8e913fdd7bf9449f81ce7e33209125946e760187
502
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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8e913fdd7b |
fix(node_health): "Failed to map" does NOT mean memory lost — plus survey results
THE MODEL WAS WRONG AND MY CHECK WITH IT. A live counter-example: k3s-prod-2 after its power
cycle shows MEMATTR=0xbeeb0018 and 'Failed to map ... @ 0xbeeb0018' — the SAME address and SAME
line as both of its 2.6 GiB boots — with MemTotal 15857732 kB, i.e. 15.1 GiB of 16 GB. FULL
MEMORY. The check reported FAIL 'THIS NODE HAS LOST MEMORY TO THE BUG' on a healthy node while
memory.physical_total correctly PASSed at 4.2%. The two checks contradicted each other.
REFINED MECHANISM — two kernel functions were conflated:
efi_memattr_init() does the memblock_reserve(). Catastrophic loss needs tbl_size NEGATIVE
(signed int -> sign-extended -> clamped to PHYS_ADDR_MAX). A garbage-but-POSITIVE tbl_size
reserves a modest wrong amount and costs nothing noticeable.
efi_memattr_apply_permissions() does the later memremap(), and THAT is what prints
'Failed to map'. It fails for ANY sufficiently wrong size, negative or merely large-positive.
So the line proves the table was corrupt AND TRUSTED, not that memory was lost. The cost is set
by the garbage VALUE, which is why one address gave 2.6 GiB twice and 15.1 GiB once.
THIS ALSO REFUTES THE ADDRESS->OUTCOME HYPOTHESIS OUTRIGHT — not untested, disproven.
STRUCTURAL FIX so the contradiction cannot recur: the shortfall is computed ONCE into a shared
fact (node_health_mem_shortfall) with worst-wins sub-verdicts; memory.physical_total IS that
verdict and firmware.efi_memattr READS it, measuring nothing itself. FAIL is gated on the shared
verdict. 'Failed to map' + normal memory is now WARN ('the bug fired and this boot survived it').
No honesty guard was weakened; one was strengthened (the measurement clause falls back to the DIMM
shortfall when zoneinfo is unreadable, and only claims 'could NOT be measured' when neither was
read). All five paths incl. the two unproducible-live SKIPs exercised against synthetic facts.
Verdicts: prod-1 WARN, prod-2 WARN (was FAIL), prod-3 PASS, dev unaffected.
SECOND FAULT, arguably worse for prod: NODE 2 HANGS ON A WARM REBOOT, STAYING POWERED. Its
journal ends cleanly mid-shutdown ('eno1: NIC Link is Down') then stops; the box sat powered but
off-LAN for ~38 min until the operator held the power button. A node that cannot survive an
unattended warm reboot cannot be rolled in an HA cluster, and node_health cannot see a machine
that is off the network. Leading candidate: node 2 is the ONLY node with 'Recover OS after Boot
Failure = Enable' — promoted from 'coincidence' in the BIOS diff to a live availability defect.
The reboot survey is NOT viable unattended on node 2 until this is understood.
SURVEY RESULTS (40 boots): prod-1 0/20, prod-3 0/20, prod-2 0 ROUNDS (hung on its first reboot),
pooled 0/40 -> p(bad) 95% CI 0.000-0.088. NOT elimination: 0/20 still permits 17% per node, and
node 2's prior 2-of-3 is unchanged. What it did establish: addresses are node-specific and highly
concentrated (node 1 used 3 distinct addresses in 20 boots, 15 at one; no address ever shared
between nodes); MEMATTR -> parse was a PERFECT function across all 7 repeated addresses over 37
boots; and the corrupting bytes are stable PER MACHINE (node 1 always 1030, node 3 always
1463964749), so the 'shared OS boot chain' inference needs refining.
Adds playbooks/memattr-survey.yml + roles/memattr_survey — reboots opt-in, resumable, artifacts
gitignored. Documents an Ansible defect worth knowing repo-wide: a looped include_tasks under the
default 'linear' strategy is flattened per host, so hosts run SERIALLY; the first attempt rebooted
node 1 twenty times while the others idled. Fixed with strategy: free + a forks preflight assert.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-OBS-04, R-TEST-02. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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b19c5db9ae |
feat(prod): node 3 onboarded — and it is NOT immune; BIOS-setting hypothesis disproven
k3s-prod-3 online at the planned 192.168.2.12 (serial 8CC015307N, same chassis/BIOS/CPU),
enabled in inventory, vaulted become confirmed, package floor installed. Health: 0 FAIL /
4 WARN / 14 PASS / 1 SKIP — the only node with zero FAILs. WD Blue WDS500G2B0A SATA SSD at
100% life, 3213 h, 0 grown bad blocks, 0 erase fails. Matched Crucial 2x16 GB pair — the only
node with symmetric memory.
*** NODE 3 IS NOT IMMUNE TO THE §0b BUG. *** Its firmware DOES publish a MAT
(MEMATTR=0xbeece018); the ABSENCE of a memattr diagnostic line means the kernel read a VALID
table, which is the opposite of immunity. There are THREE outcomes, not two: bail-out on a
garbage version >2, a valid parse with a sane size, and the catastrophic path. Seven boots across
three machines show the MAT address MOVES BOOT-TO-BOOT on every node with settings constant, and
each node has been seen on more than one path. Blast radius widens from two nodes to ALL THREE;
all three need the >= 6.13 kernel.
THE CORRUPTING BYTES ARE THE OS BOOT CHAIN, not firmware and not DRAM: garbage version
1463964749 = 0x5742544D appeared on node 2 AND node 3 — two different machines, identical bytes.
The overwriter is the shared shim/GRUB/EFI-stub/initrd placement writing into the page the
firmware pointed at. So initrd size, module set and boot device are part of the causal chain.
BIOS-SETTING HYPOTHESIS: DISPROVEN, and the three-way diff cannot support it even in principle.
All 240 attributes read on all three; firmware identical fleet-wide. The discriminating set (both
working nodes agree, broken differs) is seven attributes, of which:
- Fast Boot is the ONLY live candidate, and only as a probability-shifter — HP documents it
'skips some preboot initialization steps', which changes the heap top and hence where the MAT
lands. Different mechanism from the previously-killed MRC-caching theory; that stays dead.
- Legacy Boot Options is AFFIRMATIVELY INERT: 'Configure Legacy Support and Secure Boot' =
'Legacy Support Disable and Secure Boot Enable' on ALL THREE, Option ROM Launch Policy =
'All UEFI' on all three. No CSM is built on node 2 either. A naive diff gets this wrong.
- the rest are coincidence. After Power Loss is ELIMINATED by node 3, which works and shares
node 2's Power Off — though it is now a §1 checklist violation on TWO nodes.
FATAL CONFOUND: the 1=3!=2 partition is perfectly collinear with node 2 being the only
single-DIMM AND the only NVMe-booting node. Adding node 3 did not break the confound, it DOUBLED
it. No setting can be the cause anyway: node 2 booted good once and bad twice with settings held
constant.
EXPERIMENT DESIGN RECORDED because the obvious approach is statistically worthless: p(bad) is
known only to n=3, 95% CI ~0.09-0.99, so even 8 clean boots prove nothing. Elimination needs ~20
boots/arm; an odds shift needs ~50. Zero-touch first step: 20 reboots of node 2 unchanged, logging
MEMATTR address vs outcome — both failures were at exactly 0xbeeb0018 and all five successes
elsewhere, so if outcome maps onto a narrow address range the mechanism is settled without
touching anything.
ROLE BUG FIXED: node 3's WD drive reports a SMART threshold for only 1 of 25 attributes, and
smartctl OMITS the key rather than emitting 0 — summary.txt.j2 dereferenced a.thresh bare in five
places and the report task died, so no artifact was written. Added a thr() macro rendering 'n/a'
(deliberately not 0, which would read as a real ATA cannot-trip threshold). Would have hit any
drive of this class.
Also: three nodes, three different disk models, only one NVMe, and every node has a single disk
with no unpartitioned spare — so §2's identical-layout requirement is unmet on all three.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-OBS-04. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85
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6e4d311545 |
docs(prod): will 6.12.y get the memattr fix? Researched — not on its own
Operator asked whether waiting is viable or whether a backports kernel is permanent. Answer: it will NOT arrive on its own, but it CAN be made to, and the ask is unusually strong. VERIFIED: - NOT in linux-6.12.y. Newest commit touching memattr.c on that branch is 2024-07-12. In mainline since v6.13 (2025-01-19) — ~19 months, ~97 point releases. - NO stable tag and NO Fixes: tag on either commit. Structural, not an oversight: the unvalidated arithmetic dates to the file's creation in 2016, so it is not a regression and there is no bad commit to point Fixes: at. BOTH automatic feeds — Fixes:-scanning and AUTOSEL — had nothing to grab. AUTOSEL never surfaced it for any branch. - NOBODY has requested it: nothing on [email protected], nothing in all 8,027 open+archived Debian bugs against src:linux. - 6.12 LTS EOL is December 2028 — outlives Debian 13's support window, so not time-barred. - Debian REBASES: trixie carries 6.12.94-1 in trixie-security ('New upstream stable update'), so an upstream pickup would reach us via a normal apt upgrade. THE DECISIVE CARD: the cherry-pick is BYTE-CLEAN. Debian trixie 6.12.94-1's memattr.c hashes to 164203429fa7a..., identical to the upstream patch's pre-image blob — the file has not diverged between v6.12 and the commit's parent. cherry-pick applies with zero conflicts and zero adjustment, which removes the usual reason such requests get declined. The commit also meets every stable-kernel-rules criterion: mainline, 17 insertions, 'hardware quirk', 'a real bug that bothers people'. PLAN: backports now as explicitly provisional; email [email protected] (rules Option 2) CC linux-efi and Ard Biesheuvel who authored AND committed it as EFI maintainer, leading with the clean-apply proof and the three-boot reproduction with byte-identical e820; Debian BTS as secondary under handbook §9.1.7; make the deviation permanent only if there is no movement in 4-6 weeks. Only 8fbe4c49c0cc is needed by hand — 5d0faa8e8369 loosens a heuristic that was rejecting LEGITIMATE tables and is not required for this symptom. Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. |
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 gitea-admin
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4809199da6 | Merge pull request 'Node 2 memory: solved — Linux 6.12 EFI memattr bug, not hardware' (#15) from docs/node2-memory-refine into main | ||
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jakman85
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0a733294ff |
docs(prod): node 1's DIMMs are not a matched pair
Surfaced by the new node_health DIMM reporting, unrelated to the memattr bug and NOT a fault: DIMM1 is a Micron 8ATF2G64HZ-3G2E1 (DDR4-3200), DIMM3 a Micron 16ATF2G64HZ-2G6E1 (DDR4-2667). Both 16 GB so capacity is right, but different rank organisation and rated speed mean the pair runs at the slower 2667. Recorded in §0 where the symmetry decision gets made, because §2 requires the three nodes to end up with identical layouts and the previous '2x16 GB Micron' note hid the mismatch. Serves: R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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cf33338448 |
feat(node_health): detect the EFI memattr bug on every run, two independent ways
The fault is BOOT-TO-BOOT NON-DETERMINISTIC — the same machine booted correctly two boots
earlier — so it has to be detected on every health run, not diagnosed once. And node 1 is
exposed to the identical lottery on every reboot while currently looking healthy.
firmware.efi_memattr — reads the kernel ring buffer and distinguishes six states:
Failed to map EFI Memory Attributes table @ 0x.. -> FAIL (memory lost NOW)
Unexpected EFI Memory Attributes table version <N> -> WARN (corrupt table still published;
intact only by luck)
[Firmware Bug]: Corrupted EFI ... detected! -> PASS (the >=6.13 fix working)
no memattr line, log reaches early boot -> PASS (no table / accepted / not UEFI)
no memattr line, log does NOT reach early boot -> SKIP
dmesg unreadable -> SKIP
memory.physical_total — deliberately a SEPARATE check, not folded in: it measures the SYMPTOM
with no kernel log at all, so an unreadable-dmesg node is still not unmeasured. Two sub-verdicts,
worst wins: /proc/zoneinfo present-vs-managed (world-readable, works on metal and VMs — sum of
managed IS MemTotal) and MemTotal vs the DIMM total from dmidecode. Thresholds 10% WARN / 25%
FAIL, set from measured baselines: 2.0% prod-1, 2.1% workstation, 2.2% dev VM, vs 83.4% prod-2.
