHost IS THE HA VIP, NOT THE FOUNDER (changed 2026-09-06). It reads
+# k3s_apiserver_endpoint — which derives from kube_vip_address, so it is dev 192.168.1.49 /
+# prod 192.168.2.9 — and deliberately NOT k3s_api_host, the founder's own node IP. Those two
+# were one variable until 2026-09-06, and the conflation is what left all three prod
+# cilium-agents dialing k3s-prod-1 on an HA cluster. Do not re-merge them.
+#
+# THIS ROLE THEREFORE DEPENDS ON THE VIP EXISTING. playbooks/site.yml runs kube-vip.yml
+# before cilium.yml and roles/kube_vip blocks until the VIP answers on 6443.

 # Exact pin — MUST equal the platform/cilium HelmRelease chart.spec.version (1.20.1, an
 # exact pin, not a range). Renovate bumps both together.
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
  run_once: true
  changed_when: false

- name: Render the Cilium values file (parity-critical settings from k3s_api_host)
+- name: Render the Cilium values file (parity-critical settings from k3s_apiserver_endpoint)
  ansible.builtin.template:
    src: cilium-values.yaml.j2
    dest: "{{ cilium_values_path }}"
@@ -4,9 +4,24 @@
 ---
 # [parity] k3s kube-proxy is disabled → Cilium replaces it (ADR-0001/0002).
 kubeProxyReplacement: true
-# [parity] = the k3s API endpoint (primary node IP). The Flux HelmRelease's
-# k8sServiceHost "REPLACE-ME" must be set to this same value.
-k8sServiceHost: "{{ k3s_api_host }}"
+# [parity] = k3s_apiserver_endpoint, THE HA CONTROL-PLANE VIP (kube_vip_address) — dev
+# 192.168.1.49, prod 192.168.2.9. NOT k3s_api_host, which is the FOUNDER'S OWN node IP:
+# pointing the CNI's kube-proxy replacement at one machine on a 3-server HA cluster means
+# losing that machine stops every service/policy update reaching the datapath, silently
+# (the existing datapath keeps working from Cilium's cache, so nothing looks broken). That
+# was the live state of prod until 2026-09-06 — all three cilium-agents carried
+# KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10 while kube-vip held .9. See group_vars/all.yml.
+#
+# [parity] The Flux side is platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml's k8sServiceHost:
+# "${K3S_API_HOST}", whose per-environment value comes from clusters/<env>/kustomization.yaml.
+# THAT VALUE MUST EQUAL k3s_apiserver_endpoint for the SAME environment. If it does not,
+# Flux and this bootstrap render different control-plane paths and fight over the CNI.
+#
+# THE VIP MUST BE UP BEFORE THIS ROLE RUNS. playbooks/site.yml imports kube-vip.yml between
+# k3s.yml and cilium.yml for exactly this reason, and roles/kube_vip blocks until the VIP
+# answers. Rendering this against a VIP that nothing announces yet reproduces the
+# 2026-09-01 shape: agents that cannot reach the API server on a cold cluster.
+k8sServiceHost: "{{ k3s_apiserver_endpoint }}"
 k8sServicePort: {{ k3s_api_port }}

 # Ingress via Gateway API — no Traefik (docs/09, ADR-0002).
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# roles/etcd_io_priority
+
+Give the k3s server process — and therefore the **embedded etcd** it hosts — a larger share of
+the block device it shares with Longhorn.
+
+## The incident
+
+2026-09-07 06:05:21Z, `k3s-prod-1` went NotReady (`Kubelet stopped posting node status`) while
+the host stayed up, pingable and SSH-able. From the k3s journal:
+
+```
+slow fdatasync                took=3.56s / 6.71s / 4.95s / 3.40s   (etcd expects 1s)
+apply request took too long   took=8.30s                           (expects 100ms)
+etcdserver: too many requests
+Failed to check local etcd status for learner management: context deadline exceeded
+```
+
+No OOM, no MCE, no hung task. All three prod nodes put `/data/k3s` (etcd's WAL **and** the
+containerd image store) and `/data/longhorn` (every replica) in two directories on **one
+partition**:
+
+| node | device | drive | `/proc/pressure/io` full avg300 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| k3s-prod-1 | `/dev/sda5` | C400-MTFDDAC512MAM — 2011 consumer SATA SSD, no PLP, 61,440 reallocated sectors | **11.36** |
+| k3s-prod-2 | `/dev/nvme0n1p5` | Samsung PM9A1 NVMe | 0.75 |
+| k3s-prod-3 | `/dev/sda5` | WDC WDS500G2B0A (WD Blue SATA) | 1.29 |
+
+Recovery took a manual `systemctl restart k3s`; 18 Longhorn volumes then rebuilt onto the same
+disk etcd was trying to fsync on. The failure is self-reinforcing.
+
+## What this role does
+
+Two things, both instantly reversible, neither requiring a k3s restart:
+
+1. **`k3s-etcd-io-priority.service`** (oneshot, ordered `Before=k3s.service`) switches the
+   shared device to the **BFQ** I/O scheduler and lowers `nr_requests` from 64 to 32.
+2. **`IOWeight=10000` drop-ins** on `system.slice` and `k3s.service`, which BFQ turns into
+   `io.bfq.weight=1000` — a 10:1 share against the default-weighted `kubepods.slice` where
+   Longhorn's instance-managers live.