THREE GUARDS AGAINST A FALSE PASS, because "no memattr line" must never silently mean "fine":
1. dmesg failure yields available:false with the exact reason (rc, uid, kernel.dmesg_restrict) -> SKIP
2. the ring buffer WRAPS and every memattr line prints in the first fraction of a second, so the
collector records a boot_covered anchor (Linux version / BIOS-provided physical RAM map); no
memattr line WITHOUT that anchor is a SKIP, not a PASS
3. memory.physical_total needs no kernel log at all
Verified by forcing the unprivileged path: SKIP with the EPERM reason while zoneinfo still PASSed.
VERDICTS, confirmed live:
k3s-prod-1 WARN "EXPOSED, not immune ... survived only because its garbage version field read
1030, which is > 2 ... one unlucky boot from the failure state" + PASS 2.0%
k3s-prod-2 FAIL "THIS NODE HAS LOST MEMORY TO THE BUG ... at 0xbeeb0018" + FAIL 83.4%/83.6%
k3s-dev-* PASS both, NO false finding: "no UEFI config-table line ... did not boot via UEFI.
Log reaches back to early boot, so that absence is measured, not assumed."
Both failure texts carry the remediation verbatim, including that there is NO kernel cmdline
workaround because efi_memattr_init() runs before any efi= bail-out.
Root-gating follows the role's existing pattern: --privileged re-runs THE SAME collector under
become, only when the unprivileged pass actually failed to read something. Reimplementing the log
grep and SMBIOS parse in Jinja would have been a second source of truth for the same fact.
LATENT BUG FIXED in passing: the collector's run() used bare shutil.which(), so dmidecode (in
/usr/sbin) was invisible under the unprivileged k3s PATH and produced a FALSE "not installed"
skip reason. Now shares the sbin-aware which() collect_tools() already had.
INCIDENTAL FINDING recorded in §0b: node 1's DIMMs are NOT a matched pair — DIMM1 Micron
8ATF2G64HZ-3G2E1 (DDR4-3200), DIMM3 Micron 16ATF2G64HZ-2G6E1 (DDR4-2667). Both 16 GB so capacity
is right, but different rank organisation and rated speed, so the pair runs at 2667. Not a fault;
recorded because §2 requires the three nodes to end up symmetric and "2×16 GB Micron" hid it.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-OBS-04. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85
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47f02c6e06 |
docs(prod): second independent confirmation + no cmdline workaround exists
A second research pass reached the same root cause by a different route and pinned the arithmetic. Recording it because convergence from two independent lines is what turns this from a good hypothesis into a settled diagnosis. MECHANISM TO THE BYTE: - the garbage 'version' node 2 read was 1463964749 = 0x5742544D = ASCII 'MTBW'. The kernel is reading unrelated data. HP publishes the MEMATTR pointer into memory /sys/firmware/memmap calls plain System RAM, so the pre-Linux boot chain overwrites it. - tbl_size is a SIGNED int; num_entries * desc_size wraps mod 2^32 and goes NEGATIVE when bit 31 lands. memblock_reserve sign-extends it and memblock_cap_size clamps to PHYS_ADDR_MAX - base, so EVERYTHING above 0xbeeb0018 is reserved. - memblock_free_all then hands the allocator nothing above that line while present_pages (from memblock.memory) is untouched -> present 3340288 / managed 0. - 'Failed to map EFI Memory Attributes table' is emitted LATER by efi_memattr_apply_permissions(); it is positive PROOF the reservation already happened, a consequence rather than the cause. CLEANEST A/B TELL, one dmesg line: NODE_DATA(0) on prod-2 ends at 0xbeeb0000 — pgdat forced immediately BELOW the reservation — while on prod-1 it ends at 0x82f800000, the top of RAM. Identical 0x2a980 allocation, opposite placement. THERE IS NO KERNEL CMDLINE WORKAROUND. efi_memattr_init() is called from efi_config_parse_tables(), and x86's efi_init() calls efi_config_init() BEFORE the efi_runtime_disabled() bail-out — so noefi / efi=noruntime / efi=novamap do NOT prevent the reservation. A fixed kernel is the only real fix. EFI_MEMORY_SP / soft-reserved was the strongest competing theory and is EXCLUDED BY MEASUREMENT: /sys/firmware/memmap/10/type reads 'System RAM'. Soft-reserved would print as 'Soft Reserved' and is never memblock_add()ed, which would have left present at ~0 rather than 3340288. Also records that the hardening landed exactly one release late for Debian 13 (bug present since 2016; 8fbe4c49c0cc first in v6.13; follow-up 5d0faa8e8369) and that a Debian BTS report against src:linux is warranted — 6.12 is Debian 13's kernel for the release lifetime. Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. |
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jakman85
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49d82491dd |
docs(prod): node 2 memory SOLVED — Linux 6.12 EFI memattr bug, NOT a hardware fault
I framed this as an OPEN HARDWARE FAULT and blamed, in order: the DIMM, BIOS memory remapping,
and stale Fast Boot memory-training data. ALL THREE WERE WRONG. The hardware is fine.
ROOT CAUSE: HP's R21 firmware publishes a CORRUPT EFI Memory Attributes Table, and Linux 6.12
fails to validate it before reserving memory from its contents. drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
never validates num_entries or desc_size:
if (tbl->version > 2) { pr_warn(...); goto unmap; }
tbl_size = sizeof(*tbl) + tbl->num_entries * tbl->desc_size;
memblock_reserve(efi_mem_attr_table, tbl_size);
Garbage version > 2 -> kernel bails, memory intact. Garbage version <= 2 -> kernel multiplies two
garbage fields and reserves GIGABYTES from the table address to the top of RAM.
THE EVIDENCE THAT SETTLES IT: the same machine — same DIMM, same BIOS, same kernel, same cmdline —
booted with the FULL 15.9 GiB two boots earlier, with a byte-identical BIOS-e820 map. Boot -2:
15,917,744K available, 615,208K reserved, 'Unexpected EFI Memory Attributes table version
1463964749'. Boots -1/0: 2.6 GiB, 13.9 GiB reserved, 'Failed to map ... @ 0xbeeb0018'. No hardware
fault is intermittent in that shape or fixed by a reboot. MemTotal = DMA(3840) + DMA32(684481)
pages = 2,753,284 kB exactly, Normal contributing zero.
BOTH PROD NODES ARE AFFECTED. k3s-prod-1 prints 'Unexpected EFI Memory Attributes table version
1030' — also garbage, but >2, so the kernel bails and it keeps its 32 GiB BY LUCK, NOT IMMUNITY.
It is one unlucky boot from the identical fault. Dev nodes publish no memattr table at all
(Proxmox OVMF) and are unaffected.
FIX: kernel >= 6.13 — upstream 8fbe4c49c0cc 'efi/memattr: Ignore table if the size is clearly
bogus', whose commit message describes this verbatim. Verified absent from v6.12 and from current
linux-6.12.y. On Debian 13: linux-image-amd64 from trixie-backports.
DO NOT buy RAM, move the DIMM, RMA the board, or run memtest expecting failures. Rebooting,
disabling Fast Boot, clearing CMOS and unplugging USB are all the same lottery — they move where
the table lands and may LOOK like fixes.
Records every killed hypothesis with its disproof so none of them get re-run.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1.
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jakman85
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5ea9c93f58 |
docs(prod): BIOS password answer + CORRECT the 0x4 'auth failure' reading
Operator asked for the default BIOS password. ANSWER: there is none, and no factory default exists to look up. HP business desktops ship with no Setup and no Power-On password; the is_enabled=0 we measured IS the factory state. Recovery for a forgotten password is the PSWD jumper — and 'stringent security' must NOT be enabled, since HP documents that it removes the physical bypass and turns a 5-minute fix into a signed per-serial HP service case. CORRECTION, and the kernel driver misled me: I recorded that the firmware refused our write for lack of BIOS-admin authentication. Wrong. hp-bioscfg passes the return of HP's WMI SetBIOSSetting through hp_wmi_error_and_message(), which is THE ERROR TABLE FOR A DIFFERENT INTERFACE (the "SECU" commands under HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID). Per HP's Client Management Interface white paper, SetBIOSSetting 4 = 'Failed' (generic) and 6 = 'Access Denied'. We got 4, not 6 — and the driver has a separate BIOS_ADMIN_NOT_SET = 0x38 -> -EPERM for the no-password case, which we also did not get. 'Invalid command type' is the driver looking 4 up in the wrong table: a genuine upstream bug worth reporting to platform-driver-x86. Most likely real cause (inferred, testable): with an empty password the driver emits an UNTAGGED empty UTF-16 string, while every HP-documented caller passes Password="<utf-16/>" even when blank — the driver only prepends that prefix for a non-empty string. Setting a password may fix writes, but by flipping onto the tagged code path, NOT because 0x4 meant unauthorised. Also verified from source: hp-bioscfg CANNOT set a password. current_password and new_password both funnel into store_password_instance(), which only strscpy's into driver RAM; new_password is write-only into a buffer nothing ever reads. Count corrected: 241 attributes exposed, 239 with a current_value, 215 non-empty. I had quoted 215 as the total; it was the non-empty subset. Recommendation recorded: land read-only drift detection now (zero risk, no new credential, and it already caught real drift); treat a Setup password as a deliberate experiment on node 3 only; hp-repsetup as fallback but it needs Secure Boot off or a self-signed module; skip Sure Admin/BCU at this scale. Serves: R-ENV-03, R-SEC-01. Task: T-7.1. |
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jakman85
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3a88abb958 |
docs(prod): iGPU ruled out as the cause; CORRECT my last_pfn misreading
Operator asked whether node 2's missing memory could be reserved for integrated graphics. TESTED, and no: /proc/iomem shows 'c8800000-cc7fffff : Graphics Stolen Memory' = EXACTLY 64 MiB, matching the BIOS Video Memory Size=64 MB setting, and it sits BELOW the 4 GiB line. The UHD 630 (i915 bound) takes precisely what it is configured to take. It cannot account for 13.3 GiB and is not even in the affected address range. CORRECTION to my own analysis, prompted by checking that hypothesis properly: I cited the 'last_pfn revised DOWN from 0x42f800 to 0xc3c10' line as evidence of a memory cap. That was a MISREADING. x86 boot prints last_pfn twice — first max_pfn from the full e820, then max_low_pfn, the end of RAM below 4 GiB. The e820 low usable region ends at 0xc3c0ffff, so the next PFN is exactly 0xc3c10, which is the second value observed. It matches to the byte and is normal on any machine with more than 4 GiB. I presented a routine boot message as a smoking gun, and the 'memory remapping above 4 GB not being applied' signature claim rested partly on it. The real anomaly is narrower than first stated: the Normal zone is 'present' but 'managed 0', 13.3 GiB is reserved, and nothing in the boot log explains by what. Ruled out so far: DIMM health, firmware inventory, memory-remap settings (none exist on this platform), MTRR trim, iomem registration, and now integrated graphics. Leading remaining hypothesis is stale memory-training data cached by Fast Boot — testable with one F10 toggle. Serves: R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. |
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gitea-admin
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086e9091c9 | Merge pull request 'feat(prod): node 2 online — open hardware fault (2.6 GiB of 16 GB) + BIOS drift' (#13) from feat/prod-node-2 into main | ||
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jakman85
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9f7052ab2b |
docs(prod): fill in node-2 inventory; drop stale investigate bullets
Records node 2's as-found hardware alongside node 1 and removes two bullets that my earlier edit left duplicated/obsolete (the BIOS comparison is done; clear-CMOS was listed twice). Makes the hardware ASYMMETRY explicit in the table rather than buried in prose: node 1 is a ~2011 Micron C400 SATA SSD at 69% life with 15 grown bad blocks and 187 erase failures; node 2 is a Samsung PM9A1 NVMe at 96% life, PASSED. Same chassis, same BIOS, same CPU, same partition layout — very different storage. §2 requires an identical disk layout across all three nodes because Longhorn replica placement assumes symmetry, so this belongs in the inventory where the disk decision will be made. Serves: R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. |
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jakman85
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3c8f809aaf |
docs(prod): CORRECTION — BIOS attributes are read-only in practice, not writable
I recorded that the hp-bioscfg attributes were 'writable from the OS' because current_value has mode rw and no BIOS passwords are set. That was WRONG, and the firmware said so when the write was actually attempted: hp_bioscfg: Returned error 0x4, "Invalid command type" (surfaces as printf: I/O error) HP requires BIOS-admin authentication for programmatic changes and neither credential is provisioned on these nodes — Setup Password is_enabled=0 (role bios-admin), SPM key_mechanism=not provisioned. Secure Boot is also enabled. File mode is not authority; the firmware is. What survives the correction, and it is the useful half: READS WORK. Diffing 215 attributes between node 1 and node 2 is exactly how the drift in §0b was found — nobody spots 'After Power Loss=Power Off' by eye. So the §1 firmware checklist IS machine-CHECKABLE today with reads alone, and node_health should assert it. What does NOT survive: machine-ENFORCEABLE. Converging BIOS settings automatically would require provisioning a BIOS Setup Password on every node — a stored credential that can rewrite firmware. That is a real security decision and the operator's call, not something to default to. Consequence for the node-2 memory fault: setting Fast Boot=Disable and After Power Loss=Power On must be done in F10 on the box. Updated §0b and §1 accordingly. Serves: R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. |
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jakman85
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11b21f7347 |
docs(prod): BIOS settings compared programmatically via hp-bioscfg
Both nodes load the hp-bioscfg driver, exposing 215 BIOS attributes read/write at /sys/class/firmware-attributes/. No BIOS passwords are set, so they are writable FROM THE OS. RULED OUT as the cause of node 2's 2.6 GiB limit: firmware inventory is correct (BIOS itself reports Memory Size=16384 MB); no memory-remap/above-4G attribute exists on this platform at all; MTRRs are effectively identical with no trim warning; /proc/iomem registers the full 100000000-42f7fffff as System RAM and 127 memory blocks report online. REAL DIFFERENCES FOUND (node1 works / node2 broken): After Power Loss Power On / Power Off <- VIOLATES this document's own §1 Fast Boot Disable / Enable <- leading hypothesis Legacy Boot Options Disable / Enable TPM Activation Policy F1 to Boot / Allow user to reject MS+Windows UEFI CA 2023 Enable / Disable Leading hypothesis: HP Fast Boot reuses CACHED MEMORY-TRAINING DATA rather than retraining each boot. A DIMM fitted while Fast Boot was on is a plausible route to memory being present, inventoried, handed to the kernel — and then reserved. It is also the only memory-relevant setting differing from the working node. NOT TESTED: changing it is a firmware write plus a reboot and needs operator sanction. BROADER FINDING for T-7.1: the §1 firmware checklist is now MACHINE-CHECKABLE rather than an eyeball-at-F10 exercise, and machine-ENFORCEABLE too. That is precisely how node 2 came to have After Power Loss=Power Off while node 1 has Power On — nobody could see the drift. Follow-up recorded: extend node_health to assert the firmware checklist, add a role to converge it. Raw BIOS dumps deliberately NOT committed — they carry serials, UUIDs and MAC addresses, same reason node-health artifacts are gitignored. Only the findings are recorded. Serves: R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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cb69a53825 |
feat(prod): enable node 2 + HARDWARE FAULT — it addresses 2.6 GiB of its 16 GB
k3s-prod-2 (192.168.2.11) came online 2026-09-01. Enabled in the inventory, baseline package
floor installed, first health run completed. Vaulted become works on it unchanged.
*** OPEN FAULT: the node can only address ~2.6 GiB of a healthy, correctly-installed 16 GB
DIMM. *** Recorded in PROD-PROVISIONING §0b.
dmidecode 16 GB Samsung M471A2K43DB1-CTD in DIMM1 @ 2667 MT/s (DIMM3 empty)
BIOS e820 reports ~16 GiB usable, incl. 0x100000000-0x42f7fffff
kernel Memory: 2568544K/16546088K available (13958980K RESERVED)
last_pfn revised DOWN 0x42f800 (~16.7 GiB) -> 0xc3c10 (~3.06 GiB) in early boot
zones Normal present 3340288 pages (~12.7 GiB) but MANAGED 0
MemTotal 2,753,284 kB = 2.6 GiB
The DIMM is NOT the problem: it is present, correctly identified, and at rated speed. The
kernel sees all 16 GB and then reserves 13.3 GiB. Everything below ~3 GiB usable, everything
above 4 GiB present-but-unmanaged — the signature of memory remapping above 4 GB not being
applied, not of failing memory. Node 1 is the control: identical chassis, identical BIOS R21
Ver. 02.26.00, identical CPU, and it addresses its full 31 GiB. Per-machine state, not a
firmware-version defect.
WARNING RECORDED: do NOT assume the incoming 32 GB fixes this. If the fault is the slot, the
board or a BIOS setting rather than the DIMM, 32 GB presents identically and the money is
wasted. Verify MemTotal after any RAM change.
ALSO FOUND — the prod nodes are NOT hardware-symmetric:
node 1 Micron C400 512GB SATA SSD (~2011) — 69% life, 15 grown bad blocks, 187 erase
failures, 32 unexpected power losses
node 2 Samsung PM9A1 512GB NVMe — 96% life, 2142 power-on hours, 34 unexpected
power losses, overall-health PASSED
Same chassis, same BIOS, same CPU, same partition layout — very different storage. §2 requires
an identical disk layout across all three nodes because Longhorn replica placement assumes
symmetry, so this asymmetry is now a live input to the disk decision rather than a footnote.
Node 2's NVMe is the drive node 1 should have had.
Node 2 otherwise: 0 FAIL / 3 WARN / 12 PASS / 2 SKIP. Same three WARNs as node 1 (swap still
active pending full baseline, single IPv4 resolver, and the NVMe's 34 unexpected power losses),
plus the same unknowable-ECC SKIP.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-OBS-04. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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gitea-admin
|
f1daa8cae0 | Merge pull request 'PROVEN: 1 → 2 — R-STATE-03 DR restore executed and proven' (#12) from feat/r-state-03-proven into main | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
380ea98a38 |
feat(conformance): R-STATE-03 PROVEN — DR restore from off-cluster backup, executed
The second requirement ever proven on this project, and the one the operator had attested was working but the suite could not attest to. Test authored 2026-08-31 carrying a `conformance.home.k3s/never-executed` annotation; executed for the first time tonight. test dr-restore run 20260902T001846Z-fdc3265 req R-STATE-03 (safety-critical, DR) junit passed / 0 failed / 0 skipped sentinel DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK proof proven sha |
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gitea-admin
|
acae2ad36c | Merge pull request 'PROVEN: 0 → 1 — R-STATE-02 proven, plus two ledger bugs that made proof impossible' (#11) from feat/ledger-section-parsing into main | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
fdc3265585 |
fix(conformance): the ledger counted as evidence FOR the requirements it proves
Committing the first PROVEN row immediately degraded it to `stale-proof`. Cause: a self-defeating loop. `IMPL_EXCLUDE_PREFIXES` excluded `conformance/tests/` and `ci/tests/` but NOT `conformance/runs/`. The ledger and the preserved run logs CONTAIN the requirement IDs they are evidence FOR — `ledger.jsonl` literally holds `"requirements":["R-STATE-02"]` — so they were scanned as IMPLEMENTING evidence for R-STATE-02. That made `last_change` for the requirement move to the ledger commit itself, which the row's `git_sha` necessarily predates, so the freshness check failed. The consequence was total, not marginal: **recording a proof destroyed it, so NO ledger row could ever have been non-stale.** The ledger would have reported `PROVEN: 0 (stale N)` forever while looking like it was working — the same shape of silent-uselessness as the COMMAND-echo bug in the previous commit, and found the same way: by actually running the thing and disbelieving a green-looking result. Fix: exclude `conformance/runs/`. The ledger is the proof RECORD; it must not participate in the freshness computation about itself. Verified: `PROVEN: 1 (stale 0, self-skipped 0, failed 0, unknown 0) from 1 ledger row(s)`; R-STATE-02 reads **proven**. status.py --selftest PASS. The staleness machinery is otherwise untouched — a genuinely stale row (impl changed after the run) still degrades, which the selftest continues to assert. Serves: R-TEST-01..04. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85
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4cb5e7a8d4 |
feat(conformance): first PROVEN row — R-STATE-02 node-loss
Records the first requirement this project has ever PROVEN, in the only sense its own
definition of done accepts: a green, requirement-tagged, reproducible behaviour test,
executed against a real cluster, with the evidence committed.
test node-loss run 20260901T235117Z-e9a4b66
req R-STATE-02 (safety-critical) junit passed
sentinel NODE_LOSS_VOLUME_AVAILABLE_OK proof proven
sha
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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57d4df8c4f |
fix(conformance): ledger read tokens from Chainsaw's COMMAND echo, not real output
The run ledger mis-classified the FIRST real L3 execution — a genuine PASS recorded as
`skipped`. Diagnosis, from the preserved log, section-classified:
line 51 COMMAND echo NODE_LOSS_SKIPPED_OK <- script SOURCE
line 190 STDOUT NODE_LOSS_VOLUME_AVAILABLE_OK <- the only REAL emission
Chainsaw echoes each script into a `=== COMMAND` block before running it, and every
skip-gated test contains `echo <TEST>_SKIPPED_OK` as source text. record_run.py scanned the
raw log without distinguishing sections, so it matched the skip token in the echo.