+
+Then it **reads every one of those values back out of the kernel and asserts on them**. If the
+scheduler did not switch, or the weight did not land, the play fails. A mitigation that looks
+applied and is not is worse than none.
+
+## Why not the obvious things — all checked on the live nodes, all inert
+
+**`IOSchedulingClass=realtime` on `k3s.service`.** The scheduler here (`mq-deadline`, and BFQ
+too) *does* honour the I/O priority class, so this looks like the answer. It is not: I/O
+priority is inherited across `fork` and preserved across `exec` — `block/blk-ioc.c`'s
+`__copy_io()` copies `ioc->ioprio` into the child — and **containerd is a child of the k3s
+server process**. Verified on k3s-prod-1: `ps -eo pid,ppid,comm` shows containerd's PPID is the
+`k3s-server` PID (84553 → 84333), and
+
+```
+$ ionice -c2 -n0 -- sh -c 'ionice -p $$; sh -c "ionice -p \$\$"'
+best-effort: prio 0
+best-effort: prio 0
+```
+
+confirms inheritance through two levels of fork+exec on that node. Putting k3s in the realtime
+class therefore puts **every container on the node** in the realtime class, Longhorn included —
+no relative gain, and it demotes the rest of `system.slice` (sshd, journald) for nothing.
+Getting this to work would need containerd out of k3s's process tree, i.e. an external
+containerd via `--container-runtime-endpoint`. That is an architecture change, not a tweak.
+
+**`IOSchedulingPriority` (the level within a class).** `mq-deadline` buckets requests by
+priority **class** only — `IOPRIO_CLASS_RT/BE/IDLE` map to three `dd_per_prio` queues and the
+level inside a class is not read. So best-effort 0 versus best-effort 4 is a no-op here.
+
+**`io.latency` (blk-iolatency).** The ideal mechanism for this problem — scheduler-independent,
+protects one cgroup's latency target by throttling its siblings. **Not available:** Debian
+trixie's kernel does not build it. `grep CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP /boot/config-7.1.8+deb13-amd64`
+returns `CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_IOCOST=y` and no `IOLATENCY`, and there is no `io.latency` file
+anywhere under `/sys/fs/cgroup`.
+
+**`IOWeight=` on the stock configuration.** systemd writes `IOWeight=` to both `io.weight`
+(blk-iocost) and `io.bfq.weight` (BFQ). On these nodes as shipped, **neither reader exists**:
+the scheduler is `mq-deadline`, which has no cgroup awareness, and blk-iocost is compiled in but
+disabled (`/sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.qos` is empty). Adding a drop-in without switching the
+scheduler would be pure decoration. That is why the scheduler change and the weights are one
+role and one verification, not two independent knobs.
+
+**`IOWeight=1000` instead of `10000`.** systemd rescales `IOWeight`'s 1..10000 range onto
+`io.bfq.weight`'s 1..1000, so 1000 maps to roughly 101 — BFQ's default for an unweighted cgroup
+is 100. Only the top of the range separates anything. The role asserts the resulting
+`io.bfq.weight` is ≥ `etcd_io_priority_min_bfq_weight` (500) rather than trusting that mapping.
+
+**A udev rule instead of a unit.** `ATTR{queue/scheduler}="bfq"` on the *boot* disk fires its
+`add` event in the initramfs, where `/etc/udev/rules.d` is absent and `bfq.ko` is not loaded —
+it silently does nothing and the disk comes up on `mq-deadline` with no error anywhere.
+
+**A drop-in on `kubepods.slice`** (to lower Longhorn instead of raising etcd). `kubepods.slice`
+is a **transient** unit the kubelet creates through the systemd API (`systemctl cat
+kubepods.slice` shows `/run/systemd/transient/kubepods.slice`), and whether systemd merges an
+`/etc` drop-in into a transient unit was not verified on these nodes. Raising `system.slice`
+gets the same ratio through a unit systemd definitely owns.
+
+## What this role does NOT fix
+
+- **It does not separate etcd from Longhorn.** Both still write to one ext4 filesystem on one
+  partition. Weights arbitrate the *device queue*; they cannot arbitrate the **shared ext4
+  journal**. `fdatasync` on the WAL waits on a jbd2 commit, jbd2 is a kernel thread in the root
+  cgroup, and Longhorn's replica writes dirty the same journal. That serialization point is
+  invisible to every cgroup control in this file and is a hard limit of co-tenancy on one
+  filesystem.
+- **It is unproven on this hardware.** BFQ is the right mechanism on paper and it is what
+  systemd's `IOWeight` was built for, but nothing here has been measured on a C400 under a real
+  Longhorn rebuild. The role fails loudly if the settings do not *land*; it cannot tell you they
+  *helped*. Apply to `k3s-prod-3` first and watch the `NodeIOPressureHigh` alert and the
+  "Nodes — CPU / Memory / I-O Pressure" dashboard before touching node 1.
+- **BFQ has costs.** It disables writeback throttling (`wbt_lat_usec` is 2000 on sda today),
+  spends more CPU per request, and gives up some peak throughput. On a device that is already
+  the bottleneck this is the right trade; it is still a trade.