NODE_LOSS_SKIPPED_OK never appeared in output at all.
SEVERITY: since every skip-gated test embeds its own skip token as source, and skip outranks
pass, THE LEDGER COULD NEVER HAVE RECORDED `proven` FOR ANY TEST WITH A SKIP GATE. It would
have silently recorded nothing forever while appearing to work. It failed CLOSED — the right
direction — but a ledger that always fails closed is an expensive way to write "unknown".
FIX: classify_sections() splits the log on indented `=== NAME` markers (a section runs to the
first non-blank line indented LESS than its marker). Verified against the real log's actual
markers, including that Go's column-0 `=== RUN/PAUSE/CONT` lines carry a test name and must
never open a section. Then:
PASS tokens are read from STDOUT ONLY — exactly where Chainsaw's own contains($stdout,…)
looks, so a source echo or stderr can never manufacture a proof.
SKIP tokens are read from every section that is NOT COMMAND, so an unknown future section
name fails closed in BOTH directions.
Lines outside any section prove nothing — this also closes a second false-positive vector:
a FAILING Chainsaw run prints the assertion expression, which contains both tokens.
A log with no markers is scanned whole exactly as before (such logs have no COMMAND echo).
SECOND BUG, same root: _LOG_HEADER_RE never matched a real Chainsaw log — the lines are
` l.go:52: <BS>| 23:51:18 | <ANSI>node-loss<ANSI> | …`, not `| … |`. EVERY genuine run was
silently falling into DEGRADED whole-log mode. Now strips ANSI/backspace noise first and
accepts the Go source prefix, so runs attribute per-testcase as designed.
Safety properties re-asserted, not assumed: skip still beats pass WITHIN real output; unknown
layers still require a sentinel; JUnit failed/error/skipped still outrank everything; missing
JUnit or log still exits 3. Negative control: with scan_texts forced section-blind in a
throwaway copy, exactly the new cases fail — they do catch this bug.
Includes the preserved run directory 20260901T235117Z-e9a4b66 (report.junit.xml + run.log)
for R-STATE-02 / node-loss — 131s, cordon -> evict -> volume stayed available -> reader
re-attached -> clean teardown, the first L3 fault-injection test ever executed on this
cluster. The ledger row is recorded in the FOLLOWING commit, deliberately: git_sha is sampled
at record time and a dirty tree records `-dirty`, which is unresolvable and correctly degrades
to stale-proof. Recording against this clean commit is the honest way to get a resolvable sha
— NOT a --git-sha override, which would be a lever for recording a clean sha over a dirty
tree and was deliberately not added.
Serves: R-TEST-01..04, R-STATE-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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gitea-admin
|
14494e1947 | Merge pull request 'feat(conformance): committed run ledger — prerequisite for moving PROVEN off zero' (#10) from feat/conformance-run-ledger into main | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
e9a4b669d4 |
feat(conformance): committed run ledger — the only thing that can move PROVEN off zero
status.py has always reported PROVEN: 0 for all 51 requirements, and named the fix in its
own header: "a committed, machine-readable run ledger". There was none — _artifacts/ is
gitignored, the root .gitignore kills *.junit.xml, and a stray JUnit was surfaced only as
a quarantined mtime advisory. Built BEFORE the first real L3 execution so that run is
captured rather than reconstructed from memory.
THE TRAP THIS EXISTS TO AVOID. These tests exit 0 and Chainsaw records `passed` on a
SELF-SKIP exactly as on a real run, and Chainsaw's JUnit carries no stdout — only
properties. So committing the JUnit as proof would let DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK be recorded
as proof of R-STATE-03: authoritative-looking and wrong, which is worse than no ledger.
The sentinel token is the ONLY thing distinguishing proven from skipped, and it lives
solely in the run log. The ledger therefore records the LOG alongside the JUnit and
derives proof from the sentinel, never from the JUnit result.
Sentinel tokens are DERIVED, not hand-listed: record_run.py parses every
contains($stdout,'TOKEN') out of each test's own chainsaw-test.yaml, so the list cannot
drift from the tests. 23 of 35 tests declare no sentinel at all.
decide() is the single place `proven` is emitted, ordered WORST-FIRST:
JUnit failure/error -> failed
JUnit <skipped/> -> junit-skipped
ANY declared skip token in the log -> skipped (beats a green JUnit AND beats a pass
token present in the same log)
no sentinel declared -> proven ONLY for L0/L1 (whose JUnit is truthful on its own, since
run_l1_offline.py maps exit 3 to <skipped/>); written as an
explicit exempt-set so an unknown/blank layer fails CLOSED
EVERY declared pass token present -> proven
otherwise -> unknown-sentinel-absent
Log attribution is a state machine over Chainsaw's per-test headers; a log with no
recognisable header falls back to whole-log scanning restricted to GLOBALLY-UNIQUE tokens,
so DNS_OK (owned by two tests) can never prove either. record_run.py exits 3 if the JUnit
or the log is missing — nothing recorded, never green.
STALENESS: a proven row is honoured only while `git merge-base --is-ancestor` holds
between the requirement's last implementing/test change and the row's git_sha; otherwise
it degrades to stale-proof. A -dirty sha, an unknown rev, or an uncommitted test path all
fail ancestry the same way. A requirement reads proven only when EVERY verifying test
does (worst-of), and the latest row per test wins — not best-ever.
REFUSAL POSTURE PRESERVED: with an empty ledger the report is unchanged in intent — every
requirement not-derivable, headline "PROVEN: 0 — NOT DERIVABLE". This replaces "not
derivable" with real evidence only where evidence exists, never with optimism.
--record is explicit, never implicit (a run that silently records itself is how a bad run
becomes permanent false proof), is rejected for --status/--coverage-only/--lint, and
re-execs under tee returning ${PIPESTATUS[0]} so recording can never soften a gate. It
rm -f's a stale _artifacts/report.junit.xml first — a hazard hit live during development,
where a stale JUnit got paired with a fresh log.
Selftests: record_run.py 23 checks (incl. end-to-end Chainsaw-passed + NODE_LOSS_SKIPPED_OK
-> proof "skipped"), status.py +16 against a throwaway git repo (self-skip -> skipped;
proven-at-older-sha -> stale-proof; dirty/unresolvable -> stale-proof; worst-of;
latest-row-wins; malformed lines dropped). No regressions: --coverage-only, --status,
--lint, --strict-coverage and the merge-gate shape all rc=0 and unchanged; nothing in ci/
references status.py.
Root .gitignore needed no change — conformance/runs/ is not itself excluded, so the deeper
negations override the root's global *.junit.xml. Verified with git check-ignore.
Serves: R-TEST-01, R-TEST-02, R-TEST-03, R-TEST-04.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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gitea-admin
|
aa0a50a143 | Merge pull request 'chore(flux): restore platform prune:true — Cilium split merge 2 of 2' (#9) from chore/cilium-split-merge2 into main | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
22174186ff |
chore(flux): restore platform prune:true — MERGE 2 of 2 (Cilium split cleanup)
Closes the transition opened in merge 1 (
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gitea-admin
|
23aa2854f1 | Merge pull request 'feat(flux): Cilium gets its own Kustomization — merge 1 of 2' (#8) from feat/cilium-own-kustomization into main | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
63f98aab26 |
feat(flux): give Cilium its own Kustomization — MERGE 1 of 2 (transition)
Cilium was one of ~12 components inside a single `platform` Kustomization with wait:true,
so the CNI's health was indistinguishable from eleven unrelated components in the tier's
Ready condition, and the only emergency valve was freezing the whole platform tier. This
repo already set the precedent in reverse (oauth2-proxy and headlamp were split OUT so
unhealthy leaves would not gate a tier); Cilium is the mirror image — the one component
that legitimately SHOULD gate everything.
New clusters/base/cilium.yaml: path ./platform/cilium, wait:true, prune:true, interval 1h
(a CNI does not need a 10m re-render cadence; kustomize-controller is source-triggered so
a push still reconciles immediately — the interval is only the drift-correction floor),
timeout 10m (a 3-node DaemonSet rollout with wait exceeds the 5m default),
dependsOn:[flux-system], and postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars — the last is
LOAD-BEARING, not decorative: helmrelease.yaml references ${K3S_API_HOST} and
kustomize-controller now runs --feature-gates=StrictPostBuildSubstitutions=true, so
without it this Kustomization would fail immediately.
*** THE HAZARD WAS FAR WORSE THAN "the CNI gets pruned" ***
platform/cilium/namespace.yaml is the ONLY declaration of Namespace/kube-system anywhere
under ./platform, and the live object carries kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/name=platform.
With prune:true, the moment ./platform/cilium leaves platform's path the stale set is not
"the Cilium HelmRelease" — it is `kubectl delete namespace kube-system`, taking coredns,
metrics-server, local-path AND Cilium. A full cluster kill, not a CNI kill.
TWO INDEPENDENT PROTECTIONS, deliberately not trusting either alone:
1. prune:false on `platform` for this transition merge — Flux's documented Procedure 1 for
moving resources between Kustomizations. Chosen over the per-resource
`kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled` annotation because that needs THREE merges
and leaves the new Kustomization owning resources it can never prune.
2. The pruner's own owner-label filter. In v1.4.0, prune() passes Inclusions:
GetOwnerLabels(obj.Name...), so platform only deletes objects whose LIVE labels still
say name=platform. The new cilium Kustomization relabels all three to name=cilium on
apply, and platform.dependsOn:[cilium] is REVISION-GATED, so platform provably cannot
reconcile revision N until cilium has APPLIED revision N. The relabel deterministically
precedes the prune.
Protection 2 alone would probably have sufficed. Not betting kube-system on "probably".
NOTED FOR THE FUTURE, in-file: anyone moving a platform/* component must first check
whether it is the sole declarer of a shared Namespace — that turns a component-scoped
prune into a cluster-scoped one.
Verified: `kubectl kustomize platform` goes 88 -> 85 documents, 3 removed / 0 added /
0 CHANGED, and `kubectl kustomize platform/cilium` reproduces those 3 byte-identical
(sha256-matched). A pure ownership move; no Cilium value touched. L0 substitution gate
103 assertions (was 102), new cilium row, 0 hazards. Server-side dry-run against the live
cluster accepted both CRs. clusters/prod renders clean off the same base.
MERGE 2 (restore prune:true) follows only after verifying: 13/13 Ready; kube-system, the
HelmRelease and the HelmRepository all relabelled to name=cilium; platform's inventory no
longer lists them; and Cilium pod ages/restarts UNCHANGED from
cilium-2f8h8 r=0 2026-09-01T05:55:27Z / cilium-425m8 r=1 2026-08-30T13:25:10Z /
cilium-54cww r=0 2026-09-01T05:55:26Z, HelmRelease v11.
Serves: R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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gitea-admin
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62968c9ee9 | Merge pull request 'docs: P0/P1/P2 landed + postStart crashloop incident' (#7) from docs/poststart-incident into main | ||
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jakman85
|
645994e3a3 |
docs: record P0/P1/P2 landing + the postStart crashloop incident
Two bugs stacked and the outer one hid the inner. Fixing the dead OIDC guard made the block execute for the first time in these apps' deployed lifetime, which immediately exposed a latent defect: the hook's last statement was `[ cond ] && action`, so on the SUCCESS path it returned 1 and became the hook's exit status — and a non-zero postStart exit makes the kubelet kill the container. Records the pattern for the next PM: fixing dead code is not a safe no-op. It is the first execution of never-tested code and deserves the caution of new code, not of a one-character escape. Also records what is verified live (Cilium maxUnavailable applied with pod ages UNCHANGED, proving nothing rolled), and that strict substitution is committed but NOT ACTIVE — it needs bootstrap.sh step 1 because the controllers sit outside Flux's inventory. |
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gitea-admin
|
ac9f20034c | Merge pull request 'fix(sso): postStart hooks must exit 0 — nextcloud crashloop' (#6) from fix/poststart-exit-status into main | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
4c4f5355d9 |
fix(sso): postStart hooks must exit 0 — nextcloud crashlooped the moment OIDC ran
LIVE REGRESSION, caught on the reconcile after merging #5. nextcloud went
CrashLoopBackOff with FailedPostStartHook, 7 restarts, and apps-wave-1/2 stalled.
ROOT CAUSE — a latent bug that could never fire until now. The final statement of
nextcloud's postStart script was:
[ "$p" -ge 15 ] && nextcloud_oidc_fail "could not promote ... after retries"
On the SUCCESS path (p < 15) the test returns 1, and as the script's LAST command that
becomes the hook's exit status. A non-zero postStart exit makes the kubelet KILL the
container. This was harmless for as long as the OIDC guard above it was dead code that
exited 0 first (see
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gitea-admin
|
63002d19c8 | Merge pull request 'Close the post-build substitution race: dependsOn + strict mode + CNI blast radius' (#5) from fix/strict-postbuild-substitutions into main | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
6b4da27f84 |
feat(prod): SOPS decryption (same age key as dev) + GitOps source on main
Operator decisions, 2026-09-01:
1. Prod uses the SAME SOPS age key as dev.
2. Prod tracks the SAME BRANCH as dev (`main`). Dev is a temporary instance and will be
decommissioned once prod is deemed stable.
SOPS: eight `decryption: {provider: sops, secretRef: sops-age}` patches mirroring dev
exactly — platform, apps-wave-0/1/2, oauth2-proxy, headlamp, crafty, velero. The sops-age
Secret is still created OUT OF BAND on prod (bootstrap/sops/install-age-key.sh); the
overlay references it by name only, never inlines key material.
RECORDED CONSEQUENCE of the shared branch: once prod is live, EVERY MERGE TO main
RECONCILES BOTH CLUSTERS. There is no promotion step and no soak window — dev and prod
move together. That is a deliberate consequence of dev being temporary, not an oversight,
but it removes the "prove it on dev first" safety net that the last few days have leaned
on heavily. Worth revisiting if dev outlives its expected life.
*** BOOTSTRAP BLOCKER recorded, NOT papered over *** — the source URL cannot work on a
cold prod cluster, for two independent reasons found while wiring this:
1. SELF-HOSTING CIRCULARITY. Gitea runs ON THE DEV CLUSTER — the one slated for
decommission. Prod syncing from it means prod's source of truth lives inside the
cluster being retired. Gitea must move to prod (or off-cluster) BEFORE dev is torn
down. This makes Gitea migration the FIRST task of the decommission plan, not the last.
2. SPLIT-HORIZON DNS SENDS IT TO THE WRONG PLACE. platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml
answers the ENTIRE home.keithjackson.dev zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP} via a template
plugin. On prod that is 192.168.2.20 — PROD's own gateway, where no Gitea listens. Prod
Flux would resolve gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to itself and never reach a repository.
This is the same split-horizon mechanism that makes dev work, inverted against us.
Bring-up therefore needs a TEMPORARY source (the bootstrap host-Gitea, or an off-cluster
mirror) with a cutover to the in-cluster URL once Gitea actually runs on prod — precisely
the sequence docs/05 describes for dev's own Phase-6 cutover. The branch is settled and
correct; only the host is blocked. Documented at the patch site and in
PROD-PROVISIONING.md §7.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS.
Serves: R-SEC-01, R-GITOPS-01, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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666a60776a |
fix(flux): close the substitution race — platform dependsOn root + strict substitution (P0/P1)
P0 — clusters/base/platform.yaml gains `dependsOn: [flux-system]`. This is the actual fix for the incident, not the feature gate. Verified against kustomize-controller v1.4.0 `kustomization_controller.go :: checkDependencies` (our version): dependsOn is REVISION- gated, not merely Ready-gated — when the dependency shares a GitRepository, the dependent cannot reconcile revision N until the dependency has APPLIED revision N. Applying revision N is exactly what writes a newly-added cluster-vars knob. Graph verified mechanically, not by eye: built clusters/dev and clusters/prod and walked the resulting objects. `platform` was the ONLY Kustomization without a dependsOn, and all 11 substituting Kustomizations chain transitively through it (platform-config -> platform; the waves, apps-vms, oauth2-proxy, headlamp, homepage, crafty, velero -> platform-config). The "not chaining through platform" set is EMPTY, so this one edge protects the whole graph. DFS over the full edge set after the edit: no cycles. The root (clusters/dev/ sync.yaml) runs wait: false, which is what makes the edge deadlock-free — it reaches Ready on apply success without health-gating its children. Accepted trade-off, documented in-file: the root becomes a gate. A malformed manifest anywhere under clusters/<env> — including clusters/base — now stalls platform and everything downstream, where today it would not. Fail-closed, per doctrine. P1 — StrictPostBuildSubstitutions. MY PREMISE WAS WRONG about where this belongs and it matters: this repo deliberately does NOT use `flux bootstrap` (see bootstrap/flux/README). There is no gotk-components.yaml in git, and the live kustomize-controller Deployment carries NO Flux ownership labels — it was installed imperatively by `flux install` from bootstrap.sh and is not in Flux's inventory. `flux-system` self-manages the CR graph, NOT the controllers. Nothing under clusters/** can reach a controller flag. So it uses Flux's documented mechanism for hand-installed clusters: a new bootstrap/flux/components/kustomization.yaml wrapping `gotk-components.yaml` with a JSON-6902 patch appending --feature-gates=StrictPostBuildSubstitutions=true to kustomize-controller. JSON-6902 `add /args/-` deliberately, NOT strategic merge — a container's args is atomic and a merge patch would replace all five install-generated args. bootstrap.sh step 1 now renders (`flux install --export` into a temp dir, apply the patch, ASSERT the gate string is present so a future Flux bump that breaks the patch target fails loudly) then applies. FLUX_INSTALL_PLAIN=1 is a loud escape hatch. Nothing is vendored, so components can never drift from the pinned FLUX_VERSION. Rejected: vendoring gotk-components.yaml under the root's path (the root's prune: true would put Flux's own controllers and CRDs in a prune inventory), and shipping a partial Deployment as a Flux-managed resource (a future prune would delete kustomize-controller). ROLLOUT ORDER MATTERS. P0 arrives automatically on the next reconcile. P1 does NOT arrive on a git push — the controller Deployment is outside Flux's inventory, so an operator must re-run bootstrap.sh step 1, which restarts kustomize-controller (~10-20s; Flux is level-triggered so an interrupted reconcile is simply retried). P0 must be reconciled BEFORE P1 is rolled out: with the gate on but the ordering edge absent, the same race turns a transient empty render into a transient hard Kustomization failure. ALSO FIXES A PHASE-7 BLOCKER THIS CHANGE WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE CREATED. clusters/prod had no root Kustomization — dev/sync.yaml even carried the note "a prod overlay needs its own sync.yaml -> ./clusters/prod". With the new dependsOn, a prod bootstrap would have left platform blocked forever on a flux-system Kustomization that does not exist, and nothing downstream would ever reconcile. clusters/prod/sync.yaml is now authored, mirroring dev. Two further prod-overlay gaps found and DOCUMENTED, not guessed (PROD-PROVISIONING §7): prod has no SOPS `decryption` patch (every encrypted Secret would fail to decrypt — needs the prod age-key decision, a security choice not a copy), and no GitRepository source URL patch (needs a decision on whether prod tracks the same branch as dev, which would make a dev-facing merge reconcile prod). Substitution gate re-run: check OK, 102 assertions, 0 hazards. Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. Serves: R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01, R-PLAT-01, R-ENV-03. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
fdc4a7d9f4 |
fix(cilium): maxUnavailable 2 -> 1 — bound CNI rollout blast radius (P2)
During the substitution incident a bad render (k8sServiceHost: "") took down TWO of three
Cilium agents simultaneously. The agents' `config` init container falls back to the API
ClusterIP, which only the Cilium agent itself can translate — and that agent is the one
being replaced — so it deadlocks on `dial tcp 10.43.0.1:443: i/o timeout`.
Root cause of the 2-at-once: `updateStrategy.rollingUpdate.maxUnavailable: 2` is the
UPSTREAM CHART DEFAULT, confirmed by downloading cilium-1.20.1.tgz and reading
values.yaml:437-444 — not a local choice, and not overridden anywhere in this repo.
maxUnavailable: 1 makes a rollout replace ONE agent at a time and stop at the first pod
that fails to become Ready. The whole value of the setting is that the rollout halts on
the first bad node instead of taking the majority of the dataplane with it, and that
guarantee only exists at 1. It matters far more on a cold PROD bootstrap, where there is
no healthy peer to recover from — dev only self-healed because k3s-dev-3 kept a working
agent throughout.
Set as a [parity] field in ALL THREE places, per this repo's documented contract that the
Ansible bootstrap values and the Flux HelmRelease values must agree on settings that
define cluster networking (Ansible installs Cilium at bootstrap; the HelmRelease adopts
it; the two layers fight otherwise):
platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml (authoritative for Flux)
infra/ansible/roles/cilium/templates/cilium-values.yaml.j2 (authoritative for bootstrap)
platform/cilium/values.yaml (reference mirror, kept in sync)
Verified by rendering the .j2 with roles/cilium/defaults and diffing full value sets: every
[parity] field is byte-equal across all three; only k8sServiceHost differs, as designed
(${K3S_API_HOST} vs {{ k3s_api_host }}).