+- **k3s-prod-2 gets nothing.** Its data dir is on NVMe, BFQ is a poor fit for NVMe, and its IO
+  PSI was 0.75 during the incident. The role detects this and installs nothing rather than
+  leaving inert files behind.
+- **The real fix is hardware and is the operator's**: replace the C400, or give etcd its own
+  device and flip `node_baseline_etcd_source` back to `device` — the path
+  `roles/node_baseline` still supports unchanged, and the exit condition already written into
+  `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §2.
+
+## Running it
+
+```bash
+cd infra/ansible
+
+# ALWAYS confirm the target first — a prior mistake in this repo silently hit dev.
+ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod \
+  --limit k3s-prod-3 --list-hosts
+
+ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --limit k3s-prod-3
+```
+
+Rollback, per node, immediate:
+
+```bash
+systemctl disable --now k3s-etcd-io-priority.service
+printf 'mq-deadline\n' > /sys/block/sda/queue/scheduler
+printf '64\n'          > /sys/block/sda/queue/nr_requests
+rm -f /etc/systemd/system/{system.slice,k3s.service}.d/10-etcd-io-weight.conf
+systemctl daemon-reload
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+---
+# etcd_io_priority — give the k3s process (and therefore the embedded etcd it hosts) a
+# larger share of the block device it SHARES with Longhorn, on nodes where those two
+# tenants sit on one partition.
+#
+# READ roles/etcd_io_priority/README.md BEFORE CHANGING ANY OF THESE. Two of the obvious
+# knobs in this space are INERT on these nodes and are deliberately absent:
+#   * IOSchedulingClass= / IOSchedulingPriority= on k3s.service. I/O priority is inherited
+#     across fork and preserved across exec (block/blk-ioc.c __copy_io copies
+#     ioc->ioprio), and containerd is a CHILD of the k3s server process — verified live on
+#     k3s-prod-1: `ps -eo pid,ppid,comm` shows containerd's PPID is the k3s-server PID, and
+#     `ionice -c2 -n0 -- sh -c 'ionice -p $$; sh -c "ionice -p \$\$"'` reports best-effort
+#     prio 0 at BOTH levels. So raising k3s to the realtime I/O class raises every container
+#     on the node with it, Longhorn's instance-managers included, and buys nothing against
+#     the thing we are trying to beat.
+#   * io.latency (blk-iolatency), which WOULD be the ideal scheduler-independent protection.
+#     Not available: CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_IOLATENCY is absent from Debian trixie's kernel
+#     (`grep CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP /boot/config-7.1.8+deb13-amd64` returns IOCOST but not
+#     IOLATENCY), and there is no /sys/fs/cgroup/**/io.latency on any prod node.
+# What is left, and what this role does, is cgroup-proportional weighting — which requires
+# a scheduler that implements it.
+
+# MASTER SWITCH. Default FALSE so the LIVE dev cluster is untouched by a shared role:
+# dev already has a DEDICATED etcd device (/dev/vdc mounted at server/db,
+# docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md), so it has nothing to arbitrate and no reason to take a
+# scheduler change. Set true for the [k3s_prod] group in
+# inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml — the same seam node_baseline_backports_kernel,
+# kube_vip_address and k3s_data_dir use.
+etcd_io_priority_enabled: false
+
+# THE I/O SCHEDULER, AND WHY IT HAS TO CHANGE FOR ANY OF THIS TO WORK.
+# Measured on k3s-prod-1: `cat /sys/block/sda/queue/scheduler` -> `none [mq-deadline]`.
+# mq-deadline honours the I/O priority CLASS (RT/BE/IDLE) but knows nothing about cgroups,
+# and cgroup v2's io.weight is implemented by blk-iocost — which is compiled in
+# (CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_IOCOST=y) but DISABLED: /sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.qos is empty. So on the
+# nodes as they stand today, systemd's IOWeight= writes a number nothing reads.
+# BFQ is the one scheduler here that implements cgroup weights (CONFIG_IOSCHED_BFQ=m,
+# CONFIG_BFQ_GROUP_IOSCHED=y — module present at
+# /lib/modules/7.1.8+deb13-amd64/kernel/block/bfq.ko.xz). Under BFQ, systemd's IOWeight=
+# lands in io.bfq.weight and becomes real.
+#
+# THE COSTS, STATED: BFQ turns OFF writeback throttling (wbt_lat_usec currently 2000 on
+# sda), costs some peak throughput and some CPU, and is a poor fit for NVMe — which is why
+# the role SKIPS the whole scheduler+weight path on an NVMe-backed node (k3s-prod-2), rather
+# than pretending to help there. Set to "" to install nothing but still run the report.
+etcd_io_priority_scheduler: bfq
+
+# Block-layer queue depth for the shared device. sda's current value is 64 (blk-mq derives
+# it from the SATA NCQ depth). A shallower queue bounds how many Longhorn writes can already
+# be sitting in front of an etcd WAL flush at the DEVICE, below any scheduler's reach — the
+# one lever in this file that does not depend on cgroups or on the scheduler honouring
+# anything. Costs sequential throughput. Set to "" to leave nr_requests alone.
+etcd_io_priority_nr_requests: 32
+
+# systemd IOWeight= for system.slice (which contains k3s.service, hence etcd) and for
+# k3s.service itself. THE VALUE IS 10000 — systemd's maximum — AND THAT IS NOT COSMETIC.
+# systemd rescales IOWeight (1..10000) onto io.bfq.weight (1..1000) linearly, so IOWeight=1000
+# maps to roughly 101 — indistinguishable from BFQ's own default of 100 for an unweighted
+# cgroup. Only near the top of the range does the weight actually separate: 10000 -> 1000,
+# a 10:1 share against the default-weighted kubepods.slice. A "reasonable-looking" 500 or
+# 1000 here would be a change that reads as applied and does nothing.
+etcd_io_priority_weight: 10000
+
+# FAIL-LOUD FLOOR for the verification step. The role reads io.bfq.weight back out of the
+# live cgroups and asserts it is at least this. It exists because the rescaling above is
+# systemd's business, not ours: if a systemd version maps IOWeight differently, this role
+# must FAIL rather than leave a drop-in that looks applied. 500 = 5x an unweighted sibling.
+etcd_io_priority_min_bfq_weight: 500
+
+# The k3s data dir whose backing device is the one to protect. Defers to the CLUSTER-WIDE
+# k3s_data_dir (group_vars/k3s_prod sets /data/k3s; the roles/k3s_server default restates
+# k3s's own /var/lib/rancher/k3s for dev) — NOT a second independent variable, for the same
+# reason node_baseline_k3s_data_dir defers to it.
+etcd_io_priority_k3s_data_dir: "{{ k3s_data_dir | default('/var/lib/rancher/k3s') }}"
+
+# The systemd units that get an IOWeight drop-in, and the section each one takes.
+# BOTH ENTRIES ARE LOAD-BEARING — see tasks/main.yml "THE CGROUP WEIGHTS" for why weighting
+# k3s.service alone would arbitrate k3s against sshd and not against Longhorn at all.
+# system.slice must come first so the parent is weighted before its child.
+etcd_io_priority_weighted_units:
+  - unit: system.slice
+    section: Slice
+  - unit: k3s.service
+    section: Service
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+# Re-run the oneshot so a changed script/unit takes effect NOW rather than at the next boot.
+# It only writes two sysfs files; there is nothing to drain and nothing to restart.
+- name: Apply k3s etcd I/O settings
+  ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+    name: k3s-etcd-io-priority.service
+    state: restarted
+    daemon_reload: true
+
+# daemon-reload re-realizes cgroup attributes for units that are already running, which is how
+# a changed IOWeight= reaches a LIVE k3s.service without restarting it. It is deliberately NOT
+# a `systemctl restart k3s`: restarting the k3s server to apply a performance tweak is exactly
+# the disruption this role exists to prevent, and on the primary it bounces etcd. If the reload
+# turns out not to be enough, the role's verification step FAILS and tells the operator to do a
+# rolling restart deliberately — it never quietly leaves the weight unapplied.
+- name: Reload systemd for I/O weights
+  ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+    daemon_reload: true
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+---
+# etcd_io_priority — see README.md in this directory for the incident, the mechanism, and the
+# honest list of what this does NOT achieve. Everything runs under one `when` on the master
+# switch, so a run against dev (default false) touches nothing at all.
+#
+# TAG: `io-priority`. Every task carries it, so this role can be run alone against a live
+# cluster without dragging in any other role's work:
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --limit k3s-prod-3
+#
+# ALWAYS --limit AND ALWAYS CHECK --list-hosts FIRST. This role changes the I/O scheduler of a
+# live node's boot disk; it is safe and instantly reversible, but it is a real change and the
+# blast radius must be one node at a time (playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml sets serial: 1 too).
+
+- name: I/O priority for the shared etcd device
+  when: etcd_io_priority_enabled | bool
+  tags: [io-priority]
+  block:
+
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # DISCOVER THE DEVICE. Never hardcoded, and never taken from inventory: k3s-prod-1 and -3
+    # boot from SATA (/dev/sda5) while k3s-prod-2 boots from NVMe (/dev/nvme0n1p5), and a
+    # per-host var freezes today's hardware into inventory where it goes stale silently the
+    # first time a disk is swapped. Inventory declares the INTENT ("the disk under k3s's data
+    # dir"); the node answers what that is. Same reasoning as roles/node_baseline's disk
+    # discovery.
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: Find the filesystem source backing the k3s data dir
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: "findmnt --noheadings --output SOURCE --target {{ etcd_io_priority_k3s_data_dir }}"
+      register: _eio_findmnt
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+
+    - name: Find the whole-disk parent of that filesystem source
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: "lsblk --noheadings --output PKNAME {{ _eio_findmnt.stdout | trim }}"
+      register: _eio_pkname
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+
+    # PKNAME is empty when the source IS already a whole disk (no partition), so fall back to
+    # its basename rather than producing an empty device name.
+    - name: Resolve the block device to tune
+      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+        _eio_device: >-
+          {{ (_eio_pkname.stdout_lines | map('trim') | reject('equalto', '') | list
+              + [_eio_findmnt.stdout | trim | basename]) | first }}
+
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # NVMe IS DELIBERATELY LEFT ALONE, and this is the whole reason the role discovers the
+    # device instead of assuming it. BFQ is a bad fit for NVMe (single software queue, real
+    # throughput cost) and k3s-prod-2 — the NVMe node — measured /proc/pressure/io full avg300
+    # of 0.75 during the 2026-09-07 incident against k3s-prod-1's 11.36. It does not have this
+    # problem. Installing an inert weight drop-in there would be exactly the false confidence
+    # this role exists to avoid, so nothing is written on such a node.