MERGING THIS IS NON-DISRUPTIVE. updateStrategy lives at DaemonSet.spec.updateStrategy — a
SIBLING of spec.template (chart daemonset.yaml:49-53). The DaemonSet controller decides a
pod is out of date by hashing spec.template alone, so the pod-template hash does not move,
no new ControllerRevision is created, and zero pods are recreated. Helm patches the field
in place. (If it were disruptive it would be self-defeating: rolling agents under the old
maxUnavailable: 2 in order to install maxUnavailable: 1.) Verify after reconcile with
`kubectl -n kube-system get ds cilium -o jsonpath='{.spec.updateStrategy.rollingUpdate.maxUnavailable}'`
plus unchanged pod ages — that is the cleanest proof nothing rolled.
Trade-off recorded in the comments: upgrades serialise, roughly two waves to three at 3
nodes (a minute or two). On a large cluster this becomes painful and a percentage such as
"10%" would be right — noted so a future larger cluster revisits it deliberately.
SCOPE: this bounds blast radius, it does NOT close the substitution race. A bad render
still ships; it now breaks one node and stalls rather than taking the majority.
platform.dependsOn: [flux-system] (P0) is the fix for the cause.
Serves: R-PLAT-01, R-NET-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85
|
a344b046c9 |
docs: research findings — measured Flux substitution semantics + ranked remediation plan
Records three parallel research passes and, importantly, TWO CORRECTIONS.
Correction 1 (mine): StrictPostBuildSubstitutions alone is INSUFFICIENT — it fixes nothing
about ordering. The actual fix is one line: platform.dependsOn: [flux-system]. Verified
against kustomization_controller.go::checkDependencies at our exact version — dependsOn is
REVISION-gated, not merely Ready-gated, so a dependent sharing a GitRepository cannot
reconcile revision N until the dependency has APPLIED revision N.
Correction 2 (a research agent's): the claim that Helm considered the bad release healthy,
so remediation never fired, is WRONG — measured on the live cluster, the Helm release
secrets show v9 = failed. The machinery did fire. maxUnavailable: 2 of 3 IS confirmed, so
the real harm was blast radius, not missed detection.
Adds a MEASURED substitution-semantics table, including the two anti-patterns nobody had
written down: ${VAR:?msg} renders the MESSAGE as the value, and ${VAR:=default} silently
ships the dev value to prod. Both are exempt from strict mode by design — which is exactly
why strict would never have caught the gitea/nextcloud dead-guard bug.
Also corrects repo doctrine: escaping is TOTAL ($${ARR[0]} is safe); only the unescaped
indexed form is fatal. And qualifies an earlier overstatement in this log: kustomize strips
structural YAML comments before envsubst, so the hazard is block-scalar bodies, not all
comments.
Notes Flux 2.4.0 is out of support and that strict became default-on in kustomize-controller
v1.9.0 — so the audit is a prerequisite for the upgrade regardless.
Ranked plan P0-P5 with what is done, what is ready, and what needs an operator call.
|
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
8a2be824f6 |
feat(ci): substitution-safety gate + escape 6 comment hazards; strict mode is now SAFE
Adds conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution/ — an offline, stdlib-only
L0 check tagged R-ENV-02 + R-GITOPS-01 (deliberately NOT R-TEST-01, which would
overclaim). It reuses lib/status.py's `resources:` walk rather than forking it, so "what a
path renders" has exactly one definition. It asserts: every ${...} on a substituted path
is defined-or-escaped (comments included); no default-operator form on an undefined name;
no unparseable expansion; the rendering path actually substitutes cluster-vars; every
overlay-patched /data/KEY has a base default; and that the gate itself is load-bearing.
WIRED AS AN UNCONDITIONAL STAGE (3c) in ci/l0.sh, and that matters: stage 3b scopes to
touched requirements, and ci/touched-requirements.sh maps only clusters/* to R-ENV-02 —
so an edit to a substituted manifest under apps/ or platform/ would have filtered this
check out of exactly the change that introduces the bug. l0 fail -> BLOCK=1 in gate.sh.
Mutation-tested all five assertion classes (undefined token, indexed expansion, :- form,
missing substituteFrom, un-wired gate); each fails as intended, baseline green.
STRICT MODE IS PROVEN SAFE TO ENABLE — measured, not inspected. For all 11 substituted
paths, `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone <path> | flux envsubst
--strict` exits 0 against cluster-vars base defaults. Negative control confirms the
incident: with K3S_API_HOST unset, non-strict renders k8sServiceHost empty while strict
exits 1 with `variable not set (strict mode)`. The feature gate itself is NOT flipped
here — that is a live-cluster change and the operator's call.
Escapes the six comment hazards that stood in the way (apps/vms/unifi x4,
platform/longhorn x2). All were prose ABOUT the escaping convention; since the repo's own
contract is that $${...} emits a literal ${...}, escaping them is both precise and
self-consistent. kustomize strips these particular comments today, but comment survival is
an implementation detail — a body comment carrying $ WAS observed surviving into built
apps/wave-1 — and a survivor would kill the whole Kustomization.
DOCTRINE CORRECTED (measured against flux 2.4.0): clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml claimed an
indexed expansion is fatal "escaped or not". Escaping is TOTAL — $${ARR[0]} emits the
literal text safely; only the UNESCAPED indexed form is fatal. Corrected in place.
Also empties DOCUMENTED_GAPS in conformance/run.sh with rationale: R-ENV-02 and
R-GITOPS-01 now have a real verifying test, which run.sh's own comment named as the
trigger for removing them.
Advisory output (not failures): 6 dead cluster-vars knobs — BASE_DOMAIN, CLUSTER_ENV,
CLUSTER_POD_CIDR, PIA_REGION, PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_{KEY,VALUE}. The last four are
documented reference-only; BASE_DOMAIN and CLUSTER_ENV look like genuine rot (hostnames
are hardcoded elsewhere) and are worth a follow-up.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. 102 assertions, 0 hazards.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
3484955903 |
fix(sso): gitea + nextcloud OIDC bootstrap was DEAD CODE — envsubst ate the guard
Both ServiceDefinitions guarded their Keycloak OIDC registration with an UNESCAPED
braced expansion:
if [ -z "${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # gitea
if [ -z "${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # nextcloud, then exit 0
apps-wave-0/1 both declare postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars, and neither name is a
cluster-vars key — so Flux's envsubst substituted them away AT RECONCILE TIME, long
before the container ever ran. Verified in the LIVE cluster: the deployed Deployments
literally contain
if [ -z "" ]; then
which is always true. The entire OIDC registration block has been skipped on EVERY boot
of both apps.
WHY NOBODY NOTICED: both apps DO have the provider registered — `gitea admin auth list`
shows keycloak/OAuth2/true and `occ user_oidc:provider` shows the keycloak provider.
Those live in each app's own database, persisted from an earlier successful registration.
SSO works today and DECISIONS-LOG is not wrong. But the idempotent re-registration is
dead, so any PVC rebuild, DB restore, or fresh cluster build comes up with NO OIDC and
only the break-glass local admin. A PROD BUILD FROM THIS REPO WOULD SILENTLY HAVE NO SSO
on gitea or nextcloud.
The irony: the surrounding code was hardened twice — see its own comments about a "silent
first-boot RACE", the verify-then-retry loops, the marker files. All of that hardening was
unreachable, because the guard above it always evaluated true.
Not a regression from the recent R-ENV-02 tokenization — introduced 2026-08-27 (
|
||
|
jakman85
|
b8602c939c |
docs: INCIDENT — Flux post-build substitution fails OPEN, briefly broke Cilium
Merging PR #4 put cilium agents into Init:Error on 2/3 dev nodes for ~6 minutes. Self-healed; cluster fully green. Recorded because the mechanism is systemic and far more dangerous on a cold prod bootstrap. Root cause: cluster-vars (which DEFINES a knob) is owned by the flux-system Kustomization, while platform/ (which REFERENCES it) is owned by the platform Kustomization, with no dependency ordering between defining a variable and using it. Flux post-build substitution is NON-STRICT by default, so during the window where platform rendered the new manifest against the old cluster-vars, ${K3S_API_HOST} became the EMPTY STRING. Cilium upgraded with k8sServiceHost: "" and fell back to ClusterIP 10.43.0.1 — which only the Cilium agent can translate, and that agent was the thing restarting. Its config init container then could not reach the API server at all. Proven by the HelmRelease config digest going e83bf695 -> eebd6c88 -> e83bf695: the config changed and then changed back to BYTE-IDENTICAL. The pre-merge byte-identity verification was correct — the steady state is identical; the damage was a transient intermediate render. optional: false does NOT protect against this: it requires the ConfigMap to exist, not that every referenced key is defined. Fix recommended, NOT applied unilaterally: enable the StrictPostBuildSubstitutions feature gate on kustomize-controller so an undefined variable FAILS the Kustomization instead of silently emptying it — fail-closed, per this project's own doctrine. Requires first proving every ${VAR} in every substituted path is defined or correctly escaped, or it would fail legitimate embedded shell expansions. Interim discipline: add a knob in one commit, reference it in a later one. Serves: R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01, R-PLAT-01. |
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|
gitea-admin
|
dce0e8ffe9 | Merge pull request 'Phase 7 (prod) opened — prep only: T-7.1 checklist, R-ENV-02 tokenization, node_health, CI false-green fix' (#4) from docs/phase-7-open-prod-node-1 into main | ||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
ff0533106b |
feat(prod): operator decisions — node DNS, service VIPs, become vault, collections path
1. PROD NODE DNS = 8.8.8.8 + 1.1.1.1 (operator, 2026-09-01). Two INDEPENDENT public
upstreams, so the single-upstream SPOF that broke containerd pulls and CoreDNS
forwarding on dev cannot recur. Prod deliberately differs from dev, which is
PiHole-first because dev needs the local jackson.lan zone.
SCOPE CORRECTED IN THE COMMENTS. Three resolvers answer *.home.keithjackson.dev and
only one is configured here:
pods -> CoreDNS -> platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml, whose `template` plugin
answers the WHOLE zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}. Self-contained in-cluster;
PiHole is NOT in this path. Prod is already correct (.20).
LAN -> PiHole. Not a cluster concern.
nodes -> THIS FILE.
The one thing public node DNS breaks: the k3s API SERVER is a node process carrying
oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab and reaches the
issuer through the NODE resolver, so prod would get the PUBLIC record instead of the
prod Gateway VIP — breaking kubectl OIDC SSO. Dev avoids this only because its node
resolver IS PiHole. Not blocking (prod has no cluster or Keycloak yet); options are
recorded in PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4 for the operator to pick.
2. SERVICE VIPs DECIDED: UNIFI_L4_VIP 192.168.2.21, CRAFTY_L4_VIP 192.168.2.22 — the
first two addresses after GATEWAY_VIP (.20), mirroring dev's .53/.54/.55 ordering
within the .20-.30 pool. S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT stays TBD-PROD-* : no prod backup target
exists, and dev's versitygw is across the pfSense boundary on the dev host, so it is
not DR for prod.
3. PROD BECOME VAULT committed, ansible-vault encrypted, matching the hypervisor and
proxmox_hosts pattern. Verified working: `ansible k3s_prod -m command -a 'id -un'
--become` returns root. The L0 no-plaintext-secrets check asserts every ansible
vault.yml starts with $ANSIBLE_VAULT, so this stays honest by gate.
4. TOOLCHAIN GAP FIXED: the devcontainer image does NOT ship the Galaxy collections, so
EVERY ansible play died at parse time on community.general.modprobe. ansible.cfg now
sets collections_path = collections, and the collections are installed there from the
existing collections/requirements.yml (gitignored — pinned by requirements, fetched at
setup, vendored bytes are not source).
5. DRIVE HEALTH MEASURED and recorded in §2 with the raw attribute table so the numbers
are auditable. Verdict: usable, but not for production etcd/Longhorn state — 31% of
rated life consumed, 15 grown bad blocks, 187 erase failures, and 32 unexpected power
losses on a consumer drive with NO power-loss protection, in a single failure domain.
etcd is the worst possible tenant: it fsyncs constantly and unclean power loss without
PLP is exactly how a member corrupts.
6. NON-ECC RAM: RISK ACCEPTED by the operator, recorded as a CLOSED decision, not an open
item — do not re-litigate. Rationale: 3-node k3s homelab, not enterprise; corruption on
one node is outweighed by the other two and causes node ejection. That holds for the
dominant mode (etcd raft CRC + quorum; Longhorn 3 replicas + hard anti-affinity +
rebuild). Recorded residual: corruption introduced UPSTREAM of replication replicates
faithfully to all three replicas, so quorum sees no disagreement — low probability, and
the only mitigation is different hardware. Follow-up noted: Longhorn's
snapshotDataIntegrity is left at the chart default rather than set explicitly, and it
is the mechanism that operationalises the operator's own argument.
Serves: R-DNS-01, R-DNS-03, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03, R-SEC-01. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
0b3db6e778 |
fix(node_health): SMART verdict was wrong by 4096x — judge on portable signals
The first real SMART run FAILED k3s-prod-1's drive on reallocated=61440. That verdict
was WRONG, and the failure mode is instructive: the check trusted a VENDOR-DEFINED raw
value as if it were an ATA-standard sector count.
Micron TN-FD-20 ("SMART Attributes for the C400 SSD") names attribute 5 "Reallocated
BLOCK Count" and defines its raw as grown-bad-blocks x Block_Sector_Count, where
Block_Sector_Count is 256 x 16 = 4096 for the 128Gb-NAND parts (256GB/512GB). This is
the 512GB C400-MTFDDAC512MAM: 61440 / 4096 = 15. Triply corroborated on the drive itself
— attr 170 Grown_Failing_Block_Ct = 15, attr 196 Reallocated_Event_Count = 15, attr 5
normalised value 100 against thresh 10, and `when_failed` empty on every attribute.
FIFTEEN grown bad blocks, not sixty-one thousand bad sectors.
smartctl(8) states it outright: since ATA/ATAPI-4 rev 4 the meaning of raw Attribute
fields is "entirely vendor-specific". So a raw value can never be a portable verdict.
FAIL now comes only from signals that mean the same thing on every drive: the drive's own
smart_status.passed; NORMALISED value vs the MANUFACTURER's own threshold via smartctl's
when_failed ("now"/"past"/""), split Pre-fail -> FAIL and Old_age-or-past -> WARN; the
ATA-standard counters 197/198/187 (199 CRC is WARN-only — it is link, not media); and for
NVMe critical_warning / media_errors / percentage_used. Wear reads from the NORMALISED
lifetime indicator (202/231/233, or NVMe percentage_used) — a percentage by definition.
Vendor raw counts are still collected and PRINTED WITH THEIR NUMBERS, and may raise a
WARN, but can never drive a FAIL. Attribute 5's raw is now shown beside the normalised
reading that contradicts it, labelled vendor-encoded, with a mechanically-derived
"(= 15 x 4096)". Endurance attributes are matched by THE NAME smartctl's drivedb resolved
for that model, not by bare ID — drivedb is the portability layer; on an unrecognised
drive the name is Unknown_Attribute, nothing matches, and the field stays null with no
claim made. The STORAGE section now prints 170/172/173/174/189/206, whose previous
omission is exactly what let the misread stand unchallenged.
Also documented from TN-FD-20: on this family attr 197 "will always be 0, as reallocation
will be done on-the-fly" — so pending=0 is NOT evidence of health here. The role reports
the number and infers nothing from it.
Branches real hardware cannot exercise were verified with a harness rendering the actual
role expressions against synthetic smartctl payloads: virtio/no-stdout -> SKIP; NVMe
healthy -> PASS; NVMe degraded -> FAIL; a genuinely dying ATA drive (attr 5 normalised 8
<= thresh 10, pending 48) -> FAIL driven by the threshold trip and standard counters, not
the raw; unknown-vendor attrs -> PASS with the unnamed counter ignored; failed-in-the-past
-> WARN.
NEW VERDICTS. k3s-prod-1: 0 FAIL / 4 WARN / 12 PASS / 1 SKIP — SMART is a WARN naming the
real findings (31% of rated life consumed, 15 grown bad blocks, 187 erase failures, 32
unexpected power losses on a drive with no power-loss protection). k3s-dev-1: unchanged,
all three virtio disks still SKIP with their stated reason.
BREAKING (JSON artifact): the fact `reallocated_sectors` is renamed and gone — that name
asserted a unit ATA does not guarantee. Replaced by realloc_attr (the whole attribute,
normalised + raw), realloc_events, and grown_bad_blocks. Nothing in the repo reads it.
Serves: R-ENV-03, R-OBS-04.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
ce1966acb0 |
docs: PM handoff — Phase-7 prep session complete (PR #4, 13 commits, CI green)
Records what landed, the numbers (coverage 37->40/51, safety-critical scaffolds 1->0, PROVEN still 0 by design), the corrections made mid-session so they are not re-litigated (prod NOPASSWD rejected; the '$i envsubst bug' disproven by running the real tool; the stranded DNS branch dropped rather than landed), three near-misses worth remembering, the six items blocked on the operator, and what is knowingly left undone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
c1f24e4a6d |
fix(dns): resilient node resolvers — mechanism-detecting, per-environment (R-DNS-01/03)
Re-authors the fix stranded on origin/fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream (
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
14be9b68f6 |
test(conformance): dr-restore actually asserts off-cluster restore (R-STATE-03)
Closes the LAST scaffold-only safety-critical requirement. The operator has attested DR works (Velero -> Proxmox versitygw S3, restore demonstrated), but the L3 test carried the right tag and layer label over a 5-line TODO body — so coverage counted it and reported "0 safety-critical gaps" while the suite asserted nothing. That was test debt, not capability debt. This makes the suite assert what the operator already demonstrated. Three steps: 1. assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster (read-only): BSL must be phase Available (Velero itself reached the store), s3Url host is not localhost/*.svc/*.cluster.local, and the resolved IPv4 is none of — loopback, any Node Internal/ExternalIP, any Service ClusterIP, any Pod IP, inside any node podCIDR, inside any ServiceCIDR. A BSL that exists but never reaches Available FAILS (a live DR defect), it does not skip. 2. assert-backups-are-scheduled: R-STATE-03 says SCHEDULED off-cluster backups — Velero + BSL but zero Schedule in phase Enabled is a fail. 3. The drill: seed a nanosecond-unique canary onto a longhorn PVC in its own scratch namespace; Backup to Completed; assert a PodVolumeBackup for that volume is Completed WITH a non-empty status.snapshotID (the kopia snapshot of volume DATA reached the remote repo, not just resource JSON); ANNIHILATE the source (delete ns, poll until gone, force-delete a lingering PV, FAIL if the original PV survived — a survivor makes the restore prove nothing); Restore with namespaceMapping into a clean namespace; assert the restored PVC bound a DIFFERENT PV and that the canary bytes are identical. Off-cluster proof = endpoint outside every cluster address + BSL Available + kopia snapshotID present + every in-cluster copy destroyed + restore landing on a new PV. The bytes could only have come from outside. Skips GREEN on: no longhorn SC, Velero API absent, no BSL, Velero/node-agent not ready — all three steps re-derive the same gates so it can never half-run. An RBAC denial is deliberately NOT a skip: it fails loudly as a harness defect. Teardown is a step-level `finally` that ALWAYS runs — deletes the Restore, issues a DeleteBackupRequest so objects leave the bucket (2h ttl as backstop), deletes both scratch namespaces by name and by label, releases leftover PVs whose claimRef is one of its own. Everything it destroys is something it created. conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml: authored the R-STATE-03 grants (velero.io backups/ restores/deletebackuprequests create+delete+read; BSL/schedules/podvolume* read-only; persistentvolumes get/list/DELETE — the off-cluster proof requires destroying the PV). Also two pre-existing gaps other tests already depended on: storageclasses get/list (the skip gate of five tests) and apps deployments/daemonsets read. No write verbs on platform controllers. NOT ASSERTED, stated in the file header rather than implied: off-HOST (on dev the nodes are VMs on the same Proxmox host as the S3 target, so this does not survive hypervisor loss); no direct S3 client read (that would hand a privileged test identity the backup credential for weaker evidence); real service data (Nextcloud/Gitea/CNPG drills stay operator exercises); bare-metal rebuild DR; encryption-at-rest; retention/GC. status: scaffold-only 5 -> 4; safety-critical w/o executable L3 1 -> 0 (of 6); executable 35 -> 36. coverage unchanged at 40/51 (correct — coverage only asks whether a tagged test exists). PROVEN stayed 0 / not-derivable: it did NOT flip to proven just because the body is non-empty. AUTHORED, NEVER EXECUTED — carries a conformance.home.k3s/never-executed annotation. No cluster access from this workstation. To convert authored -> proven the operator must, IN A MAINTENANCE WINDOW (it deletes namespaces and PVs and writes/deletes bucket objects): apply the updated rbac.yaml, run `./conformance/run.sh --requirements R-STATE-03 --layer l3`, confirm the log shows DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK and NOT DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK (green but proves nothing), confirm no leaked *-dr-src/*-dr-dst namespaces or orphan PVs or *-dr-backup objects, and record the green run. Serves: R-STATE-03, R-TEST-05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
e623d27e2d |
feat(ansible): parameterise target groups so prod reuses the roles unchanged (R-ENV-02)
roles/k3s_server, roles/cilium and every node-host playbook hardcoded the dev group
names k3s_primary/k3s_secondary/k3s_servers, so the prod inventory groups could not be
selected at all. That broke the R-ENV-02 promise that prod reuses the SAME roles, and
blocked PROD-PROVISIONING.md §6 outright.