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: Decide whether a scheduler change applies to this device
+      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+        _eio_scheduler: "{{ '' if _eio_device is match('nvme') else etcd_io_priority_scheduler }}"
+
+    - name: Report that this node is intentionally skipped (NVMe-backed)
+      ansible.builtin.debug:
+        msg: >-
+          {{ inventory_hostname }}: k3s data dir {{ etcd_io_priority_k3s_data_dir }} is on
+          /dev/{{ _eio_device }} (NVMe). BFQ and its cgroup weights are not applied to NVMe —
+          nothing installed here. This is intentional, not a failure.
+      when: not _eio_scheduler
+
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # THE BLOCK-LAYER SETTINGS (scheduler + queue depth).
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: Install the block-layer settings script
+      ansible.builtin.template:
+        src: k3s-etcd-io-priority.sh.j2
+        dest: /usr/local/sbin/k3s-etcd-io-priority
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: "0755"
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+      notify: Apply k3s etcd I/O settings
+
+    - name: Install the boot-time unit that applies them
+      ansible.builtin.template:
+        src: k3s-etcd-io-priority.service.j2
+        dest: /etc/systemd/system/k3s-etcd-io-priority.service
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: "0644"
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+      notify: Apply k3s etcd I/O settings
+
+    - name: Enable and start the block-layer settings unit
+      ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+        name: k3s-etcd-io-priority.service
+        enabled: true
+        state: started
+        daemon_reload: true
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # THE CGROUP WEIGHTS.
+    #
+    # BOTH LEVELS ARE REQUIRED AND NEITHER IS SUFFICIENT. cgroup v2 weights are hierarchical:
+    # k3s.service's weight only decides its share WITHIN system.slice, and system.slice's
+    # weight is what competes with kubepods.slice (where Longhorn's instance-managers live).
+    # Weighting only k3s.service — the intuitive thing to do — would arbitrate k3s against
+    # sshd and journald and would not touch Longhorn at all.
+    #
+    # kubepods.slice is deliberately NOT given a drop-in of its own. It is a TRANSIENT unit
+    # created by the kubelet through the systemd API (`systemctl cat kubepods.slice` on
+    # k3s-prod-1 shows /run/systemd/transient/kubepods.slice), and whether systemd merges an
+    # /etc drop-in into a transient unit is not something this change verified on these nodes.
+    # Raising system.slice achieves the same ratio through a unit systemd definitely owns.
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: Ensure the systemd drop-in directories exist
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item.unit }}.d"
+        state: directory
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: "0755"
+      loop: "{{ etcd_io_priority_weighted_units }}"
+      loop_control:
+        label: "{{ item.unit }}"
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+
+    - name: Write the IOWeight drop-ins
+      ansible.builtin.template:
+        src: io-weight.conf.j2
+        dest: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item.unit }}.d/10-etcd-io-weight.conf"
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: "0644"
+      vars:
+        _eio_dropin_unit: "{{ item.unit }}"
+        _eio_dropin_section: "{{ item.section }}"
+      loop: "{{ etcd_io_priority_weighted_units }}"
+      loop_control:
+        label: "{{ item.unit }}"
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+      notify: Reload systemd for I/O weights
+
+    # Handlers must run BEFORE the verification below, or the verification reads the state from
+    # before this run's changes and reports a stale pass.
+    - name: Apply pending I/O changes before verifying them
+      ansible.builtin.meta: flush_handlers
+
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # VERIFY — the point of the role, not a formality.
+    #
+    # This repo has repeatedly shipped configuration that looked applied and was not (the
+    # Keycloak reconciler that could not read its own Secret; Longhorn's orphanAutoDeletion,
+    # silently dropped by the chart for two minor versions). Every mechanism here has a
+    # plausible silent-failure mode: the scheduler module may not load; a systemd version may
+    # rescale IOWeight differently; daemon-reload may not re-realize a running unit's cgroup.
+    # So each is READ BACK OUT OF THE KERNEL and asserted. A failure here means the mitigation
+    # is not in place — which is strictly better than believing that it is.
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    - name: Read back the live block-layer state
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: "cat /sys/block/{{ _eio_device }}/queue/scheduler /sys/block/{{ _eio_device }}/queue/nr_requests"
+      register: _eio_queue_state
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+
+    - name: VERIFY the scheduler and queue depth actually took effect
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - "'[' ~ _eio_scheduler ~ ']' in _eio_queue_state.stdout_lines[0]"
+          - "etcd_io_priority_nr_requests | string | length == 0
+             or _eio_queue_state.stdout_lines[1] | trim | int == etcd_io_priority_nr_requests | int"
+        fail_msg: >-
+          /dev/{{ _eio_device }} did not take the requested settings. Wanted scheduler
+          '{{ _eio_scheduler }}' and nr_requests '{{ etcd_io_priority_nr_requests }}'; the kernel
+          reports {{ _eio_queue_state.stdout_lines | join(' / ') }}. The cgroup weights below are
+          MEANINGLESS without the scheduler, so this is a hard failure, not a warning. Check
+          `journalctl -u k3s-etcd-io-priority` and that bfq.ko exists for this kernel.
+        success_msg: >-
+          /dev/{{ _eio_device }}: scheduler {{ _eio_scheduler }}, nr_requests
+          {{ _eio_queue_state.stdout_lines[1] | trim }}.
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+
+    # k3s.service's cgroup does not exist until k3s is running, so a cold-build run legitimately
+    # has nothing to read there. Reported, not asserted away.
+    - name: Check whether k3s.service has a live cgroup to verify
+      ansible.builtin.stat:
+        path: /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/k3s.service
+      register: _eio_k3s_cgroup
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+
+    - name: Report that k3s is not running, so its own cgroup weight cannot be verified yet
+      ansible.builtin.debug:
+        msg: >-
+          {{ inventory_hostname }}: /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/k3s.service does not exist — k3s
+          is not running on this node, so its drop-in is written but UNVERIFIED. Re-run
+          playbooks/etcd-io-priority.yml once k3s is up.
+      when:
+        - _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+        - not (_eio_k3s_cgroup.stat.exists | default(false))
+
+    - name: Read back the live cgroup I/O weights
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        cmd: "cat /sys/fs/cgroup/{{ item }}/io.bfq.weight"
+      register: _eio_bfq_weights
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+      failed_when: false
+      # `| default(false)`: Ansible templates `loop:` BEFORE evaluating `when:`, so on an NVMe
+      # node — where the stat task above is skipped and _eio_k3s_cgroup has no `.stat` at all —
+      # a bare `_eio_k3s_cgroup.stat.exists` raises even though this task will not run.
+      loop: >-
+        {{ ['system.slice']
+           + (['system.slice/k3s.service']
+              if (_eio_k3s_cgroup.stat.exists | default(false)) else []) }}
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
+
+    - name: VERIFY every live cgroup weight actually carries the boost
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - item.rc == 0
+          - item.stdout | trim | int >= etcd_io_priority_min_bfq_weight | int
+        fail_msg: >-
+          /sys/fs/cgroup/{{ item.item }}/io.bfq.weight reads
+          '{{ item.stdout | default('<unreadable>') | trim }}' (rc={{ item.rc }}), below the
+          required floor of {{ etcd_io_priority_min_bfq_weight }}. IOWeight={{ etcd_io_priority_weight }}
+          did NOT reach the kernel. Most likely causes, in order: (1) systemd rescaled the value
+          differently from what defaults/main.yml assumes — compare
+          `systemctl show {{ item.item | basename }} -p IOWeight` against the file; (2) the cgroup
+          was not re-realized by daemon-reload, in which case a ROLLING `systemctl restart k3s`
+          (one node at a time — etcd quorum is 2/3) applies it; (3) BFQ is not active on the
+          device, which the previous assert should already have caught. The drop-in on disk is
+          NOT the mitigation — this file is.
+        success_msg: "{{ item.item }} io.bfq.weight = {{ item.stdout | default('') | trim }}"
+      loop: "{{ _eio_bfq_weights.results | default([]) }}"
+      loop_control:
+        label: "{{ item.item | default('') }}"
+      when: _eio_scheduler | length > 0
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# {{ ansible_managed }}
+#
+# Proportional share of {{ _eio_device }} for {{ _eio_dropin_unit }}, which is where the k3s server
+# process — and therefore the EMBEDDED ETCD it hosts — does its WAL writes. Its competitor is
+# kubepods.slice (Longhorn's instance-managers), which stays at the default weight.
+#
+# THIS ONLY WORKS BECAUSE THE SCHEDULER IS {{ _eio_scheduler | upper }}. systemd writes IOWeight= to both
+# io.weight (blk-iocost, which is compiled in but DISABLED here — /sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.qos is
+# empty) and io.bfq.weight (BFQ). Under the stock mq-deadline this file is a no-op; the sibling
+# k3s-etcd-io-priority.service is what makes it mean something. roles/etcd_io_priority verifies
+# io.bfq.weight after writing this and FAILS the play if the value did not land.
+#
+# NOT IOSchedulingClass=. I/O priority is inherited across fork and kept across exec, and
+# containerd is a child of the k3s server process — so realtime here would be realtime for every
+# container on the node, Longhorn included. See roles/etcd_io_priority/README.md.
+#
+# {{ etcd_io_priority_weight }} is systemd's MAXIMUM and that is deliberate: systemd rescales
+# 1..10000 onto io.bfq.weight's 1..1000, so IOWeight=1000 would map to ~101 — BFQ's unweighted
+# default is 100. Only the top of the range actually separates this cgroup from its siblings.
+[{{ _eio_dropin_section }}]
+IOWeight={{ etcd_io_priority_weight }}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# {{ ansible_managed }}
+#
+# WHY A ONESHOT UNIT AND NOT A UDEV RULE. The obvious form of this is
+# `ACTION=="add|change", KERNEL=="{{ _eio_device }}", ATTR{queue/scheduler}="{{ _eio_scheduler }}"`,
+# and it is unreliable for the ONE device that matters: {{ _eio_device }} is the boot disk, so its
+# `add` event fires in the initramfs, where /etc/udev/rules.d is not present and bfq.ko is not
+# loaded — the ATTR assignment silently does nothing and the disk comes up on mq-deadline with
+# no error anywhere. A unit ordered Before=k3s.service runs after modules are loadable, fails
+# LOUDLY if the scheduler is unavailable, and is visible in `systemctl status`.