TWO KNOBS, deliberately separate — Ansible templates a play's `hosts:` BEFORE any host
context exists, so group_vars is unreadable there, while roles run WITH host context:
* which hosts a play RUNS ON — k3s_hosts, k3s_primary_hosts/k3s_secondary_hosts
(k3s.yml's split), vpn_egress_gateway_hosts; each `| default(<dev group>)`, set by -e
only. Follows node-health.yml's established `<name>_hosts | default(dev)` pattern.
* which group a ROLE means by "my primary"/"my servers" — k3s_primary_group,
k3s_servers_group in group_vars/all.yml (dev), overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod.
Follows the k3s_api_host convention already in this repo. No per-run flag.
DEV IS UNCHANGED — the key evidence. --list-hosts/--list-tasks/--syntax-check captured
for all 9 playbooks at HEAD and after: sorted host lists IDENTICAL for all 9, same
primary/secondary split, same 6-play site.yml. (Raw --list-hosts PRINT ORDER varies run
to run; proven to be Ansible's own set ordering by running UNMODIFIED HEAD cilium.yml
four times -> 3,1,2 / 1,3,2 / 1,2,3 / 1,2,3. Hence sorted comparison.) --list-tasks
differs in exactly two files, only by added TAGS annotations and one new assert; no task
reordered, renamed or removed. Var resolution verified per environment with -c local:
dev -> k3s_primary/192.168.1.50/sans .50,.49,127.0.0.1,.51,.52; prod ->
k3s_prod_primary/192.168.2.10/vip .9/sans .10,.9,127.0.0.1,.11,.12.
BREAKS THE SMARTMONTOOLS CIRCULAR DEPENDENCY. node_baseline tasks are now tagged
packages/system/disks, so the package install can run alone:
ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages
Skipping is the guard — no disks-tagged task is selected, so the
BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision paths are never templated, let alone passed to mkfs.
Belt-and-braces, a new disks-tagged assert fires first in a FULL run and names §2
explicitly instead of failing obscurely at mkfs. `tags: never` was deliberately NOT used
(it would change the default run).
FOOTGUN FOUND AND FIXED: roles/cilium, cluster_verify and flux_bootstrap all hardcoded
.cache/dev.kubeconfig — the exact file infra/devcontainer/dev.sh exports as $KUBECONFIG.
Once prod became targetable, a prod cilium/verify run would have SILENTLY OVERWRITTEN it,
leaving the operator's kubectl quietly answering from PROD. Now cluster_kubeconfig_name
(dev.kubeconfig -> prod.kubeconfig). Dev path byte-identical.
KNOWN, DOCUMENTED, NOT FIXED HERE: flux-bootstrap.yml retargets but roles/flux_bootstrap
shells out to bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh with a hardcoded --path=clusters/dev — a
bootstrap/ subtree change, not a target-group change (§6, cross-referenced to §7).
vpn.egress.gateway.yml is parameterised but prod has no egress group yet and would need
its own vaulted PIA credentials. --check against prod is still impossible until the prod
vault exists — even the packages-only run needs it.
Nothing was run against the dev cluster: --list-hosts/--list-tasks/--syntax-check, plus
debug/assert with -c local, only.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
1157c1b071 |
fix(gitea-actions): wait for dind to ACCEPT connections, not just write certs
Re-authors the fix stranded on origin/fix/act-runner-dind-readiness (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6e77150ae1 |
fix(ci): kill the false-green base resolution; cover R-SEC-01/02 + R-TEST-06 (L0)
Unblocks the enforced Gitea gate, which correctly BLOCKED this branch on ['R-SEC-01','R-SEC-02','R-TEST-06'] being touched but uncovered. Tests were authored; the coverage rule was NOT narrowed. === THE FALSE GREEN (root cause) === `make -C ci gate` locally reported PASS having checked NOTHING. resolve_base() validated nothing, and EVERY way of failing to find a base degraded silently to an empty touched set + exit 0: an `HEAD~1` last resort, a two-dot diff fallback masking a failing three-dot diff, and no check that HEAD is even AHEAD of the base. Run while sitting on `main` (main == origin/main), `origin/main...HEAD` is empty -> "no changed files vs base" -> the empty set means run.sh is invoked with NO --requirements -> coverage.py's --require gate never runs at all. Green by vacuum. Now: candidates are BASE_REF > GITHUB_BASE_REF > origin/main > main, each verified to resolve. HEAD~1 and the two-dot fallback are gone. Unresolvable base / no merge base / failed diff / HEAD-not-ahead -> loud banner, EMPTY stdout, exit 3, and a machine-readable reason (on-base | no-base | diff-failed). gate.sh turns exit 3 into an UNDECIDED decision: `on-base` -> "NOT APPLICABLE — no branch under gate" (exit 0 so push-to-main runs don't break, but it never reads as PASS); `no-base`/`diff-failed` -> BLOCKED. It also now prints the diff base it used. A stale local main warns (widens, never falsely greens). Also fixed `make -C ci test`, which was SWALLOWING failing suites. Regression: ci/tests/touched-requirements-base.test.sh — 31 assertions over 8 throwaway-repo scenarios including the exact false-green case, an already-merged branch, no base ref, a single-commit repo, bogus BASE_REF, a shallow GITHUB_BASE_REF, and origin/main-preferred-over-stale-main. === NEW L0 STATIC LAYER (conformance/tests/l0-static/) === Where docs/14 actually puts these invariants. Each check.sh really executes offline via `run.sh --layer l0` and is wired into ci/l0.sh, so it runs on every PR. No scaffolds. R-SEC-01 no-plaintext-secrets (165 assertions / 445 tracked files): .sops.yaml holds only PUBLIC age recipients; every committed Secret is SOPS-wrapped with a mac and ENC[...] values; ansible vault.yml files are $ANSIBLE_VAULT; no secret-valued ansible key carries a literal outside a vault; no PEM key / age secret key / kubeconfig client-key-data is tracked; Flux declares sops decryption; the disallow-plaintext-secrets policy Enforces and has a proving `result: fail` row. Exemptions are SELF-POLICING, not path allowlists — a .example must be referenced by no kustomization and hold only placeholders, and the Kyverno fixture is exempt ONLY while a test asserts the policy rejects it. Proven against 7 injected violations, including deleting the negative row and weakening Enforce->Audit. R-SEC-02 least-privilege-rbac (41 assertions): no wildcard apiGroup/resource/verb and no escalate|bind|impersonate in any in-repo Role/ClusterRole; no ServiceAccount bound to cluster-admin or a wildcard role; the conformance runner's own test identity is scoped and holds no rights over RBAC objects; the default-deny/host-namespace/egress-class policies Enforce and each carry a negative row. Proven against 6 injected violations. R-TEST-06 spec-immutability-enforced (16 assertions): drives the REAL ci/spec-immutability.sh against HERMETIC throwaway spec repos and asserts its exit code in every state — clean-at-pin 0, edits under docs/ or decisions/ 1, untracked addition 1, unadopted drift 1, explicit pin bump 0, ABSENT spec repo 3 (honest skip, never green), unpinned SPEC_PIN 1 — plus that gate.sh sets BLOCK=1 on its failure, so the mechanism is load-bearing. The real spec repo is never written to. Each check documents what it does NOT cover (runtime decryption, git history, runtime least-privilege, branch protection) rather than overclaiming. status.py now reads check.sh too, so a placeholder L0 body still outranks an `executable: true` annotation. Coverage 37/51 -> 40/51 (11 gaps); executable tests 32 -> 35; scaffold-only stays 5 — no sixth scaffold was added. Serves: R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02, R-TEST-01..06. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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9f59c36000 |
feat(ansible): node_health role — read-only hardware health for prod + dev nodes
Operator ask: implement the roles needed to check prod node hardware health, and run them to find out our state. This is that role; the run's findings are below. roles/node_health is a read-only sibling to cluster_verify (cluster health vs hardware health), styled after node_baseline. One unprivileged collector script does the work in a single SSH round trip — reading /sys/class/dmi, thermal + hwmon, EDAC, cpufreq + thermal_throttle, /proc/pressure, /sys/block incl. SCSI ioerr/iotmo counters, lsblk, lscpu, mounts + statvfs, per-NIC stats, resolv.conf. THE DESIGN POINT: an unreadable field is emitted as null WITH A RECORDED REASON, never as zero. The summary ends with a "NOT READ (and why) — these are UNKNOWNS, not passes" section. A fake zero on a reallocated-sector count is exactly the kind of false green this project refuses. 22 checks report PASS/WARN/FAIL/SKIP/INFO; every SKIP says why. Report-only by default; thresholds live in defaults/main.yml. Portable across bare metal AND VMs — validated against k3s-prod-1 (bare metal, no root) and k3s-dev-1 (VM, root). VM-absent things (SMART on virtio, coretemp, EDAC) skip cleanly, and iSCSI/Longhorn volumes are split out of the physical-disk set so a live replica is never mistaken for a spare device. playbooks/node-health.yml takes its target group as a variable (-e node_health_hosts= k3s_prod), deliberately unlike the other playbooks that hardcode k3s_servers — see the group-name gap already flagged in hosts.ini. Two become facts found the hard way and documented in the role: a group_vars `ansible_become: true` OUTRANKS `become: false` as a play/task keyword, so unprivileged tasks must override the variable; and `failed_when: false` does NOT catch "Missing sudo password" — only `ignore_errors` does. FIRST RUN, k3s-prod-1, 2026-08-31: 0 FAIL · 3 WARN · 12 PASS · 3 SKIP · 4 INFO. Box is healthy, cool and unstressed: i7-9700T 8C/8T, VT-x + /dev/kvm (KubeVirt OK), zero throttle events, hottest sensor 33C, PSI 0.00 across the board, 31.1 GiB RAM, eno1 up at 1000 Mb/s, BIOS R21 02.26.00, no reboot pending. DRIVE HEALTH IS STILL UNKNOWN — the headline. SMART did not run, blocked TWICE over: no vaulted ansible_become_password for prod, AND smartmontools is not on the node at all (node_baseline has never run there). Power-on hours, wear, reallocated/pending sectors and drive temperature all remain unmeasured on a ~2011 consumer SSD. WARNs: kernel ioerr_cnt=6 on sda (read cautiously — four freshly attached iSCSI disks on dev each showed a flat 7, suggesting a fixed per-device discovery cost, not media trouble; attribution needs dmesg/root); 0.95 GiB swap still active (node_baseline does the swapoff); one IPv4 resolver only (the other two upstreams are IPv6 Google), which refines rather than resolves the DNS-SPOF finding. ESCALATION — ECC status is UNKNOWABLE on this hardware: /sys/devices/system/edac/mc exists but no controller is bound. Non-ECC consumer RAM. Silent memory corruption on a prod node would be undetectable. Recorded as a SKIP with reason, not a pass. Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-OBS-04. Task: T-7.1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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677f9ea5f0 |
docs: CI is the enforcement point; local gate produced a FALSE GREEN
Operator directive: conformance and gates are enforced at the Gitea runner / CI-CD
level — use it. The authority on mergeability is the Actions run, not a local
`make -C ci gate`; local runs are a fast pre-check only.
Proven immediately on this branch. Same commit (
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