+[Unit]
+Description=Block-layer I/O settings for the shared etcd + Longhorn device ({{ _eio_device }})
+Documentation=file:///etc/systemd/system/k3s-etcd-io-priority.service
+DefaultDependencies=no
+After=systemd-modules-load.service
+Before=k3s.service shutdown.target
+Conflicts=shutdown.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/k3s-etcd-io-priority
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# {{ ansible_managed }}
+#
+# Block-layer settings for the device that carries BOTH etcd's WAL ({{ etcd_io_priority_k3s_data_dir }})
+# and every Longhorn replica on this node. Run at boot by k3s-etcd-io-priority.service, and
+# safe to run by hand at any time — it is idempotent and takes effect immediately.
+#
+# Rollback (immediate, no reboot):
+#   printf 'mq-deadline\n' > /sys/block/{{ _eio_device }}/queue/scheduler
+#   printf '64\n'          > /sys/block/{{ _eio_device }}/queue/nr_requests
+# and `systemctl disable --now k3s-etcd-io-priority.service` so it does not come back.
+set -eu
+
+DEV="{{ _eio_device }}"
+QUEUE="/sys/block/${DEV}/queue"
+
+if [ ! -d "${QUEUE}" ]; then
+    echo "k3s-etcd-io-priority: /sys/block/${DEV} does not exist — device renamed?" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+{% if _eio_scheduler %}
+# BFQ is a module here (CONFIG_IOSCHED_BFQ=m); loading it is what makes it selectable at all.
+modprobe -q {{ _eio_scheduler }} 2>/dev/null || true
+
+if ! grep -qw '{{ _eio_scheduler }}' "${QUEUE}/scheduler"; then
+    echo "k3s-etcd-io-priority: scheduler '{{ _eio_scheduler }}' not available for ${DEV}: $(cat "${QUEUE}/scheduler")" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+printf '%s\n' '{{ _eio_scheduler }}' > "${QUEUE}/scheduler"
+{% endif %}
+
+{% if etcd_io_priority_nr_requests %}
+# ORDER MATTERS: switching the elevator resets nr_requests, so this must come second.
+printf '%s\n' '{{ etcd_io_priority_nr_requests }}' > "${QUEUE}/nr_requests"
+{% endif %}
+
+exit 0
@@ -59,6 +59,17 @@ k3s_server_mode: "secondary"
 # serving cert on restart when this set changes. Deduplicated (the primary IP is
 # also k3s_api_host).
 #
+# THIS LIST COVERS BOTH API ADDRESSES, WHICH IS WHY THE 2026-09-06 SPLIT NEEDED NO CERT
+# CHANGE AND NO k3s RESTART. group_vars/all.yml now distinguishes k3s_api_host (the
+# founder, for the cold join) from k3s_apiserver_endpoint (= kube_vip_address, what Cilium
+# and every steady-state client dial). Both are already in this set, so repointing a
+# consumer from one to the other cannot produce a TLS failure. VERIFIED LIVE 2026-09-06,
+# not assumed: prod's apiserver answered through https://192.168.2.9:6443 with full CA
+# verification and tls-server-name=192.168.2.9. Do not remove either entry — dropping
+# kube_vip_address breaks every client of the VIP; dropping k3s_api_host breaks nothing
+# today only because it is also in the k3s_servers_group node-IP list below, and that
+# coincidence is not a contract.
+#
 # k3s_servers_group — NOT a literal group name — is what makes this role environment-
 # agnostic (R-ENV-02): group_vars/all.yml sets it to `k3s_servers` (dev) and
 # group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml to `k3s_prod`, so each environment SANs its own servers.
@@ -155,6 +155,18 @@
         | default(k3s_primary_token_raw.content | b64decode | trim, true) }}
  when: k3s_server_mode == 'secondary'

+# THE JOIN TARGET IS k3s_api_host — THE FOUNDER — AND MUST NOT BECOME THE VIP.
+# group_vars/all.yml splits the two API addresses (k3s_api_host = the founder's own node IP,
+# k3s_apiserver_endpoint = the kube-vip HA VIP) and this is the canonical founder-only
+# consumer. On a COLD build the VIP does not exist at this point in the sequence: kube-vip
+# is a k3s auto-deploy manifest, so it cannot be applied until a cluster exists, and
+# playbooks/site.yml only imports kube-vip.yml AFTER k3s.yml. A `--server` pointed at the
+# VIP would therefore dial an address nothing announces and the cold build would be
+# unjoinable — with no diagnostic beyond a connection timeout.
+# On a WARM single-node rejoin (`--limit k3s-dev-N`) the founder is up and answering too, so
+# the founder works in both cases and the VIP works in only one. Cilium's k8sServiceHost is
+# the opposite trade (steady state, must survive losing the founder) and uses the endpoint
+# variable instead.
 - name: Install k3s secondary (join as server)
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: >-
@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ kube_vip_port: 6443
 # only if detection is wrong.
 kube_vip_interface: ""

+# How long to wait for the VIP to actually ANSWER on kube_vip_port after the manifest is
+# written (seconds). This is a real gate, not cosmetics: since 2026-09-06 Cilium's
+# k8sServiceHost is this VIP (k3s_apiserver_endpoint), and playbooks/site.yml runs this role
+# immediately before cilium.yml — so if the VIP never comes up, the run must stop HERE with
+# a clear message rather than proceed to install a CNI pointed at an address nothing
+# answers. On a cold cluster the budget covers k3s's deploy controller applying the
+# manifest, the ghcr.io image pull and leader election; on an already-running cluster the
+# check returns immediately.
+kube_vip_wait_timeout: 300
+
 # Leader-election tuning (seconds) — a snappy failover without thrashing.
 kube_vip_lease_duration: 15
 kube_vip_renew_deadline: 10
@@ -21,6 +21,14 @@
    executable: /bin/bash
  register: kube_vip_iface_detect
  changed_when: false
+  # RUN THIS EVEN UNDER --check. It is `ip -o -4 addr show`: it reads and changes nothing.
+  # Without check_mode: false the shell module is SKIPPED in check mode, kube_vip_iface_detect
+  # has no stdout, and the assert two tasks down aborts the play with "Could not detect the
+  # interface ... set kube_vip_interface explicitly" — a misleading failure that says nothing
+  # about the node. That mattered less while this play was an out-of-band operator step; it
+  # matters now that playbooks/site.yml imports it, because `--check` on the bring-up before a
+  # cold prod build is exactly the rehearsal an operator should be able to run.
+  check_mode: false

 - name: Resolve the kube-vip VIP interface (override wins, else detected)
  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
@@ -52,3 +60,34 @@
    owner: root
    group: root
    mode: "0600"
+
+# PROVE THE VIP IS ACTUALLY UP BEFORE THIS PLAY RETURNS (added 2026-09-06).
+#
+# Templating the manifest is not the same as having a floating endpoint: k3s's deploy
+# controller still has to apply it, the image still has to pull, and leader election still
+# has to pick an owner. Nothing used to check, which was tolerable while the VIP was only an
+# operator convenience. It is not tolerable now — Cilium's k8sServiceHost IS this VIP
+# (k3s_apiserver_endpoint) and playbooks/site.yml runs cilium.yml straight after this play,
+# so an unannounced VIP would mean installing a CNI that cannot reach the API server. That
+# failure is the 2026-09-01 shape and it is very expensive to diagnose from the far side;
+# failing here instead names the actual cause.
+#
+# run_once: the VIP is ONE address for the whole environment, so one probe answers for the
+# environment. Probing from a server host (not the controller) is deliberate: the servers
+# are on the VIP's own LAN in both environments, whereas the dev controller reaches dev's
+# API only through a pfSense NAT — a controller-side probe would have been a property of
+# where the play was launched from. READ-ONLY: it opens a TCP connection and changes nothing.
+- name: Wait for the control-plane VIP to answer (the CNI's endpoint depends on it)
+  ansible.builtin.wait_for:
+    host: "{{ kube_vip_address }}"
+    port: "{{ kube_vip_port }}"
+    timeout: "{{ kube_vip_wait_timeout }}"
+  run_once: true
+  changed_when: false
+  vars:
+    ansible_become: false
+  # DELIBERATELY NOT check_mode: false, unlike the interface probe above — so a `--check`
+  # rehearsal SKIPS this and does not sit on a socket for kube_vip_wait_timeout. wait_for
+  # declares no check-mode support, so the skip is the module's own behaviour and this comment
+  # is here only so the skip does not read as an oversight. CONSEQUENCE, stated plainly: a
+  # `--check` run does NOT verify the VIP is up. Only a real run gates the CNI on it.
@@ -11,3 +11,13 @@
  ansible.builtin.systemd:
    name: systemd-resolved
    state: restarted
+
+# Masking a unit writes a symlink to /dev/null into /etc/systemd/system; the RUNNING
+# systemd keeps its old view of the unit until it re-reads unit files. The mask is read
+# fresh at the next boot either way, so this only exists so the running manager does not
+# disagree with on-disk state in between. `daemon_reload` re-parses unit files and
+# re-runs generators — it starts and stops nothing, so it cannot disturb k3s or Longhorn.
+# Fires only when a mask actually changed, so a re-run of the role is silent.
+- name: Reload systemd unit files
+  ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+    daemon_reload: true
@@ -331,6 +331,15 @@
 # The devices this role must never, under any circumstances, hand to e2label. Built from
 # gathered facts (`gather_facts: true` in the play) plus the live swap list, so it is the
 # NODE's account of what is load-bearing, not a hardcoded list of partition names.
+#
+# EXPECT THIS LIST TO BE EMPTY. Since the swap tasks in tasks/main.yml mask swap.target,
+# a baselined node has no active swap for `swapon` to report, so the swap half of
+# node_baseline_lh_protected_devices below contributes nothing. That is not a weakened
+# guard: the claim CANDIDATE is derived from whatever is mounted at
+# node_baseline_longhorn_claim_mountpoint, and a swap partition is neither mounted nor an
+# ext4 filesystem, so it can never be the candidate in the first place. The task stays
+# because the list must be the node's own account of what is load-bearing — including on
+# a node reached before baseline has run, or one an operator has deliberately swapped on.
 - name: "Longhorn (claim): list the devices currently backing active swap"
  ansible.builtin.command: swapon --noheadings --show=NAME
  register: node_baseline_lh_swapdevs